[Visible Commentary] Changes in the World Order in 2024 and South Korea's Response

YouTube 링크 : https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Ydi8p1KRgYU

Ha Young-sun, Chairman of the East Asia Institute (EAI), forecasts South Korea's relations with the US, China, and North Korea in 2024, as the US-China relationship moves from a period of 'exploration and adjustment' in 2023 to a 'year of management.' He also proposes South Korea's foreign policy strategies, including the Indo-Pacific strategy. Chairman Ha urges South Korea to institutionalize trilateral cooperation among South Korea, the US, and Japan, promote ways to improve relations with China within the framework of changing US-China relations, and take a leading role in advanced technology innovation. Furthermore, he emphasizes that as the three countries of South Korea, the US, and Japan expand their cooperation to the Indo-Pacific, South Korea should increase the weight of its partnerships with India and ASEAN to the same level as its relationships with the US, China, and Japan.

■ Ha Young-sunChairman of the East Asia Institute (EAI). Professor Emeritus, Seoul National University.

■ Responsible for and Edited by: Park Ji-su, EAI 연구원

    문의: 02 2277 1683 (ext. 208) | jspark@eai.or.kr

Video Script

Hello, this is your granddaughter. I'd like to wish all viewers of Visible Commentary a Happy New Year. Thank you very much for your readership, listenership, and support for EAI's various activities last year. We will work hard this year as well. Last year was similar, and we wanted to start this year's EAI activities with a New Year's dialogue. As last year, we will begin our New Year's dialogue by inviting EAI Chairman Ha Young-sun to discuss important issues and look ahead to 2024. Last year, we started with a forecast of US-China relations, and at that time, many forecasts predicted that US-China relations would continue to deteriorate. However, EAI predicted that 2023 would be a year of 'exploration and adjustment.' Indeed, looking at the trend over the past year, although there were some balloon incidents in the early part of the year, after March and April, much dialogue took place between the US and China, and it truly felt like a year of exploration and adjustment. Therefore, if we view 2023 in this way, we will begin by discussing how we should view US-China relations in 2024. Welcome, Ha Young-sun. Another year has passed, and we are looking ahead to 2024. As Director Sohn pointed out, last year at this time, we predicted that it would be a year of exploration and adjustment for US-China relations. Despite the negative side effects of the spy balloon incident, the US and China held a meeting in San Francisco again at the end of this year, albeit with some delays. So, how should we forecast the US-China relationship and the world order in 2024? I believe it will be a year of management. Why do I feel this way? We need to look closely at the results of the San Francisco meeting. Both sides released their summaries after the meeting. The US released a summarized explanation, while China, as always, had Foreign Minister Wang Yi provide a very detailed introduction. First, let me point out one or two particularly impressive points from Foreign Minister Wang Yi's speech. When asked what message China wanted to send to the US at this summit and what its basic stance was, he raised three main points. The first is the importance of making the right historical choice. From China's perspective, this is a very important expression. What does this mean? Can US-China relations truly be a partnership? Or are they destined to be adversaries? In other words, is it a relationship of partnership or adversarial confrontation? From China's perspective, hoping for the possibility of partnership is one of the first signals China is sending. This is the first point to keep in mind. The second point is that regarding US-China relations, they still adhere to the three principles of the new model great power relations that Xi Jinping has emphasized since first coming to power in 2012: mutual respect, peaceful coexistence, and win-win cooperation. In our terms, it's peaceful coexistence and mutually beneficial cooperation. The principle of win-win cooperation remains largely unchanged. What was further specified in this discussion was that on this basis, although the Chinese expression is 'five pillars,' in English, they hope to establish five pillars. The first pillar is accurate perception, meaning it is important to minimize mutual misunderstandings. The second is a kind of management issue. Even with accurate perception, there can be fundamental differences, and given these fundamental differences between the US and China, how to effectively manage them is the second core objective they are presenting. The San Francisco summit between the US and China made slightly more progress than the Bali summit, mainly because the US, facing a presidential election, had to handle China-related issues more cautiously, trying to avoid negative consequences in economic and political matters. China, on its part, might be facing concerns about the 'peak China' theory, suggesting that China's economic peak has passed, and related issues of domestic political legitimacy and effectiveness might also be sensitive. Therefore, China also views 2024 as a crucial year. It seems the San Francisco meeting was convened in this spirit of management. The third point is cooperation in areas where mutual benefit can be achieved, or 'win-win cooperation.' The fourth point is that they are prepared to take joint responsibility in areas where great powers must exercise responsibility. The final pillar they are requesting is to promote people-to-people exchanges. However, reading Foreign Minister Wang Yi's explanation of the overall meeting, the most interesting part for me was this. One of the questions was, what was the most difficult aspect of the entire meeting? What was the most challenging part to reconcile? He points out two things. The first is, naturally, the Taiwan issue, which China cannot compromise on. They hope the US can fully understand this. The second point, which is emphasized more than the Taiwan issue, is the risk of 'de-risking.' That is, the effort to reduce risks ironically increases risks. From a global economic perspective, the risks associated with regulating or decoupling from China are particularly emphasized. China believes that this strategy cannot succeed in the end. China will do its utmost to respond, which will create difficult problems for the US. Therefore, they hope this issue can be resolved well. I believe this was the most important aspect of the San Francisco meeting. Thus, looking at the US-China relations in 2024, we can broadly categorize them into three areas. First, regarding issues classified as core interests, they cannot be resolved in the short term without mutual misunderstanding, so the focus is on how to manage them. Second, in areas like economy and technology, is there any room for cooperation? They have moved from 'coupling' to 'de-risking,' but is there room for adjustment and management within this process? This will likely be a key debate in 2024. Finally, there are areas where the US and China can coexist and cooperate, such as climate change and environmental issues. Especially concerning issues related to elections, such as drug-related issues among young people, there have been discussions about whether these should be addressed jointly. Therefore, this is extremely important in the broader framework. It is crucial to pay close attention to this issue, as it can significantly impact the global order, Korean Peninsula affairs, or our external relations, perhaps even more than the wars in Ukraine or the Middle East. This is my first thought. Yes, you mentioned that US-China relations still remain the biggest factor influencing the world order. Last year, we viewed this as 'exploration