[EAI Fake News Conference] Populism, Fake News, and Korean Democracy

YouTube link: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=A6uEjp1mDkM

Editor's Note

Kang Won-taek, Professor at Seoul National University, points out that political polarization and populist politics provide a fertile environment for the production, distribution, and consumption of fake news (or disinformation). An analysis of fake news perception surveys reveals that respondents with populist characteristics tend to exhibit strong partisan stances and a higher acceptance of fake news. Furthermore, low trust in the judiciary significantly influences the acceptance of fake news, indicating a vicious cycle where distrust in political institutions and organizations reproduces polarized public opinion and fuels fake news consumption, thereby illustrating the current state of Korean democracy.

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Kang Won-taek (Director, EAI Center for Democratic Studies, Professor at Seoul National University): My concern was that the current challenges to modern democracy, to our democracy, stem from populism. However, the convergence of fake news, polarization, and populism poses a significant threat and challenge to democracy. To put it simply, about 30 years ago, South Korea, like many others, was part of the third wave of democratization. There were very optimistic projections, as exemplified by Francis Fukuyama's 'The End of History.' However, we are now seeing a significant 'democratic backsliding,' with a considerable number of countries regressing. The US presidential election is approaching.

Populism is now a global phenomenon. We've seen Brexit and the 'Take Back Control' movement, which have strong nativist undertones.

Among the myriad of phenomena, how does Korea fare? What exactly is populism? We need to define it simply because the term 'populism' is often used in politics to refer to mere pandering. A more academic definition is needed. Typically, populism can be distinguished by several characteristics. The very word 'populism' originates from 'people,' doesn't it?

The most fundamental characteristic of populism is the division between the majority, referred to as 'the people' or 'the masses,' and 'the elite.' The elite are depicted as bad, greedy, and corrupt. Conversely, 'the people' are portrayed as pure and virtuous. This is the most basic definition of populism. In fact, back in the early 1970s, many scholars gathered at the London School of Economics for a two- or three-day discussion on populism. The conclusion they reached was, 'Let's each define it ourselves.' There was no consensus.

Despite its ambiguity, the first and universally accepted element of populism is the 'people vs. elite' dichotomy. This 'elite' includes members of the National Assembly, the judiciary, the executive branch, and even large conglomerates. Secondly, by emphasizing 'the people,' it fosters skepticism towards representative democracy, favoring direct democracy instead. In Korea, the preference for candlelight vigils can be seen as a similar example of direct participation, as representative democracy is perceived as being conducted by the elite. Thirdly, as the initial division suggests, populism creates a 'us vs. them' dynamic. A prime example is Trump's call for a 'beautiful, big wall' on the Mexican border. Those beyond the wall are 'them,' and those within are 'us.' This constant division, whether based on race, ethnicity, or region, represents the politics of division and exclusion, a key feature of populism. Fourthly, there is criticism of capitalism. By emphasizing 'the people,' it often posits a 'general will,' suggesting that the entire nation shares a single will, which can lead to the rejection of capitalism. Fifth, and most simply put, Trump's slogan 'MAGA' (Make America Great Again) implies that America was once great.

In our view, America is still great, isn't it? What Trump appeals to is an idealized past, a better world in his mind, likely referring to a bygone era when America was led by white people. He seeks to tap into a perceived 'Heartland' and appeal to it. I believe this is a utopia that never truly existed. Secondly, charismatic leaders and emotional appeals are common. The first four points are phenomena that manifest politically in most forms of populism. The points below may or may not appear. So, what about Korea? I believe Korea is not immune to populism.

One of the most prominent examples is the term 'tochak waegu' (native Japanese collaborators) that was widely used during the previous administration. It implies that some people living in Korea are not Koreans but Japanese. This expression, 'tochak waegu,' is a classic example of dividing people into 'us' and 'them,' embodying division and exclusion. It was used as a term. Similarly, 'jeokpye' (deep-rooted evils) also frames a dichotomy of good versus evil, where 'we' are good and 'they' are deeply rooted evils, inherently wicked. Thus, such terminology appears within the concept of 'jeokpye.' Another phenomenon was the non-mediated interaction between politicians and citizens, bypassing the legislature. The National Petition system is a prime example of this.

While the Moon Jae-in administration cannot be definitively labeled a populist government, and perhaps lacked certain populist elements, I believe it did employ such strategies. Therefore, we are not entirely free from populist appeals. This leads to division, which in turn connects with political polarization. Consequently, people tend to hear only what they want to hear, and communication becomes limited to 'like-minded people' rather than engaging in broader societal dialogue. This situation creates a highly receptive environment for fake news.

