[North Korea and the World] Northeast Asian Situation and South Korea's Response After the North Korea-Russia Summit

YouTube Link: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Cm7vn8CzcCQ

Park Won-gon, Director of the EAI Center for North Korean Studies and Professor at Ewha Womans University, emphasizes that as cooperation between North Korea and Russia accelerates following their summit, South Korea must address the new security threats posed by North Korea through strategic communication with China, which maintains a certain distance from both North Korea and Russia. Director Park suggests that if Russia transfers key military technology to North Korea in exchange for conventional weapons, it will directly lead to the development of North Korea's weapon systems for attacks on the South. Therefore, South Korea must clearly establish 'red lines' for North Korea-Russia cooperation, pursue Russia diplomacy based on national interests, and simultaneously respond to new threats from North Korea, which is strengthening military cooperation with Russia, through collaboration with the ROK-U.S., ROK-Japan, and NATO allies.

■ Park Won-gon_Director, Center for North Korean Studies, East Asia Institute. Professor, Department of North Korean Studies, Ewha Womans University.

■ Editor: Park Ji-soo, EAI Research Fellow

    Inquiries: 02 2277 1683 (ext. 208) | jspark@eai.or.kr

Video Transcript

Then what would Russia have received in return? There are many speculations about this, even mentioning nuclear propulsion submarine technology. I believe that is impossible. Because even for a country like South Korea with excellent shipbuilding capabilities, it would take over 10 years to fully transfer nuclear propulsion submarine technology from the U.S., and possibly longer to deploy it operationally. Given North Korea's situation and lack of shipbuilding capacity, even if technology were transferred, it would be difficult to implement.

Hello, and thank you for watching Park Won-gon's North Korea and the World. Today, we will continue our evaluation and analysis of the North Korea-Russia summit from our previous discussion. Given the wide range of analyses emerging, it is crucial to navigate through them. Before we delve into the main topic, one notable event was North Korea launching missiles just one hour before the North Korea-Russia summit. Specifically, on the 13th, between 11:43 AM and 11:53 AM, two short-range ballistic missiles were launched from Pyongyang. One traveled 600 km, and the other approximately 300-something kilometers. The confirmation of erratic flight patterns suggests these missiles are likely North Korea's versions of the Iskander (KN23) and ATACMS (KN24) missiles.

Both are tactical nuclear missiles capable of carrying nuclear warheads. The reason I mention this is that one of the characteristics of the recent North Korea-Russia summit is the breakdown of existing military and diplomatic practices by North Korea. As I mentioned last time, the fact that they proceeded with the summit despite the U.S. recognizing and warning about it indicates a rejection of their established diplomatic norms and a move towards new forms of engagement. This missile provocation is also very novel. Historically, when the North Korean leader left Pyongyang or traveled abroad, North Korea would remain subdued to avoid escalating or worsening the situation, as Pyongyang would be temporarily empty. However, this time, they provocatively launched missiles, which is unprecedented.

In my judgment, this has several implications. Firstly, as I briefly mentioned last time, it demonstrates confidence in their nuclear capabilities. Because they possess nuclear weapons, they are signaling that they can initiate nuclear war at any time if their security is threatened. North Korea passed its nuclear law in September last year, which outlines five conditions for nuclear use. The second condition explicitly states that they will use nuclear weapons if their leadership is threatened. Therefore, if there is any threat to Kim Jong Un's safety during his travels abroad, it would be considered an immediate nuclear war, serving as a warning.

Secondly, it shows that they have sufficient control over their nuclear weapons. The nuclear law stipulates that the Chairman of the State Affairs Commission has complete control over all nuclear weapons. As you all know, Kim Jong Un is the Chairman of the State Affairs Commission of North Korea. Therefore, even if Kim Jong Un is abroad, he retains control over nuclear missiles, demonstrating once again that they have complete control over their nuclear arsenal.