and adjustment,' and this year, we are moving to the stage of 'management.' And this management has three aspects. First, there are clear differences in the core interests of the US and China, and the first challenge is how to manage these differences. The second agenda is related to technology and economic issues, which are crucial for the future of US-China relations. They are talking about 'de-risking,' but how can management and cooperation be achieved within this process? The third aspect is the cautious exploration of cooperation on global issues facing the entire world, including the US and China. This is what you have described as the three major issues in the stage of management between the US and China. Now, let's look more closely at the issue of North Korea, in relation to the US and China. In the US, perhaps the most groundbreaking event of 2023 was the joint declaration at Camp David. Therefore, how we forecast Camp David in 2024 is a crucial point of observation. I personally feel that we may be underestimating the importance of Camp David. Looking back over the past year, there was the Washington Declaration in April and the Camp David agreement in August. I want to emphasize the importance of the Camp David agreement in particular because if it can go through the institutionalization process, it will bring about significant changes, not just short-term political changes, but also new changes in the Indo-Pacific order, the Korean Peninsula, and the overall Indo-Pacific order in political, military, economic, and technological areas. However, the issue is that this trilateral cooperation among South Korea, the US, and Japan, which was a long-standing task, was achieved at Camp David. It is noteworthy that leaders in South Korea, the US, and Japan do not continuously hold power; their governments change. Even now, with the 2024 elections in the US and public opinion polls in South Korea and Japan not showing a clear advantage, there are difficulties, and new governments may emerge. In that sense, the institutionalization process is important. If it remains a declaration or a spirit, it will be a thing of the past. But if it begins to embark on the path of institutionalization in earnest, then it is a change for which we must strive with all our might, considering its direction and how we should work towards it. While the Camp David consultations involved various discussions, the extent of institutionalization remains to be seen, but even a few points are significant. First, the fact that the leaders of the three countries will meet regularly is a significant change, as is the fact that working-level officials will meet in a very permanent capacity, not just on a one-off basis. Second, security issues are involved, and in our case, this is particularly important. There are two issues. We need to be cautious about one: the discussion of North Korean issues among South Korea, the US, and Japan will inevitably begin in earnest. In particular, how to efficiently handle nuclear and missile issues, how to establish tailored deterrence, and how to take credible responses based on that are discussions that will take place on a permanent basis, which we should pay attention to. One security issue to be mindful of is that while trilateral security discussions may begin focusing on North Korea's nuclear and missile issues, this inevitably goes beyond the issue of extended deterrence. It also raises the issue of the tripartite role in integrated deterrence, which the US has emphasized in the mid-21st century. Integrated deterrence, as you know, requires integration in terms of space and weapon systems, connecting conventional weapons, nuclear weapons, cyber, and space. This is an issue that is linked to China and North Korea, and although it is a secondary and sensitive issue with potential differences in positions, it is a part where cautious discussions are beginning. The question is whether efficient discussions can take place without causing excessive misunderstanding or concern in the surrounding region. The third aspect will be the role in the economic sphere. In the economic sphere, both in terms of education and investment, the idea of decoupling from China, which was discussed almost to the point of divorce in the early stages of global developments, is practically impossible. In such a situation, how far is it possible? Some experts estimate that de-risking accounts for about 20% of the total economy. However, the most important aspect of de-risking from the US perspective is not to directly assist in strengthening China's military capabilities. In such cases, what about semiconductors and batteries, which are typical examples of de-risking? As you know, we have reached world-class levels in semiconductors and batteries, so this is a very sensitive issue. It's not a simple matter. The fourth aspect is how to cooperate in the Indo-Pacific region and how to coordinate with the US to play a role in the Indo-Pacific. This is what we face. In a limited sense, security issues, economic and technological issues are approaching us. Therefore, what should our role be within the roles of the US and Japan? This is a very important question. We have announced our Indo-Pacific strategy, but how will we implement it? Depending on the circumstances, there may be room for South Korea to secure a stronger foundation of legitimacy in the Indo-Pacific region than the US or Japan. In that regard, this is a very important aspect. Therefore, the issues arising from the institutionalization of the Camp David agreement show the possibility of a new change in the relationship between South Korea and Japan. A very cautious aspect is how China and North Korea will respond to this, or what elements can be incorporated into the Camp David vision from the perspective of China and North Korea. This is the second challenge. And finally, the significance of joint leadership by South Korea and Japan in expanding into the Indo-Pacific space. We need to approach this with a new resolve as we enter 2024. Yes, following up on that, as you mentioned, the more we deepen and expand trilateral cooperation, the more important it is to manage China and North Korea. How can we properly handle China? Looking back at last year, the South Korean government placed great emphasis on strengthening ties with the US and the US-ROK alliance. In that context, there have been many calls for a more balanced approach to South Korea-China relations in 2024. Could you please elaborate on South Korea-China relations? There have been various debates on South Korea-China relations domestically and internationally, but I believe a direction has been set. Personally, I think so. This is because the basic framework is being established with the Washington Declaration and the Camp David agreement last year. Paradoxically, some argue that this will make South Korea-China relations more difficult. However, I believe that since the foundation has been laid, it will be relatively easier to embrace South Korea-China relations within that framework. There is a possibility for both South Korea and China to improve relations, and we have reasonable expectations for this. Because, as seen in the US-China summit in San Francisco, the US-China relationship is moving towards a year of management. Within the framework of the Washington Declaration and the Camp David agreement, China's response to the strengthening of trilateral military and security cooperation, or the establishment of a new cooperative order in the economic and technological fields that will shape the mid-21st century, will inevitably lead China to strengthen its international cooperation, in addition to its domestic efforts. In that case, where do you think the most important space for cooperation lies? I believe ASEAN and South Korea are the most representative spaces where efforts should be concentrated. From our perspective, China still plays an important, albeit