Japan-Korea Relations as Seen Through Public Opinion: Conference Session 1, 2013-2023

YouTube Link: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Eez_jAp844c

The East Asia Institute (EAI) held a conference on October 13 (Friday) to discuss the fluctuations and future development directions of Japan-Korea relations, based on rigorous social science analysis of data accumulated over the past decade on mutual perceptions between the publics of South Korea and Japan. Participants pointed out that policies not solely focused on historical issues are necessary for improving Japan-Korea relations, and particularly emphasized that common perceptions between the publics of both countries regarding various existing issues could serve as a foundation for better mutual understanding. Furthermore, they assessed that the reactivation of bilateral cooperation between South Korea and Japan in various fields, including security, significantly contributes to the stabilization of the East Asian region.

■ Contact and Editing: Oh Joon-chul EAI Research Assistant

Inquiries: 02 2277 1683 (ext. 205) | jcoh@eai.or.kr

Video Transcript

This is my granddaughter. Thank you very much for visiting our institute today and attending the conference. I would like to call out each of you individually, but time is short, so I will conclude my opening remarks here. I will say a few words about our work, and then at 2 PM yesterday, this year's public opinion survey results were announced. I will briefly mention a few points about the announced results and then conclude. This public opinion survey was first initiated in 2013.

The background at that time was that 2012 was a very eventful year for Japan-Korea relations. There were remarks, the currency swap was canceled, and as you may recall, the 'Sasae Ai' initiative emerged and then disappeared into a drawer. The currency swap agreement was not extended and was terminated. Given these various very negative situations in Japan-Korea relations, and since all of these were intergovernmental matters, particularly actions taken by the political elites of both countries, we wondered if public sentiment was the same. If public sentiment differed, we questioned whether there were ways to utilize it to improve Japan-Korea relations. With this sense of inquiry, we conducted the first public opinion survey in 2013 in consultation with the Japanese think tank, the Genron NPO. As those who have seen the trend of public opinion surveys know, that was the worst period. Public perception was at its lowest. The second worst period was in 2019, during the commotion, when we conducted the survey in 2020. We hit rock bottom twice, so to speak. And this year...

will be released. This time, it is close to a ceiling, and the results are so good that Japan has completely deviated from its previous trend. So, this year marks the 11th year of continuous public opinion surveys. We have published reports on these surveys every year. Some researchers have utilized these reports for their studies. We decided to compile all 10 years of data and conduct a comprehensive review. If we talk about the 'lost decade,' we decided to gather data from that lost decade and begin research. Therefore, we have invited eight mid-career researchers, Japanese researchers, who are here today. We have provided them with Korean and Japanese data, and specifically reorganized the Japanese data to match the Korean data. The data from the past 10 years are well-organized, and all of this data is accessible to everyone. Today, we will summarize the results, and we hope that this will lead to more research. We also hope that these research findings will serve as a basis for future policies of both governments and major institutions. With this objective, we organized today's conference. The public opinion survey in Korea was conducted with 1,880 respondents through face-to-face interviews. We conducted face-to-face interviews even during the COVID-19 pandemic. In Japan, 1,000 people were surveyed via mail. There are subtle differences in the survey methodologies between the two countries, and separate research on this may be needed. We are discussing various aspects, and we are also considering changing the survey methodology starting next year due to the limitations of face-to-face interviews. In any case, we kindly ask you to make good use of the 10-year statistics. What is displayed here has already been reported by the media, so I will briefly...

access is provided. Therefore, I would like to summarize the results today and hope that more research will emerge based on these results. I also hope that the research findings will serve as a basis for the future policies of the governments of both countries or major institutions. With this intention, today's conference was organized. Regarding the public opinion survey, 188 people in Korea were surveyed through face-to-face interviews. Face-to-face surveys were also conducted during COVID-19. In Japan, 1,000 people were surveyed by mail. Since the survey methods of both sides are subtly different, research on that should also be conducted separately. We are discussing various things, and we are considering changing the survey method slightly from next year because the face-to-face survey also has limitations. In any case, please make good use of the 10-year statistics. What is presented here has already been reported by the media, so briefly.

mention just three points for those who may not have seen it. First, the data shows that both publics are experiencing a significant improvement in Japan-Korea relations. Looking at the statistics on how people perceive the current relationship, the survey was conducted in June 2019. The full-blown incident occurred on July 1st. Therefore, it was reflected in the 2020 survey, reaching its peak at 80%. Naturally, it was perceived negatively. This has been halved, so to speak. The negative perception has been halved.

Conversely, the perception of 'good' relations, which was at a baseline due to the poor state of Japan-Korea relations, has risen to about 12.7% this year. 12.7% is not a high figure, as it is comparable to the worst period of Korean perception of Japan. However, it has been widely reported, especially in Japan. Looking at the trend, around 2019-2020, it was nearly halved, meaning the negative perception sharply decreased, and the positive perception increased from 7% to 21%, more than tripling. Therefore, the overall evaluation of the situation is very high on both sides, and particularly active evaluation is being made by the Japanese side. This active evaluation appears to have been significant not only this year but also last year.

Regarding this, a press conference was held in Tokyo yesterday. Japanese journalists and members of the media asked about the reasons for the Japanese side's rapid shift in perception of the current relationship. One of the questions was whether this was not too much of a follow-the-government approach, implying that the evaluations were too government-led and dominant. In contrast, as shown here, there is a difference in perception.

Regarding favorability, our perception of Japan has not changed. As you can see, it has remained around 31% for the past year and this year. Japan has risen significantly. Looking at the chart, the red line at the top represents the perception of Japan from the Korean side. It has fluctuated between approximately 50% and 70%, around 20%. Korea still remains within that range. Similarly, positive impressions also remain within a range of about 20%, between 12% and 31%. However, Japan's perception of Korea has completely broken out of that range. As you can see, it has fluctuated between about 40% and 55%, 52-53%. Last year, it was at a low of about 40% for negative impressions, and now it has fallen further to 32.8%. Positive impressions have risen steadily to...

37.4%. This indicates that the perception of the other country, as shown in the graph, is that Japan has better impressions of Korea than Korea has of Japan. Overall, this is the situation. We conducted regression analysis to determine which factors have the highest correlation with perception. The important finding was that the importance of bilateral relations has a significant correlation. Second, the policy towards Japan by one's own government and the policy towards Japan by the other country's government are significant. Interestingly, two events occurred in the latter half of the survey period in Korea. We were very concerned, but they were the Camp David Accords and the Fukushima wastewater discharge. We analyzed these, and surprisingly, there was no correlation.

Therefore, statistically, these perceptions are formed independently of Fukushima and the Camp David Accords. This is, of course, just statistics. Regarding the two correlated factors, as shown here, the importance of bilateral relations has a significant correlation. Even during periods of poor relations, it reached 90% or 80%. This year, it is 74.12%, which is a significant drop of 8.5%. Looking at the trend related to importance, this year saw the largest fluctuation. This suggests that the perceived importance is not very high. Second, although I have my own thoughts, this is something that many people here today should discuss and find answers to. The second highly correlated factor is, as you might expect, this.

The Korean government asked a very specific question this time, and I actually opposed this question. Originally, it was asked how the Korean government's policy and attitude towards Japan-Korea relations are evaluated. This time, it was refined to ask about the attitude towards improving Japan-Korea relations. As you can see, this is already being recorded. The evaluation of the Moon administration's policy towards Japan was very low at 30% at the time. Even when discussing this with the Japanese side, we said that the Korean government's response to Japan does not accurately reflect public sentiment; it is a bit too strong. Compared to that, this year and last year, it has dropped by about 10% to 21%. So, support for the policy towards Japan is 20%. To reiterate, only one out of five people supports the Korean government's attitude towards improving relations. This is the result. Are there any opposition party members here? If the opposition party uses this...

