[7th EAI Academy] ② China's Global Strategy and the Future of the Korean Peninsula

YouTube Link: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=uoB11B2FPSM

Video Script

This is a transition. Welcome. Today's topic is China, and the title is rather grand: 'China's World Strategy.' Recently, interest in China has significantly waned, and people have even begun to strongly dislike China. As I will explain later, our EAI public opinion poll concluded that although people dislike China, relations with China are still important. In this regard, I believe continued study of China is necessary. What I want to focus on today is that extremely polarized views and debates about interpretations of China are prevalent domestically. My main aim today is to bring forth what China is trying to communicate, using China's own wording, and to collaboratively interpret what China intends to achieve. While there are various ways to interpret China, generally, the current discussions revolve around adopting the U.S. approach, or...

from the context of China as seen by the United States, which is facing challenges from China. However, as someone who studies China, I believe that by not starting from what China clearly asserts and claims, but by constantly trying to interpret China, there might be misunderstandings or distortions. Therefore, as I speak today, I will repeatedly mention Xi Jinping, whom you may dislike, and Wang Yi. You might think, 'He looks Chinese and only talks about China; is he pro-China?' However, I hope you will understand this from the perspective of looking at China differently. 'Pro-China' was not a bad expression at one time. For example, 'pro-Japan' carries some emotional baggage. 'Pro-China' didn't used to be like that. Just because we are friendly doesn't mean we don't look at facts, right? How about 'pro-China'?

China's World Strategy: 72 Years of History and Patterns

Pro-Japan, Pro-China. Lately, when someone says, 'That person is pro-China,' it seems to carry a somewhat negative sentiment. The most crucial point at this juncture is the perception that China is a country now challenging the United States. So, what strategy does this challenging China possess? And can China truly replace the United States and bring about a new change to the world order that has been led by the U.S. until now? That is the question. Therefore, in looking at China's world strategy, I intend to briefly explain the trend of its 72-year history since its founding, if possible. By observing this trend, we can discover certain patterns and, through them, gain insights into China's future strategies. Thus, I will begin by interpreting China's discourse, specifically 'Chinese characteristics' as China always refers to it. Based on that, I will then examine China's perceptions and policies regarding the future of the Korean Peninsula. China undeniably remains a significant player in Korean Peninsula issues.

Let's move on. Briefly, China's foreign policy strategy, coincidentally, undergoes major trends, diplomatic discourse, and diplomatic visions roughly every decade. In the 1970s, it began advocating anti-hegemonism. The meaning of anti-hegemonism is opposition to hegemony, and hegemony seems to be a very ideological concept. The 1970s were an ideologically driven Cold War era, but in reality, delving into the content reveals that the target of hegemony was a threat to China's absolute security, and hegemony itself is important.

At that time, China was in a hostile relationship with both the U.S. and the Soviet Union, facing absolute security threats. Although the diplomatic ideology might seem like a staged rhetoric, it contained the meaning of protecting China's security. However, in the early to mid-1970s, as relations with the United States began to improve, the absolute security threat was largely resolved. Based on that, as you well know, Deng Xiaoping emerged and initiated the reform and opening-up policy. Economic development, rather than security, began to become the top priority. In line with this, China first proposed a foreign policy strategy of 'independent and autonomous diplomacy.' This was the first time it was named as a diplomatic line: 'independent and autonomous diplomacy.' As you know, Deng Xiaoping is synonymous with opening up. However, for a country that is opening up to simultaneously advocate for independence and autonomy might seem contradictory. The reason is that opening up was so desperately needed, and this was a way to resolve potential internal identity debates that could arise from opening up, serving as a form of justification.

We will conduct diplomacy independently and autonomously. Isn't that what all countries do? Diplomacy is fundamentally conducted to achieve independence and autonomy. The reason for explicitly naming it as a diplomatic line was to pursue the reform and opening-up policy more actively, while ensuring that China's independence and autonomy would not be compromised. In the 1990s, China began to use the term 'great power' for the first time. However, at that time, China seemed to want to emphasize 'responsibility' rather than 'great power' when using the term 'responsible great power.' This is because, as China focused on its reform and opening-up policy in the 1980s, it became increasingly reliant on international cooperation. Consequently, China actively participated in international economic organizations. As you can see, it joined almost all major international economic organizations in the 1980s, such as the IMF, World Bank, ADB, and GATT (predecessor to the WTO). However, it only participated in economic organizations.

This led to criticism of China as a 'free rider,' a country that only sought benefits without fulfilling its obligations and responsibilities within international organizations. Therefore, in the 1990s, China began to use the expression 'we will fulfill our responsibilities.' Around that time, China also began participating in security and human rights-related international organizations that it had previously avoided, such as the ARF, CTBT, and various social and human rights covenants. You may recall that 1997 was a year of significant international shock.

This was the year of the Asian financial crisis. Until then, China had not played a major role, but it was perceived at the time as having played a role in preventing the crisis from worsening. Thus, the diplomatic vision and goal of 'responsible great power' were effectively utilized during that period. Then, in the 2000s, China began to use the term 'rise' (崛起, juéqǐ). For a while, the media struggled to find a suitable Korean translation, asking, 'What does 'juéqǐ' mean?' It translates to 'to rise abruptly' or 'to stand tall.' However, what China actually wanted to convey was not just 'rise' but 'peace.' That is, from the 1990s onwards, China began to be perceived as a threat and a challenge to the international community as it grew. To counter this, China sought to convey that 'we are rising, but we are doing so peacefully, and therefore we are not a threat.'