limited, role in inter-Korean relations from a security standpoint. In economic terms, whether it's trade or investment, China's economy is undoubtedly the most important partner, despite its fluctuations. Therefore, within this established framework, there is a necessary mutual common interest to actively seek to improve South Korea-China relations. I have a small expectation that this year will see progress in maximizing mutual interests, acknowledging that there are certain differences in core interests. However, I must point out one thing: there have been criticisms that South Korea's China policy has undergone various changes with each new government. However, in the current situation, we must also establish our position within the basic changes in US-China relations. If US-China relations are moving from exploration and adjustment to management, then compared to the previous period of more intense strategic competition, if we move towards management, we must also seek a South Korea-China relationship that responds to these rapid changes, keeping the global agenda in mind. Therefore, new concepts for South Korea-China relations should also be considered within that framework in 2024. You mentioned China. What is another issue that South Korea must pay close attention to? It is North Korea, isn't it? North Korea adopted the Law on the Development of Nuclear Weapons last year and codified it into its constitution. What can we expect from North Korea in 2024? Usually, due to the relative limitations of information about North Korea's domestic situation, forecasts for the year are often based on the direction set by North Korea's New Year's addresses. However, the day we are having this dialogue is when the 8th Party Congress, 9th Plenary Session is underway in Pyongyang. According to media reports, it started the day before yesterday, and Chairman Kim delivered a relatively long speech yesterday on where North Korea will go in 2024 and where it should go. There were also internal discussions. However, the full original text has not yet been transmitted to us. Based on the overall discussions being conveyed, North Korea is emphasizing the year 2024. The reason is that the 8th Party Congress was held in 2021. Three years have passed. Now, two more years until 2025. At the 8th Party Congress, what was pointed out? They stated that for the next five years, they would focus on two key issues: First, for sovereignty and survival, the development and strengthening of North Korea's nuclear armament capabilities are unavoidable. These are the two pillars. Perhaps for North Korea, this is the greatest achievement to date, as Chairman Kim emphasizes it. Second, as we can easily understand, economic development is the most crucial issue for North Korea. However, the problem is not easy, and we do not know the content of yesterday's speech. Therefore, to achieve success in 2024 and 2025, they are emphasizing the need to make maximum efforts over the remaining two years, based on the basic achievements of the past three years, focusing on what efforts should be made domestically and internationally. However, as I briefly review this, the problem I encounter, and which fills me with both frustration and sympathy, is that it is not easy to achieve these two major goals in the remaining two years. This is a dilemma. What kind of dilemma will North Korea face in 2024? Briefly summarizing the two issues that North Korea has emphasized since the 8th Party Congress, the first is the unavoidable goal of continuously strengthening nuclear forces for self-reliance and survival. However, I believe this will bring complex problems in 2024. What kind of problems will it bring? First, can it truly guarantee self-reliance and survival? Why do I say this? First, in our case, the Washington Declaration was issued in April last year. In the Washington Declaration, it was naturally stated that to counter North Korea's nuclear and missile issues, a more systematic tailored extended deterrence must be established on the Korean Peninsula. Accordingly, a permanent consultative body was established, and the second meeting of the Nuclear Consultative Group (NCG) was held in the US in mid-December. Based on this, the US has already set its basic direction for nuclear weapons policy in 2022, stating that it will implement tailored deterrence against North Korea. However, if North Korea's nuclear weapons pose a threat to the US or its allies and partners, or if the threat or use of nuclear weapons arises, Kim Jong-un's regime will cease to exist. This was re-emphasized at the NCG meeting in mid-December. Therefore, this is a very important issue. The effectiveness of North Korea's nuclear weapons is questionable if their use would lead to the destruction of the user. Even if they achieve a momentary victory through use, the outcome would inevitably be war. Therefore, logically, their effectiveness is of little significance, which is a very difficult point for North Korea to counter. Second, from the US perspective, it is a very difficult situation, and they do not know how to proceed. However, one thing the US emphasizes is that the mid-21st century is no longer a nuclear deterrence era, but an era of integrated deterrence. In other words, the role of nuclear weapons among conventional weapons, nuclear weapons, cyber weapons, and space weapons is rapidly shrinking. China is also responding to this by advocating for a paradigm shift in its offensive strategy. Therefore, in that sense, the more I see North Korea emphasizing the strengthening of its nuclear forces, the more I believe it is repeating outdated ideas. We need to clearly recognize that this is a military and security-level discourse that is increasingly out of sync with the 21st century. Second, what I regret is that this is not just a matter of self-reliance and survival, but it has a tremendous negative impact on North Korea's right to development. Frankly, in my view, North Korea's biggest problem until 2025 is the economy. As you know, North Korea is currently ranked among the bottom 10 in the world in terms of per capita income, hovering around $1,000. This is a dilemma. Especially after COVID-19, despite the desperate efforts to raise it over five years since the 8th Party Congress, the borders have been closed recently, and growth was negative in 2021 and 2022. However, it seems to be shifting towards positive growth this year, albeit for the first time compared to the previous two years. Nevertheless, I believe there is no hope. Regrettably, why do I say this? In the relationship between China and the US, although the risk of de-risking is mentioned, in North Korea's case, the economic sanctions due to nuclear and missile issues, even if China and Russia do not fully participate in the sanctions, still pose a significant obstacle to a rapid economic recovery. Therefore, the remaining two years, which are crucial for self-reliance and international support, are hindered by the strengthening of nuclear armament capabilities. If this cannot be achieved, then by 2025, North Korea will face a very dark future. Yes, you have explained the two major dilemmas facing North Korea with a sense of sympathy. This seems to be a continuation of our New Year's dialogue from last year. So far, we have discussed the major challenges for 2024, namely, how to view US-China relations, the institutionalization of Camp David and its follow-up, how to appropriately manage and expand South Korea-China relations, and the issue of North Korea. Finally, as US-China relations enter a stage of management, the diplomatic stage or arena for cooperation between the US and China may relatively expand. And as you pointed out earlier, Chairman Ha, the case of China's relations with ASEAN and South Korea are becoming increasingly important. From our perspective, we announced the Indo-Pacific strategy in December 2020 and the implementation plan in December 2023. Therefore, the