[EAI Academy, 5th Term] ⑧ The Young in the Future: Dreams of Korea in the 21st Century

YouTube link: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=B5-KmHTBr6s&si=OGRDY3A9eEHyzaOc

■ Ha Young-sunis concurrently the Chairman of the East Asia Institute (EAI) and Professor Emeritus at Seoul National University. He served as a member of the Senior Advisory Council for the Inter-Korean Summit Preparation Committee and the Presidential Advisory Council on National Security (2008-2016). He holds bachelor's and master's degrees in Diplomacy from Seoul National University and a Ph.D. in International Politics from the University of Washington. He was a professor in the Department of Diplomacy at Seoul National University (1980-2012) and was a visiting fellow at Princeton University's Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs and the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute. His recent books and edited volumes include "World Politics of Love: War and Peace" (2019), "A Correct View of Korean Diplomatic History: Tradition and Modernity" (2019), and "US-China Competition in Building the Asia-Pacific Order" (2017).

Video Transcript

The title, 'The Young in the Future: Dreams of Korea,' is a bit of a parody. It wasn't initially intended to be a book titled 'The Young in History.' At first, while studying Korean diplomatic history, I came across stories about the youth of figures like Yu Gil-jun in their teens and twenties. This led to the idea of collecting these stories for a lecture, which was a hope of the East Asia Institute. The book wasn't published then, but the lecture series 'The Young in History,' covering seven to eight topics, was held. Someone suggested it would be a shame to discard it and proposed publishing it as a book. The people included in the book are arranged chronologically from the 18th century: Park Ji-won, Dasan Jeong Yak-yong, Park Gyu-su, Yu Gil-jun, Kim Yang-su, and Ahn Jae-hong, whom you may or may not be familiar with. Their youth during the Japanese colonial period, and after liberation, figures like Yi Yong-i...

personally, Yi Hyeong was also my teacher. The last part included colleagues and juniors with whom I studied at the time. For convenience, the photo is of me in my twenties. Therefore, today's talk will likely correspond to Chapter 9 or 10. The reason is that the people in 'The Young in History' were not just living through their times; they had dreams.

If you ask whether they achieved those dreams, most likely, they did not. If they had achieved them, perhaps they wouldn't be remembered as figures we should commemorate. Therefore, as they lived through their times, perhaps their reality was not like a dream. If reality were like a dream, they would just live happily, wouldn't they? But since reality was not like a dream, they pursued dreams. What dreams did they have in their respective eras? So, although it's about their times, it's all about the future of their times. They were the 'young in the future.' In the 18th century, figures like Park Ji-won and Dasan, who were in positions of power under Jeongjo, while the Noron faction had dominated for a long time, or Park Gyu-su, whose family was part of the elite, equivalent to today's Gangnam elite, did not take the state examination.

Dasan, as you know, was someone who sharpened his sword, so to speak, to participate in Jeongjo's politics. It's similar for all of them. In the 19th century, intellectuals in newspapers naturally pursued their dreams, and they had them. In the post-Cold War era, in a sense, it's similar. Relatively speaking, compared to the 18th century, you are likely to experience the happiest, objectively and physically, period in your twenties or thirties. Perhaps you might think, 'Do I need to dream?' You might be a generation that could think that. However, the fact that you came here at 6:30 PM on a busy late August day, when the heat hasn't ended, suggests there's still some lingering desire. You want to have some vague dream. I will assume that's why you came. So, what kind of dream should we have?

This is about the 21st century. It seems the previous seven lectures were conducted in a certain way. The staff guiding the session mentioned there were no questions this time, unlike previous sessions where about half the attendees asked questions. This is paradoxically good, as it implies a lack of dreams. Therefore, I must be the one to provide them, meaning I will ask the questions. I will make you regret not asking questions! It's always easier to attack than to defend. Attackers know where to strike, while defenders don't know where the attack will come from. I've prepared two hypothetical questions, but they are also quite vague. So, for the first hour or so, I intend to raise some issues.

I haven't reviewed the previous seven hours in detail, so I don't know how they were conducted. If I had been asked to read them for reference, I would know the answers. Has anyone here been to the venue? Has anyone seen the cover? Has anyone read the assistant guide's notes? If you've read them and know the answers, then I'll have to proceed assuming you have no prior preparation. Because in the reading material, the last chapter says something like this: If one wants to understand international politics, is it really possible to grasp it by reading textbooks or listening to lectures? Such cases are very rare.

Instead, it's more likely to receive a significant shock. What form of shock would be more impactful? The last chapter of 'The Shock of the Real' was not originally a lecture but an appendix to 'World Politics of Love.' It discusses the complex thoughts I had while looking at twelve pictures or buildings, which perhaps provided the greatest stimulus for my thinking about international politics. Has anyone here been to London? Not a single person out of twenty-six. I felt shy about going to London. How far have you traveled on your backpacking trips? Have you been to Hyde Park in London? Do you remember Hyde Park? Usually, people go to Hyde Park as a matter of course.

