[5th EAI Academy] ④ Korea-Japan Relations Read Through Four Keywords 2032

YouTube 링크 : https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=oNes2FymoFk

■ Yeol YoProfessor at Yonsei University's Graduate School of International Studies and Director of the East Asia Institute. He has served as Dean of Yonsei University's Graduate School of International Studies, Head of the Underwood International College, Director of the Institute for Sustainable Development, and Director of the Institute for International Studies. He was also President of the Korean Association of International Studies (2019) and President of the Korean Association for Japanese Studies (2012). He has held fellowships as a Fulbright, MacArthur, Japan Foundation, and Senior Fellow at Waseda University's Advanced Research Center. He has served as an advisor to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Korea National Diplomatic Academy, the Northeast Asian History Foundation, and the Korea Foundation, as well as a specialist member of the Presidential Committee for North-East Asian Cooperation. He holds a Ph.D. in Political Science from the University of Chicago and has been a professor at Chung-Ang University, a specially invited professor at the University of Tokyo, and a visiting scholar at the University of North Carolina (Chapel Hill) and the University of California (Berkeley). His research areas include Japanese foreign policy, international political economy, East Asian international politics, and public diplomacy.

Recent publications include "Conditions for Presidential Success in 2022" (2021, co-edited), "Policy Recommendations for the New Government's Foreign Policy in 2022" (2021, co-edited), "The Global Appeal of BTS" (2021, co-edited), "Korea's Choices After the Crisis" (2021, co-edited), Japan and Asia's Contested Order (2019, with T. J. Pempel), Understanding Public Diplomacy in East Asia (2016, with Jan Melissen), “South Korea under US-China Rivalry: the Dynamics of the Economic-Security Nexus in the Trade Policymaking,” The Pacific Review 23, 6 (2019), and "Korea's Middle Power Diplomacy" (2017, co-edited).

Video Script

What exactly is this 2032? Suddenly, there's talk of 2030, 2040, 2050, 2060, but why 2032? Aren't you curious? Well, I'm not particularly curious either, but the reason I wrote 2032 is related to the "Decisive Decade" mentioned below. Last fall, as Biden's prospects in the midterm elections began to dim, it was stated that a "Decisive Decade" had begun, one that would determine the future world order. This decisive decade is crucially about competition with China. How we shape the world order amidst strategic competition with China is a critical turning point in world history and crucial for America's prosperity and security. And whose historical decision is it? It's Xi Jinping's, right? He had his third term last year.

I ask China experts if it will end in three years. China usually does two terms, right? They followed Deng Xiaoping's established rule for ten years, but that was broken last year. Given the circumstances of COVID-19, he is now 69 years old. Even if he serves a fourth term, he is younger than the current Biden or Trump. So, for 10 years, China's 10 years – how will Korea fare? In my subjective judgment, the current political order will likely last for 10 years.

Unless there's impeachment, the current administration will likely last until 2027. My prediction or hope is that it will be wrong, but I don't see the political landscape in Korea changing significantly even in 2027. Conversely, this means that generational change might not occur. Then, after enduring five years of hardship, we will likely reach around 2032. Japan has a parliamentary system, so depending on the general election, there are snap elections. Nevertheless, the current LDP's dominant system, the one-party dominance system, is unlikely to change easily.

The '203' is not specific to Japan, but the US itself talks about 10 years, and this side (referring to Korea) is looking at 5 or 10 years, and Korea is also looking at 5 or 10 years. Japan, on the other hand, seems unlikely to see major changes within about 10 years, so I thought there might be a change in about 10 years, hence 2032. You can disagree, or think whatever you want, but the reason I mention 2032 is because your future doesn't end in 2032.

Your future might end around then, but I believe it's a decisive decade for your future. If things don't change for 20 years, or if the immense driving force for change doesn't erupt 10 years from now, the current situation will likely continue. If you are a proponent of maintaining the status quo and wish for this to continue, then it might. However, I don't believe this status quo will be maintained. I've said this before, and I will discuss it today. If Japan continues on its current path, it cannot be said to be "surviving"; it cannot maintain its current living standards, its current safety, or its prosperity. If it continues like this, that's what I'm going to talk about from now on. Therefore, Japan's grand strategy – the 20th century and the 21st century. I have a chapter on this, which is about to be published. I will discuss some points from that chapter, and based on that, I will discuss the future of Korea-Japan relations through the four keywords: peace, prosperity, reconciliation, and coexistence.

