Reading the Achievements of the ROK-U.S.-Japan Summit Correctly

YouTube Link: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=v-WxeOZf_1M

On August 18, Park Won-gon, Director of the EAI Center for North Korean Studies and Professor at Ewha Womans University, and Kim Yang-gyu, Senior Research Fellow at EAI, analyzed the perspectives of the three countries on North Korean issues within the three documents (Principles, Spirit, and Commitments) from the ROK-U.S.-Japan summit held at Camp David, and discussed South Korea's future response. Director Park assessed that the ROK, U.S., and Japan view the North Korean issue not just within the Korean Peninsula but within the framework of global order and international security. He emphasized that the institutionalization of regular summits and working-level meetings in this context is a very significant achievement in promoting the stability of ROK-Japan, ROK-U.S., and trilateral relations. Senior Research Fellow Kim pointed out that the 'Camp David commitments' differ fundamentally from Article 4 of the NATO Charter in that consultations to respond to threats affecting common interests and security are efforts, not obligations, and assessed that it is difficult to view it as a quasi-military alliance. Furthermore, he suggested that South Korea should cooperate with consistent principles as the U.S. pursues an integrated deterrence strategy and requests active cooperation from its allies.

■ Park Won-gon_Director of the Center for North Korean Studies, East Asia Institute. Professor of North Korean Studies at Ewha Womans University.

■ Kim Yang-gyu_Senior Research Fellow, East Asia Institute. Lecturer, Department of Political Science and International Relations, Seoul National University.

■ Managed and Edited by: Park Ji-soo, EAI Research Fellow

    Inquiries: 02 2277 1683 (ext. 208) | jspark@eai.or.kr

Video Script

Many advocating for nuclear armament in South Korea wanted the statement to include a provision that if North Korea launched a nuclear weapon, there would be a nuclear response in April. However, this was omitted. From the perspective of North Korea's regime, especially its hereditary leadership system, I believe this omission is a greater pressure on North Korea itself and conversely, a greater deterrent for us. This is regrettable, but in a situation like North Korea's, if they were to launch a nuclear attack first, they would maintain their will and capacity to wage war. Therefore, deterring war is more effectively achieved through a tailored strike against the North Korean leadership rather than attacks on the North Korean populace.

Hello and thank you for joining us for "North Korea and the World." Today, I have invited a guest for the first time. Sitting next to me is Dr. Kim Yang-gyu. Could you please introduce yourself? I am delighted to be here. Thank you. Dr. Kim, it is only natural that you should be here, given that this is hosted by the East Asia Institute. Today, we will be speaking with Dr. Kim Yang-gyu. As you all know, the channel's name is "North Korea and the World." Therefore, I believe it is a very important issue to connect the world with North Korea. The ROK-U.S.-Japan summit...

We will analyze the issues discussed at Camp David and their implications, particularly focusing on North Korea. Let's begin by discussing our overall assessment. Dr. Kim, how would you summarize the summit overall? While there weren't many entirely new elements, it felt like existing discussions were shifted from bilateral frameworks to global issues. That's correct. It can be broadly summarized into four categories: first, institutionalizing cooperation; second, security; third, economy; and fourth, the role of the ROK, U.S., and Japan as a hub in the Indo-Pacific region. All these aspects are encompassed within these four points. Another notable characteristic is the shift from the Phnom Penh Declaration in November last year, where North Korea was the primary focus of the joint statement. This time, North Korea was not the central issue. Instead, the discussion began with a broader framework of the Indo-Pacific, followed by the China-Taiwan issue, and then the North Korean issue. Therefore, in my assessment, the core of the three documents from the ROK-U.S.-Japan summit—which we refer to as the Spirit, Principles, and Commitments—lies in the convergence of the world order envisioned by the U.S., South Korea, and Japan. One aspect that particularly caught my eye was the institutionalization. Institutionalization can take many forms, but notably, the ROK-U.S.-Japan leaders agreed to meet at least once a year. Additionally, ministers from various departments will convene. The highest-level security officials will also meet regularly, with the annual meetings of leaders and security officials being firmly established. The meetings of other ministers are subject to future adjustments. However, the crucial point is that...

