North Korea and the World: North Korea's Constitutionalization of Nuclear Armed Forces and its 'Irreversible' Will to Possess Nuclear Weapons

YouTube Link: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=OLlUITliUsQ

Park Won-gon, Director of the EAI Center for North Korean Studies (Professor at Ewha Womans University), analyzes the meaning and background of North Korea's constitutionalization of 'advancing nuclear armament' in September 2023. Park explains that North Korea's move to constitutionalize, following its declaration as a nuclear-weapon state in 2012 and the legalization of nuclear armament in 2022, reaffirms 'the communization of the Korean Peninsula' as the North Korean regime's ultimate goal, while also serving as an effort to strengthen its legitimacy by emphasizing it as a political achievement of Kim Jong Un, distinct from his predecessors. Furthermore, he assesses that the North Korean regime's promotion of an offensive nuclear strategy demonstrates Kim Jong Un's lack of confidence in the one-man rule system and his anxiety about future uncertainties.

■ Park Won-gon_Director, Center for North Korean Studies, East Asia Institute. Professor, North Korean Studies, Ewha Womans University.

■ Managed and Edited by: Park Ji-soo, EAI Researcher

    Inquiries: 02 2277 1683 (ext. 208) | jspark@eai.or.kr

Video Transcript

It will clearly appear at the negotiating table with the United States with the goal of being recognized as a nuclear-weapon state and having sanctions lifted. Then, in preparation for that negotiation, we have clearly established in the constitution, beyond nuclear legislation, that they are a nuclear-weapon state. This is unacceptable. Hello and thank you to everyone watching "North Korea and the World." Today, I will discuss North Korea's nuclear legalization. North Korea has continuously elevated the level of its nuclear legalization, and in September, around the time of Chuseok, it was reinserted into the constitution. I will analyze and explain what this means and how North Korea has achieved this. The first instance was at the end of 2012, after Kim Jong Il's death, when Kim Jong Un's rule began. The preamble of the constitution states that "Comrade Kim Jong Il transformed our fatherland into an invincible political and ideological power, a nuclear-weapon state, and an unbeatable military power." Many people were surprised at the time. Such expressions were not present in North Korea's constitution before. Although they had continuously claimed to be a nuclear-weapon state since their nuclear test in 2006, embedding it in the constitution carries significant meaning. Especially, as mentioned, embedding 'nuclear-weapon state' as an achievement of Kim Jong Il in the constitution makes it irreversible. Within the North Korean political system, Kim Jong Un cannot deny the legitimacy of his father and grandfather. While he must build his own achievements upon that legitimacy, fundamentally, once the narrative that nuclear weapons were created by Kim Jong Il is enshrined in the constitution, it is impossible to abandon nuclear possession; it is like crossing a final line. Therefore, when it appeared in the constitutional preamble in 2012, many expressed concern that denuclearization of North Korea would become very difficult. However, North Korea has continued to advance this work. Many of you are likely aware that in September last year, 2022, the Supreme People's Assembly legalized nuclear armament, stating, "On the Nuclear Armed Forces Policy of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea."

It reaffirms that nuclear armament is for the defense of the state's sovereignty, territorial integrity, and fundamental interests. Here, the expression 'territorial integrity' is used. What North Korea refers to as 'territorial integrity' is the complete communization of South Korea, the completion of the communization of the Korean Peninsula. The most crucial element adopted at the Supreme People's Assembly in September 2022 was precisely 'territorial integrity.' To reiterate, their goal is to achieve the communization of the Korean Peninsula, even if it means using nuclear weapons. The adopted content includes many significant points.

Here, it states regarding the status and control of nuclear capabilities: "North Korea's nuclear capabilities are subject to the supreme leader's sole command." As you well know, Kim Jong Un holds many titles, including Chairman of the State Affairs Commission and General Secretary. Therefore, it clearly states in the law that the sole control of nuclear capabilities rests with Kim Jong Un. It further states that any attack on this command system, on Kim Jong Un, will automatically trigger a nuclear war. And here is another crucial point: the principles of nuclear weapon use include the following.

If non-nuclear states collude with nuclear-weapon states, they can attack the non-nuclear states. We can fully understand who they are referring to. North Korea constantly speaks of South Korea and the United States colluding, calling the ROK-US alliance a "gang of bandits." Therefore, North Korea clearly states here that it can attack South Korea, which is a non-nuclear state, at any time because it has allied with the United States, a nuclear-weapon state. It then outlines five principles for nuclear weapon use. I will not elaborate on all of them but will briefly mention the second one: "Nuclear armament status: Nuclear weapons can be used when it is judged that an attack by hostile forces on the state leadership and command organs is imminent or has occurred."

In other words, 'state leadership' refers to Kim Jong Un, as mentioned earlier. Thus, if there is any attack on Kim Jong Un – and this 'attack' does not solely refer to a nuclear attack but also conventional attacks – any form of military threat will automatically lead to a nuclear response, a nuclear war. This demonstrates the repeated linkage of any act that threatens Kim Jong Un's safety with nuclear weapons. In addition, it includes the qualitative and quantitative enhancement of nuclear capabilities. The meaning is quite clear. Firstly, it exhibits a highly offensive nuclear strategy. No other nuclear-weapon states possess such an offensive nuclear strategy. Even if they do, they do not explain or publicize it in such detail. This clearly indicates North Korea's intentions. Secondly, as mentioned, the five conditions imply that North Korea can use nuclear weapons arbitrarily under any circumstances.