This is clearly a very aggressive and concerning situation. Let's return to the North Korea-Russia summit and analyze a few aspects further. First, what kind of deal was struck between North Korea and Russia? While it hasn't been publicly disclosed, and only implicit statements have been made, it is difficult to ascertain the exact details. Therefore, we can only speculate. As mentioned, the primary driver for the North Korea-Russia summit was Russia's shortage of artillery shells needed for the war in Ukraine.

This is a shortage of conventional weapons. Thus, it is highly probable that they received support for such weapon systems from North Korea. More importantly, what did Russia offer in return? There are numerous speculations, even mentioning nuclear propulsion submarine technology. I believe that is impossible. Because even for a country like South Korea with excellent shipbuilding capabilities, it would take over 10 years to fully transfer nuclear propulsion submarine technology from the U.S.

and possibly longer to deploy it operationally. You are aware of AUKUS, where the U.S. and the UK agreed to provide two nuclear submarines to Australia, with a target year of 2030. Operational deployment is expected by the mid-2030s. Given North Korea's situation and lack of shipbuilding capacity, even if technology were transferred, it would take 15 to 20 years from now, which is a very difficult scenario. Furthermore, regarding key technologies for ICBMs, such as re-entry technology, Russia has never transferred such core weapon systems or technologies to its allies since the Soviet era. Therefore, the possibility remains very low.

Therefore, I believe the possibility remains very low. So, what level of assistance might have been provided? Firstly, as I mentioned, food, energy, and fertilizer, which North Korea urgently needs to overcome its economic difficulties, are all major Russian exports. In addition, from a military perspective, there was a visit to the aircraft factory. Russia has a factory that produces basic aircraft and fighter jets. It is difficult to call the fighter jets North Korea possesses its main force; they are primarily MiG-29s, which are nearly 40 years old.

In reality, these aircraft cannot perform effectively because they require parts and continuous upgrades, which are not being adequately provided. Therefore, if Russia were to provide assistance in terms of weapon support, it might involve parts to replace the aging components of the MiG-29s, as Russia is known to possess a significant number of these parts. The possibility of receiving advanced fighter jets like the Su-35 is, in my opinion, almost nonexistent.

Therefore, our assessment is that there are limitations to the transfer of weapon system technology. However, it is crucial to remember that any form of weapon provision to North Korea is a clear violation of UN Security Council resolutions. Furthermore, North Korea's export of weapons is also a clear violation of UN resolutions. For instance, international law prohibits the export of items such as tanks, artillery shells, and small arms, including grenades. Therefore, most of the items exchanged as corresponding measures in the discussions between North Korea and Russia are violations of UN sanctions resolutions.

In the case of food, Russia has already implicitly suggested humanitarian aid, which could be an exception to some extent. However, concerning crude oil, there are clear UN Security Council resolutions that prohibit exceeding certain limits. They are required to report their support and exports to the sanctions committee each time. Therefore, activities like ship-to-ship transfers, where goods are secretly transferred in open waters to circumvent quotas, are also clearly bound by sanctions resolutions. Additionally, there are restrictions on fertilizer, as some of it can be diverted for military purposes. Ultimately, most of the actions taken by North Korea and Russia are in violation of UN sanctions resolutions.

However, a statement made during the summit that has caused some consternation was from the Kremlin spokesperson: "If necessary, we are prepared to discuss procedural issues related to the Security Council with the North Korean side." This has generated considerable discussion and varied interpretations. The phrasing is somewhat ambiguous, but "procedural issues related to the Security Council" can be interpreted as referring to the sanctions currently imposed on North Korea. If so, it implies that Russia would actively work to prevent further sanctions against North Korea, which it is already doing. Therefore, what we can infer is that Russia might take some action regarding existing sanctions. However, this is also very difficult, as any change to UN Security Council sanctions resolutions would require the formation of a new UN Security Council and the adoption of additional resolutions. This would involve easing or repealing existing sanctions, which the permanent members – the U.S., France, and the UK – would not agree to. Russia is likely aware of this.