This was the message China aimed to convey. However, the expression 'peaceful rise' (和平崛起, hépíng juéqǐ) immediately sparked controversy, with some interpreting it as China beginning to flex its muscles and pose a threat. Consequently, this expression became obsolete within a year. In 2004, it was replaced by the term 'peaceful development' (和平发展, hépíng fāzhǎn). Regardless, since the 1990s, and particularly since the late 1990s, China has played an increasingly important role in the international community, participating in international organizations, and achieving nearly double-digit economic growth (around 10%) which garnered international attention. On the other hand, to avoid being perceived as a threat, China began using terms like 'responsibility' and 'peace.'

Furthermore, in the current Xi Jinping era, China has begun to use the term 'great power diplomacy with Chinese characteristics.' Looking at the trend of participation in international organizations, China was initially exclusive and opposed to most organizations before the UN. In the 1980s, it participated selectively in economic organizations aligned with its development strategy. In the 1990s, it progressively began participating in security and human rights-related international organizations, signaling its intention to become a 'responsible great power.' Entering the 21st century, China has evolved to the stage of creating international organizations, even naming them after Chinese cities.

During the Xi Jinping era, China has begun to establish new international orders. While the period up to the early 21st century saw China participating within the existing international order to expand its benefits and increase its voice, the Xi Jinping era has seen the creation of alternative institutions and organizations. Representative examples include the AIIB and NDB. Consequently, the expression 'great power diplomacy with Chinese characteristics' during the Xi Jinping era has led to the perception that China is moving beyond merely participating in and contributing to the existing order, and is instead expanding its intentions to create a new, Chinese-style order. In essence, looking at the broad sweep of China's 70-year history, the trend is clear: China is expanding. Its role in international organizations is growing, its voice is becoming louder, and its vision is increasingly globalized. This trend is particularly evident during the Xi Jinping era. There has been a significant shift in this trajectory.

This is summarized in a table that was distributed, which I have just explained. With the advent of the Xi Jinping era, particularly his second term which began in 2013 and is now entering its third term, the foreign policy agenda presented at the beginning of each year in 2020, 2021, and 2022 reveals a certain pattern. The foreign policy agenda presented first each year consistently includes 'domestic development.' Although not explicitly stated in 2021, another continuously emphasized aspect is 'national interests,' or so-called 'core interests.' Broadly, there are two main points consistently emphasized in China's foreign policy agenda: China's development and its core interests. The core interests are clearly defined in the 2022 agenda as sovereignty, security, and development interests. While referred to as 'core interests,' they are essentially fundamental interests. These are the most basic interests of a state. Paradoxically, this implies that China is still unable to protect even its basic national interests, particularly concerning sovereignty, security, and development, and is focusing on safeguarding them.

Diplomatic Challenges and China's Great Power Diplomacy in the Xi Jinping Era

In this context, a crucial element China emphasizes is the 'reform of the global governance system.' China believes that the current global governance system needs reform because it does not align with China's national interests and is ill-fitting for China. The global governance system, as it is, was created under U.S. leadership to serve U.S. interests. Therefore, reform is necessary to align with the changed international order. While in 2021 the tone was 'proactive participation,' by 2022 it shifted to 'active leadership,' implying a move beyond participation to taking the lead. This subtle but significant change in wording is crucial for understanding China. While those who do not observe continuously might see China's statements as typical or stereotypical, repeating the same things without apparent change, researchers actively seek out these subtle shifts. These shifts reveal China's intentions and are evident in the content of the annual foreign policy agendas.

Furthermore, last year, the Central Foreign Affairs Work Conference was held. This conference convenes every five years and sets the broad direction for China's foreign policy strategy over the next five years. It is attended by Xi Jinping and the seven members of the Politburo Standing Committee, the top leadership of China, making it significant. The notable aspect of the conference held at the end of 2023 is that since the 2000s, a certain paradigm has been forming in Chinese foreign policy. This paradigm involves broadly categorizing diplomatic targets into four groups: great powers, neighboring countries, developing countries, and multilateral forums. At each stage, China prioritizes relationships with certain countries and focuses its diplomacy accordingly. While all four categories are important, the conference specifies which country relationships will be prioritized. For example, the Central Foreign Affairs Work Conference in 2014 prioritized 'neighborhood diplomacy.'

Neighborhood diplomacy is indeed very important for China. Yes. Some people may find the term 'neighborhood diplomacy' disagreeable, thinking, 'Isn't that too Sinocentric? Does China consider itself the center and everything else its neighborhood?' There is room for such interpretation due to China's historical Sinocentric worldview. In the past, during the imperial era, this tendency was evident, as China maintained a hierarchical international order through the tributary system. However, couldn't 'neighborhood' be understood as a common noun? From our perspective, if we place ourselves at the center, aren't China and other countries our neighbors?

One could express it that way. In any case, China uses the term 'neighborhood' in this context. China borders more countries than any other nation in the world. How many countries do you think it shares borders with? Twenty-five? That's a high estimate. I thought it was fewer. Oh, that's not right. There are many. You're starting with such a high number. If we consider only land borders, it's 14 countries. If we include maritime borders, it's 20 countries. Isn't 20 countries a lot? When I say 20, people might think, 'Oh, only that many?' However, it is the most in the world. Later, when you go home, look at a map. Surrounded by so many countries, having many neighboring countries can actually be beneficial for national development, as potential partners are concentrated nearby.

