North Korea and the World: Deconstructing the North Korea-Russia Treaty: How Do the 1961 and 2024 Treaties Differ?

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Video Script

Interpretation of the Russia-North Korea Treaty as a Substantive Alliance and Errors in Expectation

It specifies a state of aggression as a condition for mutual military assistance, and assumes that South Korea has no plans to invade North Korea. Ladies and gentlemen, what do you think of this? I believe this is also like covering the sky with one's palm. At any moment, this is why Putin's words are meaningless. Hello. Thank you sincerely to everyone watching Park Gun's North Korea and the World. Today, I would like to talk about the treaty signed by North Korea and Russia after their summit on June 19th. To get straight to the point, I interpret this treaty as a quasi-alliance treaty, with a very high possibility that it includes a de facto automatic intervention clause. I did not anticipate this correctly. I had considerable doubt as to whether North Korea and Russia would sign a new alliance of a level comparable to the treaty they signed in 1961. Therefore, I stated on public broadcast that they would not, citing three reasons, but I was completely wrong. While it may sound like an excuse, let me first explain why I was wrong. There are three reasons.

I mentioned three reasons. The first is that even before the specific details of the treaty were revealed, North Korea and Russia had already announced that they would sign a 'Comprehensive Strategic Partnership.' This is one of several levels of relations: the lowest is 'friendly relations,' above that is 'cooperative relations,' then 'strategic partnership,' above that is 'strategic cooperative partnership,' and the highest is 'strategic alliance.' Therefore, when North Korea and Russia sign a 'Comprehensive Strategic Partnership,' it implies that they are not forming a 'strategic alliance,' which is above it. For this reason, I did not anticipate that the treaty signed on the 19th would be a treaty effectively equivalent to an alliance. This is my first mistake. For reference, countries that have a 'Comprehensive Strategic Partnership' include Vietnam, Egypt, Mongolia, and South Africa, in addition to North Korea. South Korea and Russia had a 'Strategic Cooperative Partnership' in 2008. And North Korea and Russia had 'friendly relations' in 2000. As I mentioned earlier, 'friendly relations' is the lowest level of bilateral relations from Russia's perspective, and they have signed a treaty that represents a vertical upgrade in relations after 24 years.

The second reason is that if North Korea and Russia were to sign a treaty equivalent to an alliance, it would be highly interpretable as an act of hostility towards South Korea. Consequently, a situation has arisen where it can only be interpreted that way. This is because at the end of last year and the beginning of this year, Kim Jong Un of North Korea explicitly stated that the relationship with South Korea was a 'hostile state relationship,' and repeatedly used terms like 'primary enemy' and 'hostile.' Furthermore, through the Military Founding Day on February 9th, he stated that their ultimate goal is to occupy South Korean territory by force. North Korea has always referred to this as 'territorial stability.' This can be seen as a clear declaration that they intend to occupy South Korea through their military power. Since March, Kim Jong Un has been continuously conducting war exercises that could attack South Korea, based on specific scenarios. I have explained this in detail in previous broadcasts. In this

context, if Russia signs a treaty with North Korea that is effectively equivalent to an alliance, I believe it is not unreasonable to interpret Russia as being hostile towards South Korea. That is the second reason. Russia is, in fact, important to South Korea. I still believe that the full reasons why Russia has done this have not yet been revealed. This is because the 'convenient alliance' between Russia and North Korea is still valid. This means that North Korea and Russia are cooperating due to the war in Ukraine. Consider this: if Russia had not illegally invaded Ukraine, and consequently did not need artillery shells to sustain its war effort, would Putin have met with Kim Jong Un last year and again this year, even going to Pyongyang? I have considerable doubt about that. Therefore, while North Korea and Russia are currently cooperating due to the special circumstances of the Ukraine war, if the war in Ukraine reaches a certain level of resolution and ends, then Russia will have much

more important interests in South Korea. After the Ukraine war, Russia will find it difficult to establish normal relations with European countries. Due to the Ukraine war, European countries have clearly defined Russia as an adversary, and therefore, the possibility of resuming projects like their gas pipelines is almost nil. In such a situation, to escape its economic isolation, Russia will inevitably have to focus on the 'New Eastern Policy,' which involves the Eastern Siberia region, and South Korea will ultimately be its key partner. Of course, from our perspective, if the Ukraine war ends with Russia's illegal victory, it will be difficult for us to cooperate as well. If the situation reaches a level that the international community can tolerate, rather than such an outcome, we can resume economic relations with Russia. However, European countries are likely to impose significant restrictions. From that perspective, while cooperation with North Korea may be necessary in the short term due to the Ukraine war, in terms of much larger national interests, cooperation with South Korea is naturally

