[North Korea and the World] Four Positions on North Korean Denuclearization: From Regime Change to Recognition as a Nuclear State

YouTube Link: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=7A_dwcEXshE

Park Won-gon, Director of the EAI Center for North Korean Studies and Professor at Ewha Womans University, and Kim Yang-gyu, Senior Research Fellow at EAI, categorize the various discussions within the United States regarding North Korea's denuclearization and explain their characteristics. Director Park categorizes the U.S. positions into four types: denuclearization through regime change, continuous pursuit of 'complete denuclearization,' a shift to arms reduction talks, and a focus on non-proliferation instead of denuclearization, analyzing the background of each. Director Park and Senior Research Fellow Kim emphasize that the international community must not grant North Korea nuclear-state status, as doing so would critically weaken the global nuclear non-proliferation regime.

■ Park Won-gon_Director of the EAI Center for North Korean Studies. Professor of North Korean Studies at Ewha Womans University.

■ Kim Yang-gyu_Senior Research Fellow at EAI. Lecturer in the Department of Political Science and International Relations at Seoul National University.

■ Production and Editing: Park Ji-soo, EAI Research Fellow

    Inquiries: 02 2277 1683 (ext. 208) | jspark@eai.or.kr

Video Transcript

If it truly comes to this situation, the U.S. should actually help North Korea develop its nuclear weapons. It means that North Korea's nuclear development capability must reach a certain level of the U.S. If this happens, I believe it is highly likely that South Korea's nuclear armament will no longer be an option but a path that must be taken. Hello, and welcome back to 'North Korea and the World.' Today, following up on our previous discussion, I am joined by Dr. Kim Yang-gyu, a senior research fellow at the East Asia Institute.

Hello, I'm Kim. Nice to meet you. Last time, we discussed the Bold Initiative. Currently, what are the U.S.'s thoughts on North Korea's denuclearization? I believe this is a very important topic. So, today, we plan to delve into that. What are your thoughts? Yes, recently, when I meet with researchers from various think tanks, especially those in the U.S., many ideas seem to be circulating. In South Korea as well, many people are saying that North Korea's denuclearization has become very difficult, starting with independent nuclear armament. Therefore, I believe this is a very important topic. And understanding the diverse voices within the U.S. and where the current Biden administration is heading is crucial. Indeed, especially last year, North Korea launched approximately 33 ballistic missiles, totaling over 70, and eight intercontinental ballistic missiles. This was the highest number ever recorded, and they demonstrated significantly improved missile capabilities compared to before. Therefore, the question of whether it is possible to completely denuclearize North Korea, which effectively possesses nuclear weapons and continues to enhance its nuclear capabilities, is a subject of much discussion. So, we plan to discuss this today. Broadly speaking, I understand there are about four positions within the U.S. The first is, you've probably heard of it,

the so-called neocons, the most hardline position. A representative figure is former National Security Advisor John Bolton during the Trump administration. These individuals believe that North Korea's denuclearization must be achieved, but that the only way to achieve it is through regime change in North Korea. You are well aware of neocons, aren't you? Yes, I know a little. Could you please explain it? Neoconservatism refers to neo-conservatism. Historically, it originated from left-wing intellectuals in the U.S. in the 1970s who supported the Reagan administration's strong confrontational policy towards the Soviet Union. They are referred to as a group that shifted their stance. You might recall figures like former Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger or former Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz. Their core tenets include militaristic anti-communism, minimal state intervention, a minimal welfare state, and governance by traditional elites. However, their most famous aspect is perhaps the 'Wilsonianism' revealed through the Iraq War. It is an ideological tendency that does not shy away from using military force for liberal values, which can be described as militaristic liberalism or something similar. That's correct. I feel these people have a somewhat idealistic bent. Because their fundamental goal is reminiscent of Kant's Perpetual Peace, the idea that if the entire world becomes democratized, wars will cease. However, the problem, as you mentioned, is that they believe democracy must be achieved through military intervention, even if it means overthrowing the government of the opposing nation.

