Japan-Korea Relations as Seen Through Public Opinion, Conference Session 2: Japan-Korea Relations as Seen Through Public Opinion, 2013 - 2023

Category: Multimedia
Published: October 23, 2023
Related Projects: Japan-Korea Mutual Perception (East Asian Perception) Survey

YouTube Link: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ReFbzWOPM5Y

The East Asia Institute (EAI) held a conference on Friday, October 13th, to discuss the changes in Japan-Korea relations and future development directions based on rigorous social science analysis of data on mutual perceptions between the Korean and Japanese public accumulated over the past decade. Participants pointed out that policies that do not solely focus on historical issues are necessary for improving Japan-Korea relations, and emphasized that common perceptions between the publics of both countries regarding various existing issues could serve as a foundation for better mutual understanding. They also assessed that the reactivation of bilateral cooperation between Korea and Japan in various fields, including security, significantly contributes to regional stability in East Asia.

■ Contact and Editing: Oh Joon-chul EAI Research Assistant

Inquiries: 02 2277 1683 (ext. 205) | jcoh@eai.or.kr

Video Transcript

This conference is deeply meaningful to me personally, which is why I am here today to moderate. It is very difficult for a public opinion survey to continue for over 10 years; this is the 11th year. Even though the Japanese Cabinet Office conducts such surveys, the Korean government itself does not conduct continuous surveys on foreign relations or Korea-Japan relations. In this regard, the fact that the East Asia Institute, a private institution, can continue such surveys is a testament to our institute's capabilities and a source of pride. Furthermore, I have often felt regret when reports based on these surveys were released, as there was little analysis of the accumulated data over 5, 6, 7, or 10-11 years.

I felt it was a pity that people were too busy to analyze the long-term data. However, Director Son Yeol has initiated a project to organize the past data, which is excellent. I congratulate him, and I believe a good book will be published based on this. The data collection, usually done in June, was slightly delayed to August due to COVID-19, and this year, it was conducted in Japan in September and in Korea from late August to early September. Therefore, as you can see here, all data is cut off at 2022 in the graphs. So, to the presenters who are a bit busy, I hope you can connect the 2023 data as well, as the book is expected to be released around the end of this year or early next year.

I hope it can all be connected. To save time, I will not speak at length. In the second session, there are four presenters and two discussants. Their biographies are all available, so there is no need to speak at length. As you can see from the program, we have invited presenters covering areas such as economic relations, perceptions of neighboring countries, how history interacts with foreign policy decision-making structures, and security relations. Thus, we have invited presenters in these respective areas. The first presenter, Professor Lee Jeong-hwan from Seoul National University, will speak about the changes in perceptions of Korea-Japan economic relations and economic cooperation. Professor Lee, yes, understood. Yes, yes, yes, thank you. I will speak about the changes in perceptions of Korea-Japan economic relations and economic cooperation. As you can see, in response to the question raised by Mr. Lee Won-do earlier, all eight of us are in a state of some panic. So, regarding the significance of this research, and so on, I also have such aspects, but regarding these public opinion surveys...

The fact that social perception emerged from the results is a key factor that should be reflected in policy, or is it different from whether there is a synchronized response to policy implementation? Korean society's view of Japan and Japan's view of Korean society is a phenomenon in itself, and understanding it is, of course, not to say that policy should be made strictly in accordance with it, but there are strategic choices and judgments of policy participants. However, society thinks differently. It is a valuable resource for exploring ways of communication with society. In the data over the past 10 years, there is no shortage of content regarding economic relations between Japan and Korea and economic cooperation between Korea and Japan. However, it is naturally not at the center. Therefore, regarding this part, I also struggled a bit with why this is important in the introduction.

I thought about it quite a bit, but in the end, what is the meaning of the economy in how Japan views Korea? And Japan's view of Korea is also part of it, but this time, I focused on the economic variables in how Korea views Japan. In a way, looking at the Japanese data, I couldn't grasp it well. The economic part is like that, and in the Korean part, although not explicitly revealed, there seems to be a part that shows the economic aspect in the Korea-Japan relationship. Fundamentally, if we look at the Korea-Japan economic relationship or economic cooperation broadly as a dimension of the Korea-Japan relationship, it is largely seen as...

Professor Kim Hye-jin and Professor Kim Da-da wrote about the nature of the Korea-Japan relationship becoming horizontal and equal, which is the core of the general theory of the current Korea-Japan relationship. The economic field is a key area in that regard. The historical analysis of the Korea-Japan economic relationship and economic cooperation, and its industrial aspects, and changes in trade relations, etc., actually require looking at the data and reality. It's not that we need to look at perceptions, but within those changes in reality, how the economic field is perceived as a basis for the perception of horizontality and equality is clearly there, and the East Asia Institute's research survey seems to be good data for observing that part. And fundamentally, to conclude, it is...

When I raised the issue of Korea-Japan economic cooperation, the core of the response seems to be the inherent desirability of the good word 'cooperation.' And because the economy is perceived as something separate from conflict issues like history and territory, the inherent desirability of cooperation in the economic field is very strong. This strength is evident even in the conflict structures between the two governments over the past 10 years. And, as Professor Kang Tae-hoon mentioned, the differences based on political and ideological tendencies, which are difficult to analyze exactly the same way with the data, can be partially explained by comparing the ideological tendencies of respondents—conservative, progressive, and moderate. In recent years, as Korea's policy towards Japan has become highly politicized and partisan, the variation among conservative, progressive, and moderate respondents in their responses may also occur in the economic part.

I also examined the possibility of this occurring. So, broadly speaking, I dealt with three categories of questions: First, is Korea-Japan economic cooperation important? Second, what is the nature of the economic relationship between Korea and Japan? Third, how should Japan's export controls on Korea be responded to? I further divided the second category, 'How do you view the Korea-Japan economic relationship?', into three sub-categories. First, how important is Japan to the Korean economy? Second, are the Korean and Japanese economies equal? Third, are the Korean and Japanese economies structurally complementary and compatible? These questions are all in the East Asia Institute's questionnaire, and I have compiled them. However, it is not possible to cover the entire period from 2012-2023; some questions cover the last 5 years, and some cover the last 3 years. This is a preliminary remark.

