[5th EAI Academy] ② The Future of U.S. Leadership Amidst Changes in the World Order

YouTube Link: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=7HFun3eyf48

■ Jeon Jae-sung_Professor in the Department of Political Science and International Relations at Seoul National University and Director of the EAI Center for National Security Studies. He currently serves as an advisor to the Ministry of Unification, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Ministry of National Defense, the Army, and the Navy. He previously served as President of the Korean Association of International Studies (2021), Director of the SNU Institute for Global Social Affairs, and Vice Dean of the SNU Institute for Peace and Unification Studies. He was a visiting professor at Keio University in Japan for two years. His main research areas include international political theory, history of international relations, East Asian security studies, and Korean foreign policy. He holds a bachelor's and master's degree in International Relations from Seoul National University and a Ph.D. in International Politics from Northwestern University in the United States.

His major works include *East Asian International Politics Theory: International Politics of States with Imperfect Sovereignty* (Seoul: Hanul, 2020), *Sovereignty and International Politics: The Imperial Nature of the Modern Sovereign State System* (Seoul: Seoul National University Press, 2019), *Is Politics Moral?: Reinhold Niebuhr's Transcendent Realism* (Seoul: Hangilsa, 2012), and *East Asian International Politics: From History to Theory* (Seoul: East Asia Institute, 2011). His edited volumes include *Theories of the East Asian Regional Order: Imperfect Sovereignty and Regional Conflicts* (Seoul: Social Critic, 2018), *International Politics of Complexity and Complication* (Seoul: Social Critic, 2017), and *East Asia and the Korean Peninsula Amidst U.S.-China Competition* (Seoul: Neulpum Plus, 2015).

Video Script

When this lecture series was initially planned, there were country-specific issues and function-specific issues. So, the content I intend to cover is primarily U.S. foreign policy. However, the question we must ask this time is whether it is right for the U.S. to lead and guide the new world order, even though it is the strongest power. It possesses immense power compared to other nations. President Biden's defense budget for this year, which amounts to nearly 800 to 900 trillion Korean won, is a substantial sum and a significant increase, the highest since the end of the Cold War.

While the U.S.-China strategic competition is considered the most important independent variable in the world order, one might wonder if it is truly that important. As I went to various meetings all day today, the weather was so hot that I wondered if the Earth would ever cool down. Amidst these challenging issues, how important is the U.S. or U.S.-China strategic competition compared to climate change or the various threats we face? At first glance, it seems correct that the U.S. is the strongest nation and that the power struggle or strategic competition with the second-largest power is a crucial variable. However, we must first consider the significant changes in the world order. In the past, when studying international politics, especially 20th-century international politics, we learned, as you well know, that international politics is centered around great powers and that the distribution of power determines everything.

We learned this in textbooks, but is great power politics still determining the world order to such a significant extent? It is time to fundamentally question this. While preparing for this lecture, I reread a speech from 1990-1991, around the time Iraq invaded Kuwait, when President George H.W. Bush spoke of a new world order. It was also when the end of the Cold War was declared due to successful negotiations with Gorbachev, and the Berlin Wall fell on November 9, 1989. Germany's unification was imminent.

This was a speech delivered when the U.S. was aiming to establish a unipolar hegemonic system as a global superpower. It was filled with hope, and many of the terms we use today were present. Most importantly, it discussed a new world order. While not explicitly using the terms "no-based order" or "rule-based order," it suggested that international relations were evolving towards a rule-based order, similar to domestic politics, rather than a power-based or might-based order. Theoretically, this implies that the organizing principle of international politics is shifting from anarchy to a state of governance or a hierarchical state. General Secretary Gorbachev fully agreed with this.

However, the speech also emphasized the need for a strong response to Iraq's violation of sovereignty through aggression against another nation, which undermined this new world order. It contained a great deal. Thirty-two years later, looking back, the international order has not unfolded this way. Military power remains important, and we are facing many new challenges that were not anticipated at the time. Most importantly, U.S. leadership, which was so hopeful during the past 30 years of the post-Cold War era, has not been successful. Many people discuss when U.S. leadership began to falter or become ineffective. It is often cited that after the 9/11 terrorist attacks, when President George W. Bush took office, the war in Afghanistan against terrorism was acceptable, but the invasion of Iraq in 2003 was problematic. It raised many international legal issues and lacked the support of permanent members of the UN Security Council. It was precisely for the U.S.'s own interests.

The fundamental rules of the post-Cold War era, declared as a non-based order, began to crumble. Consequently, even though many countries criticize Russia in the current Ukraine crisis, they do not necessarily endorse the U.S. and Western support for the war in Ukraine. For example, India, a representative of the Global South, criticizes the existing liberal order, represented by China and Russia, but does not necessarily endorse the Global West. India's position, often described as a "fence-sitting state," is neither fully aligned with the West nor the East, though it is not entirely non-aligned. While India believes the Ukraine war must be resolved, it points out that the Global West pays little attention to numerous other civil conflicts, such as those in Myanmar, Africa, and Yemen, often interpreting the Ukraine war as crucial for European security order. Thus, countries in the Global South criticize the excessive attention given to the Ukraine war.

These criticisms highlight the imbalances in the post-Cold War order and the international system. It suggests that while the U.S. is important, its ideas for shaping the international order are not being well-received. This indicates that U.S. leadership is not functioning as effectively as expected. On one hand, there is regret that the U.S. could have been wiser, although there have been many successful aspects. On the other hand, the U.S.'s agency, its capacity to shape the international order, is becoming increasingly challenging due to the growing complexity of international politics. I will elaborate on this further later.

In this context, there are intense debates surrounding the world order today. As mentioned in the reading materials, the concept of international order, dating back to Hedley Bull, refers to a situation where principal actors, through explicit institutions or implicit rules, engage in predictable and regular interactions. This implies the need for a foundation that enables predictable, stable, and rule-based behavior. Although international politics is anarchic, it is not necessarily chaotic; states have historically created order. However, the order we see today and will see in the future is vastly different from the past. Therefore, when we try to fit the future international order into the theories we have studied, while some aspects may align, no single theory adequately explains it. Just as the interwar period was well-explained by theories that provided a framework for understanding the future, leading to the emergence of realism and utopianism as foundational concepts in international relations, if you can explain the crises of the past 30 years and propose a framework for understanding future international politics, you could become a theorist whose work endures throughout the 21st century. However, such a theorist has yet to emerge. Who is the theorist who best explains the past 30 years? Many are attempting to do so, but no clear figure has emerged. In the U.S., realism and liberalism still contend, with scholars like John Mearsheimer and Alexander Wendt offering explanations for the past 30 years, but they are considered insufficient.

We must examine the flow of the world order in conjunction with U.S. foreign policy. The current era is described as a new Cold War, an era of bipolarity, or a multipolar system. We hear discussions of U.S.-China hegemonic competition or a chaotic state of jungle politics, referred to as G-zero. These perspectives contain elements of truth, but deeper consideration is warranted, particularly in relation to U.S. foreign policy. When we speak of a new Cold War, it requires certain theoretical congruities. A Cold War involves ideological confrontation between blocs. While the Biden administration attempts to divide the world into democracies versus authoritarian regimes, authoritarianism is not a clear ideological category like capitalism versus communism or dictatorship. Authoritarianism describes a political process. As scholars like Scokpol argue, there are socio-economic and political systems that explain society as a whole, such as capitalism and communism. Is authoritarianism such a system? This is quite complex. China still emphasizes the market, exhibiting characteristics of market socialism and communism. Authoritarianism, while based on multi-party systems, allows for the monopolistic political power of a single party, shaping all political and social institutions accordingly. However, it does not define class relations or social systems. Therefore, it is difficult to characterize it as a Cold War with ideological or systemic opposition leading to bloc conflict.

A Cold War also requires strong cohesion within blocs and significant antagonism between them. This is not the case now. If we consider the U.S. and China as two blocs, our current relationship with China is entirely different from our past relationship with the Soviet Union. In this regard, there is little antagonism between blocs, and cohesion within blocs is also very weak. The fact that European leaders like President Macron are visiting Beijing to negotiate with China, and U.S. Secretary of State Blinken is also visiting Beijing, makes it very difficult to view this as a new Cold War. While the term is used because it offers partial explanatory power—highlighting the confrontational nature of relations and the cooling of ties, with some parallels to the old Cold War—it is not analytically precise.

Could it be considered a bipolar system? This is because the U.S. and China stand out significantly. How power is distributed between nations is a major question in international politics. If we consider hard power alone—military and economic strength—the U.S. is first, and China is second. Determining third place becomes ambiguous. Economically, it could be Japan or Germany; militarily, if we consider nuclear capabilities, it could be Russia. This also connects to a multipolar system. So, can we consider it bipolar? The U.S. and China are indeed prominent. However, for this to be the case, as I have been contemplating, there must be polar states, which are referred to as "poles." In international politics, this is often depicted as a dominant pole around which other states, like iron filings to a magnet, cluster. These states are strong, and others are subordinate to them. The current relationship between the U.S. and Europe, or the U.S. and Japan and South Korea—a trilateral summit is about to be held—suggests that the U.S. is not standing so tall as to create an independent pole.

Considering the U.S.'s request for assistance from South Korea and Taiwan for its semiconductor supply chain, it seems awkward to describe it as a complete pole. It might be more accurately described as a slightly elevated pole system, or perhaps a clay pole system. To call it a pole system is difficult, given the current division of labor and the relatively even distribution of power among developed nations. In this sense, the interdependence among developed countries is high. The U.S. is well aware of this and recognizes the need for assistance from other countries, as does China. Therefore, while the bipolar system explains one aspect, it does not explain everything.

A multipolar system would require a third polar state, but it is difficult to identify one. Thus, a multipolar system, with three or more poles, is unlikely. While the U.S. and China possess the most significant power, their interdependence with other nations does not translate into fully antagonistic and cohesive blocs. The term "hegemonic competition" is frequently used, but it has been criticized for a long time. Hegemony implies a state that can provide public goods and impose order in an anarchic international system. We often discuss public goods. These are non-excludable and non-rivalrous goods that everyone needs but no one wants to pay for. In the international arena, this could mean a wealthy nation acting as a lender of last resort to maintain an open liberal economic order when it faces crisis, or a powerful state with a strong military acting as the world's police force to deter states like Iraq that disrupt international security. Such a state is a hegemonic state. Therefore, unipolarity and hegemony are different concepts. Unipolarity simply means having more power than other states, while hegemony involves the role of an order-provider. In today's international politics, there is arguably no state with the power to fulfill the role of a hegemon, given the extreme complexity of international issues. Do you not think so?

Thus, it is difficult to view the current situation as hegemonic competition. The winner of the U.S.-China competition will not become a hegemonic state. Hegemony can only be achieved through alliances of multiple states. The idea of "impossible hegemony" has been discussed for a long time, and some U.S. theorists believe this, though it is not widely accepted. They believe that if the U.S. wins the U.S.-China competition, it can regain hegemonic status. However, addressing issues like climate change, health crises, non-proliferation, and the regulation of new technologies is extremely difficult for the U.S. alone. Therefore, while they may not be polar states, both the U.S. and China likely believe they can achieve hegemony.

