[Visible Commentary] Changes in the World Order in 2024 and Korea's Response

하영선

Category: Multimedia
Published: January 2, 2024
Related Projects: Visible Commentary

YouTube Link: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Ydi8p1KRgYU

Ha Young-sun, Chairman of the East Asia Institute (EAI), forecasts the prospects for ROK-US-Japan cooperation, ROK-China relations, and the North Korean issue in 2024, as the ROK-US relationship moves from a period of 'exploration and adjustment' in 2023 to a 'year of management.' He also proposes Korea's foreign policy strategies, including the Indo-Pacific strategy. Chairman Ha urges Korea to institutionalize ROK-US-Japan cooperation, seek ways to improve ROK-China relations within the framework of changes in ROK-US relations, and take a leading role in advanced technology innovation. Furthermore, he emphasizes that as the ROK, US, and Japan expand their cooperation to the Indo-Pacific, Korea should increase the weight of its partnerships with India and ASEAN to the same level as its relationships with the US, China, and Japan.

■ Ha Young-sun, Chairman of the East Asia Institute. Professor Emeritus, Seoul National University.

■ Production and Editing: Park Ji-soo, EAI Research Fellow

Contact: 02 2277 1683 (ext. 208) | jspark@eai.or.kr

Video Script

Hello, this is your granddaughter. I wish all viewers of Visible Commentary a Happy New Year. Thank you very much for your continued readership, viewership, and support for EAI's various activities last year. We will work hard this year as well. Last year was similar, but we wanted to start this year's EAI activities with a New Year's dialogue. As last year, we have invited EAI Chairman Ha Young-sun to have a dialogue about important issues and to forecast 2024. Last year, we started with a forecast of ROK-US relations. At that time, many forecasts predicted that ROK-US relations would worsen, but EAI predicted that 2023 would be a year of 'exploration and adjustment.' Indeed, looking at the flow of the past year, although there were some balloon incidents in the early stages, through March and April, much dialogue took place between the US and China, and it truly was a year of exploration and adjustment.

Therefore, if we view 2023 in this way, how should we view ROK-US relations in 2024? We will begin by discussing this topic. Welcome, Ha Young-sun. Another year has passed, and we are forecasting for 2024. As Director Son pointed out, last year we predicted that it would be a year of exploration and adjustment when forecasting ROK-US relations in this very place. Despite the side effects of the spy balloon incident, the US and China held a meeting in San Francisco at the end of this year, albeit with some delay. So, what is the most appropriate forecast for ROK-US relations and the world order in 2024? I would say it will be a year of management. Why do I feel this way? We need to look closely at the results of the San Francisco meeting. After the summit, the US released a summarized explanation, and China, as always, had Foreign Minister Wang Yi provide a very detailed account. First, I would like to highlight one or two particularly impressive points from Foreign Minister Wang Yi's remarks. First, what message did China want to send to the US at this San Francisco summit, and what is its basic stance? He presented three main points. The first is the importance of making the 'right historical choice.' What does this mean? Can ROK-US relations truly be a partnership, or are they destined to be adversaries? In other words, is it a relationship of partnership or confrontation? From China's perspective, hoping for the possibility of partnership is one of the first signals China is sending. This is the first point to keep in mind. Second, China maintains that ROK-US relations...

Since Xi Jinping first came to power in 2012, he has emphasized the three principles of a new type of great power relations: mutual respect, peaceful coexistence, and win-win cooperation. In other words, peaceful coexistence and cooperative prosperity. The principle of cooperation for mutual benefit remains unchanged. What has been further specified in this discussion is what China refers to as 'five pillars,' though in English it is translated as five pillars. The first pillar is the importance of accurate perception, minimizing misunderstandings between the two sides. The second pillar is a matter of management. Even with accurate perception, fundamental differences are inevitable between the US and China, so how to effectively manage these differences is the second core objective. The most significant reason for the progress at the San Francisco summit compared to the Bali summit is likely that the US, facing a presidential election, had to handle China-related issues more cautiously, considering potential negative impacts on the economy and politics. China, on the other hand, may also be concerned about the 'peak China' theory, suggesting that China's economic peak has passed, and related domestic political legitimacy and efficiency issues. Therefore, both sides likely viewed 2024 as a crucial year, and the San Francisco meeting was perhaps a meeting focused on management.

The third point is cooperation in areas where mutual benefit can be achieved, referred to as 'holistic cooperation.' The fourth point is that they are prepared to take joint responsibility in areas where great powers should do so. The final pillar requested is the promotion of people-to-people exchanges. However, when reading Foreign Minister Wang's explanation of the overall summit, the most interesting part for me was this. One of the questions asked was, 'What was the most difficult aspect of the entire meeting, or the most difficult part to reconcile?' He pointed out two things. The first, naturally, is the Taiwan issue, which China cannot compromise on and hopes the US will fully accept. The second, which he emphasized even more than the Taiwan issue, is the 'risk of risk,' meaning that efforts to reduce risk actually increase risk. Specifically, in terms of the global economy, the risks associated with regulating or decoupling from China are particularly emphasized. China believes this will ultimately not lead to success in a zero-sum game. China will do its utmost to respond, and the US will face difficult challenges. Therefore, finding a way to resolve this issue is perhaps the most important aspect of the San Francisco meeting. From this perspective, forecasting ROK-US relations in 2024 can be broadly summarized in three points. First, regarding issues classified as core mutual interests, which cannot be resolved in the short term due to misunderstandings, the focus will be on how to manage them. Second, in areas of economics and technology, is there room for cooperation? Moving from coupling to decoupling, how can we navigate this transition? This will likely be a key debate in 2024. Third, there are areas where the US and China can coexist and cooperate, such as issues like climate change and other environmental problems. Given that elections are involved, for example, in the US, issues related to drug use among young people might be addressed collaboratively. Therefore, this is very important from a broader perspective, and depending on the situation, it may be necessary to pay close attention to this issue, even more so than the war in Ukraine or the conflicts in the Middle East.

Third, they are seeking cooperation in areas of mutual benefit, referred to as 'holistic cooperation.' Fourth, they are prepared to take joint responsibility in areas where great powers should do so. The final pillar requested is the promotion of people-to-people exchanges. However, when reading Foreign Minister Wang's explanation of the overall summit, the most interesting part for me was this. One of the questions asked was, 'What was the most difficult aspect of the entire meeting, or the most difficult part to reconcile?' He pointed out two things. The first, naturally, is the Taiwan issue, which China cannot compromise on and hopes the US will fully accept. The second, which he emphasized even more than the Taiwan issue, is the 'risk of risk,' meaning that efforts to reduce risk actually increase risk. Specifically, in terms of the global economy, the risks associated with regulating or decoupling from China are particularly emphasized. China believes this will ultimately not lead to success in a zero-sum game. China will do its utmost to respond, and the US will face difficult challenges. Therefore, finding a way to resolve this issue is perhaps the most important aspect of the San Francisco meeting. From this perspective, forecasting ROK-US relations in 2024 can be broadly summarized in three points. First, regarding issues classified as core mutual interests, which cannot be resolved in the short term due to misunderstandings, the focus will be on how to manage them. Second, in areas of economics and technology, is there room for cooperation? Moving from coupling to decoupling, how can we navigate this transition? This will likely be a key debate in 2024. Third, there are areas where the US and China can coexist and cooperate, such as issues like climate change and other environmental problems. Given that elections are involved, for example, in the US, issues related to drug use among young people might be addressed collaboratively. Therefore, this is very important from a broader perspective, and depending on the situation, it may be necessary to pay close attention to this issue, even more so than the war in Ukraine or the conflicts in the Middle East.