The most prominent example is the invasion of Iraq, which ultimately failed, and a similar experience in Afghanistan. In essence, this is the most extreme conservative argument. Regardless, the crucial point is that these arguments are being applied to North Korea. Therefore, for North Korea to achieve complete denuclearization, regime change may be necessary. This is the first group's argument. The second group represents the current Biden administration's and the mainstream U.S. thinking. As we discussed last time, the goal is the complete denuclearization of North Korea, not the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula. It means the complete denuclearization of North Korea, as North Korea is the only entity with nuclear weapons on the Korean Peninsula. This group argues that this goal must remain unchanged. Could you elaborate on this? Fundamentally, some argue that since North Korea effectively possesses nuclear weapons, crisis management and similar discussions are more practical and realistic. They argue that continuously advocating for denuclearization prevents discussions on threat reduction and other important issues. However, those in this camp question whether North Korea would respond with reciprocal trust-building measures if discussions shift. They believe that changing the goal is meaningless as the actor, North Korea, remains the same. Furthermore, they argue that if we back down, the credibility of the non-proliferation regime will be undermined, making it impossible to prevent other countries from exploiting the NPT to acquire nuclear technology and become nuclear states. Therefore, any action that weakens the nuclear non-proliferation regime is unacceptable. This is my understanding of the official position of the South Korean government and the Biden administration. Indeed. To put it simply, if North Korea's possession of nuclear weapons is effectively acknowledged, South Korea's nuclear armament will inevitably gain momentum. If this extends to Taiwan, a nuclear domino effect could occur, and the U.S.'s credibility in providing extended deterrence to numerous countries through treaty alliances since its inception would be fundamentally undermined. This would shake the very foundation of the NPT regime, established in 1968. Therefore, the mainstream U.S. and the Biden administration maintain that the ultimate goal of North Korea's complete denuclearization is non-negotiable. That is the second group. The third group discusses more realistic approaches. Given North Korea's continuous advancement of its nuclear capabilities, they propose acknowledging this reality and shifting to nuclear arms reduction. The ultimate stage of nuclear arms reduction is the elimination of all nuclear weapons. Therefore, while not abandoning the goal of eliminating North Korea's nuclear capabilities, they argue for a gradual approach through arms reduction.

What is your assessment of this, Dr. Kim? The wording itself seems quite sensitive. There's 'arms control' and 'arms reduction,' and translating it as 'arms reduction' can be a delicate issue. What I find noteworthy is that 'freezing' is often proposed as an intermediate step. In a way, the two positions don't seem significantly different. However, from a short-term perspective, is there a need for such a proposal? Is it sufficient to bring North Korea to the negotiating table by abandoning the goal of complete denuclearization? I have some doubts about this. People like NK News often discuss this. It is a persuasive argument, and indeed, the common interest shared by North Korea, South Korea, and the U.S. is to prevent war on the Korean Peninsula. Therefore, we must discuss ways to avoid war. Currently, discussions are not even happening, so how can we bring them to the negotiating table?

It seems they are suggesting that some concessions should be made to North Korea's demands. While I can understand this to some extent, I still question whether sacrificing the ultimate and most important principle of denuclearization is justifiable. That's correct. My concern is that if this becomes somewhat formalized, it will ultimately result in the de facto recognition of North Korea as a nuclear-weapon state. Although it may not be officially stated, many countries, including South Korea, might perceive it as a process that begins with the assumption that North Korea is a nuclear-weapon state. A few months ago, I recall a U.S. official, at the Under Secretary level, responsible for nuclear arms control, officially mentioned nuclear arms reduction. This caused significant controversy, and the U.S. itself retracted the statement.

This is because nuclear arms reduction inherently presupposes the de facto recognition of a state as a nuclear-weapon state. Therefore, I have concerns about whether South Korea and Japan, facing existential threats, can accept this. The fourth position goes even further: officially recognize North Korea as a nuclear-weapon state and focus on non-proliferation. Those who advocate for this position fundamentally believe that North Korea is already a de facto nuclear-weapon state and should not be denied this status any longer. During the Cold War, the U.S. and the Soviet Union, despite possessing nuclear weapons, avoided war through what we commonly call Mutually Assured Destruction (MAD). They argue that pursuing this stability is a more realistic choice now. What are your thoughts on this? This is a very important point. The SALT talks and various arms control negotiations between the U.S. and the Soviet Union were based on a consensus regarding non-proliferation. The formation of this consensus was significantly influenced by the perceived vulnerability of the U.S. and the Soviet Union. I believe this logic is plausible when discussing nuclear weapons. However, can North Korea possess a second-strike capability against the U.S.? The key to second-strike capability is the survivability of nuclear assets after a U.S. attack. As you humorously explained, they have various platforms, launching from submarines and trains. But can this be achieved before North Korea develops nuclear-powered submarines? Even after developing nuclear-powered submarines, I have concerns about the effectiveness due to missile range limitations. Can this be achieved? And if it cannot be achieved, is there any incentive for the U.S. to officially accept it? I am very skeptical about that. That's correct.