I will proceed with this discussion. We've already spent 20 minutes, so I'll just move on. Looking at this graph, it's a survey from 1919. In 19, the Japan Center for Economic Research (JCER) made a projection using IMF data, not independently. This is widely used. It projects that China's GDP will overtake the US GDP in 2034. That's the top graph, right? And what's interesting is that around 2060, a reversal is expected to occur.

The reason for this is demographics. China is facing a double whammy of low birth rates and an aging population. As you'll see later, China's population is declining, while the US remains young, and India is a younger, larger nation. Therefore, this graph may have a slight demographic bias. As I am not an economist, I cannot provide authoritative interpretations of GDP calculations and projections regarding demographic factors and labor force. However, it's evident even at a glance that population factors are significantly considered when comparing China, India, and the US. Of course, there can be counterarguments to this, but I believe it's important. I will discuss it later. Looking at this, consider the future. Up to around 2030, and then to 2040, the economic powers rise.

China, the US, and India will be in that order. If we draw a line at 2040, India stands out. India's GDP will rise to about 40% of China's and the US's. In 2008, after the subprime mortgage crisis and the global financial crisis originating on Wall Street, China's GDP reached 40% of the US's. In the 1980s, Japan's economy was booming, and the US felt threatened. They thought, "This is dangerous." Japan's GDP reached 40% of the US's. So, what did the US do? They signed the Plaza Accord, which drastically revalued the yen, making it difficult for Japan to export and forcing them to import more. A year or two later, Japan's GDP reached 70% of the US's GDP.

That was due to the exchange rate, but it was an artificial exchange rate. India reaching 40% is projected to happen around 2040 in this graph. So, what do you think? We are completely immersed in the US-China strategic competition, the US-China hegemony competition. In fact, it's unavoidable, as Korea is situated on the fault line of this competition. The Korean Peninsula is within the sphere of influence of the US-China competition. So, while not completely saturated with US-China competition, we are indeed in the eye of the storm, so to speak. Therefore, we tend to understand many issues by framing them within the context of US-China competition. However, if you look at this graph with a longer-term perspective, for those of you in your 30s, 40s, and 50s, and up to 2050 – aren't most of you born in the millennium?

After 2000, right? So, it's easy to calculate. In 2050, you'll be around 50. It changes like this. The reason I'm elaborating on this is that Goldman Sachs' projections from 2022 are also relatively similar. But that's not what I want to focus on; I want to focus on this. If you look at the box on the far right, the one we're interested in, roughly from 2023 to 2050, yellow China starts to decline around 2030, while the US declines gently from 2020. Yellow Europe, the total EU, is also gradually declining. So, as you can see from this graph, the crossover between the EU and China already occurred around 2020.

Below that is India, and below that is ASEAN. Comparing the situation around 2020 with the situation in 2034-2050, what do you see? With some rising and some falling, they are much more clustered. What would you call this? It's not US-China hegemony competition, is it? Economically speaking, would you call this polarization or multipolarization? Perhaps this is related to the world order discussions you've had recently. The future world order – what will we call it? It's no longer bipolar.

Right. So, in such an era, how should a nation's grand strategy, not just world strategy, be formulated? This is roughly what we'll discuss. For instance, as we'll touch upon later, Japan talks about the Indo-Pacific. Suddenly, the Indo-Pacific – what is this unfamiliar space? We at the East Asia Institute have even submitted an Indo-Pacific Strategy report to the government since last year. Looking at this graph, it makes sense, doesn't it? The growth centers in this graph are India and Southeast Asia.

The US and China, and the EU are gradually declining. This is the kind of order that will emerge. Therefore, we must begin our discussion with these factors in mind. I will move on from this. I will briefly review Japan's foreign policy strategies over the next two pages. We need to understand this to comprehend Japan's future or present. You've all studied Japanese political science or Japanese foreign policy, right? So, I don't want to go into excessive detail, but I will share my perspective on why I initially focused on Japan. The environment in which Japan has lived for the past 100 years was that it was in the "world" until 1945, and then from around 1948, it truly entered the American world, the world of the US. The "American Century" is another name for American hegemony, and that hegemony was centered around the Pacific order, the space of the Pacific. And as the Pacific became the Atlantic, these were all US-led orders.