I used the 2023 data. So, yes, I will first mention that I used the data. We are about 5 minutes in. First, regarding the importance of economic cooperation, there is a very strong inherent desirability. We did not ask about the specific year. When asked if economic cooperation is important, the answer is almost always 'important.' If you look at the overall percentage here, it can be seen as generally 80%. Even amidst the emotional backlash against export controls in 2020, it is generally 28%. Of course, in 2019, regardless of ideological tendency, it is clear that there is a clear variation compared to the fact that economic cooperation is important.

Conservative and progressive. However, it is difficult to say that the perception is completely different at 84% and 77%. Therefore, inherently, economic cooperation is important, and the perception that the Korea-Japan relationship is important is also very strong. You have already mentioned this before I did, but regardless of the steady negative perception of Japan, the perception that the Korea-Japan relationship is important is consistent. Looking at the turning point you mentioned, Mr. Yoon Suk-jun, in the last few years, there hasn't been much difference. When asked why the Korea-Japan relationship is important, there are several questions. There are several questions, and these questions can be categorized and grouped. For example, major trade relations, national interests, or economic reasons are cited, or geographical proximity and cultural closeness, or shared democratic systems, or security reasons. When grouped, the perception that the Korea-Japan relationship is economically important and the perception that it is geographically and culturally important are consistently presented together. It is difficult to say which is higher. This is based on selecting only the first choice. Fundamentally, the most meaningful aspect here is that the proportion of people who consider the economy or culture and geography as important is not as high as the proportion of people who consider values and security as important, which has significantly increased in the last 2-3 years. This proportion seems to be an issue in the interpretation of the following graph. When we divide the proportion of people who consider the Korea-Japan relationship important and the economy important by ideological tendency, the proportion of progressives who consider the economy important is slightly higher. It is difficult to consider this as particularly meaningful.

In 2023, it appears that progressives are significantly higher. This might be related to the increase in responses regarding values and security. I apologize, but the increase in values and security is higher among conservatives than progressives, and it is relatively low among progressives. Fundamentally, when focusing on cooperation rather than the economy in Korea-Japan economic cooperation, the proportion of people who think it is important is, of course, consistently high, but the variation by ideological tendency is less than I thought. I felt that it was less than I expected. Instead, perhaps the rhetoric of policymakers about sharing values, such as valuing and security, is being reflected in the public's perception these days? We can also consider that.

I will move on from this. Moving on to the status of Japan in the Korean economy, this is a multiple-choice question. When asked which country is important to the Korean economy, China is overwhelmingly chosen. It is higher than the United States. Fundamentally, until recently, the percentage of people choosing China was almost 80% until around 2020. The percentage of people choosing Japan has remained around 30-40%. If we consider this in light of the fact that the volume of trade between Korea and Japan, and the proportion of Japan in Korea's exports and imports, has inevitably decreased compared to China, then the fact that 40-50% of people still believe that the Japanese economy has significance for the Korean economy is something to consider. I believe there is a considerable amount of sedimentation regarding the economic relationship between Korea and Japan.

I think there is some sedimentation regarding the importance of the Japanese economy. When we divide the countries important for economic relations by ideological tendency, we see a division between progressives and conservatives regarding the importance of Japan. This is not because it is important, but rather because it is related to the emotional backlash against Japan, and I think it is reflected. More fundamentally, what is important in this graph is that the proportion of people who do not consider China important is decreasing, regardless of ideological tendency. This reflects the perspective on the threat of China. That is, regardless of ideological tendency in Korea, attitudes towards China are changing. Now, regarding the equality of the Korean and Japanese economies, in our public opinion survey, the question is whether Korea and Japan are equal. When asked this question, based on per capita GDP and purchasing power parity per capita GDP, they have recently reversed. The purchasing power parity GDP between Korea and Japan has recently reversed. And regarding defense budget, etc., when asked if they are equal, the response that they are already equal or are becoming equal is overwhelming, regardless of ideological tendency. So, about four out of ten people think they are already equal, and another four out of ten think they will be equal soon. The proportion of people who judge that Japan is still impossible to be equal is very small, regardless of ideological tendency.

This could be seen as a positive perception of Korea's future in Korean society. I think we need to consider how sustainable this perception will be in the long term. Ultimately, the process of dialogue between Korea and Japan over the past 30 years has been reflected in the GDP growth rate. Will this perception of equality continue at this pace? There is also curiosity about that. Next, we need to look closely at the nature of the industrial network. I think this question is one that makes us wonder how well respondents can understand it. Therefore, regarding this question, the proportion of 'don't know' responses is generally low, but the proportion of 'don't know' responses here is surprisingly high. And the variation between complementarity and competition does not seem to be discovered by any variable, but rather it seems that complementarity and competition are interpreted as cooperation and conflict. Looking at the breakdown by year, recent conflicts...

especially after the export regulations, the perception of conflict, not complementarity, has become more pronounced between progressives and conservatives. However, this needs to be understood within the context of Korea's export and trade structure and its globalization. Therefore, there is some concern about how appropriate this social perception is. Regarding the solution to export regulations, in the period between 2020 and 2022, in the top row, the response 'Let's actively respond' to Japan was high regardless of whether the respondent was conservative or progressive. It was over 60%, in the 60s, but it dropped by almost 20% in two years. So...

Fundamentally, despite ideological differences, there is a general consensus among the public that a response is needed to the economic conflict between Korea and Japan regarding export regulations. And this part is also interesting: regardless of whether they are conservative or progressive, Korean society generally welcomes the United States' strong economic offensive against China when the US and China are in conflict. This is fundamentally the case. However, looking at this year's data, Koreans seem to be generally cautious this year, and there seems to be a part of avoiding conflict. Fundamentally, the economic part has a high proportion of desirable responses overall.