the ROK-U.S.-Japan leaders will meet annually, which I believe is very important. A minimum mechanism for direct communication between the leaders of South Korea and Japan has been established. Furthermore, ministerial meetings are also possible. In that regard, I believe this contributes to continuity, stability, and a reduction in uncertainty. This is also linked to ROK-Japan relations. While relations have been normalized and cooperation appears to be progressing well, we cannot be certain what might happen at any given moment. Considering the history of ROK-Japan relations, the most regrettable aspect is that when difficulties arise, dialogue becomes blocked, preventing resolution. However, within the framework of ROK-U.S.-Japan cooperation, even if ROK-Japan relations face difficulties again, they can gather and engage in dialogue. The U.S. could even play a mediating role. In that sense, it promotes stability in bilateral relations and trilateral relations. I believe this is one of the most significant outcomes. Now, Dr. Kim briefly touched upon this, but let's delve deeper into the North Korea-related discussions. What are your thoughts?

Previously, ROK-U.S. and ROK-Japan security dialogues were primarily focused on the Korean Peninsula. However, there has been a shift towards a broader alliance framework. This summit truly felt like an updated version of the Indo-Pacific strategy, with discussions focusing more on that aspect. Personally, I don't think there were any entirely new elements in the North Korea section. While various training exercises have been conducted to strengthen extended deterrence, they have not significantly deviated from expectations. However, it is clear from the structure of the documents that North Korea is not positioned at the forefront, unlike in the Phnom Penh Declaration.

And as Dr. Kim mentioned, the discussions largely reaffirm what the ROK, U.S., and Japan have been doing regarding North Korea. Many of these are continuations of previously suspended activities. Therefore, one could interpret this as a lack of new developments. However, from a slightly different perspective, I believe North Korea is being viewed within the broader framework of the U.S. and ROK-U.S.-Japan's global order and security. The East Asia Institute has been discussing the issue of integrated deterrence for some time now, and I see many echoes of that here. Integrated deterrence, as a research outcome that I have also written about, can be simply explained as follows: the ROK, U.S., and Japan, along with key U.S. allies, strengthen their networking to respond to various challenges. In the case of the ROK-U.S.-Japan, as we will discuss later, the flashpoints in the Indo-Pacific region—such as the South China Sea, Taiwan, and the Korean Peninsula—are areas where conflict could arise. Focusing on the Korean Peninsula issue, the greater the scope and level of ROK-U.S.-Japan cooperation, the stronger their response capability towards North Korea becomes. This summit has institutionalized ROK-U.S.-Japan cooperation. Did you notice the expression used? "Multi-domain" finally appeared. Multi-domain is a core concept of integrated deterrence, encompassing various domains, including cyber and space. Strengthening ROK-U.S.-Japan cooperation across these domains means that concerning North Korea, for example, if North Korea launches a satellite to develop a military reconnaissance satellite...

...or develops ICBMs, the frameworks for effectively countering these actions are being established here. Now, a question that arises is whether North Korea will react by tomorrow, as our broadcast is scheduled for then. When we assess the impact on North Korea, we primarily look at their reaction. North Korea often explains things in detail themselves. I believe there is a high possibility that North Korea will react strongly to this. This implies, conversely, that the ROK, U.S., and Japan's readiness to respond to North Korea could be significantly enhanced. Of course, these aspects depend on how concretely the ROK, U.S., and Japan further develop and implement these measures. However, the fundamental mechanism to significantly enhance the response capability towards North Korea has been established. I believe this provides a much more comprehensive and seamless approach. One thing that was notably absent, which I considered a less provocative element, was the omission of a phrase that North Korea dislikes the most. That phrase was "the end of the North Korean regime." This phrase was not included. However, as you mentioned, a significant portion of this document incorporates AI and quantum computing. These are important because the more comprehensive the surveillance and disruption capabilities become, the greater the information processing capacity. The intention is to simultaneously build the fundamental capacity to effectively process this vast amount of information.

