[7th EAI Academy] ① The Future of U.S. International Leadership and the Advent of a Multipolar Order

YouTube Link: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Kx8IvlN11Eg

Video Script

Today, I will speak about the United States' foreign policy strategy and its implications for the international order. Exactly three months from today, there will be a US presidential election. As a hegemonic power, the United States has wielded immense national strength and employed various strategies, significantly impacting the international order and its ally, South Korea. Therefore, an analysis of US foreign policy transcends the analysis of a single nation's foreign policy to become an analysis of the entire world order. While you may view US foreign policy and the international order from diverse perspectives, considering the broad strategic directions of US foreign policy that will emerge during the US presidential election period, you will ponder what the future international order will truly be like and the significance of the changes in the current international order of 2024. This will likely be a period we look back on as having been critically important. There are still many twists and turns in international politics.

The era in which we are currently living is marked by immense changes and new aspects not only in the United States but also in terms of the international order. From a scholarly perspective, the international political perspectives or theories observed up to the 20th century have many limitations in understanding the future international order, as many new phenomena are emerging that do not easily repeat past patterns. We often speak of the weakening of US hegemony, the decline of the unipolar system, and the advent of bipolar or multipolar systems.

This is a very traditional and continuous analysis that views the world structure centered on hard power, such as the distribution of national power, military strength, and economic power, in terms of poles. While the future may unfold in part this way, there will be far more changes. Climate change, the possibility of nuclear war, and the existential threat to humanity are situations that require humanity to unite and resolve.

Academic Reflections on Changes in the International Order and U.S. Foreign Policy Strategy

The development of new technologies like AI will also bring about tremendous changes, increasing the importance of the actors driving these changes, such as tech elites or non-state actors. We are living in an era where it is extremely difficult to grasp the international order consistently. In the first part of today's lecture, I want to share academic reflections on how to understand changes in the international order, although we primarily view it through our diplomatic relations with the United States. The first part will cover international politics, and the latter part will discuss the various strands of US foreign policy strategies. The election in three months between Harris and Trump is significant not just as a contest between two parties or two presidents, but because they represent vastly different foreign policy approaches. Regarding the war in Ukraine alone, one candidate might end it in a day, while another might advocate for fighting to the end, making it a potentially life-or-death election for President Zelensky.

This influence extends beyond Ukraine. In the reading material you received, there is a paper that uses the term 'regional order.' While various theoretical perspectives on the international order are interesting and valid, there can be discussions on how to understand the future international order from a South Korean perspective. As I intended to discuss multipolar order further in the latter part of the first half of the lecture, I have set the topics as 'The Future of US International Leadership' and 'The Advent of Multipolar Order.' This is because even amidst the decline of hegemony, a different form of US leadership will likely be maintained.

The Concept and Characteristics of the U.S.-Led Liberal International Order

First, the most commonly used term to describe the current international order is the 'US-led liberal international order' or 'rules-based order.' It is an order where the US, with its leadership, projects its hard power and a blueprint for world order. While the US leads, do other countries have no role? Not at all. A leader always has followers, and the order is maintained when followers contribute significantly to its upkeep. Therefore, the division of leadership between the US and the role of other countries within the liberal bloc is crucial. More importantly, the term 'liberal international order' itself. Let me explain what 'liberalism' means here.

Liberalism is an order that regards freedom as the most important political purpose or value. As the modern Western order was established, it sought to realize individual freedom from the feudal order of the Middle Ages, and this expanded into the international order as the liberal international order. As mentioned in Schwellrohr's paper, there is an analysis suggesting that the era of the liberal international order or the multilateral rules-based order is passing. The foreign policy of the Republican Party in the US, particularly after the Trump administration, can be divided into 'America First' and 'Trumpian conservative realism.' If the Republican Party in the past leaned towards 'America First,' then after Trump's first term, US foreign policy is likely to revert to interventionism, prioritizing national interests and intervening in global affairs.

In this regard, the nature of US leadership will change significantly, and the world order in such a situation will not be one where the US invests substantial capital or effort to maintain the liberal international order, but rather a balance of power order. It is an order that naturally emerges from the competition of power balances between states. In balance of power theory, peace is not the objective; while stability can be secured, conflict and war are means by which balance is maintained. In contrast, the liberal international order emphasizes peace. Since 1945, international politics has moved beyond a military power-centric balance of power system, pursuing a multilateral order that, similar to domestic politics, controls violence and creates mutually legislative rules.