The definition of hegemony, as used by American policymakers, is as follows: If there is a country, hegemony defines its external boundaries. But these boundaries are drawn quite broadly, allowing a specific actor, a specific country, to utilize its talents well. However, if that boundary is crossed, the hegemonic power will strike. Japan has grown within this framework.

If it tries to cross that framework, the US will inevitably intervene, like using a bat in a game. For example, when Japanese semiconductors grew excessively, the US, through the US-Japan Semiconductor Agreement, imposed restrictions. When China began to rise and Toyota became too large, the US, through the US-Japan Auto Agreement, imposed quantity restrictions. These are examples of what the US has done in terms of its hegemonic boundaries. Within those boundaries, they say this: Japan must not grow to the point of threatening core US interests. This is the concept of hegemony. In that sense, you've studied China, right? The US allowed China to grow within the US hegemonic order, making it a growth center. That's fine, but it shouldn't grow to the point of threatening US interests.

That was the US assessment about 10 years ago. They decided it wouldn't work. That is American hegemony, and Japan grew within it. Within that growth, there were such developments. I won't repeat them here. After 1945, if we talk about Japan's grand strategy, we cannot overlook the "Yoshida Doctrine." It is both a foreign policy and an economic strategy. The content is attributed to Prime Minister Yoshida. Yoshida's doctrine was that during the Cold War, through the alliance with the US, US forces would be stationed in Japan, allowing Japan to avoid spending on defense and focus on economic recovery and development.

Therefore, with minimal armament and the Self-Defense Forces kept to a minimum, relying on the US military for the rest, Japan pursued an economy-first strategy. This is the Yoshida Doctrine, and it is considered a grand strategy. In other words, while it might appear as a US-subordinate diplomacy on one hand, it was a national strategy that maximized Japan's capabilities within its international strategic environment at the time. However, as Japan's national strength grew, it became difficult to maintain this approach indefinitely. Domestically, questions arose: Why should we continue to depend on the alliance? Why should US forces remain in Japan like an occupying force, enjoying extraterritorial status through unequal treaties? Why is this necessary? Critically, Japan is an independent nation and the world's second-largest economy. Is there any historical precedent for the world's second-largest economy being subordinate to the world's largest military power? Do you understand what I mean? Is it logical for the second-largest economy to invite the military of the largest military power onto its territory and ask for protection? Naturally, such questions would arise.

This is the post-Cold War era. In the post-Cold War era, what strategy did the US pursue? It's written here as the "unipolar moment." Why "moment"? Because it was truly a moment. While we talk about a unipolar system, the period in history when the US had sole global hegemony was very short. You might have heard this comparison between Rome and the US. Compared to Rome's long hegemony, the US's unipolar moment was brief. In the Pacific, the US was hegemonic, but globally, it wasn't entirely so. They tried to establish a global unipolar system, but ultimately failed. The core of that failure was the attempt to inject American values worldwide, particularly to Japan, the second-largest economy. This included criticism of Japanese capitalism and Japanese values. In Japan at the time, these criticisms were perceived as an attack using values to undermine their position and an attempt to suppress them. This led to a gradual backlash and reaction in Japan. This occurred in the early post-Cold War period. Thus, the American-led economic model, neoliberal globalization, and American values like liberal democracy, individual rights, etc., were emphasized as global standards that everyone should follow.

To achieve prosperity, this model was promoted. However, a backlash against this emerged globally, and Japan was no exception. This can be considered Japan's 20th century. We've just finished the 20th century in about 10 minutes, and we'll finish the 21st century in another 10 minutes. The major global changes – you can probably understand them by reading the text. The decline of American hegemony is an undeniable fact, isn't it? As I mentioned with the "unipolar moment," after that moment passed, there was a relative decline, while China's rise was relative, and India is also emerging. Overall, we can speak of a simultaneous rise in Asia. Wasn't there a massive power shift globally during the period when the US possessed overwhelming military and economic power?

Towards Asia. If the US had created a global governance system that incorporated the voices of Japan and other established powers, and said, "This is the global standard, follow it," the world might be different now. The debates about the world order that emerged in the lectures you attended before this one have likely taken shape. The US missed its opportunity, China is emerging, and India is slowly following. What happened to Japan in this context? Represented by Abe, the image shown is an election poster. In 2012, the LDP won the election and regained power. Abe became Prime Minister for the second time, embarking on a path of long-term rule. This marked a change in Japan.