This is not on the chart. And regarding what the Japanese public sees, similarly, the Japanese public has shown a dramatic decline in negative evaluations and a sharp increase in positive evaluations over the past two years. Regarding the evaluation of the Japanese government's attitude towards Japan-Korea relations, is this recorded? As you can see, in Korea, support is 13-14%, 14.6%. So, Korean citizens give the Korean government's attitude 21% and the Japanese government 14%, 14.6%, which is very stingy. Meanwhile, Japan has a support rate of about 31.3%. However, as you can see, there is also the option 'cannot say which.'

This means the majority, or rather the largest group, of people are undecided. So, we researchers need to interpret this. Usually, in our surveys, the 'neither' option is very high for the Japanese side, but in this question, it is very high for Korea, and relatively lower for Japan. It appears that the Japanese people have largely made up their minds. Therefore, although it has only been a year, further analysis is needed. Regarding the evaluation of the Korean government's policy attitude, even if we cannot fully assess it, the most important consideration is likely the evaluation of the Korean solution proposed in March regarding forced labor during wartime. This evaluation is also interesting. The 'neither' option is the largest here. However, negative evaluations are more numerous than positive evaluations.

In Korea, and in Japan, negative evaluations are dominant, and 'neither' is relatively good. Therefore, regarding why the government's policies are discussed in this way, particularly in Korea, there could be various interpretations. On one hand, there are such issues. Especially from the perspective of the Korean public, there was a very famous remark at the time: 'We have filled 50%, so Japan should fill 50%. Why aren't they filling it? It's been 5 months.' So, is it possible that they are not even giving 20% or 10%? That's one possibility. Second, regarding the solution or Fukushima, the commotion around Fukushima started very early, although the discharge happened later. Considering that these two very popular policies were pushed forward, perhaps 21% is not that bad? Including those who are undecided, it exceeds 50%. So, in any case...

interpretations can be made, but these interpretations are our task. Lastly, regarding the improvement of Japan-Korea relations, it is always discussed that the historical issues must be resolved. Even after 10 years, what has not changed is that the historical issues as we see them differ from those seen by Japan. While everyone agrees that historical issues are important, we consider perceptions of aggressive wars, textbooks, comfort women, and historical issues as historical problems. In contrast, the Japanese side interprets it as a problem with anti-Japan education, anti-Japan textbooks, and excessive anti-Japan behavior by Koreans regarding historical issues. So...

The attitude, rather than the interpretation, is seen as a significant issue, and this trend has remained unchanged between the publics of both countries, even through the comfort women and forced labor issues. Regarding historical issues, even this year, despite the positive results, there has been no significant change. I will conclude my remarks here. Although the public opinion survey results have been released, they are still being processed, so they have not yet been provided to the eight individuals writing these reports.

Providing them might cause unnecessary trouble or confusion. Therefore, the data is not included. However, we believe that the absence of this year's data in the presentations by the researchers today will not significantly hinder the development of their arguments. I will now briefly present the results of this year's public opinion survey. From now on, we will listen to the presentations through the two panels and have a productive discussion. I will conclude my remarks here with the hope for a fruitful discussion. The moderator for the first session will be the Chairman of the Korea Foundation for the Support of Victims of Forced Mobilization and Overseas Emigration. Please give him a big round of applause. Yes, I have just been introduced. My name is Shim Kyu-sun. Can you hear me clearly?

Yes, among the current public opinion surveys, I have been most closely following survey number 24, which deals with the evaluation of the forced labor solution. It is a great honor to be moderating today, having written articles based on the survey results until recently. One might wonder if a seminar can be held with just 10 years of public opinion survey data, but I believe it is entirely possible for two reasons. First, this public opinion survey is recognized as the most credible among joint South Korea-Japan public opinion surveys.

In my view, the second most credible is the one conducted by the Yomiuri Shimbun and the Hankook Ilbo. In terms of credibility and the breadth of the survey, 10 years of data is certainly worthy of research. My second point is that a great many significant events have occurred over these 10 years. As you know, the comfort women agreement, President Lee Myung-bak's visit to Dokdo, the frustration of the comfort women agreement, the Supreme Court's final ruling on the forced labor issue, and President Yoon Suk-yeol's response to it. Over the past decade, these few events, in my opinion, will certainly be included when discussing the next 100 years of Japan-Korea relations. In my view, these are the defining moments of the past decade. The normalization of relations in 1965, the Kim Dae-jung-Obuchi Declaration in 1998, and the cultural opening to Japan are also included. However, the events of the past 10 years, in my opinion, will encompass everything that will shape the next 100 years of Japan-Korea history. Therefore, it is sufficiently...

possible for a seminar to function. Today's proceedings consist of the first session and a discussion. Uniquely, the organizers have allocated one hour for the first session and presentations, and 50 minutes for the discussion. In deference to this, the presenters will keep their presentations within one hour, meaning approximately 15 minutes per presentation. Following that, we will have comments from two individuals for about 15 minutes each. Then, for the remaining 20 minutes, we can open the floor for comments or questions, allowing each presenter to respond for 3-4 minutes. This should allow us to stay within the time limit. They call it the 'lost decade,' but I would like to make one final remark before handing over to the presenters. After President Lee Myung-bak's visit to Dokdo in 2012, Japan-Korea relations deteriorated so severely...

that the US Embassy in Seoul thought, 'There are seven rear bases in Japan, and so many people don't know about them. Despite how close Japan and Korea are.' Therefore, the US Embassy in Seoul, not in Korea or Japan, organized a program for about 15 mid-career Korean journalists to tour these seven bases in Japan. As the head of that delegation, I went to Japan and had a discussion with three Japanese journalists at the US Embassy in Tokyo. What surprised me at the time was that previously, when Korea made a claim, Japanese journalists would say, 'Oh, that again,' but they would still listen. However, all three journalists simultaneously said, 'Please stop.'

Hearing them say that, I realized how much things had changed. That was the beginning of the 'lost decade,' though I didn't realize it at the time. I only thought that Japan had changed considerably. But as Director Son Yeol mentioned earlier, that was indeed the beginning. In that sense, today's seminar will be a very important occasion. Now, could we please have Professor Park Seung-hyun start? Yes, hello. I am Park. I will proceed with my presentation without a PPT. Given the 15-minute presentation time, I will present as much as I can, and there will be opportunities to discuss the rest later. I am truly grateful to be the first presenter. My topic is 'What do South Koreans and Japanese people think of each other?' I have prepared a presentation on this subject. The title came about as I was writing, and the sub-theme I came up with is 'The Gap Between Historical Memory and Oblivion, and Popular Culture.' 'Remembering' emphasizes the flow, and on the other hand, the mutual perception survey over the past decade reflects this gap in historical memory. Furthermore, I added 'popular culture' at the end because I wanted to discuss how Japan-Korea relations are constantly changing and evolving in the present tense. I teach at a university...

using this data. The students found the classes very interesting. They found it very engaging because they were shocked by some of the perceptions of Japan when we looked at how Japan views us. And when we asked Koreans how they view Japan, there were many similarities. Also, as I specialize in Japan, my experiences with Japan led me to realize there were differences, and that experience itself creates perceptual differences. Some students are eagerly awaiting the 2023 survey. So, in this survey, on page 18, I analyzed what impressions South Koreans and Japanese people have of each other, and what comes to mind when they think of the other country. To do this, I analyzed the causes of positive and negative impressions and mutual perceptions over the past 10 years of Japan-Korea mutual perception surveys.