This is partially true. After World War II ended in 1945, international organizations like the UN and GATT (now WTO) were established, and the number of liberal democratic states increased. Peace, marketization, and the peace of multilateral institutions were realized, meaning we have rarely lived outside this liberal international order. In international politics, there is no higher authority, so war is possible at any time if one wills it, yet we have not experienced war for decades. Since the Korean War, there has been a global movement to resolve issues through international law, international organizations, and US intervention. While not entirely successful, and the US has even participated in more wars, the overall flow of the international order has aimed to create an order different from the existing balance of power or realist order, and to some extent, it has been maintained.

From 1945 until 1991, before the collapse of the Soviet Union, the liberal international order was maintained within the liberal democratic bloc, while a socialist/communist order was maintained in the other bloc. However, within the communist bloc, national sovereignty was not respected, making it difficult to view that order as a liberal order. The order we are currently experiencing can be seen as the liberal world order of the post-Cold War era, maintained for approximately 30 years since 1991.

In particular, you were born into this era and may perceive international politics as US-led, with international law and organizations being important, and conflicts being resolved judicially/politically, with US military intervention when necessary. Of course, there were many flaws and mistakes, and the US also experienced economic problems. The world that will unfold after the end of the post-Cold War era is extremely difficult to imagine. Paradoxically, the last 30 years were a period when US national power was at its peak. Around 2000-2001, the US accounted for nearly 50% of global defense spending. This level of military power far exceeds that of the Roman Empire or other past empires.

The US maintained the greatest power that a political entity could possess in human history. Yet, the efforts to realize a liberal international order during that post-Cold War period were not successful. The neoliberal economic order experienced crises, and the process of expanding liberalism globally provoked immense backlash, leading to the 9/11 terrorist attacks. In crisis situations like the COVID-19 pandemic, US leadership was limited in a Trumpian manner, and international cooperation faltered in the face of individual nations' recovery efforts.

The US-China strategic competition, which the US did not anticipate, is unfolding at a very rapid pace. Predicting future situations is extremely difficult. Technological changes are so rapid that the international politics transformed by artificial intelligence and Fourth Industrial Revolution technologies are almost unimaginable. It is questionable what kind of global governance might emerge. The last 30 years were the peak period of the US-led liberal international order, but many latent factors of crisis existed that threatened its maintenance. This is a highly paradoxical phenomenon.

We believed that international politics would be realized as a liberal international order, which was unprecedentedly powerful and ideologically ambitious in history, but the outcome is a situation filled with crises, three crises occurring every decade, and a future that is difficult to predict due to US-China strategic competition. An analysis of why this has happened is necessary. The international order is undergoing fundamental changes. Analyses suggesting a multipolar order or a US-China hegemonic war are not entirely accurate, but such narratives are prevalent. The reason we do not know where things are heading is that we lack the proper analytical tools. We need to consider this together.

Theoretical Analysis of the Liberal International Order

It is necessary to reflect on what the liberal international order of the past 70-80 years truly was. There are liberal analyses of the liberal international order. A representative scholar is Professor John Ikenberry of Princeton University. He believes that the liberal international order has many relative advantages, is an unprecedentedly good order in human history, and was possible because the states that realized liberalism became leaders. Peace, an open international economy, and the role of international organizations were important. The problem, he argues, is not with the liberal mechanism itself but its weakening, and thus, only by moving further towards liberalism can the liberal order be restored. This argument is valid, suggesting that the issue is not failure but insufficient development.

There are no inherent problems. US leadership is very important. Whether it is Harris (Biden) or Trump who wins, the belief is that the US can still provide necessary global public goods and revive the liberal international order. On the other hand, there are also realist analyses of liberalism. They argue that what the US did cannot truly be called a liberal international order.

The analysis suggests that great powers merely used rhetoric about human rights and national rights to justify taking away the autonomy of weaker states and maintaining dominance through alliances, and that there was little that transcended the limitations of international politics. As structural realists argue, it is difficult to overcome the structural limitations of the international system. This is a 'second image' variable, something one might learn in school lectures. The argument is that the operating principle of liberalism cannot overcome the more fundamental structural constraint of anarchy. Carl Schmitt argued that liberalism is inherently unrealizable politically. It involves creating a representative decision-making process where sovereigns gather to express their will, but it is difficult for delegated decision-makers to fully realize the will of the people.

In situations of war or crisis, the supreme decision-maker faces circumstances requiring independent judgment. Because there is considerable room for interpretation based on this decision-maker's thoughts, the power of the sovereign, the supreme policymaker, is immense. This is also referred to as determinism or the exception. Therefore, even a liberal order cannot escape its political nature. While it may seem that the liberal international order, when functioning well, creates order by aggregating the multilateral opinions of many states, in reality, there is always the potential for the supreme leader, the US, to make unilateral and even unilateralist decisions. Thus, a critique exists that a liberal order in its complete sense is impossible.