Within that, partisan differences are clearly found. However, I wonder if these partisan perceptions are as significant as I expected. And rather than partisan perceptions, party platforms are very consistent. This could ultimately be the social background of the 'two-track' approach, but it seems that using the economy as a momentum for Korea-Japan cooperation is not highly regarded by the public. I think that perhaps the economic relationship between Korea and Japan is not an issue, but rather it has become like air, a materialized relationship built in the past. However, further thought may be needed on these matters. This concludes my presentation. Thank you. Yes, regarding the issue of... you mentioned that regardless of impressions, Koreans view Japan as...

You mentioned that even though they overwhelmingly consider the Chinese economy important, there is continuity in the relationship with Japan. So, recently, when I take a taxi in Japan, drivers often say, 'Japan has become poor.' And when I hear from relatives or acquaintances who are in Japan, they frequently say, 'You are so rich in Korea,' especially in the last five years. So, it seems that not only we but also Japan feels a sense of equality towards Korea. Therefore, I hope this leads to a good discussion later. The second presentation will be by Professor Oh Seung-hee from the Seoul National University Institute for Japanese Studies, who was also at our institute. She will present on 'Mutual Perceptions of Neighboring Countries among Korean and Japanese Citizens: Strengthening Mutual Connections and Threats from North Korea and China.' The presentation will be 15 minutes. Hello, I am Oh Seung-hee, introduced just now. I was a senior researcher at the East Asia Institute until two years ago, and I diligently studied this public opinion survey data from 2019, 2020, and 2021.

I know how arduous and important this work is, and how many revisions it involves. I would like to express my gratitude once again for the excellent preparation of this meeting. Since the important contents have already been mentioned in the annual reports, the meaning of this project is to look more closely at the parts that were not fully captured in those important trends, and to examine them in more detail according to each research area. In my case, I mainly focus on international relations, especially Japan's relations with China, so I have focused on whether perceptions of neighboring countries influence mutual perceptions between Korea and Japan. To conclude, mutual connections between Korea and Japan are strengthening, while perceptions of North Korea and China as threats are becoming more prominent. Since this survey has accumulated 10 years of data, it will continue to hold significant meaning in the future. Experts can set various hypotheses and discuss why historical turning points have influenced Korea-Japan relations based on the figures, and all of these are captured within the 20-year period from 2012 to 2023. And as we approach the 60th anniversary of diplomatic relations between Korea and Japan, this data will be discussed even more importantly in the future. I was also preparing the data and happened to see the materials that were uploaded last night, as the deadline was until 9 AM today. I thought I didn't need to include it if there were no major changes, but there were some peculiar aspects in 2023. So, when I looked at it, I thought that by further subdividing the period from before 2019, from 2019 to 2020, from 2020 to 2022, and this year, 2023, there would be many parts that could be explained.

And you mentioned that even though they overwhelmingly consider the Chinese economy important, there is continuity in the relationship with Japan. So, recently, when I take a taxi in Japan, drivers often say, 'Japan has become poor.' And when I hear from relatives or acquaintances who are in Japan, they frequently say, 'You are so rich in Korea,' especially in the last five years. So, it seems that not only we but also Japan feels a sense of equality towards Korea. Therefore, I hope this leads to a good discussion later. The second presentation will be by Professor Oh Seung-hee from the Seoul National University Institute for Japanese Studies, who was also at our institute. She will present on 'Mutual Perceptions of Neighboring Countries among Korean and Japanese Citizens: Strengthening Mutual Connections and Threats from North Korea and China.' The presentation will be 15 minutes. Hello, I am Oh Seung-hee, introduced just now. I was a senior researcher at the East Asia Institute until two years ago, and I diligently studied this public opinion survey data from 2019, 2020, and 2021.

Given the significant fluctuations over the past 3-4 years due to COVID-19, I have considered how to explain these fluctuations. Although I haven't finished everything, I will present what I have done so far. Among the many questions, I have focused on the question: 'Are there any countries or regions that you feel are a military threat to your country? If so, which ones?' This is this year's data. When looking at Korea and Japan, the perception of threat from North Korea is the highest. In Korea, followed by China, then Japan. In Japan, after North Korea and China, Russia appears. The low perception of threat from Korea is perhaps the biggest difference in threat perception between Korea and Japan. I think...

I believe that Korean society fundamentally tends to view Japan as a threat, while Japanese society does not view Korea as a threat. This can lead to various explanations. In this context, another interesting point is the significant fluctuations over the past 3-4 years. In 2019, we experienced a boycott of Japanese products, but how can we explain the recent increase in visits to Japan, which could be called a 'Japan craze' in 2023? It seems contradictory and paradoxical that such a change has occurred in such a short period. Various explanations are possible, but what I would like to focus on this time is the concept of mobility. There are various recent studies in humanities and social sciences using the concept of mobility. This applies not only to movement and means of transportation but also to explaining movement, mobility, and spatial connections. I also intend to focus on the nature of movement. Looking at the recent trend from 2019 to 2023, the boycott in 2019 can be seen as Korea voluntarily choosing not to go to Japan, i.e., non-movement. In addition to institutional restrictions on movement, conscious non-movement occurred. In 2020 and 2021, COVID-19 represented involuntary and forced non-movement. Although physical connections became more difficult, online connections were strengthened, which is a characteristic. In 2022, as we experienced recovery after COVID-19, there was an increase in movement and consumption to recover from the physical movement restrictions. Here, voluntary movement can be seen as occurring, and in 2023, the recent data...