First, regarding issues classified as core mutual interests, which cannot be resolved in the short term due to misunderstandings, the focus will be on how to manage them. Second, in areas of economics and technology, is there room for cooperation? Moving from coupling to decoupling, how can we navigate this transition? This will likely be a key debate in 2024. Third, there are areas where the US and China can coexist and cooperate, such as issues like climate change and other environmental problems. Given that elections are involved, for example, in the US, issues related to drug use among young people might be addressed collaboratively. Therefore, this is very important from a broader perspective, and depending on the situation, it may be necessary to pay close attention to this issue, even more so than the war in Ukraine or the conflicts in the Middle East.

Yes, the point is that ROK-US relations continue to be the most significant factor influencing the world order. Last year, we viewed these relations as 'exploration and adjustment,' and this year, we are moving to the stage of 'management.' This management involves three aspects. First, there are clear differences in core interests between the US and China, and the first challenge is how to manage these differences effectively. Second, concerning advanced technology and economic issues, which are crucial for the future of both countries, there is talk of 'de-risking.' The second important agenda is how to achieve management and cooperation within this de-risking process. Third, there are global issues that the entire world, including the US and China, is facing, and the cautious exploration of cooperation in these areas. These three major issues represent the 'management' phase of ROK-US relations. Now, let's look more specifically at the ROK issue, separately from the US and China. In the US, perhaps the most groundbreaking event of 2023 was the ROK-US joint declaration at Camp David. Therefore, how we can forecast Camp David in 2024 is a crucial point to watch. Personally, I feel we may be underestimating the relative importance of Camp David. Looking back at the year, there was the Washington Declaration in April and the Camp David agreement in August. I want to emphasize the importance of the Camp David agreement because if it can go through a process of institutionalization, it will bring about significant changes, not just short-term changes at the government level, but also long-term changes in the Indo-Pacific order, or the Korean Peninsula itself, and the overall Indo-Pacific order in political, military, economic, and technological spheres. We should expect new changes.

However, the issue is that this is an unprecedented event, bringing together the ROK, US, and Japan, who have long been a subject of discussion, at Camp David for an agreement. What needs to be noted is that the ROK, US, and Japan do not have continuous political forces in power; governments change. Even now, looking at the US in 2024, or public opinion polls in Korea and Japan, the situation is not one of overwhelming advantage, but rather considerable difficulty. Therefore, a new government may emerge, and we cannot be certain. In that sense, the institutionalization process is important. If the spirit of the agreement remains merely a declaration or a spirit, it will be a thing of the past. However, if the process of institutionalization truly begins to move forward, then from Korea's perspective, it is a change for which we must exert our full effort, considering its direction and how we should strive to achieve it. While the Camp David consultations involved a wide range of discussions, we need to focus on how much institutionalization will proceed. Even considering just a few aspects, it is difficult not to assign significance beyond the governmental level. First, the framework for the leaders of the three countries to meet regularly, and for working-level officials to meet not just once but in a very permanent capacity, is a significant change. Second, security issues are also involved, and for us, this is a particularly important aspect. There are two issues, and we must be cautious about one: the discussion of North Korean issues among the ROK, US, and Japan will inevitably become more serious. Specifically, how to efficiently address the issue of North Korean nuclear weapons and missiles, how to develop tailored deterrence, and how to take credible response measures will be discussed on a permanent basis. This is something we need to pay attention to. Another aspect of security that requires attention is that if the ROK, US, and Japan begin discussing security issues, centered on North Korea's nuclear and missile programs, it will inevitably lead to discussions beyond simple extended deterrence. It will also raise questions about the tripartite role in what the US calls 'integrated deterrence' in the latter half of the 21st century. Integrated deterrence, as you know, requires integration in terms of space and across various weapon systems, including conventional weapons, nuclear weapons, cyber, and space. This interconnectedness creates a problem. While the North Korean nuclear and missile issue is a North Korean problem, it is also directly related to China. Therefore, this aspect may involve secondary discussions and potential differences in positions. However, as cautious discussions begin on this matter, the question arises of how to manage it without causing excessive misunderstanding or concern among neighboring countries, and whether efficient discussions are possible.

Third, what role will be played in the economic sector? In terms of education, investment, and global trends, for a while, it was almost considered a divorce to completely remove China from supply chains. However, the situation has evolved to the point where this is practically impossible. In that context, what is possible? Some experts suggest that de-risking applies to about 20% of the overall economy. However, the most important aspect of de-risking from the US perspective is not allowing anything that directly contributes to strengthening China's military capabilities. In such cases, how should we proceed? For example, semiconductors and batteries are typically considered at risk. As you know, we have reached a world-class level in semiconductors and batteries, so this is a very sensitive issue. The discussion is not simple; it is more complex than we think. Fourth, how to cooperate in the Indo-Pacific region, and how to coordinate effectively with the US to fulfill our role in the Indo-Pacific strategy, is a challenge presented to us. This involves security issues, as well as economic and technological aspects. Within the roles of the US and Japan, what should our role be? This is a very important question. Although we have announced our Indo-Pacific strategy, how we will pursue it is crucial. Depending on the circumstances, there may be opportunities for Korea to secure a stronger basis of legitimacy in the Indo-Pacific region than the US or Japan. Therefore, this aspect is very important. Looking at it this way, the Camp David agreement and its institutionalization process reveal the possibility of new changes in ROK-Japan relations. A very cautious aspect is how China and North Korea will respond to this, or what elements can be incorporated from the perspective of China and North Korea into the Camp David framework. The third homework assignment is the meaning of joint ROK-Japan leadership in expanding into the Indo-Pacific space. We need to approach this with a renewed determination as we enter 2024. Yes, following up on that, the question naturally arises: as ROK-Japan cooperation deepens and expands, managing relations with China and North Korea becomes crucial. How should we effectively manage relations with China, in particular? Looking back at last year, the Korean government placed great emphasis on strengthening ROK-US relations. In that context, regarding ROK-China relations, there are many discussions about the need for appropriate adjustments in 2024. Could you please elaborate on ROK-China relations?