more important. Therefore, I questioned whether they would make such a choice. Let me offer my third point: this is Russia involving itself in the Korean Peninsula situation. In international relations theory, great powers typically avoid forming alliances with non-great powers, especially those with clauses akin to automatic intervention. When South Korea formed an alliance with the United States in 1953, President Syngman Rhee found the entire process extremely difficult. At the time, for a weak nation like South Korea to form an alliance with the most powerful nation, the United States, was considered a political and diplomatic victory. Although North Korea possesses nuclear weapons, it remains one of the poorest countries in the world, and if a treaty of this nature is signed, Putin and Russia could become involved in unintended conflicts.

Key Provisions of the Russia-North Korea Treaty and the Controversy over Automatic Intervention

Therefore, I thought they would not make such a choice, but I was wrong. While I will explain why I was wrong later, I believe it also partially explains why they signed it. Let's delve into the treaty itself. It consists of a total of 23 articles, and its exact title is the 'Treaty on Comprehensive Strategic Partnership.' The most problematic article is Article 2. Although it has been widely discussed in the media, it contains the following provision: 'In the event that one party is subjected to armed attack and is thus in a state of war, the other party shall without delay provide military and other assistance with all the means at its disposal.'

In 1961, the Soviet Union and North Korea signed the 'Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation, and Mutual Assistance.' The content of Article 1 of that treaty is very similar to the current one. The difference between the treaty signed on June 19, 2024, and the one signed in 1961 is that the June 19 treaty includes one prerequisite. What is it? 'In accordance with Article 51 of the UN Charter and the laws of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and the Russian Federation, without delay.' Some interpret this prerequisite as making it different from the 1961 treaty, and I don't think that interpretation is entirely incorrect. However, if we look more closely, Article 51 of the UN Charter states the following: An aggression occurs.

Before the UN can define it and take substantive action, the attacked state has the right to respond individually or with allies. What does this mean? Ultimately, it means that the treaty signed by North Korea and Russia provides legitimacy for the two countries to jointly respond in the event of armed aggression and military situations, separate from the UN. Therefore, I do not believe Article 51 of the UN Charter serves as a prerequisite. Rather, I believe it strongly aims to legitimize their new treaty. The issue lies with 'in accordance with the laws of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and the Russian Federation.'

To what extent will adherence to these laws be a limiting factor? For reference, we have the ROK-US Mutual Defense Treaty. It does not have an automatic intervention clause. Instead, it states: 'Each party will act in accordance with its constitutional processes.' South Korea and the United States are free democratic nations. Legislation and administration are completely separate. In our case, the National Assembly, and of course the US Congress, require ratification. Although in the US, the President declares war first and Congress ratifies it later.

Therefore, while the executive branch is ultimately more important, democratic nations still have procedures. Do you think the Russian Duma and the North Korean Supreme People's Assembly can make decisions on this based on their own independent judgment? I don't think so. Given the nature of these two authoritarian, one-man-ruled states, such prerequisites will not function. To reiterate, by including these clauses, it ultimately means that it can all be decided by the state leader at any time. Therefore, I believe that even if it is considered de facto automatic intervention, sufficient conditions to prevent it are not met. Another reason I consider this to be automatic intervention is that Putin himself has acknowledged it. After visiting North Korea, Putin immediately went to Vietnam. He did similar things in Vietnam, and then held a press conference. Naturally, a question arose: 'What do you think of the treaty signed between North Korea and Russia?' Putin replied, 'There is nothing new in the treaty signed between North Korea and Russia compared to the treaty signed in 1962, and it is almost the same content.'

He said that the treaty signed in July 1961 has no new content and is almost the same. He mentioned Article 51 of the UN Charter and adherence to the laws of Russia and North Korea, stating that it's nothing special. This means that Putin himself stated that the treaty signed in 1961 already contained an automatic intervention clause, and the treaty signed on June 19th is the same. Then, the following statement was made at Putin's press conference. I will read it verbatim.