If North Korea understands this, it represents a significant and dangerous change. Because it is a dangerous change, I am also very curious about North Korea's reaction. Conversely, North Korea's dangerous changes mean that the effectiveness of deterring North Korean nuclear weapons, from our perspective in South Korea, increases. As Dr. Kim mentioned earlier, at the ROK-U.S. summit in April, the U.S. directly mentioned the "end of the regime" in relation to North Korea. However, this is not a new U.S. policy; it was also mentioned in the Nuclear Posture Review (NPR). There was some controversy surrounding this. Many advocating for nuclear armament in South Korea wanted the statement to include a provision that if North Korea launched a nuclear weapon, there would be a nuclear response in April. However, this was omitted. From the perspective of North Korea's regime, especially its hereditary leadership system, I believe the "end of the regime" is a greater pressure on North Korea itself and conversely, a greater deterrent for us. This is regrettable, but in a situation like North Korea's, if they were to launch a nuclear attack first, and the U.S. responded with nuclear weapons, causing massive casualties among the North Korean populace, the North Korean regime, led by Kim Jong-un, would maintain its will and capacity to wage war as long as the leadership remained intact. Therefore, deterring war is more effectively achieved through a tailored strike against the North Korean leadership rather than attacks on the North Korean populace. I would like to reiterate this point. Now, let's move on to the next area, which is a controversial one. Several points have already been widely reported in the media. For the first time, the name "People's Republic of China" was mentioned, which differs from the Phnom Penh Declaration in November. At that time, China was not mentioned. This time, with the mention of the People's Republic of China and discussions about the South China Sea, these elements were included. However, if I may briefly comment, the inclusion of these points is based on the international tribunal's ruling that recognized China's illegal activities. This is already a verdict. Therefore, there is no significant issue with mentioning China. Thus, I believe that while there are considerable elements of containment towards China, a certain level of adjustment was made. I also found it interesting that our position on China remains unchanged, and the desire for a peaceful resolution of the Taiwan issue was emphasized. When I meet with Chinese scholars, I always suggest adding this phrase: instead of always speaking negatively, saying "we oppose, we oppose," it is better to say "we hope for a peaceful resolution." This is less offensive. I recall saying this, and such a phrase appeared for the first time, which I found very interesting. Finally, let's discuss the third document, the Commitments, which has led to much debate about whether it signifies a quasi-alliance or a move towards a NATO-style alliance. Dr. Kim, what are your thoughts?

So, deterrence means producing research results. I have also written something, but I will explain it very simply. It's like this: the US, along with its core allies like South Korea and Japan, strengthens their networking to respond to various challenging elements. For instance, in the case of South Korea-Japan-US, which I will discuss shortly, it concerns flashpoints in the Indo-Pacific region, such as potential conflicts in the South China Sea, Taiwan, and the Korean Peninsula. If we focus solely on the Korean Peninsula issue, the stronger the cooperation between South Korea, Japan, and the US, and the higher the level of their cooperation, the greater their capacity to respond to North Korea becomes. This time, as you may have seen, the cooperation between South Korea, Japan, and the US has been elevated, and the expression that appeared this time – have you seen it? – is 'multi-domain.' This 'multi-domain,' which includes cyber and space, is a core concept of deterrence. Strengthening cooperation between South Korea, Japan, and the US across these entire domains means that, from North Korea's perspective, their actions, such as launching satellites to develop military reconnaissance satellites,

or developing ICBMs, can be countered more effectively within a larger framework. So, we are curious, and it seems our broadcast will be aired by tomorrow. Will North Korea react by tomorrow? When we assess the impact on North Korea, we primarily look at their reaction. North Korea often explains it in detail themselves. I believe there is a high possibility that North Korea will react strongly to this. This implies, conversely, that the readiness of South Korea, Japan, and the US against North Korea could be significantly

enhanced. Of course, the extent to which these details are further specified and implemented by South Korea, Japan, and the US remains to be seen. However, overall, I believe that the fundamental mechanism to significantly enhance their capacity to respond to North Korea has been established this time. If it is done more meticulously, in a truly seamless and granular manner, then I think what I considered to be a relatively less provocative element this time is that the expression North Korea dislikes the most was not included.

That expression was 'the end of the North Korean regime.' That expression was not included. This means that if North Korea uses nuclear weapons, there was a possibility that their regime could end. However, as you mentioned, a significant portion of this document involves AI and quantum computing. These are important because the more comprehensive surveillance becomes, the greater the information processing capacity needed. It means they are simultaneously developing the fundamental capability to effectively process that vast amount of information.

I completely agree. In this inflection point, where the situation is changing, the most important factor is principles. What is South Korea's grand strategy, and what are its guiding principles? It is crucial to proceed consistently based on these principles. Overall, both Dr. Kim and I agree that the ROK-U.S.-Japan summit at Camp David has many positive aspects and significant meaning. However, the crucial point is how to implement and sustain this moving forward. When will the next meeting take place, given that it is annual? It will be either this year or next. South Korea has already expressed its desire to host it. I believe this is very important. The format and nature of that meeting will be determined. If the second meeting is successful, it will essentially become institutionalized. For example, a ROK-U.S.-Japan summit that is not solely focused on this issue, but rather a dedicated meeting for ROK-U.S.-Japan, would be meaningful. If the second meeting is held in such a manner, it can continue to the third and fourth meetings. Therefore, the second meeting is very important. We will conclude today's discussion here. Please remember to like and subscribe; this encourages us to continue our work. Thank you. I would also like to thank Dr. Kim for joining us today. We will now conclude. Thank you.

