North Korea and the World: Goals and Challenges of U.S.-ROK Extended Deterrence

YouTube Link: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=QKA0GwJOLSQ

Video Script

The Importance of Extended Deterrence and North Korean Nuclear Use Scenarios

There needs to be certainty that if North Korea uses nuclear weapons against South Korea, the United States will respond even if it means risking its own homeland. If extended deterrence is institutionalized, South Korea and the U.S. will plan and act together, which will lead to a situation where the U.S. must respond. Hello. Thank you sincerely to everyone watching Park Won-gon's North Korea and the World. Today, I will continue our discussion from last time on extended deterrence between South Korea and the U.S. What I said earlier is that ultimately, if Kim Jong-un has no intention of self-destruction through the formidable response capabilities of South Korea and the U.S., he cannot initiate war itself. Nevertheless, it is necessary for South Korea and the U.S. to prepare to the fullest extent, and in a way, this is also a psychological battle.

Deterrence has a very psychological component. If the adversary possesses formidable capabilities, the simple psychology that the adversary cannot attack easily can deter war. Many deterrence theories have evolved from this. What I will discuss today is how to deter North Korea. I believe South Korea and the United States must choose one of two options. The first is to ensure that North Korea can never use nuclear weapons. The second is for North Korea to use low-yield nuclear weapons but prevent escalation beyond that. This is a widely discussed topic. To state my conclusion upfront, I believe that preventing North Korea from using any type of nuclear weapon whatsoever must be the core top priority for South Korea and the U.S.

This is because, firstly, even if North Korea uses low-yield tactical nuclear weapons, a full-scale war will be inevitable. Regardless of whether North Korea's nuclear weapons are low-yield or high-yield, their use will inevitably cause immense damage to us. Furthermore, the Korean Peninsula is very narrow between North and South Korea. In military terms, in a situation with a very narrow battlefield environment, North Korea's use of nuclear weapons means the entire area will inevitably become a battlefield. Therefore, the most important thing from our perspective is to prevent war. To deter war, I believe the core top priority for South Korea and the U.S. must be to prevent North Korea from using any type of nuclear weapon.

To this end, South Korea and the U.S. are continuously pursuing a strategy of decisively punishing North Korea for any use of nuclear weapons. A prime example is the Washington Declaration in April last year, where President Biden clearly stated, “The use of nuclear weapons by North Korea would mean the end of its regime.” This is not the first time such a statement has been made; the U.S. Nuclear Posture Review Report of 2022 also explicitly states that the use of nuclear weapons by North Korea would result in the end of its regime. Additionally, South Korea and the U.S. hold the Security Consultative Meeting (SCM) at the end of the year.

The same content was included in the joint statements of the defense ministers at the 55th meeting last year and the 54th meeting the year before. "Any nuclear attack by North Korea is unacceptable and will ultimately lead to the end of the Kim Jong-un regime." This means that if North Korea uses nuclear weapons, its regime will end. The end of the regime is an immense burden for North Korea. In a way, the end of the regime may be a greater burden for North Korea than the U.S. responding with nuclear weapons in the event of North Korea's nuclear use. As you know, North Korea is a one-man rule system. Ultimately, Kim Jong-un's security is far more prioritized than national security. Unfortunately, even if North Korea fires nuclear weapons, the U.S. responds with nuclear weapons, and immense damage occurs to the North Korean populace, if only Kim Jong-un survives, the North Korean regime will still have the will to continue the war.

Recommendations for Deterring North Korean Nuclear Use

Therefore, targeting the North Korean regime rather than the North Korean populace, and aiming for the end of the regime, has a greater deterrent effect. North Korea itself has acknowledged this. Kim Jong-un himself has reacted very sensitively to the talk of the end of the regime multiple times at the end of the year, beginning of the year, and even before. For example, at the end of last year and the beginning of this year, Kim Jong-un stated, "They openly talk about the end of the regime," and "They make the outrageous statement of the end of the regime." This, conversely, indicates a deterrent effect. I believe this is working, but if I may offer a few suggestions, what South Korea and the U.S. must consider is that any use of nuclear weapons by North Korea, whether low-yield or high-yield, will inevitably lead to escalation, and it is important to make announcements to prevent this. That is, "Unless North Korea uses nuclear weapons first, the U.S. will not use nuclear weapons preemptively." This is a very important concept.

The United States has never denied the preemptive use of nuclear weapons since its acquisition. This is the 'No First Use' principle in English, which always carries ambiguity. It leaves open the possibility of preemptive nuclear use. However, from North Korea's perspective, stating that the U.S. will not use nuclear weapons if North Korea does not use them is very helpful in controlling escalation. This paradoxically means the following: "If North Korea uses nuclear weapons, the U.S. will also use nuclear weapons." Therefore, "North Korea, if you use your nuclear weapons, you will be met with retaliation with the U.S.'s formidable nuclear arsenal, leading to the end of your regime, so do not use them" can be a very powerful deterrent message.

Of course, this would require modifying the nuclear strategy that the United States has maintained for a long time, but I believe it is fully discussable and necessary to discuss. Another point is that there is discussion within South Korea about deploying U.S. tactical nuclear weapons to South Korea, and I am cautious about this. If U.S. nuclear weapons, meaning tactical nuclear weapons brought to the Korean Peninsula, are deployed to South Korea, it could serve as a message of proportional and limited response, implying that if North Korea attacks South Korea with low-yield tactical nuclear weapons, the U.S. will respond with low-yield tactical nuclear weapons.