It specifies a state of aggression as a condition for mutual military assistance, and assumes that South Korea has no plans to invade North Korea. Ladies and gentlemen, what do you think of this? In other words, he implied that this treaty would never be invoked unless South Korea invaded North Korea, which I believe is like covering the sky with one's palm. This is because, as you all know very well, Putin's invasion of Ukraine is a clear war of aggression. He attacked first. Yet, he has never used the term 'aggression.'

He still calls it a 'special military operation' and claims it is conducted 'in self-defense.' What about North Korea? The Korean War was clearly a war of invasion by North Korea in collusion with the Soviet Union and China, but North Korea has never admitted to it and instead calls it the 'Fatherland Liberation War.' Therefore, there is a 100% possibility that they can arbitrarily interpret whether it is an invasion or not. For this reason, I believe Putin's statement is meaningless.

Additional Implications of the Treaty and South Korea's Response

Therefore, overall, it is not unreasonable to consider this treaty a quasi-alliance treaty between North Korea and Russia that has effectively restored the automatic intervention clause. Beyond this, there are several other problematic articles in the treaty. For example, Article 2 states: 'The DPRK and Russia shall strengthen strategic and tactical cooperation.' Both socialist Russia and North Korea use this expression, and 'strategic' is a sensitive term. 'Strategic' usually refers to nuclear weapons. Does this mean strengthening cooperation on nuclear weapons? As some have already suggested, it is not entirely impossible to interpret this as an acknowledgment of North Korea's nuclear possession. Article 3 states: 'The Parties shall cooperate to eliminate threats to their security and to maintain peace and stability in the region by promptly taking measures to eliminate the conditions that create such threats.' This implies that they will consult on matters. In the future, this could be interpreted as North Korea and Russia preparing in advance not only for joint exercises between South Korea and the US, or South Korea, the US, and Japan, but also in a wide range of other areas.

Article 8 states: 'The Parties shall establish mechanisms for joint action to strengthen defense capabilities.' How should this be interpreted? 'Strengthen defense capabilities.' North Korea and Russia will strengthen their defense capabilities, with joint objectives. Typically, we might interpret this as opening the door for enhanced military exercises, military exchanges, and arms trade between North Korea and Russia in the future. Finally, one more point.

This is Article 10, which mentions 'peaceful nuclear energy.' 'Cooperation shall be carried out in the sphere of peaceful nuclear energy.' As you well know, North Korea is producing nuclear weapons using nuclear energy. It is producing nuclear materials. This is a clear violation. Furthermore, any form of exchange or cooperation with North Korea, as mentioned, violates UN Security Council sanctions resolutions that Russia itself has agreed to and passed. Yet, they are explicitly stating their intention to cooperate in the most sensitive area of nuclear energy. I believe this is a very serious problem. Our government immediately convened the National Security Council, strongly condemned North Korea and Russia, and on the 20th, immediately announced a review of providing lethal weapons to Ukraine. In response, Putin, during a press conference in Hanoi, Vietnam, as I mentioned earlier, said the following.

Regarding the statement from South Korea, he retorted, 'We do not rule out supplying highly precise weapons to North Korea.' This means that if South Korea provides lethal weapons to Ukraine, Russia will 'not rule out supplying highly precise weapons' to North Korea. In response, our National Security Advisor countered again. He said, 'If Russia truly supplies advanced precision weapons to North Korea, then we will have no further constraints.' This implies that we can provide any kind of weapon to Ukraine. To summarize, I believe South Korea has clearly stated a red line to Russia this time.

There is a point of regret. When the summit and treaty between North Korea and Russia were discussed, I believe a clearer red line should have been drawn. A clear red line should have been drawn regarding a quasi-alliance treaty, any form of mutual intervention, or automatic intervention clauses. South Korea possesses a powerful tool for a red line: the provision of lethal weapons to Ukraine. This is because, with the current front lines in a stalemate, North Korea's support for Russia is essentially the resources needed for Russia to sustain the war. Overseas research findings have already been published, indicating that over 60% of the ammunition supplied by North Korea to Russia was duds and not properly managed. The report also states that out of two KN-23 short-range ballistic missiles used, only about three hit their targets, indicating limitations in their lethality. As Russia enters its third year of war, it has converted its economy to a wartime economy. Therefore, it can more actively increase the production of necessary military supplies. This could potentially reduce its reliance on North Korea. If South Korea provides lethal weapons to Ukraine, it is a completely different matter. The weapons we possess, as you well know, include the K9 self-propelled howitzer, the K2 tank, and many others. These are crucial weapons that can enable the Ukrainian army to break through on the battlefield against Russia. That is why Putin has reacted so sensitively. I believe this carries a completely different significance. Therefore, the fact that South Korea could not prevent the quasi-alliance and automatic intervention clauses is