I previously stated that August 18th would mark a turning point, dividing history into before and after. When I heard that, I immediately thought of NATO. I had anticipated that such elements would be included. However, the question is how to interpret the level of commitment in these documents. I believe the third document is quite interesting. It is mentioned in the Camp David Principles, but it was extracted and formed into a separate document. There were reportedly differing opinions on the final title. The U.S. favored including the word "duty," while South Korea preferred "commitment." This reveals considerable deliberation. The core objective is to coordinate government responses to regional challenges, provocations, and threats. South Korea is cooperating. However, the second paragraph states that this does not bind them to mutual defense treaties like the ROK-U.S. Mutual Defense Treaty or the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty. This means it is not an obligation but rather a voluntary action if needed. This reflects the government's considerations. Given the persistent landmines in ROK-Japan relations and unresolved issues, South Korea cannot help but feel considerable pressure regarding a move towards an alliance with Japan. Therefore, the commitments themselves were designed to allow for conservative interpretations. This was likely reflected in the final deliberations. In my view, the content bears similarities to Article 4 of the NATO Charter. If Article 4 is invoked, Article 5 can be triggered. Articles 4 and 5 are closely linked. However, the commitments adopted this time do not include any elements of Article 5; they are solely based on Article 4, with some modifications. It is written more cautiously than the ROK-U.S. Mutual Defense Treaty, which we discussed earlier. Therefore, it is difficult for China to worry about this in the way they might fear. This is the core point. While some have already labeled this a quasi-alliance or a mini-NATO, I believe there is currently neither the will nor the intention for such a development. Furthermore, I believe it will be quite difficult for South Korea and Japan to move towards an alliance in the future. This is my basic assessment.

Therefore, this time, there is confusion about the term "quasi-alliance." I am not sure what a quasi-alliance is. The generally accepted definition of an alliance is a military alliance. In a military alliance, countries are obligated to assist their allies if attacked by an enemy. However, these commitments do not contain such provisions. The emphasis on mutual consultation is, in my opinion, very important. While the government may have its concerns, from the perspective of civilian scholars like myself and research institutions, we can speak more freely. The regional challenges, provocations, and threats mentioned here are well-known. The primary military challenges in the Indo-Pacific are three: the Taiwan Strait issue, the South China Sea issue, and the North Korean nuclear issue. If a crisis occurs in the Taiwan Strait, and South Korea becomes involved, or if a threat arises on the Korean Peninsula and the Japan Self-Defense Forces enter our territory or airspace, these are ongoing concerns. There is growing suspicion about these matters. I believe it is time for the ROK, U.S., and Japan to discuss these issues frankly, not necessarily publicly, but at a deeper level. This is because, as we briefly discussed, the U.S. has designated the Indo-Pacific as a single theater of operations. Therefore, if conflicts arise in these three regions within the Indo-Pacific, the U.S. will utilize its forward-deployed assets to respond. For example, if a crisis occurs in the Taiwan Strait, assets from U.S. Forces Korea and U.S. Forces Japan will be utilized. This falls under the responsibility of INDOPACOM. Consequently, the Taiwan issue is inevitably linked to the Korean Peninsula issue. Similarly, all these are closely interconnected. Therefore, South Korea needs to discuss this within this framework. For instance, if a crisis occurs in the Taiwan Strait, what plans does the U.S. have for utilizing U.S. Forces Korea or U.S. Forces Japan? To what extent can South Korea cooperate, and where are the boundaries beyond which it cannot cooperate? It is necessary to draw such lines and discuss them. The issue of the Japan Self-Defense Forces is similar. If the Japan Self-Defense Forces enter our territorial waters or airspace, we must clearly draw the line, stating that this is not permissible, and then identify areas of cooperation. I believe these aspects are necessary. Therefore, although there is much debate surrounding these commitments, I consider them a significant achievement that allows us to discuss situations we previously found uncomfortable and avoided more directly. Finally, as we conclude, let's discuss the future direction. What should be done moving forward? How should these developments be managed, particularly regarding the containment of China, which will likely provoke a backlash from China and North Korea? Dr. Kim, please begin. We haven't had much time to discuss economic and climate change issues, which are also significant. However, the early warning system extends beyond just North Korean missiles; it also includes consultations when supply chain disruptions occur, and this is related to China. While we are cautious about using economic leverage, is this...

