North Korea and the World: The Korean Peninsula on the Brink of War

YouTube Link: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=c5PMVt5onxg

Park Won-gon, Director of EAI's North Korea Research Center and Professor at Ewha Womans University, analyzes the implications of the 2018 North Korea-U.S. summit joint statement and its impact on future denuclearization talks. Director Park assesses the joint statement as a victory for North Korea, reflecting its perspective that denuclearization can only proceed after improvements in North Korea-U.S. relations and the withdrawal of U.S. extended deterrence towards South Korea. He criticizes the Trump administration for prioritizing its political interests over peace on the Korean Peninsula and North Korea's denuclearization. Furthermore, Director Park advises that South Korea must carefully prepare countermeasures, as it will likely seek to resume negotiations on the nuclear issue from the basis of the Singapore agreement.

■ Park Won-gonDirector of the North Korea Research Center at the East Asia Institute. Professor of North Korean Studies at Ewha Womans University.

■ Managed and Edited by: Park Ji-soo, EAI Researcher

Inquiries: 02 2277 1683 (ext. 208) | jspark@eai.or.kr

Video Transcript

Looking back, it was effectively a North Korean victory. We must be cautious. If North Korea initiates dialogue and negotiations again, they will undoubtedly bring this up. Then, we must seriously consider how starting from this point aligns with our understanding of North Korea's denuclearization. Hello, and welcome to North Korea and the World. Today, I intend to look back at the past. This is because we will be discussing North Korea's nuclear issue today, and what was the significance of 2018 and 2019, prior to 2020? And how should the events of 2018 and 2019 be understood in the current context? The Kim Jong Un era has provided crucial insights into North Korea's nuclear capabilities, and I believe there is still significant continuity. I am confident that dialogue and negotiations on the nuclear issue will undoubtedly commence in the future.

Therefore, I believe it is crucial to reconfirm what happened in the past and what North Korea's stance was. Many people likely remember 2018, specifically June 12, 2018, when President Trump, the U.S. leader at the time, met with Chairman Kim Jong Un of North Korea for the first time in history. Regardless of positive or negative interpretations, the summit between the U.S. and North Korea holds historical significance. It was an unprecedented event, especially from the perspective of a North Korea researcher. So, how did we get to that point? While there are many possible explanations, I believe the 'Trump variable' played a significant role among various factors in 2017. As you all know, former U.S. President Trump was a highly unique president. To put it mildly, he approached issues with a very different perspective and methodology compared to previous presidents.

Many documented 2017, but at that time, President Trump directed extremely strong rhetoric towards North Korea, such as "fire and fury" and stating North Korea would be "totally destroyed." He also called Kim Jong Un "Rocket Man." These were unprecedented statements from a U.S. president. This is a confirmed fact. In 2017, North Korea's Ministry of Foreign Affairs invited U.S. journalists to Pyongyang. The first question they asked was, "We cannot understand your President Trump at all." They then asked the U.S. journalists, "What do you think President Trump is thinking?" This indicates that North Korea was indeed tense because a president unlike any they had dealt with before had emerged. Subsequently, starting in September, the U.S. conducted maximum-level military exercises in October and November.

The level of military exercises involved deploying carrier strike groups to the East Sea for joint training with South Korea. The deployment of an aircraft carrier strike group signifies a level of military readiness typically seen when the U.S. is preparing for war. The fact that such a deployment occurred suggests that North Korea could have perceived the possibility of war as very high, and that preparations for war were underway. Furthermore, U.S. fighter jets and strategic bombers capable of delivering nuclear weapons would likely have been detected by North Korean radar. They flew along the East Sea, not crossing into North Korean airspace, but flying parallel to the Military Demarcation Line before exiting into the West Sea. From North Korea's perspective, this constituted a significant threat. In typical military operations, an attack would involve entering the sea and then crossing over from the West Sea to attack Pyongyang. To that extent, North Korea could have genuinely believed that Trump's U.S. might attack them. As evidence of this, consider the incident I mentioned earlier, where

North Korea itself invited U.S. journalists through its Ministry of Foreign Affairs to ask questions. On November 29, 2017, North Korea declared the completion of its "state nuclear force." This announcement followed the launch of the Hwasong-15 intercontinental ballistic missile. However, the Hwasong-15 launch occurred around the time the Olympics were beginning. During that period, Kim Yong Nam and Kim Yo Jong, Kim Jong Un's sister, visited South Korea. Following this, inter-Korean relations began to thaw, leading to the historic first meeting between the U.S. and North Korea on June 12, referred to by North Korea as the "U.S.-North Korea summit," resulting in a joint statement. From today's perspective, this joint statement from the summit is effectively a North Korean victory.

This is because, as you can see on the screen, on June 11, the day before the June 12 joint statement, North Korea published a statement through the Rodong Sinmun. The statement outlined what North Korea expected from the upcoming U.S.-North Korea summit and the joint statement. The expectations and goals articulated by North Korea precisely matched the joint statement released the following day. The order of priorities was also unchanged, and the wording was identical. I recall that day vividly: on June 12, television continuously broadcast images of Trump and Kim Jong Un signing various documents. South Korean journalists present there sent me these documents, calling them the agreed-upon text, asking for my immediate analysis before the official announcement.