While London has many world-class parks, no one had previously informed me that the Serpentine Gallery was located there. I just crossed the road and then crossed back. What surprised me was that, as I recall, it was exactly ten years ago, a very hot day in 2013. I walked to the end of Hyde Park, crossed the road, and found this structure. I had this thought the moment I saw it: I deeply regretted it. Because the war ended, and then the post-war period began, lasting nearly 30 years. If I went there in 2013, it had been about 20 years since then.

For over 20 years, during that time, I had a theme that the world, which aimed to be postmodern, would change from simple order to complex order. I explained this in various ways. Most of what I will discuss today is related to that. When you reach the age of sixty or one hundred, and the year is 2100, you will understand that the strange things I heard on August 31, 2023, were indeed the reality I came to live in. To explain this complexity, from the 1990s to the present, I have been engaged in proselytizing, but most people find it difficult to grasp, perhaps understanding it vaguely. Even after listening for an hour, you might find yourselves lost.

But why do I feel both envy and regret? Because this is what I thought: International politics seems to be heading in this direction in the 21st century. So, I began to investigate why such a temporary structure was built in front of the museum. It's not something you can see all the time. What is it? The Serpentine Gallery annually selects one architect from around the world, aged 40 or early 50s, who shows the most promise and is likely to become a master, and gives them an award. Not with money, but by allowing them to build whatever they want in front of their gallery for three to four months.

This award was given to Sou Fujimoto, a Japanese architect. While Japan is now confident, perhaps due to its economic growth and increasing military spending surpassing Korea's for the first time this year, there are many areas where its accumulated expertise shows significant disparities. In architecture, this was the 13th time such an award was given. It's been 24 times now, and they probably build something every year. It's demolished after about five months. So, if you don't see it then, you can't find it online. No Korean has ever received this award.

Since the Nobel Prize does not award architecture, if you count the number of recipients of what is equivalent to the Nobel Prize in Architecture, Japan has many, while the US and Korea have zero. Despite the growing number of talented architects in Korea, there is still a significant gap. My intuition was correct. Upon entering and reading the accompanying books, I found that this architect also wanted to convey the idea of complexity. His dream world was one where he could create architecture like a forest. He always felt that in a forest, there are weeds, giant trees, and small trees, all coexisting harmoniously without complaint. He wondered why human society couldn't be like that. So, he wanted to build architecture in that way.

For example, he designed apartments not like matchboxes, but by mixing different sizes, like 40-pyeong and 20-pyeong units, to create a harmonious living environment for everyone. He wanted to build something like that. The moment I saw it, I felt a sense of complexity. It was ten years ago, and I had already written several papers and given lectures, but few people seemed to understand. If an architect can convey their message through a single building, even to someone like me who isn't an architect, how should I convey the message of international politics? This was a source of distress.

In other words, the world moving towards 2050 and 2100 can be summarized in one word: complexity. But is this a new idea? If we try to organize it, it might be related to the discussions of the previous seven speakers. So, when we try to forecast the world approaching 2050 or 2100, what criteria should we use to make it relatively easy to think about? For convenience, let's consider GDP. GDP is related to our lives, isn't it? How much is the per capita income, or the total GDP of a country? This is relevant to thinking about our future lives.

The table shown above generally covers up to the early 2000s. It's rare for people to think, 'I already knew that.' For example, consider China. In the 17th century, the Qing Dynasty was established. From the mid-17th century to the late 19th century, during the reigns of the Kangxi, Yongzheng, and Qianlong emperors, China's economy accounted for over 30% of the world's economy.

We tend to think that China was overwhelmingly dominant, but that's a big misconception. Western Europe combined began to surpass China only in the late 19th century, around the time of the Industrial Revolution. This is a key point to remember. China's economy then plummeted from over 30% to nearly 0%. But today, in 2023, the biggest issue is that it is gradually rising again. How high will it rise? This is a crucial issue in contemporary international politics.

Therefore, the US-China relationship is the most important issue in 21st-century Korean international politics. If we are to forecast this, how far has it risen? China's transformation began to be felt in the early 21st century, around 2000, when its per capita income was about $1,000 and its GDP was around $1.2 trillion. At that time, the US GDP was over $10 trillion, so there was a significant gap. China's GDP was only about 15-20% of the US GDP.

However, according to the IMF's projections for 2023, China's GDP is expected to be around $20 trillion, while the US GDP is around $27 trillion, out of a global GDP of approximately $105 trillion. This represents an incredibly rapid change. For about 40 years since the reform and opening up began in 1978, China has maintained double-digit growth, achieving remarkable progress. As you can see, other countries like Japan, India, and Korea are similar. Korea's projected GDP for this year is around $1.7 trillion.