Additionally, by comparing historical knowledge of the other country and views on historical issues and their solutions, I analyzed the perceptual gap surrounding historical issues, which can be considered the core of Japan-Korea relations. As expected, this perceptual gap is fully reflected in the temporal gap between remembrance and oblivion. The consistent perception on both sides is that Japan-Korea relations are not good but are important. While it is difficult to expect good relations, and the current situation may continue, there is a shared understanding that Japan-Korea relations must be navigated in some way. On page 19, in several sections of the Japan-Korea perception survey, we see that for Korea, negative impressions of Japan, what comes to mind when thinking of Japan, and the tasks to be resolved in Japan-Korea historical issues are inseparable.

In many respects, it can be seen that historical issues overwhelmingly dominate the view of Japan. In contrast, Japan's historical knowledge of Korea and its current situation reflect current issues much more. Perhaps the significant shift in Japan's perception in the 2013 survey this year was also due to the fact that perceptions are more susceptible to changes in the geopolitical situation in Japan, as the underlying emotions related to historical issues are much deeper on the Korean side. Due to these differences, Korea perceives Japan as militaristic, while Japan perceives Korea as nationalistic. Interestingly, Korea highly evaluates Japan's democracy while also viewing Japan as militaristic. On the other hand, Japan views Korea as nationalistic, but the younger generation's responses often included democracy and capitalism, indicating potential.

Furthermore, as many are paying attention to these days, the mutual perception of popular culture, added in 2021, shows that enjoying popular culture drives mutual favorability. On the other hand, despite this, the knowledge and interest in Japan-Korea relations among the younger generation enjoying Japanese popular culture are very low. This does not necessarily mean that Japan-Korea relations will improve solely because of this. However, when asked why Japan-Korea relations are important, the answer is that they are close neighbors historically, geographically, and culturally. Therefore, the emotional exchange and familiarity brought about by popular culture are very important for Japan-Korea relations. Moving on to page 20, the fundamental reason for the state of Japan-Korea relations lies in historical issues. On page 21, interestingly, regarding positive impressions, Koreans consistently cite the Japanese people as kind and diligent. Another point is that Japan is seen as an advanced country with a high standard of living. What is interesting is that while Japanese people enjoy popular culture regardless of Japan-Korea relations, Koreans' positive evaluation of Japanese national character is not significantly affected by Japan-Korea relations. This seems interesting.

The evaluation of Japan as an advanced country with a high standard of living has consistently ranked second over the past decade. Recently, there was a question asking if South Korea and Japan are comparable, and Koreans agreed they are comparable. In my class, students said that Japanese wages are not high, so they wouldn't go to Japan for work, and they have no intention of working there. However, many agreed that Japan is an advanced country with a high standard of living. So, what exactly is this standard of living? It's clearly not just about economics. I think it would be interesting to conduct in-depth interviews to find out. However, in my view, the evaluation of Japan as an advanced country with a high standard of living seems to be closely related to the positive evaluation of the Japanese national character. On page 2023, in the mutual perception of national character between South Korea and Japan, both sides do not have a distinct impression. However...

The reason for the negative impression is the historical issue. On page 21, we see that in terms of positive impressions, Koreans consistently cite the Japanese as being kind and diligent. Another point is that Japan is a developed country with a high standard of living. What is interesting is that while the enjoyment of popular culture by Japanese people does not significantly affect the Korea-Japan relationship, the positive evaluation of Japanese national character by Koreans is not significantly affected by the Korea-Japan relationship. This seems interesting.

Furthermore, the evaluation of Japan as a developed country with a high standard of living has consistently ranked second over the past decade. Recently, there was a question asking if Korea and Japan are very equal, to which Koreans responded affirmatively. On the other hand, in our classes, students often said they would not go to Japan for employment because wages are not high, yet they largely agreed that Japan is a developed country with a high standard of living. If this is the case, what exactly is this standard of living? It is clearly not just an economic issue, but what could it be? It seems like an in-depth interview would be interesting. However, in my opinion, the evaluation of Japan as a developed country with a high standard of living is closely related to the positive evaluation of Japanese national character. On page 2023, page 2, we see that both Koreans and Japanese do not have a clear impression of each other's national character. However,

The important response is that Japan perceives Korea as stubborn. However, Korea has a considerable number of positive responses regarding Japan, such as 'kind' and 'diligent.' This is particularly striking when compared to China. Regarding China, there are firmly negative evaluations. For example, Japanese people describe Chinese people as 'blunt,' 'stubborn,' 'exclusive,' and 'aggressive,' with high percentages. In contrast, despite the difficulties in Japan-Korea relations, there is a high degree of intimacy between Korea and Japan, which is an interesting aspect.

On page 26, regarding events of mutual interest, Korea looks to the past, specifically the Imjin War. I found this very interesting, as students also cited the Imjin War. Admiral Yi Sun-sin is frequently mentioned. I found that Admiral Yi Sun-sin is consistently ranked as the most respected figure in Korea. On the other hand, Japan's interest lies in the atomic bombing and the Korean War. In 2013, there was this element regarding Japan: the birth of a female president in Korea, the Seoul Olympics, and the World Cup – very recent events. So, the temporal focus of interest is quite different. This is why Japanese people can enjoy Korean popular culture regardless of Japan-Korea relations. On page 27, as mentioned earlier,...

nationalism and militarism. Despite this, this seems to have potential for change in the future. On page 2, we examined what kind of historical remembrance and oblivion occurred over the past decade through literature research. On page 30, everyone looking at this will probably realize how different Korea and Japan are. Historical issues are seen differently by each country, and the responsibility for resolution also lies with the other country. This is the biggest difference between Korea and Japan. Then we move on. Regarding popular culture, I initially intended to focus on popular culture. However, since the survey period was relatively recent, in 2021, it was difficult to discern the changes over the past decade. Nevertheless, on page 36, it shows that while young people with high favorability through popular culture might be expected to have a positive outlook on the future of Japan-Korea relations, this is not the case. The importance of Japan-Korea relations was highest among those aged 60 and above, and the question of whether relations should improve also shows that 20-year-olds responded with 39%, while those in their 70s responded with 67%. The older the age group, the more they believe relations should improve. Professor Seok Ju's research suggests that as popular culture exchange expands, mutual relations will also solidify, which needs to be reconsidered. Another point to note here is that there is considerable internal variation in opinions among those aged 60 and above. In my view, the number of respondents in this survey shows that the number of respondents in their 60s is about three times that of respondents in their 20s. Since Japan is also a country where the elderly population aged 65 and above constitutes 30%, it is necessary to differentiate the age groups of 60 and above. I believe we need to divide them into 60s and 70s. In conclusion, I would like to emphasize the crucial role of the media in Japan-Korea relations. Initially, I wanted to make this the main topic, but other aspects came to the forefront as I proceeded. Both South Korea and Japan cited domestic media outlets as their primary source of information on bilateral relations, and the impact of media reports on public sentiment was highly evaluated. However, the credibility regarding fairness is quite low. Korean respondents stated that media outlets are influenced by political situations or stances, sensationalize issues, or provoke anti-Japanese sentiment, and also lack expertise on Japan. These points serve as reminders of the media's role. Looking at this, even while teaching, I realized that there is indeed fatigue from Japan-Korea conflicts, and the gap in perceptions, especially regarding historical issues, is so vast that it can be considered diametrically opposed. We need to face this reality. Despite this, why do Japanese people express distrust towards Korea, which is a topic that needs to be discussed more actively? On the other hand, there are undoubtedly historical agreements and achievements made by both South Korea and Japan, but their evaluation is quite lacking. Therefore, I believe there should be a more in-depth public forum to recall these achievements. Thank you. There are a few lies that work in Korea. And among these lies, I have added one more: presenters saying 'I will present briefly' is a lie, but they keep their promises and adhere to the time. Professor Park, you have truly kept your time, and I thank you for that. This could be considered an introduction to Session 1. From now on, we will delve into details such as hate speech, historical issues, public trust, and the correlation between diplomatic actions. Now, let us hear from Professor Seok Ju-hee, who will approach the issue of hate speech. Hello, I am Seok Ju-hee from the East Asia Institute. Thank you for giving me the opportunity to present at this valuable event. My research question is based on the premise that happy homes are happy for similar reasons, but unhappy homes are unhappy for various reasons. Therefore, I have rarely considered why Japan-Korea relations are good. It was simply convenient for me. However, when Japan-Korea relations became difficult, I thought about why they were difficult and painful, and the efforts to resolve them have always stayed with me. This time, I received 10 years of valuable data, and while a comparative analysis of both South Korea and Japan would be beneficial, today's presentation focuses on Japan. I have traced the periods when Japan perceived Korea negatively over the past 10 years, focusing solely on negative questions. Thus, I believe the issue of hate speech began to emerge more publicly around 2005 with the manga 'Yamano Saki' and its serialization.

