[North Korea and the World] Three Reasons Why the ‘Bold Initiative’ Differs from Previous North Korea Policies

YouTube Link: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=614z7kploT4

Park Won-gon, Director of the EAI Center for North Korean Studies (Professor at Ewha Womans University), and Kim Yang-gyu, Senior Researcher at EAI, discuss the ‘Bold Initiative’ announced by the Yoon Suk-yeol administration in November, focusing on its implications for North Korea's denuclearization. Director Park positively assesses the initiative for emphasizing South Korea's role as the primary actor in resolving the North Korean nuclear issue and for adhering to the principles of North Korea's ‘complete denuclearization’ and maintaining sanctions. He particularly notes the difference from the Lee Myung-bak administration's ‘Denuclearization, Opening, 3000’ policy, as the Yoon administration shows willingness to engage in dialogue with North Korea even if it does not take proactive denuclearization steps. Furthermore, Director Park and Senior Researcher Kim propose that the administration should conceive of a ‘Bold Initiative 2.0’ that adds ‘Development’ to the current 3D principles (Deterrence, Renunciation, Dialogue) for North Korea's denuclearization.

■ Park Won-gon_Director, Center for North Korean Studies, East Asia Institute. Professor, Department of North Korean Studies, Ewha Womans University.

■ Kim Yang-gyu_Senior Researcher, East Asia Institute. Lecturer, Department of Political Science and International Relations, Seoul National University.

■ Managed and Edited by: Park Ji-soo, EAI Researcher

    Inquiries: 02 2277 1683 (ext. 208) | jspark@eai.or.kr

Video Transcript

Regarding North Korea's issues, shouldn't there always be a push and pull? North Korea continues to develop nuclear weapons, so naturally, we push. It is necessary to deter and renounce their nuclear development. However, at the same time, it is clear that we also need to offer incentives for the benefits North Korea would receive if it abandoned its nuclear program. Hello, and thank you to all the viewers who have joined us again for Park Won-gon's North Korea and the World. Today, we have invited someone you will likely see often in the future: Dr. Kim Yang-gyu, a senior researcher at the East Asia Institute (EAI).

Please greet our viewers. Thank you. Yes, I invited Dr. Kim Yang-gyu here because we need to continue this program, and frankly, it would be quite challenging to do it alone. So, I decided to collaborate with Dr. Kim, whom I like, who is capable, and who, he claims, is better looking than I am. We will create a more enriching program together. You explained the changing patterns of North Korea's survival strategies in the previous two videos. Perhaps, before delving into specific issues, it would be beneficial to discuss how South Korea and the international community have responded to these changes, and then move on to the main discussion? Therefore, the first question I wanted to ask is about the Yoon Suk-yeol administration's announcement of a new North Korea policy called the 'Bold Initiative.' It received strong criticism, such as being the 'epitome of foolishness,' from Vice Department Director Kim Yo-jong. Since then, the number of mentions has decreased, and its importance seems to be diminishing.

Although the recent ROK-US-Japan summit included support for the Bold Initiative, suggesting it might not be entirely the case, could you please explain the content of the Yoon Suk-yeol administration's Bold Initiative? Essentially, what can it be summarized as? There are very detailed contents of the Bold Initiative, which I believe you can fully confirm through other media or government sources. Therefore, I will focus on explaining its implications for North Korea's denuclearization. The Bold Initiative outlines three principles: renunciation, deterrence, and dialogue.

These are the terms used. In the current situation, I believe deterrence and renunciation are the most crucial aspects. Given that North Korea is advancing its nuclear capabilities and completely refusing dialogue, these two elements are inevitably emphasized. These three principles of the Bold Initiative do not operate in isolation; they move in tandem within the same framework. This means that while deterring and seeking the renunciation of North Korea's nuclear weapons, the door for dialogue is always kept open. There is no sequential relationship.

It's not that dialogue occurs only after North Korea's nuclear weapons are deterred and renounced; the door for dialogue remains open. However, it is true that the possibility of North Korea engaging in dialogue increases if a certain level of deterrence and renunciation is achieved. But in terms of principles, these operate within the same framework. Furthermore, regarding denuclearization specifically, the most crucial first principle is that South Korea assumes the role of the primary actor in the issue of North Korea's denuclearization. I believe this is very important because the uncertainties are immense. Even during the Trump administration, while evaluations may vary, South Korea's positions were not fully reflected due to US leadership. There are also various evaluations of the Biden administration's North Korea policy, with some judging it as passive. In any case, this is our issue, and South Korea is the one directly threatened. Therefore, if we take the lead and resolve this issue,

Historically, prior to the emergence of the Kim Young-sam administration in 1993, the North Korean nuclear issue was essentially a South-North Korean issue. The US urged South Korea to take the lead in addressing this issue. However, from 1993 onwards, the North Korean nuclear issue effectively began with the United States. Therefore, regaining this issue, perhaps the phrasing is not entirely appropriate, but South Korea must play a much more active and leading role than before. Secondly, the Bold Initiative emphasizes the principle of complete denuclearization of North Korea.

