North Korea and the World: From 'Prioritizing Nukes' to 'Prioritizing Economy': North Korea's Policy Shift and South Korea's Role

YouTube Link: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=XFKDr2RfqV0

Park Won-gon, Director of EAI's North Korea Studies Center (Professor at Ewha Womans University), and Kim Yang-gyu, Senior Research Fellow at EAI, discuss South Korea's role in encouraging North Korea to abandon its 'prioritize nukes' policy for regime security and shift towards a 'prioritize economy' policy. They suggest that South Korea should sincerely consider sophisticated support measures to clearly convey the message that the benefits of abandoning nuclear weapons outweigh the costs of possessing them, and to assure North Korea that its regime can be secured and economic development achieved even without nuclear weapons.

■ Park Won-gon_Director of the North Korea Studies Center at the East Asia Institute. Professor at the Department of North Korean Studies, Ewha Womans University.

■ Kim Yang-gyu_Senior Research Fellow at the East Asia Institute. Lecturer at the Department of Political Science and International Relations, Seoul National University.

■ Editor: Park Ji-soo, EAI Research Fellow

    Inquiries: 02 2277 1683 (ext. 208) | jspark@eai.or.kr

Video Transcript

This is an era where that is becoming technically feasible. That is why it is regrettable that although Chairman Kim Jong-un states that denuclearization is absolutely impossible, one wonders if the future of clinging to nuclear weapons will continue to be secure. I believe this thought is also somewhat becoming prevalent. Thank you to all the viewers who participated today. Today, continuing from last time, we will have a discussion with Dr. Kim Yang-gyu, our Senior Research Fellow at the East Asia Institute. Welcome. Thank you.

Last time, we summarized the various discussions within the United States regarding North Korean denuclearization into about four categories. Today, we intend to discuss a different topic, perhaps the most difficult one: What should South Korea do? How should we resolve the protracted issues on the Korean Peninsula, including North Korean denuclearization? Each administration has presented very diverse policies on denuclearization, North Korea, and unification. Today, we will focus on the issue of nuclear weapons.

This year holds significance in many ways: it marks the 70th anniversary of the ROK-US alliance and the 70th anniversary of the Korean War Armistice. North Korea, out of the blue, declares this year as the 30th anniversary of the North Korean nuclear crisis. In 1993, North Korea announced its withdrawal from the NPT. In fact, with the Geneva Agreed Framework in 1994, we consider 1993 as the first North Korean nuclear crisis. To commemorate the 30th anniversary, we held a seminar at the Korean Political Science Association in March. It was a full-day seminar focusing on the North Korean nuclear issue, where officials who dealt with North Korean issues from the so-called progressive and conservative camps participated. They were, of course, well-known figures.

One point they made resonated deeply with me. They, from both the progressive and conservative administrations, largely agreed that if the South Korean government had maintained a consistent policy on the North Korean nuclear issue over the past 30 years, the situation in 2023 would be vastly different. The progressive administrations primarily pursued engagement policies, aiming to resolve North Korea's issues through improved inter-Korean relations. Conversely, conservative administrations, given the severity of the North Korean nuclear issue, considered deterrence and dissuasion as paramount. They believed that progress in inter-Korean relations would be difficult if the nuclear issue was not resolved at the outset. The crucial point, regardless of which approach is correct, was their conclusion that any policy, if consistently pursued for 30 years, would have led to a very different outcome today. They agreed that a situation might have arisen where North Korea could have abandoned its nuclear weapons.

Do you agree with this, Dr. Kim? I believe the picture became more complicated once nuclear development began. I am thinking along these lines. Because until then, in terms of political science theory, I was discussing models like the rational actor model or others. The basis for consistently applying a particular model is when the intentions of the other party are clear or when their capabilities do not change drastically. However, in a situation where North Korea is believed to possess nuclear weapons, and is reported as such, is it reasonable to expect that maintaining a single, consistent policy will resolve the issue? I am somewhat skeptical. We begin with a sense of regret, as we cannot conduct experiments with the past. However, if I may pose a question: North Korea's prioritization of nuclear weapons, the so-called 'prioritize nukes' policy, has not changed and has perhaps even intensified under Kim Jong-un. The issue is that to make North Korea abandon its nuclear weapons, it must abandon its 'prioritize nukes' policy and shift to a 'prioritize economy' policy.