There have been various discussions domestically and internationally regarding ROK-China relations, but I believe a direction has been established. This is because the basic framework is being formed through the Washington Declaration and the Camp David agreement last year. Paradoxically, some argue that this will make ROK-China relations more difficult. However, I believe that since the foundation has been laid, it will be relatively easier to foster ROK-China relations within that framework. Both Korea and China have no choice but to make efforts to improve relations, and I have considerable expectations for this. Looking at the US-China relationship, the San Francisco summit indicates a move towards a year of management. Similarly, within the framework of the Washington Declaration and the Camp David agreement, China's approach to ROK-China relations will be shaped by its own efforts and international cooperation. If the ROK-US-Japan security cooperation, particularly integrated deterrence, and the new cooperative order in the economic and technological spheres are established, China will have no choice but to strengthen international cooperation. In this context, what are the most important areas for China? I believe ASEAN and Korea are the most representative areas where efforts should be made. From our perspective, China still plays an important role in inter-Korean relations, albeit limited. In terms of the economy, regardless of fluctuations in the Chinese economy, it remains the most important partner. Therefore, within this established framework, there is a compelling mutual interest to actively seek to improve ROK-China relations. I have modest expectations that this year will see progress in maximizing mutual benefits, acknowledging the existing differences in core interests. However, one point to note is that ROK-China policy has undergone various changes with each new government and administration. In the current situation, we must also position ourselves within the fundamental changes in US-China relations. If US-China relations are moving from exploration and adjustment to management, then compared to the previous phase, where strategic competition was more intense, moving towards management implies that we must also adapt our ROK-China relations to respond to these rapid changes, keeping the global agenda in mind. Therefore, we must also consider new approaches to ROK-China relations within this framework in 2024. You mentioned China; what about North Korea, which Korea must pay the most attention to? North Korea adopted the Law on the Development of Nuclear Weapons in 2022 and constitutionalized it last year. What will happen with North Korea in 2024? Typically, due to the relative scarcity of information about North Korea's domestic situation, forecasts for the year are often based on the direction set in their New Year's addresses. However, the date of this dialogue is during the 8th Central Committee's 9th Plenary Meeting in Pyongyang. According to media reports, it began the day before yesterday, and yesterday, Chairman Kim delivered a relatively long speech on where North Korea should go in 2024, followed by internal discussions. However, the full text has not yet been released. Based on the overall discussions reported, North Korea is emphasizing the year 2024. This is because the 8th Party Congress was held in 2021, and three years have passed. In two years, it will be 2025. At the 8th Party Congress, what was highlighted?

The two core issues to be emphasized over the next five years are: first, the development and strengthening of North Korea's nuclear armament capabilities are inevitable for sovereignty and survival. These are the two pillars. Perhaps for North Korea, this is the greatest achievement to date, as Chairman Kim currently emphasizes. Second, as we have always understood, economic development is the most crucial issue for North Korea. However, the problem is not easy. We do not know the content of yesterday's speech. Therefore, to succeed in the next two years of 2024 and 2025, we must make maximum efforts with the basic achievements of the past three years, emphasizing what efforts should be made domestically and internationally. However, as I briefly review this, the problem I encounter, which is both frustrating and evokes sympathy, is that it is not easy to achieve these two major goals in the remaining two years. What kind of dilemma will North Korea face in 2024? Based on the two issues emphasized by North Korea since the 8th Party Congress, a brief summary is as follows: First, the continuous strengthening of nuclear forces for sovereignty and survival is an inevitable goal. However, I believe this will bring about very complex problems in 2024. What kind of problems will it bring? First, will it truly guarantee sovereignty and survival? Why do I say this? There are two issues. First, in April last year, there was the Washington Declaration. Naturally, security issues were discussed, and it was stated that more systematic tailored extended deterrence must be established on the Korean Peninsula to respond to North Korea's nuclear and missile threats. In connection with this, a standing consultative group was formed, and the second meeting of the ROK-US Nuclear Consultative Group (NCG) was held in the US in mid-December. According to this, the US had already set its basic direction for nuclear weapons in 2022. While it stated that tailored deterrence would be implemented for North Korea, it also warned that if North Korea's nuclear weapons pose a threat to the US or its allies and partners, or if nuclear weapons are used, Kim Jong-un's regime will cease to exist. This was reiterated at the meeting in mid-December. Therefore, this raises a very important issue. The effectiveness of North Korea's nuclear weapons is questionable if their use would lead to the annihilation of the user. Even if momentary victory is achieved through use, it would inevitably lead to war. Logically, the effectiveness is of little significance. This is a very difficult point for North Korea to accept. Second, from the US perspective, it is very difficult and uncertain how to proceed. However, one point the US emphasizes is that the mid-21st century is no longer an era of nuclear deterrence. It is an era of integrated deterrence. In other words, the role of nuclear weapons among conventional weapons, nuclear weapons, cyber weapons, and space weapons is rapidly diminishing. China is also responding to this by advocating for a transformation of its strategy. Therefore, in that sense, the more North Korea emphasizes the strengthening of its nuclear capabilities, the more I see it as repeating outdated arguments. We need to clearly recognize that this is a military and security argument that is increasingly out of sync with the 21st century. Second, what I find regrettable is that this is not just a matter of sovereignty and survival, but it has a tremendous negative impact on North Korea's right to development. Frankly, in my view, the biggest problem for North Korea until 2025 is the economy. As you know, North Korea's per capita income is among the lowest in the world, hovering around $1,000. Even though the 8th Party Congress called for a desperate effort to raise it over five years, the borders have been closed recently, resulting in negative growth in 2021 and 2022. It seems to be finally tipping towards positive growth this year. However, I still see no hope. Unfortunately, why do I say this? While China discusses the risks of de-risking in its relationship with the US, in North Korea's case, the economic sanctions due to nuclear and missile development pose a significant obstacle to rapid economic recovery, even if China and Russia do not fully participate in the sanctions. Self-reliance plus international support is crucial for the remaining two years. However, due to the decisive factor of nuclear armament capability enhancement, if development rights cannot be secured rapidly, it will be difficult for Kim Jong-un to achieve significant results in the remaining two years, as he clings to the 'pillar' of nuclear weapons, which has little effectiveness, while economic development becomes even more important. When I speak of significant results, for North Korea, returning to positive growth, say 2-3%, is meaningless. For the North Korean economy to recover, it needs at least double-digit economic growth for 30-40 years, as China experienced during its reform and opening up. At this critical juncture, if this is not achieved, North Korea may face a very dark future in 2025.