I recall that being discussed, and such an expression appeared for the first time. I found it very interesting. Lastly, let's discuss the third joint statement, which is the core of the matter. There is much discussion about whether this constitutes a quasi-alliance or if South Korea, Japan, and the US are moving towards a NATO-style alliance. Let's discuss this finally. Dr. Kim, what are your thoughts? Ultimately, I believe it will be a period of decisive change, divided into before and after August 18th. When I heard that statement, what came to my mind was NATO.

I had expected it to be included, but these two points are bundled together. To what extent should we interpret the level of commitment? I believe the third document is quite interesting. This is because it is based on the principles of the Camp David Accords, but it has been extracted and formulated into a single document. As has been reported in the media, there were differing opinions on how to finalize the title. The US favored including the word 'duty,' while South Korea preferred 'commitment.' Therefore, reading this content reveals various considerations. The core objective is to coordinate government responses to regional challenges, provocations, and threats, and to cooperate with South Korea and Japan. However, the second paragraph states that this does not bind them to a mutual defense treaty between South Korea and the US, or between the US and Japan.

In other words, it is not an obligation but rather something done voluntarily when necessary. These contents reflect the government's considerations. Given the persistent difficulties in South Korea-Japan relations and the unresolved issues between them, there is considerable apprehension about South Korea and Japan moving towards an alliance. Therefore, the commitment itself has been formulated in a way that allows for very conservative interpretations. This is likely because the content that required finalization was reflected in it. From my perspective, the content is indeed similar to Article 4 of the NATO Treaty. Article 5 can only be invoked if Article 4 is invoked, meaning Articles 4 and 5 are closely linked. However, in the case of the commitment adopted this time, there is no content corresponding to Article 5; it is entirely absent. While it resembles Article 4, the nuances are different.

Indeed. I fully agree with that sentiment. Moving forward, as we discussed at the beginning, the most important thing in this changing situation is principles. What is South Korea's grand strategy, and what are its guiding principles? It is crucial to proceed consistently based on these principles. Overall, both Dr. Kim and I agree that the ROK-U.S.-Japan summit at Camp David has many positive aspects and significant meaning. However, the crucial point is how to implement and sustain this moving forward. When will the next meeting take place, given that it is annual? It will be either this year or next. South Korea has already expressed its desire to host it. I believe this is very important. The format and nature of that meeting will be determined. If the second meeting is successful, it will essentially become institutionalized. For example, a ROK-U.S.-Japan summit that is not solely focused on this issue, but rather a dedicated meeting for ROK-U.S.-Japan, would be meaningful. If the second meeting is held in such a manner, it can continue to the third and fourth meetings. Therefore, the second meeting is very important. We will conclude today's discussion here. Please remember to like and subscribe; this encourages us to continue our work. Thank you. I would also like to thank Dr. Kim for joining us today. We will now conclude. Thank you.