Thus, populism and fake news are intimately connected. I examined the extent to which our society is divided. Is it truly, truly polarized? What I consider important is that when we discuss populism, fake news, or polarization, we often blame politicians or political suppliers, such as parties and politicians. However, I believe consumers are equally problematic. This analysis focuses on the attitudes of consumers of political information and populism. As you can see from the deeply embedded data... For example, supporters of the Democratic Party rate the Democratic Party at 6.24 out of 10, while the People Power Party receives a score of 1.67. Conversely, supporters of the People Power Party rate their party at 6.45, while the Democratic Party receives a score of 1.74.

This pattern is consistent across all measures. For instance, regarding Lee Jae-myung, Democratic Party supporters rate him at 6.25, while People Power Party supporters rate him at 1.45. For Yoon Suk-yeol, the scores are 1.25 from Democratic Party supporters and 6.25 from People Power Party supporters. There is an enormous difference in preference, with scores ranging from the teens to the sixties. Thus, preferences are clearly divided based on partisan affiliation.

Next is ideological distance. If it's difficult to see, please refer to the materials provided. This section measures how respondents perceive their own position, the position of their preferred party, and the position of the opposing party. The averages are presented, broken down by the party supporters.

For Democratic Party supporters, the distance to the Democratic Party is 0.2, indicating they are very close. The distance to Lee Jae-myung is also minimal. However, the perceived distance to the People Power Party among Democratic Party supporters is nearly 4. On a scale of 0 to 170, with 11 categories, a score of 4 represents a considerable distance. This pattern is not unique to Democratic Party supporters; People Power Party supporters exhibit a similar trend. They perceive their own party as very close and the opposing party as very distant. Interestingly, they also perceive the opposing party as ideologically extreme, while their own party is seen as nearly moderate. In such a situation, it becomes difficult to achieve compromise between the two parties, leading to challenges in reaching consensus. The perceived distances are vastly different. To verify this, let's look at the nine questions presented here.

One question concerns North Korea security, a common dividing line between conservatives and progressives in Korea. Another is market vs. state intervention, a universal debate about the role of the state versus market autonomy. Then there is libertarianism versus authoritarianism, concerning individual freedom. Interestingly, consistent differences emerge across all nine domains.

It's astonishing how consistently these differences appear. This raises the question of whether people's views truly differ on all policies. It's quite perplexing. Looking at the next page, I decided to ask again. Upon further investigation, slightly over half of those who identify as progressive support the Democratic Party. The rest do not. For the People Power Party, 62% identify as conservative, which is slightly higher but still similar. This indicates a divergence between party affiliation and ideological self-identification. Why, then, do policy stances appear more consistently along ideological lines? I believe this is due to 'partisan mobilization.' In electoral theory, 'partisan rationalization' suggests aligning one's own views with those of the party one supports. If a party's statement resonates with one's own thoughts, it's a matter of persuasion. Another factor is projection, where individuals, even if unsure, assume a party's stance based on its past actions. In my view, partisan factors have significantly amplified policy differences, more so than the actual policy gaps themselves. This is where the difference between polarization in Korea and the US lies. In the US, it's often termed a 'culture war,' involving religious values like Christianity and traditional family values. This is not the case in Korea. However, the phenomenon of polarization is remarkably similar to that in the US.

So, party support and ideological attitudes do not align, yet why do policy stances appear more consistent from an ideological perspective? In my view, this is due to 'partisan mobilization.' Within electoral theory, a common concept discussed is partisan rationalization, aligning one's own stance with the party one supports. I recall the party saying something, and then think, 'My thoughts are also like that.' This is persuasion. Another factor is projection, where even if I don't know well, I might assume, 'Based on what that party has done, they probably think this way.' However, I believe partisan factors have significantly amplified these policy stance differences, more so than the general public's views. This is the difference in polarization between Korea and the United States. In the U.S., they call it culture, don't they? They call it a culture war, which involves fights encompassing Christian culture, past family values, and other religious values. We do not have such a culture at all. Yet, the polarization that manifests is almost similar to that in the U.S.

Therefore, while US polarization may involve cultural and value-based factors, Korean polarization appears to be driven much more heavily by partisan factors.

Regarding populism, a scholar named Acemoglu has conducted relevant research. Broadly, there are three main aspects: first, distrust in representative democracy, with the belief that the public should decide directly; second, anti-elitism; and third, a conflict between good and evil. These can be further categorized into eight aspects. In Korea, the anti-elite sentiment is the strongest manifestation of populism, coupled with direct public participation and a good-vs-evil confrontation. Analysis by party affiliation shows that individuals who support a particular party are more receptive to populism. In other words, those with strong partisan affiliations are more likely to adopt populist attitudes.