This interconnectedness creates a problem. While the North Korean nuclear and missile issue is a North Korean problem, it is also directly related to China. Therefore, this aspect may involve secondary discussions and potential differences in positions. However, as cautious discussions begin on this matter, the question arises of how to manage it without causing excessive misunderstanding or concern among neighboring countries, and whether efficient discussions are possible. Third, what role will be played in the economic sector? In terms of education, investment, and global trends, for a while, it was almost considered a divorce to completely remove China from supply chains. However, the situation has evolved to the point where this is practically impossible. In that context, what is possible? Some experts suggest that de-risking applies to about 20% of the overall economy. However, the most important aspect of de-risking from the US perspective is not allowing anything that directly contributes to strengthening China's military capabilities. In such cases, how should we proceed? For example, semiconductors and batteries are typically considered at risk. As you know, we have reached a world-class level in semiconductors and batteries, so this is a very sensitive issue. The discussion is not simple; it is more complex than we think. Fourth, how to cooperate in the Indo-Pacific region, and how to coordinate effectively with the US to fulfill our role in the Indo-Pacific strategy, is a challenge presented to us. This involves security issues, as well as economic and technological aspects. Within the roles of the US and Japan, what should our role be? This is a very important question. Although we have announced our Indo-Pacific strategy, how we will pursue it is crucial. Depending on the circumstances, there may be opportunities for Korea to secure a stronger basis of legitimacy in the Indo-Pacific region than the US or Japan. Therefore, this aspect is very important. Looking at it this way, the Camp David agreement and its institutionalization process reveal the possibility of new changes in ROK-Japan relations. A very cautious aspect is how China and North Korea will respond to this, or what elements can be incorporated from the perspective of China and North Korea into the Camp David framework. The third homework assignment is the meaning of joint ROK-Japan leadership in expanding into the Indo-Pacific space. We need to approach this with a renewed determination as we enter 2024.

Fourth, how to cooperate in the Indo-Pacific region, and how to coordinate effectively with the US to fulfill our role in the Indo-Pacific strategy, is a challenge presented to us. This involves security issues, as well as economic and technological aspects. Within the roles of the US and Japan, what should our role be? This is a very important question. Although we have announced our Indo-Pacific strategy, how we will pursue it is crucial. Depending on the circumstances, there may be opportunities for Korea to secure a stronger basis of legitimacy in the Indo-Pacific region than the US or Japan. Therefore, this aspect is very important. Looking at it this way, the Camp David agreement and its institutionalization process reveal the possibility of new changes in ROK-Japan relations. A very cautious aspect is how China and North Korea will respond to this, or what elements can be incorporated from the perspective of China and North Korea into the Camp David framework. The third homework assignment is the meaning of joint ROK-Japan leadership in expanding into the Indo-Pacific space. We need to approach this with a renewed determination as we enter 2024.

Looking at it this way, the Camp David agreement and its institutionalization process reveal the possibility of new changes in ROK-Japan relations. A very cautious aspect is how China and North Korea will respond to this, or what elements can be incorporated from the perspective of China and North Korea into the Camp David framework. The third homework assignment is the meaning of joint ROK-Japan leadership in expanding into the Indo-Pacific space. We need to approach this with a renewed determination as we enter 2024. Yes, following up on that, the question naturally arises: as ROK-Japan cooperation deepens and expands, managing relations with China and North Korea becomes crucial. How should we effectively manage relations with China, in particular? Looking back at last year, the Korean government placed great emphasis on strengthening ROK-US relations. In that context, regarding ROK-China relations, there are many discussions about the need for appropriate adjustments in 2024. Could you please elaborate on ROK-China relations?

If the ROK-US-Japan security cooperation, particularly integrated deterrence, and the new cooperative order in the economic and technological spheres are established, China will have no choice but to strengthen international cooperation. In this context, what are the most important areas for China? I believe ASEAN and Korea are the most representative areas where efforts should be made. From our perspective, China still plays an important role in inter-Korean relations, albeit limited. In terms of the economy, regardless of fluctuations in the Chinese economy, it remains the most important partner. Therefore, within this established framework, there is a compelling mutual interest to actively seek to improve ROK-China relations. I have modest expectations that this year will see progress in maximizing mutual benefits, acknowledging the existing differences in core interests. However, one point to note is that ROK-China policy has undergone various changes with each new government and administration. In the current situation, we must also position ourselves within the fundamental changes in US-China relations. If US-China relations are moving from exploration and adjustment to management, then compared to the previous phase, where strategic competition was more intense, moving towards management implies that we must also adapt our ROK-China relations to respond to these rapid changes, keeping the global agenda in mind. Therefore, we must also consider new approaches to ROK-China relations within this framework in 2024.

Therefore, within this established framework, there is a compelling mutual interest to actively seek to improve ROK-China relations. I have modest expectations that this year will see progress in maximizing mutual benefits, acknowledging the existing differences in core interests. However, one point to note is that ROK-China policy has undergone various changes with each new government and administration. In the current situation, we must also position ourselves within the fundamental changes in US-China relations. If US-China relations are moving from exploration and adjustment to management, then compared to the previous phase, where strategic competition was more intense, moving towards management implies that we must also adapt our ROK-China relations to respond to these rapid changes, keeping the global agenda in mind. Therefore, we must also consider new approaches to ROK-China relations within this framework in 2024. You mentioned China; what about North Korea, which Korea must pay the most attention to? North Korea adopted the Law on the Development of Nuclear Weapons in 2022 and constitutionalized it last year. What will happen with North Korea in 2024? Typically, due to the relative scarcity of information about North Korea's domestic situation, forecasts for the year are often based on the direction set in their New Year's addresses. However, the date of this dialogue is during the 8th Central Committee's 9th Plenary Meeting in Pyongyang. According to media reports, it began the day before yesterday, and yesterday, Chairman Kim delivered a relatively long speech on where North Korea should go in 2024, followed by internal discussions. However, the full text has not yet been released. Based on the overall discussions reported, North Korea is emphasizing the year 2024. This is because the 8th Party Congress was held in 2021, and three years have passed. In two years, it will be 2025. At the 8th Party Congress, what was highlighted?

In the current situation, we must also position ourselves within the fundamental changes in US-China relations. If US-China relations are moving from exploration and adjustment to management, then compared to the previous phase, where strategic competition was more intense, moving towards management implies that we must also adapt our ROK-China relations to respond to these rapid changes, keeping the global agenda in mind. Therefore, we must also consider new approaches to ROK-China relations within this framework in 2024. You mentioned China; what about North Korea, which Korea must pay the most attention to? North Korea adopted the Law on the Development of Nuclear Weapons in 2022 and constitutionalized it last year. What will happen with North Korea in 2024? Typically, due to the relative scarcity of information about North Korea's domestic situation, forecasts for the year are often based on the direction set in their New Year's addresses. However, the date of this dialogue is during the 8th Central Committee's 9th Plenary Meeting in Pyongyang. According to media reports, it began the day before yesterday, and yesterday, Chairman Kim delivered a relatively long speech on where North Korea should go in 2024, followed by internal discussions. However, the full text has not yet been released. Based on the overall discussions reported, North Korea is emphasizing the year 2024. This is because the 8th Party Congress was held in 2021, and three years have passed. In two years, it will be 2025. At the 8th Party Congress, what was highlighted?