The meaning of the data is that although movement is increasing, the nature of the movement is diversifying, and it is necessary to examine this in various ways. When examined from the perspective of various connections and disconnections, movement and non-movement, the factors influencing impressions of the other country and perceptions of the Korea-Japan relationship are examined based on identity perception. Here, self-perception and other-perception of Koreans and Japanese people, and threat perception, are considered to have a significant influence. Therefore, I have examined the threat perception of neighboring countries between Japan and Korea by year over the past 10 years. The red line represents North Korea; the red color represents Korean responses, and the thin line of the same color represents Japan's perception of North Korea. At the top, both Korea and Japan show the highest threat from North Korea, and it is also noteworthy that the threat perception of North Koreans towards North Korea is the highest this year. Next is China, represented by the blue line. The thick blue line shows that the perception of threat from China in Japan is slightly higher, and it has recently been declining, suggesting that the perception of threat from China needs to be examined more complexly. The important thing is the yellow line; the thick yellow line represents Korea's perception of threat towards Japan. Korea views Japan as the third-largest threat, but the most recent characteristic is that this threat perception has been decreasing since 2020.

It continues to decrease this year, approaching Russia's threat perception, which is represented by the gray line. The reason why the perception of threat towards Japan has been decreasing over the past 3-4 years can also be a subject of research. In summary, Korea's threats are North Korea, China, and Japan, while Japan's threats are North Korea, China, and Russia. The fact that Korea is not a threat to Japan is perhaps what allows Koreans to consume Japanese popular culture more freely. The fact that Korea's perception of threat towards Japan has been decreasing recently and the perception of threat towards North Korea is increasing in common are recent trends. Furthermore, the 2023 data shows that Korea's threat perception of North Korea is at its highest, and a complex perception of China is needed. The perception of threat towards the United States has slightly rebounded in both countries, which is also an interesting aspect to observe. This is data from the Japanese Cabinet Office, showing the favorability of Japanese citizens towards neighboring countries. It is also divided by generation. Favorability towards the United States is the highest, followed by Korea and China. The orange line represents the young generation aged 18-29. While the overall perception of China is negative, a characteristic is that the favorability towards China among the young generation in Japan is higher than in other generations. It is also confirmed that the perception of Korea in Japan is also higher among the young generation. So, what are the reasons for the recent decrease in threat perception related to Korea-Japan security perceptions? Various explanations are possible, but I would like to examine two main ones. First, the influence of popular culture. As many of you have already mentioned, popular culture enhances the impression of the other country. Until 2022, it was 'yes' for both Korea and Japan. Interestingly, in the 2023 data, the 'yes' response in Korea has decreased. There could be various reasons for this. In Japan, favorability towards Korea is high due to popular culture, including food culture and shopping. In contrast, in Korea, people mention the kindness and diligence of the Korean people and their living standards. Therefore, even though mobility has increased and the number of visitors to Japan has increased, what kind of experiences they have there, whether they find commonalities, is important. If they expect kind Japanese people and experience unkind Japanese people, it could have the opposite effect. Therefore, it is necessary to examine the diverse movements and their nature in more detail. Due to time constraints, I will skip this. 'Crash Landing on You' was very popular in Japan, and in Korea, 'Slam Dunk,' 'Suzume no Tojimari,' and various other popular cultures have the effect of increasing interest in the other party. Second, the fact that Korea is currently 'consuming' Japan. There can be various factors to interpret the recent increase in visits to Japan, but the exchange rate cannot be ignored. Due to the very cheap yen, it is a rational consumption, and it is very advantageous to consume Japan. However, not only the consumption of popular culture but also the perception of economic aspects is prominent, and we can observe the characteristic of Korea consuming Japan. To conclude, the world has become connected as a hybrid space before and after the COVID-19 pandemic. The connection and disconnection of physical space, the hyper-connection of cyberspace, and the influence of cultural content, especially the expansion of Korea's cultural content influence, have affected the Korea-Japan relationship. The expansion of connection and consensus between Korea and Japan is important. The disconnection and non-connection with North Korea and China, and the change in perception of these countries, are factors that strengthen the connection between Korea and Japan in response. The characteristics of the younger generation, who have not experienced war, who have grown up in a political system that values freedom and democracy, and who express themselves through consumption and actively communicate their cultural preferences through hybrid spaces, show these changes in perception. I intend to analyze the expansion of consensus due to increased mobility, which can influence self-perception, other-perception, and threat perception, and thus influence perceptions of the other country. This concludes my presentation. Thank you. You seem to have been too ambitious. Your paper felt like two papers to me. You mentioned that as the threat from North Korea and China increases, the threat from Japan decreases, and at the same time, you discussed the improving relationship between Korea and Japan through exchanges and cooperation, especially in culture, through mobility, etc. Since the causal relationships and layers are different, I think the organization could be further strengthened. Next, Professor Park Myung-hee from the National Assembly Research Service will present on 'Historical Perceptions and Foreign Policy Decision-Making Structures of Korean and Japanese Citizens.'

Hello, I am Park Myung-hee. My paper is titled 'Historical Perceptions and Foreign Policy Decision-Making Structures of Korean and Japanese Citizens.' The problem awareness that led me to choose this topic is how public opinion regarding foreign policy related to historical issues is formed. It is empirically well-known that public opinion is very important in foreign policy, but public opinion influences foreign policy, and the direction of the government's foreign policy also influences public opinion, so I believe it happens in a bidirectional manner. Therefore, I intended to examine the last 10 years with the framework that there are fixed historical perceptions of both countries' citizens, and the government's persuasion to gain the consent of its citizens combine to form new public opinion. Chapter 2 examines the perceptions that have consistently appeared over the past 10 years, and Chapter 3 aims to compare the characteristics of public opinion and policy regarding the issue of victims of forced mobilization.

However, in Japan, the government continued to maintain its position, and Abe's cabinet maintained high approval ratings. Approval ratings significantly increased after the comfort women agreement. However, the emphasis in persuasion differs between Korea and Japan. For example, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs held a press conference with the Minister of Foreign Affairs and announced the results of the meeting. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs, on the other hand, combines the press conference content with the phone call between President Park Geun-hye and Prime Minister Abe, and says that all issues, including the comfort women issue, were resolved by the Claims Agreement, and that with this comfort women agreement, it was finally and irreversibly resolved. They strongly emphasize Abe's remarks. However, looking at media reports, I compared the number of articles in the Nikkei Shimbun and the Yomiuri Shimbun in 2017. The number of articles published in 2017 was the highest, not in 2016 or 2015. This was the time when President Moon Jae-in's government took office, the TF was formed, the TF results were announced, and such events occurred within a year, and the reporting was concentrated accordingly. However, it is difficult to consider this as receiving significant attention. I was curious, so I also included the keyword 'Moon Jae-in.' In 2017, there were 74 articles, and in 2018, there were 852 articles. This suggests that in Japan, the reporting was not on the issue of comfort women itself, but rather on the issue of Korea-Japan relations using the individual keyword 'Moon Jae-in.'

