[North Korea and the World] Denuclearization of North Korea and South Korea's Response Amidst US Alliance Transformation

YouTube Link: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=RQ292tg86d0

Video Script

Whether it is advantageous for Trump to be elected or for Biden to be elected is a very difficult question. However, one thing is certain: I believe Trump is more likely to rapidly undermine the norms that have been the core of Korea's prosperity and security, such as the rules-based international order, free trade, the rule of law, respect for sovereignty, and opposition to changing the status quo by force. Hello, I am Park Won-gon. Thank you to those watching North Korea and the World. Today, I intend to discuss the impact of the US presidential election on Korea. Of course, there is still time until the US presidential election. It is November, but I believe those who are interested are well aware that discussions about the impact of the US presidential election results on Korea have already begun and are being raised frequently. In particular, there are many concerns being raised about the potential impact if former President Trump were to return to the White House. Therefore, today I will discuss this in general.

US Presidential Election Results and Prospects for North Korean Denuclearization

Today, I will first discuss how the US presidential election will affect the issue of North Korean denuclearization. Regardless of whether Trump or Biden wins, it will be difficult for North Korean denuclearization to be a priority in US foreign policy. Although there have been special circumstances due to COVID-19 since 2020, there have been no dialogues between North Korea and the US during this period. In particular, one of the trends under the Biden administration is that the North Korean nuclear issue has not been a priority in US foreign policy. It is anticipated that the Ukraine war, the Gaza war, and the US-China strategic competition are taking priority in foreign policy, leading to a general decrease in focus and importance on the North Korean issue. This is unlikely to change significantly regardless of whether Biden or Trump wins the election. Ultimately, it is likely that the status quo regarding the North Korean issue will be maintained. That is, the stalemate will continue.

As you may recall, after winning the presidency in 2016, Trump met with Kim Jong-un in 2018 and 2019 through the so-called Korean Peninsula Peace Process. Since then, there have been no dialogues from 2020 onwards. In particular, it is true that Biden's North Korea policy has been heavily criticized. From the moment Biden announced his North Korea policy until now, the term 'Strategic Patience 2.0 of the Obama administration' has been used. The reason why both Biden and Trump are unlikely to prioritize the North Korean issue, in addition to other important matters, is that they seem to share a similar view on North Korea. The first is that North Korea is an untrustworthy partner.

This is likely a stronger sentiment within the Democratic Party. Despite the Iran nuclear deal reached during the Obama administration, North Korea unilaterally proceeded with its withdrawal in less than two months. Therefore, key figures in the Biden administration have the perception that North Korea cannot be truly trusted as a negotiating partner. Furthermore, this is a perception shared by both Trump and Biden: it is difficult to achieve North Korean denuclearization through nuclear negotiations with North Korea. With the accumulated experience of nuclear negotiations over the past 30 years, it is considered very difficult, and some even say practically impossible. Consequently, questions are arising about whether it is necessary to invest their political assets and capabilities in this endeavor.

Nevertheless, there are also discussions about Trump. Some experts argue that Trump might meet Kim Jong Un again, similar to the Korean Peninsula Peace Process in 2018 and 2019. It is difficult to say whether this is accurate. It depends on Trump's mindset and will be influenced by the foreign policy environment within the United States. Considering his tendencies, I believe the possibility is not high. This is because he has tried it once and did not achieve significant results. They met three times. Although Trump said they got along well,

there was no substantial progress. In that regard, Trump has clearly learned from the experience, and thus, would he need to invest his political assets here? Especially since he is very sensitive to costs, there are significant limitations in such a situation. Therefore, my judgment is that he will not easily meet with Kim Jong-un. What we should be more concerned about is that Trump might pursue negotiations for political gain rather than for actual denuclearization measures by North Korea. Trump has been consistently saying during his campaign rallies that he 'got along well with Kim Jong-un.' This implies that during his presidency, North Korea did not conduct nuclear tests or intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) tests, which he heavily emphasizes. Therefore, if Trump were to be elected, he might reach an agreement to lift some sanctions in exchange for North Korea's moratorium on these activities, and then declare political victory. This is a very serious issue, but we cannot completely rule out the possibility.