Objectively speaking, this is not the case. While it might be described as a competition for leadership rather than hegemonic competition, it is difficult to call it hegemonic competition. Therefore, it is likely that state-level hegemonic competition will cease to exist on Earth. If theories of hegemony and power struggles imply hegemonic competition, then power struggles will likely become increasingly rare as international politics itself transforms. To speak of G-zero requires an implicit agreement among states to return to a might-based order. In 18th and 19th-century European international politics, states agreed to establish an order based on power. However, even this order based on power was not arbitrary; wars were fought in an orderly manner. Is this the case now? It is no longer an era where military power is used in an orderly fashion to determine whose commands are followed. The world is now far more regulated by international law, which is more binding than domestic law. Even China and Russia, criticized by the U.S., do not entirely disregard the non-based or rule-based order. In fact, President Xi Jinping's statements emphasize international order and the United Nations. Russia, while violating the current order, claims this is due to the U.S. breaking international norms. No one explicitly states they will create a new order by breaking existing international laws, such as through the expansion of NATO or by providing global public goods. They adhere to existing orders. In this sense, we are not heading towards G-zero. While terms like "jungle of states" are used, no one is truly going into the jungle; everyone is adhering to norms.

These are all alternative perspectives from 20th-century international politics. While they offer partial explanations, they do not fully account for the current situation. So, from what perspective should we view international politics? If order is no longer created by great power politics or U.S. hegemony, and even if the U.S. were to regain its strength and be able to shape the world order, it could neither become a hegemonic state nor a polar state, and it would still have to adhere to existing norms. In such circumstances, what conceptualization of international politics is important? This question is inevitable. I do not have the answer either. Therefore, I have organized the variables and future prospects that we can consider.

Hegemony refers to a state that can provide public goods capable of imposing order in an anarchic international system. We have many concepts of public goods. These are international versions of public goods that are non-excludable and non-rivalrous, meaning everyone needs them, but no one wants to pay to produce them. For example, a very wealthy country that acts as a lender of last resort when the open liberal international economic order is in crisis, or a powerful military state that acts as the world's police force to prevent states that disrupt international security order, such as those in Iraq, from doing so. Such a state is a hegemonic state. Therefore, unipolarity and hegemony are different concepts. Unipolarity means having more power than other states, which is true, but hegemony requires acting as an order-imposer. In today's international politics, there are arguably no states with the power to fulfill the role of hegemony, given the increasing complexity of international issues. You might think so too.

Given this, what will the future look like? It is difficult to say. However, there seems to be inertia in the perceptions of actors. Particularly in the U.S., although it is difficult to speak carelessly about other countries, it is questionable whether U.S. administration officials, members of Congress, researchers involved in policy decisions, think tanks, and economic actors truly understand that the international order is changing, even as they strive to create a world order that best serves U.S. national interests. They may believe that the order is not changing and that the U.S. can become a hegemonic power again. What does "Build Back Better" or "Build Back World Better" entail? Is it about creating a better version of American hegemony?

If the U.S. can forge a hegemonic alliance with the consent and cooperation of other nations and lead this alliance—what I now call "meta-leadership"—then it is a role that can be embraced. President Obama eloquently expressed this as "lead from behind." If the effort is to revive such meta-leadership, it is certainly welcome. However, unlike the past 70 years, during which the U.S. has undertaken many actions, some beneficial and others contradictory, such as advocating for a liberal international order while supporting coups d'état—as historian Odd Arne Westad notes in his book, U.S. interventions, numbering around 633, have often been non-liberal. Thus, even the U.S., while pursuing a liberal international order, cannot always uphold the ideal of liberalism in all its foreign policy actions. In this regard, U.S. leadership over the past 70 years must differ significantly from future leadership. We have much to say about this. For instance, regarding the North Korean nuclear issue, despite U.S. efforts over the past 30 years, its approach to North Korea's existential threat has been insufficient. This is not to say North Korea is blameless; its illicit nuclear development is undeniable. However, if the U.S. had better recognized the geopolitical context and North Korea's sense of threat, and approached the issue accordingly, the situation might have been different. This reflects on the U.S.'s approach to many global issues.

Furthermore, the next decade is crucial. On October 26th of last year, the U.S. released its National Security Strategy, referring to it as a "decisive decade." As you may have heard, the next ten years are decisive. This does not mean engaging in war with China during this period. Rather, the interpretation is that by accumulating national strength over the next decade, the U.S. will possess overwhelming power in its competition with China. This is akin to a self-strengthening policy, described as "investing" in the document. The idea is that by investing diligently for ten years, the U.S. can regain hegemonic power and gain an advantage over China in the subsequent decade. China also views the next ten years as critical, albeit expressed differently. Both sides recognize the immense security challenges ahead. China's 20th Party Congress report, for instance, frequently mentions crises and security. We too believe the next decade will be decisive, but whether we are making truly decisive efforts is another question. All nations recognize the next ten years as crucial for determining the pace of national strength development, especially as it coincides with the Fourth Industrial Revolution and U.S.-China strategic competition. Therefore, intense competition is expected. This can be seen as a prediction of future trends, where nations will compete vigorously, viewing it as short-term hegemonic competition. Both the U.S. and China will strive to form blocs. Consequently, the era of remaining neutral is over. Scholars and many individuals in both countries are urging nations to quickly choose sides—either with the U.S. or China. When I frequently meet with U.S. officials, after hearing about South Korea's foreign policy, they want to know whether South Korea is on the U.S. side or the Chinese side. This is understandable.

This is because they are all normatizing. These are various alternatives discussed in 20th-century international politics. While they can explain certain aspects of international politics, they do not explain everything. So, what perspective should we adopt to understand international politics? If the international order is no longer shaped by great power politics or American hegemony, and if the era when America, having become prosperous again, could shape the world order, is over, then the question arises: what kind of international politics is important for us to conceptualize, especially if America can neither be a hegemonic power nor a unipolar power, and must adhere to existing norms? I don't have the answer either. Therefore, I have organized the variables and future prospects that we can consider.

The primary variable is that economic interdependence between the United States and China will continue. This is becoming a widely accepted proposition. While there are significant controls, both the US and China are currently seeking an appropriate level of interdependence. Later, I will discuss the concept of de-risking, but after experiencing several events such as COVID-19, the Ukraine crisis, and especially the strategic competition between the US and China, they realized that markets, in the end, are linked to war or geopolitical struggles. Geopolitics refers to political struggles connected to geography. What is politics? It can be expressed in various ways, but it is about the game of who holds the initiative in distinguishing between 'us' and 'them,' or the allocation of resources. It can also be about dividing based on identity or even territory. Carl Schmitt, a scholar, argued that politics is the distinction between friend and foe. In our daily lives, we distinguish between ourselves and our enemies.

Returning to the U.S.-China relationship, the logic of the past two to three decades, where they engaged in economic interdependence based solely on market logic without considering geopolitical factors or distinguishing friends from enemies, has certainly been broken. Nevertheless, economic interdependence for mutual benefit will continue. This is related to the proposition that a new Cold War will not occur. Fierce battles are underway regarding the extent of interdependence and in which sectors it should occur. Furthermore, within the U.S. and China blocs, many member states seek to maintain relationships with both sides. Countries under China's influence also need to maintain relationships with liberal states. Non-polar actors and non-state actors are becoming increasingly important. For instance, international organizations will face increasing demands from both the U.S. and China as they pursue their national interests. The voices of middle powers and smaller states, often referred to as the Global South, are also gaining prominence. While South Korea has discussed middle power diplomacy extensively, it has also faced criticism for being idealistic or lacking concrete actions. However, as economic relations become more complex and blocs emerge, middle and smaller powers are becoming increasingly significant. This is evident in the military sphere, where geography is crucial. The U.S. and China's approaches to Pacific island nations are highly significant, as seen in the security agreement discussions between the Solomon Islands and China. Recalling the Pacific War, the strategic locations then considered important are regaining significance. Furthermore, access to smaller states possessing critical minerals is also crucial. In an era where the U.S. managed the global order as a unipolar power, the actual importance of third-world countries was not apparent. However, as the U.S. and China confront each other militarily and economically, the importance of middle and smaller powers has increased substantially. These countries are aware of this, leading to louder voices and greater input into international politics. This trend is likely to continue. The numerous threats we face today cannot be resolved without U.S.-China cooperation. Both the U.S. and China are well aware of this. While absolute cooperation is ideal, they strive for relative gains, seeking to minimize relative losses. For example, in reducing carbon emissions, they aim to reduce less or delay reductions. In health cooperation, they seek to minimize losses. Cooperation is not absent, but the manner of cooperation is determined by realism. Therefore, cooperation on global challenges does not necessarily imply a liberal approach.

Fierce battles are underway regarding the extent of interdependence and in which sectors it should occur. Furthermore, within the U.S. and China blocs, many member states seek to maintain relationships with both sides. Countries under China's influence also need to maintain relationships with liberal states. Non-polar actors and non-state actors are becoming increasingly important. For instance, international organizations will face increasing demands from both the U.S. and China as they pursue their national interests. The voices of middle powers and smaller states, often referred to as the Global South, are also gaining prominence. While South Korea has discussed middle power diplomacy extensively, it has also faced criticism for being idealistic or lacking concrete actions. However, as economic relations become more complex and blocs emerge, middle and smaller powers are becoming increasingly significant. This is evident in the military sphere, where geography is crucial. The U.S. and China's approaches to Pacific island nations are highly significant, as seen in the security agreement discussions between the Solomon Islands and China. Recalling the Pacific War, the strategic locations then considered important are regaining significance. Furthermore, access to smaller states possessing critical minerals is also crucial. In an era where the U.S. managed the global order as a unipolar power, the actual importance of third-world countries was not apparent. However, as the U.S. and China confront each other militarily and economically, the importance of middle and smaller powers has increased substantially. These countries are aware of this, leading to louder voices and greater input into international politics. This trend is likely to continue. The numerous threats we face today cannot be resolved without U.S.-China cooperation. Both the U.S. and China are well aware of this. While absolute cooperation is ideal, they strive for relative gains, seeking to minimize relative losses. For example, in reducing carbon emissions, they aim to reduce less or delay reductions. In health cooperation, they seek to minimize losses. Cooperation is not absent, but the manner of cooperation is determined by realism. Therefore, cooperation on global challenges does not necessarily imply a liberal approach.

While South Korea has discussed middle power diplomacy extensively, it has also faced criticism for being idealistic or lacking concrete actions. However, as economic relations become more complex and blocs emerge, middle and smaller powers are becoming increasingly significant. This is evident in the military sphere, where geography is crucial. The U.S. and China's approaches to Pacific island nations are highly significant, as seen in the security agreement discussions between the Solomon Islands and China. Recalling the Pacific War, the strategic locations then considered important are regaining significance. Furthermore, access to smaller states possessing critical minerals is also crucial. In an era where the U.S. managed the global order as a unipolar power, the actual importance of third-world countries was not apparent. However, as the U.S. and China confront each other militarily and economically, the importance of middle and smaller powers has increased substantially. These countries are aware of this, leading to louder voices and greater input into international politics. This trend is likely to continue. The numerous threats we face today cannot be resolved without U.S.-China cooperation. Both the U.S. and China are well aware of this. While absolute cooperation is ideal, they strive for relative gains, seeking to minimize relative losses. For example, in reducing carbon emissions, they aim to reduce less or delay reductions. In health cooperation, they seek to minimize losses. Cooperation is not absent, but the manner of cooperation is determined by realism. Therefore, cooperation on global challenges does not necessarily imply a liberal approach.

The numerous threats we face today cannot be resolved without U.S.-China cooperation. Both the U.S. and China are well aware of this. While absolute cooperation is ideal, they strive for relative gains, seeking to minimize relative losses. For example, in reducing carbon emissions, they aim to reduce less or delay reductions. In health cooperation, they seek to minimize losses. Cooperation is not absent, but the manner of cooperation is determined by realism. Therefore, cooperation on global challenges does not necessarily imply a liberal approach.