It's slightly below Brazil's. But this is fine; the problem lies ahead. If we consider this, the situation has changed dramatically from 12% in the early 2000s to nearly 80% now. The current debate is about what the situation will be in 2050. This is not just someone else's problem; it is urgently your problem, or perhaps today's problem. For example, if you are investing in stocks, one of the biggest concerns for stock investors these days is what to do if they hold Chinese stocks. They have already lost nearly half their value. Will they fall further, or should they sell now, or should they hold on because they will rise?

This is a crucial question, potentially life-altering, especially if you invested borrowed money. However, understanding China's position in 2050, when you are in your fifties or sixties, is relatively important. Will it be a Chinese world, or will the US world be maintained? Or will it be a shared world of both countries? Or will there be an unexpected new world where Korea becomes the center of the world? If you can make such a judgment, it would be truly worthwhile to be here today.

You need to prepare. Are there any among you for whom Chinese is the most comfortable foreign language? Most of you are comfortable with English, right? But if China were to dominate the world order in 2055 or 2060, those who invested in English would be left behind, wouldn't they? Of course, if AI develops to the point where you can have a chip implanted in your brain and translate automatically without errors, it might be different. But if it doesn't work out that way, that judgment is crucial. For example, there are many people who studied Russian. During the Cold War, it was useful, but now, due to the situation in Ukraine, its utility has significantly decreased.

So, if we make judgments based solely on GDP, what happens? Recently, there's been a major debate about 'Peak China.' Professor Lee Dong-ryul mentioned 'Peak China,' but I haven't heard of it elsewhere. 'Peak China' refers to whether China has reached its peak now. Those who are immediately concerned, like stock investors, are debating whether this is the peak, whether it's already declining, or whether it will continue to rise or remain stable. This debate has become particularly heated in the last two to three years. This table, compiled by leading figures in current affairs, like The Economist, presents their arguments.

This is a recent table. Previously, it was projected that China would surpass the US in total GDP around 2030. By 2050, it was expected that there would be a significant gap. This was the thinking five years ago. If you invested in China based on that, you've now lost money. But the reality is quite different from the projections. At the bottom is Goldman Sachs' 2003 forecast, which projected that China would achieve parity with the US GDP around 2040, meaning reaching 100%.

Goldman Sachs made that projection in 2003. So, perhaps we shouldn't blindly trust them. Goldman Sachs is a representative institution, but companies pay enormous sums to hear their advice and invest based on it. If it turns out to be wrong, what recourse do they have? It's your fault for believing them. But what happened after that? It aligned with the 2040 projection. However, in 2008-2009, the global financial crisis hit the US hard, while China successfully weathered it. After that, the expectation shifted: why wait until 2040?

Projections for 2006, 2030, and 2035 emerged. In the last year or two, the 'Peak China' debate has intensified. Is it possible that China will not surpass the US in GDP? This 'great weight' has begun to be felt. Looking at the table, the dotted line at the bottom, curving downwards below 100, represents the current forecast. Most projections suggest that achieving parity will be difficult until the mid-2050s or 2060s. This means investors will lose money. However, it's not a complete collapse like the fall of the Qing Dynasty.

However, surpassing 100 will be very difficult for you. In the last five years, USTR and the 2050 project, one of the most representative research projects, have been deeply involved. We also agonized over how to present the US-China relationship in 2050 in our report. If you look it up, you'll find that at the time, we chose to be overly optimistic about the Chinese economy, projecting that it would reach parity with the US around 2050. However, most economic research institutes at the time believed China would bypass the US. Now, the prevailing view is that achieving parity will be very difficult.

So, if the general projection is that China will not collapse by 2050 but will find it relatively difficult to surpass the US, what does that imply? We need to consider this. While investing in stocks is important, military spending is as crucial as GDP in politics. What will military spending be like in 2050 or 2100? It's difficult to find accurate statistics for military spending projections for 2050 or 2100. Unlike economics, which allows for more quantitative and scientific research in international politics, military spending statistics are not as meticulously compiled.

As a workaround, let's consider projecting based on last year's global military spending statistics. There aren't many sources that provide total global military spending. We are always interested in North Korea's military spending, Japan's military spending, and China's military spending. Most international relations scholars are unaware of these figures. What about Russia's military spending during the Ukraine war? They might say, 'I don't know, but they are fighting.' Look at Russia.

It's not 300 billion; it's 86 billion. That seems like a lot, doesn't it? Right before the Ukraine war, Russia's military spending was similar to South Korea's. We mistakenly believe that because Russia was one of the two superpowers during the Cold War, it is still a superpower. But even during the current war, its spending is less than $100 billion. Even if we assume this figure is underestimated and double it, it's still less than the US. The US spends about $2.2 trillion globally, and China spends $300 billion.