In April 2018, North Korea declared a moratorium on ICBM and nuclear tests at a plenary session at the time of initiating negotiations with Trump. Of course, they later broke it. There is a possibility of North Korea adopting such an attitude. If such an agreement were reached, North Korea's denuclearization would effectively be off the table. It would become a de facto nuclear-armed state with some sanctions lifted. Of course, traditional strategists in both the US and South Korea, as well as voices within South Korea, would strongly oppose this. Trump might bear that burden. Alternatively, North Korea might take the initiative to break the stalemate. In December 2019, North Korea declared a 'frontal breakthrough' strategy, stating that it would no longer engage in dialogue, and since then, despite the special circumstances of COVID-19, it has been working to advance its nuclear capabilities. The problem is that it doesn't stop there. To become a nuclear-armed state,

it needs sanctions to be lifted, even if it has to give up some nuclear capabilities. There are debates about this, but I still believe that as long as sanctions remain, North Korea, and especially Kim Jong-un, will not be able to achieve the economic development five-year plan they desire. Therefore, lifting sanctions is crucial. Consequently, North Korea might favor Trump next year, or even if the Biden administration is re-elected, they might come forward for a decisive negotiation. Of course, I believe there is a high probability that North Korea will attempt a negotiation in the form of nuclear disarmament through this. If North Korea truly wants Trump as a partner, there is a possibility of a seventh nuclear test before the US presidential election in November. If this happens, it would create a situation where Trump could claim that Biden's North Korea policy and denuclearization policy have completely failed. The upcoming US presidential election will be very close, and this could have some influence on the outcome.

US Presidential Election Results and Changes in the ROK-US Alliance

This would create a more favorable situation for Trump. If they do not conduct a seventh nuclear test, then perhaps next year, especially if Trump is re-elected, they might propose a nuclear freeze negotiation, where they would refrain from a seventh nuclear test in exchange for sanctions relief. This is clearly not a good scenario for us. Second, I will discuss the US presidential election and the ROK-US alliance. I believe this alliance has undergone significant changes recently. This is the biggest change in the history of the alliance, which was established through a mutual defense treaty after the Korean War 53 years ago and has continued to this day. This is not just applicable to South Korea; the United States is transforming the entire alliance structure in the Indo-Pacific region. The turning point, I believe, was the recent summit between Biden and Kishida. What is happening here is that the US's existing alliances in the Indo-Pacific region have been bilateral alliances.

The US is at the center, and bilateral alliances are formed like spokes of a wheel to create a single system. However, although signs of change were evident from 2001, the situation has become concrete recently. The US is saying, 'We will now move towards a lattice structure.' What does this mean? Instead of bilateral alliances, it means responding by strengthening a network of small-group, multilateral alliances and partnerships. Therefore, instead of existing bilateral alliances, it will involve cooperation among three to four countries. A network structure is being formed, and we need to pay close attention to two words that the US consistently emphasizes. One is the concept of 'protection.' The explanation is that the basic goal of bilateral alliances was for the US to protect its allies. However, this is no longer the case; instead, a small-group multilateral cooperation system will work together with the US to respond to common threats. Of course, the primary target is China, and North Korea is also a target to some extent. However, the core is ultimately China, and they will respond together through this lattice structure.

For example, China imposed economic coercion on South Korea because of THAAD, didn't it? Australia also suffered the same fate. So, if China were to impose economic coercion in such a manner again, countries bound by this lattice alliance network would work together to respond. In addition, they are talking about a 'multiplier effect' militarily, which means forming a network centered around treaty allies and combining the regional characteristics and military advantages of those allied countries to achieve a greater multiplier effect. This is being done with China in mind. China officially has only one ally, North Korea. Geopolitically, it is difficult for them to align with North Korea to counter the US. However, the US is in a much more advantageous position to counter China by bringing together its treaty allies in the Indo-Pacific region, and they are emphasizing the military significance of this.