If you look at this, doesn't it resemble the rise of Trump if you replace "Japan" with "US" and make a few other changes? Yes, this is a global process. As Japan fell into prolonged recession and its capitalist model faced criticism, its economy, and similarly its military strength, experienced a relative decline in national power. Directly confronting its neighbors, China and Korea – China, which it defeated 100 years ago in the Sino-Japanese War, and Korea, which it colonized – China already surpassed Japan in 2010, and Korea has continued to rise. Experiencing these directly has led to a resurgence of retro-nationalism, do you understand what I mean? And this has a significantly reactionary character. It's about restoring Japan's past greatness, as we see with Trump or Macron. Restoring that glory is fine, but the process of restoration creates problems with countries like Korea and China, who were harmed by that glorious past.

In other words, if the period of colonization and rule over Korea was Japan's glorious past, what does that make Korea? It's partly your glory, but for us, it's a humiliation. There's clearly something wrong, and historical debates are inevitable. This is where it originates. The right-wing nationalist forces believe that the "glorious past" is ultimately based on traditional values – Japanese traditional values – and a political system, social order, and cultural traditions based on them.

The essence is that these must be restored. So, Abe came to power with two main goals: first, to shed the post-war system. "Shedding" means to break free from it. The post-war system, in this context, refers to the system established by the US occupation forces in 1945, which judged Japan's past through the victor's justice. They portrayed Japan's glorious past negatively, as a dark history created by the US, and this must end.

And what is the symbol of this? The constitution written by Americans must be rewritten by the Japanese people. Constitutional revision, for these people, is about: China is growing, North Korea is developing missiles, Japan's security is at risk, but we don't know if the US will protect us, so we need to strengthen our own capabilities. But the constitutional structure is problematic. From a strategic realist perspective, they argue for constitutional revision. You might think that way, but they are using that logic. Fundamentally, constitutional revision signifies the end of the post-war system, the revival of Japanese order, and the regaining of a glorious Japan through it.

There are questions later from someone who asked. The majority of Japanese citizens do not agree with this. What about the military? But why does this person remain in power? Because they gain popularity elsewhere, or the opposition is too weak. I'll address that later. Thus, as this kind of nationalism rises, a politician like Shinzo Abe emerges to the forefront of Japanese politics. This has brought about many changes. That's what has happened over the past decade.

The core point is this: The future world envisioned by the ruling elite centered around Abe is as described. They saw it correctly. So, that's how it turned out, although the graph wasn't drawn at the moment they held power; it was a projection. American hegemony is relatively declining. Therefore, the Pacific or the Indo-Pacific is not enough. That concept of space is now... So, Abe introduced the concept of the Indo-Pacific. The Indo-Pacific refers to the space combining the Indian Ocean and the Pacific Ocean. What is the core? Maritime – two oceans plus.

The core is written here, and as you can see, the future of the world as seen by the ruling power centered around Abe is the same as before. They saw it well, and that's how it turned out. However, the graph was not drawn at the moment they existed; it was a prediction. US hegemony is relatively declining. Therefore, it's not enough to focus only on the Pacific or Asia-Pacific. That's why Abe introduced the concept of the Indo-Pacific. The Indo-Pacific refers to the combined space of the Indian Ocean and the Pacific Ocean. What is the core idea? It's the union of the two oceans.

The Indian Ocean and the Pacific Ocean. The Indian Ocean is far from us, and the Pacific Ocean – where is our Pacific? Do we border the Pacific? The East Sea is part of the Pacific, but we don't call it the Pacific, do we? However, the Japanese call the waters east of Japan the Pacific, and the Sea of Japan the Sea of Japan. There are such differences, but the core concept is maritime. The Indo-Pacific is, as President Yoon mentioned, a space where universal values are realized.

There are two aspects. This space has been conceptualized, and many countries are now following or participating in it. Is China a continental power or a maritime power? When I studied in the US, I was taught that China is a "continental state." A continental power. The new space, the maritime space – if one has a maritime identity, China's position there is relatively diminished, right? You've probably seen maps of the Western Pacific. If you flip that map upside down, you'll see not just mainland China and the Pacific, but if you flip it like this, with China here, then the Korean Peninsula here, and Japan partially covering it, and then the southwestern islands of Japan, stretching from Kyushu, including Okinawa, and continuing all the way to the end, to Senkaku and Diaoyu Islands, which are disputed territories, and then further out, Yonaguni Island, which is close to Taiwan.