However, historically and currently, there are virtually no countries among China's neighbors that China can truly trust or consider friendly. Who do you think they are? The country closest to China? Perhaps Pakistan. Pakistan. Out of 25 countries, if you search with a magnifying glass, it's probably Pakistan. Some might mention North Korea. We will discuss North Korea later when we talk about the Korean Peninsula. North Korea is also ambiguous. Ambiguous. In any case, the neighborhood is extremely important. In fact, for China to go global, its neighborhood must first be managed. Without managing its neighborhood, globalization is practically impossible. In this regard, it is starkly contrasted with the United States. The U.S. continent is, in a sense, a natural fortress, surrounded by oceans on both sides, with Canada to the north and Mexico to the south. While there are complex situations in South America, the U.S. does not share borders with directly hostile nations.

Therefore, in 2014, neighborhood diplomacy was prioritized. At the foreign affairs work conference in 2018, 'great power diplomacy' was prioritized. Here, 'great power diplomacy' ultimately refers to the United States. Then, in 2023, neither great powers, neighbors, developing countries, nor multilateral forums were specifically prioritized. There was a shift from the existing paradigm. China presented its 'Global Initiative.' Instead of designating specific targets for diplomatic cooperation, China presented its vision for the globe. Countries that do something like this are often called superpowers or great powers, like the United States. In October 2013, Xi Jinping stated the need for a new relationship with the world. The content, as you can see here, is as follows: a peaceful world, multipolarity and globalization, and open, inclusive, and comprehensive economic globalization. These two were the core elements: multipolarity and globalization. These are the core contents. One of the implementations is what is currently referred to as Xi Jinping's 'building of a modern country with Chinese characteristics.'

Creating a favorable long-term environment for this is a very familiar expression. This is a continuation of the domestic development strategy mentioned in 2020, contributing to China's domestic development, and the reference to the 2022 Beijing Winter Olympics. It includes fostering an international environment conducive to domestic development, under the premise that 'diplomacy is an extension of domestic affairs.' With these changes, summarizing the evolution of China's world strategy, the patterns and characteristics observed over the past 70 years are as follows: The overarching trend is that China's national strength has increased, and in line with this increase, it has gradually begun to participate in the international system and expand its influence. Before joining the UN in 1971, China was a country that resisted the existing international order. Then, with the consolidation of reform and opening-up in the 1980s, it began selective participation, primarily in economic fields. By the 1990s, it advocated for the 'responsible great power' theory and initiated comprehensive participation. In the 21st century, China led international participation, even playing a leading role in the Six-Party Talks on the North Korean nuclear issue. During the Xi Jinping era, it began creating entities like the AIIB and NDB. Thus, it has maintained a gradual development.

China's Global Initiatives and Attempts to Create a New Order

Thus, in 2014, the focus was on peripheral diplomacy, and at the 2018 Foreign Affairs Working Conference, 'major power diplomacy' was prioritized. Major power diplomacy here ultimately refers to the United States. Then, in 2023, neither major powers, peripheral nations, developing countries, nor multilateralism were the focus. A paradigm shift occurred from the existing framework. China proposed its 'Global Initiative.' Instead of designating specific targets as important cooperative partners in diplomacy, China presented its vision for the globe. Nations that engage in such actions are perceived by us as superpowers and great powers. In October 2013, Xi Jinping stated the need to build new relations with the world. The content, as seen here, is as follows: a peaceful world, multipolarization and globalization, and an open, inclusive, and comprehensive economic globalization. These two were the core elements: multipolarization and globalization. These are the essential contents. One of the implementations is the so-called Xi Jinping's 'Chinese modernization construction'.

creating a favorable long-term environment for development is a very familiar expression. This is an extension of the domestic development strategy mentioned earlier in 2020, namely contributing to China's domestic development, and continues to the mention of the 2022 Beijing Winter Olympics. It includes the objective of creating a favorable international environment conducive to domestic development, within the framework of the proposition that 'diplomacy is an extension of domestic affairs.' With these changes, summarizing the patterns and characteristics of China's world strategy evolution, as explained so far over the 70-year period, is as follows. The overarching trend is that China's national strength has been increasing, and in accordance with this increase in national strength, it has gradually begun to participate in the international system and expand its influence. Prior to joining the UN in 1971, China was a country that resisted the existing international order. Then, with the consolidation of reform and opening up in the 1980s, it began selective participation, primarily confined to the economic sphere, and by the 1990s, it had become a responsible great power.

advocated for comprehensive participation. In the 21st century, China has led international engagement, even taking the initiative in the Six-Party Talks on the North Korean nuclear issue. Under the Xi Jinping administration, initiatives like the AIIB began to emerge. Thus, a gradual development has been sustained. Observing this trajectory, one wonders about the next stage. It is clear that the Xi Jinping era has seen China adopt a highly assertive diplomatic strategy, sparking debates about whether it aims to create a new order. However, China's objective is not truly reform or an alternative.