This year, it continues to decline, and now the gray area is becoming closer to the Korean perception of threat from Russia. Why has the perception of threat from Japan decreased in the last 3-4 years? This can also be a subject of research. To summarize, Korea's threats are North Korea, China, and Japan, and Japan's threats are North Korea, China, and Russia. The point that Korea is not a threat to Japan can be seen as a factor that allows Korea to be somewhat freer, especially in consuming popular culture. The recent trend is that the perception of threat from Korea to Japan is decreasing, and the perception of threat from North Korea is commonly increasing. Furthermore, the 2023 data shows that North Korea is perceived as the highest threat by Korea, and a complex perception is needed for China. The perception of threat from the US has slightly rebounded for both countries, which is an interesting aspect to observe. This is from the Japanese Cabinet Office data. The Japanese public's

favorability towards neighboring countries was examined, divided by generation. Favorability towards the US is the highest, followed by Korea and China. The orange line represents the young generation, aged 18 to 29. While the overall perception of China is negative, a key characteristic in Japan is that the favorability towards China among the young generation is higher than in other generations. It can also be confirmed that the perception of Korea is also higher among the young generation in Japan. So, what are the reasons for the recent decrease in perceptions of threat between Korea and Japan? Various factors can be considered, but I would like to examine two main ones. The first is the influence of popular culture.

As you have all mentioned, does popular culture generally enhance the impression of the other country? Overall, until 2022, the answer was yes for both Korea and Japan. Interestingly, in the 2023 data, the 'yes' response from Korea has decreased. There can be various reasons for this. In Japan, favorability towards Korea is high due to popular culture, with mentions of food culture and shopping. In contrast, in Korea, people mention the friendly and diligent national character and living standards. Although there is a lot of travel and many visitors to Japan, the question is whether they have positive experiences there and discover commonalities. If people expect a very friendly Japan and experience an unfriendly one, it could have the opposite effect. Therefore, it is necessary to examine the various types of travel and their nature in more detail. Due to time constraints, I will move on. "Crash Landing on You" was very popular in Japan.

and various popular culture content such as "Slam Dunk" and "The Window of the Soul" in Korea have influenced increased interest in the other country. Secondly, we can consider that Korea is currently consuming Japan. How should the recent increase in visits to Japan be interpreted? While various factors exist, the exchange rate cannot be ignored. Due to the very weak yen, it is arguably a rational consumption, and it is very beneficial to consume Japan. However, not only the consumption of popular culture but also perceptions from an economic perspective are prominently emerging, presenting a characteristic of Korea consuming Japan. To conclude, since the COVID-19 pandemic, the world has been connected as a hybrid space. The connection and disconnection of physical spaces, hyper-connectivity of cyber spaces, and the influence of cultural content, especially the expansion of Korea's cultural content influence, have affected Korea-Japan relations.

The expansion of connection and consensus between Korea and Japan is important. The disconnection and non-connection with North Korea and China, and the change in perception of these countries, are factors that strengthen the connection between Korea and Japan in response. The characteristics of the younger generation, who have not experienced war, who have grown up in a political system that values freedom and democracy, and who express themselves through consumption and actively communicate their cultural preferences through hybrid spaces, show these changes in perception. I intend to analyze the expansion of consensus due to increased mobility, which can influence self-perception, other-perception, and threat perception, and thus influence perceptions of the other country. This concludes my presentation. Thank you. You seem to have been too ambitious. Your paper felt like two papers to me. You mentioned that as the threat from North Korea and China increases, the threat from Japan decreases, and at the same time, you discussed the improving relationship between Korea and Japan through exchanges and cooperation, especially in culture, through mobility, etc. Since the causal relationships and layers are different, I think the organization could be further strengthened. Next, Professor Park Myung-hee from the National Assembly Research Service will present on 'Historical Perceptions and Foreign Policy Decision-Making Structures of Korean and Japanese Citizens.'

I have been researching the interaction between government policy and public opinion for a long time as part of the regional research division at the Sejong Institute. When spring arrives, there is always a pattern with the publication of history textbooks. It's simple. The comfort women issue, where civil society addressed the UN, led to complications and prolonged the issue, and then the government's comfort women agreement further complicated the problem. Therefore, although they interact, when the government takes a policy that is too hasty or not well-considered, the impact on public opinion seems to have been significant. The dynamism is very interesting, and I think this was a very good presentation. The last presentation will be by Mr. Joon-il, a researcher at the Korea Institute for Defense Analyses, on the Korea-Japan security relationship based on public opinion surveys. Hello, I am Joon-il from the Korea Defense Analyses Institute.