Then there's Taiwan. Not far from Taiwan are the Philippines. Japan extends this way. Here, Japan is an ally of the US, and US forces are stationed here. Okinawa, where a large portion of the US forces in Japan are located (one-fifth of the total), is right in front of China on this map. Taiwan is next to it, and then the Philippines, with US military bases there. So, the sea is blocked. China is now developing a blue-water navy and is trying to expand outwards, but it constantly clashes with the US and Japan. Therefore, they are turning sideways, building artificial islands in the South China Sea to make it their maritime route, and so on. The point is, historically, it's difficult to see this as a maritime power.

While they aspire to become a maritime power now, this concept is not particularly appealing to China. Second, regarding universal values, or liberal values – these are quite distant from China's values. Therefore, if it's a space that emphasizes these values, China will remain a secondary power. So, this is a spatial strategy. By defining space in this way, a hierarchy is naturally established within that defined space, and what is important and what is less important becomes clear. That's the essence of a spatial strategy, and the Indo-Pacific is such a space. That's why China rejects the Indo-Pacific.

There are three countries in the world that reject the Indo-Pacific and do not use the term. They are all around us: China, North Korea, and Russia. Until just a year ago, South Korea also did not use it. It was a very unique case. Considering China and others, Japan, therefore, this is the 21st century. While the strategy in the past was about economic recovery and growth and maintaining alliances, Abe's grand strategy in the 21st century is about strengthening deterrence – self-strengthening, enhancing military capabilities. That's why, with the release of Japan's national security and defense strategies last year, they announced a doubling of defense spending over the next five years. Second is the expansion of collective self-defense rights, which will be discussed on the next page. I will answer when questions arise.

Essentially, this means: The most important thing for Japan to navigate the 21st century is still the US-Japan alliance. Japan needs to secure the US. Both Japan and the US know that America's power is not what it used to be. Japan's strategy is to integrate its capabilities with the US, filling in the gaps in American capabilities. This is seen as the path to ensuring Japan's security. Therefore, if Japan strengthens its military capabilities to enhance the US-Japan alliance, the US and Japan must have the same goals.

Do you understand what I mean? There must be common security objectives and common threats. The common threat here, simply put, is North Korea, and the real threat is China. Japan has reached that point under the previous administration. Therefore, when discussing strategic objectives, there is no significant difference between the US and Japan. Hence, the integration of the alliance, and the integration of the alliance means synchronizing capabilities and projecting those capabilities together. Do you understand? As will be discussed later, Korea is not yet at that level.

Right. The core issue is China. Do South Korea and the US share the same threat perception and security interests regarding China? Yes, they do. It's not easy. Our society is divided. There's a group that agrees, like those protesting in Gwanghwamun on weekends. And there's a group that completely disagrees, like those in Seocho-dong in the past. However, the majority of our citizens still don't see China as a security competitor. In other words, we haven't reached the point of militarily balancing against China by joining forces with the US. There's a difference in that regard. So, when Japan speaks of collective self-defense, it means exercising collective self-defense rights jointly with the US.

Do you understand? When China poses a threat to Japan, the US intervenes. When China poses a threat to the US, Japan participates. The Abe administration enabled this. Therefore, bringing about changes within Japan to exercise collective self-defense rights is a significant transformation, as it fundamentally alters the constitutional framework. So, this collective self-defense, which has just been mentioned, signifies moving towards the level of completing the integration of the alliance with the US to ensure Japan's security. And then, partner countries – it's not easy with just the US.

Therefore, it is necessary to continue connecting with other countries. In this regard, there's the Quad, right? Centered around India, with Australia, forming the Quad with the US. The US also places great importance on the ROK-US alliance. Since Japan still has reservations about South Korea, it doesn't fully share security interests with South Korea. There's the Dokdo issue, and while there's clear agreement on North Korea's nuclear and missile development, Japan is still hesitant about full security cooperation with South Korea. Therefore, regarding the ROK-US-Japan security cooperation, which requires ROK-Japan military cooperation as a prerequisite, progress is being made, albeit slowly. So, although the President will attend a ROK-US-Japan summit tomorrow in the US, Japan is gradually expanding its scope.