Therefore, another possibility is that they will simply disregard existing sanctions. This would be a public declaration that Russia no longer intends to abide by sanctions. However, the question is whether they would go this far. If Russia were to do so, it would entail serious consequences. Firstly, Russia's legitimacy and authority as a permanent member of the UN Security Council would be challenged. Disregarding resolutions they themselves agreed to, without proper procedural justification, would undermine the very existence of permanent Security Council members. This would be a grave challenge to the UN Security Council and could even trivialize the UN itself. Therefore, we must recognize that the North Korea-Russia summit has a significant impact on the international order. Lastly, let's discuss China. I touched upon China two weeks ago, and during the entire summit period, China clearly maintained a distance. Questions were repeatedly raised at Chinese Foreign Ministry press briefings, and the consistent response was that this is a bilateral issue between North Korea and Russia.

This is because it remains uncomfortable for China. The North Korea-Russia meeting is not just a meeting; it is occurring within the context of the Ukraine war. If China were to become involved, it could significantly disrupt the global order it envisions. As strategic competition with the U.S. intensifies, European countries are crucial for China, and it seeks to expand economic cooperation through them. This is evident in the visits of the German Chancellor and the French President to Beijing. However, if China were to become involved in the Ukraine war, it would pose an existential threat to most European NATO countries. Therefore, China maintains a distance. What we can learn and understand from this is that North Korea, China, and Russia can experience gaps and rifts based on their respective national interests. While this will become clearer as events unfold, China is uncomfortable with the growing alignment between North Korea and Russia. Additionally, there have been some unusual developments in North Korea-China relations recently.

On July 27th, for instance, during what North Korea calls Victory Day, delegations from China and Russia brought personal letters from Putin and Xi Jinping, respectively. The letter from Putin was formally received by the Minister of Defense and delivered to Kim Jong Un with full protocol. However, the letter from Xi Jinping was received in a hallway next to the banquet hall by the Chinese delegation. This was quite perplexing. Furthermore, a Chinese delegation attended North Korea's founding anniversary on September 9th. North Korea announced that the banquet was held on September 9th, the day Kim Jong Un was in Pyongyang. On September 11th, Kim Jong Un departed for Russia, but he did not attend the banquet. There are many other such instances. In any case, China is understandably uncomfortable with the alignment of North Korea and Russia, especially in the context of the Ukraine war.

So, what should South Korea do? I will offer some policy recommendations. Firstly, it is important to note two significant statements made by Russia during this summit. Russia indicated it would explain its North Korea-Russia summit outcomes to South Korea, and it warned that South Korea's provision of weapons to Ukraine would lead to a rupture in ROK-Russia relations. We need to interpret these statements carefully.

First, we must actively communicate our position to Russia through all available diplomatic channels, both public and private, and persuade them. We need to draw a line, stating that the transfer of Russian weapon systems or technology to North Korea is unacceptable because such weapons would be used for attacks against South Korea. Furthermore, this is a complex issue: what should be done if North Korean artillery shells are indeed transferred to Ukraine? We must thoroughly consider such scenarios. However, South Korea's red line, as mentioned, is when Russia transfers critical weapon systems to North Korea that could be used for attacks against South Korea. Crossing this line would necessitate a response. The response should involve uniting with the ROK-U.S., ROK-Japan, and NATO allies to counter Russia and North Korea. This is the overarching principle. However, it is crucial to note that initial efforts should focus on diplomatic engagement.

China also holds a different stance, and communication is becoming more extensive and reaching a certain level. We need to intensify this communication to ensure that both South Korea and China adopt the position that North Korea and Russia should not cooperate in the context of the Ukraine war. I have discussed North Korea and Russia. I believe the issue of North Korea-Russia relations is critically important and will continue to require our close attention. Thank you.

China also holds a different stance, and communication is becoming more extensive and reaching a certain level. We need to intensify this communication to ensure that both South Korea and China adopt the position that North Korea and Russia should not cooperate in the context of the Ukraine war. I have discussed North Korea and Russia. I believe the issue of North Korea-Russia relations is critically important and will continue to require our close attention. Thank you.

I have discussed North Korea and Russia. I believe the issue of North Korea-Russia relations is critically important and will continue to require our close attention. Thank you.