Chapter 2. I will take a breath. Seeing the time, I will continue. What has consistently appeared over the past 10 years is that the Korea-Japan relationship is bad, and the impression of the other country is not good. However, the biggest reason for the unfavorable impression of the other country is the historical issue. But when we delve deeper into the question, 'What are the historical issues that need to be resolved?', they differ. The issue that the Korean and Japanese governments considered most important as a current issue after 2018 was likely the issue of forced mobilization victims. However, from 2015 to 2020, the issue of comfort women is persistent in Korea. In Japan, the textbook issue, which has never been specifically addressed by either Korea or Japan, has emerged as a historical issue that needs to be resolved in the public's perception. This indicates a difference between policy-level and public perception. I also found one question. Professor Lee Deok-won asked a provocative question, and I really liked this question because I wanted to find out about it. It was about how knowledge of forced annexation is structured. This question was asked in 2014. In 2014, the level of knowledge in Korea and Japan was similar. However, in Korea, it was uniformly known across all generations. In Japan, over 40% were concentrated in the 60s and older. Therefore, since this was surveyed in 2014, and 10 years have passed, if we ask now, the number of people who answer 'yes' in Japan is likely to decrease significantly. We can also see that the evaluation of the Korea-Japan relationship is linked to favorability, but we can find years when this is not linked. For example, when the Korea-Japan relationship is evaluated as bad, unfavorability increases, and so on. This was the case in 2016 and 2017 in Korea, and in 2019 and 2020 in Japan. This year's survey will likely be similar, I thought briefly. This shows that public opinion evaluates the Korea-Japan relationship negatively, but favorability increases. Therefore, foreign policy decisions and public opinion can be considered to have been made in a fragmented situation. Chapter 3 deals with the comfort women issue. Regarding public opinion, the evaluation of comfort women is negative in Korea and positive in Japan. However, looking at the surveys in 2016 and 2017, public opinion in Korea became sharply negative, increasing from 30% to 56%. In Japan, it remained relatively constant. At this time, comparing the policy decision-making environment, there was a change of government in Korea, for example, the impeachment of President Park Geun-hye, the launch of President Moon Jae-in's government, and discussions about nullifying the comfort women agreement during the presidential election campaign. According to media reports, in 2016, it was around 6,300 articles, and in 2017, it was around 6,700. In 2018, it dropped by half. So, it seems that continuous significant attention was not shown. However, in conclusion, in January 2018, our government announced its decision on the comfort women issue, stating that it could not deny the fact that the 2015 agreement was an official agreement, and therefore would not request renegotiation. However, when I put the content of the reports from December 2015 to December 2018 into a word cloud, the most frequent keywords were 'victim,' followed by 'President Moon Jae-in,' and thirdly 'renegotiation.' In other words, in the government's policy direction, no persuasive frame or message was found in the reported content. So, there was a gap, a fragmentation. In Japan, the government continued to maintain its position, and Abe's cabinet maintained high approval ratings. Approval ratings significantly increased after the comfort women agreement. However, the emphasis in persuasion differs between Korea and Japan. For example, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs held a press conference with the Minister of Foreign Affairs and announced the results of the meeting. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs, on the other hand, combines the press conference content with the phone call between President Park Geun-hye and Prime Minister Abe, and says that all issues, including the comfort women issue, were resolved by the Claims Agreement, and that with this comfort women agreement, it was finally and irreversibly resolved. They strongly emphasize Abe's remarks. However, looking at media reports, I compared the number of articles in the Nikkei Shimbun and the Yomiuri Shimbun in 2017. The number of articles published in 2017 was the highest, not in 2016 or 2015. This was the time when President Moon Jae-in's government took office, the TF was formed, the TF results were announced, and such events occurred within a year, and the reporting was concentrated accordingly. However, it is difficult to consider this as receiving significant attention. I was curious, so I also included the keyword 'Moon Jae-in.' In 2017, there were 74 articles, and in 2018, there were 852 articles. This suggests that in Japan, the reporting was not on the issue of comfort women itself, but rather on the issue of Korea-Japan relations using the individual keyword 'Moon Jae-in.'

Chapter 4 deals with the issue of victims of forced mobilization. First, regarding public opinion, the evaluation of the Supreme Court ruling is positive in Korea and negative in Japan. However, there is a difference between Korea and Japan regarding how to resolve this issue. In Korea, there are many different opinions. Therefore, there are various opinions such as the judicial ruling, the establishment of a foundation by companies of both countries, and even the argument advocated by the Japanese government that it is not necessary because it contradicts the Claims Agreement. In contrast, Japan's approach is very simple: either they don't know, or they say it doesn't need to be followed because it contradicts the Claims Agreement, or they suggest joint arbitration or ICJ proceedings. However, in Korea, regarding the policy environment, the government's official position has not been stated, as it is a civil lawsuit. In October 2019, for the first time, it was mentioned that companies of both countries would voluntarily establish a foundation to provide support, but basically, there was nothing. Consequently, a bill regarding the establishment of a foundation was introduced in the National Assembly. While it is said that historical issues are very dominant, I question this. Looking at media reports related to victims of forced mobilization in Korea, there were 4,100 articles in 2019. However, during the same period, export control measures had 9,400 articles, and GSOMIA had 5,900 articles. While people say that historical issues are very important, I found that other issues were actually being reported and dealt with. In Japan, although the government changed, the Abe administration continued on the same course. A characteristic after the Supreme Court ruling in Japan is that the Ministry of Foreign Affairs continuously issues statements on its website in the form of statements by the Minister of Foreign Affairs. That is, regarding the judicial judgment on Japanese companies, the statement from the Minister of Foreign Affairs stated that it is a violation of the Claims Agreement, therefore it is a violation of international law, and the Korean government must rectify it. If not, it must go to the International Court of Justice or an arbitration committee. Following this, requests for consultation under the Claims Agreement, going to an arbitration committee, and the fact that Korea does not respond are periodically reported in 2019. However, this was not only posted in Japanese but also translated into Korean, English, Spanish, French, and so on.