Indo-Pacific strategy is entering a phase of full implementation. What direction should South Korea's Indo-Pacific strategy take in 2023 and 2024? I would like to hear your thoughts. We have proclaimed our Indo-Pacific strategy and how to develop it in a future-oriented manner. From South Korea's perspective, what are the areas shared with the US and Japan, and what are the spaces that South Korea can independently explore? This is our homework. Especially as we enter 2024, what we need to pay more attention to is the expansion of our diplomatic space and overall external activities. Not just diplomacy, but the full expansion of our living space into the Indo-Pacific. Previously, we thought of it in a limited way, such as inter-Korean relations or bilateral relations like ROK-US, ROK-Japan, ROK-China, or ROK-US. Now, thinking of a slightly broader space called the Indo-Pacific, what spaces should we prioritize? An interesting point is that among the various events China held last year, one that left a deep impression on me was the large-scale commemorative event on October 24th marking the 10th anniversary of the New Model Neighboring Country Relations policy. Foreign Minister Wang Yi gave a very long speech. What I found new in his speech was his detailed elaboration on the fact that their living space is not limited to the US or Europe, and he repeatedly emphasized the scope of this space by naming individual countries. As discussed earlier, the US and China are in a situation where they must manage relations in three areas. Therefore, what China can do importantly is to fully commit to its neighboring countries in a broad sense of Chinese perspective. The way it commits is, paradoxically, by emphasizing shared responsibility in global management, and then by prioritizing areas where mutual benefit can be achieved through one-on-one interactions with neighboring countries, while still acknowledging differences in core interests. Similarly, in our own space, paradoxically, while China views its neighboring countries as its living space, in the process of expanding and complexifying the space for coexistence with us, the Indo-Pacific comes into play. Therefore, the most important thing we need to pay attention to is ASEAN and India. The US, in particular, seems to feel certain burdens and limitations in this regard. However, in our case, including India, if we consider India and ASEAN not as separate entities but as part of the complexification of our living space, and if we begin to embrace them in earnest, then it must go beyond mere diplomacy or limited economic exchanges and cooperation. Then, what kind of lives will we concretely build with ASEAN and India? In that regard, there are certain limiting factors, and the search for possibilities, although frustrating, inevitably leads back to San Francisco. In areas where core interests conflict, we must cautiously cooperate and play a role. In the Indo-Pacific space, we may face issues such as the Taiwan issue or issues in the South Pacific. In these areas, our limited capabilities in core areas are subject to constraints. The reservation clause in the Camp David agreement, stating that they do not agree on everything, also has such meaning. Therefore, I believe that in our case, we need to be more proactive in the second and third areas. We must take on shared responsibility, even if it is difficult, to find a breakthrough as a 'global pivotal state.' Second, how can we achieve a win-win game in the economic and technological sectors? India and ASEAN must be elevated to the same level of importance as Camp David or South Korea-China relations. Therefore, in terms of budget, research, or the Ministry of Foreign Affairs' administrative support, a comprehensive overhaul may be necessary. Yes, you have covered the five major issues. Finally, regarding the direction of South Korea's foreign policy for 2024, what advice would you give to South Korea's foreign policy decision-makers? Every year is described as important, but 2024 is still a very important year, not just for the current administration, but in the context of the 21st century. If we properly recognize the changes and develop countermeasures or lead the way, we will ride the waves of history. Otherwise, we will be swept away by the waves. In contrast, our domestic political discourse, academic discussions, and media discussions often do not move beyond short-term and partisan perspectives. This regret stems from two points, to put it bluntly. First, the reconstruction of this complex space is no longer just a concept or idea; as explained above, construction has begun in earnest. It is being shaped by the Washington Declaration, Camp David, South Korea-China relations, South Korea-ASEAN relations, and South Korea-India relations. Depending on who builds this three-dimensional complex apartment well, the outcome will be determined. However, our current blueprint is still based on a very superficial level of pre- and post-Cold War designs, where we argue about whose is better. In such a situation, we will not be able to reside anywhere, nor will we be able to play an important role in the newly constructed apartments. This is a critical juncture. Therefore, how the trilateral relations, inter-Korean relations, South Korea-China relations, South Korea-ASEAN relations, and South Korea-India relations, which are developing regionally, can be integrated three-dimensionally, and furthermore, in cyberspace and outer space... This year, 2023 and 2024, will be a very important turning point in the context of the century or civilization. We are treating the emergence of generative AI, like ChatGPT, as merely a new source of interest. If we do, we will be left behind in history. I believe this is a small manifestation of a grand change. What grand change is occurring? When the new standard of civilization, 'rich country, strong army,' emerged in the 19th century, it came to us in the form of military power and economic strength. The more fundamental issue with ChatGPT and openness is that the knowledge it provides is fundamentally transforming all stages and domains of the world order. We anticipate that this will change our lives, our countries, and the global space at a much faster pace than we expect, starting from this year. If we cannot keep up with this pace, we will once again face a very dark mid-21st century. To put it extremely, taking a leading role or jointly leading in advanced technology innovation and its dissemination is the greatest challenge facing South Korean diplomacy. Paradoxically, in that sense, it is a year that requires a complete reevaluation. In 2024, to put it extremely, the revolutionary changes brought about by such advanced technologies should form the basis of diplomacy. If the president, all policymakers, and all 50 million of us can contribute to this, we will have another opportunity. Otherwise, we may face the mid-21st century gazing enviously at the stage. We must keep this in mind for the year. Thank you, Chairman Ha Young-sun, for your valuable insights over this long period. We have discussed the five major challenges facing South Korean diplomacy in 2024 and the attitude required to face them. One is the urgent need for insight to properly design and construct our complexifying living space. The second is that the greatest challenge and shock that South Korea and the world will face in 2023 and 2024 will be the impact of advanced technology. In the future, when looking back at 2024 from somewhere on Earth, and especially from the Korean Peninsula, it may be remembered as a year when advanced technology shook the foundations of South Korean diplomacy. This could be a test of whether the South Korean government can respond appropriately. You have provided very meaningful and serious remarks. With these remarks, we conclude Visible Commentary's start to 2024. Thank you, viewers of Visible Commentary. Thank you, Mr. Ha. L.