So, in that case, what will be the future of ROK-Japan security cooperation and the security relationship between the two countries? What will be the key factor? It's clearly China, isn't it? Regarding North Korea's nuclear weapons, there's complete alignment. And missile development. Beyond that, there are quite a few shared security interests between Japan and South Korea. Maritime safety is critical for sea lanes and trade, and these are fundamentally shared. Furthermore, the safety and peace in the Taiwan Strait – how can one oppose that? Of course. Regardless of Taiwan's legal status, both South Korea and Japan share security interests in these matters. However, China poses a significant challenge in this regard, which you likely understand well. So, I'll take about 5 to 7 more minutes.

This is one of the key factors here. Second, regarding prosperity – you can easily understand this by just looking at it. The core difference from the US is that we still desire free trade. The US government doesn't use the term "free trade"; they use "fair trade." But what is the standard for fairness? There's a significant possibility that it will be judged by American standards. Therefore, in this aspect, there are many areas where Japan and South Korea can cooperate. Second, in terms of economic security, it's very difficult when a major power uses economic means for strategic security reasons. We experienced this with THAAD once, didn't we? We've also experienced it with Japan. However, Japan is also making considerable efforts regarding China, and looking at what the US is doing, one might feel that economic coercion isn't just limited to China; the US is also engaging in it. For example, with semiconductors

and the IRA, these actions might seem excessive. These actions contradict the order that the US itself is promoting. Since the US is undermining that order, there are many areas where South Korea and Japan must cooperate. Therefore, these are likely the tasks that need to be addressed over the next decade. This is just a reminder for you. China imposes an average tariff of 21% on US exports, and the US imposes an average tariff of 21% and 19% on Chinese exports. Isn't that enormous?

When the two countries trade, a 20% tariff is currently applied. We must prevent this era of protectionism. What would happen if we also resorted to such measures? The problem is that measures other than tariffs are increasingly being used to block trade. For example, preventing investment. In our case, SK and Samsung are prevented from investing in new technologies in their factories in China. This is not a tariff, but trade is being blocked in such ways, which is a major problem.

Finally, this is not the very end, but I'd like to discuss this for about 5 minutes, and then we can delve deeper during the Q&A. Will these historical issues persist in 10 years? Currently, the issue of comfort women, right? The comfort women issue is not resolved. While the grandmothers are passing away, the issue itself remains unresolved. Lawsuits are ongoing. Among them, one grandmother is persistently calling for a case to be brought before the ICJ. Forced labor – this involves a very large number of people, from 20,000 to 100,000 people who have filed lawsuits. It's possible that there are individuals here whose families are involved in the forced labor issue. So, will this issue still be pending in 10 years?

Will it be resolved once they all pass away? Not necessarily, right? This is an issue of historical perception. If it were simply about compensating them, it would have been resolved with money long ago. But it's not just that. It's about demanding genuine apologies based on historical perception, and through that, moving towards reconciliation. But that remains an unresolved issue, doesn't it? What will happen in the future? To put it simply, the relationship between Korea and Japan – President Kim Dae-jung said in 2000, compared to the friendly relations between the two countries over the past 50-60 years, the conflicts over the past few decades are nothing, aren't they? Let's move forward with a broad perspective. The article I sent you, I believe it's a very important article. It contains too much information, making it somewhat difficult to understand, but what is the core message? The Korea-Japan relationship has not been a smooth one.

For over a thousand years, there has been a constant emotional conflict, a relationship of conflict. As indicated here, these factors have ultimately shaped Japanese nationalism and Korean nationalism, and they are being replayed as today's conflicts. That's what the article shows. When I talk about 10 years, I mean the resistance nationalism that the current older generation holds towards Japan. At the root of this resistance nationalism, alongside a sense of moral superiority, what else is there? Isn't it a sense of humiliation, disgrace, and inferiority?

I understand, and you understand too. Japan is the same. Japan has traditionally held a sense of contempt towards Korea, viewing it as a vassal state of China, a weak nation, as evidenced by events like the Imjin War where they barely managed to repel invaders who took 18,000 captives, a nation that failed in modernization, and a subordinate of Japan. On the other hand, Japan also has moral issues, right? Such as its colonial rule. These factors intertwine, creating what is called a 'self-dividing mentality.' Do you understand what 'self-dividing' means? It refers to a state where conflicting emotions are intertwined and expressed, making it very difficult to have a harmonious relationship with the other party. This is the psycho-historical structure of Korea-Japan relations. Can your generation overcome this? My research suggests otherwise.