Therefore, when I put Japan's government policy into a word cloud, it included Japanese companies, the Korean government, and the Korea-Japan Claims Agreement. This aligns with the proposals suggested by the Japanese public in the opinion survey, namely that Japanese companies do not need to comply because it contradicts the 1965 Claims Agreement. Ultimately, it appears that the public has accepted the proposals made by the government. In conclusion, as I have been working on this, I have considered about four points. First, there is a clear gap not only in perceptions between Korea and Japan but also between the governments and citizens of both countries. Regarding the comfort women issue, the Japanese government considers it resolved, but Korean citizens still view it as the most important historical issue that needs resolution. Both Korean and Japanese citizens raise issues regarding textbooks, but the governments have taken no action for 10 years. Second, the political environmental changes, such as the comfort women and forced mobilization issues, have ultimately driven public opinion in both countries. Third, there is a difference in whether the government frames foreign policy issues for its own citizens. In Korea, there seems to have been no clear framing for the comfort women and victims of forced mobilization issues. In contrast, Japan has created frames such as 'final and irreversible resolution' and 'violation of the Claims Agreement and international law,' and these have continued. Therefore, in conclusion, there is a fixed task to be resolved in the perceptions of the citizens of both countries. While pursuing only the resolution of historical issues in the short term may resolve foreign policy issues, in the long run, historical conflicts between the citizens of both countries are expected to continue. Therefore, if the government makes efforts, it will be necessary to pay attention to this aspect in the long term. This concludes my presentation. Thank you. The interaction between government policy and public opinion, I have also been very interested in this field and have conducted much research as part of the regional research division at the Sejong Institute. When spring arrives, textbooks are published, and there is always a pattern. It's simple. The comfort women issue, where civil society addressed the UN, led to complications and prolonged the issue, and then the government's comfort women agreement further complicated the problem. Therefore, although they interact, when the government takes a policy that is too hasty or not well-considered, the impact on public opinion seems to have been significant. The dynamism is very interesting, and I think this was a very good presentation. The last presentation will be by Mr. Joon-il, a researcher at the Korea Institute for Defense Analyses, on the Korea-Japan security relationship based on public opinion surveys. Hello, I am Joon-il from the Korea Defense Analyses Institute.

It is a good thing for researchers. Today, I will present on the topic of South Korea-Japan security relations as read through public opinion surveys, specifically asking whether security is important in South Korea-Japan relations. As I am someone who fundamentally deals with security, security relations are important to me. However, regarding South Korea-Japan relations, as Mr. Lee Jeong-hwan briefly mentioned earlier, while there are many statements about economic relations being important or cultural relations being important, I was curious about what the general public actually thinks about security relations.

I was curious about that, and I thought it might be meaningful to examine public opinion trends using data from 2013 to 2023. So, this research began as a sort of attempt to do just that. Recently, it seems that security relations are perhaps the most dynamically changing aspect. With the Yoon Suk-yeol administration, shuttle diplomacy has been restored, and a key focus of this is the strengthening of security cooperation. The government is emphasizing through its policies that security cooperation is crucial for improving South Korea-Japan relations. However, when we look at South Korea-Japan relations since the Cold War era, there has been a dynamic of repeated conflict and cooperation.

What I find somewhat significant is that if we had only viewed Japan with negative perceptions, South Korea-Japan security cooperation would likely not have progressed at all. However, despite the existence of negative perceptions, security cooperation between South Korea and Japan has proceeded. This phenomenon itself exists, and I wanted to explore whether these dual characteristics were also reflected in public opinion. Lastly, since 2010, the regional order itself seems to have been changing dynamically, not just South Korea-Japan relations. Especially within the major structural changes of US-China relations, it seems to be a time of great 고민 for both South Korea and Japan regarding what kind of policies to pursue not only in their relations with the US and China but also in their bilateral relations. And within that context, particularly since 2018,

it seems that South Korea-Japan security relations have been characterized more by conflict than cooperation. Therefore, against this backdrop, I believed it would be meaningful to examine data collected by the East Asia Institute and the Asan Institute for Policy Studies from 2013 to 2022, and thus proceeded with the research. This part is somewhat theoretical. In foreign policy, discussions about public opinion often present a dichotomy: on one hand, public opinion is seen as ignorant and difficult to incorporate into policy; on the other hand, as democratic societies develop, policies that ignore public opinion struggle to gain legitimacy, thus necessitating some form of public opinion reflection.

In this sense, discussions on public opinion seem to be frequently addressed as research topics. Looking at South Korea-Japan relations, while institutions like the East Asia Institute, the Asan Institute for Policy Studies, and newspapers like the Hankook Ilbo and Yomiuri Shimbun conduct long-term public opinion surveys, many surveys have been conducted in a fragmented manner. Furthermore, there is a strong anti-Japanese sentiment in Korea, leading to a fixed notion that negative perceptions will persist regardless of the issue. Conversely, there is also the view that perceptions of Japan can change depending on the issue. Despite these points, as mentioned earlier, research on public opinion and its correlation with national policy remains somewhat insufficient.

In this regard, we are conducting a very preliminary yet meaningful study. Therefore, I will present on South Korea-Japan security relations as reflected in public opinion surveys. It is often stated, almost as a matter of course, that both South Korea and Japan are important security cooperation partners. This has been discussed frequently. Looking at the background, there was the US-led bilateral alliance system during the Cold War, and South Korea-Japan relations developed as part of that alliance system. In reality, there is no history of institutionalized security cooperation between South Korea and Japan bilaterally. It is not as if South Korea and Japan, as US allies, have taken the lead in establishing multilateral security cooperation bodies in the region and cooperating within them.

Therefore, it has been argued that South Korea-Japan security relations have been influenced by the intervention and withdrawal of the United States, with the US variable being the dominant factor influencing South Korea-Japan relations. On the other hand, recent issues between South Korea and Japan show that security, economy, and identity are not separate but are interconnected, mutually influencing each other, and creating a certain dynamism in bilateral relations. Furthermore, when considering South Korea-Japan relations, it is a crucial issue whether this is a bilateral relationship or, particularly in terms of security, a trilateral relationship involving the United States. Therefore, in this survey, while there were various survey items, I focused on dividing them into issues that can be viewed as bilateral and issues that can be viewed as involving the United States, to empirically examine how public opinion perceives South Korea-Japan security relations.