It is not a replacement, nor is it about creating or replacing a new order, but rather about complementing the existing order and offering alternatives. At the time, the AIIB garnered significant attention. One might question why the AIIB was established when the Asian Development Bank (ADB) already existed, but the AIIB's creation attracted considerable attention and popularity. However, looking at its current development, the distinction between the ADB and AIIB is unclear, and the AIIB seems to be benchmarking and cooperating with the ADB. In other words, it doesn't feel entirely new. It's a conservative approach to the existing order, akin to renovating an apartment rather than rebuilding it. Yet, the international community suggests China will not stop here. Following this trend, the next stage may involve China proposing alternatives or reforms, rather than...

a complete reconstruction. Over the past 70 years, China has undergone a phased development. The target year for China's domestic development vision of becoming a 'moderately prosperous society in all respects' is 2049, the 100th anniversary of the founding of the People's Republic of China. Approximately 25 years remain. If we consider China's world strategy trend beyond these 25 years, it is possible that a reconstruction could occur then. Of course, many changes will need to happen in the interim. The biggest prerequisite is the continuation of the remarkable and rapid growth that China has shown over the past 70 years, or the past 40 years since reform and opening-up. Additionally, the United States would need to decline more rapidly than it is now. However, the situation in the Xi Jinping era

presents very challenging proposals. Since the advent of the Xi Jinping era, China's economic growth rate has sharply declined, and some are even talking about 'Peak China,' suggesting that China's rise is over. Therefore, it is highly questionable whether China can continue on this path. Secondly, it is undeniable that China has continued to rise and expand its role accordingly. However, to date, China has grown strictly within the framework of the existing international system and order. China has never stated that it needs to change the existing order, nor has it taken actions to do so. China has spoken of 'anti-hegemony,' 'independence,' 'autonomy,' 'responsible great power,' and 'peaceful rise,' and 'great power diplomacy with Chinese characteristics.' Examining the content of these statements reveals that China's intention is to protect its security for the realization of its national strength and prosperity, to avoid external interference in its internal affairs, and to participate more actively in the international community.

to take responsibility. Furthermore, China believed it needed to persuade the international community that its rise would not pose a threat to neighboring countries or others, but would proceed peacefully. I believe that China's 'great power diplomacy with Chinese characteristics' ultimately stems from a sense of crisis, a fear that if it does not circumvent or delay facing the challenge of the so-called 'Thucydides Trap,' the tragedy of great powers, its growth may stagnate. However, the international community questions whether China is solely focused on 'independent great power,' 'rising great power,' and 'diplomacy.' There are undoubtedly significant changes occurring within this trend, especially during the Xi Jinping era. It is not the case that Xi Jinping is the sole reason why our country and the international community have come to dislike China. During the Xi Jinping era, there have been numerous changes in diplomatic discourse. Firstly, there is an abundance of visions and

Excess and Characteristics of Diplomatic Discourse in the Xi Jinping Era

discourses. For example, the content from 2010 includes 'peaceful rise' and 'peaceful development.' During the Xi Jinping era, an overwhelming number of discourses have been introduced, making it difficult to list them all. These include 'new type of international relations,' 'community of shared future for mankind,' 'reform of the global governance system,' 'global development initiative,' 'global development initiative,' 'global security initiative,' and 'global civilization initiative.' There are even books published in China interpreting these concepts. Why is this happening? The term 'peaceful rise' also exists. The content of these concepts is very complex. For instance, the 'community of shared future for mankind' will be explained later.

The content of that will also be explained later. One characteristic is the interpretation that the discourse is becoming excessive, to the point of being considered overabundant. Another characteristic is that, as mentioned earlier, concepts like 'independence,' 'autonomy,' 'responsible great power,' and 'peaceful rise' emerged after China had already begun its rise, aiming to persuade the international community that its rise would not be a threat or challenge. However, during the Xi Jinping era, China preemptively presents its future plans. This was not the case before. While there was evolution, the previous statements were framed within the context of 'we will try to evolve' or 'our growth will be peaceful.' In contrast, the Xi Jinping era has seen China proactively presenting its future intentions. Therefore, it is clear that the Xi Jinping era is very different from the preceding period. China has now become a country that draws its own picture and presents its blueprint.

Instead of responding to, adapting to, and complying with changes in the international community, much like Trump's 'America First,' Xi Jinping's so-called 'great power diplomacy with Chinese characteristics' is not 'China First,' nor is it a 'global vision' or 'global blueprint.' The term 'global' appears frequently, as seen in the aforementioned GDI, GSI, and GNI. Examining the content reveals terms like 'community of shared future for mankind,' 'new type of international relations,' and 'new type of great power relations.' The underlying message is an attempt to create an international environment conducive to China's rise and its continued ascent. For instance, the expression 'new type of international relations' signifies that great power politics should not be the norm. It aims to counter U.S. unilateralism and hegemonic politics. China asserts that it must prevent U.S. interference in its affairs. China needs to create an environment and conditions that allow it to grow while maintaining its unique socialist one-party system.

This is the necessity. The 'new type of great power relations' is similar. In the old model of great power relations, great power politics often led to inevitable war during power transitions. China, however, wishes to avoid this. This is because China can only grow by avoiding such conflicts. Like many countries in history that challenged the U.S. and failed, China wants to avoid this. Or, it wants to delay such a situation until it has grown, perhaps until 2049. The recently introduced concepts like GDI, GSI, and GNI are also similar. Global development signifies that China's rise is not a threat. GSI, the Global Security Initiative, opposes bloc confrontation and the Cold War through cooperative security. Opposing the Cold War is crucial from China's perspective. Recall the North Korea-China relationship later. GCI, the Global Civilization Initiative, emphasizes the importance of growth. In fact, the U.S.-China competition is not only a strategic and economic competition but also, in part, a competition of civilizations and races. Jokingly, on a common-sense level, the reason why Americans perceive Chinese people as more threatening than they might be, and feel fear, is rooted in the idea that 'we can never imagine losing to China and becoming a second-rate country.'