过去一年是探索与调整的一年。因此，如果我们将2023年视为如此，那么我们应该如何看待2024年中美关系呢？我将从这个主题开始进行阐述。很高兴见到各位，又一年过去了，我们迎来了2024年的展望。正如孙院长所指出的，去年在这个场合展望中美关系时，我们曾预测这将是探索与调整的一年。尽管存在侦察气球事件的副作用，但中美两国基本按照略有延迟的进程，于今年年底在旧金山再次举行了会晤。那么，对于2024年中美关系和世界秩序的走向，我们应该如何展望才算恰当呢？在我看来，或许会是“管控”的一年。为什么会有这种感觉呢？我们需要仔细关注旧金山峰会的结果。会谈结束后，美方发布了其总结性

说明，而中方一如既往，由外交部长王毅做了非常详细的介绍。首先，我将特别指出王毅部长讲话中一两处给我留下深刻印象的内容。第一，此次旧金山峰会，中方希望向美方传递的信息是什么？其基本立场是什么？在回答这些问题时，中方提出了三点。第一，中方认为，做出正确的历史选择至关重要。这意味着什么呢？中美关系究竟能否成为伙伴关系，还是只能是对手关系？换言之，是伙伴关系还是对抗关系？在合作或对抗的二元对立框架下，中方至少希望伙伴关系的可能性，这是中方发出的第一个信号。这是希望大家留意的第一点。第二，关于中美关系，中方一直

自2012年习近平主席上任十年来，一直在强调“新型大国关系”的三原则：相互尊重、和平共处、合作共赢。用我们的话来说，就是和平共处，合作共赢。在这些原则上没有大的变化。在这一基础上，此次讨论中更为具体化的是，用中方的话说是“五大支柱”，用英语来说就是希望建立五个支柱。第一个支柱是“正确认知”，即最大限度地减少相互间的误解。第二个支柱是“有效管控”，即使能正确认识，但本质上必然存在差异。中美之间存在根本性分歧，那么如何有效管控这些分歧呢？这是第二个核心目标。可以说，旧金山峰会比

白宫峰会取得一些进展，最关键的原因或许在于，美国即将面临总统大选，不得不更加谨慎地处理中国问题，并且需要避免经济和政治问题带来的副作用。而中国方面，也面临着“中国崩溃论”的担忧，即中国经济是否已经过了顶峰？以及与此相关的国内政治合法性问题和效率问题，也可能使其面临一些谨慎之处。因此，中国认为2024年是至关重要的一年。旧金山峰会或许就是本着这种管控的意愿而举行的。我个人是这样认为的。

第三点是，在能够相互获益的领域展开合作，即“合作共赢”。第四点是，在应承担大国责任的领域，双方都有共同的意愿去承担。最后一点是，倡导人文交流。当然，在回顾整个会谈时，王毅部长在解释时，我最感兴趣的部分是这里。有一个问题是，那么在整个会谈中最困难的部分是什么？最难调整的部分是什么？对此，王部长提出了两点。第一，台湾问题自然是中方绝不退让的底线，希望美方能充分理解。第二，与台湾问题相比，更强调的是“去风险”（risk reduction）。也就是说，“去风险”反而可能增加风险。特别是从全球经济角度来看，如果试图

特别强调了试图进行监管和分离所带来的风险问题，这最终可能导致神父之间的斗争无法成功。中国将继续努力应对这一问题，而美国也将面临困难，因此希望能妥善解决这一问题，这可能是旧金山会议上最重要的部分。我对此有这样的印象。因此，从这个角度来看，2023年和2024年的中美关系可以大致分为三个方面。首先是相互核心利益的分类，短期内无法互相误解并解决的问题，因此如何进行管理是第一点。第二，特别是在经济和技术领域，是否存在一定的合作空间？在耦合和去风险的过程中，如何从这里开始进行良好的调整是一个重要的问题，可能会成为2024年的核心争论。

除了这些，最后我认为中美之间为了共生而合作的空间是不可或缺的，存在许多问题，比如气候变化等环境问题，尤其是与选举相关的部分。在美国的情况下，例如青少年毒品相关问题等，这些问题都需要共同解决。因此，从大局来看，这非常重要，涉及到全球范围内，或者南北韩问题，或者我们与外部关系的设定，如何在这种情况下进行大致的设置，可能需要密切关注乌克兰战争或以色列中东战争的动态，这是我第一个想法。

是的，现在的说法是，中美关系仍然是左右世界秩序的最大因素。如果说去年中美关系是探索和调整的话，今年则是进入管理阶段的过程。管理的任务大致有三个方面：首先，中美之间的相互核心差异是显而易见的，如何妥善管理这些差异是首要任务。其次，关于中美未来的核心问题，涉及到技术、尖端技术和经济问题的去风险讨论，如何在去风险的过程中进行管理与合作是第二个重要议题。最后，涉及到中美及全球面临的全球性问题，谨慎地寻求合作，可能是中美管理阶段的三个主要议题。

在考虑韩国问题时，我们必须关注中美关系。2023年可以说是一个具有划时代意义的事件，即坎普·大卫的韩美共同宣言。因此，2024年我们如何看待坎普·大卫的前景将是一个非常重要的观察点。我们相对低估了坎普·大卫的重要性。回顾四年，4月的华盛顿宣言和8月的坎普·大卫协议，特别是我想强调坎普·大卫协议的重要性。如果这一协议能够经过具体的制度化过程，将带来相当大的变化，这不仅仅是短期的政权问题，而是在更长期的意义上，涉及到印太秩序、朝鲜半岛及印太秩序整体上所产生的政治、军事、经济、技术等领域的新变化。

我认为这是一个值得关注的问题。然而，问题在于，这一切都是在长期以来的韩美关系中达成的共识，但需要注意的是，韩美之间的政治力量并不是持续掌权的，而是不断变化的。因此，即使现在来看，美国在2024年面临的情况，或者韩国和日本的国内舆论调查也并非一边倒，反而面临相当大的困难。因此，任何新政府的出现都是不可预知的，因此在这个意义上，制度化过程是非常重要的。如果这一过程仅仅停留在声明或精神层面，那么这将成为过去的事情，但如果这一制度化过程开始真正走上轨道，