Given this, what will the future look like? It is difficult to say. However, there seems to be inertia in the perceptions of actors. Particularly in the U.S., although it is difficult to speak carelessly about other countries, it is questionable whether U.S. administration officials, members of Congress, researchers involved in policy decisions, think tanks, and economic actors truly understand that the international order is changing, even as they strive to create a world order that best serves U.S. national interests. They may believe that the order is not changing and that the U.S. can become a hegemonic power again. What does "Build Back Better" or "Build Back World Better" entail? Is it about creating a better version of American hegemony? If the U.S. can forge a hegemonic alliance with the consent and cooperation of other nations and lead this alliance—what I now call "meta-leadership"—then it is a role that can be embraced. President Obama eloquently expressed this as "lead from behind." If the effort is to revive such meta-leadership, it is certainly welcome. However, unlike the past 70 years, during which the U.S. has undertaken many actions, some beneficial and others contradictory, such as advocating for a liberal international order while supporting coups d'état—as historian Odd Arne Westad notes in his book, U.S. interventions, numbering around 633, have often been non-liberal. Thus, even the U.S., while pursuing a liberal international order, cannot always uphold the ideal of liberalism in all its foreign policy actions. In this regard, U.S. leadership over the past 70 years must differ significantly from future leadership. We have much to say about this. For instance, regarding the North Korean nuclear issue, despite U.S. efforts over the past 30 years, its approach to North Korea's existential threat has been insufficient. This is not to say North Korea is blameless; its illicit nuclear development is undeniable. However, if the U.S. had better recognized the geopolitical context and North Korea's sense of threat, and approached the issue accordingly, the situation might have been different. This reflects on the U.S.'s approach to many global issues.

If the U.S. can forge a hegemonic alliance with the consent and cooperation of other nations and lead this alliance—what I now call "meta-leadership"—then it is a role that can be embraced. President Obama eloquently expressed this as "lead from behind." If the effort is to revive such meta-leadership, it is certainly welcome. However, unlike the past 70 years, during which the U.S. has undertaken many actions, some beneficial and others contradictory, such as advocating for a liberal international order while supporting coups d'état—as historian Odd Arne Westad notes in his book, U.S. interventions, numbering around 633, have often been non-liberal. Thus, even the U.S., while pursuing a liberal international order, cannot always uphold the ideal of liberalism in all its foreign policy actions. In this regard, U.S. leadership over the past 70 years must differ significantly from future leadership. We have much to say about this. For instance, regarding the North Korean nuclear issue, despite U.S. efforts over the past 30 years, its approach to North Korea's existential threat has been insufficient. This is not to say North Korea is blameless; its illicit nuclear development is undeniable. However, if the U.S. had better recognized the geopolitical context and North Korea's sense of threat, and approached the issue accordingly, the situation might have been different. This reflects on the U.S.'s approach to many global issues.

Regarding the North Korean nuclear issue, despite U.S. efforts over the past 30 years, its approach to North Korea's existential threat has been insufficient. This is not to say North Korea is blameless; its illicit nuclear development is undeniable. However, if the U.S. had better recognized the geopolitical context and North Korea's sense of threat, and approached the issue accordingly, the situation might have been different. This reflects on the U.S.'s approach to many global issues.

Furthermore, the next decade is crucial. On October 26th of last year, the U.S. released its National Security Strategy, referring to it as a "decisive decade." As you may have heard, the next ten years are decisive. This does not mean engaging in war with China during this period. Rather, the interpretation is that by accumulating national strength over the next decade, the U.S. will possess overwhelming power in its competition with China. This is akin to a self-strengthening policy, described as "investing" in the document. The idea is that by investing diligently for ten years, the U.S. can regain hegemonic power and gain an advantage over China in the subsequent decade. China also views the next ten years as critical, albeit expressed differently. Both sides recognize the immense security challenges ahead. China's 20th Party Congress report, for instance, frequently mentions crises and security. We too believe the next decade will be decisive, but whether we are making truly decisive efforts is another question. All nations recognize the next ten years as crucial for determining the pace of national strength development, especially as it coincides with the Fourth Industrial Revolution and U.S.-China strategic competition. Therefore, intense competition is expected. This can be seen as a prediction of future trends, where nations will compete vigorously, viewing it as short-term hegemonic competition. Both the U.S. and China will strive to form blocs. Consequently, the era of remaining neutral is over. Scholars and many individuals in both countries are urging nations to quickly choose sides—either with the U.S. or China. When I frequently meet with U.S. officials, after hearing about South Korea's foreign policy, they want to know whether South Korea is on the U.S. side or the Chinese side. This is understandable.

This leads to the question of whether South Korea's foreign policy should align with the U.S. or China, a question often posed in conversations among friends. Efforts to establish blocs will intensify. But is this the answer? Do the U.S. and China themselves believe they can create blocs? Many policy papers in the U.S. argue that forcing this very issue hinders U.S. efforts to gain allies. After all, China is the top trading partner for 120 out of 200 countries. Forcing these countries to reduce their trade with China and align with the U.S. is perceived as pressure, rendering such foreign policy ineffective. Therefore, it is more important to acknowledge the economic interdependence with China and then identify shared interests with the U.S. While the U.S. acknowledges this, there is a domestic discourse in South Korea suggesting that since there is no room for maneuver between the U.S. and China, and given their hegemonic competition, we must choose sides. This perspective is overly simplistic, although it is an important discourse.

While the U.S.-China competition is not hegemonic competition, explaining this in detail is quite difficult in general terms. However, for those of you who are deeply involved in international politics, efforts to establish blocs will occur, but it will not be easy. Furthermore, policy conflicts between governments and corporations are certain to increase. In the U.S., for example, numerous legislative proposals are being made, and are in the process of being enacted, regarding direct investment in China and export controls. However, corporations have different perspectives. Even if such regulations are enacted, corporations find ways to circumvent them or maintain economic ties with China to survive. Therefore, while some companies may accept decoupling from China as a given, others view it as a matter of survival. This creates inevitable conflict between the U.S. government's efforts to achieve a certain level of decoupling from China and corporations' attempts to maintain economic relations with China. The Global South is becoming increasingly important, leading to intensified courtship efforts by many developed countries towards these nations. According to OECD projections for 2023, the GDP rankings in 2060 will be as follows: China will be first, India second, the U.S. third, Indonesia fourth, Turkey fifth, Japan sixth, Germany seventh, and Brazil eighth. The top ten rankings have historically remained relatively stable, dominated by Western European nations since the Peace of Westphalia. However, the 21st century will witness a revolutionary shift, with non-Western countries making significant advancements. In such a scenario, will the permanent members of the UN Security Council—the U.S., France, and the UK—be able to maintain their positions? This will be extremely difficult. How will the world look then? Regarding this, major powers—China, in particular, has been proactive by forming BRICS and building extensive networks with countries like Brazil, South Africa, and Indonesia, as well as through the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). In contrast, Western countries have made limited efforts in this regard. Furthermore, due to historical colonial rule, developing countries in the Global South still grapple with post-colonial issues in their relations with former colonial powers. Unlike most Western countries, which were colonial powers, Korea was colonized by a non-Western empire, Japan. This experience, perhaps, led to a more profound colonial rule. When discussing with officials from Southeast Asian countries, they do not view past Western colonial rule as positively as they might, and some even discuss the "modernization through colonization" theory or similar narratives of Western development.

This is overly simplistic, although it is an important discourse. The U.S.-China competition is not hegemonic competition, and explaining this in detail is quite difficult in general terms. However, for those of you who are deeply involved in international politics, efforts to establish blocs will occur, but it will not be easy. Furthermore, policy conflicts between governments and corporations are certain to increase. In the U.S., for example, numerous legislative proposals are being made, and are in the process of being enacted, regarding direct investment in China and export controls. However, corporations have different perspectives. Even if such regulations are enacted, corporations find ways to circumvent them or maintain economic ties with China to survive. Therefore, while some companies may accept decoupling from China as a given, others view it as a matter of survival. This creates inevitable conflict between the U.S. government's efforts to achieve a certain level of decoupling from China and corporations' attempts to maintain economic relations with China. The Global South is becoming increasingly important, leading to intensified courtship efforts by many developed countries towards these nations. According to OECD projections for 2023, the GDP rankings in 2060 will be as follows: China will be first, India second, the U.S. third, Indonesia fourth, Turkey fifth, Japan sixth, Germany seventh, and Brazil eighth. The top ten rankings have historically remained relatively stable, dominated by Western European nations since the Peace of Westphalia. However, the 21st century will witness a revolutionary shift, with non-Western countries making significant advancements. In such a scenario, will the permanent members of the UN Security Council—the U.S., France, and the UK—be able to maintain their positions? This will be extremely difficult. How will the world look then? Regarding this, major powers—China, in particular, has been proactive by forming BRICS and building extensive networks with countries like Brazil, South Africa, and Indonesia, as well as through the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). In contrast, Western countries have made limited efforts in this regard. Furthermore, due to historical colonial rule, developing countries in the Global South still grapple with post-colonial issues in their relations with former colonial powers. Unlike most Western countries, which were colonial powers, Korea was colonized by a non-Western empire, Japan. This experience, perhaps, led to a more profound colonial rule. When discussing with officials from Southeast Asian countries, they do not view past Western colonial rule as positively as they might, and some even discuss the "modernization through colonization" theory or similar narratives of Western development.

This is a very simplistic discourse, although it is an important one. The U.S.-China competition is not hegemonic competition, and explaining this in detail is quite difficult in general terms. However, for those of you who are deeply involved in international politics, efforts to establish blocs will occur, but it will not be easy. Furthermore, policy conflicts between governments and corporations are certain to increase. In the U.S., for example, numerous legislative proposals are being made, and are in the process of being enacted, regarding direct investment in China and export controls. However, corporations have different perspectives. Even if such regulations are enacted, corporations find ways to circumvent them or maintain economic ties with China to survive. Therefore, while some companies may accept decoupling from China as a given, others view it as a matter of survival. This creates inevitable conflict between the U.S. government's efforts to achieve a certain level of decoupling from China and corporations' attempts to maintain economic relations with China. The Global South is becoming increasingly important, leading to intensified courtship efforts by many developed countries towards these nations. According to OECD projections for 2023, the GDP rankings in 2060 will be as follows: China will be first, India second, the U.S. third, Indonesia fourth, Turkey fifth, Japan sixth, Germany seventh, and Brazil eighth. The top ten rankings have historically remained relatively stable, dominated by Western European nations since the Peace of Westphalia. However, the 21st century will witness a revolutionary shift, with non-Western countries making significant advancements. In such a scenario, will the permanent members of the UN Security Council—the U.S., France, and the UK—be able to maintain their positions? This will be extremely difficult. How will the world look then? Regarding this, major powers—China, in particular, has been proactive by forming BRICS and building extensive networks with countries like Brazil, South Africa, and Indonesia, as well as through the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). In contrast, Western countries have made limited efforts in this regard. Furthermore, due to historical colonial rule, developing countries in the Global South still grapple with post-colonial issues in their relations with former colonial powers. Unlike most Western countries, which were colonial powers, Korea was colonized by a non-Western empire, Japan. This experience, perhaps, led to a more profound colonial rule. When discussing with officials from Southeast Asian countries, they do not view past Western colonial rule as positively as they might, and some even discuss the "modernization through colonization" theory or similar narratives of Western development.