Therefore, this traditional idea of a single ethnic nation and Japan's investigation show that traditional anti-Korean sentiment is very low among the younger generation. As you can see here, this is a reinforced PPT. If you look at it, you'll understand. So, while there is hope based on these factors, this applies to your generation in their 20s, 30s, and teens. You are not the mainstream of politics. Those individuals are the ones leading Korea-Japan relations. That's why I mentioned the 2030s earlier. Therefore, it is not easy to move towards reconciliation. So, the argument was that if we continue functional cooperation in areas like security and economy, as we did last year, the historical issues will also be resolved.

I don't see it that way. Even if conditions are created for resolution, it doesn't mean the issue will be resolved simply through security and economic cooperation and deepening interdependence. Will it be resolved gradually with the deaths of the elderly victims? That is unlikely. Conversely, as our opposition party claims, if we don't resolve this, it's impossible to move forward. I believe that is also incorrect. If this issue is not resolved, and it becomes a prerequisite for engagement, then there's nothing we can do with Japan. We cannot engage in anything meaningful. Can we endure that? Is that in our national interest? These questions are intertwined, and this issue must be resolved by both sides simultaneously. Therefore, regarding security cooperation, tomorrow at Camp David, efforts will be made to elevate trilateral security cooperation among Korea, the US, and Japan to a new level.

There will also be significant economic cooperation. However, alongside this, we must resolve the remaining issues. Simultaneously. If we think, 'Let's just leave this aside and not dwell on it,' the problems will not be solved. Sooner or later, this issue will hinder functional cooperation. I am making this point. As for the rest, if you look at the population data, the blue line represents the elderly population. In Japan, the elderly population has already fallen below 50%, reaching 59% in some metrics. The 59% figure refers to the economically active population. The elderly population is steadily increasing. Here, the blue line indicates...

It rises to 36%, and when you add the under-15 population, which is in the teens, it's about 45%. This means 55% must support the remaining 45%. And this is within the next decade. One might exclaim, 'Are they crazy?' Korea is catching up to Japan at an incredibly rapid pace. Look at this: by 2050, the working-age population will be in their 50s. You will have to work then. At that time, you will have to support the under-15s and the over-65s. It will be a 50/50 split. Will that be possible? Without major reforms, how will we cope with that situation? But what will happen if we do nothing?

This is what I see: Japan and Korea are the same. Therefore, they should not cooperate and learn from each other in this way. This is because, in terms of unique academic papers, there are no such countries on Earth. China is catching up, about 10 years behind, but with 1.4 billion people. Now, regarding this discussion, there are those who were in their third year of high school in 2018. Five years ago, in 2018, there were 600,000 high school graduates entering university. At that time, the number of students taking the university entrance exam was 600,000, and the university admission rate was 40%. There were also economic factors, but there were so few universities that it was a 60% difference.

Although it's the same 600,000, back then, the number of people entering the workforce exceeded 1 million, but in 2018, it was 600,000. Do you know how many it is this year? 400,000. It has decreased by 50% in five years. Therefore, local universities are all dying. This situation will be maintained for the next 10 years, and then it will decrease to 1.7 million between 2035 and 2038. From 400,000, it will drop sharply. I believe the parents of that generation made a rational choice. They cannot afford marriage, raising children, housing, and education in the current system created by the older generations. Then there is no solution, right? That is a rational choice, but can it shock the older generations into repentance and change the system, or will it lead to ruin? If people continue to make the rational choice not to have children, it will lead to ruin.

The people who are not having children will be in a situation where they will be in their 50s in 2050. Therefore, both countries are facing a crisis of mutual destruction. When I say mutual destruction, it means that while the metropolitan areas can survive—the two poles of Tokyo and Osaka in the Kanto and Kansai regions, and a few in Korea—the rest will face mutual destruction. What will happen if these issues, including environmental and climate change, which we are all anticipating when they will end, continue? Therefore, the agenda for the older generation and the current generation is not this.

All of these are important, but for you, they are matters of life and death. The things written there indicate that the scope of Korea-Japan cooperation will increase significantly in the next 10 years. There are also global challenges and unique challenges for both countries, such as the population issue I just discussed.