So, if we consider this, it seems plausible. China's spending is $300 billion. Earlier, we saw that China's GDP was 75% of the US GDP (20 trillion vs. 27 trillion). But in terms of military spending, it's one-third, or 33%. This means China understands that it cannot compete with the US militarily, although it can compete economically. Of course, in terms of traditional Chinese strategy, even with equal strength, China's resolve and tenacity might be stronger than the US's. After all, Mao Zedong unified China not just with military power but also with nothing else, defeating the Nationalist Party.

Even so, with a 3:1 ratio, they likely believe it's not time to fight. This is why I often say that the world has become a place where amateurs in international politics, who haven't even studied the most basic information, are making pronouncements about the dangers of the US and the possibility of a US-China war. Have they ever looked at the data? It's rare for a 3:1 ratio to lead to war. A 1:1 ratio is already burdensome. Perhaps a 1:1 scenario could lead to war, but not a 3:1 scenario. Therefore, looking at this table, the US is still significantly larger, spending $2.2 trillion, with $900 billion of that spent by the US itself. The proportion is substantial. Second, China's spending is larger than expected.

It has increased significantly over the last decade, so $300 billion is a relatively large amount. Whether our ranking is something to be proud of or ashamed of is unclear, but it is ranked ninth. I believe this is the first year for Korea. Japan's exchange rate has fallen so much that if you travel there, you'll notice it's a great time to visit. The Japanese yen has weakened. The Japanese Ministry of Defense and other agencies must be quite shocked.

This is the first year, 2023, that Japan's military spending is lower than South Korea's. Is this important? Relatively speaking, yes. While China's rise began in 1978, its military spending has been significant since the 2000s. Crucially, neighboring countries began to fear China in 2008-2009. After overcoming the global financial crisis, China's GDP surpassed Japan's in 2010. Japan was in an uproar, realizing that China's economy was becoming larger overall.

Interestingly, the Chinese perspective was different. I vividly remember a prominent international relations scholar at Tsinghua University, whom Americans refer to as a 'thinker,' telling me in Beijing, 'We have finally surpassed Japan's GDP.' His response to me was, 'We are not playing a game with Japan; our primary game is with the United States.' That was accurate. In 2000, China's GDP was $1,000, or $1.2 trillion. The US GDP was over $10 trillion. Japan, in its 'lost three decades,' maintained its GDP at around $5 trillion.

By 2010, it had reached $5 trillion. In ten years, China surpassed $5 trillion, while the US had $15 trillion. So, his statement meant that they were no longer looking at Japan but at the US. This was somewhat true. So, who will win this 'Peak China' debate? Especially this year, with the Chinese economy facing difficulties, the argument that it has already peaked is gaining traction. The third data point is that economic and military power in the 21st century, which were the primary measures of international politics and world order from the 19th century onwards, are still important. The basis for national power was wealth and military strength. However, in the 21st century, while wealth and military strength remain important, intellectual capacity has become crucial. Through cutting-edge technology and scientific revolutions, controlling high-tech is determining the fate of the 21st century.

As famously stated, 'To dominate the 21st century, dominate AI.' Such statements are openly made in the US. As a symbolic data point, let's consider the top 20 think tanks in the world. Currently, there are only 18 because the director of the University of Pennsylvania's Think Tanks and Civil Societies Program, which ranks them annually, suddenly passed away last year, and they couldn't release the statistics. If we combine them, there are 20.

You can quickly see that 10 of them are economic. GDP is $27 trillion out of $105 trillion, which is less than 30%. Military spending is about 40%, with $900 billion out of $2.2 trillion. Intellectual capacity is about 50%. These are crucial indicators. However, the bigger problem is that time is running out. With the global indicators I've discussed, how can we make accurate forecasts for when you will be in your fifties or sixties, or even when you reach 100? There are various theories about this.

There is a lot of information in the media and academic writings that can confuse the general public or lead them to make incorrect judgments. The first widely circulated theory is the 'Thucydides Trap,' which you may have heard of. This theory suggests that when a rising power like China rapidly approaches the power of an established power like the US, historical conflicts often ensue. This would be a very grim outlook for you. If a conflict occurs in the 2050s or beyond, even if we can live to 100 biologically, many people might die in a US-China war. In that case, you might not live as long as you have already lived.

This is a possible forecast. The second hypothesis, related to the recent 'Peak China' debate, is a new type of falsehood emerging: Does power always lead to conflict? Or, if a declining power faces a rising power, does conflict occur? Instead, if China begins to weaken, does conflict arise then? The 'Peak China' proponents argue that conflict is more likely when power is declining.

They argue that now is the last chance, and they must engage in a risky confrontation to widen the gap. Although the arguments are diametrically opposed, both the 'transition' and 'Peak China' theories suggest a high risk of instability in US-China relations. However, I intend to explain that there is a high probability that we will face the year 2050 in a third way, not through either of these scenarios. Therefore, you don't have to be too disheartened; there is a chance. Which of these scenarios will prevail is a matter of individual luck and national fortune. Why do I say this? The left side represents the cyclical theory of hegemonic powers, advocated by those who argue for the cyclical nature of world order.