In this regard, the conflict between government policies and corporate interests is inevitable. Taking the U.S. as an example, numerous legislative proposals are being made, and are in the process of being enacted, regarding direct investment in China and export controls. However, corporations have different perspectives. Even if such regulations are enacted, corporations find ways to circumvent them or maintain economic ties with China to survive. Therefore, while some companies may accept decoupling from China as a given, others view it as a matter of survival. This creates inevitable conflict between the U.S. government's efforts to achieve a certain level of decoupling from China and corporations' attempts to maintain economic relations with China. The Global South is becoming increasingly important, leading to intensified courtship efforts by many developed countries towards these nations. According to OECD projections for 2023, the GDP rankings in 2060 will be as follows: China will be first, India second, the U.S. third, Indonesia fourth, Turkey fifth, Japan sixth, Germany seventh, and Brazil eighth. The top ten rankings have historically remained relatively stable, dominated by Western European nations since the Peace of Westphalia. However, the 21st century will witness a revolutionary shift, with non-Western countries making significant advancements. In such a scenario, will the permanent members of the UN Security Council—the U.S., France, and the UK—be able to maintain their positions? This will be extremely difficult. How will the world look then? Regarding this, major powers—China, in particular, has been proactive by forming BRICS and building extensive networks with countries like Brazil, South Africa, and Indonesia, as well as through the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). In contrast, Western countries have made limited efforts in this regard. Furthermore, due to historical colonial rule, developing countries in the Global South still grapple with post-colonial issues in their relations with former colonial powers. Unlike most Western countries, which were colonial powers, Korea was colonized by a non-Western empire, Japan. This experience, perhaps, led to a more profound colonial rule. When discussing with officials from Southeast Asian countries, they do not view past Western colonial rule as positively as they might, and some even discuss the "modernization through colonization" theory or similar narratives of Western development.

While extensive research is needed on this topic, it is clear that competition, conflict, and confrontation surrounding the Global South will increase, along with issues related to global challenges and threats. Considering these factors, the future international order will be significantly different, shaped by these variables and future developments. How, then, should we conceptualize the current international politics? This is my rudimentary view. In this context, among the various discourses put forth by scholars, the concept of a "multipolar order"—though not a perfectly accurate term—is relevant. When explaining conflicts between states, the core concepts have traditionally been balance of power and balance of interests. While Hans Morgenthau argued that states would balance against rising powers to avoid becoming too powerful, the act of balancing is costly. It requires augmenting military power, accumulating economic strength, or forming alliances, which can compromise autonomy. Consequently, states often prioritize their interests over balancing, aligning themselves with whichever side offers greater benefits, regardless of the international power distribution. However, in recent times, the balance of values, as emphasized by constructivism through collective identity and other factors, such as the solidarity among democratic states, has also become evident. Thus, the current international politics operates on multiple levels simultaneously. For instance, even among Western countries within the U.S. bloc, economic interests can lead to engagement with China. Germany is a prime example. Its recent National Security Strategy, the first of its kind, includes a section on China. The paper describes China as both a partner and a rival. While it is difficult to accept a China-led international order due to its authoritarian nature, China's market is crucial for Germany's economy, with over 50% of its market share derived from China. This was highlighted in a paper concerning the automotive industry, likely referring to Mercedes-Benz or Volvo. Germany's heavy reliance on Russian energy prior to the Ukraine war, importing over 50% of its oil and gas, led to severe difficulties. A similar dependence on China could have dire consequences if military issues arise. Therefore, defining the relationship with China requires balancing power and interests, which is exceedingly difficult. Following the release of Germany's National Security Strategy, many scholars have questioned its ambiguity. France, while advocating for strategic autonomy, lacks the policy tools to pursue it effectively. European countries are also facing significant challenges. While no single factor can explain the situation, states are competing to shape an order that is most advantageous to them, based on their ideas and collective efforts. This competition involves various ideas forming large clusters that vie for influence in shaping the order. No single country can create this order alone. Therefore, while the U.S. may seek to restore the liberal international order, it will be difficult for the U.S. to achieve this alone. The current trend is a competition to see who can build a more robust order by sharing power, interests, and values. Consequently, both the U.S. and China are moving beyond simple balance of power or interest-based persuasion. They are also incorporating values into their proposed orders. The U.S. is presenting a liberal international order based on economic security and values. Similarly, China has proposed the Global Security Initiative (GSI) and the Global Development Initiative (GDI), possibly also the Global Civilization Initiative. While the specifics are not detailed, they all convey positive messages. However, China is attempting to present its own pillars of order, which typically include economics, security, and values. Russia, too, might have presented such proposals, but its current situation makes this difficult. Middle Eastern countries are also attempting to present new, post-colonial orders, as discussed in the "Flochart" paper. This leaves the question of what future order South Korea envisions. The concept of "interpolarity," which I find intriguing, suggests an era where interdependence among poles is maintained. Hearing "interpolarity" after being accustomed to "bipolarity" and "multipolarity" evokes a sense of "aha!"—a realization that perhaps our thinking was flawed, that poles can interact. Another idea is that poles are not necessarily states; non-state actors can also be poles. This concept, though nascent and not yet fully developed, is quite fascinating. Furthermore, the term "international order" implies relations between nation-states. We also use the term "global order," encompassing non-state actors, and sometimes "planetary politics," which includes ecosystems, animals, plants, and Gaia, especially in the context of environmental crises. The term "world order" extends beyond Earth to encompass the universe, including infinite orders of time and space, relevant for future interplanetary relations. Currently, distinguishing between international and global orders, it is evident that non-state actors like corporations and international organizations play a significant role, making the term "global order" more appropriate. Considering these analytical perspectives, the question arises: how much can the U.S. contribute to shaping this order, and how much does it intend to? This question is perhaps more important than simply explaining the Biden administration's foreign policy.

While extensive research is needed on this topic, it is clear that competition, conflict, and confrontation surrounding the Global South will increase, along with issues related to global challenges and threats. Considering these factors, the future international order will be significantly different, shaped by these variables and future developments. How, then, should we conceptualize the current international politics? This is my rudimentary view. In this context, among the various discourses put forth by scholars, the concept of a "multipolar order"—though not a perfectly accurate term—is relevant. When explaining conflicts between states, the core concepts have traditionally been balance of power and balance of interests. While Hans Morgenthau argued that states would balance against rising powers to avoid becoming too powerful, the act of balancing is costly. It requires augmenting military power, accumulating economic strength, or forming alliances, which can compromise autonomy. Consequently, states often prioritize their interests over balancing, aligning themselves with whichever side offers greater benefits, regardless of the international power distribution. However, in recent times, the balance of values, as emphasized by constructivism through collective identity and other factors, such as the solidarity among democratic states, has also become evident. Thus, the current international politics operates on multiple levels simultaneously. For instance, even among Western countries within the U.S. bloc, economic interests can lead to engagement with China. Germany is a prime example. Its recent National Security Strategy, the first of its kind, includes a section on China. The paper describes China as both a partner and a rival. While it is difficult to accept a China-led international order due to its authoritarian nature, China's market is crucial for Germany's economy, with over 50% of its market share derived from China. This was highlighted in a paper concerning the automotive industry, likely referring to Mercedes-Benz or Volvo. Germany's heavy reliance on Russian energy prior to the Ukraine war, importing over 50% of its oil and gas, led to severe difficulties. A similar dependence on China could have dire consequences if military issues arise. Therefore, defining the relationship with China requires balancing power and interests, which is exceedingly difficult. Following the release of Germany's National Security Strategy, many scholars have questioned its ambiguity. France, while advocating for strategic autonomy, lacks the policy tools to pursue it effectively. European countries are also facing significant challenges. While no single factor can explain the situation, states are competing to shape an order that is most advantageous to them, based on their ideas and collective efforts. This competition involves various ideas forming large clusters that vie for influence in shaping the order. No single country can create this order alone. Therefore, while the U.S. may seek to restore the liberal international order, it will be difficult for the U.S. to achieve this alone. The current trend is a competition to see who can build a more robust order by sharing power, interests, and values. Consequently, both the U.S. and China are moving beyond simple balance of power or interest-based persuasion. They are also incorporating values into their proposed orders. The U.S. is presenting a liberal international order based on economic security and values. Similarly, China has proposed the Global Security Initiative (GSI) and the Global Development Initiative (GDI), possibly also the Global Civilization Initiative. While the specifics are not detailed, they all convey positive messages. However, China is attempting to present its own pillars of order, which typically include economics, security, and values. Russia, too, might have presented such proposals, but its current situation makes this difficult. Middle Eastern countries are also attempting to present new, post-colonial orders, as discussed in the "Flochart" paper. This leaves the question of what future order South Korea envisions. The concept of "interpolarity," which I find intriguing, suggests an era where interdependence among poles is maintained. Hearing the term "interpolarity" after being accustomed to "bipolarity" and "multipolarity" evokes a sense of "aha!"—a realization that perhaps our thinking was flawed, that poles can interact. Another idea is that poles are not necessarily states; non-state actors can also be poles. This concept, though nascent and not yet fully developed, is quite fascinating. Furthermore, the term "international order" implies relations between nation-states. We also use the term "global order," encompassing non-state actors, and sometimes "planetary politics," which includes ecosystems, animals, plants, and Gaia, especially in the context of environmental crises. The term "world order" extends beyond Earth to encompass the universe, including infinite orders of time and space, relevant for future interplanetary relations. Currently, distinguishing between international and global orders, it is evident that non-state actors like corporations and international organizations play a significant role, making the term "global order" more appropriate. Considering these analytical perspectives, the question arises: how much can the U.S. contribute to shaping this order, and how much does it intend to? This question is perhaps more important than simply explaining the Biden administration's foreign policy.