a failure to draw the first red line. A second red line must be clearly drawn. Regarding highly precise weapons, let me give an example. I believe the most coveted item for North Korea, referred to as Russia's highly precise weapons, is the S-400 air defense system. North Korea lacks air superiority. One-third of the aircraft in North Korea are older than I am. It is also known that a large-scale air exercise recently resulted in the crash of many aircraft. In this situation, South Korea possesses stealth aircraft, represented by the F-35. These can fly to Pyongyang without being detected by North Korea. They lack radar and an air defense system to counter them. Russia possesses one of the world's most advanced air defense systems, heavily deployed around Moscow. The S-400 can detect aircraft like the F-35 from 20 miles away. This is extremely important for North Korea, and if it is provided to North Korea, it poses a very serious problem for South Korea. Since we do not possess nuclear weapons, our means of deterrence are limited. However, we have the 'three-axis system.' The third component of this is KMPR, or Korea Massive Punishment and Retaliation. This involves retaliating decisively if North Korea uses nuclear weapons. This is referred to as a decapitation strike operation. Naturally, in the event of war, the enemy's key command centers must be eliminated. The F-35 stealth fighter's capability is highly effective in eliminating key command centers in Pyongyang.

Possibility of Advanced Weapons Transfer and Security Threats to South Korea

As I mentioned, North Korea cannot detect our F-35 with its radar. They are completely unaware of its presence even when it flies there. But will Russia really provide something like the S-400? I am uncertain about this. Firstly, it is extremely expensive; each battery costs $200 million. So, I wonder if they will provide it. However, it is clear that this is what North Korea values most and needs most. If it is provided, it could severely impact our ability to deter North Korea's nuclear weapons, specifically our ability to conduct decapitation strikes through air superiority. Although there are debates, it is undeniable that North Korea acquiring an advanced air defense system, which it previously lacked, poses a significant security threat to South Korea.

So, how can we prevent this situation? I believe that the red line stated by our government – that if highly precise weapons are provided, we will provide all types of weapons to Ukraine – has a significant deterrent effect on Russia. For example, North Korea's nuclear-related technology, even nuclear-powered submarines, intercontinental ballistic missile re-entry technology, and multiple warhead technology, which are discussed by some, have never been provided by Russia to even its allies or friendly nations since the Soviet era, despite their importance and sensitivity. Therefore, although the possibility is low, the red line for South Korea is indeed anything above highly precise weapons, such as the S-400. There are various other technologies as well, but if Russia provides such items to North Korea, our response should and likely will be activated.

Finally, let me conclude with China. How does China view this entire situation? As I mentioned before, there are undeniable signs of strain in bilateral relations that can no longer be hidden. China will be greatly uncomfortable with the treaty signed between North Korea and Russia in the broader context. Let me give three reasons. First, it can be seen that North Korea and Russia have officially institutionalized their alignment. By signing a quasi-alliance treaty, they have demonstrated their intention to fight together. This makes it uncomfortable for China to maintain friendly relations with both North Korea and Russia. China officially opposes the formation of a bloc comprising North Korea, Russia, and China.

How, then, should we prevent such a situation? I believe that the red line announced by our government, that we will provide all types of weapons to Ukraine if they provide us with ultra-precision weapons, serves as a significant deterrent to Russia. For example, some have mentioned North Korea's nuclear-related technologies, such as nuclear-powered submarines, intercontinental ballistic missile re-entry technology, and multiple warhead technology. However, Russia has no precedent of providing such important and sensitive technologies to even its allies or friendly nations since the Soviet era. Therefore, although the possibility is low, the Korean red line is above ultra-precision weapons and the S-400, as I just mentioned. There are various other technologies as well, but if Russia provides those to North Korea, our response to that should and likely will be activated.