From around the 16th century, it is believed that a dominant power emerges roughly every 100 years. For example, the Netherlands emerged as a dominant power from the 16th to the 17th century. We might dismiss the Netherlands today, but it was once a world leader. Then came the 18th and 19th centuries, followed by the US cycle starting in 1945. The crucial point is, what happens after the US cycle began in 1945? When a dominant power emerges, it naturally establishes its own order. The US created the UN, the international economic order, the trade order, and so on. This is the full stage, followed by the 'regime stabilization' phase, where war occurs. Then, the order is re-established. This happens because, in international politics, when an order is established, the person who led its creation tends to benefit more, while others are left at a disadvantage.

This leads to the emergence of dissatisfied powers. If the US established the order, it would be considered the 'public good.' However, if the order is not sufficiently established, and the US benefits disproportionately, China, from its perspective, sees itself as having reached 75% of the US economy and having strengthened militarily relative to other countries, and being competitive in advanced technology. Yet, in the actual operation of the order, its influence is not adequately reflected.

This is considered the 'regime stabilization' phase. Why does such a period arise? Why isn't my voice being reflected? To fight back, one needs power. In domestic politics, the opposition leader might go on a hunger strike, but in international politics, there's no hunger strike. From a certain point, if the US doesn't listen, it leads to violence. In principle, if China is dissatisfied with the US-led order, it must fight. But with only one-third of the power, why should it receive less? This dissatisfaction arises because their demands are not met.

This is the 'regime stabilization' phase, characterized by intense competition. The US officially calls this a 'rules-based order.' However, there are multiple sets of rules, and it's debatable which one should be prioritized. Direct confrontation doesn't occur immediately. Historically, these situations often remain unresolved. So, what happens? The conclusion is that one must build power. Power is primarily military and economic strength. As power increases, the concentration of power weakens. If China's economy surpasses the US economy,

will China's military spending surpass that of the US? This raises complex questions about whether such a situation will arise in 2050 or 2100. However, there are two perspectives. In my view, the gap between the US and China is narrowing less than we expected, and the possibility of reversal is relatively low. However, this does not mean there is no risk of war. The situation will continue to be tense. They will not fight directly but will clash in surrounding regions. Thus, the possibility of conflict in third regions, without direct confrontation, will inevitably increase.

This is the argument. We are running out of time, but I will continue. The changes we are experiencing now, and the forecasts for 2050 and 2100 that you will encounter, suggest these outcomes. However, forecasting solely based on these projections presents significant challenges. If we categorize these changes, what kind of transformation are you experiencing? Whether it's fortunate or unfortunate, you will live in a different international political environment than what you have experienced so far. Who are the people living in such times?

Of course, everyone experiences change. However, if we consider changes that are not mere shifts but transformations or revolutions, then in our case, the 19th century was a revolution in international politics. This is because we lived in a world order based on 'li' (propriety) within a 'heavenly kingdom' for a very long time, nearly a thousand years since the era of tributary states. This began to change gradually during the Goryeo Dynasty, and by the Joseon Dynasty, we started to think differently. However, the West did not think this way. They established the nation-state and operated not according to 'li' but based on wealth and military strength, self-reliance, and balance of power.

It would have been good to continue living by those principles, but in the 21st century, you are not living in that era but have already entered a new one. The chaotic state of our domestic politics is because, while the times have moved forward, the political parties are still struggling to adapt to the concept of the nation-state. This makes it difficult to keep pace with the future. What is the significant change? The actors are important, and the nature of actors is shifting from nation-states to network states.

Second, the space in which these actors operate is becoming more complex. While the world order was structured around wealth and military strength, it has now become much more complex. Pursuing only wealth and military strength had significant negative impacts, leading to the inclusion of cultural and ecological issues. A crucial change in the 21st century is that science and technology, and knowledge, form the foundational stage for new developments. This is structured as a triple complex of global governance, or co-governance, at the highest level.

What does this mean? For example, the actors appearing on stage are the 'actors.' In Korea, 'actor' is translated as 'haeng-ui-ja,' but I prefer to translate it as 'ju-in-gong' (protagonist) because it better conveys the idea. If the protagonist enters the stage, the way they dance will differ greatly depending on whether the stage is simple or complex. Therefore, you are currently only seeing the modern stage. In the past, the actors were also singular. While trot music is somewhat different now,

in the past, the actors were singular. Now, the actors are also singular. While trot music is somewhat different now,

We end up with the MC being alone. The MC was also alone. These days, it's rare for the MC to be alone; there are usually multiple MCs, and groups are overwhelmingly dominant. Instead, there are few people who perform alone. Usually, when a group appears, there are backup dancers behind them. Nowadays, they are no longer called backup dancers. Those dancers might even be the main performers. Therefore, the stage has naturally changed. From the core act of dancing on stage, time has already run over schedule, so I don't think we have time to discuss in detail what China and the US are doing. China is also sensing signs of such changes, so they are making efforts to carry out their own reconstruction. Biden has his own approach, and Xi Jinping has his own. They are making efforts to separately grasp the changes in actors, stages, and performances, but whether this is sufficiently 21st-century is something we must consider, as it is very difficult.