That seems plausible. China's rise is historically unique. In modern history, there are no instances of non-Western countries becoming superpowers. China, though not yet considered a developed country, is rising to the ranks of great powers. There are few cases of non-Western countries approaching hegemonic status. While Japan existed, it did not achieve the same level of growth as China. There are also no instances of non-white nations becoming hegemonic powers. In this context, from the U.S. perspective, it inherited hegemony from Britain. It won the competition for hegemony, and that power transition, unlike most historical power transitions, occurred without war. When explained intuitively, similarities in race and civilization are often cited.

That seems plausible. China's rise is historically unique. In modern history, there are no instances of non-developed nations becoming superpowers. China is difficult to classify as a developed country, yet it is ascending to the ranks of great powers. It is also rare for non-Western countries to approach hegemonic status. While Japan was an exception, it did not grow as much as China. There are also no instances of non-white nations becoming hegemonic powers. In this context, from the U.S. perspective, the U.S. inherited hegemony from Britain. It is said that the transfer of power, which was a rare event in the history of hegemonic competition, occurred without war. When explaining intuitively, similarities in race and civilization are often discussed.

However, a power transition from China to the United States would be an absolutely unacceptable change in that context. Therefore, China seems to place great importance on tolerance and diversity of civilizations. To digress slightly, there is the expression 'community of shared future for mankind.' This expression is essentially the diplomatic vision and discourse that China, under Xi Jinping, is promoting. What are your feelings about this expression? Does it resonate with you? Is it a good expression? If we set aside its inherent implications, purposes, and intentions, and focus solely on the expression itself, the headline is crucial when we write a thesis or a newspaper article. In a way, this is the headline of the Xi Jinping era.

That seems to be the case. Xi Jinping includes this term in almost all his speeches, in some form. How do you feel about it? China has historically pursued non-alignment... Please don't try to refute it now... Yes, that seems to be the intention. However, doesn't the expression itself feel like asking someone, 'Will you share your destiny with me?' What China is trying to convey, according to its interpretation, is 'There is me in you, and you in me.' In other words, China's development will be an opportunity for other countries, not a threat.

The Belt and Road Initiative and China's Diplomatic Strategy for Modernization

This is what it intended to convey. But is that expression truly persuasive? As China rises, neighboring countries feel fear, vigilance, and concern, yet China urges them to see its rise as an opportunity. When this expression first appeared, it was translated into English as 'comity with common destiny.' Perhaps due to controversy, it has now been changed to 'shared future for mankind.' Westerners might see this and think, 'That's a good expression; it means sharing the future.' However, in Chinese characters, it is still 'minggongti.' Especially for Koreans or those who use Chinese characters, doesn't the term 'destiny' imply a very close, trusting, and loving relationship? Even when I expressed my feelings to Chinese scholars, they seemed to agree but did not change it. However, the English translation was changed. The term 'One Belt One Road' was also initially 'One Belt One Road.' Now it is BRI (Belt and Road Initiative). Some interpret the omission of 'One' as significant. It used to be 'One Belt, One Road,' but now it has been expanded globally, hence the name change. However, I personally focus on the word 'Initiative.' Initially, 'strategy' was used frequently. In this context, China's initial Belt and Road was considered a development strategy. However, this might take too long to explain. The Belt and Road Initiative was a development strategy, but what differentiated it from previous development strategies was the promise to build infrastructure in neighboring countries. This requires the consent of neighboring countries. Therefore, it cannot proceed without their agreement. Consequently, persuading neighboring countries

has become a crucial issue. To emphasize the meaning of 'this is not about pursuing my own interests, but a proposal for cooperation with you,' the term 'Initiative' was likely chosen. It was a toning down. However, the Belt and Road Initiative originated as a development strategy to secure new growth engines for China, meaning it was intended to enhance China's interests. From 1978 to the mid-2000s, China consistently pursued an export-led economic growth strategy. However, this strategy reached its limits. Consequently, China began to create a domestic real estate bubble to fuel its growth. But the bubble began to deflate. Seeking a way to utilize the excess capacity and materials accumulated while anticipating the real estate bubble, China decided to look overseas, utilizing overseas infrastructure construction to deploy these materials and labor, thereby finding a new growth model. This is how the Belt and Road Initiative is interpreted. However, as it did not proceed smoothly, it was rebranded as an 'Initiative,' and now it has shifted to a foreign policy strategy.

It has largely transformed into a foreign policy strategy, facing criticism for causing debt traps in neighboring countries, leading to losses even when spending money. The reason for discussing this is that, upon closer examination, the visions of the Xi Jinping era, while distinct, are not significantly different in content from previous ones. The objective has been to create an external environment conducive to China's development. However, it seems questionable whether China is successfully presenting global discourses or blueprints that can garner international support and voluntary promotion, and that the international community can agree upon.