I have examined this further. The data presented here, statistically significant up to about 90%, reveals that while partisan factors are present, individuals who are more receptive to populism tend to have lower political satisfaction and efficacy. For example, they believe the government does not listen to their voices or that their efforts are futile. This suggests a low response rate from the political system. Another factor is the perception of the National Assembly. One of the significant reasons why populism operates in Korea is the functioning of the political system itself. The political alienation, stemming from the belief that public demands are not reflected, is strongly projected.

Finally, regarding fake news, the findings are similar to those presented by Professor Yoon. As you can see, all eight items relate to fake news that specific party supporters might find interesting. I measured this by dividing respondents by party affiliation. Interestingly, for issues that Democratic Party supporters are interested in, the response that Democratic Party supporters would believe it is higher. For fake news that People Power Party supporters are interested in, the likelihood of accepting it as true or false increases among People Power Party supporters.

In other words, even with the same fake news, the interpretation differs depending on the partisan affiliation. The interpretation is partisan, and the source of fake news is perceived through a partisan lens. Before concluding, I conducted an overall analysis. The top item here represents receptivity to fake news. You can refer to the data for details. The Democratic Party group, the People Power Party group, and the combined group are shown here.

Populism characterized by a good-vs-evil, friend-vs-foe dichotomy significantly influences the acceptance of fake news. When society is more divided, people tend to accept more information.

Interestingly, regarding the National Assembly, trust is high among those who support the opposition party, which currently holds a majority in the Assembly. Conversely, for supporters of the ruling party and the president, receptivity to fake news varies depending on their trust in the president. Fake news is interpreted in a highly partisan manner. This is similar to the US situation.

What I want to emphasize here is that greater distrust in the judiciary correlates with increased receptivity to fake news. As South Korea's judiciary has, at some point, become embroiled in partisan struggles, its credibility as a neutral arbiter has significantly diminished. This decline in trust has led to a higher acceptance of fake news.

In conclusion, to summarize what I have discussed: First, partisan polarization in Korea is severe. However, unlike in the US, Korean polarization is driven by partisan mobilization rather than cultural factors, which appears to be a key difference. Second, populism is related to partisanship. From an institutional perspective, political institutions' failure to heed public voices increases receptivity to populism. Overall, anti-elitism, the good-vs-evil confrontation in populist politics, and politics of hatred and exclusion influence the acceptance of fake news. Lastly, low trust in political institutions means that the president and the National Assembly are interpreted through a partisan lens. Conversely, lower trust in the judiciary, which should be neutral, leads to higher receptivity to fake news. In sum, the current situation seems to reflect the present state of Korean democracy and is a cause for concern. I will conclude my presentation here. ■

■ Kang Won-taek_Director of the EAI Center for Democratic Studies. Professor at the Department of Political Science and International Relations, Seoul National University.

■ Managed and Edited by: Kim Sun-hee, Senior Researcher, EAI, Park Ji-soo, Researcher, EAI

    Inquiries: 02 2277 1683 (ext. 208) | jspark@eai.or.kr

Video Transcript

Yes, hello. My initial concern was that the challenges to modern democracy, to our democracy, stem from populism. However, when it meets fake news, and through the internet, polarization, populism, and fake news converge, they can pose a significant threat and challenge to democracy. To put it simply, about 30 years ago, South Korea, like many others, experienced the third wave of democratization. There were very optimistic projections, as exemplified by Francis Fukuyama's 'The End of History.' However, we are now seeing significant 'democratic backsliding,' with a considerable number of countries regressing. This is something we could hardly imagine happening in our own country, but it is happening elsewhere. The factors driving this are... Populism is now a global phenomenon. We've seen Brexit and the 'Take Back Control' movement, which have strong nativist undertones.

Among the myriad of phenomena, how does Korea fare? What exactly is populism? We need to define it simply because the term 'populism' is often used in politics to refer to mere pandering. A more academic definition is needed. Typically, populism can be distinguished by several characteristics. The very word 'populism' originates from 'people,' doesn't it? The most fundamental characteristic of populism is the division between the majority, referred to as 'the people' or 'the masses,' and 'the elite.' The elite are depicted as bad, greedy, and corrupt. Conversely, 'the people' are portrayed as pure and virtuous. This is the most basic definition of populism. In fact, back in the early 1970s, many scholars gathered at the London School of Economics for a two- or three-day discussion on populism. The conclusion they reached was, 'Let's each define it ourselves.' There was no consensus.