After reviewing the initial documents, my first reaction was, "Please provide the next document." I assumed there must be a more detailed document accompanying the signed text. However, the South Korean journalist informed me that this was all there was. The document I received was in English. Upon re-reading it, I recognized the wording and the order of points. I then checked the Rodong Sinmun from the previous day and confirmed that the content matched exactly what you see here. While there were differences in expression between English and Korean, the order and content were identical. First, the improvement of U.S.-North Korea relations, which North Korea consistently advocates for, was listed. Second, the establishment of a permanent and stable peace regime on the Korean Peninsula. Third, the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula. Even from these points alone, one must question

whether the U.S.-North Korea joint statement of June 12 was truly a proper agreement. This statement reflects North Korea's position. Another characteristic of this statement is that the points are numbered. Typically, joint statements are not numbered. The numbering '1, 2, 3' suggests a reflection of priorities. In my interpretation, it implies that North Korea's denuclearization is possible only after the improvement of U.S.-North Korea relations (first) and the establishment of a stable peace regime on the Korean Peninsula (second).

These preceding conditions could be attached. At the time, I was deeply concerned. I hoped my interpretation was wrong, but it was soon proven correct. Shortly after the U.S.-North Korea Singapore agreement, then-U.S. Secretary of State Pompeo visited Pyongyang on July 5-7, 2018. He did not meet with Kim Jong Un and returned. Upon arrival at Osan Air Base in South Korea, North Korea's Ministry of Foreign Affairs spokesperson issued a statement criticizing Secretary Pompeo for his "gangster-like" demands for denuclearization. The statement detailed various points, but as mentioned earlier, it directly challenged the Singapore agreement, questioning how denuclearization could be discussed without first addressing improvements in U.S.-North Korea relations and the peace regime. Secretary Pompeo had demanded complete, verifiable, and irreversible denuclearization (CVID) from North Korea, and North Korea's Ministry of Foreign Affairs clearly raised objections.

For accuracy, I will read North Korea's statement verbatim: "The Singapore summit and meeting were undermined by the U.S. bringing only unilateral and gangster-like demands for denuclearization, such as CVID, without regard for the spirit of the summit."

My feared interpretation was correct. North Korea had a clear intention and will through the U.S.-North Korea Singapore agreement, and by assigning priorities, it embedded the message that denuclearization could only occur after its demands were met. Later, details emerged about this. One characteristic of the Trump administration was that President Trump famously fired key aides, sometimes through Twitter. These aides would then publish memoirs, typically within months to a year, detailing the events. The memoirs reveal that Kim Yong Chol, North Korea's negotiating partner in the Singapore summit, did not agree to specific details desired by the U.S. until the very end. It is reported that Secretary Pompeo then told President Trump, "North Korea is not agreeing to anything. What should we do?"

President Trump reportedly responded, "Just sign a meaningless document, take pictures, declare victory, and leave." This is corroborated by testimony. This indicates that President Trump prioritized his own political interests over peace on the Korean Peninsula and North Korea's denuclearization. A similar situation repeated itself at the Hanoi summit in 2019. In any case, this stance led to the issuance of statements and agreements that aligned with North Korea's desires.

Finally, let me add one more point. The Singapore joint statement mentioned the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula, which sparked considerable debate. I, for one, argued immediately that "denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula" was fundamentally different from what we understood as North Korea's denuclearization or what Secretary Pompeo referred to as CVID. North Korea's definition of denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula, a concept discussed since previous generations, hinges on the U.S. withdrawing its extended deterrence, including nuclear assets, provided to South Korea. Only then, North Korea argued, could it proceed with a certain level of denuclearization. This premise fundamentally differed from our understanding of North Korea's denuclearization. There was significant debate, and many offered alternative interpretations of my argument. However, North Korea itself resolved this ambiguity.

On December 20, 2018, North Korea issued a commentary through the Korean Central News Agency stating that the June 12 U.S.-North Korea joint statement clearly mentioned "denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula," not "denuclearization of North Korea," which could not be found even with a thorough search. It then defined "denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula" as follows: "The complete elimination of the U.S. nuclear threat to Korea is the definition of denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula." Therefore, in conclusion, the Singapore agreement of June 12, 2018, ultimately contained everything North Korea desired.

The reason I am revisiting this past is that even at the 8th Party Congress in 2021 and up to the present, North Korea denies everything regarding its relationship with the U.S., yet still refers to the Singapore agreement as a meaningful accord. We must be cautious. If North Korea initiates dialogue and negotiations again, they will undoubtedly bring this up. Then, we must seriously consider how starting from this point aligns with our understanding of North Korea's denuclearization.

Today, I have presented my interpretation and the significance of the U.S.-North Korea Singapore agreement from June 2018. Many events transpired during the Korean Peninsula peace process in 2018 and 2019. I will share those details with you as time permits. Please subscribe and like. Thank you.