For the 20s, it was 39%, and for the 70s, it was 67%. The older the age group, the more they felt it needed to be improved. Therefore, Professor Seok-ju's research suggests that as cultural exchange expands, mutual relations will also be consolidated, which needs to be considered. Another point to note here is that there are significant differences within the 60s and older age group. In my opinion, looking at the numbers in the survey, the number of respondents in their 60s is about three times that of respondents in their 20s. Japan is also a country where the elderly population aged 65 and over accounts for 30%, so there is a need to differentiate the age group of 60s and older. Therefore, I think it is necessary to divide them into 60s and 70s. In conclusion, the role of the media in Korea-Japan relations is very important, and I would like to emphasize this at the end. Initially, I wanted to make this the main topic, but as things progressed, other issues came to the forefront.

It emerged. Thus, both South Korea and Japan cited the media of the other country as a path to obtain information about the other nation and relations between the two countries. They also highly evaluated the impact of media reports on public sentiment. However, trust in fairness is considerably low. South Korean respondents stated that media outlets are swayed by political situations or stances, engage in sensationalism or provocative reporting, and, on the other hand, lack expertise about Japan. These points can be said to serve as reminders of the media's role. While examining these points, I thought about how the fatigue from the South Korea-Japan conflict is clearly present, and the need to address the perception gap, especially the significant, almost opposing, differences in historical perceptions. Despite this, why do Japanese people express distrust towards studying Korean, which requires a necessary degree of sincerity? This needs to be discussed more actively. Furthermore, I felt that the historical agreements and achievements made by both South Korea and Japan are clearly present but are evaluated rather poorly. I believe there should be a more in-depth public forum for discussion that reminds us of these achievements. Thank you. There are several lies that work in South Korea. Among these lies, I have added one more: presenters saying 'I will give a brief presentation.' They keep their promises and adhere to time. Professor Park truly kept his time, and I am grateful. This session might serve as an introduction, and from now on, we will delve into details regarding hate speech, historical issues, public trust, and the correlation between diplomacy and actions. Now, let us hear the presentation from Professor Seok Ju-hee, who will approach the issue of hate speech.

Hello, I am Seok Ju-hee from the Northeast Asian History Foundation. Thank you for giving me the opportunity to present at this esteemed event today. My fundamental line of inquiry regarding the mutual perception survey between South Korea and Japan is that happy households are happy for similar reasons, but unhappy households are unhappy for various reasons. Therefore, I have rarely considered why South Korea-Japan relations are good when they are good. It was simply convenient for me. When relations became strained, I contemplated why they were strained and difficult, and the efforts to resolve them have consistently stayed with me. Thus, I received 10 years of valuable data for this opportunity. While a comparative analysis of both South Korea and Japan would be ideal, what I have prepared today focuses on Japan's perspective. I have extracted only the negative questions about when the Japanese perceived South Korea as uncomfortable and tracked this over 10 years. Consequently, the issue of hate speech began with the manga 'Kougang Yu' by Yamano Sal-in in 2005.

The subtitle is the proposed solution. Ultimately, if the phenomenon of current issues has manifested in everyday spaces, then perhaps these feelings of hate or anti-Korean sentiment can be resolved through public diplomacy or private exchanges in everyday life. As the content I mentioned earlier is included, I will focus on the main points as stated: how hate speech emerged in everyday discourse, how negative perceptions of the other country appeared in the mutual perception surveys, the reduction of hate speech discourse, and the expansion of public diplomacy and private exchange. First, regarding hate speech discourse, as the Director mentioned today, in 2022 and 2023, both South Korea and Japan saw record-high favorability ratings, which I believe everyone will agree on. However, if we delve slightly into the internet or media, such discourse, particularly hate speech and anti-Japanese sentiment, remains evident through media tools frequently used by young people in their 20s and 30s.

Although hate speech may not be the main issue in Japan-Korea relations today, it has entered the political discourse in Japan-Korea relations with the popularization and commercialization of media. I would like to convey this point. This is not yet a complete paper, but the general table of contents is as follows: First, the everyday discourse of hate speech that has appeared in Japanese society, and similarly, when did the language of anti-Japan enter our daily lives? While it has a long history, I will discuss the issue of hate speech as a basic everyday discourse and how it has become structured and influenced Japan-Korea relations. Third, I will analyze the 10 years of data from the mutual perception survey between South Korea and Japan, focusing only on the negative aspects. Fourth, the reason for conducting such research is to hope for the resolution of the everydayness and popularization of hate speech. Therefore, the subtitle of my presentation is 'Solutions.' Ultimately, if the phenomenon of current issues appears in everyday spaces, should we not resolve emotions like hate speech and anti-Japan sentiment through public diplomacy and private exchange in everyday life? This is the alternative I would like to propose. Since the content I mentioned earlier is included, I will focus on the main points: how hate speech emerged in everyday discourse, how negative perceptions of the other country appeared in mutual perception surveys, the reduction of hate speech discourse, and the expansion of public diplomacy and private exchange. First, regarding hate speech discourse, as the Director mentioned earlier, both South Korea and Japan have seen record-high favorability ratings in 2022 and 2023. However, if we delve slightly deeper into the internet and media, we find that such discourse, especially hate speech and anti-Japan sentiment, remains, particularly through media tools frequently used by people in their 20s and 30s. In traditional media, hate publications targeting Koreans have been appearing since 2012. Content containing anti-Japan sentiment or emotions is produced, distributed, and spread through social media and the internet. Specifically, as Professor Park Seung-hyun also mentioned, there are persistent conflicts between extreme groups regarding historical issues, territorial disputes like Dokdo, and specific organizations like the 'Comfort Women' and 'The Korea Council,' which also generate hate speech. However, on the other hand, while I may sound like I am suggesting that Japanese and Korean societies are constantly spreading this, looking back, there were efforts in 2019 by traditional media newspapers to refrain from hate speech. For example, if anti-Japan or anti-Korea content appeared in the media, an apology broadcast was immediately issued. Although it is written in the main text, when the chairman of DHC made hateful remarks about The Korea Council, Saitama Prefecture decided to handle the distribution of DHC products as a case of...