While extensive research is needed on this topic, it is clear that competition, conflict, and confrontation surrounding the Global South will increase, along with issues related to global challenges and threats. Considering these factors, the future international order will be significantly different, shaped by these variables and future developments. How, then, should we conceptualize the current international politics? This is my rudimentary view. In this context, among the various discourses put forth by scholars, the concept of a "multipolar order"—though not a perfectly accurate term—is relevant. When explaining conflicts between states, the core concepts have traditionally been balance of power and balance of interests. While Hans Morgenthau argued that states would balance against rising powers to avoid becoming too powerful, the act of balancing is costly. It requires augmenting military power, accumulating economic strength, or forming alliances, which can compromise autonomy. Consequently, states often prioritize their interests over balancing, aligning themselves with whichever side offers greater benefits, regardless of the international power distribution. However, in recent times, the balance of values, as emphasized by constructivism through collective identity and other factors, such as the solidarity among democratic states, has also become evident. Thus, the current international politics operates on multiple levels simultaneously. For instance, even among Western countries within the U.S. bloc, economic interests can lead to engagement with China. Germany is a prime example. Its recent National Security Strategy, the first of its kind, includes a section on China. The paper describes China as both a partner and a rival. While it is difficult to accept a China-led international order due to its authoritarian nature, China's market is crucial for Germany's economy, with over 50% of its market share derived from China. This was highlighted in a paper concerning the automotive industry, likely referring to Mercedes-Benz or Volvo. Germany's heavy reliance on Russian energy prior to the Ukraine war, importing over 50% of its oil and gas, led to severe difficulties. A similar dependence on China could have dire consequences if military issues arise. Therefore, defining the relationship with China requires balancing power and interests, which is exceedingly difficult. Following the release of Germany's National Security Strategy, many scholars have questioned its ambiguity. France, while advocating for strategic autonomy, lacks the policy tools to pursue it effectively. European countries are also facing significant challenges. While no single factor can explain the situation, states are competing to shape an order that is most advantageous to them, based on their ideas and collective efforts. This competition involves various ideas forming large clusters that vie for influence in shaping the order. No single country can create this order alone. Therefore, while the U.S. may seek to restore the liberal international order, it will be difficult for the U.S. to achieve this alone. The current trend is a competition to see who can build a more robust order by sharing power, interests, and values. Consequently, both the U.S. and China are moving beyond simple balance of power or interest-based persuasion. They are also incorporating values into their proposed orders. The U.S. is presenting a liberal international order based on economic security and values. Similarly, China has proposed the Global Security Initiative (GSI) and the Global Development Initiative (GDI), possibly also the Global Civilization Initiative. While the specifics are not detailed, they all convey positive messages. However, China is attempting to present its own pillars of order, which typically include economics, security, and values. Russia, too, might have presented such proposals, but its current situation makes this difficult. Middle Eastern countries are also attempting to present new, post-colonial orders, as discussed in the "Flochart" paper. This leaves the question of what future order South Korea envisions. The concept of "interpolarity," which I find intriguing, suggests an era where interdependence among poles is maintained. Hearing "interpolarity" after being accustomed to "bipolarity" and "multipolarity" evokes a sense of "aha!"—a realization that perhaps our thinking was flawed, that poles can interact. Another idea is that poles are not necessarily states; non-state actors can also be poles. This concept, though nascent and not yet fully developed, is quite fascinating. Furthermore, the term "international order" implies relations between nation-states. We also use the term "global order," encompassing non-state actors, and sometimes "planetary politics," which includes ecosystems, animals, plants, and Gaia, especially in the context of environmental crises. The term "world order" extends beyond Earth to encompass the universe, including infinite orders of time and space, relevant for future interplanetary relations. Currently, distinguishing between international and global orders, it is evident that non-state actors like corporations and international organizations play a significant role, making the term "global order" more appropriate. Considering these analytical perspectives, the question arises: how much can the U.S. contribute to shaping this order, and how much does it intend to? This question is perhaps more important than simply explaining the Biden administration's foreign policy.

The core concepts have traditionally been balance of power and balance of interests. While Hans Morgenthau argued that states would balance against rising powers to avoid becoming too powerful, the act of balancing is costly. It requires augmenting military power, accumulating economic strength, or forming alliances, which can compromise autonomy. Consequently, states often prioritize their interests over balancing, aligning themselves with whichever side offers greater benefits, regardless of the international power distribution. However, in recent times, the balance of values, as emphasized by constructivism through collective identity and other factors, such as the solidarity among democratic states, has also become evident. Thus, the current international politics operates on multiple levels simultaneously. For instance, even among Western countries within the U.S. bloc, economic interests can lead to engagement with China. Germany is a prime example. Its recent National Security Strategy, the first of its kind, includes a section on China. The paper describes China as both a partner and a rival. While it is difficult to accept a China-led international order due to its authoritarian nature, China's market is crucial for Germany's economy, with over 50% of its market share derived from China. This was highlighted in a paper concerning the automotive industry, likely referring to Mercedes-Benz or Volvo. Germany's heavy reliance on Russian energy prior to the Ukraine war, importing over 50% of its oil and gas, led to severe difficulties. A similar dependence on China could have dire consequences if military issues arise. Therefore, defining the relationship with China requires balancing power and interests, which is exceedingly difficult. Following the release of Germany's National Security Strategy, many scholars have questioned its ambiguity. France, while advocating for strategic autonomy, lacks the policy tools to pursue it effectively. European countries are also facing significant challenges. While no single factor can explain the situation, states are competing to shape an order that is most advantageous to them, based on their ideas and collective efforts. This competition involves various ideas forming large clusters that vie for influence in shaping the order. No single country can create this order alone. Therefore, while the U.S. may seek to restore the liberal international order, it will be difficult for the U.S. to achieve this alone. The current trend is a competition to see who can build a more robust order by sharing power, interests, and values. Consequently, both the U.S. and China are moving beyond simple balance of power or interest-based persuasion. They are also incorporating values into their proposed orders. The U.S. is presenting a liberal international order based on economic security and values. Similarly, China has proposed the Global Security Initiative (GSI) and the Global Development Initiative (GDI), possibly also the Global Civilization Initiative. While the specifics are not detailed, they all convey positive messages. However, China is attempting to present its own pillars of order, which typically include economics, security, and values. Russia, too, might have presented such proposals, but its current situation makes this difficult. Middle Eastern countries are also attempting to present new, post-colonial orders, as discussed in the "Flochart" paper. This leaves the question of what future order South Korea envisions. The concept of "interpolarity," which I find intriguing, suggests an era where interdependence among poles is maintained. Hearing "interpolarity" after being accustomed to "bipolarity" and "multipolarity" evokes a sense of "aha!"—a realization that perhaps our thinking was flawed, that poles can interact. Another idea is that poles are not necessarily states; non-state actors can also be poles. This concept, though nascent and not yet fully developed, is quite fascinating. Furthermore, the term "international order" implies relations between nation-states. We also use the term "global order," encompassing non-state actors, and sometimes "planetary politics," which includes ecosystems, animals, plants, and Gaia, especially in the context of environmental crises. The term "world order" extends beyond Earth to encompass the universe, including infinite orders of time and space, relevant for future interplanetary relations. Currently, distinguishing between international and global orders, it is evident that non-state actors like corporations and international organizations play a significant role, making the term "global order" more appropriate. Considering these analytical perspectives, the question arises: how much can the U.S. contribute to shaping this order, and how much does it intend to? This question is perhaps more important than simply explaining the Biden administration's foreign policy.

In its National Security Strategy, Germany ambiguously describes China as both a partner and a rival. While it is difficult to accept a China-led international order due to its authoritarian nature, China's market is crucial for Germany's economy, with over 50% of its market share derived from China. This was highlighted in a paper concerning the automotive industry, likely referring to Mercedes-Benz or Volvo. Germany's heavy reliance on Russian energy prior to the Ukraine war, importing over 50% of its oil and gas, led to severe difficulties. A similar dependence on China could have dire consequences if military issues arise. Therefore, defining the relationship with China requires balancing power and interests, which is exceedingly difficult. Following the release of Germany's National Security Strategy, many scholars have questioned its ambiguity. France, while advocating for strategic autonomy, lacks the policy tools to pursue it effectively. European countries are also facing significant challenges. While no single factor can explain the situation, states are competing to shape an order that is most advantageous to them, based on their ideas and collective efforts. This competition involves various ideas forming large clusters that vie for influence in shaping the order. No single country can create this order alone. Therefore, while the U.S. may seek to restore the liberal international order, it will be difficult for the U.S. to achieve this alone. The current trend is a competition to see who can build a more robust order by sharing power, interests, and values. Consequently, both the U.S. and China are moving beyond simple balance of power or interest-based persuasion. They are also incorporating values into their proposed orders. The U.S. is presenting a liberal international order based on economic security and values. Similarly, China has proposed the Global Security Initiative (GSI) and the Global Development Initiative (GDI), possibly also the Global Civilization Initiative. While the specifics are not detailed, they all convey positive messages. However, China is attempting to present its own pillars of order, which typically include economics, security, and values. Russia, too, might have presented such proposals, but its current situation makes this difficult. Middle Eastern countries are also attempting to present new, post-colonial orders, as discussed in the "Flochart" paper. This leaves the question of what future order South Korea envisions. The concept of "interpolarity," which I find intriguing, suggests an era where interdependence among poles is maintained. Hearing "interpolarity" after being accustomed to "bipolarity" and "multipolarity" evokes a sense of "aha!"—a realization that perhaps our thinking was flawed, that poles can interact. Another idea is that poles are not necessarily states; non-state actors can also be poles. This concept, though nascent and not yet fully developed, is quite fascinating. Furthermore, the term "international order" implies relations between nation-states. We also use the term "global order," encompassing non-state actors, and sometimes "planetary politics," which includes ecosystems, animals, plants, and Gaia, especially in the context of environmental crises. The term "world order" extends beyond Earth to encompass the universe, including infinite orders of time and space, relevant for future interplanetary relations. Currently, distinguishing between international and global orders, it is evident that non-state actors like corporations and international organizations play a significant role, making the term "global order" more appropriate. Considering these analytical perspectives, the question arises: how much can the U.S. contribute to shaping this order, and how much does it intend to? This question is perhaps more important than simply explaining the Biden administration's foreign policy.

The paper describes China as both a partner and a rival. While it is difficult to accept a China-led international order due to its authoritarian nature, China's market is crucial for Germany's economy, with over 50% of its market share derived from China. This was highlighted in a paper concerning the automotive industry, likely referring to Mercedes-Benz or Volvo. Germany's heavy reliance on Russian energy prior to the Ukraine war, importing over 50% of its oil and gas, led to severe difficulties. A similar dependence on China could have dire consequences if military issues arise. Therefore, defining the relationship with China requires balancing power and interests, which is exceedingly difficult. Following the release of Germany's National Security Strategy, many scholars have questioned its ambiguity. France, while advocating for strategic autonomy, lacks the policy tools to pursue it effectively. European countries are also facing significant challenges. While no single factor can explain the situation, states are competing to shape an order that is most advantageous to them, based on their ideas and collective efforts. This competition involves various ideas forming large clusters that vie for influence in shaping the order. No single country can create this order alone. Therefore, while the U.S. may seek to restore the liberal international order, it will be difficult for the U.S. to achieve this alone. The current trend is a competition to see who can build a more robust order by sharing power, interests, and values. Consequently, both the U.S. and China are moving beyond simple balance of power or interest-based persuasion. They are also incorporating values into their proposed orders. The U.S. is presenting a liberal international order based on economic security and values. Similarly, China has proposed the Global Security Initiative (GSI) and the Global Development Initiative (GDI), possibly also the Global Civilization Initiative. While the specifics are not detailed, they all convey positive messages. However, China is attempting to present its own pillars of order, which typically include economics, security, and values. Russia, too, might have presented such proposals, but its current situation makes this difficult. Middle Eastern countries are also attempting to present new, post-colonial orders, as discussed in the "Flochart" paper. This leaves the question of what future order South Korea envisions. The concept of "interpolarity," which I find intriguing, suggests an era where interdependence among poles is maintained. Hearing "interpolarity" after being accustomed to "bipolarity" and "multipolarity" evokes a sense of "aha!"—a realization that perhaps our thinking was flawed, that poles can interact. Another idea is that poles are not necessarily states; non-state actors can also be poles. This concept, though nascent and not yet fully developed, is quite fascinating. Furthermore, the term "international order" implies relations between nation-states. We also use the term "global order," encompassing non-state actors, and sometimes "planetary politics," which includes ecosystems, animals, plants, and Gaia, especially in the context of environmental crises. The term "world order" extends beyond Earth to encompass the universe, including infinite orders of time and space, relevant for future interplanetary relations. Currently, distinguishing between international and global orders, it is evident that non-state actors like corporations and international organizations play a significant role, making the term "global order" more appropriate. Considering these analytical perspectives, the question arises: how much can the U.S. contribute to shaping this order, and how much does it intend to? This question is perhaps more important than simply explaining the Biden administration's foreign policy.

