[North Korea and the World] North Korean Regime's Intensified Ideological Control and Its Implications

YouTube Link: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ewpFEa4LO5Y

Park Won-gon, Director of EAI's Center for North Korean Studies (Professor at Ewha Womans University), assesses that North Korea has intensified ideological struggle under the 'frontal breakthrough' line following the Hanoi summit breakdown, and that the level of control and punishment has become severe starting in 2020. Director Park explains that ideological laws such as the 'Law on the Rejection of Anti-Socialist Ideology and Culture,' the 'Law on Guaranteeing Youth Education,' and the 'Law on Protecting Pyongyang Dialect' demonstrate that the North Korean regime is unable to control the influence of Hallyu (Korean Wave), analyzing this as a reaction to North Korea's closed-door policies.

■ Park Won-gonDirector, Center for North Korean Studies, East Asia Institute. Professor, Department of North Korean Studies, Ewha Womans University.

■ Managed and Edited by: Park Ji-soo, EAI Researcher

    Inquiries: 02 2277 1683 (ext. 208) | jspark@eai.or.kr

Video Transcript

The fact that such strict penalty provisions are included in the law suggests that the North Korean regime is quite anxious about this. It indicates that North Korea is anxious and serious enough to include such matters in legislation. Hello, and thank you for joining Park Won-gon's North Korea and the World. Today, we will continue discussing internal affairs in North Korea from our previous session. Last time, I offered my interpretation regarding Kim Ju-ae's appearance in connection with the fundamental characteristics of the North Korean regime, and whether she would be the successor in the fourth hereditary succession. Today, I will discuss ideological control within North Korea. This is also a very serious issue and is believed to have various implications.

North Korea has always maintained ideological control, right? Yes, that's correct. Since the establishment of the so-called Democratic People's Republic of Korea on September 9, 1948, which is referred to as National Foundation Day, ideological control has been the core of North Korea. However, the intensification of ideological control observed in the last three years is different from the past. It began in December 2019 with the 7th Central Committee's 5th Plenary Meeting. I have discussed this in a previous video.

Prior to 2018-2019, North Korea attempted what was called the Korean Peninsula Peace Process. This led to meetings between former U.S. President Trump and Kim Jong Un, and in fact, they met three times. President Moon Jae-in and Kim Jong Un also met in April 2018 at the Panmunjom Declaration, and in September 2018 at the Pyongyang Joint Declaration. They also had a brief meeting in June 2019. They met once in 2018 as well. There were about four meetings. Kim Jong Un also met with Putin and Xi Jinping multiple times. Situations that were previously unseen were unfolding.

In October 2019, North Korea concluded its last working-level meeting with the United States in Stockholm, Sweden, and effectively broke off the talks. Following this, in December of the same year, they held a plenary meeting and announced their new line. That line is the 'frontal breakthrough' strategy. The 'frontal breakthrough' strategy has four components: self-reliance, ideological purity, strengthening nuclear capabilities, and a long-term approach. Previously, North Korea had attempted to improve relations through denuclearization talks, engaging with South Korea, the United States, and the international community. However, from late 2019, these attempts were halted. The mention of a 'long-term approach' naturally implies an antagonistic policy towards South Korea and the United States. Consequently, internal control must be strengthened. In 2018 and 2019, North Korea, which referred to the U.S. as its sworn enemy, is now... The full text is available online.

In December 2020, the Law on the Rejection of Anti-Socialist Ideology and Culture was passed. The content is quite extensive, but it essentially states the following: Article 27 stipulates that the dissemination of South Korean ideology and culture will be considered a crime. While this is not entirely new, it specifies that viewing, listening to, or possessing South Korean movies, music, books, songs, or drawings will be punished with 5 to 10 years of correctional labor. Correctional labor means being in prison and working for all hours except sleep.

Article 28 also includes provisions regarding the dissemination of enemy ideology and culture. 'Enemy country' naturally refers to South Korea. Therefore, if someone disseminates such recordings, edited materials, or books to many people for collective viewing, they will be sentenced to life imprisonment or even execution. In North Korea, there is a generation akin to South Korea's MZ generation, known as the Jangmadang generation. They are highly exposed to foreign culture. They listen to a lot of music, for instance. If they watch something and show it to their friends, it constitutes dissemination.

This can lead to sentences ranging from life imprisonment to execution. When this law was first announced, I strongly felt that the North Korean authorities could no longer prevent this. This is because the numerous cases that have occurred are intuitively evident. It is well-known that Pyongyang and the North Korean regime have made significant efforts to block Hallyu. Nevertheless, the fact that they passed a law with such strict penalty provisions clearly demonstrates that the North Korean regime cannot stop Hallyu. I believe this is a testament to their inability to control it.