China's Position and the Complexity of Sino-North Korean Relations

I will conclude with a discussion on China. How does China feel watching all these developments? As I have mentioned before, the signs of abnormality in bilateral relations are now too significant to hide. In the current situation where North Korea and Russia have concluded this treaty, China will be very uncomfortable in the broader context. I will give three reasons. First, it can be seen that North Korea and Russia have officially institutionalized their alignment. Having formed a quasi-alliance, they have now shown a willingness to fight together. Therefore, China cannot help but feel uncomfortable maintaining friendly relations with both North Korea and Russia. China's official position is that it firmly opposes the formation of an alignment linking North Korea, China, and Russia.

This is because, from China's perspective, maintaining good relations with European countries is crucial in its strategic competition with the United States. However, North Korea and Russia are cooperating on the Ukraine war, a real threat to Europe. Therefore, China must maintain a distance. Given that North Korea and Russia have now shown such close alignment, China is inevitably uncomfortable. Second, ROK-US cooperation will be strengthened, and the NATO summit and the Asia-Pacific Quad, involving South Korea, Japan, Australia, and New Zealand, may be strengthened. European countries are now more likely to take direct action and voice their opinions on the North Korean issue. While this cooperation aims to check North Korea and Russia, it ultimately increases the burden on China, as it could be perceived as a check on China. This is not just my opinion; it is also the view of Professor Stephen Min-dae Gong, who has visited Korea well and is well-known. He stated that the North Korea-Russia treaty and the ROK-US-Japan alliance have significantly exacerbated the threat of confrontation or conflict from China's perspective. This is an accurate assessment.

For the reasons just mentioned, in 1961, following the treaty between North Korea and the Soviet Union, the treaty between China and North Korea on Friendship, Cooperation, and Mutual Assistance was signed approximately two weeks later. The content of this treaty is almost identical: 'In the event that one party is subjected to armed attack, the other party shall provide military and other assistance with all its might without delay.' North Korea and Russia effectively abandoned the 1961 treaty in 1996.

They then signed the Treaty of Friendly Cooperation in 2000, and now, on June 19, 2024, they have signed a quasi-alliance treaty again. However, North Korea and China have not abandoned the 1961 treaty and continue to adhere to it. Of course, when I discussed this issue with Chinese officials and scholars, many stated that it is a de facto defunct treaty and that China is unlikely to automatically intervene on behalf of North Korea. However, now that China and Russia have signed a treaty equivalent to automatic intervention, China is inevitably in a very uncomfortable position. This is because, despite the current poor relations between North Korea and China, North Korea will undoubtedly say to China: 'China, you have signed such a treaty with Russia, so what will you do?' This is a typical example of North Korea's pendulum diplomacy. In 1961, they first signed a mutual defense treaty with China, which included automatic intervention, and then used this to secure a similar treaty with the Soviet Union. This time, North Korea is likely to use this treaty to pressure China.

They must pressure China through their close relationship with Russia to obtain what they desire. Ladies and gentlemen, the emergence of such a situation is very uncomfortable for China as well, and it is likely to be pushed into making choices it does not want to make. Therefore, for these three reasons, I believe China's perspective on North Korea and Russia is by no means comfortable. We need to analyze and respond more meticulously and effectively to what will happen in the future. Thank you for watching.

Comprehensive Assessment and Policy Recommendations

Park Won-gon, Director of the EAI Center for North Korean Studies, points out that the Comprehensive Strategic Partnership Agreement signed between North Korea and Russia on June 19 is a 'quasi-alliance treaty' and, in effect, includes an automatic intervention clause, making its content identical to the treaty signed between the Soviet Union and North Korea in 1961. Director Park explains that this treaty is dangerous because it presupposes the legitimacy for North Korea and Russia to jointly respond in military situations, separate from the UN, and provides room for arbitrary judgment by North Korea and Russia on the criteria for 'armed invasion.' In response, he suggests that South Korea should utilize the provision of lethal weapons to Ukraine as leverage, clearly presenting Russia with South Korea's red line regarding North Korea-Russia cooperation.

■ Park Won-gon_ Director, Center for North Korean Studies, East Asia Institute. Professor, Department of North Korean Studies, Ewha Womans University.

■ Managed and Edited by: Park Ji-soo, EAI Research Fellow

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