There are times when efforts are made to realize the will of the delegated sovereigns, but the situation is not always favorable. For instance, when war or a crisis occurs, all available options within the legal framework and those delegated by the people are exhausted. At this point, the president or prime minister, as the supreme decision-maker, must make a decision independently. The room for discretion based on the supreme decision-maker's thinking is considerable, highlighting the significant capacity of the supreme policymaker, the leader. This is also referred to as the decision-maker's decisiveness.

Decisions made in exceptional circumstances are also called exceptionalism, and therefore, even a liberal order cannot escape its political nature. In international politics, when the liberal international order functions well, it may appear that order is created by aggregating the multilateral opinions of many states, but in reality, there is always the potential for the supreme leader, the US, to make highly independent and unilateral decisions. Because such possibilities always exist, there is a critique that a liberal order in its complete sense is impossible.

This may be a somewhat complex discussion, but it is necessary to question whether the liberal international order is inherently realizable. In the early 1990s, the United States made considerable efforts. In 1990 and 1991, the Cold War, which had lasted for 45 years, ended with the collapse of the Soviet Union, and the US and liberal nations were engulfed in a spirit of victory. The aspirations the US held for the world order at that time were unimaginable. Scholars like Fukuyama spoke of the 'end of history,' suggesting that history had entered a completely different phase. They believed the era of balance of power based on human selfishness and power was over, and that democratization would spread globally, leading to a peaceful existence for humanity—a 'new Wilsonian moment.' Of course, there were counterarguments, such as Huntington's prediction of a 'clash of civilizations,' foreseeing that suppressed non-Western civilizations might raise issues, leading to conflict.

The Limits of U.S. Hegemony and Public Goods Provision Capacity

Consequently, the US hegemony over the past 30 years has not been successful. There are various reasons for this, but people ask why US hegemony failed. They question whether it lacked physical strength or if policy directions were misguided. Furthermore, questions arise as to whether the US was not truly a hegemonic power, meaning it was stronger than other nations but not strong enough to impose order on the world. While the term 'hegemony' is frequently used, academically, hegemony refers to imposing order on an anarchic international situation. This includes rules-based orders and norm-based orders. While easy to say, imposing rules that all nations must adhere to amidst conflicts is an immense undertaking. This requires the capacity to provide exemplary public goods.

Public goods are things that everyone needs but no one is willing to produce at their own expense. Domestically, the government collects taxes to produce public goods, but in international politics, there is no such state performing this function. A hegemonic state, with its vast financial resources, can provide public goods without financial support from other nations, thereby imposing order on the international system, and through this, reap long-term benefits and strengthen its hegemony. This is a feat possible only for a very small number of states. While we believe the US has played this role over the past 30 years, looking back, there have been too many wars the US could not intervene in and disputes it could not resolve. Take the North Korean nuclear issue, for example; if the US had invested more policy resources, it might have been resolved.

The statement that the US failed to resolve the North Korean nuclear issue may be somewhat inaccurate. Of course, the US is not necessarily obligated to resolve it. However, some voices point to the US's hostile policy towards North Korea as one of the reasons North Korea developed nuclear weapons. Nevertheless, the US has sometimes made efforts, but the results have been insufficient. Such problems are scattered across the globe. The Israeli-Palestinian issue, the Russia-Ukraine war, and China's economic challenge to the US have all intensified over the past 30 years. Resolving the 9/11 attacks and economic crises also took considerable time. Therefore, while US hegemony may have been vastly superior to that of other nations, it might not have been sufficient to meet the demand for public goods to solve global problems.

Being strong does not necessarily mean being able to provide sufficient public goods to establish international order. These are two entirely different logical frameworks. Even the strongest nation is not necessarily a hegemonic power, in the sense of being an order-provider. Over the past 30 years, we believed, and the US itself likely believed, that it exerted considerable effort to maintain world order. However, looking back now, the US may not have been capable of solving all problems. International politics has become far more complex, and research is needed on global issues and new conflicts arising from the end of the Cold War. The competitive logic of the two superpowers during the Cold War had suppressed all other issues. The same applies to post-colonial issues.

Many issues in the Third World, suppressed since the end of 19th-century imperialism, such as problems with former colonial powers, territorial disputes due to arbitrarily drawn borders, and division issues like ours, had been festering internally. The logic of superpower competition during the Cold War was superimposed on these issues, driving them beneath the surface, only to erupt after the Cold War ended. These issues continue to manifest today in places like the Korean Peninsula and Taiwan. Could the US have resolved these issues? The demand for peace and stability in international politics has increased. Therefore, the illusion we held, particularly due to US international politics scholarship over the past 30 years, is that while the liberal international order after the Cold War was a positive process, it may have been insufficient.