Whether it is failing to do so or not is debatable. However, in my opinion, it is not succeeding. It seems to remain focused solely on the goal of achieving national prosperity and strength through 'China First.' Isn't leadership about that? Logically, a leader must present a vision for how they will develop the organization, country, and society. They must ask for support and votes. One cannot become a leader by merely explaining how well they will live. It's not enough to say, 'I will live well.' However, what China is currently doing, although it appears to be a global discourse, seems to be confined to the idea of 'I will live well. I will continue to create an environment where I can live well.' If so, doesn't this indicate certain limitations for China? Although its physical size is growing, there are structural limitations. These are structural limitations. China still requires a significant amount of time and

space to achieve great power status. Currently, it is considered number two, but the economic gap is widening, making it difficult to surpass the United States. Growth is important. For a country with complex borders like China, stabilizing its surrounding regions is crucial for growth. China's growth is inevitable, as it has been in the past and will be in the future. As China advocates for openness, international cooperation is an important aspect. It cannot grow amidst international opposition, vetoes, and resistance. However, on the other hand, China still faces the challenge of protecting its core interests.

and space. Currently, it is considered number two, but the economic gap is widening, making growth important. For a country with complex borders like China, stabilizing its surrounding regions is crucial. Yes, and China's growth is inevitable, as it has been in the past and will be in the future. As China advocates for openness, international cooperation is an important aspect. Yes, it cannot grow amidst international opposition, vetoes, and resistance. However, on the other hand, China still faces the challenge of protecting its core interests.

China's Core Interests and Vulnerabilities

Most of what is perceived as threatening about China stems from what China claims as its core interests. Because these interests are perceived as infringing upon our core interests, we become assertive. The international community perceives China as inherently assertive. Issues such as Taiwan, the South China Sea, the Senkaku Islands dispute with Japan, and the North Korean issue are all matters of sovereignty and territory that China considers non-negotiable bottom lines.

Normally, strong powers do not draw red lines. In elementary school, when teachers paired students, there was a boy who deliberately pushed his desk towards his female classmate's desk because he liked her. Then the girl would draw a line, saying, 'If you cross this, I'll prick your finger.'

Then the boy would say, 'Try it,' and cross the line. The girl would then prick her finger. However, in most cases, the boy would back down slightly and redraw the line. In other words, a red line presupposes a situation where one can be pricked or forced to retreat. If the United States were to use force against Taiwan, which China claims as its core interest, would China go to war with the United States?

No. This reveals China's vulnerability. Furthermore, Taiwan, Xinjiang, Tibet, and Hong Kong demonstrate that China is an immature great power that has not yet fully established the basic sovereign system of a modern state. Regardless of who the president is, it is difficult for Xi Jinping to concede on these issues. Having already fostered patriotism and nationalism within China, if Xi Jinping were to concede on the Taiwan issue, it would inflict significant damage on his regime. Moreover, the complex sentiments of neighboring countries must also be considered. In any case, China has its limitations. There is only 10 minutes left.

Therefore, President Xi Jinping's global discourse is for domestic consumption, and domestic development is the top priority. Recently, China has been emphasizing 'new quality productive forces' and 'high-quality development.' These phrases leave room for interpretation, providing livelihoods for people like me. In simple terms, it means achieving technological self-reliance through innovation in cutting-edge technologies to revitalize the Chinese economy, but this will take a very long time.

There is ongoing debate about whether China can achieve independent technological self-reliance, especially with the U.S. strictly controlling advanced technologies and trade. China occasionally surprises the world, such as when its lunar probe 'Chang'e' sent back the first photos of the far side of the moon, or when Huawei, a target of U.S. sanctions, suddenly released a new smartphone. However, as former Premier Li Keqiang stated, 'It will take a very long time, like an artisan sharpening a sword for ten years to make a fine blade,' implying that achieving technological self-reliance will be a lengthy process.

It is uncertain whether China can achieve technological self-reliance solely through its own efforts without relying on technology transfer, but in the context of U.S.-China competition, China has no other choice. To achieve this, it must concentrate domestic resources on domestic development and maintain low-cost relationships externally. In its strategy towards the U.S., there has recently been mention of the 'three principles and five non-preferences.' Specifically, the 'five non-preferences' include no new Cold War, no change in China's system, no opposition to China through alliances, no pursuit of Taiwan's independence, and no conflict with China.

This message conveys that if China's vulnerable points are not touched, cooperation based on mutual respect, peace, and coexistence is possible. However, the content of the 'five non-preferences' sounds desperate, demanding no attempts to change China's system, maintenance of the Xi Jinping regime, non-interference in the Taiwan issue, and restraint in pressuring China through alliance consolidation.

Whether this sounds desperate from an empathetic perspective is debatable, but from the standpoint of a superpower like the U.S., such demands might seem somewhat peculiar. However, China appears to be seeking to buy time. The U.S., fearing that China might overtake it if given more time, believes it cannot afford to grant it. Conversely, China states that it does not intend to surpass the U.S. Whether this statement can be trusted is questionable. In any case, China remains in a defensive position against U.S. pressure, a situation that has persisted for over 70 years. Ultimately, if the U.S. does not touch upon China's vulnerabilities, China will not challenge the U.S.

In the case of the Taiwan issue, it is rare for China to be the instigator. If the U.S. encourages Taiwan's independence or strengthens its military support, China views this as an infringement of its sovereignty and territory and responds accordingly. This pattern has led to the escalation of the Taiwan issue. However, when tensions rise, the U.S., China, and Taiwan all revert to maintaining the status quo.

Structural Problems and Geopolitical Implications of South Korea-China Relations

The Taiwan issue is ultimately an intractable problem, and the U.S., China, and Taiwan are all aware of this. Taiwan's subjugation to China or its complete independence is realistically impossible. Next, let's examine the South Korea-China relationship. According to public opinion polls, 70% of Koreans dislike China, yet over 80% still consider the relationship important.

This indicates a difficult challenge: 'How to maintain relations with a country we dislike?' It's akin to having to work with someone you dislike in a social setting. The South Korea-China relationship is more serious because it is a matter of structure, not emotion. Since the 2000s, as China's rise began, the South Korea-China relationship has gradually deteriorated, which was realistically confirmed through the THAAD conflict. Our diplomacy towards China has essentially been subordinate to our North Korea policy.