The U.S. is presenting a liberal international order based on economic security and values. Similarly, China has proposed the Global Security Initiative (GSI) and the Global Development Initiative (GDI), possibly also the Global Civilization Initiative. While the specifics are not detailed, they all convey positive messages. However, China is attempting to present its own pillars of order, which typically include economics, security, and values. Russia, too, might have presented such proposals, but its current situation makes this difficult. Middle Eastern countries are also attempting to present new, post-colonial orders, as discussed in the "Flochart" paper. This leaves the question of what future order South Korea envisions. The concept of "interpolarity," which I find intriguing, suggests an era where interdependence among poles is maintained. Hearing "interpolarity" after being accustomed to "bipolarity" and "multipolarity" evokes a sense of "aha!"—a realization that perhaps our thinking was flawed, that poles can interact. Another idea is that poles are not necessarily states; non-state actors can also be poles. This concept, though nascent and not yet fully developed, is quite fascinating. Furthermore, the term "international order" implies relations between nation-states. We also use the term "global order," encompassing non-state actors, and sometimes "planetary politics," which includes ecosystems, animals, plants, and Gaia, especially in the context of environmental crises. The term "world order" extends beyond Earth to encompass the universe, including infinite orders of time and space, relevant for future interplanetary relations. Currently, distinguishing between international and global orders, it is evident that non-state actors like corporations and international organizations play a significant role, making the term "global order" more appropriate. Considering these analytical perspectives, the question arises: how much can the U.S. contribute to shaping this order, and how much does it intend to? This question is perhaps more important than simply explaining the Biden administration's foreign policy.

From a normative perspective, what kind of order should South Korea and its researchers consider? South Korea is geographically located next to China, making it part of the Global East. However, we possess a strong Global West identity, perhaps stemming from our colonial past. Although we are citizens of a developed country, we are a developed nation that emerged from colonial rule. Like the U.S., we experienced colonization in the 20th century, making us a representative of the Global South in a sense. Our identity encompasses the Global East, West, and South. This unique position offers advantages. When discussing the world order, we cannot be easily dismissed as simply a developed nation without experiencing colonialism, nor can we be dismissed as a developing nation, especially given our cultural prominence. Furthermore, while we understand China and Russia intimately due to our 2000-year history with China, we are also a highly developed nation. Therefore, we are in a favorable position. In this context, the concept of a "Korean-style international order" or "Korean international relations theory" is being discussed by established scholars. South Korea's current global standing and its ability to leverage this position—much like the export of K-pop—allow it to promote its vision for the global order. If South Korea can articulate a compelling answer to the question of what constitutes a desirable global order, its influence will be far greater than in the past, precisely because this is an era of order competition. What kind of answer can we provide? First, let's consider the liberal international order. While "liberalism" is a broad term, it encompasses core values such as human rights, the rule of law, and democratic political processes, pursued at the international level. In economics, it implies an open economic order; in security, it aims to protect national sovereignty, often manifesting as collective security and U.S.-led alliances. In terms of values, it promotes the expansion of democracy. However, an artificial pursuit of democratic expansion can lead to nation-building projects, as seen with the neoconservatives. Nevertheless, given South Korea's growth within the liberal international order, it is natural for us to pursue it. It is difficult for South Korea to pursue a non-liberal international order. The challenge lies in the inherent tension between liberalism and democracy. Liberalism, in all conditions, prioritizes freedom but acknowledges disparities based on ability, thus potentially leading to significant inequality. Even John Rawls, in discussing liberalism, acknowledges that while starting from an equal position under the veil of ignorance, inequalities are inevitable due to innate differences. Democracy, on the other hand, emphasizes equality and discusses remedies for innate inequalities at the community level, potentially preventing the breakdown of the social fabric. The neoliberal international order, in particular, has been characterized by its acceptance and tolerance of inequality between nations, which has led to numerous problems. Therefore, we can discuss a liberal and democratic international order. This implies an order where all states, regardless of their power, can voice their opinions. In the United Nations, for instance, a General Assembly-centric approach, rather than one dominated by permanent Security Council members, would be more democratic, although not without its own challenges. It is crucial to pursue a liberal and democratic international order, emphasizing global leadership based on human rights. If great powers continue to pursue international order solely through great power politics, it could lead to war, especially in the current era of geopolitical competition. This could result in a descent into conflict, prompting widespread opposition from other nations. The formation of alliances among these great powers, capable of leading global order—perhaps not necessarily the U.S., but other meta-hegemonic powers—is essential.

The concept of "interpolarity" suggests a period where interdependence among poles is maintained. Hearing "interpolarity" after being accustomed to "bipolarity" and "multipolarity" evokes a sense of realization—that perhaps our thinking was flawed, that poles can interact. Another idea is that poles are not necessarily states; non-state actors can also be poles. This concept, though nascent and not yet fully developed, is quite fascinating. Furthermore, the term "international order" implies relations between nation-states. We also use the term "global order," encompassing non-state actors, and sometimes "planetary politics," which includes ecosystems, animals, plants, and Gaia, especially in the context of environmental crises. The term "world order" extends beyond Earth to encompass the universe, including infinite orders of time and space, relevant for future interplanetary relations. Currently, distinguishing between international and global orders, it is evident that non-state actors like corporations and international organizations play a significant role, making the term "global order" more appropriate. Considering these analytical perspectives, the question arises: how much can the U.S. contribute to shaping this order, and how much does it intend to? This question is perhaps more important than simply explaining the Biden administration's foreign policy.

This is the question being raised. From a normative perspective, what kind of order should South Korea and its researchers consider? South Korea is geographically located next to China, making it part of the Global East. However, we possess a strong Global West identity, perhaps stemming from our colonial past. Although we are citizens of a developed country, we are a developed nation that emerged from colonial rule. Like the U.S., we experienced colonization in the 20th century, making us a representative of the Global South in a sense. Our identity encompasses the Global East, West, and South. This unique position offers advantages. When discussing the world order, we cannot be easily dismissed as simply a developed nation without experiencing colonialism, nor can we be dismissed as a developing nation, especially given our cultural prominence. Furthermore, while we understand China and Russia intimately due to our 2000-year history with China, we are also a highly developed nation. Therefore, we are in a favorable position. In this context, the concept of a "Korean-style international order" or "Korean international relations theory" is being discussed by established scholars. South Korea's current global standing and its ability to leverage this position—much like the export of K-pop—allow it to promote its vision for the global order. If South Korea can articulate a compelling answer to the question of what constitutes a desirable global order, its influence will be far greater than in the past, precisely because this is an era of order competition. What kind of answer can we provide? First, let's consider the liberal international order. While "liberalism" is a broad term, it encompasses core values such as human rights, the rule of law, and democratic political processes, pursued at the international level. In economics, it implies an open economic order; in security, it aims to protect national sovereignty, often manifesting as collective security and U.S.-led alliances. In terms of values, it promotes the expansion of democracy. However, an artificial pursuit of democratic expansion can lead to nation-building projects, as seen with the neoconservatives. Nevertheless, given South Korea's growth within the liberal international order, it is natural for us to pursue it. It is difficult for South Korea to pursue a non-liberal international order. The challenge lies in the inherent tension between liberalism and democracy. Liberalism, in all conditions, prioritizes freedom but acknowledges disparities based on ability, thus potentially leading to significant inequality. Even John Rawls, in discussing liberalism, acknowledges that while starting from an equal position under the veil of ignorance, inequalities are inevitable due to innate differences. Democracy, on the other hand, emphasizes equality and discusses remedies for innate inequalities at the community level, potentially preventing the breakdown of the social fabric. The neoliberal international order, in particular, has been characterized by its acceptance and tolerance of inequality between nations, which has led to numerous problems. Therefore, we can discuss a liberal and democratic international order. This implies an order where all states, regardless of their power, can voice their opinions. In the United Nations, for instance, a General Assembly-centric approach, rather than one dominated by permanent Security Council members, would be more democratic, although not without its own challenges. It is crucial to pursue a liberal and democratic international order, emphasizing global leadership based on human rights. If great powers continue to pursue international order solely through great power politics, it could lead to war, especially in the current era of geopolitical competition. This could result in a descent into conflict, prompting widespread opposition from other nations. The formation of alliances among these great powers, capable of leading global order—perhaps not necessarily the U.S., but other meta-hegemonic powers—is essential.

This is the question being raised. From a normative perspective, what kind of order should South Korea and its researchers consider? South Korea is geographically located next to China, making it part of the Global East. However, we possess a strong Global West identity, perhaps stemming from our colonial past. Although we are citizens of a developed country, we are a developed nation that emerged from colonial rule. Like the U.S., we experienced colonization in the 20th century, making us a representative of the Global South in a sense. Our identity encompasses the Global East, West, and South. This unique position offers advantages. When discussing the world order, we cannot be easily dismissed as simply a developed nation without experiencing colonialism, nor can we be dismissed as a developing nation, especially given our cultural prominence. Furthermore, while we understand China and Russia intimately due to our 2000-year history with China, we are also a highly developed nation. Therefore, we are in a favorable position. In this context, the concept of a "Korean-style international order" or "Korean international relations theory" is being discussed by established scholars. South Korea's current global standing and its ability to leverage this position—much like the export of K-pop—allow it to promote its vision for the global order. If South Korea can articulate a compelling answer to the question of what constitutes a desirable global order, its influence will be far greater than in the past, precisely because this is an era of order competition. What kind of answer can we provide? First, let's consider the liberal international order. While "liberalism" is a broad term, it encompasses core values such as human rights, the rule of law, and democratic political processes, pursued at the international level. In economics, it implies an open economic order; in security, it aims to protect national sovereignty, often manifesting as collective security and U.S.-led alliances. In terms of values, it promotes the expansion of democracy. However, an artificial pursuit of democratic expansion can lead to nation-building projects, as seen with the neoconservatives. Nevertheless, given South Korea's growth within the liberal international order, it is natural for us to pursue it. It is difficult for South Korea to pursue a non-liberal international order. The challenge lies in the inherent tension between liberalism and democracy. Liberalism, in all conditions, prioritizes freedom but acknowledges disparities based on ability, thus potentially leading to significant inequality. Even John Rawls, in discussing liberalism, acknowledges that while starting from an equal position under the veil of ignorance, inequalities are inevitable due to innate differences. Democracy, on the other hand, emphasizes equality and discusses remedies for innate inequalities at the community level, potentially preventing the breakdown of the social fabric. The neoliberal international order, in particular, has been characterized by its acceptance and tolerance of inequality between nations, which has led to numerous problems. Therefore, we can discuss a liberal and democratic international order. This implies an order where all states, regardless of their power, can voice their opinions. In the United Nations, for instance, a General Assembly-centric approach, rather than one dominated by permanent Security Council members, would be more democratic, although not without its own challenges. It is crucial to pursue a liberal and democratic international order, emphasizing global leadership based on human rights. If great powers continue to pursue international order solely through great power politics, it could lead to war, especially in the current era of geopolitical competition. This could result in a descent into conflict, prompting widespread opposition from other nations. The formation of alliances among these great powers, capable of leading global order—perhaps not necessarily the U.S., but other meta-hegemonic powers—is essential.