It is legalized that they can use nuclear weapons in virtually all environments. The possibility of a preemptive strike is also mentioned: they will use it when it is imminent. 'Imminent' refers to a situation where the other side has not yet attacked. Yet, they claim they will use nuclear weapons, which clearly signifies a preemptive strike. Here, something very important emerges: the vulnerability of Kim Jong Un's one-man rule system. Because the system is controlled by one person, if that person is eliminated, North Korea would be in a situation where it cannot wage nuclear war. They are acutely aware of this, which is why they continue to emphasize this point.

Thirdly, let me discuss the third point. On September 26-27, 2023, the 9th session of the 14th Supreme People's Assembly was held. What was added to the constitution this time? While the 2012 constitutional preamble mentioned being a nuclear-weapon state, the content in the September 2023 Supreme People's Assembly session is more extensive. It states: "As a responsible nuclear-weapon state, it guarantees the nation's right to survival and development, deters war, and contributes to world peace and stability through nuclear armament."

Furthermore, the mission of the Republic's armed forces is stated as: first, to defend the state's sovereignty, territorial integrity, and the rights and interests of the people, and to safeguard the achievements of the socialist revolution from all threats. To summarize, 'territorial integrity' appears again. And to defend the rights and interests of the people – this is a very ambiguous concept. Depending on how 'defense of rights and interests' is defined, it can be interpreted arbitrarily. By reinserting such concepts into the constitution, and by incorporating the condensed content of last September's legalization, each element is an ambiguous concept that can be interpreted and expanded arbitrarily. I believe this poses a greater risk. Kim Jong Un delivered a speech in which the core message was to build nuclear forces and solidify them as irreversible state law. This expression has appeared frequently in the last year or two. 'Irreversible' is a term originally used in CVID (Complete, Verifiable, Irreversible Denuclearization), which is pursued during denuclearization. This is a term also found in UN Security Council resolutions.

While North Korea was pursuing complete denuclearization, North Korea is now saying the opposite: that nuclear possession is something that cannot be irreversibly abandoned. This was reiterated by Kim Jong Un in his speech. What does this signify? First, it emphasizes Kim Jong Un's personal achievements. As mentioned earlier, the 'nuclear-weapon state' mentioned in the 2012 constitutional preamble was an achievement of Kim Jong Il. From Kim Jong Un's perspective, having invested everything in nuclear weapons over the past decade, he clearly needs his own achievements. Therefore, what was enshrined in the constitution this time is his achievement. Statements like these are emerging. For example, Choe Ryong Hae, Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme People's Assembly, reported that the subject changed from "Comrade Kim Jong Il" in the 2012 constitutional preamble, which stated that Kim Jong Il created the nuclear-weapon state, to Kim Jong Un in the 2023 constitution. He stated that since the announcement of the state nuclear armament policy law in 2012, North Korea has undergone a dramatic transformation over the past year.

To summarize, North Korea's current nuclear capabilities, making it a de facto nuclear-weapon state, are an achievement of Kim Jong Un. Therefore, the subject, which was Kim Jong Il in 2012, has been changed to Kim Jong Un in the 2023 constitution to emphasize Kim Jong Un's accomplishments. In other words, due to a lack of political legitimacy, Kim Jong Un must continuously demonstrate his achievements through nuclear capabilities. Second, it seeks to solidify its position as a nuclear-weapon state once again. The inclusion of 'irreversible' is the highest legal status. It aims to eliminate any discussion of denuclearization itself.

In this regard, it is also institutionally preparing for direct negotiations with the United States. I believe North Korea will clearly prolong the situation until the US presidential election next year, if they can hold out. However, due to internal resilience issues, things might change. Regardless, the important point is that North Korea will undoubtedly appear at the negotiating table with the United States with the goal of being recognized as a nuclear-weapon state and having sanctions lifted. In preparation for that negotiation, they will argue that it is unacceptable for us to demand denuclearization when they have clearly established themselves as a nuclear-weapon state in the constitution, beyond nuclear legislation. North Korea is likely seeking to establish institutional mechanisms to achieve a state of nuclear arms control, where they partially limit and reduce nuclear weapons. However, I also discern another aspect here: a lack of confidence from Kim Jong Un.

Why? If North Korea truly possessed nuclear capabilities and had enshrined it in the 2012 constitutional preamble and enacted nuclear legislation last September, why would it be necessary to embed it in the constitution again? As I mentioned, it serves to further emphasize his legitimacy, and that aspect is certainly present. However, simultaneously, it demonstrates a lack of confidence in the Kim Jong Un regime. By embedding it in the constitution, they are signaling that it cannot be changed. No country in the world does this. This, in itself, is evidence that the current situation facing the Kim Jong Un regime is far from easy.

How North Korea will effectively adjust and manage "living with COVID" will likely be a significant challenge for North Korea. In that sense, the current actions of North Korea, which appear to be a reaction to the increasing uncertainty about the future and the growing challenges, are leading to the firm establishment of North Korea's nuclear status in the constitution. That is my assessment. I will conclude here for today. Please remember to like and subscribe. Thank you.

How North Korea will effectively adjust and manage "living with COVID" will likely be a significant challenge for North Korea. In that sense, the current actions of North Korea, which appear to be a reaction to the increasing uncertainty about the future and the growing challenges, are leading to the firm establishment of North Korea's nuclear status in the constitution. That is my assessment. I will conclude here for today. Please remember to like and subscribe. Thank you.