Chinese scholars have described this as 'sleeping in the same bed but dreaming different dreams' (異床異夢). The key factor that confirmed the structural differences between South Korea and China was China's faster-than-expected rise. The most important variable is geopolitics.

When considering the South Korea-China relationship, exchanges or leader-level contacts are secondary issues. Geopolitics has an absolute impact on the South Korea-China relationship. From China's perspective, from the Qing dynasty to the Sino-Japanese War, the Second Sino-Japanese War, and the Korean War, all were processes of power transition. The world we live in today is also undergoing a process of power transition, which is an uncommon experience. We are living at a historical juncture, an experience that will provide important stories for future generations.

The process of U.S.-China conflict has repeatedly turned the Korean Peninsula into a battlefield during periods of power transition. China, having experienced this, considers its relationship with South Korea not because it favors North Korea, but for geopolitical reasons. President Xi Jinping stated, 'South Korea and China are neighbors who cannot move away,' but one might wish they could, like countries along the Mediterranean coast of Europe. Our ancestors maintained our nation in the harsh and difficult Korean Peninsula. However, we are once again facing new crises.

The representative conflict cases between South Korea and China, such as the Cheonan sinking, the shelling of Yeonpyeong Island, and the deployment of THAAD, are all structural issues that stem from U.S.-China competition and North Korea's provocations. North Korea's provocations instantly escalate into a U.S.-China competition issue, which is the destiny of the Korean Peninsula. Therefore, there is a reason to manage North Korea's provocations.

The THAAD conflict also arose due to North Korea's nuclear test, but it quickly escalated into a U.S.-China issue with the entry of U.S. aircraft carriers. In the future, North Korea's provocations are likely to unfold in the context of U.S.-China competition. While the negative sentiment of Koreans towards China may be fluid, the deterioration of the relationship is a structural issue. Therefore, in a situation where cooperation with neighboring countries is inevitable, emotions should not be neglected.

In 2013, then-Vice President Biden told South Korea to 'choose your side wisely.' At that time, South Korea was seeking to strengthen its relationship with China by joining the AIIB, attending China's Victory Day parade, and concluding an FTA. Ten years later, then-Chinese Ambassador to South Korea, Xing Haiming, told South Korea not to 'bet on China's defeat.' This is the reality facing South Korea. The South Korean public's opinion supports neutrality, making a wise choice.

It should be fluid and subject to change, so there's no need to take it too seriously. However, the reason for the deterioration lies entirely in structural issues, not just emotions. Therefore, we must be very vigilant. If we neglect these worsening emotions, we face the challenge of how to resolve a situation where we must continue to dislike a neighboring country with whom cooperation is inevitable. There was a record, and this was meant to be a passing observation, but there was exactly a 10-year difference. In 2013, Biden visited and spoke about 'betting.' He said, 'Choose your side wisely.' At that time, President Park Geun-hye was seeking to join the AIIB, attend China's Victory Day parade, and conclude an FTA with China, prompting the U.S. to pressure South Korea by saying, 'Bet wisely.' He acted very friendly, holding hands tightly, but spoke harshly. Exactly 10 years later, this is a very recent event that you all know well. He has now finished his term and returned. Xing Haiming met with our Foreign Ministry representative

and said, 'Bet wisely.' I have intentionally used the exact wording, but the wording differs slightly. Biden told us to side with the U.S. I don't know if Xing Haiming remembered or knew about our situation from 10 years ago. I don't know, but he said, 'Don't bet on China's defeat. Side with China.' It has been somewhat expanded, but the original wording was something like, 'Don't bet on China's downfall. We won't fall.' This is the reality facing South Korea. South Korea's choice, based on public opinion polls, is surprisingly wise. The public supports neutrality.

South Korea-China Relations Mired in North Korea Diplomacy

Recently, the proportion of neutral opinions has been decreasing, likely related to anti-China sentiment. The neutral opinion, which had constituted 60-70% for a considerable period, has begun to decline. Finally, amidst the ongoing North Korean issue, it is no exaggeration to say that our diplomacy with China over the past 32 years has essentially been focused on North Korean nuclear diplomacy. Given the advancement of North Korea's nuclear capabilities, our diplomacy with China can only be deemed a failure. Since the establishment of diplomatic ties between South Korea and China in 1992, sanctions against North Korea have been in place since 1993. From the outset of diplomatic relations, the North Korean issue and the North Korean nuclear issue have been the most critical issues in South Korea-China diplomacy. Nevertheless, one of the significant reasons for the current state of South Korea-China relations is that our diplomacy with China has been excessively preoccupied with North Korea diplomacy. Examining our foreign policy reveals a lack of strategic consideration for South Korea-China relations. In the initial phase, South Korea-China relations developed by leaps and bounds.

The development of South Korea-China relations over the past 20 years can be seen as a natural progression driven by economic logic. As a neighboring great power rapidly grew, it aligned with our export strategy, leading to rapid growth within a complementary relationship. There were no particular policy efforts. Our policy was to hope that China would play a role in the North Korean issue. Ultimately, it was to ask China to exert influence over North Korea to abandon its nuclear weapons, and furthermore, to help North Korea collapse so that unification could occur. While there were no significant differences between progressive and conservative governments, the direction differed. Conservative governments invariably pursued a policy of pressure and containment towards North Korea. They were ultimately convinced that if China locked the back door, North Korea would collapse. This explains why President Park Geun-hye focused on relations with China. The same applies to President Lee Myung-bak.