Direct and indirect utilization is the most common way to obtain information. Therefore, it is crucial to transmit images of the other country through media. What is the impression of Japanese people toward South Korea? Tracking this over the years reveals it clearly. Although the situation is improving, for the past 10 years, negative impressions have consistently predominated. Why do they hold negative impressions of South Korea? Frankly, regarding the Dokdo issue, I am also affiliated with the Dokdo Research Institute, but the Dokdo issue is largely entrenched. As Professor Kim Han also mentioned, it is already entrenched and managed to some extent. Therefore, specific events like 'Takeshima Day' in February, which we are always aware of, and textbook issues in March, allow us to anticipate and respond. Thus, the Dokdo issue has been stable since President Lee Myung-bak's landing on Dokdo, with no significantly surprising incidents; it has been a phenomenon of stabilization or solidification. The historical issues show a slight decrease in proportion.

Furusato Nozei. Therefore, efforts were made within Japanese society to curb such behavior, which should not be overlooked. When I examine how hate speech is structured, I see institutional regulations and political spaces. Institutional regulations refer to ordinances against hate speech, meaning the strength of institutional measures, whether strong or weak. Political space, according to the scholar Kapferer, who analyzed Japanese society from the 1960s, is one framework. Joseph, on the other hand, observed protests and demonstrations during Korea's democratization movement.

Both scholars define political space as an arena where not only elections but also protests and events on the streets continuously occur. Considering this space, including online and offline, as political space, and when institutional regulations, even if they are ordinances, appear to be loose, within this structure, hate speech or anti-Japan sentiment may be reduced or become loose. Conversely, if institutional regulations are loose and the political space is relatively open, hate speech and anti-Japan sentiment may spread. This structural pattern may have formed. This is what I have organized while creating a theoretical framework.

Within this structure, hate speech spreads politically. However, as mentioned earlier, there is also media backlash against hate speech. Therefore, in Japan, and also in Korea, traditional media does not actively use the term 'anti-Japan.' Thus, despite the emergence of hate speech as an everyday phenomenon due to institutional regulations and media backlash, it can be considered a contained phenomenon. Existing research, including my own on hate speech, in South Korea and Japan, shows that it has clearly emerged from 2006 to the present. Of course, the analysis of individual factors differs, so due to time constraints, I will move on. Let's proceed to the analysis. There are five questions. First, where do people obtain information about South Korea or Japan-Korea relations? This is a crucial question. Second, what is the impression of Japanese people towards South Korea? Third, what corresponds to the current political and social situation in South Korea? Fourth, what is the national character of South Korea? This item has disappeared in two surveys. And as Professor Park Seung-hyun mentioned, which country or region do Japanese people feel is a military threat? This is the first question because it relates to where information is obtained. I believe it is important to consider where information is obtained, meaning through which medium hate speech or anti-Japan discourse is disseminated. Over 90% obtain information through media outlets. On the other hand, direct conversation or visits, while natural, are very low percentages.

Therefore, obtaining information through media is crucial for shaping the image of the other country. What is the impression of Japanese people towards South Korea? Tracking this over 10 years clearly reveals that although the situation is improving, negative impressions of South Korea have predominated over the past decade. What are the reasons for having negative impressions of South Korea? I believe the Dokdo issue, which I am also involved with at the Dokdo Research Institute, is largely solidified and managed. As Professor Kim Han mentioned, it is already solidified and managed to some extent. Therefore, specific events like 'Takeshima Day' in February, which we always know about, and the textbook issue in March, are predictable and manageable. Thus, the Dokdo issue has been stable since President Lee Myung-bak's landing on Dokdo, with no major surprising events since then; it has become a stable, fixed phenomenon. The historical issue shows a slight decrease in proportion.

Here, one variable is political leaders or the government. Therefore, when there is a change in government or leadership, or regarding the stance or attitude towards a particular government, issues such as distrust in the government can influence public perception. Yes, the political and social situation in South Korea. I believe there are significant implications here. As it is a democratic country, logically, democracy or pacifism should be higher concepts. However, from Japan's perspective, the highest concept, occupying the largest percentage, is nationalism. Therefore, when Japan views South Korea, nationalism is the primary perception. Second is statism. Only recently, in 2022, has democracy shown a significant increase. Analysis is needed, but it is likely due to the spread of cultural exchange, such as K-pop and the Korean Wave, along with other factors. Government factors may also be involved, allowing for such analysis. However, the next concept is statism, and democracy and militarism were previously juxtaposed. Pacifism is the lowest concept. This may be due to the perception of peace in the context of division. To summarize, the perception of positive terms like peace and democracy is at a lower level, followed by nationalism, statism, and militarism, in that order. In the survey conducted in 2013 and 2014, peace was also ranked lower than other concepts. This is the country or region that Japanese people feel is a military threat. Here, there is a clear symmetry. First, China and the United States. When China is perceived as a threat, the perception of the US decreases, and when China decreases, the perception of the US increases. Similarly, when North Korea is perceived as a threat, South Korea shows a somewhat symmetrical decrease and increase. Consequently, North Korea, China, and Russia, communist countries, are perceived as threats, while the US and South Korea are ranked lower. This is a natural outcome.

One of the variables here is political leaders or the government. Therefore, regarding changes in government or leadership, or the stance or attitude towards a particular government, issues such as 'we cannot trust the governments of both countries' might influence public perception. Yes, the political and social situation in South Korea. I believe there are important implications here. As you can see, South Korea is naturally a democratic country, and commonsensically, democracy or pacifism should be higher-order concepts. However, from Japan's perspective, nationalism accounts for the largest percentage as the highest-order concept. That is, when Japan views South Korea, nationalism is primary. Second is statism. Only recently, in 2022, democracy appears to have gained more prominence. While further analysis is needed, perhaps factors such as the spread of cultural exchange through K-pop or the Korean Wave, along with other elements, have played a role. This analysis is possible. However, uncomfortably, the next concept is statism, and democracy and militarism were closely juxtaposed previously. Pacifism is the lowest-order concept. This might be a response based on the perception of peace in the context of division. To summarize again, the perception of positive terms like peace and democracy is at a lower level, followed by nationalism, statism, and militarism in that order when recognizing South Korea's political and social landscape. This was also the case in the 2013 and 2014 surveys, where it was ranked lower than peaceful.

The countries and regions that Japan perceives as military threats. There are indeed points of symmetry here. First, China and the United States. When China is perceived as a threat, the perception of the US decreases, and when China decreases, the perception of the US increases. And when North Korea is perceived as a threat, South Korea's perception slightly and symmetrically decreases and increases in tandem. Consequently, regarding North Korea, China, Russia, and communist bloc countries...

This might be because the concept of peace is understood in the context of a divided situation. However, still uncomfortably, the subsequent concept is statism, and democracy and militarism were closely juxtaposed. Pacifism is the lowest-order concept. This might be a response based on the perception of peace in the context of division. To summarize again, the perception of positive terms like peace and democracy is at a lower level, followed by nationalism, statism, and militarism in that order when recognizing South Korea's political and social landscape. This was also the case in the 2013 and 2014 surveys, where it was ranked lower than peaceful. The countries and regions that Japan perceives as military threats. There are indeed points of symmetry here. First, China and the United States. When China is perceived as a threat, the perception of the US decreases, and when China decreases, the perception of the US increases. And when North Korea is perceived as a threat, South Korea's perception slightly and symmetrically decreases and increases in tandem. Consequently, regarding North Korea, China, Russia, and communist bloc countries...