Despite its ambiguity, the first and universally accepted element of populism is the 'people vs. elite' dichotomy. This 'elite' includes members of the National Assembly, the judiciary, the executive branch, and even large conglomerates. Secondly, by emphasizing 'the people,' it fosters skepticism towards representative democracy, favoring direct democracy instead. In Korea, the preference for candlelight vigils can be seen as a similar example of direct participation, as representative democracy is perceived as being conducted by the elite. Thirdly, as the initial division suggests, populism creates a 'us vs. them' dynamic. A prime example is Trump's call for a 'beautiful, big wall' on the Mexican border. Those beyond the wall are 'them,' and those within are 'us.' This constant division, whether based on race, ethnicity, or region, represents the politics of division and exclusion, a key feature of populism. Fourthly, there is criticism of capitalism. By emphasizing 'the people,' it often posits a 'general will,' suggesting that the entire nation shares a single will, which can lead to the rejection of capitalism.

Fifth, and this may or may not always appear, but most simply put, Trump's slogan 'MAGA' (Make America Great Again) implies that America was once great. In our view, America is still great, isn't it? What Trump appeals to is an idealized past, a better world in his mind, likely referring to a bygone era when America was led by white people. He seeks to tap into a perceived 'Heartland' and appeal to it. I believe this is a utopia that never truly existed. Secondly, charismatic leaders and emotional appeals are common. The first four points are phenomena that manifest politically in most forms of populism. The points below may or may not appear. So, what about Korea? I believe Korea is not immune to populism.

One of the most prominent examples is the term 'tochak waegu' (native Japanese collaborators) that was widely used during the previous administration. It implies that some people living in Korea are not Koreans but Japanese. This expression, 'tochak waegu,' is a classic example of dividing people into 'us' and 'them,' embodying division and exclusion. It was used as a term. Similarly, 'jeokpye' (deep-rooted evils) also frames a dichotomy of good versus evil, where 'we' are good and 'they' are deeply rooted evils, inherently wicked. Thus, such terminology appears within the concept of 'jeokpye.' Another phenomenon was the non-mediated interaction between politicians and citizens, bypassing the legislature. The National Petition system is a prime example of this. While the Moon Jae-in administration cannot be definitively labeled a populist government, and perhaps lacked certain populist elements, I believe it did employ such strategies. Therefore, we are not entirely free from populist appeals. This leads to division, which in turn connects with political polarization. Consequently, people tend to hear only what they want to hear, and communication becomes limited to 'like-minded people' rather than engaging in broader societal dialogue. This situation creates a highly receptive environment for fake news.

Thus, populism and fake news are intimately connected. I examined the extent to which our society is divided. Is it truly, truly polarized? What I consider important is that when we discuss populism, fake news, or polarization, we often blame politicians or political suppliers, such as parties and politicians. However, I believe consumers are equally problematic. This analysis focuses on the attitudes of consumers of political information and populism. As you can see from the deeply embedded data... For example, supporters of the Democratic Party rate the Democratic Party at 6.24 out of 10, while the People Power Party receives a score of 1.67. Conversely, supporters of the People Power Party rate their party at 6.45, while the Democratic Party receives a score of 1.74. This pattern is consistent across all measures. For instance, regarding Lee Jae-myung, Democratic Party supporters rate him at 6.25, while People Power Party supporters rate him at 1.45. For Yoon Suk-yeol, the scores are 1.25 from Democratic Party supporters and 6.25 from People Power Party supporters. There is an enormous difference in preference, with scores ranging from the teens to the sixties. Thus, preferences are clearly divided based on partisan affiliation.

Next is ideological distance. If it's difficult to see, please refer to the materials provided. This section measures how respondents perceive their own position, the position of their preferred party, and the position of the opposing party. The averages are presented, broken down by the party supporters. For Democratic Party supporters, the distance to the Democratic Party is 0.2, indicating they are very close. The distance to Lee Jae-myung is also minimal. However, the perceived distance to the People Power Party among Democratic Party supporters is nearly 4. On a scale of 0 to 170, with 11 categories, a score of 4 represents a considerable distance. This pattern is not unique to Democratic Party supporters; People Power Party supporters exhibit a similar trend. They perceive their own party as very close and the opposing party as very distant. Interestingly, they also perceive the opposing party as ideologically extreme, while their own party is seen as nearly moderate. In such a situation, it becomes difficult to achieve compromise between the two parties, leading to challenges in reaching consensus. The perceived distances are vastly different. To verify this, let's look at the nine questions presented here.

One question concerns North Korea security, a common dividing line between conservatives and progressives in Korea. Another is market vs. state intervention, a universal debate about the role of the state versus market autonomy. Then there is libertarianism versus authoritarianism, concerning individual freedom. Interestingly, consistent differences emerge across all nine domains.