那么从韩国的角度来看，我们必须思考这一过程将朝哪个方向发展，以及我们如何努力推动这一进程。这是我们必须进行战略投入的变化之一。坎普·大卫的会议进行了非常多样化的讨论，制度化的进展程度值得关注，但首先，我们可以想到的几个方面并不容易赋予其意义。首先，三国领导人定期会晤的框架，以及负责实务的人员不再是一次性的，而是以非常常设的形式进行会晤，这是一项重要的变化。其次，安全问题也非常重要，尤其是我们在这一方面面临着非常重要的挑战。我们必须谨慎对待的两个问题是，首先，朝鲜问题和韩美之间的问题将开始进行正式讨论，尤其是北核和导弹问题。

如何有效处理这些问题，如何制定所谓的定制型威慑，以及如何根据这些问题采取可靠的应对措施，这些讨论将会持续进行，这是我们需要关注的部分。在安全问题中，我们需要关注的一个方面是，韩美日如果围绕北核和导弹问题展开讨论，这不仅仅是扩展威慑的问题，同时也是美国在21世纪中期强调的多元威慑因素的角色问题。这是一个非常复杂的问题，因为核武器、常规武器、网络武器和太空武器之间的关系是相互关联的。

因此，北核和导弹问题是朝鲜的问题，但这与中国有直接关系，因此这一部分可能是一个非常敏感的问题，立场差异也可能存在。然而，这一敏感讨论的开始意味着我们需要思考如何在不引起过多误解或担忧的情况下进行有效的讨论。第三个问题是经济领域的角色。经济方面，教育和投资等领域在全球范围内都在发生变化，尤其是在过去一段时间内，中国在军事能力提升方面的直接帮助是美国所不允许的，这在美国的去风险战略中占据了最重要的部分。因此，在这种情况下，我们该如何应对？具体来说，典型的去风险领域包括半导体和电池等问题。我们在半导体和电池等领域已经达到了全球水平，因此这是一个非常谨慎的问题。如何进行讨论并不是简单的事情。

在印太地区，我们如何进行合作，以及如何在韩美之间进行良好的协调，以便在印太地区发挥作用，这将是我们面临的任务。在某种程度上，安全问题也将涉及到经济和技术领域的问题，这些问题将会接踵而至。因此，在这一过程中，美国的角色、日本的角色以及我们的角色究竟是什么，将是一个非常重要的问题。我们已经提出了印太战略，但如何推动这一战略，尤其是在2024年，我们需要更加关注的是，前面提到的外交空间或对外活动的整体，不仅仅是外部的，而是我们生活空间的全面印太扩展。

我们过去可能将南北韩或双边关系视为韩美、韩日、韩中等关系，但现在我们需要将其视为一个更广泛的印太空间。在这个过程中，我们需要关注哪些空间是重要的。一个有趣的事情是，中国在过去的各种活动中，尤其是在10月24日举行的周边国家关系新政策十周年的大规模纪念活动中，强调了他们的生活空间不仅仅是美国和欧洲。通过提及这些国家的名字，他们强调了这一点。中美之间的关系在某种程度上是相互依存的，因此在这一过程中，我们也需要关注如何在这一空间中进行合作。

第二个任务是，最后，这一切在扩展到印太空间时，韩美共同主导的意义是什么？在迎接2024年时，我们需要以新的决心开始行动。正如您所提到的，深化和扩大韩美合作的同时，如何管理与中国和朝鲜的关系，尤其是如何妥善处理与中国的关系，这是一个非常重要的问题。从过去一年来看，韩国政府在韩美关系上付出了很大的努力，而在此过程中，相对而言，韩中关系在2024年可能需要适当的调整。因此，请您谈谈关于韩中关系的看法。关于韩中关系的讨论，过去在国内和国际层面上都经历了许多争论。

但我个人认为，方向已经逐渐明确。为什么这么说呢？因为正如刚才提到的，去年的华盛顿宣言和坎普·大卫协议的达成，基本框架已经开始形成。反过来，这可能导致韩中关系的困难。虽然有人认为这会使韩中关系变得更加复杂，但我认为基础已经建立，因此在这个框架下，韩中关系的改善可能会在更大的框架内实现，韩国和中国都将不得不努力，甚至期待这一点。因为在中美关系方面，旧金山峰会的进展表明，管理的过程正在转变。

从中国的角度来看，韩美关系的推进，尤其是在21世纪中期将影响经济和技术领域的新合作秩序的形成。如果中国能够在国内努力的同时，增强国际合作，那么在这种情况下，最重要的空间可能是东盟和韩国。因此，我认为我们在这一方面需要付出更多的努力。此外，从安全的角度来看，中国在南北韩关系中仍然扮演着重要角色，尤其是在经济领域，贸易和投资等方面，中国经济的波动是毋庸置疑的。

尽管如此，经济仍然是最重要的部分，因此在这一基本框架下，我们必须积极寻求改善韩中关系的机会，因为双方在共同利益方面存在着不可避免的相互需求。因此，我认为在这一过程中，尽管双方的核心利益存在一定差异，但在相互利益最大化的努力中，仍然可以取得进展。因此，我对未来持有一定的期待。然而，我必须指出的是，过去在韩中关系中，国内新政府上台时，相关政策经历了多次变化。

这种现象在当前情况下显得尤为突出，因为我们需要在中美关系的基本变化中重新定位自己。如果中美关系从探索和调整转向管理，那么在这种情况下，探索和调整的阶段将比之前更加激烈，至少在战略竞争方面将更加紧张。因此，如果中美关系进入管理阶段，我们需要在全球范围内考虑这一点，以便迅速应对变化，重新审视韩中关系的构想。因此，我认为2024年是一个需要认真思考的年份。关于中国的问题，您刚才提到的，韩国需要特别关注的部分是朝鲜。朝鲜在2022年通过了武力政策法，去年经历了宪法化的过程。那么，2024年朝鲜将会如何发展呢？通常情况下，我们在新年展望时，往往会参考朝鲜在新年时的讲话，来预测这一年的走向。