For this analysis, I posed four main questions. First, I examined how public opinion in South Korea and Japan perceives the other country from a broader perspective. Second, I investigated which issues are considered important in South Korea-Japan relations. Third, I considered it important to assess whether public opinion in South Korea and Japan perceives the other as a security threat. And fourth, if it is a security threat, is a military conflict possible? Finally, is security cooperation between South Korea and Japan positive or negative? I formulated these four main questions and completed the survey analysis using the mutual perception data for each question. A slight point of regret for me was that we used survey data from 2013 to 2022, and while some issues were consistently raised, others were raised sporadically, making time-series analysis difficult. Second, some survey questions were only asked in Korea or only in Japan, which limited our ability to conduct a horizontal analysis of mutual perceptions between the two countries. Therefore, I would like to mention that the research was conducted with these limitations in mind. First, regarding how public opinion in South Korea perceives Japan, this was likely cited by other presenters as well. So, you can see the survey results for South Korea and Japan here. What I intended to show was simply the broad perspective that both countries view each other negatively.

However, when asked why they hold such negative perceptions, the reasons cited in the South Korean survey results were primarily historical and territorial issues. The Japanese survey also cited historical and territorial issues, and from 2018 onwards, the comfort women issue. The years 2021 and 2022 were somewhat peculiar; in what I termed 'politics,' there was an expression of feeling discomfort with the South Korean government.

Overall, both countries viewed each other negatively. This was a very macroscopic perspective. However, when asked why they held such negative views, the reasons for holding unfavorable perceptions of the other country were primarily historical and territorial issues in the Korean survey. The Japanese survey also cited historical and territorial issues, and since 2018, the comfort women issue. The years 2021 and 2022 were somewhat peculiar. In my view, there was an expression, which I simply term 'politics,' indicating a sense of discomfort with the South Korean government.

So, these were the reasons. Looking at the South Korean survey results, they appear somewhat erratic. Although the reasons remained similar, the Japanese survey results showed negative and positive perceptions remaining at very similar levels. Interestingly, the Japanese survey results revealed more numerous and diverse reasons for holding negative perceptions of the other country. So, what issues does public opinion in South Korea and Japan consider important? As mentioned earlier, if we simply say 'negative,' then what improvements would lead to better bilateral relations? This data is only available for South Korea, so I will cite only that. In South Korean public opinion, the causes hindering the development of South Korea-Japan relations were the Dokdo issue in 2014-15, the comfort women issue from 2016-18, and from 2019-22,

it broadened to include historical issues, including forced labor. Thus, while the Dokdo issue was more prominent until 2015, from 2016 onwards, historical issues were more broadly perceived as hindering the development of South Korea-Japan relations. I would have preferred the question about priority issues to be discussed at South Korea-Japan summit meetings to have a longer time frame, but unfortunately, it was only available for 2014 and 2015. As you can see, the Dokdo issue was ranked as the number one cause hindering the development of South Korea-Japan relations. In South Korea, there is a perception that discussions on historical issues, including the Dokdo issue, are necessary if a summit is to be held.

In contrast, Japan's perception was that dialogue for relationship improvement itself is necessary. This difference, where the issues considered important by public opinion differ from the tasks that should be discussed at a summit meeting, was somewhat intriguing. So, given that there are negative perceptions of each other, and that resolving historical issues is crucial for the development of bilateral relations, does public opinion in South Korea and Japan truly perceive the other as a military threat?

This may have been cited by other presenters as well. In South Korea, North Korea, China, and Japan are perceived as threats. What I observed is that North Korea consistently ranks first, with a very high proportion of perception regarding North Korea. However, the ranking of second and third place has changed since 2017. This suggests that the second and third rankings are relative threats rather than absolute ones. That is, it seems that the perception of threat is relative, such as whether China is more threatening than Japan, or Japan is more threatening than China. On the other hand, Japan consistently perceives North Korea, China, and Russia as threats. Regarding South Korea, the perception of South Korea as a threat is at a much lower level, around 10%. So, if a South Korea-Japan military conflict were to occur, both countries have shown a very reserved stance on this possibility.

While not completely ruling out the possibility of military conflict, the fact that they have shown a reserved stance on this matter suggests that even if they perceive each other as a threat, it does not necessarily translate into a possibility of conflict. In other words, I believe that public opinion senses some room for security cooperation. In this sense, is public opinion in South Korea and Japan positive or negative about security cooperation? Unfortunately, the questions here were primarily from the South Korean side, so I could not examine how public opinion in Japan perceives this. However, as you can see from the data, I also included information on ideological orientation (progressive, moderate, conservative) for this question. It seems that there is little difference in opinion on South Korea-Japan security issues based on ideology. Despite ideological differences, they seem to hold similar stances on security issues.

There was also the P-1 incident. Despite the P-1 incident, 65% of respondents believed that South Korea-Japan security cooperation should be pursued. I found this particularly interesting. Furthermore, regarding the question of what South Korea's response should be if Japan takes retaliatory measures following the South Korean Supreme Court's ruling, the option of resorting to security measures was ranked low. This was also consistently low among both progressives and conservatives, suggesting that on security issues, there seems to be more room for cooperation between the two countries.

I will conclude my presentation after discussing this part. However, regarding South Korea-Japan security relations, the issue of the Self-Defense Forces' involvement in the event of a crisis on the Korean Peninsula has consistently faced opposition from the South Korean public. This is something we should pay attention to. Particularly since 2017-2016, public support for this has been declining. If this is to be considered in policy-making, then policy considerations that reflect public opinion are necessary.

And I need to skip this part due to time constraints, but regarding South Korea-US security cooperation, both countries strongly advocate for its strengthening. What I found particularly noteworthy was that both countries believe that South Korea-US cooperation is necessary for peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula. Considering that both South Korea and Japan perceive North Korea as a threat, the possibility of South Korea-Japan security cooperation, in response to the North Korean threat and as a means to enhance peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula, seems to be met with strong public acceptance in both countries. However, given that negative perceptions of each other remain high, I believe that policy-making is needed to bridge the gap between policy and public opinion and to transform these negative images.

Specifically, policy considerations that present new forms of cooperation, enabling both sides to overcome their stereotypes, are absolutely necessary. Thank you. This concludes my presentation.

*This text is an AI translation of an original written in Korean. Some translations or nuances may be inaccurate.

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