To summarize, from 2013 to 2022, mutual perceptions between South Korea and Japan have clearly improved. However, negative perceptions of South Korea within Japan still persist to some extent. Among these, historical issues and territorial disputes appear to be solidified. Current issues, hate speech, and anti-Japan sentiment have the potential to spread indiscriminately through mass media and the internet. This is because, as mentioned earlier, most information is obtained through the media. Therefore, how can we increase hate speech and favorability equally? Research and analysis on the phenomenon of hate speech in Japan are continuously needed. While external factors like Japan-Korea relations contribute to hate speech, recent analyses suggest that internal factors within Japanese society, such as inequality, patriotism, and xenophobia or discrimination against foreigners, are projected onto South Korea. One more point.

Regarding the data we analyzed, going back to the 1960s and up to the 2000s, for about 40 years, the response rate for disliking Korea has consistently been high since the 1960s. However, in the long term, recently, the proportion of those who like Korea more than dislike it has been steadily increasing. This can be evaluated positively. Therefore, I would like to continue emphasizing the concrete methods for building a future-oriented, friendly cooperative relationship between South Korea and Japan, specifically through public diplomacy. Public diplomacy, while maximizing national interests through cultural exchange, also contributes to increasing the credibility and trustworthiness of the government, especially when public diplomacy is directed from South Korea to Japan. This is because the government guarantees a stable and continuous channel, and by guaranteeing the private sector, it enhances credibility.

If viewed positively, perhaps it can lead to an improvement in public sentiment. Therefore, as I have repeatedly said, I believe we need to explore ways to vitalize public diplomacy and private exchange through such data, while continuously examining hate speech and anti-Japan sentiment. This concludes my presentation. I would like to thank Dr. Seok Ju-hee for adhering strictly to the time limit. Regarding speech and hate speech, if anyone is more curious, the Seoul National University Institute for Japanese Studies will be hosting a seminar on 'Hate Speech and Cyber Governance' with Japanese experts on the 17th. You will likely find it very helpful if you attend. I am mentioning this as part of the Seoul National University Institute for Japanese Studies' anniversary event. Professor Park Seung-hyun and Dr. Seok Ju-hee also mentioned the media at the end of their presentations, discussing the role of mass media as a source of information, its positive and negative functions. Director, if I may suggest, perhaps for the next session, we could dedicate it to discussing the role of the media in Japan-Korea relations: is it playing a positive role, or is it acting as an antagonist? While some aspects are anticipated, others are criticized, so perhaps this could be considered. Now, let us hear from Professor Yoon Suk-jung, who will speak on the topic of history.

Yes, I am Yoon Suk-jung from the Korea National Diplomatic Academy. My research is on the topic of Japan-Korea relations and public opinion on historical issues. The survey I conducted is titled 'Japan-Korea Relations and Historical Issues in Both Countries.' Specifically, it investigates how people think about Japan-Korea relations and the historical issues of both countries. I will refer to the four response options as Options 1, 2, 3, and 4. One of the reasons I conducted this survey is that Japan-Korea relations have been described as a '10-year relationship,' and public opinion has become dominated by anti-Japan and anti-Korea sentiments. However, these four options go beyond that, asking about the perspectives of the South Korean and Japanese publics. Given the severe historical conflict, how should it be resolved? Should historical issues be resolved first to enable future cooperation? Or should we build trust through cooperation first and then resolve historical issues? These are the types of responses.

I investigated the results for these four response options. The reason I conducted this survey is that, as mentioned, Japan-Korea relations have been described as a '10-year relationship,' and public opinion has become dominated by anti-Japan and anti-Korea sentiments. However, these four options go beyond that, asking about the perspectives of the South Korean and Japanese publics. Given the severe historical conflict, how should it be resolved? Should historical issues be resolved first to enable future cooperation? Or should we build trust through cooperation first and then resolve historical issues? These are the types of responses.

If we oppose Japan, or if Korea is xenophobic towards Korea, it goes beyond that to a slightly different perspective. And based on that perspective, there will be preferred policies in terms of public opinion, and I thought it was a question that could gauge that. That's why I researched the survey, and I thought that the responses implied various perspectives on Korea-Japan relations. So I organized them into these four categories. The first response prioritizes resolving historical issues. It argues for resolving historical issues as a prerequisite for cooperation. This perception is highly consistent with the government's policy of the 'past issues one-track policy.' However, I don't think this is a balanced perspective, but it suggests that to move towards future-oriented Korea-Japan relations, we must currently accept conflict over historical issues. This is a response that considers the adjustment period and the ongoing conflict.

I believe this is the response being considered. The second perspective prioritizes cooperation over historical issues. It suggests that by accumulating cooperation, it might be possible to resolve historical issues in the long term between Korea and Japan. The reason for cooperation is that it benefits both Korea and Japan's national interests. Therefore, the idea is that national interest alignment between Korea and Japan depends on how much their national interests coincide. This response tends to increase when situations arise where Korea and Japan must cooperate, such as when the North Korean issue escalates or the China issue intensifies. Now, for responses 3 and 4, I think response 3 is very well-crafted. It suggests that no matter what, Korea and Japan will

always experience conflict due to historical issues. The Korea-Japan relationship depicted here is like Sisyphus's punishment. Sisyphus, angered by Zeus, had to roll a boulder up a mountain, and even when he reached the summit, the boulder would roll back down, forcing him to repeat the arduous task. This response reflects the frustration and helplessness of an unending, meaningless labor. Responses 1, 2, and 3 are similar yet diametrically opposed, making it a very well-designed set of options. Response 4 was 'I don't know.' Typically, 'I don't know' is not a primary focus of research, but since it consistently accounted for 19% and 21% of responses in Japan, I felt it was important to examine. Professor Park Seung-hyun

also presented a similar point in his paper, which I drew upon. Regarding the 'I don't know' response, it could imply a lack of knowledge or a state where one has knowledge but is not yet ready to answer. Furthermore, since historical issues and the development of Korea-Japan relations are fundamentally political matters, this could be seen as a parallel to the general public's political apathy discussed in political science. Ultimately, I interpreted this as an endorsement of the status quo, neglect, or a 'not my problem' attitude. Now, looking at the South Korean public opinion surveys first, from 2013 to 2015, response 1 was the most frequent. However, from 2016 onwards, responses 1 and 2 became the top two, and

This continued in a pattern where the top two positions were frequently exchanged until 2022. Then, from 2017 to 2018, during the Moon Jae-in administration and the Abe government, there was conflict over the comfort women agreement. At that time, interestingly, the South Korean government itself placed a high priority on addressing the issues surrounding the comfort women agreement, and public opinion was overwhelmingly negative toward the agreement. However, as seen here, in the 2018 situation, the response that emphasized the need to resolve the issue in a future-oriented manner by first building cooperative relations, which would then gradually lead to the resolution of historical issues, received the highest percentage of responses. Therefore, despite the extremely negative public perception of the comfort women agreement in South Korea,

there was a dual perception of recognizing the importance of cooperation with Japan. This period marked the beginning of the forced mobilization issue, escalating bilateral relations into a complex crisis encompassing economic and security matters. Interestingly, in 2020, the third answer option received the most responses from the South Korean public. While the historical conflict during the Park Geun-hye and Abe administrations in 2013 and 2015 saw the first answer option as the most frequent, during this period of complex crisis, the third answer option was the most prevalent. Although not discussed here, when considering how to respond to historical issues, the general public opinion in South Korea has shown a tendency towards more flexible and softened responses, indicating it was not a hostile stance. Therefore, it is natural that things would return to the original state in 2021.