Reflections on the Unipolar System and U.S. Foreign Policy

So, how should we view the US unipolar system and its foreign policy over the past 30 years? When I attended a conference in the US, I met a former State Department official who said that the US unipolar system is a 'disease' and continues to act as a major ailment for Americans. This is a regrettable situation. The same applies to us. When we looked at the US, there was an image of an omnipotent hegemonic power, and the gap between that image and reality has placed a significant burden on the US. For us as well, the problems arising when expectations placed on the US were not met were more numerous. Therefore, I believe that the judgments made at the time, such as 'unipolar system' or 'end of the Cold War,' may have been fundamentally flawed.

Therefore, after experiencing the past 30 years, we can ask whether the two US candidates fully grasp and are capable of realizing a new path, a new liberal international order. From our perspective, this is the case. Thus, when discussing US foreign policy today, it is more important to ask what should be the criteria for evaluating US foreign policy within its structure by looking back at the trajectory of US foreign policy over the past 30 years, rather than focusing on the foreign policy content of the two individuals. To do this, our perspective on the international order must be more accurate than the US-centric view of the US-led international order. To this end, I will briefly explain what the liberal international order is later. Although it is in the PPT, the content is extensive, so I will convey only the core points. Liberalism is an order that prioritizes the freedom of its constituents. There is an international order and a global order. The international order is an order based on states as units, while the global order is one where various actors, including individuals, corporations, media, interest groups, and international organizations, operate beyond states. In today's terms, it is a multi-stakeholder order.

Transition from a State-Centric Order to a Global Order

We naturally assume that the political order of 8 billion people, divided into 200 countries, is maintained through relations between states. However, in reality, international politics, especially during the Ukraine war, with the roles of tech companies, individuals, and the intervention of international organizations, shows that international politics is not solely driven by state power. Furthermore, globalization has led to the world becoming a single political and military unit, and as the role of national governments shrinks, populist backlash arises. For example, farmers might protest if their government fails to protect them and foreign agricultural products flood the market. The weakening of state power brought about by what Dani Rodrik calls 'hyper-globalization' is causing dissatisfaction among citizens, which is spreading across liberal democratic countries worldwide.

Globalization is irreversible. While globalization has policy aspects of economic globalization known as neoliberalism, it has already become a global unit due to technological and cognitive advancements. Therefore, we are in a transitional phase from the international to the global level. This is a crucial point. The order in which we live is moving away from the Westphalian system, which originated from the Thirty Years' War in Europe and was state-centric. The state-centric order is evolving into a global order, where other political units, like what I mentioned earlier as 'terrage,' operate together. 'Inter-state' refers to relations between states, but 'global order' implies that various units on Earth create order with equal rights. Nowadays, we can even discuss non-human organisms and minerals within the ecosystem on other planets. The order we live in

here, or even managing space, means that if we include our influence on other planets within the political order, then making that order liberal means prioritizing the freedom of states, the constituents of that order, as the most important value. The freedom of a state ultimately refers to survival and territorial integrity. Just as individual survival and property rights are core to liberal political philosophy in a domestic order, liberal values in international politics are state survival, security, and territorial integrity. However, states cannot be formed by that alone. A liberal order can be defined as one that guarantees not only formal sovereignty but also non-interference in internal affairs and active freedom for states. In reality, international order has only been able to achieve a very limited, passive freedom, maintaining only state survival and security. However, we aim to create an order that allows for more active freedom, where all states can realize their potential and rights. Even weaker states already harbor such aspirations.

So, what is the format of international order that can realize such a liberal order? In domestic politics, these liberal aspirations are realized through democratic processes. The democratic order, where all individuals can participate in the political order as sovereigns and create order equally through the legislative process, was what we desired as a liberal democratic order when combined with the liberal order.

However, liberal order and democratic order are very different concepts. Liberalism is a political ideology concerning the source of power and the need for freedom from external interference. Democracy, on the other hand, is about how power is distributed and who should participate in political decisions. There can be socialist democracy, or liberalism can be restricted based on qualifications or specific groups. In the past, non-Western countries were considered uncivilized and thus unable to be free, leading to the belief that they should adopt monarchies or dictatorships. Regardless, what I want to convey here is that the standard for a fully realized liberal international order is very high, but it has not been sufficiently realized. Therefore, it is correct that the liberal international order in which we live was a liberal order in a very limited sense. The liberal international order that the US has sought to realize over the past 30 years has strived to guarantee the survival and territory of all states, but the issue of active freedom, or policy autonomy, which more and more states are demanding, and non-interference in internal affairs, does not realistically exist in international politics. Rather, international politics aimed at interfering in internal affairs is the true nature of current international politics. In that sense, the limitations of the liberal international order lie on one side. On the other hand, democracy means that all members must be able to participate and determine their own destiny.