I believe you will agree with that. So, how should we proceed? In principle, the more North Korea possesses nuclear weapons, the greater the cost. Therefore, the ultimate goal is to make abandoning nuclear weapons more advantageous than possessing them. That will be one pillar. Another is to ensure that the benefits of abandoning nuclear weapons are greater than the benefits of possessing them. The question is how to achieve this. I have mentioned before that the cost of North Korea's nuclear program is not just a superficial cost but a significant burden for North Korea. Especially with the recent concept of integrated deterrence and the ROK-US summit held not long ago, to put it simply, North Korea previously had to contend with South Korea, the United States, and Japan. Now, it must also contend with NATO.

While China and Russia are behind them, it is uncertain how much military assistance they will provide. In such a situation, the cost of maintaining and possessing nuclear weapons will inevitably increase significantly. I believe this could become a burden for North Korea. As you mentioned, alongside the quantitative increase in burdens, there are also significant qualitative changes. The integrated deterrence that the United States is pursuing, encompassing all its capabilities and the entire spectrum of military power, along with the combined capabilities of its allies and its own forces, is central to this. At its core lies the revolution in precision and transparency that the United States is developing. This means that the location of North Korea's nuclear assets can be tracked 24 hours a day, and these tracked assets can be precisely struck at any moment if the will exists. The current operational methods employed by the United States involve using precision-guided missiles, akin to a scalpel, to eliminate only the leadership, thereby minimizing collateral damage. This approach has been increasingly emphasized by the US government recently.

This is an era where that is becoming technically feasible. That is why it is regrettable that although Chairman Kim Jong-un, in the Nuclear Force Policy Law last year, mentioned that many cases have met tragic ends after abandoning nuclear weapons, he stated that denuclearization is absolutely impossible. However, one wonders if the future of clinging to nuclear weapons will continue to be secure. I believe this thought is also somewhat becoming prevalent. As you accurately pointed out, Dr. Kim, due to North Korea's unique leader-centric system, if Kim Jong-un's authority falters, North Korea's capacity and will to wage war will diminish. War is not only about capacity but also about will. As the supreme commander, the leader himself disappearing would mean... According to the law passed by the Supreme People's Assembly last September, all nuclear control and use authority rests solely with Chairman Kim Jong-un. Furthermore,

one of the five conditions for nuclear use stated by North Korea is the imminent threat or intention of a nuclear attack on North Korea's leadership. Therefore, this can be seen as an indication of North Korea's vulnerability. The information you mentioned earlier, from the journal 'International Security' in 2017, suggests that the United States, with its significantly developed capabilities, is aware of the location of North Korea's strategic assets, including Kim Jong-un's movements. If North Korea shows signs of war or similar actions, the US possesses the capability to strike those assets. This, in a way, provides a very certain deterrent effect on North Korea. Therefore, from the perspective of deterrence and dissuasion, it seems evident that the situation will become increasingly difficult for North Korea going forward. The only country capable of countering the United States' advanced technology is China, and realistically, the only nation that can challenge the United States is China. China is developing similar capabilities through concepts like 'intelligentized warfare.' However, it remains questionable whether China will provide North Korea with the same level of protection or extended deterrence that it offers South Korea. Therefore, while the Yoon Suk-yeol administration is making significant efforts in deterrence, I believe it might be an excessive effort, as the game seems to be tilting heavily in one direction. Regarding dissuasion, as we discussed last time, there are certain vulnerabilities in the current North Korean sanctions regime, such as the issue of illicit transfers. One report last year indicated that one-third of the funding for North Korea's missile launches comes from such sources. This issue has been discussed numerous times, and various countermeasures are being developed, including the establishment of task forces and the identification of collaborators. Therefore, even though Russia and China are supporting North Korea at the UN Security Council, making the current situation challenging, I am skeptical about North Korea's long-term advantage in this game.