Following this, in September 2021, North Korea passed the Law on Guaranteeing Youth Education. North Korea has a concept of prioritizing youth. This is understandable, as youth are the backbone of any nation and will lead the country in the future. If the youth are well-raised, the nation will prosper. North Korea shares this sentiment, emphasizing youth to ensure the revolutionary cause is carried forward. In this context, they prioritize youth. This law, though extensive, includes provisions such as Article 39 on 'Appearance.' It states that youth must always maintain a neat and elegant appearance in their hairstyles and clothing, in accordance with our nation's fine traditions and socialist lifestyle.

While the above is understandable, the idea of codifying it into law is unimaginable to us. Article 41 further elaborates on prohibited actions for youth. These include distorting North Korean songs, dancing in non-traditional ways, using foreign-sounding speech or writing styles, and adopting non-traditional clothing and hairstyles. Essentially, it means punishing any imitation of South Korean styles. It is a well-known fact that due to the influence of Hallyu, younger generations in North Korea, particularly in Pyongyang, are increasingly imitating South Korean hairstyles and fashion. Now, North Korea, recognizing the seriousness of this, has passed the Law on Guaranteeing Youth Education to prevent it. This law, too, demonstrates the powerful influence of South Korea's Hallyu, as acknowledged by North Korea itself. The final law, passed on January 18, 2023, is the Law on Protecting Pyongyang Dialect.

The content of this law is quite alarming. Article 1 explicitly states the goal of fundamentally eliminating the phenomenon of using 'puppet language.' 'Puppet language,' as mentioned earlier, refers to South Korean speech. The law aims to prohibit its use, implying that it is widely spoken. Article 2 defines 'puppet language' as a mixture of vocabulary, grammar, and intonation that has become Westernized, Japanized, or Sinicized, thereby completely losing the essence of the Korean language. The law uses harsh terms like 'degenerate and disgusting trash language.'

This is how the law describes it: 'degenerate and disgusting trash language.' It is important to understand this. Article 19, under Section 2, prohibits 'imitating puppet-style forms of address.' To ensure accuracy, I will read it verbatim: 'Addressing someone other than a blood relative as 'oppa' or adding 'nim' after a job title is considered imitating puppet-style forms of address and should not be done.' Do you understand what this means? It refers to practices like these.

This has been happening for some time now. In South Korea, even after marriage, wives, especially if younger, often call their husbands 'oppa.' North Korea, influenced by Hallyu, has seen married couples begin to use this form of address. Among younger people, it is also common to casually call someone 'oppa' during dating, or when there is an age difference, even among friends. Similarly, adding 'nim' after a job title is also influenced by South Korea. The law prohibits these practices. In North Korea, boyfriends and girlfriends are typically referred to as 'comrade' (dongji, dongmu).

The law states, and I quote: 'While the term 'oppa' may be used until one is a member of the Children's Union, after becoming a member of the Youth Union, one must use 'dongji' or 'dongmu'.' What do you think? The fact that such provisions are included in the law indicates North Korea's anxiety and the seriousness of the situation. It also highlights the immense influence of language. The influence of South Korean language on North Korea signifies the collapse of the ideological control that North Korea so highly values. However, the fact that even such specific terms are regulated is not something we are accustomed to. There is also Article 22, which prohibits 'imitating puppet-style intonation.' It describes this as 'servile, affected, and disgusting intonation with elongated, drawn-out pronunciations.' Is our intonation like that?

Ri Chun-hee, a famous North Korean announcer, speaks in a very low, bass voice. This sounds very unnatural to us. However, in an interview with a Taiwanese media outlet, Ri Chun-hee stated that she tries to speak as naturally as possible. Perhaps this is what North Koreans consider natural. It differs from our way of speaking. Furthermore, Article 23 prohibits 'giving children puppet-style names.' North Korean citizens are forbidden from giving their children 'degenerate' South Korean-style names. North Korea favors names related to steel and iron. Many names start or end with such characters. However, these names differ from South Korean names. As North Korea begins to be influenced by South Korea, some people might choose South Korean-style names, which is now prohibited.

The law imposes legal responsibility for these violations. For instance, speaking or writing in 'puppet language' can result in a correctional labor sentence of 6 years or more, or life imprisonment or execution in severe cases. Simply using such language can lead to such severe penalties. There is also the offense of 'disseminating puppet language.' If someone teaches this 'puppet language' to others, they face a correctional labor sentence of 10 years or more.

This can also lead to life imprisonment or execution in severe cases. To summarize what I have discussed today: I reiterate that North Korea's enactment of such laws is a testament to its inability to prevent the cultural infiltration from South Korea. Culture has immense power. Conversely, this can also be seen as a backlash against North Korea's increasingly closed-door policies. We must observe how this situation unfolds. It is truly regrettable that many North Korean residents face such severe punishments for using certain expressions.

That is all for today. Please subscribe and like. Thank you.

We will conclude here for today. Please subscribe and like. Thank you.