South Korea, in terms of geography, is part of the Global East, situated next to China. However, we possess a strong Global West identity. Perhaps due to our colonial past, we are citizens of a developed country, yet we are a developed nation that emerged from colonial rule. Like the U.S., we experienced colonization in the 20th century, making us a representative of the Global South in a sense. Our identity encompasses the Global East, West, and South. This unique position offers advantages. When discussing the world order, we cannot be easily dismissed as simply a developed nation without experiencing colonialism, nor can we be dismissed as a developing nation, especially given our cultural prominence. Furthermore, while we understand China and Russia intimately due to our 2000-year history with China, we are also a highly developed nation. Therefore, we are in a favorable position. In this context, the concept of a "Korean-style international order" or "Korean international relations theory" is being discussed by established scholars. South Korea's current global standing and its ability to leverage this position—much like the export of K-pop—allow it to promote its vision for the global order. If South Korea can articulate a compelling answer to the question of what constitutes a desirable global order, its influence will be far greater than in the past, precisely because this is an era of order competition. What kind of answer can we provide? First, let's consider the liberal international order. While "liberalism" is a broad term, it encompasses core values such as human rights, the rule of law, and democratic political processes, pursued at the international level. In economics, it implies an open economic order; in security, it aims to protect national sovereignty, often manifesting as collective security and U.S.-led alliances. In terms of values, it promotes the expansion of democracy. However, an artificial pursuit of democratic expansion can lead to nation-building projects, as seen with the neoconservatives. Nevertheless, given South Korea's growth within the liberal international order, it is natural for us to pursue it. It is difficult for South Korea to pursue a non-liberal international order. The challenge lies in the inherent tension between liberalism and democracy. Liberalism, in all conditions, prioritizes freedom but acknowledges disparities based on ability, thus potentially leading to significant inequality. Even John Rawls, in discussing liberalism, acknowledges that while starting from an equal position under the veil of ignorance, inequalities are inevitable due to innate differences. Democracy, on the other hand, emphasizes equality and discusses remedies for innate inequalities at the community level, potentially preventing the breakdown of the social fabric. The neoliberal international order, in particular, has been characterized by its acceptance and tolerance of inequality between nations, which has led to numerous problems. Therefore, we can discuss a liberal and democratic international order. This implies an order where all states, regardless of their power, can voice their opinions. In the United Nations, for instance, a General Assembly-centric approach, rather than one dominated by permanent Security Council members, would be more democratic, although not without its own challenges. It is crucial to pursue a liberal and democratic international order, emphasizing global leadership based on human rights. If great powers continue to pursue international order solely through great power politics, it could lead to war, especially in the current era of geopolitical competition. This could result in a descent into conflict, prompting widespread opposition from other nations. The formation of alliances among these great powers, capable of leading global order—perhaps not necessarily the U.S., but other meta-hegemonic powers—is essential.

Therefore, the concept of a "Korean-style international order" or "Korean international relations theory" is being discussed by established scholars. South Korea's current global standing and its ability to leverage this position—much like the export of K-pop—allow it to promote its vision for the global order. If South Korea can articulate a compelling answer to the question of what constitutes a desirable global order, its influence will be far greater than in the past, precisely because this is an era of order competition. What kind of answer can we provide? First, let's consider the liberal international order. While "liberalism" is a broad term, it encompasses core values such as human rights, the rule of law, and democratic political processes, pursued at the international level. In economics, it implies an open economic order; in security, it aims to protect national sovereignty, often manifesting as collective security and U.S.-led alliances. In terms of values, it promotes the expansion of democracy. However, an artificial pursuit of democratic expansion can lead to nation-building projects, as seen with the neoconservatives. Nevertheless, given South Korea's growth within the liberal international order, it is natural for us to pursue it. It is difficult for South Korea to pursue a non-liberal international order. The challenge lies in the inherent tension between liberalism and democracy. Liberalism, in all conditions, prioritizes freedom but acknowledges disparities based on ability, thus potentially leading to significant inequality. Even John Rawls, in discussing liberalism, acknowledges that while starting from an equal position under the veil of ignorance, inequalities are inevitable due to innate differences. Democracy, on the other hand, emphasizes equality and discusses remedies for innate inequalities at the community level, potentially preventing the breakdown of the social fabric. The neoliberal international order, in particular, has been characterized by its acceptance and tolerance of inequality between nations, which has led to numerous problems. Therefore, we can discuss a liberal and democratic international order. This implies an order where all states, regardless of their power, can voice their opinions. In the United Nations, for instance, a General Assembly-centric approach, rather than one dominated by permanent Security Council members, would be more democratic, although not without its own challenges. It is crucial to pursue a liberal and democratic international order, emphasizing global leadership based on human rights. If great powers continue to pursue international order solely through great power politics, it could lead to war, especially in the current era of geopolitical competition. This could result in a descent into conflict, prompting widespread opposition from other nations. The formation of alliances among these great powers, capable of leading global order—perhaps not necessarily the U.S., but other meta-hegemonic powers—is essential.

When viewed through the lens of identity, it is natural for us to pursue a liberal international order. It is difficult for South Korea to pursue a non-liberal international order. The problem is that liberalism is fundamentally different from democracy. Liberalism is about freedom in all circumstances but acknowledges differences in ability. Therefore, liberalism can be inherently unequal. Even Rawls, when discussing liberalism, acknowledges that although everyone starts from the same point under the veil of ignorance, inequality is inevitable and discusses remedies for innate inequalities. However, this can also lead to the breakdown of the community. Democracy, on the other hand, discusses equality at the level of the entire community. The liberal international order, particularly the neoliberal international order, has been an order that largely tolerates and accepts inequality between states. Because this has caused so many problems, we can discuss a liberal democratic international order. This is an order where all states, regardless of their power, can voice their opinions, such as in the United Nations, where representation is more focused on the General Assembly than on permanent members.

It is crucial to strive for a liberal yet democratic international order centered on the 198 member states. If great powers continue to pursue future international order solely through great power politics, it could ultimately lead to war, and they could fall into a trap. Then, war would ensue. This would result in great powers destroying the global order, which is why other countries are actively opposing it. The formation of a coalition of these nation-states, led by meta-hegemonic powers—whether it be the United States or another country—is crucial.

Next is the very important term of economic competition. I also use the term US-China strategic competition frequently. I used this term often even before the US did, but it refers to a crucial competition between the US and China over strategic interests. The term competition itself, the Biden administration introduced the 3C policy: containment, competition, and cooperation or coordination. One might think that containment and competition are different.

I also looked up the etymology of competition. Competition originally meant multiple actors striving to reach the same goal as quickly as possible, which is based on rules. To compete, there must be something to start with, like starting together, or not deviating from the path. Competition can occur, but it's usually not a free-for-all. On the other hand, confrontation means winning regardless of the rules, a prime example being war. Therefore, the US has often advocated for moving towards competition rather than confrontation, believing that if competition can be based on rules and avoid escalating into war, it can produce better outcomes. From our perspective, it's not necessarily bad for the US and China to engage in strategic competition. If it can lead to better outcomes through competition without escalating into confrontation, and if such competition does not lead to the destruction of the planet, then considering the Ukraine war, the global public sphere has functioned quite well, perhaps better than expected. Schools also teach about the theory of just war, concluding that it is meaningless to define what constitutes a just war. This was the prevailing view in the 4th century AD. Now, 2000 years later, the concept of just war is gradually becoming relevant again. So, how should we think about the future order, normatively or analytically? Time has passed, but I will quickly move on to the next topic. Even if it takes a little longer, in that sense, how should we view post-Cold War US leadership? Based on what has been discussed so far, if we explain US foreign policy by describing what it was like under Trump, what it is like under Biden, and what it will be like in the future, we might question the premise that this will create a new world order. The world order has structural aspects that go beyond the agency of individual actors. This is not as simple as Waltz's concept of power distribution, but rather...

Mearsheimer also explains it in a similar way. Rather than that, it's more complex, including economics, finance, actors, and the Global South. Evaluating the extent to which US foreign policy can be effective within an international order framework that includes these factors is important. In that regard, this is a slightly different topic, and it's something I haven't fully theorized yet. My view is that international order is formed from the end of wars. Wars are primarily fought between great powers, and there are always defeated nations. Because these defeated nations were great powers, there are many tasks of managing the vacuum they leave behind. The relationship between the victorious nations is newly established based on how this vacuum is filled, and many frameworks for a new order are created thereafter.

After World War I, the Treaty of Versailles was established. After World War II, under US leadership, these orders generally lasted for about ten to twenty years. They don't last indefinitely. So, around the late 1960s or 1970s, they needed to be revitalized or revised. At that time, the policies of the hegemonic powers were inevitably unilateral. Thus, the US declared, 'We will give up on this, or that,' or 'We will withdraw our 7th Division from Asia and leave its security to you,' as seen during the Vietnam War. Such unilateral declarations, which were difficult to accept, were even more shocking than those made during the Trump administration.

Therefore, American liberal hegemony has intermittently practiced unilateralism. Looking at the Reagan era and even now, if we consider the post-Cold War period as a war, the victorious nation, the US, had a budget deficit for the following decade, with the 1990s being the only year of surplus. Thus, the 1990s can truly be called a beautiful 'Belle Époque' for the US, analogous to the 1920s, which is referred to as the Belle Époque in diplomatic history. Stock prices never fell, and all household appliances like refrigerators emerged then, leading to immense optimism among Americans, which was followed by a drastic fall in 1929 due to the Great Depression. The post-Cold War decade, following the 1990s, was a period of great hardship for about twenty years, from 2000 onwards. This included 9/11, the 2008 financial crisis, the COVID-19 pandemic, and US-China competition. We are now entering a period where the achievements of the first decade after the Cold War need to be re-evaluated. Therefore, the current international order, which has been US-led, has experienced such cycles multiple times, and perhaps...

This is a periodically recurring phase of intermittent greatness. However, there are different ways to periodize international order. One is the larger cycle of globalization, and another is events like the 9/11 terrorist attacks. The issue of the Global South and terrorism, while illegal and life-threatening, has its roots in colonialism and the regional problems that have persisted since the late 19th and early 20th centuries. These have been underlying issues. The 2008 financial crisis, as you can see, these crises have occurred over the past thirty years. This indicates a multitude of problems that are structural and cannot be explained by a single cycle.

Therefore, it has been very difficult for the US, as a hegemonic power, to cope with all these problems while experiencing so many of them. Looking at it this way, the past thirty years have been the period when the US was the most powerful nation in history. For example, if you were born in the US and are now 25 years old, say born in '98, you were three or four years old when 9/11 happened. Around the age of ten, you experienced the financial crisis. Your uncles may have died in the Iraq War, as many people say.

Your father lost his job due to the economic crisis, and your family members died from COVID. Can this era be considered the most beautiful period for American youth? Can the US be considered a nation that was truly doing well and was stronger than any other nation in history? It's difficult to say. In that sense, one might question whether the US was truly a hegemonic power for the past thirty years. While we might consider it hegemonic in relative terms compared to other nations, in terms of the gap between the total amount of public goods required for the establishment of international order and the US's national strength, it is possible that even with the US's best efforts, it was an impossible task. In that sense, perhaps the past thirty years need to be re-examined. I am thinking about this, but my research is not yet conclusive enough to state it definitively. However, I believe the nature of the international order over the past thirty years needs to be re-examined.

In that regard, the foreign policy and strategy of the Biden administration. We need to assess whether the foreign policy proposed by the US, as the champion of the liberal international order that needs to be revived, is sufficient and whether it will succeed. This is not a fight against China, but rather a fight against the past US itself, or a fight against the immense burden of the future international order. The question is whether it will truly succeed. The Biden administration has very well-delineated the world into three parts. This is a new framework drawn up recently. On May 26th last year, Secretary Blinken gave a speech at George Washington University. You may have read it, but it is a very important speech, so please read it.

He organized the Biden administration's foreign policy into Invest, Align, and Compete. I think it's a very well-organized framework. 'Invest' refers to strengthening domestic capabilities, which consists of security and economy. The core of this self-strengthening policy is the reinforcement of the US economy and the implementation of domestic policies. 'Domestic policies' is also a very important term, and our EAI has published many studies on it. Strengthening the US economy is also addressed through terms like economic security. 'Align' refers to strengthening partnerships and alliances, or alliances based on shared values. 'Compete' refers to the economic competition with China. As mentioned earlier, there are competition, confrontation, and cooperation. The term 'competition' was chosen, and it was first discussed in relation to China. Therefore, the relationship with China is defined as competition.