Therefore, this time, there is confusion about the term "quasi-alliance." I am not sure what a quasi-alliance is. The generally accepted definition of an alliance is a military alliance. In a military alliance, countries are obligated to assist their allies if attacked by an enemy. However, these commitments do not contain such provisions. The emphasis on mutual consultation is, in my opinion, very important. While the government may have its concerns, from the perspective of civilian scholars like myself and research institutions, we can speak more freely. The regional challenges, provocations, and threats mentioned here are well-known. The primary military challenges in the Indo-Pacific are three: the Taiwan Strait issue, the South China Sea issue, and the North Korean nuclear issue. If a crisis occurs in the Taiwan Strait, and South Korea becomes involved, or if a threat arises on the Korean Peninsula and the Japan Self-Defense Forces enter our territory or airspace, these are ongoing concerns. There is growing suspicion about these matters. I believe it is time for the ROK, U.S., and Japan to discuss these issues frankly, not necessarily publicly, but at a deeper level. This is because, as we briefly discussed, the U.S. has designated the Indo-Pacific as a single theater of operations. Therefore, if conflicts arise in these three regions within the Indo-Pacific, the U.S. will utilize its forward-deployed assets to respond. For example, if a crisis occurs in the Taiwan Strait, assets from U.S. Forces Korea and U.S. Forces Japan will be utilized. This falls under the responsibility of INDOPACOM. Consequently, the Taiwan issue is inevitably linked to the Korean Peninsula issue. Similarly, all these are closely interconnected. Therefore, South Korea needs to discuss this within this framework. For instance, if a crisis occurs in the Taiwan Strait, what plans does the U.S. have for utilizing U.S. Forces Korea or U.S. Forces Japan? To what extent can South Korea cooperate, and where are the boundaries beyond which it cannot cooperate? It is necessary to draw such lines and discuss them. The issue of the Japan Self-Defense Forces is similar. If the Japan Self-Defense Forces enter our territorial waters or airspace, we must clearly draw the line, stating that this is not permissible, and then identify areas of cooperation. I believe these aspects are necessary. Therefore, although there is much debate surrounding these commitments, I consider them a significant achievement that allows us to discuss situations we previously found uncomfortable and avoided more directly. Finally, as we conclude, let's discuss the future direction. What should be done moving forward? How should these developments be managed, particularly regarding the containment of China, which will likely provoke a backlash from China and North Korea? Dr. Kim, please begin. We haven't had much time to discuss economic and climate change issues, which are also significant. However, the early warning system extends beyond just North Korean missiles; it also includes consultations when supply chain disruptions occur, and this is related to China. While we are cautious about using economic leverage, is this...

...a new Cold War era? Some argue that we are being drawn into a Cold War mentality. This is not a Cold War logic uniting us. What I want to emphasize is that the U.S.'s national strategy already operates on a global scale. They prefer the term "operating system." The U.S. is already moving in this direction. We cannot change this direction. The U.S. is maximizing its capabilities and integrating them tightly, seeking cooperation from its allies. What we cannot ignore is that the U.S. is scrutinizing the commitments of its allies, almost as if a professor is testing students' homework. They are using slightly different terminology. They are indirectly exerting pressure. For example, when we released the ROK-Japan agreement, there was a sudden press conference that felt uncomfortable. Looking at such instances, we are perhaps moving too slowly. Nevertheless, when global changes exert pressure on us, how are we preparing? If we do not prepare in advance, we may be overwhelmed by the atmosphere and pressure. Therefore, I believe this is a time for careful consideration, preparation, and response regarding how we will formulate our position and handle these matters.

I completely agree. In this inflection point, where the situation is changing, the most important factor is principles. What is South Korea's grand strategy, and what are its guiding principles? It is crucial to proceed consistently based on these principles. Overall, both Dr. Kim and I agree that the ROK-U.S.-Japan summit at Camp David has many positive aspects and significant meaning. However, the crucial point is how to implement and sustain this moving forward. When will the next meeting take place, given that it is annual? It will be either this year or next. South Korea has already expressed its desire to host it. I believe this is very important. The format and nature of that meeting will be determined. If the second meeting is successful, it will essentially become institutionalized. For example, a ROK-U.S.-Japan summit that is not solely focused on this issue, but rather a dedicated meeting for ROK-U.S.-Japan, would be meaningful. If the second meeting is held in such a manner, it can continue to the third and fourth meetings. Therefore, the second meeting is very important. We will conclude today's discussion here. Please remember to like and subscribe; this encourages us to continue our work. Thank you. I would also like to thank Dr. Kim for joining us today. We will now conclude. Thank you.

Indeed. I fully agree with that sentiment. Moving forward, as we discussed at the beginning, the most important thing in this changing situation is principles. What is South Korea's grand strategy, and what are its guiding principles? It is crucial to proceed consistently based on these principles. Overall, both Dr. Kim and I agree that the ROK-U.S.-Japan summit at Camp David has many positive aspects and significant meaning. However, the crucial point is how to implement and sustain this moving forward. When will the next meeting take place, given that it is annual? It will be either this year or next. South Korea has already expressed its desire to host it. I believe this is very important. The format and nature of that meeting will be determined. If the second meeting is successful, it will essentially become institutionalized. For example, a ROK-U.S.-Japan summit that is not solely focused on this issue, but rather a dedicated meeting for ROK-U.S.-Japan, would be meaningful. If the second meeting is held in such a manner, it can continue to the third and fourth meetings. Therefore, the second meeting is very important. We will conclude today's discussion here. Please remember to like and subscribe; this encourages us to continue our work. Thank you. I would also like to thank Dr. Kim for joining us today. We will now conclude. Thank you.