Since we need to wrap up our discussion, the question is, what should we do? How should you all proceed? In our case, regarding actors, stages, and performances, what about 2050? That will be your problem, won't it? In which sphere should I work? Should I view the world and work from a national perspective? Or should I view the world and work from a network perspective? The order of the world in 2050 or 2100 will inevitably be structured around such frameworks, whether it's the five great powers or not.

However, among the 300 people in Yeouido, perhaps less than 1% are working with a network perspective. What is this network? How should international politics be approached from a network perspective? Then, engaging in rudimentary conflicts like the current South Korea-China relations would be impossible. In fact, it might need to be a six-layer network, not a five-layer one. Why? Because the idea of five powers, which emerged in the 19th century concerning surrounding countries and the 'four great powers,' is a framework of the modern nation-state order. That is our ingrained notion. The second consideration is the order structured around the Asia-Pacific region, the order structured globally, the order structured around the Korean Peninsula, and the domestic network. Finally, we set up a cyber network as the outermost layer to create a five-layer network. However, what has recently become a point of contention is the rapidly increasing interest in 'space.'

Who will dominate space? Perhaps it will become a six-layer network, or even more. Furthermore, another space might be needed beyond that. This is because some people who think in the 21st century, considering a broader meaning of 'space' like a 'space of love' to prevent the Earth's destruction, might conceive of a six-layer network. However, we are not even accustomed to two or three layers yet. When we hear that the US and South Korea have done something, we tend to view it only from the perspective of US-South Korea relations. We are not even accustomed to looking at three parties beyond just US-South Korea.

In that case, if we are told to consider China and Russia simultaneously, does it end there? Not at all. The five-layer network of Asia-Pacific, global, Korean Peninsula, and cyber, along with the domestic network, is changing at an extremely rapid pace. Therefore, the emergence of cyberspace is what we can consider. The term 'cyberspace' itself first appeared in 1984 when Gibson, in his science fiction novel Neuromancer, conceived of a space that could be a collective hallucination created by humans. We now consider this. The World Wide Web, which we are familiar with, became commercialized in 1994. In just 30 years, we have become slaves to cyberspace. We feel like we can't live without cyberspace now.

We are all addicted to some extent. Therefore, who will control cyberspace in the face of such rapid change is a very important question. Why are controlling semiconductors and AI important? Of course, there can be another issue. Just because cyberspace is important, does it mean we should invest all national power in cyberspace? It doesn't work that way. The idea of mastering the five-layer network implies that since the 19th century, within the space of the Western modern international order, they are fighting with traditional military power. So, will we only engage in cyber warfare? But in reality, to break through and attack, one must be able to defend against attacks using nuclear or conventional weapons.

However, if we do not adequately prepare for cyberspace, we can no longer survive. Therefore, one needs to consider whether to become a cyberspace-centric person, a modern person, or a traditional person. What I am repeatedly emphasizing here is that by 2050 or 2100, you will inevitably be reborn as complex individuals. Such individuals will emerge as the standard for a new humanity. This is a realistic perspective. This is an explanation I once used because the complexity of the stage is difficult to explain no matter how much I try.

Therefore, for those of you who are young in history, there are detailed explanations in the last chapter, 'The World Politics of Love.' When I first looked at the shape of the Dabotap pagoda, I realized that at that time, people were not obsessed with Dabotap itself, but with complexity. That's why I thought of it in the same way as my complex model. I've been talking about this for 30 years, but it hasn't been very convincing. Recently, people have occasionally said, 'That's a bit strange,' but why? Because if you look closely at Dabotap, it is a three-tiered pagoda.

There is a base pagoda, a central pagoda in the middle, and a three-tiered pagoda at the very top. If we consider this in terms of security, governance, culture, and ecology, it means that within the base pagoda of technology, information, and knowledge, there is a spire that controls everything at the top. While I've listed six elements on a flat plane for the complex pagoda, the most crucial aspect is the pagoda of technology, information, and knowledge. We often talk about what values are most important these days, but in the 21st century, the foundation is who leads in cutting-edge technology. That is the primary goal. Secondly, by 2050, with AI constantly evolving, what will happen to the relationship between humans and machines? As the relationship shifts from humans being superior and machines inferior to AGI and even superintelligence, there is a risk of reversal.