然而，今天是我们开始讨论的日子，朝鲜在平壤召开了第八届第九次全体会议。根据媒体报道，这次会议从前天开始，回顾了2024年，并且昨天金元帅发表了关于朝鲜未来走向的较长讲话，内部讨论也在进行中。虽然目前我们尚未收到完整的原文，但从目前传递的信息来看，朝鲜在2024年强调了几个问题。原因是，八次党代会在2021年召开，三年过去了，2025年将是朝鲜八次党代会的关键年份。

朝鲜强调在未来五年内，特别关注两个核心问题。首先，为了维护自主权和生存权，朝鲜的核武装能力的发展和增强是不可避免的。这是朝鲜的两大目标。其次，经济发展是朝鲜面临的最核心问题。然而，问题在于，这并不容易。由于昨天的讲话内容尚不清楚，

因此，为了在2024年和2025年取得良好成果，朝鲜在过去三年中必须利用基本成果，在剩下的两年内尽最大努力，强调国内和国际方面的努力。然而，我在观察这一点时，感到困惑和无奈，因为在剩下的两年中，朝鲜要实现这两个目标并不容易。这是一个困境。那么，2024年朝鲜将面临什么样的困境呢？从八次党代会开始，朝鲜强调的两个问题可以简要总结如下。首先，为了维护自主权和生存权，持续增强核武力量是不可避免的目标。

然而，我认为这在2024年将带来非常复杂的问题。第一个问题是，这是否能够成为朝鲜自主权和生存权的保障？为什么这么说呢？首先，去年4月的华盛顿宣言中，显然提到了安全问题，为了应对北核和导弹问题，必须在半岛上建立更为系统的量身定制的扩展威慑措施。因此，与此相关的常设协商机制已经在12月中旬的第二次会议上成立。根据这一点，美国在2022年设定的核问题的基本方向已经明确，即如果北核对美国、盟友或合作伙伴构成威胁，那么一旦核威胁或核使用的时刻到来，朝鲜的金正恩政权将不再存在。

这一点在12月中旬的会议上再次得到了强调。因此，这一问题非常重要。如果朝鲜拥有的核武器在使用时，使用者将不再存在，那么即使获得了短期的胜利，最终也将不可避免地导致战争。因此，从逻辑上讲，朝鲜的核武器的有效性将变得毫无意义，这对朝鲜来说是一个非常困难的指控。第二，朝鲜的立场非常尴尬，未来该如何应对仍然不明朗。然而，美国强调的一个观点是，21世纪中期将不再是核威慑的时代，而是综合威慑的时代。换句话说，常规武器、核武器、网络武器和太空武器之间的角色将迅速减少。中国也在对此进行相应的调整和转变。因此，从这个意义上讲，朝鲜强调核武力量的增强，我认为这是一种过时的说法，重复这样的言论将会带来什么样的后果，这是一个值得关注的问题。

第二，我感到遗憾的是，这不仅仅是自主生存权的问题，而是对朝鲜发展权产生了巨大的负面影响。实际上，我认为到2025年，朝鲜面临的最大问题是经济。众所周知，朝鲜在全球范围内的经济水平处于最低水平，国民收入仅略超过1000美元。

在这种情况下，朝鲜面临着困境，尤其是在经历了疫情后，尽管在八次党代会上强调要在五年内拼命提升经济，但直到最近，国境仍然关闭，因此2021年和2022年都出现了负增长。然而，今年可能首次出现正增长，尽管如此，我仍然认为没有希望。遗憾的是，我之所以这么说，是因为在中美关系中，去风险化的风险被提及，但在朝鲜的情况下，朝鲜面临的核导弹经济制裁，即使中国和俄罗斯没有有效参与制裁，朝鲜的经济恢复仍然面临着巨大的挑战。因此，自力更生加上国际援助是朝鲜在未来两年中至关重要的因素。如果朝鲜的核武装能力不断增强，

将会成为朝鲜发展权的决定性因素，这将使得朝鲜在金正恩的领导下，面临着核武器的有效性不足，而经济发展则变得更加重要。因此，朝鲜在实现重大成果方面将面临相对困难。我所说的重大成果，至少在朝鲜的情况下，负增长转为正增长，达到2%或3%的增长，这样的说法是毫无意义的。朝鲜经济要恢复，至少需要经历两位数的经济增长，正如中国在改革开放中所经历的那样，朝鲜正处于一个绝对紧迫的时刻，如果无法实现这一目标，到2025年，朝鲜将面临非常严峻的局面。

您提到的两大困境，我感到非常同情，这与我们去年新年讨论的延续有关。到目前为止，我们讨论了2024年的主要任务，包括如何看待中美关系，如何推进坎普·大卫的制度化，以及如何适当管理和扩大韩中关系，最后还提到了朝鲜问题。最后，随着中美关系进入管理阶段，中美之间的外交竞争舞台或合作舞台可能会相对扩大。正如您所指出的，关于中国的案例，

在朝鲜半岛，韩国与东盟的外交变得非常重要。我们也在进行印太战略的推进，2022年12月发布了印太战略，2023年12月将发布实施计划。因此，印太战略现在进入了正式实施阶段。关于2023年和2024年，韩国的印太战略应该朝哪个方向发展，我希望您能谈谈。我们发布印太战略后，如何在未来发展这一战略，尤其是如何在美国或日本的共同利益与韩国独立探索之间找到平衡，这是我们需要思考的任务。特别是在2024年，我们需要更加关注的是，如何在外交空间或对外活动中，不仅仅是简单的外交，而是如何在我们的生活空间中进行全面的印太扩展。

我们过去可能将南北韩或双边关系视为韩美、韩日、韩中等关系，但现在需要将其视为更广泛的印太空间。在这个过程中，我们需要关注哪些空间是重要的。值得一提的是，中国在过去的多项活动中，尤其是在10月24日举行的周边国家关系新政策十周年纪念活动中，强调了他们的生活空间不仅仅是美国或欧洲，而是包括周边国家的关系。