When 200 countries determine international politics today, do they all participate with an equal 1/200 share to create international order? Of course not. Consider the permanent members of the UN Security Council alone; five countries hold decision-making power. In domestic politics, this would be considered an aristocracy. Therefore, international politics is not democratic at all. In political theory, a hegemonic power corresponds to a monarchy, and most of the system is maintained in an aristocratic form by developed, powerful nations. Since democratic elements are partially realized in the General Assembly and other general areas, it can be considered a mixed government in domestic political terms. Therefore, how to formulate the formula for this mixed government is crucial. Unlike domestic politics, international politics has vast differences, and it is natural for states to exist unequally even when together, leading to inevitable conflict. Setting that aside for a moment, on the other hand, the global

The Liberal World Order and Realistic Challenges

political order is a liberal global order where the ideal is for 8 billion people to each exercise 1/8 billionth of the decision-making power. In that sense, in this era of globalization, all of you are living in a globalized era. Each of us is a crucial player with a 1/8 billionth share, but am I exercising precisely that 1/8 billionth of the authority in shaping the affairs of this planet? Since we cannot participate directly, we participate through South Korea, and it is true that South Korea, as an economy ranked among the top 12 globally, exercises more authority in global governance than weaker African nations. In that sense, we contribute to a certain extent of global governance, but are we exercising commensurate power when decisions are made on various events that affect our destiny? Reflecting on this, the answer is no. Therefore, if we are truly living within a liberal international order and wish to create a global governance that realizes our freedom, are we

sufficiently doing so? My point is that we are not. From this perspective, regarding US foreign policy, the US has historically built a liberal order, but even if it were sufficiently liberal, given the existence of weaker states and the intrusion of realism, the US has, over the past 30 years, created a hegemonic liberal order based on realism—that is, a liberal political order akin to a monarchy—and this has reached its limit in leading the world. This is due to various reasons. Therefore, the international order is already showing significant limitations to the liberal international order that the US has pursued. When we discuss US foreign policy today, is it appropriate to ask what is wrong with the Biden administration's foreign policy or Trump's foreign policy? Or should we consider whether we have sufficiently contemplated the fundamental problems inherent in the US-led liberal order, which we believed has led the world well? And if it is not necessarily bad, what direction should it take? Having this in mind at the international political level is crucial for effectively evaluating the foreign policies proposed by the current US candidates. This is the core message I wish to convey to you. In this regard, if we do not sufficiently achieve this, from South Korea's perspective, we have grown and lived well within the liberal international order, and our values are already ingrained in us as liberalism. There is likely not a single person among you who is not a liberal. Liberalism is the rejection of having one's destiny, which one has not determined, decided by another. It is freedom from power one does not desire, and the freedom to enjoy one's freedom as long as it does not infringe upon the freedom of others. We believe in and embody this. Democracy is similar. We do not accept a political order in which we do not participate.

Therefore, we must think about how to reflect our values of liberal democracy in international politics, but the current international political order is not sufficiently moving in that direction. Rather, there are various forces seeking to present an opposing order. This does not necessarily mean it is bad, but rather that international orders with values different from ours can emerge. For example, Russia's invasion of Ukraine is such a case. Historically, in an interview with Fox News, Putin revealed his perception of Ukraine, criticizing Ukraine's independent statehood historically, mentioning Nazism, and discussing Russia's future importance. This shows a perspective different from the liberal international order we generally conceive of.

The Emergence and Competition of Diverse International Orders

If so, we must consider how to reflect our values of liberal democracy in international politics, but the current international political order is not sufficiently advancing in that direction. Rather, there are various forces seeking to present an order that is the opposite. This is not necessarily to say it is bad, but it means that an international order with values different from ours can certainly emerge. For example, Russia's invasion of Ukraine is also such a case. Historically, Putin's views on Ukraine were revealed in an interview with Fox News, which included criticism of Ukraine's history as an independent nation, references to Nazism, and discussions about Russia's future importance. This shows a perspective different from the liberal international order we generally conceive of.