This discussion will likely be one of the central themes you will face in 2050 or 2100. Because if you miss the development of AI, it will be difficult for the Earth to survive. The second point is that security, economy, culture, and ecology, which appear in the traditional domain, remain important. Secondly, what are the security issues that South Korea needs to address? The first is likely the stability of North and South Korea. To achieve that, can we find a breakthrough while still burdened by North Korea's nuclear weapons?

Second, how will the alliance system evolve? Furthermore, going beyond alliances, if we only focus on alliances, the conflict centered around the US and China will inevitably escalate into an arms race. How should these issues be addressed? Third, after a period of being focused on the global liberal order, we are now facing fragmentation and the crisis of a nation-state-centric world order. Is it not inevitable that we will eventually walk the path of a multipolar world? Therefore, what is the area where South Korea can lead or take the initiative? Fourth, on a cultural level, the biggest dilemma we face is how to resolve the conflict between nation-state-centric nationalism and universalism. Fifth, regarding ecology. Finally, democracy. Then, can an actor who fully understands complex vectors and complexity perform a dance that leads to a world where I live, you live, and everyone lives happily by 2050 or 2100? I once used the expression 'wolf spider.' The wolf symbolizes the performance of the modern international order. It is a famous phrase that represents a dilemma of the modern international order discussed by Hobbes: as individual nation-states become more complete, the conflicts become more intense. A war of wolves will break out.

What kind of dance should we perform to reach a world in 2050 or 2100 where everyone, including myself and you, can live happily as a global standard? In that context, I once used the expression 'wolf spider.' The wolf is a famous metaphor symbolizing the performance of the modern international order. It is one of the dilemmas of the modern international order, as Hans Morgenthau discussed: the more a modern nation-state achieves completeness, the more intensely it fights. A fight among wolves, a fight between wolves, will ensue.

The term 'wolf spider' emerged because, as I mentioned earlier, in the 21st century, it is far more efficient to weave together all possible actors rather than having only a few actors in the world order. This is metaphorically represented by the spider. Spiders, of course, have poor eyesight and spin webs to catch prey that wanders in. Paradoxically, the spiderweb is crucial. I didn't know there was such a thing as a wolf spider. When I was intensely contemplating such matters, I searched the internet for 'wolf' and 'spider,' and a spider called the wolf spider appeared. So, from then on, I started talking about becoming a wolf spider. What is presented here is a slightly more advanced concept than the wolf spider. The relationship between bees and birds, for instance, is a metaphor for symbiosis. Over time, as hummingbirds fed on the nectar of flowers, their beaks evolved.

And the flowers began to produce nectar that only hummingbirds liked. This demonstrates that not only Darwinian evolution exists, but also symbiotic evolution. My point is that perhaps the 'wolf spider plus symbiotic performance' will be the core of your future performance. As a final example, how do we deal with complex crises? To illustrate this, I worked on a project not to show how to deal with them, but to explore why BTS, with its significant global attention, has become a form of new civilizational standard, attracting the interest of many young people worldwide. Personally, although I have never sung in my life, I listened to all approximately 200 songs sung by BTS.

There are two aspects to what BTS does: the content of the lyrics and the song itself, and the dance. I took a close look at all 200 songs and read their lyrics. I'm not sure how familiar you are with them, but as I read through the 200 songs, two songs particularly stood out to me. Whether they agree or not, I found them very interesting. Ultimately, I believe these two songs are central. One is 'Fake Love,' released in 2017-2018. They seem to have a vague sense about this song. RM and others consider 'Fake Love' a very important song for them, and RM is known for his high intellectual capacity.

The other, released about a year later, is 'Mikrokosmos,' which, although not sung as frequently as 'Fake Love,' is a song titled 'Small Universe.' The core message of 'Small Universe' is that there are 7 billion small candles in the world, and while we are each one of them, aren't we all illuminating each other? One relates to self-love, while the other connects to the vanity and falsity of international politics, lived through this wolf-like existence. In my brief analysis, I discussed the difference between self-love and competition, as described by Rousseau, for instance.

The minimum self-love required to live, and the competition or societal recognition sought to appear admirable in the eyes of others. Naturally, I don't believe they were directly influenced by Rousseau in their songwriting process. However, these are fundamental questions that people inevitably grapple with when they think deeply. They are questions that transcend East and West, and eras. Rousseau pondered the nature of true love and wrote about it, while these artists, needing to express something, arrived at this point after much deliberation. They began releasing music in 2013, and I've examined all 200 songs.

Their earliest songs, like those from 'The Most Beautiful Moment in Life' series, contained rudimentary elements of these themes. However, the songs about love released around 2017-2018, and 'Mikrokosmos,' likely resonate with fans worldwide, including ARMY, because the lyrics, melody, and dance are not only complex but also overlap with their own struggles and thoughts. This is why I explained the concept of 'complex performance,' like the wolf spider or the relationship between the hummingbird and the flower. To conclude, the path that I, you, or Korea in 2050 or 2100 must take is to broaden and deepen our networking capabilities externally, as a nation. Internally, however...