Progressive governments did the opposite. Because their policy towards North Korea was one of engagement, there were areas of policy convergence with China. Therefore, relations with China were not as important; rather, persuading the United States was crucial. By focusing on improving North Korea-US relations, they sought to cooperate with China to lead North Korea towards openness. In any case, I wonder if our unilateral China diplomacy has been conducted to realize our intentions without deeply considering China's intentions towards China. China still claims, as if playing a recording, that it will play a constructive role, but we do not believe so. I believe the difference arises from the gap between our goals and intentions and what China intends to do. China believes it has acted, but we believe China has also acted. This is what China has done.

China's Strategy for Maintaining the North Korean Regime and Summit Diplomacy

There are cases from 1994, 2018, 2019, 2013, and 2017. There are two major commonalities. 1994, 2018, and 2019 were periods when China played a role and took action. The most representative manifestation of China's concern about being bypassed in Korean Peninsula affairs was in 2018. In 2018, inter-Korean and North Korea-US summits were held. President Xi Jinping is the only Chinese leader who has not visited North Korea in the seven years since he came to power. He is also the only leader to have visited South Korea before North Korea. President Xi Jinping summoned Kim Jong Un to China four times in succession in 2018. The implication was, 'Are you getting too close to the United States? Let's talk.' The cases of 2003 and 2017 have commonalities. China plays a role. The Six-Party Talks were also held. In 2017, China, more than the United States,

In cooperation with the United States, it quickly led to a high-intensity sanctions agreement. There are two commonalities. When the United States considers the possibility of a physical attack on North Korea, China acts first to prevent it. In other words, China plays a role when the North Korean regime is on the verge of collapse or when China's role and status on the Korean Peninsula are diminished. China considers this its constructive role. We need to understand what China is trying to do and what its interests are. Only then can we negotiate. We unconditionally say, 'Make North Korea abandon its nuclear weapons; can't you make it abandon its nuclear weapons?' but it doesn't seem to be the case. During President Park Geun-hye's administration, China supported our unification and made preparations.

No. Due to geopolitical variables, no matter how much China dislikes North Korea, it seems true that President Xi Jinping dislikes North Korea. However, this does not mean China will cause North Korea to collapse or abandon it. If there were a geopolitically feasible method, it would be the abolition of the South Korea-US alliance or the withdrawal of US Forces Korea. This is not my speculation but something the late Dr. Kissinger said last year. Kissinger's deal, after being so fond of deals for 70 years, he was still talking about a grand bargain for the Korean Peninsula before his death. This would be on the condition that the US withdraws from the Korean Peninsula and China dismantles North Korea's nuclear weapons. In reality, this is the only possible method, but it is also unrealistic. North Korea-China relations are a matter of absence.

What interests me regarding North Korea-China relations is summit diplomacy. This is because Chinese leaders can only meet if they visit a particular location. Nowadays, summit meetings often occur within the context of multilateral meetings, given the sheer number of them. North Korea-China summit meetings should ideally occur regularly, but this has not always been the case. There have been three instances: immediately after the establishment of diplomatic ties, and then after Xi Jinping came to power. There are clear signs of abnormality in North Korea-China relations since Xi Jinping's ascent. The reasons for the interruption immediately after the establishment of diplomatic ties are clear. Currently, the reasons are unknown, but summit meetings are not taking place. In 2019, North Korea's leader was invited four times, but for the past 4-5 years, there have been no summit meetings at all. Some are calling it Korean, but perhaps in my opinion, if President Xi Jinping were to visit South Korea, would you welcome him? It would be a snub. In any case, President Xi seems to fear that. The fear of not being welcomed. In any case,

If President Xi Jinping visits South Korea this time, I believe he will visit North Korea first. He will likely visit North Korea before coming to South Korea. President Xi Jinping has consistently participated in APEC next year. Therefore, he should come then. In that case, is there a possibility he will go to North Korea first? This is my personal speculation. In any case, there is significance to such summit meetings; there have been years with more than three meetings. There are exactly three such instances: around the Korean War, and in the 2000s, during the generational transition from Kim Jong Il to Kim Jong Un. At that time, we didn't know why they were meeting so frequently. Shortly after meeting three times, Kim Jong Il passed away. This relates to the issue of the third-generation succession and North Korea-US relations. Even from this, I think we can symbolically understand how China views North Korea. Thank you for your hard work.

The Sustainability of China's Distinct Great Power Diplomacy and the Design of South Korea-China Relations

Lee Dong-ryul, Director of the Center for Chinese Studies at EAI, points out that China, which has been expanding its influence within the existing international order, has reached a stage where it is presenting alternative international order discourses such as 'great power diplomacy with Chinese characteristics' and 'China First' during the Xi Jinping era. However, he explains that it is necessary to cautiously observe whether these discourses can gain universality in the international community, manage conflicts with neighboring countries, and control anti-China sentiment in the international community to be sustainable. The director diagnoses the deterioration of South Korea-China relations as a structural problem influenced by exogenous variables such as South Korea-US relations and the North Korean nuclear issue, emphasizing the need to simultaneously pursue short-term conflict resolution and mid-to-long-term relationship design between the two countries.

■ Lee Dong-ryul, Director of the China Research Center at the East Asia Institute, Professor of Chinese Language and Literature at Dongduk Women's University.