China currently places great importance on the international order and strives to adhere to the rules that nations currently uphold. However, this is not liberalism. Liberalism is fundamentally based on ontological individualism. The individual is the most important entity, and individuals create society, not the other way around where society exists first and individuals are assigned their roles within it. In China's case, it emphasizes the leadership of the state or party over individual freedom. Therefore, while there are commonalities in emphasizing rules, peace in the international order, and sovereignty, it is not a liberal order in its fundamental sense, leading to competition among various international orders. In this regard, the future era may be unipolar and post-hegemonic, but I will move on from this point.

China currently places great importance on the international order and strives to adhere to the rules that nations currently uphold. However, this is not a liberal order. Liberalism is fundamentally based on ontological individualism, where individuals constitute society, rather than society existing first and individuals being assigned roles within it. In China's case, it emphasizes the leadership of the state or party over individual freedom, and it stresses rules, peace in the international order, and sovereignty. While there are commonalities in these aspects, it is not a liberal order in its fundamental sense, thus inevitably leading to competitive international orders. Therefore, the future era may be unipolar and post-hegemonic, but I will move past this point.

Limitations of the Liberal International Order and the Search for Alternative Orders

Ladies and gentlemen, we have already discussed this, and in that regard, the section on the international order is concluding. So, what do you think the future international order will be like? The liberal international order, which has been maintained since the post-World War II division and reunification of the world, has played a significant role, with the US demonstrating considerable leadership. We thought it would continue to be maintained, but that is not the case at all. The liberal international order is showing clear limitations. The reasons for these clear limitations are numerous, as discussed so far. Globalization, the US's own lack of power, the inherent limitations of what we considered the liberal order, and challenges from non-liberal international orders are all interacting complexly to challenge the liberal international order. Therefore, we need to consider what is necessary to further develop this liberal order. Let's set that aside for a moment. In that context, what is this liberal order?

When conceptualizing it, what exactly is that liberal order? Does it merely refer to the foreign policies of states, or is it about certain principles that constitute liberalism? These are more fundamental questions. This content is from a paper, and it is difficult to explain it all, but it can be viewed through the concept of power. You can think of it as a regional system. There is the concept of 'international society' discussed by the English School of International Relations, and within that, the concept of 'regional security complex' is used, among others. However, a different meaning here is that the historicity of this region is extremely important.

Historicity. The English School of International Relations is fundamentally imperial, and it does not fully grasp the logic of conflict or diffusion between powers arising from the convergence of civilizations. The argument in Florcard's 'Multipolar World' suggests that the current international politics, which is fragmenting into several different order units, cannot be simply viewed as competition among a few great powers due to the emergence of states with immense power. Rather, far more complex logic is at play. The spheres of the liberal international order discussed so far are largely maintained. However, because they have shown significant limitations, China, while belonging to it, is seeking to establish an alternative order. This is not merely a rebellion or a hegemonic competition, but a much more ambitious and significant effort to propose an order superior to the liberal order. Regardless of whether it succeeds, Russia is also doing the same.

Russia is also making efforts to create an order centered on Russia, not just seeking conflict, and Islam is likewise. There are efforts to revive or restore the traditional order that the Islamic region historically possessed. Therefore, when looking at the future of international politics, the new revival of self-centered orders historically created—paradoxically, because the Western-centric order has not evolved sufficiently—will continue to face many difficulties in resolving post-colonial issues and others. If this intensifies and leads to security confrontation, similar to past theories of hegemonic stability, it will result in far more unfortunate consequences. Thus, US-China relations are not simply a hegemonic competition between two countries, but a more systematic and fundamental confrontation where China seeks to critique the limitations of the order created by the US. If better outcomes emerge from the boundaries of these two spheres, that would not be a bad thing.

Therefore, when looking at US foreign policy and current international politics, we need to consider the breadth and depth of competition more broadly. Within those spheres, the perspectives, narratives, and our own storytelling about international order are deeply embedded and significantly different. In the case of South Korea, although it was historically part of the Confucian cultural sphere, it has significantly integrated into the Western international order, arguably being the only country where the US's democratization project has succeeded. Japan was a defeated nation, as was Germany, but we were not. Nevertheless, the work of democratic peace and nation-building, which the US cherishes in liberal theory, has been remarkably successful. Thus, we are a developed country by origin. There are no other such countries in the world, and our liberal democracy is far more advanced than that of the US. Looking at it now, we are a model of global democracy, with no violence, no election disputes, and a very high level of political consciousness among individuals. In that context, the unique characteristics of our political culture