It can be considered a natural phenomenon. In 2022, when the new government was inaugurated, the second answer option received the highest number of responses. Now, let's look at the public opinion surveys in Japan. The third option consistently holds the largest share. The sentiment is that historical issues will remain unresolved and that Japan-South Korea relations will be characterized by a "Sisyphus-like" cycle. However, even in the Japanese public opinion surveys, a clear improvement is seen in 2016. In 2016, the second answer option was the most frequent. But after the comfort women agreement in 2017-2018, during the subsequent conflict, the third option once again became the most frequent. When the forced mobilization issue surfaced and bilateral relations fell into a complex crisis, it is interesting to note that in 2019,

"I don't know" became the third most frequent response. However, the significance of the "I don't know" response lies in the fact that as the percentage of responses advocating for future-oriented cooperation to resolve historical issues decreased, the percentage of those who believe historical issues can be resolved through cooperation increased. Then, starting in 2021, the first answer option began to be selected most frequently. While the third answer option had been the most common among the Japanese public until now, the reason for the emergence of the first answer option warrants further research. It is likely influenced by the "post-Abe" government era, where the stance was that without resolving the asset seizure issue, improvement in bilateral relations would be impossible. This aligns with the policy adopted by the Suga government in 2021, which essentially reverted to the two-track policy on historical issues pursued during the Park Geun-hye administration. The public opinion at the time strongly mirrored this stance. However, for Japan, this might not necessarily be a negative development.

This might be a bold interpretation, but it's not entirely negative for Japan. If the third answer option had remained dominant, it would imply that historical conflicts would continue indefinitely with no resolution. However, in this context, the belief that there is a clear path to resolution if historical issues are addressed suggests that the Japanese public began to view historical issues not just as a source of conflict, but as a problem that needs to be overcome for the advancement of future bilateral relations, starting in 2021. This perspective likely contributed to the responses seen in 2022. Although the first answer option was the most frequent in 2022, the Japanese public, by viewing historical issues not as isolated events but as part of building future-oriented bilateral relations, may have come to believe that cooperation could lead to resolution. This could have served as a catalyst.

It also suggests that the Japanese government's policy of prioritizing asset seizure was a significant misstep. While further research is needed for supplementation, to conclude, although both countries experienced a "lost decade" of historical conflict, the people of South Korea and Japan underwent different initial perceptions and paths of change in their views. This divergence in responses is likely due to the different meanings and contexts that historical issues hold for each nation and its citizens. Personally, when considering future diplomacy with Japan, looking back at the past decade, there were opportunities for improving relations that were missed, particularly in 2016.

The window of opportunity, which was slightly longer in South Korea, lasting from 2016 to 2017, could be considered lost in retrospect. Therefore, it is crucial to be able to proactively identify not only government policies but also shifts in public opinion. Furthermore, while anti-Korean sentiment in Japan is a significant issue, the "I don't know" response is also a major concern. This "I don't know" response needs to be reduced. Even if favorable statistics emerge from Japan, the response is inherently capped at 80% because of the "I don't know" factor, whereas South Korea can achieve scores from 100%, potentially reaching 50% or 60% with favorable responses. Therefore, addressing the "I don't know" response is necessary. My presentation concludes here. Thank you for listening. It was requested to finish by 45 minutes.

45 minutes. Indeed, it has concluded. Regarding Professor Yoon Seok-jeong's paper, it mentions that the "lost decade" was a statement by Ambassador Shin Kak-soo. However, the phrase "Sisyphus-like punishment," which I recalled earlier, was written by Professor Lee Geun-kwan at a seminar around 2015, after the final ruling. Hearing this, I asked the professor if I could use this expression, and he agreed. At that time, "rollercoaster" was the most commonly used term to describe the ups and downs. But the phrase "Sisyphus-like punishment," coined by Professor Lee Geun-kwan, was more evocative than "rollercoaster" for describing continuous sharp declines followed by rises and falls. It was a good phrase.

I remember asking the professor after the session if I could truly use it. In any case, it is true that historical issues are a recurring problem between South Korea and Japan, much like Sisyphus's punishment. However, as mentioned earlier, has the time come to consider ways to reduce this gap? Now, finally, we will hear from Ms. Lee Ju-kyung on the topic of public consciousness and whether it is being adequately reflected in diplomacy. Please proceed. Hello, I am Lee Ju-kyung from Pusan National University. Are you comfortable participating in the e-conference? A little louder, please. Ah, yes. Thank you for giving me the opportunity to participate. I am grateful to have received the extensive materials. In particular, I was given the opportunity to study opinion poll data accumulated over ten years. Personally, I believe this data is highly valuable both academically and policy-wise. I also learned a great deal while analyzing it.

Thank you. My research theme is the relationship between South Korea-Japan diplomacy and public political efficacy. The research background, as Committee Member Kim Ki-sun mentioned, focuses on the relationship between diplomacy and public opinion. Specifically, drawing from the political system, I aimed to include considerations for the mechanism of deadlock in South Korea-Japan relations, and conversely, the mechanism of mitigation. The research content is as stated in the title. The most noteworthy aspect is the advantage of having accumulated data over ten years, which allows for the identification of a consistent directionality, or what I term "consistency," in the broader framework. Therefore, I plan to analyze the responses with the largest proportions and, from there, present the current implications for South Korea-Japan diplomacy. The structure includes chapters 1 and 2 on research design.

Chapters 3 and 4 provide analyses for South Korea and Japan, respectively. These are treated as independent variables in the setup. Chapter 5 discusses South Korea-Japan diplomacy as the dependent variable, along with public political trust, and concludes the study. First, let's look at the problem statement: Is the "lost decade" a result of political responses that consider negative public sentiment? The part I considered here is how to ultimately align diplomacy and mutual public perception. Domestically, it has been considered an obstacle or a limiting factor in policy implementation, particularly in South Korea-Japan relations. Applying this to periods of confrontation, it is understood that during those times, high-level political efficacy would be required due to the wide gap between the two nations. By examining the actual state of public consciousness, I aimed to elucidate its relationship with diplomacy. The analytical framework utilizes the feedback structure of the political system as a model to establish the structure and process of public opinion and policy.

The causal structure is understood as political efficacy or trust in the political process, derived from the results of this. As shown in the diagram, there are inputs, outputs, and feedback in the public opinion-policy structure and process. Public perception of the counterpart nation is inputted, which leads to government responses as output. The public's evaluation of these responses is then produced. Based on this feedback, government responses are modified or maintained, and this, in turn, leads to the public re-establishing its perception of the relationship with the counterpart nation, forming a continuous feedback loop. This structured outcome is defined as political efficacy and political trust. The analysis targets three aspects related to perception of the counterpart nation, two aspects of government response evaluation, and political process trust. This latter part requires some attention: the focus is on political efficacy, but the corresponding question is limited to the first quarter of 2021 in South Korea.