Therefore, to succeed in the next two years of 2024 and 2025, we must make maximum efforts with the basic achievements of the past three years, emphasizing what efforts should be made domestically and internationally. However, as I briefly review this, the problem I encounter, which is both frustrating and evokes sympathy, is that it is not easy to achieve these two major goals in the remaining two years. What kind of dilemma will North Korea face in 2024? Based on the two issues emphasized by North Korea since the 8th Party Congress, a brief summary is as follows: First, the continuous strengthening of nuclear forces for sovereignty and survival is an inevitable goal. However, I believe this will bring about very complex problems in 2024. What kind of problems will it bring? First, will it truly guarantee sovereignty and survival? Why do I say this? There are two issues. First, in April last year, there was the Washington Declaration. Naturally, security issues were discussed, and it was stated that more systematic tailored extended deterrence must be established on the Korean Peninsula to respond to North Korea's nuclear and missile threats. In connection with this, a standing consultative group was formed, and the second meeting of the ROK-US Nuclear Consultative Group (NCG) was held in the US in mid-December. According to this, the US had already set its basic direction for nuclear weapons in 2022. While it stated that tailored deterrence would be implemented for North Korea, it also warned that if North Korea's nuclear weapons pose a threat to the US or its allies and partners, or if nuclear weapons are used, Kim Jong-un's regime will cease to exist. This was reiterated at the meeting in mid-December. Therefore, this raises a very important issue. The effectiveness of North Korea's nuclear weapons is questionable if their use would lead to the annihilation of the user. Even if momentary victory is achieved through use, it would inevitably lead to war. Logically, the effectiveness is of little significance. This is a very difficult point for North Korea to accept. Second, from the US perspective, it is very difficult and uncertain how to proceed. However, one point the US emphasizes is that the mid-21st century is no longer an era of nuclear deterrence. It is an era of integrated deterrence. In other words, the role of nuclear weapons among conventional weapons, nuclear weapons, cyber weapons, and space weapons is rapidly diminishing. China is also responding to this by advocating for a transformation of its strategy. Therefore, in that sense, the more North Korea emphasizes the strengthening of its nuclear capabilities, the more I see it as repeating outdated arguments. We need to clearly recognize that this is a military and security argument that is increasingly out of sync with the 21st century. Second, what I find regrettable is that this is not just a matter of sovereignty and survival, but it has a tremendous negative impact on North Korea's right to development. Frankly, in my view, the biggest problem for North Korea until 2025 is the economy. As you know, North Korea's per capita income is among the lowest in the world, hovering around $1,000. Even though the 8th Party Congress called for a desperate effort to raise it over five years, the borders have been closed recently, resulting in negative growth in 2021 and 2022. It seems to be finally tipping towards positive growth this year. However, I still see no hope. Unfortunately, why do I say this? While China discusses the risks of de-risking in its relationship with the US, in North Korea's case, the economic sanctions due to nuclear and missile development pose a significant obstacle to rapid economic recovery, even if China and Russia do not fully participate in the sanctions. Self-reliance plus international support is crucial for the remaining two years. However, due to the decisive factor of nuclear armament capability enhancement, if development rights cannot be secured rapidly, it will be difficult for Kim Jong-un to achieve significant results in the remaining two years, as he clings to the 'pillar' of nuclear weapons, which has little effectiveness, while economic development becomes even more important. When I speak of significant results, for North Korea, returning to positive growth, say 2-3%, is meaningless. For the North Korean economy to recover, it needs at least double-digit economic growth for 30-40 years, as China experienced during its reform and opening up. At this critical juncture, if this is not achieved, North Korea may face a very dark future in 2025.

First, will it truly guarantee sovereignty and survival? Why do I say this? There are two issues. First, in April last year, there was the Washington Declaration. Naturally, security issues were discussed, and it was stated that more systematic tailored extended deterrence must be established on the Korean Peninsula to respond to North Korea's nuclear and missile threats. In connection with this, a standing consultative group was formed, and the second meeting of the ROK-US Nuclear Consultative Group (NCG) was held in the US in mid-December. According to this, the US had already set its basic direction for nuclear weapons in 2022. While it stated that tailored deterrence would be implemented for North Korea, it also warned that if North Korea's nuclear weapons pose a threat to the US or its allies and partners, or if nuclear weapons are used, Kim Jong-un's regime will cease to exist. This was reiterated at the meeting in mid-December. Therefore, this raises a very important issue. The effectiveness of North Korea's nuclear weapons is questionable if their use would lead to the annihilation of the user. Even if momentary victory is achieved through use, it would inevitably lead to war. Logically, the effectiveness is of little significance. This is a very difficult point for North Korea to accept. Second, from the US perspective, it is very difficult and uncertain how to proceed. However, one point the US emphasizes is that the mid-21st century is no longer an era of nuclear deterrence. It is an era of integrated deterrence. In other words, the role of nuclear weapons among conventional weapons, nuclear weapons, cyber weapons, and space weapons is rapidly diminishing. China is also responding to this by advocating for a transformation of its strategy. Therefore, in that sense, the more North Korea emphasizes the strengthening of its nuclear capabilities, the more I see it as repeating outdated arguments. We need to clearly recognize that this is a military and security argument that is increasingly out of sync with the 21st century. Second, what I find regrettable is that this is not just a matter of sovereignty and survival, but it has a tremendous negative impact on North Korea's right to development. Frankly, in my view, the biggest problem for North Korea until 2025 is the economy. As you know, North Korea's per capita income is among the lowest in the world, hovering around $1,000. Even though the 8th Party Congress called for a desperate effort to raise it over five years, the borders have been closed recently, resulting in negative growth in 2021 and 2022. It seems to be finally tipping towards positive growth this year. However, I still see no hope. Unfortunately, why do I say this? While China discusses the risks of de-risking in its relationship with the US, in North Korea's case, the economic sanctions due to nuclear and missile development pose a significant obstacle to rapid economic recovery, even if China and Russia do not fully participate in the sanctions. Self-reliance plus international support is crucial for the remaining two years. However, due to the decisive factor of nuclear armament capability enhancement, if development rights cannot be secured rapidly, it will be difficult for Kim Jong-un to achieve significant results in the remaining two years, as he clings to the 'pillar' of nuclear weapons, which has little effectiveness, while economic development becomes even more important. When I speak of significant results, for North Korea, returning to positive growth, say 2-3%, is meaningless. For the North Korean economy to recover, it needs at least double-digit economic growth for 30-40 years, as China experienced during its reform and opening up. At this critical juncture, if this is not achieved, North Korea may face a very dark future in 2025.