This inevitably leads to changes in the ROK-US alliance. The biggest change will be this. The fundamental goal of the ROK-US alliance is, of course, to respond to North Korea. However, the US is fundamentally changing the alliance structure by developing the ROK-US alliance to move beyond a singular response to North Korea and to utilize it in various ways within the Indo-Pacific region. As I mentioned earlier, the US has been doing this for some time. It has been a long time since the US established the Indo-Pacific region as a single theater of operations. What this means is that if a conflict occurs in the Pacific region, whether it's a Taiwan Strait crisis or a Korean Peninsula crisis, US forces deployed forward will be utilized there. Therefore, there is a very high possibility that US Forces Korea will be utilized in a Taiwan Strait crisis, and it is clear that US Forces Japan will be utilized in case of an emergency on the Korean Peninsula.

Therefore, contrary to what some are saying, if a Taiwan Strait crisis occurs, South Korea will inevitably be involved as an ally, unable to avoid contributing. If South Korea does not choose to adapt to this change, the ROK-US alliance will lose its meaning. The US is fundamentally changing the alliance itself, so we have very little room for choice. In this situation, what should we do? South Korea will likely have to take responsibility for responding to the North Korean threat.

Extended Deterrence and Cost-Sharing Issues under a Trump Administration

Current ROK-US operational plans include the deployment of large-scale US reinforcements in case of an emergency on the Korean Peninsula, but the possibility of this is now significantly reduced. While some US Air Force and Navy assets may be deployed, South Korea will have to bear the primary responsibility for responding to conventional warfare. Trump is much more sensitive to costs, so he is likely to emphasize this aspect further. Regarding the defense of South Korea, people considered close to Trump have openly stated, 'South Korea should be responsible for its own defense. South Korea is such a prosperous nation, and it spends so much on defense expenditures. Why can't it take responsibility?' Furthermore, there are calls for greater military contributions to the Indo-Pacific region, and Trump is likely to strongly advocate for this. Another, and perhaps the most concerning, issue is

extended deterrence. South Korea does not possess nuclear weapons, while the US does and poses a tangible threat. We have no choice but to rely on US extended deterrence. However, if Trump comes to power, this could face significant challenges. Trump, from 2016 to 2020, demanded a sixfold increase in cost-sharing contributions. Trump's fundamental view of alliances is based on cost-benefit analysis. He is very sensitive to how much allies contribute financially, and although South Korea's burden-sharing rate is much higher than that of other US allies, he claimed it was insufficient and demanded a sixfold increase, ultimately leading to a one-year agreement. Under the Biden administration, there have been 11 rounds of negotiations for what is called a 'Special Measures Agreement' (SMA). While the first and second rounds were completed, and as you may have seen in the media recently, there is a push to finalize the 12th SMA before Trump potentially takes office. Regardless of this, if Trump comes to power, he may demand cost-sharing.

Specifically, what aspects might he demand cost-sharing for? This was also raised during the 2016 and 2020 cost-sharing negotiations: he might demand payment for the joint ROK-US military exercises and for the strategic assets that the US deploys to South Korea. The problem with this is that such items are not included in the current ROK-US Special Measures Agreement (SMA). There are no such items at all. Therefore, during the negotiations at that time, we stated that we could not pay for these items because they were not included. Trump, who tends to disregard such agreements, argued that regardless of whether items were included or not, it was for the protection and defense of South Korea, and thus payment should be made, essentially making an arbitrary demand. This could be repeated. Second, if this happens, extended deterrence will inevitably be weakened. Under the Biden administration, through the Washington Declaration, the Nuclear Consultative Group (NCG), which you may have heard of, has been institutionalizing extended deterrence. The core principles are twofold: timely deployment of US strategic assets to the Korean Peninsula to deter North Korea, and responding to North Korean actions if deterrence fails. If the cost-sharing demands continue, and if we refuse to pay, there is a concern that they might refuse to provide these services. If the demand for these costs shakes extended deterrence, the argument for nuclear armament within South Korea is likely to gain traction. It is unavoidable. If the US does not provide adequate extended deterrence to South Korea due to cost issues, the voice demanding that South Korea pursue nuclear armament will inevitably grow louder. Relatedly, I believe the discussion on the transfer of wartime operational control (OPCON) is also likely to be shelved.