...we must overcome internal conflicts such as regional disparities and generational divides. Primarily, security will be a necessary condition; a minimum level of security must be maintained, and a foundation for sustenance must be established. However, to overcome the inherent limitations of modernity, we must seek new paths beyond those previously taken by nations, in terms of cultural ecology. Most importantly, you must understand that the stage for the 21st century is technology and information.

Isn't it always like that? Not necessarily. If you look at human history, the ancient era was dominated by religion. Since most people didn't know the existing problems, the foundation for judging everything was the lower class. Then, isn't religion always important? No, but in the early stages, the most important factor was political contribution. However, as nations were formed and revolutions like the Industrial Revolution occurred, isn't the economy the most important thing? It was likely after the Industrial Revolution that the economy became the sole determinant. Technology has led to completely unexpected situations, transforming the world. Even warfare has moved past the era of nuclear conflict.

Viewed that way, North Korea is experiencing the greatest tragedy. At a time when goods have become obsolete and must be discarded, they are clinging to their final vestiges. They possess nuclear weapons as a fundamental part of their military system. So, where are they heading now? Advanced technologies, particularly AI, are beginning to be integrated into weaponry. In this transitional phase, they are likely moving towards a nuclear plus AI weapons system. Because such changes are occurring, individuals must also study and penetrate new fields or join companies, right?

They must. What will things be like in 2050? I studied diligently, but then I found that stocks had disappeared, the company went bankrupt, or it became a subsidiary. In such cases, one is bound to become impoverished, materially and spiritually. Therefore, one must be extremely cautious about which industry to enter and what to study accordingly. If I pursue a traditional field, as mentioned earlier, it involves a combination. The future, present, and past are all likely to be mixed. Is the past meaningless? Not necessarily. Consider the luxury goods we buy today; many of their designs are significantly influenced by traditional Eastern aesthetics.

Therefore, rather than focusing on just one aspect, one must become someone who can live in the past, present, and future simultaneously. Furthermore, without preparing for the integration of military affairs, the economy, culture, and environment with science, technology, and information, it will be very difficult to become an essential member of society in the 2050s. So, should one prioritize coding and computer science upon entering university, perhaps eliminating other majors? This is partially correct. Thirty to fifty years ago, when I taught at Gwanak, I advised the opposite: study two fields. One was AI and computer science, and the other was classical Chinese. It might sound nonsensical, but the fastest way to train one's intellectual imagination is through the lens of classical Chinese; the training to view the world through it is crucial. Personally, regarding world politics, for instance, when I encountered ancient inscriptions like the oracle bone script, the original form of classical Chinese, I realized the limits of human imagination. These are the kinds of important aspects being discussed. To reiterate the previous point, the theory of co-evolution emphasizes the following: upon closer examination, symbiosis occurs through the simultaneous processes of self-organization and co-evolution. A fascinating example can be seen in children. Most of you may not have experience raising children, but infants typically begin to speak around 24 months. They start learning language. What do they do from the moment they are born? They start crying. In Rousseau's terms, they possess a minimal self-love from birth. They need to breathe, eat when hungry, and move their bodies. This self-love exists. However, since they cannot survive on this alone, they begin to form relationships with others.

The process of self-organization is therefore constantly driven by the organism's need for development; failure to do so signifies death. But this alone is not sufficient. Ultimately, interactions with surrounding social forces and other humans occur. Co-evolution involves the need to leverage the strength of others in relationships. Therefore, how these relationships are established becomes a crucial aspect. If managed well, the child will avoid delinquent behavior in adolescence and, as an adult, will be self-sufficient while maintaining harmonious relationships with others.

This is analogous to the situation North Korea faces today. Self-organization must be continuous. However, they believed that the only viable options for self-organization were nuclear weapons and economic growth. But there is no possibility for the organism to survive through these two means. Realistically, why not? Pursuing economic growth with nuclear weapons creates an external dilemma that is not accepted. Thus, they fall into a self-imposed trap that cannot be resolved despite continuous efforts. Moreover, in order to co-evolve with neighboring countries, there must be give and take. In their relations with the United States, they have attempted to resolve issues by assuming that U.S. policy towards North Korea is fixed, leading to a situation where it is difficult to fulfill both objectives.

Consequently, we observe a current dilemma where fulfilling these two objectives is extremely difficult. So, the question arises: how will Korea respond? If North Korea fails, or as mentioned earlier, if time does not permit, what about the approach taken by the U.S. and China? Or, as Korea prepares for the 21st century, for 2050, or even for the next 200 years, what must I do for my own self-organization, and what efforts are necessary for co-evolution with others? This is likely the core challenge.

This has become quite lengthy.