However, in Japan, satisfaction with democracy surveys have been conducted for a relatively long period. Based on the theoretical discussion here, political efficacy is not a short-term variable; therefore, even a single instance can be suitable for trend analysis. Furthermore, as organized in the diagram, the construct validity of efficacy and satisfaction with democracy is very similar. Thus, with these clues, validity was assessed and the analysis proceeded. Looking first at South Korea, the perception of the counterpart nation was reactive to diplomatic issues during periods of strained relations. Although there were many unfavorable impressions in the first quarter of 2013, the overall trend of negative sentiment has been easing with each passing year. Regarding the reasons for favorable or unfavorable impressions of Japan, as previous speakers have also

mentioned, the primary reason for unfavorable impressions is largely the historical issues, which have become a deeply entrenched source of conflict. Given that these issues pertain to the three essential elements of a nation—sovereignty, people, and territory—they align with perceptions of national identity. Therefore, this aspect, being subjective, requires mutual recognition between one's own cognition and that of the other party, indicating a solidified and ongoing conflict between South Korea and Japan. Conversely, reasons for favorable impressions include national character and being a developed country. In terms of future relations, even during periods of conflict, South Korean public opinion has been proactive in establishing friendly relations with Japan and perceives political confrontation as something to be avoided. To summarize, beneath the dual sentiment of criticism towards historical issues and favorability towards present-day Japan, we can observe a combination of contrasting perceptions: wariness towards politics and favorability towards society. At this juncture, South Korean public opinion, which has been actively seeking to overcome confrontation even during periods of conflict,

can be reinterpreted. Next, regarding the evaluation of government responses, there is a lack of dominant public opinion, or rather, a state of reservation. This survey has been ongoing since 2020. During the Moon Jae-in administration, responses like "doing well," "average," and "doing poorly" were distributed with similar proportions, and this trend appears to continue in the 2023 results. In this sense, public opinion does not highly evaluate the responses of any particular administration. Furthermore, the basis for evaluating government responses is important. Generally, voters tend to evaluate the government based on policies they prioritize for the sake of judgment efficiency. Regarding this, there are questions posed over the past three years, and I have additionally examined two more data sources.

Looking at the chart, the three-year survey data shows a high demand for problem-solving regarding historical issues, Dokdo, and education. In terms of policy, strengthening economic cooperation such as trade and investment ranks second. A similar survey from 2013 during the Park Geun-hye administration shows the same pattern: an overwhelming request for correct historical perception, followed by economic cooperation and trade. The 2021 data from the separate survey on conditions for the success of the 2022 presidential election also shows a similar trend. While the proportions may vary depending on the time and situation, an overall orientation towards prioritizing history and economy, or a dual focus on both, is confirmed. In this regard, perceptions of South Korean public opinion towards Japan can be seen as converging on the common ground of historical and economic issues. Next, regarding Japan, South Korean perception can be summarized into three categories: indifference, conformity, and nationalistic alienation.

First, regarding favorability ratings, the chart shows that Japan's ratings are more reserved compared to South Korea's. The dominant perception is unfavorable, but less so than in South Korea, and a significant improvement is confirmed in 2023. Additionally, the proportion of undecided respondents is relatively high. A subtle but noticeable difference is the frequent, minor increases in unfavorable ratings. While unfavorable ratings in South Korea increased year-on-year in two periods (2015-2016 and 2021), Japan saw increases in four periods (2014, 2017-2019, and 2022). This is likely due to a combination of factors, including the trends in South Korea-Japan diplomacy, the evaluation of domestic public opinion, and the effect of conformity with South Korean public opinion.

Regarding the reasons for favorable and unfavorable impressions, the responses for unfavorable impressions are largely predictable. However, what is particularly noteworthy in the favorable category is the response "being a fellow democratic country." This averaged 21.7% over the ten-year period. Since 2015, this figure has been steadily increasing, and in 2023, it reached its highest point, accounting for 50.3% of all favorable reasons. This is a very significant finding. In this sense, we can observe a dual sentiment of distrust towards South Korean politics and trust in the shared democratic system—a combination of distrust and trust.

In connection with this, an examination of the image of South Korean politics and society reveals that they are perceived as having a strong nationalistic sentiment, and there is suspicion that South Korean politics promotes and expands this sentiment when necessary. This could ultimately lead to a sense of alienation from the overall South Korean political process. Furthermore, in terms of future relations, the rate of avoiding confrontation is relatively high. Responses such as "future-oriented overcoming" and "I don't know" are also frequent. While this may seem somewhat passive compared to South Korea, this point will be revisited later. Regarding the evaluation of government responses, a dominant public opinion is not clearly visible in Japan either. This period covers the Abe and Kishida administrations, and the proportions are evenly distributed, making it difficult to assess whether the dominant public opinion is positive or negative. The proportion of undecided and indifferent respondents is also high. This reservation and indifference extend not only to South Korea but also to their own government,

indicating a degree of cynicism and apathy in Japanese public opinion. When we examine the criteria used by Japan to evaluate government responses, historical issues account for the largest proportion. However, a notable difference compared to South Korea is the emphasis on security rather than the economy. The first bar represents economic cooperation such as trade and investment, while the second bar represents the resolution of the North Korean nuclear issue. In Japan's case, the second bar is longer, suggesting that South Korea's strategic value is interpreted more highly in the context of the North Korean threat. This suggests a difference in the priorities of cooperation and utility between the people of South Korea and Japan.

Based on the aforementioned perceptions of the counterpart nation and evaluations of government responses in South Korea and Japan, let's now examine public efficacy regarding South Korea-Japan diplomacy. First, in South Korea, we analyzed the political efficacy of the government's diplomacy towards Japan in 2021. The chart shows that the dominant view is that there are some differences, but these do not appear to be strongly related to ideological tendencies. Synthesizing the discussions so far, a space for convergent diplomacy towards Japan emerges. This space is likely defined by historical and identity issues as the upper limit and conflict avoidance and economic cooperation as the lower limit. Within this space, South Korean public opinion seems to perceive a gap between its views and the government's responses. Next, for Japan, we substituted satisfaction with democracy. The chart shows that the dominant view is dissatisfaction or unhappiness. When asked about the specific problems with democracy, responses such as public distrust and indifference towards politics, and politicians' and parties' lack of problem-solving ability, are frequent. This indicates overall dissatisfaction and indifference not only with the policies implemented but also with the actors and processes involved in policy-making. Therefore, diplomacy towards South Korea is unlikely to be an exception. Furthermore, the reserved indifference can be reinterpreted. A decline in internal efficacy, the belief that one's own opinion can influence political decision-making, and a decline in external efficacy, the responsiveness of policies implemented through the political process to society. This cycle of perceptions may accumulate, ultimately manifesting as reserved indifference. Regarding the current state of political trust between South Korea and Japan, institutional trust in investigative agencies has been added for clarity. The chart shows that in both South Korea and Japan, trust in the institutions of representative democracy, including the government, political parties, parliament, and the media, is at a very low level. Therefore, while they affirm institutional democracy, they hold a low evaluation of its operational methods,

confirming a low level of trust in their own political systems. To conclude, regarding the implementation of South Korea-Japan diplomacy, was it aligned with public opinion? Based on the analysis, there was a gap between public opinion and government responses, which in turn led to low political trust, indifference, and resistance. Commonalities in the consciousness of the people of South Korea and Japan were identified in three areas: First, the government's responses do not receive support from the majority of public opinion. Second, specific government policies are not highly evaluated.

In this regard, it can be confirmed that they are conducting evaluations, which indicates a low level of trust in their own government's politics. To conclude, was the method of implementing Korea-Japan diplomacy aligned with public opinion? Based on the analysis, there was a gap between public opinion and the government's response, which manifested as decreased political trust, apathy, and dissent. Three commonalities in the consciousness of the Korean and Japanese people were identified: First, the respective governments' responses do not receive majority support from the public. Second, specific government policies are not being evaluated favorably.

Third, distrust of the counterpart nation's politics is a contributing factor, which is seen as a particular challenge in South Korea-Japan diplomacy. The tentative conclusion is that the mechanism of deadlock in South Korea-Japan relations stems from a structural problem arising from the combined effect of self-distrust in the political process and distrust of the counterpart nation. The implications derived from this are twofold. Conversely, considering the mechanism for mitigating this deadlock, a virtuous cycle process is anticipated, leading from the political level to the public level and then to trust in the counterpart nation.

Thank you. This concludes my presentation.