exist, while other countries have very different conceptions of politics within their respective spheres. In this light, power is not merely created by physical force in international politics but is also shaped by a long historical process. The future flow of international politics will involve clashes between these spheres, and various powers will compete. However, an era of continuous competition is no longer possible due to the existential threat to humanity. This is another logic, but the risk of nuclear war, the escalating climate crisis, potential health crises, and the uncontrollability of technology are all factors. We do not know how these will unfold, but the possibility of technology being misused or becoming uncontrollable, leading to scenarios akin to AGI or ASI, is foreseeable. We may not all be here in two years. Before that happens, a unified response in international politics is necessary. This is because the globe must be reborn as a single sphere. While international order has developed significantly since 1945, the liberal order is now woefully inadequate to meet the demand for public goods. As a result, multiple orders are clashing, not merely in terms of power or hegemonic conflict, but as a fundamental clash of perspectives on international politics. If we cannot move towards a new global sphere, we are reaching a critical juncture where humanity could face extinction. In that sense, we are living in a vastly different international order than what we envisioned in the 20th century. Let me briefly discuss US foreign policy for about five minutes. This is likely content you are already familiar with. The core point is that the Biden administration's foreign policy is a liberal foreign policy, pursuing the revival or resurrection of hegemony to maintain the liberal international order. However, it is difficult to see it as fully grasping the fundamental problems of the liberal international order.

The Current State and Future Prospects of U.S. Foreign Policy

Nevertheless, the Biden administration is well aware that the US has already lost the national strength to provide public goods. This could be due to supply chain issues or a lack of military power. Thus, Biden's foreign policy is shifting towards a monarchical or aristocratic model, or towards building a global leadership group with allied partner nations through hegemonic alliances. It is evolving towards a meta-leadership that leads these alliances and partnerships.

However, as mentioned earlier, creating truly multilateral leadership that fully utilizes the demands of various countries, including the Global South and other liberal nations, is challenging due to the US's own insufficient national strength. Furthermore, has the US truly understood the problems with its leadership and provided new discourse or strategic narratives effectively? Ladies and gentlemen, the Biden campaign has concluded, and now the Harris campaign is underway. The words, concepts, or slogans used in these campaigns offer a glimpse into the Democratic Party's theoretical analysis of international politics and their vision for leading the world. Therefore, by observing these, you should be able to evaluate whether Harris possesses a sufficient discourse structure to handle the future international order that will unfold based on the international political trends discussed earlier. If not, what is lacking, and if it cannot be achieved through the US, what alternative should be proposed, such as forming a new axis of power, moving towards full democracy, or engaging in hegemonic competition?

Therefore, the Biden administration's foreign policy aims to strengthen US power through domestic manufacturing revival and economic growth, and to revive hegemony by borrowing the strength of allies and partner nations. Simultaneously, competition with rival nations, particularly China, through what is termed 'pacing trade,' is a crucial core of foreign policy, as many US policymakers have discussed. But is this sufficient? Especially regarding the strategy towards China, there have been criticisms that the US's vision for the ultimate outcome of its China strategy and how it intends to manage competition with China is too unclear. This led to Sullivan's speech on 'derisking' on April 27th last year. And the Forbes article you read in October clearly outlines the core of US foreign policy thinking. You must carefully evaluate whether it is truly

sufficient. That Forbes article was very well-written, and Harris's foreign policy is unlikely to surpass it. In that regard, it is crucial to evaluate how the world order will change if such an era continues for another four years. First, it is necessary to accurately assess the success or failure of the 'derisking' paradigm that has persisted for the past year, but no one seems to be evaluating it, and even the US itself appears uncertain about its potential success. Particularly in the technology sector, with security implications, the call for complete 'decoupling' raises concerns that it might actually foster China's indigenous advanced semiconductor ecosystem. Therefore, it is still too early to tell.

Expected foreign policy of Trump's second term. Many analyses have emerged recently, and statistical studies suggest that Trump tends to implement the foreign policies he advocated during his campaigns. Furthermore, there is considerable continuity between his first and second terms, and he aims to achieve what he could not during his first term. The core of Trump's foreign policy is best explained by Randall Lively's article, which I believe describes Trump better than Trump himself. As mentioned earlier, the US does not need to excessively intervene in areas not core to its interests, which means he will not pursue a hegemonic policy. Hegemony is a long-term diplomatic strategy of providing public goods necessary for international order, establishing a structure, and then reaping the long-term benefits. Regarding Taiwan, while the US may assist Taiwan in 'de-transitioning' from China, its stance is whether it is absolutely necessary to intervene in case of an emergency. The article also touches upon the North Korean issue, which has significant implications concerning South Korea.