Let's move on to the question of benefits. While deterrence and dissuasion may be functioning and possible, what about providing benefits? How can we enable them to abandon 'prioritize nukes' and adopt 'prioritize economy'? This is truly a difficult question.

Thomas Schelling, a scholar who meticulously developed the concept of deterrence, stated that deterrence requires the ability to punish the adversary if they engage in unwanted provocations. This is, of course, a crucial element. However, in the game of deterrence, if the adversary approaches with their hands raised, and you do not move, you do not shoot. You must also provide a promise that you will not shoot if they do not move, even with your immense offensive capabilities. Deterrence operates when both are simultaneously in effect. However, by continuously emphasizing the strengthening of deterrence, if you attempt to assassinate Kim Jong-un without North Korea initiating any action, there is no guarantee against retaliation. Therefore, from North Korea's perspective, it is bound to feel insecure. To put it in general terms, there might be an 'security dilemma' that North Korea perceives.

How can we alleviate that or provide security assurances to North Korea? Perhaps through a treaty? Previously, the ultimate solution was discussed as diplomatic relations between North Korea and the United States. However, diplomatic relations alone may not suffice. To achieve this, the ROK-US alliance would have to be dismantled to a certain extent, and North Korea would still need to possess nuclear weapons for them to feel their security dilemma is somewhat controlled. Beyond that, there seems to be no other viable method. How do we resolve this issue? This is a matter that requires considerable thought. North Korea argues that even if such a treaty is signed, it could become a mere piece of paper at any moment. They cite the tragic fates of leaders in Iraq and Libya as examples of what they wish to avoid. However, this is a separate issue. This concerns not the security of a state, but the security of a regime.

Given that, we have neither the will nor the means to guarantee the security of the North Korean regime. If forces opposing Kim Jong-un emerge, sending our troops to protect them is ethically and practically impossible. Therefore, I believe we need to engage in deeper contemplation on how to address this. A more plausible approach might be related to North Korea's economic development. While this is a complex issue, we need to create pathways for North Korea to achieve economic success if it abandons its nuclear weapons. Efforts in this regard have been made over the past period, and it is important to refine and develop them further going forward. What are your thoughts?

We need to discuss development in Northeast Asia. It is necessary to convey that if North Korea does not engage in provocations on the Korean Peninsula, we have absolutely no intention of overthrowing its regime. As a token of this assurance, we must sincerely consider and discuss with North Korea the future path for its survival. This is an extremely difficult task. It involves deterring and dissuading while simultaneously engaging in dialogue and showing them that there is an alternative path to survival. This presents a very complex picture. To outsiders, it might appear confusing, raising questions about what color or direction this policy intends to take. It is easy to face criticism for such ambiguity. However, the East Asia Institute has been deeply contemplating this issue for over a decade. We have developed strategies such as 'concentric development.' We will dedicate a future session to introduce this in detail. Today, we pose the question: What policy should South Korea adopt to resolve the North Korean nuclear issue?

It is a difficult question, and finding a clear, definitive answer is not easy. We present this topic for your consideration, hoping for a shared reflection. We look forward to a time of collective contemplation. Thank you, Dr. Kim Han-gyu, for joining us today. Thank you. Thank you.

We need to discuss development in Northeast Asia. It is necessary to convey that if North Korea does not engage in provocations on the Korean Peninsula, we have absolutely no intention of overthrowing its regime. As a token of this assurance, we must sincerely consider and discuss with North Korea the future path for its survival. This is an extremely difficult task. It involves deterring and dissuading while simultaneously engaging in dialogue and showing them that there is an alternative path to survival. This presents a very complex picture. To outsiders, it might appear confusing, raising questions about what color or direction this policy intends to take. It is easy to face criticism for such ambiguity. However, the East Asia Institute has been deeply contemplating this issue for over a decade. We have developed strategies such as 'concentric development.' We will dedicate a future session to introduce this in detail. Today, we pose the question: What policy should South Korea adopt to resolve the North Korean nuclear issue?

It is a difficult question, and finding a clear, definitive answer is not easy. We present this topic for your consideration, hoping for a shared reflection. We look forward to a time of collective contemplation. Thank you, Dr. Kim Han-gyu, for joining us today. Thank you. Thank you.