Therefore, this raises a very important issue. The effectiveness of North Korea's nuclear weapons is questionable if their use would lead to the annihilation of the user. Even if momentary victory is achieved through use, it would inevitably lead to war. Logically, the effectiveness is of little significance. This is a very difficult point for North Korea to accept. Second, from the US perspective, it is very difficult and uncertain how to proceed. However, one point the US emphasizes is that the mid-21st century is no longer an era of nuclear deterrence. It is an era of integrated deterrence. In other words, the role of nuclear weapons among conventional weapons, nuclear weapons, cyber weapons, and space weapons is rapidly diminishing. China is also responding to this by advocating for a transformation of its strategy. Therefore, in that sense, the more North Korea emphasizes the strengthening of its nuclear capabilities, the more I see it as repeating outdated arguments. We need to clearly recognize that this is a military and security argument that is increasingly out of sync with the 21st century. Second, what I find regrettable is that this is not just a matter of sovereignty and survival, but it has a tremendous negative impact on North Korea's right to development. Frankly, in my view, the biggest problem for North Korea until 2025 is the economy. As you know, North Korea's per capita income is among the lowest in the world, hovering around $1,000. Even though the 8th Party Congress called for a desperate effort to raise it over five years, the borders have been closed recently, resulting in negative growth in 2021 and 2022. It seems to be finally tipping towards positive growth this year. However, I still see no hope. Unfortunately, why do I say this? While China discusses the risks of de-risking in its relationship with the US, in North Korea's case, the economic sanctions due to nuclear and missile development pose a significant obstacle to rapid economic recovery, even if China and Russia do not fully participate in the sanctions. Self-reliance plus international support is crucial for the remaining two years. However, due to the decisive factor of nuclear armament capability enhancement, if development rights cannot be secured rapidly, it will be difficult for Kim Jong-un to achieve significant results in the remaining two years, as he clings to the 'pillar' of nuclear weapons, which has little effectiveness, while economic development becomes even more important. When I speak of significant results, for North Korea, returning to positive growth, say 2-3%, is meaningless. For the North Korean economy to recover, it needs at least double-digit economic growth for 30-40 years, as China experienced during its reform and opening up. At this critical juncture, if this is not achieved, North Korea may face a very dark future in 2025.

In other words, the role of nuclear weapons among conventional weapons, nuclear weapons, cyber weapons, and space weapons is rapidly diminishing. China is also responding to this by advocating for a transformation of its strategy. Therefore, in that sense, the more North Korea emphasizes the strengthening of its nuclear capabilities, the more I see it as repeating outdated arguments. We need to clearly recognize that this is a military and security argument that is increasingly out of sync with the 21st century. Second, what I find regrettable is that this is not just a matter of sovereignty and survival, but it has a tremendous negative impact on North Korea's right to development. Frankly, in my view, the biggest problem for North Korea until 2025 is the economy. As you know, North Korea's per capita income is among the lowest in the world, hovering around $1,000. Even though the 8th Party Congress called for a desperate effort to raise it over five years, the borders have been closed recently, resulting in negative growth in 2021 and 2022. It seems to be finally tipping towards positive growth this year. However, I still see no hope. Unfortunately, why do I say this? While China discusses the risks of de-risking in its relationship with the US, in North Korea's case, the economic sanctions due to nuclear and missile development pose a significant obstacle to rapid economic recovery, even if China and Russia do not fully participate in the sanctions. Self-reliance plus international support is crucial for the remaining two years. However, due to the decisive factor of nuclear armament capability enhancement, if development rights cannot be secured rapidly, it will be difficult for Kim Jong-un to achieve significant results in the remaining two years, as he clings to the 'pillar' of nuclear weapons, which has little effectiveness, while economic development becomes even more important. When I speak of significant results, for North Korea, returning to positive growth, say 2-3%, is meaningless. For the North Korean economy to recover, it needs at least double-digit economic growth for 30-40 years, as China experienced during its reform and opening up. At this critical juncture, if this is not achieved, North Korea may face a very dark future in 2025.

Self-reliance plus international support is crucial for the remaining two years. However, due to the decisive factor of nuclear armament capability enhancement, if development rights cannot be secured rapidly, it will be difficult for Kim Jong-un to achieve significant results in the remaining two years, as he clings to the 'pillar' of nuclear weapons, which has little effectiveness, while economic development becomes even more important. When I speak of significant results, for North Korea, returning to positive growth, say 2-3%, is meaningless. For the North Korean economy to recover, it needs at least double-digit economic growth for 30-40 years, as China experienced during its reform and opening up. At this critical juncture, if this is not achieved, North Korea may face a very dark future in 2025.

If development rights cannot be secured rapidly, it will be difficult for Kim Jong-un to achieve significant results in the remaining two years, as he clings to the 'pillar' of nuclear weapons, which has little effectiveness, while economic development becomes even more important. When I speak of significant results, for North Korea, returning to positive growth, say 2-3%, is meaningless. For the North Korean economy to recover, it needs at least double-digit economic growth for 30-40 years, as China experienced during its reform and opening up. At this critical juncture, if this is not achieved, North Korea may face a very dark future in 2025. Yes, you have explained the two major dilemmas facing North Korea with a sense of sympathy. This seems to be a continuation of our New Year's dialogue from last year. So far, we have discussed the five major tasks or core challenges for 2024: how to view US-China relations, the institutionalization of Camp David and the follow-up agenda, how to appropriately manage and expand ROK-China relations, and the North Korean issue. Finally, as US-China relations enter a phase of management, the diplomatic stage or stage for cooperation between the US and China may relatively expand. In that context, as the Chairman pointed out earlier, the case of China, specifically Korea's diplomacy with ASEAN, is becoming increasingly important. We also announced our Indo-Pacific strategy in December 2022 and the government released an implementation plan in December 2023. Therefore, the Indo-Pacific strategy is entering a phase of full-scale implementation. We would like to hear your thoughts on the direction Korean diplomacy should take in 2024 regarding the Indo-Pacific strategy. Our task is to consider how to develop the Indo-Pacific strategy in a future-oriented manner from Korea's perspective, identifying areas of commonality with the US and Japan, and areas where Korea can independently seek opportunities. In particular, as we enter 2024, we need to pay more attention to the expansion of our diplomatic space and overall external activities, not just diplomacy, but our living space in the Indo-Pacific. Previously, we may have thought of it in a limited way, such as inter-Korean relations or bilateral relations like ROK-US, ROK-Japan, ROK-China, or ROK-US. Now, thinking of the Indo-Pacific as a broader space, what areas should we prioritize?

Yes, you have explained the two major dilemmas facing North Korea with a sense of sympathy. This seems to be a continuation of our New Year's dialogue from last year. So far, we have discussed the five major tasks or core challenges for 2024: how to view US-China relations, the institutionalization of Camp David and the follow-up agenda, how to appropriately manage and expand ROK-China relations, and the North Korean issue. Finally, as US-China relations enter a phase of management, the diplomatic stage or stage for cooperation between the US and China may relatively expand. In that context, as the Chairman pointed out earlier, the case of China, specifically Korea's diplomacy with ASEAN, is becoming increasingly important. We also announced our Indo-Pacific strategy in December 2022 and the government released an implementation plan in December 2023. Therefore, the Indo-Pacific strategy is entering a phase of full-scale implementation. We would like to hear your thoughts on the direction Korean diplomacy should take in 2024 regarding the Indo-Pacific strategy. Our task is to consider how to develop the Indo-Pacific strategy in a future-oriented manner from Korea's perspective, identifying areas of commonality with the US and Japan, and areas where Korea can independently seek opportunities. In particular, as we enter 2024, we need to pay more attention to the expansion of our diplomatic space and overall external activities, not just diplomacy, but our living space in the Indo-Pacific. Previously, we may have thought of it in a limited way, such as inter-Korean relations or bilateral relations like ROK-US, ROK-Japan, ROK-China, or ROK-US. Now, thinking of the Indo-Pacific as a broader space, what areas should we prioritize?