Speaking of denuclearization, if North Korea is effectively recognized as possessing nuclear weapons, then South Korea's nuclear armament will inevitably gain momentum. If this extends to Taiwan, a nuclear domino effect will occur. The United States currently provides extended deterrence to many countries through treaties with about 50 nations, but this fundamental trust will be undermined. Therefore, the NPT regime, established in 1968, will be shaken, leading to a significant change in the international order that the U.S. has upheld since 1945. Thus, the mainstream view in the U.S. and the Biden administration maintains that the complete denuclearization of North Korea is a non-negotiable principle and goal. This is the second group. The third group discusses practical matters. Given North Korea's continuous advancement in nuclear capabilities, they suggest acknowledging this reality and focusing on arms control instead. The ultimate goal of arms control is the elimination of all nuclear weapons. Therefore, while not abandoning the complete elimination of North Korea's nuclear capabilities, they argue that this should be pursued gradually through arms control.

They propose this gradual approach. Dr. Kim, how do you evaluate this? The wording itself seems very cautious. There's 'disarmament' and 'arms control,' and translating this as 'arms control' appears to be a sensitive issue. What I find noteworthy is that a freeze is currently being considered as an intermediate step. In a way, the two positions don't seem significantly different. However, from a short-term perspective, is there a need for such a proposal? Is it sufficient to bring North Korea to the negotiating table by abandoning the goal of complete denuclearization? I have some doubts. Many people, including Mr. Enki, have discussed this, and their arguments are quite persuasive. The common interest shared by North Korea, South Korea, and the United States is to prevent war on the Korean Peninsula. Therefore, we must discuss ways to avoid war, but currently, discussions are not even taking place. How can we bring them to the negotiating table?

This suggests that some concessions must be made to North Korea's demands. While I understand this to some extent, I question whether sacrificing the ultimate and most important principle of denuclearization is justifiable. My concern is that if this approach becomes somewhat formalized, it will effectively lead to the recognition of North Korea as a nuclear-weapon state. Although it will not be officially stated, many countries, including South Korea, might perceive this as a process that begins with the premise that North Korea is a de facto nuclear-weapon state. A few months ago, I recall a U.S. official, at the Under Secretary level, responsible for nuclear arms control, officially mentioned arms control, which caused significant controversy, and the U.S. itself had to retract that statement. This is because the starting point of arms control inherently assumes that a country is effectively a nuclear-weapon state. Therefore, I have concerns about whether South Korea and Japan, which face existential threats, can accept this. This leads to the fourth perspective.

This perspective goes further, advocating for the outright recognition of North Korea as a de facto nuclear-weapon state, essentially a declaration, and then focusing on non-proliferation. Proponents of this view believe that North Korea is already an actual nuclear-weapon state and that this should no longer be denied. They argue that pursuing the stability known as 'mutual assured destruction' (MAD), which existed between the U.S. and the Soviet Union during the Cold War despite both possessing nuclear weapons, is a more realistic option. What are your thoughts on this? This is a crucial point. This perspective emerged from arms control negotiations like SALT between the U.S. and the Soviet Union, and the consensus on non-proliferation.

If it truly comes to this situation, the U.S. should actually help North Korea develop its nuclear weapons. It means that North Korea's nuclear development capability must reach a certain level of the U.S. for stability to emerge. This is a realistic consideration, and theory clearly differs from reality. If this happens, the threat perceived by South Korea will intensify, and in such a case, South Korea's nuclear armament will likely become not an option but a path that must be taken. Therefore, I believe this last argument carries significant risks. So, we have discussed four arguments today, and the voice advocating for nuclear arms reduction is growing louder within the U.S. Dr. Kim, what are your thoughts again? My fundamental position remains that the goal of complete denuclearization of North Korea should not be abandoned. What is your stance? I agree. I believe this is a principle that cannot be compromised under any circumstances.

If we retreat from this position, in a situation where a significant vertical nuclear proliferation competition is already occurring, it will only complicate the picture and make resolution more difficult. We must be wary of moving in that direction. Furthermore, without considering the various developments occurring at the technological level, I believe we need to be more cautious about hastily granting North Korea nuclear-weapon state status based on outdated nuclear theories. Indeed. Today, we examined the diverse discourse within the U.S. regarding North Korea's denuclearization. We hope this has been helpful for your overall understanding. Next time, we will discuss more concretely what policies South Korea should pursue, which is a very difficult issue, and have a discussion from a principled standpoint. Thank you for your hard work, Dr. Kim.

Thank you. Well done. Thank you. Thank you.

Thank you. Thank you. Thank you.