I completely agree. Moving forward, as we discussed at the beginning, the most important factor in this changing situation is principles. What is South Korea's grand strategy, and what are its guiding principles? It is crucial to proceed consistently based on these principles. Overall, both Dr. Kim and I agree that the ROK-U.S.-Japan summit at Camp David has many positive aspects and significant meaning. However, the crucial point is how to implement and sustain this moving forward. When will the next meeting take place, given that it is annual? It will be either this year or next. South Korea has already expressed its desire to host it. I believe this is very important. The format and nature of that meeting will be determined. If the second meeting is successful, it will essentially become institutionalized. For example, a ROK-U.S.-Japan summit that is not solely focused on this issue, but rather a dedicated meeting for ROK-U.S.-Japan, would be meaningful. If the second meeting is held in such a manner, it can continue to the third and fourth meetings. Therefore, the second meeting is very important. We will conclude today's discussion here. Please remember to like and subscribe; this encourages us to continue our work. Thank you. I would also like to thank Dr. Kim for joining us today. We will now conclude. Thank you.

Indeed. I fully agree with that sentiment. Moving forward, as we discussed at the beginning, the most important thing in this changing situation is principles. What is South Korea's grand strategy, and what are its guiding principles? It is crucial to proceed consistently based on these principles. Overall, both Dr. Kim and I agree that the ROK-U.S.-Japan summit at Camp David has many positive aspects and significant meaning. However, the crucial point is how to implement and sustain this moving forward. When will the next meeting take place, given that it is annual? It will be either this year or next. South Korea has already expressed its desire to host it. I believe this is very important. The format and nature of that meeting will be determined. If the second meeting is successful, it will essentially become institutionalized. For example, a ROK-U.S.-Japan summit that is not solely focused on this issue, but rather a dedicated meeting for ROK-U.S.-Japan, would be meaningful. If the second meeting is held in such a manner, it can continue to the third and fourth meetings. Therefore, the second meeting is very important. We will conclude today's discussion here. Please remember to like and subscribe; this encourages us to continue our work. Thank you. I would also like to thank Dr. Kim for joining us today. We will now conclude. Thank you.

Indeed. I fully agree with that sentiment. Moving forward, as we discussed at the beginning, the most important thing in this changing situation is principles. What is South Korea's grand strategy, and what are its guiding principles? It is crucial to proceed consistently based on these principles. Overall, both Dr. Kim and I agree that the ROK-U.S.-Japan summit at Camp David has many positive aspects and significant meaning. However, the crucial point is how to implement and sustain this moving forward. When will the next meeting take place, given that it is annual? It will be either this year or next. South Korea has already expressed its desire to host it. I believe this is very important. The format and nature of that meeting will be determined. If the second meeting is successful, it will essentially become institutionalized. For example, a ROK-U.S.-Japan summit that is not solely focused on this issue, but rather a dedicated meeting for ROK-U.S.-Japan, would be meaningful. If the second meeting is held in such a manner, it can continue to the third and fourth meetings. Therefore, the second meeting is very important. We will conclude today's discussion here. Please remember to like and subscribe; this encourages us to continue our work. Thank you. I would also like to thank Dr. Kim for joining us today. We will now conclude. Thank you.

Indeed. I fully agree with that sentiment. Moving forward, as we discussed at the beginning, the most important thing in this changing situation is principles. What is South Korea's grand strategy, and what are its guiding principles? It is crucial to proceed consistently based on these principles. Overall, both Dr. Kim and I agree that the ROK-U.S.-Japan summit at Camp David has many positive aspects and significant meaning. However, the crucial point is how to implement and sustain this moving forward. When will the next meeting take place, given that it is annual? It will be either this year or next. South Korea has already expressed its desire to host it. I believe this is very important. The format and nature of that meeting will be determined. If the second meeting is successful, it will essentially become institutionalized. For example, a ROK-U.S.-Japan summit that is not solely focused on this issue, but rather a dedicated meeting for ROK-U.S.-Japan, would be meaningful. If the second meeting is held in such a manner, it can continue to the third and fourth meetings. Therefore, the second meeting is very important. We will conclude today's discussion here. Please remember to like and subscribe; this encourages us to continue our work. Thank you. I would also like to thank Dr. Kim for joining us today. We will now conclude. Thank you.