It's astonishing how consistently these differences appear. This raises the question of whether people's views truly differ on all policies. It's quite perplexing. Looking at the next page, I decided to ask again. Upon further investigation, slightly over half of those who identify as progressive support the Democratic Party. The rest do not. For the People Power Party, 62% identify as conservative, which is slightly higher but still similar. This indicates a divergence between party affiliation and ideological self-identification. Why, then, do policy stances appear more consistently along ideological lines? I believe this is due to 'partisan mobilization.' In electoral theory, 'partisan rationalization' suggests aligning one's own views with those of the party one supports. If a party's statement resonates with one's own thoughts, it's a matter of persuasion. Another factor is projection, where individuals, even if unsure, assume a party's stance based on its past actions. In my view, partisan factors have significantly amplified policy differences, more so than the actual policy gaps themselves. This is where the difference between polarization in Korea and the US lies. In the US, it's often termed a 'culture war,' involving religious values like Christianity and traditional family values. This is not the case in Korea. However, the phenomenon of polarization is remarkably similar to that in the US.

Therefore, while US polarization may involve cultural and value-based factors, Korean polarization appears to be driven much more heavily by partisan factors. Regarding populism, a scholar named Acemoglu has conducted relevant research. Broadly, there are three main aspects: first, distrust in representative democracy, with the belief that the public should decide directly; second, anti-elitism; and third, a conflict between good and evil. These can be further categorized into eight aspects. Analysis by party affiliation shows that individuals who support a particular party are more receptive to populism. In other words, those with strong partisan affiliations are more likely to adopt populist attitudes.

In Korea, the anti-elite sentiment is the strongest manifestation of populism, coupled with direct public participation and a good-vs-evil confrontation. This is evident across the board. Therefore, when we look at party affiliation, supporting a particular party makes one more receptive to populism. In other words, those with strong partisan affiliations are more likely to adopt populist attitudes. I have examined this further. The data presented here, statistically significant up to about 90%, reveals that while partisan factors are present, individuals who are more receptive to populism tend to have lower political satisfaction and efficacy. For example, they believe the government does not listen to their voices or that their efforts are futile. This suggests a low response rate from the political system. Another factor is the perception of the National Assembly. One of the significant reasons why populism operates in Korea is the functioning of the political system itself. The political alienation, stemming from the belief that public demands are not reflected, is strongly projected.

Finally, regarding fake news, the findings are similar to those presented by Professor Yoon. As you can see, all eight items relate to fake news that specific party supporters might find interesting. I measured this by dividing respondents by party affiliation. Interestingly, for issues that Democratic Party supporters are interested in, the response that Democratic Party supporters would believe it is higher. For fake news that People Power Party supporters are interested in, the likelihood of accepting it as true or false increases among People Power Party supporters.

In other words, even with the same fake news, the interpretation differs depending on the partisan affiliation. The interpretation is partisan, and the source of fake news is perceived through a partisan lens. Before concluding, I conducted an overall analysis. The top item here represents receptivity to fake news. You can refer to the data for details. The Democratic Party group, the People Power Party group, and the combined group are shown here.

Populism characterized by a good-vs-evil, friend-vs-foe dichotomy significantly influences the acceptance of fake news. When society is more divided, people tend to accept more information. Interestingly, regarding the National Assembly, trust is high among those who support the opposition party, which currently holds a majority in the Assembly. Conversely, for supporters of the ruling party and the president, receptivity to fake news varies depending on their trust in the president. Fake news is interpreted in a highly partisan manner. This is similar to the US situation. What I want to emphasize here is the judiciary.

The greater the trust in the judiciary, the lower the acceptance of fake news. As South Korea's judiciary began to engage in partisan disputes at some point, its credibility as an institutionally neutral arbiter significantly declined. This diminished trust, in turn, increased the acceptance of fake news. To summarize the points made so far: First, informational polarization is severe in South Korea. However, unlike the US, it is not a cultural phenomenon but rather driven by partisan mobilization, which appears to be a key difference. Second, populism is related to partisanship. However, from an institutional perspective, the political establishment's apparent disregard for the public's voice is increasing the acceptance of populism. Overall, anti-elitism, confrontational politics, and the politics of hatred and exclusion are influencing the rise of fake news. Finally, there is low trust in political institutions. The presidency and the National Assembly are subject to partisan interpretations, while trust in the judiciary, which should be neutral, is declining, leading to...

the increased acceptance of fake news. Overall, this situation seems to reflect the current state of South Korean democracy and is a cause for concern.