The very principle of complete denuclearization of North Korea is becoming increasingly shaky. Some advocate for denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula, partial denuclearization, or even nuclear disarmament, effectively acknowledging North Korea as a nuclear-weapon state, with various opinions emerging. However, the Bold Initiative holds the principle that the goal of complete denuclearization of North Korea cannot be abandoned under any circumstances. It is not about providing incentives to North Korea only after complete denuclearization; rather, it involves establishing a roadmap towards the ultimate goal of denuclearization, and if North Korea takes meaningful denuclearization steps, corresponding incentives will be provided. This is the typical approach to denuclearization, and this approach will still be maintained. It may sound like an obvious statement,

but this principle is actually being significantly undermined. Lastly, it also addresses the principle regarding sanctions against North Korea. There is much discussion about sanctions. Some argue that lifting certain sanctions first would incentivize North Korea to come to the negotiating table. However, the Bold Initiative clearly states otherwise. In principle, sanctions will be maintained until complete denuclearization of North Korea is achieved. Of course, if North Korea takes meaningful denuclearization steps, corresponding incentives will be provided, but the principle is that sanctions will be maintained. I agree with this point because once sanctions begin to be eased or partially suspended, North Korea's economy, which is specialized for sanctions, will revive. The effect of sanctions will be completely nullified, and reimposing sanctions would be impossible in the current situation where China and Russia are siding with North Korea. There would be no way to hold North Korea accountable for violating agreements if it fails to keep its promises again.

Therefore, sanctions must be maintained until denuclearization is visibly achieved, and perhaps even until the final moment of North Korea's denuclearization. This is the basic stance. What are your thoughts on North Korea's evaluation of this? Conceptually, it's referred to as the 'economy-security exchange model.' Even during the Lee Myung-bak administration, there were many discussions about North Korea potentially abandoning its nuclear program if economic development guarantees were provided. However, the term 'Denuclearization, Opening, 3000' from the MB administration itself could be seen as provocative to North Korea. North Korea does not use the term 'opening'; they refer to it as 'improvement.' They show an allergic reaction to the term 'opening' because it implies the collapse of their regime. Therefore, there was an inherent resistance to the very word 'opening.' Another point, though this may be subject to interpretation, is that economic measures would only follow North Korea's denuclearization, implying a sequential policy.

This led to a strong backlash from North Korea. However, I believe the Bold Initiative is clearly different from that. As mentioned earlier, the three D's—renunciation, deterrence, and dialogue—operate within the same framework. Therefore, even if North Korea does not take typical steps, South Korea and the United States are willing to engage in dialogue with North Korea. Once we sit down at the negotiating table, many issues can be discussed collectively. I believe there is a difference there.

North Korea raised the issue of needing a model for security for security and economy for economy. However, it seems that this aspect is still lacking in the initiative, and there is criticism that it appears insufficient. I agree to a certain extent. The Washington Declaration from the ROK-US summit in April states that the only solution to the Korean Peninsula issue is dialogue and diplomacy. However, while the government consistently upholds dialogue and diplomacy as a principle, the level of its implementation is not very high. President Biden's statement at the Washington summit that North Korea's use of nuclear weapons would result in the end of its regime is a very effective deterrence measure.

This is because North Korea's regime is a one-man rule system, and the burden felt by the North Korean leadership regarding the 'end of the regime' if North Korea uses nuclear weapons is significantly greater. This has a strong deterrent effect. However, since dialogue is a core component of the Bold Initiative, it would have been more balanced if more emphasis on dialogue had been included in the summit-level discussions. So, a more expanded form, which is a very accurate point. To convey the basic principles and the precise meaning of the Bold Initiative more effectively, deterrence and renunciation are currently important, but what about dialogue and development for North Korea? Therefore, why not make it a 4D approach? Regarding the issue, shouldn't there always be a push and pull? North Korea continues to develop nuclear weapons, so

naturally, we push. It is necessary to deter and renounce their nuclear development. However, at the same time, it is clear that we also need to offer incentives for the benefits North Korea would receive if it abandoned its nuclear program. We will discuss this in more detail next time. Today, we have discussed the current government's Bold Initiative with Dr. Kim Yang-gyu. We would appreciate your thoughts on this matter. As we have newly launched our YouTube channel, your likes and subscriptions provide us with great encouragement. We kindly ask for your support.

Thank you.