Thus, what the US is trying to do is, similar to how President G.H.W. Bush sought to create a New World Order at the beginning of the post-Cold War era in 1990, the US is now in a situation where it must create a new world order, whether Biden wants it or not. The National Security Strategy from last year states, 'The post-Cold War is definitely over.' I found this expression very interesting. The post-Cold War is over, and we are now entering the post-post-Cold War era. This is not just a shift in US foreign policy from Trump to Biden, but a complete transition of an era, or in other words, a shift in the order. While this is policy language that can be stated and moved on, it poses a significant academic challenge: when did the post-Cold War era actually end, and how did it end? No one has explained this. What was the nature of the post-Cold War era? No one can explain this either.

The previous Cold War ended abruptly with the collapse of the Soviet Union. Realists at the time were greatly perplexed because they argued that the distribution of power among great powers was the most important variable, and no one predicted the collapse of the Soviet Union. Thus, the structure of power distribution changed completely. They didn't know when it ended or why it ended. The same is true now; they don't even know that it has ended. The end of the post-Cold War era is also unknown to many. While the National Security Strategy may not be entirely accurate, in that sense, there are no theories explaining this change in order. The Biden administration, as an actor, does not use the term 'New World Order,' but through 'domestic policy reinforcement' plus 'Bidenomics' or economic policies, plus 'democratic solidarity,' it is creating its own definition of the international order, which consists of security, economic, and ideological orders. In that sense, the US-China strategic competition, as the US views China as the only competitor with the intention and capability to challenge the US order, is in that sense...

It would be more comprehensive to call it 'order competition' rather than 'strategic competition.' It encompasses various aspects. Therefore, we need to consider the extent to which strategic competition is important in order competition, and how the clashes between the US and China in Taiwan, the Korean Peninsula, and elsewhere will affect the change in order. There is also the question of whether the order pursued by China deviates from the existing liberal rules-based order. However, some US scholars who are more favorable to China argue that China's foreign policy is not that revisionist and that it actually adheres to the norms established by the US.

For example, according to scholars like Ian Johnson, China's voting record at the UN is largely in favor of maintaining the status quo. So why do we perceive it as revisionist? If we consider the issue of sovereignty, Taiwan, Hong Kong, and the South China Sea are somewhat ambiguous, but China claims them as its own waters. However, China is, in my terminology, a state with incomplete sovereignty. Sovereignty typically requires a territory, population, and integrated government that can satisfy itself. China, however, has divided territory, and its population is divided, with Taiwanese citizens. Furthermore, its government's administrative power does not extend to these areas. South Korea is the same. Although we are a sovereign state, North Korea's existence means that our sovereignty is incomplete. If we were to completely abandon North Korea, we would instantly become a fully sovereign state.

However, as long as the constitution mandates unification, we remain a state with incomplete sovereignty. Therefore, attempts to unify with North Korea are seen as highly revisionist in international politics, as it appears to be an attempt to unify with another UN member state. The same applies to Taiwan. In that sense, from a 'sovereignty game' perspective, China is a significant revisionist force. However, when it comes to the international political game, it exhibits strong characteristics of maintaining the status quo. This is a perceptual illusion because existing international relations theories primarily deal with relationships between fully sovereign states. They do not theorize international politics concerning the unfinished modernization and transition of states with subjectively incomplete sovereignty, which have gone through colonialism. Since this has not been brought into the realm of academia, when we look at China, it is not theoretically a revisionist state in the strict sense.

Russia seems different. They claim that it was originally our land. However, to argue that Ukraine is part of Russia would be difficult, as Ukraine has existed as a sovereign state for too long, making it different from Taiwan. Therefore, Russia's invasion of Ukraine is difficult to view as a 'dead game.' In that sense, it is an illegal act of changing the international political status quo. However, the unification of Taiwan is not viewed in the same way, and many countries are tense about it. At a recent conference held by our East Asia Institute, Professor Chen Zhaohui of China likely uploaded a video discussing this.

He said, 'If Texas were to declare independence, and China provided weapons to Texas, would the US stand idly by?' It's the same situation. China could argue, 'Taiwan is our land, why are you giving weapons to it when we have already acknowledged the One China principle?' Although the situation is much more complex than that, China could make such an argument. Therefore, from a 'sovereignty game' perspective, this can be seen as a status quo-maintaining aspect of international politics. In that sense, there is a broad perspective on how the issue of Taiwan influences the international order. Regarding the uncertainty of US strategy towards China, I will postpone that for later.

Conflict between Invest and Align. The US prioritizes strengthening itself first, believing that a stable world requires it. While allies may be asked to endure some hardships, it is difficult for them to accept everything. There are many other interesting discussions in the US-China strategic competition, particularly regarding the efficiency of authoritarianism. China's economy is facing significant difficulties nowadays. However, the intriguing phenomenon is that the world is paying less attention to China's economic problems. This is because their relationship with China has diminished. In the past, whenever China's GDP fell, our GDP also fell significantly, and we discussed it extensively.

However, we too have seen a strong trend towards diversification, if not decoupling, from China. Professor Lee Dong-ryul may have discussed this previously. This trend has become very strong. On the other hand, democracy has been criticized for being ineffective in handling the COVID-19 pandemic or economic crises. Taking advantage of this, democracy has been weakened in countries like Turkey and Hungary. Although these are democratic procedures, they are used to weaken the media or the judiciary during crises. The US is similar. Trump's strategy involved using the decline of the middle class or economic crises to undermine existing democratic procedures through populism. Despite this, democracy is being restored. This involves concepts like adaptation, resilience, and prevention.

Combined concepts. Democracy, surprisingly, has resilience, while authoritarianism tends to falter after dealing with crises. These discussions are common nowadays. This relates to the US's domestic policy reinforcement, which I will skip for now. However, it has significant implications for us. As an ally in a military alliance, it is crucial for us to effectively utilize the domestic policy reinforcement pursued by the US to enhance our military capabilities. Furthermore, Professor Lee Seung-ju and others, who specialize in economics, will provide more in-depth explanations.

While the US has pursued a new security order centered on domestic policy reinforcement, efforts to establish a new economic order are also underway in various forms. This year's key themes have been 'friend-shoring' and 'diversifying.' Let's look at Sullivan's National Security Strategy, which was delivered on April 26th. The speech was quite significant. The neoliberal capitalist model is over. The old Washington Consensus is no longer valid. The state is intervening more strongly, and in critical security matters, decoupling is pursued if necessary, such as technological decoupling with China in advanced technologies. This indicates a shift towards economic security policies. However, there are ongoing discussions about whether this represents a paradigm shift in capitalism solely for the purpose of US-China competition.

This is particularly relevant in the economic sphere. However, the US economy has been performing surprisingly well recently. Although the Fed downgraded its rating from AA to AA+, I'm not entirely sure about the details. However, the general sentiment in the US economic community is that this was a mistake, and the assessment itself is not entirely reliable. Compared to China, the US economy, in terms of growth rate and other factors, is performing much better. There could be various reasons for this, which fall under the domain of economics. However, the US paradigm for economic security and development is vastly different from the past.

Unlike the past thirty years, the state is intervening, but this intervention is not a game of authoritarian players. It is a democratic development strategy. Usually, developmental states are highly authoritarian, like during the Park Chung-hee era or in present-day China. Not all authoritarian states are developmental, and many authoritarian states fail to develop. However, there is much discussion about successful developmental authoritarianism. It is likely that in the future, most democratic countries will also have to pursue considerably democratic development strategies.

It is also referred to as a 'designer economy.' In any case, the new economic order that the US is pursuing, based on the experiences of the past thirty years, is manifesting in a very different form. Therefore, I reiterate that US foreign policy is moving towards a new structural and order-changing framework. Whether this is a positive or negative direction is a separate issue, as is the extent to which the US recognizes this. The new normal order is characterized by a division between democracy and authoritarianism. However, the question remains whether this is truly sustainable and whether democracy can be clearly defined as 'our side.' There are ongoing discussions about these issues. The US itself, and this is my final point, faces a crucial election next year. Scholars believe this election will be as significant as the 2020 election. If Trump becomes president again, it is expected to be a contest between Trump and Biden, barring any major surprises. Trump is currently fighting a battle between going to prison and going to the White House. If he goes to the White House, he plans to overhaul many programs, including the judiciary and the FBI. He has spoken extensively about changing the existing democratic procedures through democratic means. He has been indicted three times, and the content of the latest indictment is that he infringed upon the democratic right of the American people to elect their president. On January 6th, he incited the belief that the election was fraudulent, even though he knew it was not. Some newspapers have even called this treason, indicating the gravity of the indictment. It is uncertain how this will unfold, but if democratic regression and changes in foreign policy occur from 2025 onwards, the impact on the world order will be immense. Therefore, other lectures on American politics...

Please attend many lectures given by experts in domestic politics. The issues that concern American voters are, first and foremost, the economy, followed by income inequality, and so on. Foreign policy ranks around 14th. Therefore, American voters do not choose candidates based on who is better at foreign policy, similar to us. However, the impact of a candidate chosen in this manner on the world order is immense. In that sense, as mentioned earlier, there is a need for a liberal democratic order. We live in an era where events anywhere in the world affect our destiny. Even small incidents in Africa, as explained by complex systems theory, will affect us, yet we live in an era where we cannot control them.

Therefore, democracy is about controlling the variables that affect our destiny. Despite the expansion of political and economic spaces on a global scale, there is no system capable of governing them. The world has become globalized, but global governance is absent. In that sense, we have no influence on the decision-making processes of the US president, which significantly impact our destiny. This does not mean we should have voting rights, but rather that we need a mechanism to adjust the governance that affects our nation. In this regard, global democracy and liberal democratic politics are necessary.

It is very difficult to predict what kind of world it will be from 2025 onwards. Will the US continue to pursue hegemony? To be a hegemon, one must possess many things: capabilities, intentions, consensus among the American people, international recognition, and the ability to respond to incidents. All these must be clear before one can be called a hegemon. Both the US and China face significant challenges in these areas. I will only mention this for now. In that regard, perhaps we can discuss this further during the Q&A session, as time is very limited.

Do we have a sufficient framework to understand the current international news? The term 'liberal international order' is very important, so a discussion on this is necessary. We must evaluate the Biden administration's policies. The variable of Trumpism and the ongoing formation of US strategy towards China are also significant issues for us. How will we view the future international order? Ultimately, we are studying to achieve this goal, which can be called our foreign policy grand strategy. Few countries have a grand strategy. In this context, we need to consider how South Korea's strategy towards the US should evolve.

It is very difficult to know what kind of world it will be from 2025 onwards. Will the US continue to pursue hegemony? To be a hegemon, one must possess many things: capabilities, intentions, consensus among the American people, international recognition, and the ability to respond to incidents. All these must be clear before one can be called a hegemon. Both the US and China face significant challenges in these areas. I will only mention this for now. In that regard, perhaps we can discuss this further during the Q&A session, as time is very limited.

Do we have a sufficient framework to understand the current international news? The term 'liberal international order' is very important, so a discussion on this is necessary. We must evaluate the Biden administration's policies. The variable of Trumpism and the ongoing formation of US strategy towards China are also significant issues for us. How will we view the future international order? Ultimately, we are studying to achieve this goal, which can be called our foreign policy grand strategy. Few countries have a grand strategy. In this context, we need to consider how South Korea's strategy towards the US should evolve.