Our task is to consider how to develop the Indo-Pacific strategy in a future-oriented manner from Korea's perspective, identifying areas of commonality with the US and Japan, and areas where Korea can independently seek opportunities. In particular, as we enter 2024, we need to pay more attention to the expansion of our diplomatic space and overall external activities, not just diplomacy, but our living space in the Indo-Pacific. Previously, we may have thought of it in a limited way, such as inter-Korean relations or bilateral relations like ROK-US, ROK-Japan, ROK-China, or ROK-US. Now, thinking of the Indo-Pacific as a broader space, what areas should we prioritize? An interesting point is that at various events in China last year, one that left a lasting impression on me was the large-scale commemorative event on October 24th, marking the 10th anniversary of the new type of neighborhood relations policy, which might have seemed somewhat unexpected. Foreign Minister Wang Yi delivered a lengthy speech, and what struck me as new was his detailed elaboration on the extent of China's living space, emphasizing that it is not limited to the US or Europe. He repeatedly mentioned country names, listing them one by one. As mentioned earlier, the US and China are currently in a management phase across three areas. Therefore, what China can do is to focus its efforts on its neighborhood relations in a broader sense. The approach is to prioritize shared responsibility in global management, followed by prioritizing areas where mutual concessions are possible through one-on-one interactions. However, core interests remain a point of difference that must be accepted. Similarly, in our own space, while China views its neighborhood relations as its living space, as the Indo-Pacific enters the process of expansion and diversification of our coexisting space, the most important areas to focus on are ASEAN and India. The US, in particular, seems to feel certain burdens and limitations in this regard. However, for us, including India, if we consider India and ASEAN not as separate entities but as part of the diversification of our living space and begin to embrace them, it will go beyond mere diplomacy or limited economic exchange and cooperation. It will require genuine engagement. Then, what kind of life will we concretely build in the ASEAN space or in our relations with India? In this regard, the search for possibilities is, regrettably, limited and leads back to San Francisco. In areas where core interests conflict, we will have to engage in cautious cooperation and play a role. In the Indo-Pacific space, we may encounter issues such as the Taiwan issue or issues in the South Pacific. In these areas, there are likely limitations in our core areas. The reservation clause in the Camp David agreement, stating that not all aspects are agreed upon, also reflects this. Therefore, in our case, we need to strengthen our initiative in the second and third areas. In terms of taking shared responsibility, even if it is somewhat difficult, how can we break through in a more substantial way under the name of a 'central country'? Second, how can we achieve a win-win game in the economic and technological sectors? India and ASEAN should be elevated to the same level of importance as Camp David or ROK-China relations. In that sense, perhaps a comprehensive reorganization of budgets, research, and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs' administrative structure is necessary.

An interesting point is that at various events in China last year, one that left a lasting impression on me was the large-scale commemorative event on October 24th, marking the 10th anniversary of the new type of neighborhood relations policy, which might have seemed somewhat unexpected. Foreign Minister Wang Yi delivered a lengthy speech, and what struck me as new was his detailed elaboration on the extent of China's living space, emphasizing that it is not limited to the US or Europe. He repeatedly mentioned country names, listing them one by one. As mentioned earlier, the US and China are currently in a management phase across three areas. Therefore, what China can do is to focus its efforts on its neighborhood relations in a broader sense. The approach is to prioritize shared responsibility in global management, followed by prioritizing areas where mutual concessions are possible through one-on-one interactions. However, core interests remain a point of difference that must be accepted. Similarly, in our own space, while China views its neighborhood relations as its living space, as the Indo-Pacific enters the process of expansion and diversification of our coexisting space, the most important areas to focus on are ASEAN and India. The US, in particular, seems to feel certain burdens and limitations in this regard. However, for us, including India, if we consider India and ASEAN not as separate entities but as part of the diversification of our living space and begin to embrace them, it will go beyond mere diplomacy or limited economic exchange and cooperation. It will require genuine engagement. Then, what kind of life will we concretely build in the ASEAN space or in our relations with India? In this regard, the search for possibilities is, regrettably, limited and leads back to San Francisco. In areas where core interests conflict, we will have to engage in cautious cooperation and play a role. In the Indo-Pacific space, we may encounter issues such as the Taiwan issue or issues in the South Pacific. In these areas, there are likely limitations in our core areas. The reservation clause in the Camp David agreement, stating that not all aspects are agreed upon, also reflects this. Therefore, in our case, we need to strengthen our initiative in the second and third areas. In terms of taking shared responsibility, even if it is somewhat difficult, how can we break through in a more substantial way under the name of a 'central country'? Second, how can we achieve a win-win game in the economic and technological sectors? India and ASEAN should be elevated to the same level of importance as Camp David or ROK-China relations. In that sense, perhaps a comprehensive reorganization of budgets, research, and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs' administrative structure is necessary.

As mentioned earlier, the US and China are currently in a management phase across three areas. Therefore, what China can do is to focus its efforts on its neighborhood relations in a broader sense. The approach is to prioritize shared responsibility in global management, followed by prioritizing areas where mutual concessions are possible through one-on-one interactions. However, core interests remain a point of difference that must be accepted. Similarly, in our own space, while China views its neighborhood relations as its living space, as the Indo-Pacific enters the process of expansion and diversification of our coexisting space, the most important areas to focus on are ASEAN and India. The US, in particular, seems to feel certain burdens and limitations in this regard. However, for us, including India, if we consider India and ASEAN not as separate entities but as part of the diversification of our living space and begin to embrace them, it will go beyond mere diplomacy or limited economic exchange and cooperation. It will require genuine engagement. Then, what kind of life will we concretely build in the ASEAN space or in our relations with India? In this regard, the search for possibilities is, regrettably, limited and leads back to San Francisco. In areas where core interests conflict, we will have to engage in cautious cooperation and play a role. In the Indo-Pacific space, we may encounter issues such as the Taiwan issue or issues in the South Pacific. In these areas, there are likely limitations in our core areas. The reservation clause in the Camp David agreement, stating that not all aspects are agreed upon, also reflects this. Therefore, in our case, we need to strengthen our initiative in the second and third areas. In terms of taking shared responsibility, even if it is somewhat difficult, how can we break through in a more substantial way under the name of a 'central country'? Second, how can we achieve a win-win game in the economic and technological sectors? India and ASEAN should be elevated to the same level of importance as Camp David or ROK-China relations. In that sense, perhaps a comprehensive reorganization of budgets, research, and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs' administrative structure is necessary.