Characteristics and Implications of a Second Trump Administration's Foreign Policy

In that regard, the nihilism emerging from the current Trump camp, and the implications for the Korean Peninsula, suggest that the Trump administration will pursue a foreign policy focused on strengthening US national power by not starting new wars and not intervening in regions outside of US core interests. Consequently, it will be a strong nation, but a normal great power, not a hegemonic power. In such a scenario, the world order will inevitably become a balance of power, as there will no longer be a hegemonic power seeking to resolve military conflicts. Such a world will be a vastly different era. It may be a period of international politics that we have not witnessed since 1945, and perhaps one that most people alive today have not witnessed. This could also lead to a change in US policy, and while the US may no longer act alone, there are expected foreign policies for individual countries, which I will skip for now. Ladies and gentlemen, you may have more to say during the Q&A session later. Vice President Harris's expected foreign policy

Vice President Harris's Expected Foreign Policy

is a topic of great interest to everyone. However, recent efforts focus on discussing the differences between Vice President Harris and the Biden administration, drawing from the discussions during the 2016 election, her performance as Vice President, and the content from the 2020 primaries. Some differences are observed. For instance, regarding the war in Ukraine, she shows a much stronger commitment to support, and concerning the situation in Israel, while criticizing Hamas's attack, she also expresses criticism regarding human rights issues in Israel. It is difficult to be precise. However, her hard-line geopolitical competition policy towards Russia and China is expected to be maintained, and she will likely focus on strengthening US national power economically, indicating continuity with the present. She will also strive to restore leadership.

In summary, we need to observe further whether the current changes in the world order and the leadership sufficient to provide order are adequately present. The final point is a brief discussion on whether China, if it were to lead, could create an alternative new sphere. You will likely hear more about this later when discussing China. However, the challenges China currently presents are not merely a confrontation of physical power or a hegemonic war, but a significant effort to establish an alternative order to the current one. More effort is needed. Therefore, while last year I focused on US foreign policy itself, this year, the world order that will emerge before or after the upcoming election seems to be a more critical issue. We also need to contemplate this further. How should we view the changing US, and consequently, how should we address numerous issues such as North Korea's nuclear program, the ROK-US alliance, and extended deterrence? Therefore, please think more diligently. I came prepared to discuss complex issues beyond just the US today, so it might not resonate immediately, but in subsequent lectures, more engaging and specific discussions will follow. Nevertheless, it is my personal concern that the current world order cannot be adequately analyzed with existing international political science, thus requiring more effort. Academically, and for the era in which you will live, it is important to have a broad perspective. Studying does not solely mean diligently reading existing books but also requires creative thinking. Therefore, I have spoken with the intention of encouraging you to think broadly and extensively. Thank you for your hard work.

The Potential for a China-Led Order and South Korea's Challenges

In summary, we need to observe further whether the changes in the world order we have seen and the leadership to establish order are sufficient. The final point is a brief discussion on whether, if a China-led order emerges, China can create a new alternative sphere. You will hear more about this when you discuss China later, but the various challenges China currently presents are not simply a confrontation of physical power or a hegemonic war, but a significant effort to establish an alternative order to the current one. More effort is needed. Therefore, last year I spoke about US foreign policy itself, but today, the world order that will emerge after or around this election seems to be a much more important issue. We also need to think more deeply, and then consider how to view the changing United States. Consequently, many issues are at stake, such as the North Korean nuclear issue, the ROK-US alliance, and extended deterrence.

Therefore, think more diligently. Today, I came with the intention of discussing complex issues beyond just the United States, so it might not resonate immediately, but in the following lectures, much more interesting and specific discussions will take place. Nevertheless, it is my personal concern, but since the current world order cannot be adequately analyzed with existing international political theory, more effort is needed. Academically, and because this is the era in which you will live, it is important to take a broad view. Studying does not necessarily mean diligently reading existing books; it is also a time to engage in creative thinking. Therefore, I spoke with the intention of encouraging you to think broadly and extensively. Thank you for your hard work.

Jeon Jae-sung, Director of the EAI National Security Research Center, based on a theoretical analysis of the post-Cold War US-led liberal international order, diagnoses that the liberal order has reached its limits, as evidenced by economic crises and international conflicts. Furthermore, in a situation where the emergence of a hegemonic power to establish order in international politics is becoming increasingly difficult and the possibility of a multi-polar order is growing, he explains that the US is facing a policy competition between the Democratic Party, which seeks to expand leadership within the international community, and the Republican Party, which seeks to limit the scope of intervention to core interest areas, and the choice of voters.

■ Jeon Jae-sung_ Director of the East Asia Institute National Security Research Center, Professor at the Department of Political Science and International Relations, Seoul National University.