如前所述，我们面临着三个领域的管理，因此中国在这一广义的空间中，周边国家的关系将是一个重要的战略目标。中国希望在全球管理中强调共同责任的部分，然后在双方之间建立一定的优先关系。我们必须承认，在核心利益方面仍然存在差异。因此，在这一过程中，我们也需要关注如何在印太空间中进行合作。我们面临的问题可能包括大米问题和南太平洋问题等。在这些方面，我们必须谨慎处理。正因为如此，我们在印太空间中必须更加强化我们的倡议，尤其是在第二和第三领域。

在共同责任方面，即使面临一定的困难，我们也必须在中间国家的角色中加强我们的立场。第二个问题是，在经济和技术领域的合作中，我们如何推动合作，尤其是如何将印度和东盟纳入这一框架，而不是将其视为单独的部分。我们必须在这一过程中进行深入的合作，以便在印太地区建立更紧密的联系。

在核心利益冲突的部分，我们需要谨慎对待合作和角色的承担。在印太空间中，我们面临的问题可能包括大米问题或南太平洋问题等。在这些问题上，我们需要谨慎处理，因为在坎普·大卫的协议中，双方并未就所有问题达成一致，因此我们需要在这一点上保持警惕。因此，在这一过程中，我们需要加强我们的倡议，尤其是在第二和第三领域。我们需要在共同责任的基础上，尽管面临一定的困难，但作为中枢国家，我们需要为实现突破口而努力。第二，我们需要思考在经济和技术领域中，如何在竞争中取得优势。东盟和印度等国家的关系需要提升到与坎普·大卫和韩中关系同等的重要性。这样看来，

在这一过程中，我们需要进行全面的改革，包括预算、研究和外交部的行政等方面。至于2024年韩国外交的方向，我希望外交决策者能够关注这一点。2024年将是一个非常重要的年份，不仅仅是当前政府层面的重要性，而是21世纪的转折点。如果我们能够正确认识到这一点，并制定相应的应对措施，那么我们将能够迎接历史的潮流，反之则可能被历史的浪潮所淹没。在国内政治、学术讨论和媒体舆论中，短期和党派的视角仍然占主导地位，这让我感到遗憾。

我想指出的两点是，首先，重建这一复合空间的问题不再仅仅是一个观念或概念，而是已经开始了。正如我之前所提到的，华盛顿宣言、坎普·大卫、韩中关系、韩东盟、韩印等关系正在逐步形成。谁能够在这一复合空间中构建出更好的生活空间，将决定未来的走向。然而，我们目前的设计图仍然停留在冷战的水平，仍在争论哪个更好。在这种情况下，我们将无法在任何地方立足，也无法在新的建筑中发挥重要作用。因此，如何在区域内建立南北韩关系、韩中关系、韩东盟、韩印等关系，将是一个重要的问题。

首先，重建这一复杂空间的问题不再仅仅是一个观念或概念，而是已经开始了。正如我之前所描述的，建设已经开始。通过华盛顿宣言、坎普大卫、韩中关系、韩东南亚关系、韩印关系等，谁能够在这一生活空间中构建出立体的复合体，谁就能在未来占据主导地位。然而，我们现在的设计图仍然停留在冷战时期的水平，仍在争论哪个更好，这样一来，我们将无法在任何地方立足，也无法在新建的建筑中承担重要角色。因此，如何在南北韩关系、韩中关系、韩东南亚关系、韩印关系等方面进行立体化的构建，将是一个重要的课题。

在2023年和2024年，我们将面临一个历史性的转折点。我们必须意识到，生成型人工智能的出现将对我们的生活、国家和全球空间产生深远的影响。如果我们无法跟上这一变化的步伐，我们将在21世纪中期面临黑暗的未来。因此，韩国在这一领域的领导角色将是我们面临的最大挑战。因此，2024年将是一个需要重新审视的年份。极端来说，尖端技术带来的革命性变化将影响外交政策的制定。我们需要在这一点上做好准备，以便在未来的历史中留下深刻的印记。

而现在，开放性和技术的出现所带来的更根本性的问题，是它所提供的知识正在迅速改变世界秩序的所有舞台和领域。从去年到今年，这种变化的速度远远超过我们的预期，正在改变我们的生活、国家和地球空间。如果我们无法跟上这一节奏，我们将在21世纪中期面临更加黑暗的局面。因此，极端地说，承担起在尖端技术创新及其扩散方面的引领角色，或共同引领的角色，将是韩国外交面临的最大课题。因此，从这个意义上说，2024年将是一个需要重新振作的一年。如果极端地说，尖端技术所带来的革命性变化必须在外交上得到体现，这将是总统、所有政策决策者以及我们所有人都必须面对的挑战。

我们若能倚靠它，便会有另一次机会降临；否则，我们也许将迎来以羡慕眼光凝望舞台的21世纪中期——我们必须铭记于心的一年。我想，莫非不是如此？河英善理事长，非常感谢您在百忙之中，长时间为我们发表这些宝贵的见解。您提到了2024年韩国外交将面临的五大课题，并逐一详述，然后又就面对这些课题的姿态——或许可以这么说——从两个方面进行了阐述。其一是：我们迫切需要一种眼界，能够妥当地设计并构建起那日益复合化的生活空间。其二是：在设计构建它的过程中，2023年韩国乃至整个地球村可能遭遇的最大挑战与冲击，大概会是尖端技术的影响吧。因此，当遥远的未来某日，在地球的某个地方回望2024年，特别是望向韩半岛时，将因何而被铭记？按照您刚才所言，尖端技术在韩国……

感谢哈英善理事长在长时间内分享了宝贵的意见。2024年韩国外交面临的五大任务，以及应对这些任务的态度，我认为我们必须具备适当的视野，以便在复杂的生活空间中进行设计和建设。同时，2023年和2024年全球将面临的最大挑战和冲击，可能是尖端技术的影响。因此，当我们回顾2024年，尤其是朝鲜半岛时，我们将如何记住这一年，可能会与尖端技术对韩国外交的影响密切相关。