The Biden administration has not emphasized it much. Instead, there is a possibility that the US might transfer wartime operational control to South Korea to utilize US Forces Korea more effectively for a wider range of responses in the Indo-Pacific region, rather than direct responses to North Korea. However, ladies and gentlemen, looking at the history of alliances, this is not unique to the ROK-US alliance but is a common trend. To narrow it down to the ROK-US alliance, the US's continued maintenance of the alliance, and the primary objectives of the ROK-US alliance, are essentially two. First, of course, is responding to the threat from North Korea, which accounts for a much larger proportion. Simultaneously, there is also the intention to control the South Korean military. The US wants to prevent escalation into another war in the process of responding to North Korean provocations. This is also one of the reasons why the US maintains operational control. This tendency has been evident within the Democratic Party, both during the Obama and current Biden administrations, which is why they have not been very enthusiastic about the transfer of wartime operational control.

Finally, I will discuss South Korea's response. South Korea must never abandon the ultimate goal of North Korean denuclearization. Whether it's denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula or the Korean Peninsula, without complex terminology, it means eliminating North Korea's nuclear weapons. This ultimate goal must never be abandoned. I say this because voices within the US are increasingly arguing, 'North Korean denuclearization is an unrealistic option, so we should effectively accept North Korea as a nuclear-armed state by freezing its nuclear program and pursuing nuclear disarmament.' The moment we accept such nuclear disarmament negotiations, North Korea becomes a nuclear-armed state. I believe we must never accept this, and we must not abandon the goal of North Korean denuclearization.

South Korea's Response Strategy: Denuclearization Goals and Negotiation Framework

Therefore, the clear goal must be to eliminate the nuclear weapons in North Korea—all past, present, and future nuclear capabilities. Furthermore, equally important is the need for a phased approach, which is unavoidable. However, there must be a roadmap that encompasses all stages. If North Korea continuously breaks down the process like slicing salami, it will lead to North Korea becoming a nuclear-armed state. The moment the goal is abandoned, with a timetable for the entire roadmap outlining how, in what manner, and by when North Korean denuclearization should be achieved, North Korea will become a nuclear-armed state.

Therefore, the clear goal is the denuclearization of North Korea, eliminating all past, present, and future nuclear capabilities. Equally important is that while phased implementation is unavoidable, there must be a roadmap that encompasses all stages. If North Korea continuously breaks this down like salami, it will lead to the step-by-step process of North Korea becoming a nuclear power. A timetable for the overall roadmap must be established, specifying how, in what manner, and by when North Korean denuclearization should be achieved; upon abandoning this goal, North Korea will possess nuclear weapons.

This is something we must not overlook. Second, the framework for denuclearization negotiations must be fundamentally changed. For the past 30 years, North Korean nuclear negotiations have been largely led by the United States. Since the Kim Dae-jung administration, the approach has been to entrust the nuclear issue to the US for negotiation. Previously, the primary target of North Korea's nuclear development was the United States, threatening to attack the US mainland with ballistic missiles. However, starting in May 2019, North Korea began developing short-range, low-yield ballistic missiles capable of carrying nuclear warheads, such as the KN-23. This signifies that the primary target of the nuclear capabilities developed so far is South Korea. They are developing countless missiles with ranges that can reach South Korea, and Kim Jong-un himself has shown operational plans, stating that they will fire their low-yield nuclear weapons at South Korea to gain the initiative in the initial phase of a war on the Korean Peninsula.