As I have repeatedly stated, we have two options, and this is the second option I mentioned earlier. It is effective in preventing escalation. However, its effectiveness in preventing North Korea from using nuclear weapons in the first place is diminished. I believe it could even send the wrong message to North Korea. Without such measures, if "North Korea uses nuclear weapons, it means the end of its regime" and "it will be retaliated against with nuclear weapons," North Korea, knowing that the U.S.'s formidable nuclear arsenal could lead to the end of its regime, will not be able to use nuclear weapons easily. I believe this has the effect of appropriately deterring nuclear use from the outset. We need to consider this aspect as well.

Current Status of Institutionalizing Extended Deterrence in South Korea and the U.S.

So, what are South Korea and the U.S. doing? South Korea and the U.S. are continuously working to institutionalize so-called extended deterrence. Through the Washington Declaration in April last year, they established the Nuclear Consultative Group (NCG), and preparations are ongoing throughout this year. There are many sensitive details, and it is difficult to elaborate due to limited public disclosure, but what is clear is that there is a discernible difference between the period before and after the NCG's launch. It is evident that in terms of information sharing, consultation, joint planning, and joint execution, there has been significant progress after the NCG compared to before. For example, in terms of information sharing, when U.S. strategic assets entered South Korea, previously, even if South Korea sought prior consultation or made requests, consultation with the U.S. was rarely successful. However, after the NCG, we have confirmed situations where prior consultation with South Korea takes place, and the U.S. agrees to their deployment upon South Korea's request.

This is a much higher level than before. Joint planning can be seen as a precursor to operational planning, even if it is not full operational planning. Previously, nuclear matters were exclusively controlled by the U.S., and even close allies did not share their plans. Now, discussions on how to respond to specific scenarios have reached a considerable level of joint planning. The next important aspect is joint execution, following joint planning. Discussions are underway on how South Korea and the U.S. will respond on a combined basis. This has been publicly disclosed: it was confirmed that South Korea and the U.S. would establish guidelines by June of this year and implement them in practice through combined training in the latter half of the year. There are several such initiatives, one of which is the Tailored Deterrence Strategy (TDS). While specific details have not been disclosed externally, it involves discussions on how South Korea and the U.S. will respond to North Korea's nuclear use scenarios. This naturally includes content on what resources will be utilized, including the U.S.'s advanced nuclear capabilities.

This has been revised again, marking the first revision in 10 years. It was announced in October 2023. Although specific details are not available, it is known that the TDS, a tailored nuclear strategy for South Korea and the U.S. to jointly respond to North Korea's advanced nuclear capabilities over the past decade, has been revised. In addition to this, there is the concept of 'Nuclear-Conventional Integrated Operations.' This involves combining the U.S. nuclear forces with South Korea's three-axis system to counter North Korea. I believe that quite specific discussions are taking place between South Korea and the U.S., and they have reached a considerable level. The test of our extended deterrence, meaning whether the U.S. will respond to North Korea's nuclear use against South Korea while risking its own homeland, will lead to a situation where the U.S. must respond if extended deterrence is institutionalized, as South Korea and the U.S. will train together and act according to plans. As I mentioned earlier, if North Korea reaches the level of attack, the U.S. is actually much more likely to respond preemptively. This is the extended deterrence that South Korea and the U.S. are continuously developing.

Challenges to Extended Deterrence in the Event of a Second Trump Term

Finally, I must address the return of Trump. If Trump wins the U.S. presidential election again in November and returns to the White House, what will happen? I will focus solely on extended deterrence. There are clear challenges. The most crucial elements of extended deterrence are two: first, combined training where South Korea and the U.S. specifically counter North Korean nuclear threat scenarios, and second, the projection of U.S. formidable nuclear assets onto the Korean Peninsula. However, Trump has sufficiently demonstrated a negative stance on both of these over the past four years. He continuously raises cost issues. He claims that combined training is very expensive and that deploying strategic assets also incurs significant costs. Therefore, we cannot rule out the possibility that he will raise cost issues.

Strictly speaking, South Korea cannot bear these costs. South Korea and the U.S. have a Special Measures Agreement (SMA) to cover part of the costs of U.S. troop presence, but it does not include items for combined training costs or strategic asset deployment costs. In other words, there is no basis for us to pay. Trump prefers situations without a basis. There is a possibility that he will unilaterally demand costs from allies. If that happens, it could pose a challenge to the extended deterrence we have established. Beyond that, there are many challenging factors, and while I believe the South Korean government is already preparing, I think it is very important to prepare more thoroughly. This is all I have to say today.

Thank you.

Park Won-gon, Director of the EAI Center for North Korean Studies (Professor at Ewha Womans University), argues that since a full-scale war is inevitable on the Korean Peninsula the moment nuclear weapons are used, the top priority of extended deterrence between South Korea and the U.S. must be to deter North Korea from using any type of nuclear weapon. To this end, he emphasizes the need to publicly declare, in addition to the threat of "the end of the Kim Jong-un regime," that the U.S. will not launch a preemptive nuclear strike unless North Korea uses nuclear weapons first. He also notes that while extended deterrence has indeed achieved a more advanced level of institutionalization with the 'Washington Declaration' in April 2023, the South Korean government must prepare from now on for the risks it may face if Trump is elected in the U.S. presidential election in November.

■ Park Won-gon: Director of the EAI Center for North Korean Studies. Professor of North Korean Studies at Ewha Womans University.

■ Management and Editing: Park Ji-soo, EAI Researcher
Inquiries: 02 2277 1683 (ext. 208) | jspark@eai.or.kr

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