In our own space, while China views its neighborhood relations as its living space, as the Indo-Pacific enters the process of expansion and diversification of our coexisting space, the most important areas to focus on are ASEAN and India. The US, in particular, seems to feel certain burdens and limitations in this regard. However, for us, including India, if we consider India and ASEAN not as separate entities but as part of the diversification of our living space and begin to embrace them, it will go beyond mere diplomacy or limited economic exchange and cooperation. It will require genuine engagement. Then, what kind of life will we concretely build in the ASEAN space or in our relations with India? In this regard, the search for possibilities is, regrettably, limited and leads back to San Francisco. In areas where core interests conflict, we will have to engage in cautious cooperation and play a role. In the Indo-Pacific space, we may encounter issues such as the Taiwan issue or issues in the South Pacific. In these areas, there are likely limitations in our core areas. The reservation clause in the Camp David agreement, stating that not all aspects are agreed upon, also reflects this. Therefore, in our case, we need to strengthen our initiative in the second and third areas. In terms of taking shared responsibility, even if it is somewhat difficult, how can we break through in a more substantial way under the name of a 'central country'? Second, how can we achieve a win-win game in the economic and technological sectors? India and ASEAN should be elevated to the same level of importance as Camp David or ROK-China relations. In that sense, perhaps a comprehensive reorganization of budgets, research, and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs' administrative structure is necessary.

Therefore, in our case, we need to strengthen our initiative in the second and third areas. In terms of taking shared responsibility, even if it is somewhat difficult, how can we break through in a more substantial way under the name of a 'central country'? Second, how can we achieve a win-win game in the economic and technological sectors? India and ASEAN should be elevated to the same level of importance as Camp David or ROK-China relations. In that sense, perhaps a comprehensive reorganization of budgets, research, and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs' administrative structure is necessary. Yes, you have outlined the five major issues for 2024 and the attitude Korea should take. You mentioned two key points: first, the urgent need for vision to properly design and build our complex living space, and second, the greatest challenge and shock facing Korea and the world in 2023-2024 will be the impact of advanced technology. This will be the benchmark for judging whether the Korean government can respond appropriately when looking back at 2024 from the distant future, perhaps from space, and especially from the Korean Peninsula. You have given us a very significant message that advanced technology may shake the foundations of Korean diplomacy and that it will be a test of whether the Korean government can respond effectively. With these serious remarks, we will conclude the Visible Commentary's New Year's dialogue for 2024. Thank you very much to all viewers of Visible Commentary. Thank you, Professor.

Yes, you have outlined the five major issues for 2024 and the attitude Korea should take. You mentioned two key points: first, the urgent need for vision to properly design and build our complex living space, and second, the greatest challenge and shock facing Korea and the world in 2023-2024 will be the impact of advanced technology. This will be the benchmark for judging whether the Korean government can respond appropriately when looking back at 2024 from the distant future, perhaps from space, and especially from the Korean Peninsula. You have given us a very significant message that advanced technology may shake the foundations of Korean diplomacy and that it will be a test of whether the Korean government can respond effectively. With these serious remarks, we will conclude the Visible Commentary's New Year's dialogue for 2024. Thank you very much to all viewers of Visible Commentary. Thank you, Professor.

While we point out that every new year is important, 2024 is particularly crucial, not just for the current government, but in the context of the 21st century. If we correctly understand the changes and prepare or lead the response, we will ride the wave of history. Otherwise, we will be swept away by the tide. In contrast, our domestic political discourse, academic discussions, and media coverage often remain too short-term and partisan. This regret stems from two points, to put it bluntly. First, the reconstruction of this complex space is no longer a mere concept or idea; it has begun in earnest, as explained above. It is being constructed through the Washington Declaration, Camp David, ROK-China relations, ROK-ASEAN relations, and ROK-India relations. The outcome will depend on who can skillfully design and build this three-dimensional complex apartment. However, our current blueprint is still based on a very rudimentary level of post-Cold War thinking, arguing about whose is better. If we continue to engage in such arguments, we will not be able to reside anywhere or play a significant role in the newly constructed apartments. This is a critical juncture. Therefore, how the ROK-Japan relationship, inter-Korean relations, ROK-China relations, ROK-ASEAN relations, and ROK-India relations, which are progressing regionally, can be integrated three-dimensionally, and furthermore, how cyber and AI...

In the context of the 21st century or civilization, 2023 and 2024 will be a crucial turning point. If we merely consider the emergence of generative AI, such as ChatGPT, as a new source of interest, we will be left behind in history. I believe this is a small manifestation of a grand transformation. What kind of grand transformation is occurring? In the 19th century, the new standard of civilization, 'rich country, strong army,' arrived, manifesting in military power and economic strength. The more fundamental issue with ChatGPT and open-source technologies is the knowledge they provide. This knowledge is creating a universal shock that is transforming all stages and domains of the world order. From last year onwards, at a much faster pace than we anticipate, it is changing our lives, our countries, and the global space. If we cannot keep up with this pace, we will face a very dark mid-21st century. To put it extremely, taking a leading role or jointly leading in advanced technology innovation and its diffusion is the greatest challenge facing Korean diplomacy. Paradoxically, therefore, this is a year that calls for a complete change of heart. In 2024, to put it extremely, the revolutionary changes brought about by advanced technology must form the backbone of diplomacy. If the president, all policymakers, and all 50 million or 80 million of us can contribute to this, we will have another opportunity. Otherwise, we may face the mid-21st century merely as spectators, gazing with envy.

To put it extremely, taking a leading role or jointly leading in advanced technology innovation and its diffusion is the greatest challenge facing Korean diplomacy. Paradoxically, therefore, this is a year that calls for a complete change of heart. In 2024, to put it extremely, the revolutionary changes brought about by advanced technology must form the backbone of diplomacy. If the president, all policymakers, and all 50 million or 80 million of us can contribute to this, we will have another opportunity. Otherwise, we may face the mid-21st century merely as spectators, gazing with envy.

Thank you very much, Chairman Ha Young-sun, for your valuable insights over this extended period. You have outlined five major challenges facing Korean diplomacy in 2024 and the attitude Korea should adopt. First, the urgent need for vision to properly design and build our complex living space. Second, the greatest challenge and shock facing Korea and the world in 2023-2024 will be the impact of advanced technology. This will be the benchmark for judging whether the Korean government can respond effectively when looking back at 2024 from the distant future, perhaps from space, and especially from the Korean Peninsula. You have given us a very significant message that advanced technology may shake the foundations of Korean diplomacy and that it will be a test of whether the Korean government can respond effectively. With these serious remarks, we will conclude the Visible Commentary's New Year's dialogue for 2024. Thank you very much to all viewers of Visible Commentary. Thank you, Professor.

You have given us a very significant message that advanced technology may shake the foundations of Korean diplomacy and that it will be a test of whether the Korean government can respond effectively. With these serious remarks, we will conclude the Visible Commentary's New Year's dialogue for 2024. Thank you very much to all viewers of Visible Commentary. Thank you, Professor.

*This text is an AI translation of an original written in Korean. Some translations or nuances may be inaccurate.

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