Therefore, the North Korean nuclear issue is now an existential threat to South Korea, rather than to the US mainland. Naturally, South Korea should be the primary actor in nuclear negotiations. South Korea and North Korea must engage in nuclear negotiations. To this end, South Korea needs to thoroughly coordinate with the United States to change the framework of nuclear negotiations. Although it will not be easy, this is a direct threat to us. We trust the US as an ally, but if it poses a threat to us, it is appropriate for us to be the principal party. Furthermore, as I mentioned earlier,

North Korea is likely to attempt to change the game next year. In this situation, we also need to be prepared. North Korea will naturally try to engage in dialogue with the US, excluding South Korea. We must thoroughly coordinate with the US to ensure that South Korea has a voice as a principal party. We must create the space for such action. The 'Audacious Initiative,' announced by the Yoon Suk-yeol administration as its North Korea policy, has three concepts: renunciation, deterrence, and dialogue. However, in the current situation, dialogue is not visible. Of course, it is understandable that deterrence is necessary because North Korea completely refuses dialogue and continues to advance its nuclear program. However, the voice of dialogue must also move in parallel within this framework, but it is too faint. Therefore, by creating and emphasizing the voice of dialogue within the same framework, we must prepare for various future situations. It is clear that South Korea will have to respond to conventional threats. The question is, under the existing excessive agreements,

Multifaceted Preparation and Enhanced Cooperation under a Trump Administration

what should be done if Trump takes office? A multidimensional approach is necessary. First, we need to consider at what level we can afford to pay. Furthermore, we must also discuss our economic contributions to the US. Since Trump talks more directly, we can also discuss purchasing US weapons. Additionally, from our perspective and based on principle, we must continue to pursue a response to the low-yield nuclear weapons that North Korea intends to use. As I mentioned before, in addition to tailored deterrence by ROK-US, it is clearly necessary to continue developing the integration of nuclear and conventional capabilities, combining conventional forces within South Korea's 'three-axis system' with the US's nuclear capabilities.

Trump prioritizes bilateral relationships. This makes it easier for him to extract more from allies. Nevertheless, given the nature of the existing small-group multilateral systems, there is a considerable possibility that he might utilize them effectively if necessary. In any case, cooperating with such countries undoubtedly helps broaden flexibility and space for maneuver amidst various changes. I believe South Korea should also create more of such frameworks. Therefore, shouldn't South Korea emphasize and prepare more for consultations within small-group multilateral systems, such as those between South Korea, the US, and Australia, or between South Korea, the US, and India? I briefly mentioned the cost issue earlier. If Trump brings it up, in terms of counter-benefits, first, through the revision of the ROK-US atomic energy agreement, we could also reprocess plutonium. If Trump emerges, this is not an impossible task. The issue of the shield is a serious concern. That issue can be resolved, and we can also acquire what is commonly referred to as latent nuclear capabilities. Second, we have

the nuclear-powered submarines that we have been pursuing. I believe there is a clear strategic significance to such nuclear-powered submarines. I am one of those who argue against aircraft carriers. In that regard, I believe the Trump administration might be more open, and we could receive them as a counter-benefit. Finally, you will probably ask these questions: Is it more advantageous for Trump to win, or for Biden to win? This is a very difficult question. However, one thing is certain: if Trump wins, the norms that have been the core of Korea's prosperity and security—namely, free trade, the rule of law, respect for sovereignty, and opposition to changing the status quo by force—are likely to be rapidly undermined. I believe Trump would do so. Therefore, it clearly presents a greater challenge for South Korea. I will conclude here for today. Thank you.

Park Won-gon, Director of the EAI Center for North Korean Studies (Professor at Ewha Womans University), analyzes the impact of the 2024 US presidential election on Korean Peninsula security. Park emphasizes that regardless of the election outcome, the US will pursue alliance transformation and suggests that South Korea should begin preparing for the US's demand for enhanced independent response capabilities to North Korean threats and increased investment in this area. Furthermore, he argues that South Korea must never abandon the ultimate goal of 'complete denuclearization' of North Korea and stresses the need to shift the basic framework of North Korean denuclearization negotiations from US-North Korea discussions to South-North Korea discussions through cooperation with the US.

■ Park Won-gon_Director, EAI Center for North Korean Studies. Professor, Department of North Korean Studies, Ewha Womans University.

■ Managed and Edited by: Park Ji-soo, EAI Research Fellow

Inquiries: 02 2277 1683 (ext. 208) | jspark@eai.or.kr