[5th EAI Academy] ① China's Future International Order and the Korean Peninsula

YouTube link: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=vn5bPAAbzU8

■ Lee Dong-ryulHe is a professor in the Department of Chinese Language and Literature at Dongdeok Women's University and serves as the Director of the EAI Center for Chinese Studies. He holds a Ph.D. in Political Science from the School of International Studies at Peking University and has served as the President of the Association for Modern Chinese Studies, a policy advisor to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and a member of the Korea-China Future Development Committee.

His main research areas include China's foreign relations, Chinese nationalism, and minority issues. His recent works include "A Case Study of Korea-China Diplomatic Negotiations in the 1980s," "The Origin and Transition of Geoeconomics in the 21st Century (co-authored)," "Korea's Foreign Relations and Diplomatic History (Modern Volume 3) (co-authored)," "China's Strategy and Role in the Denuclearization and Peace Process on the Korean Peninsula," "The Evolution of China's Diplomatic Discourse Since the 1990s and its Current Implications," and "A Geoeconomic Approach and Geopolitical Dilemma of Xi Jinping's 'Maritime Power' Initiative."

Video Transcript

There are about four big questions. Originally, the topic was whether China, as it rises as a great power, would dismantle the existing US-centric international order and create a new one. There were many discussions about this. I intend to find an answer to this question. One thing I felt uncomfortable with while studying China is that discussions about China always seem to go to extremes. Even now, when I see the media or receive questions, they always ask if China will collapse.

There is also the theory of China's peak, which argues that China has already reached its peak and only decline and fall remain. On the other hand, some argue that China will soon surpass the US and become a challenger state, creating a new order centered around China. Is it possible that China, having experienced hegemony in the past, is trying to create a new Sinocentric order? Questions like these arise. In reality, things are progressing somewhere in between, but people always ask one of these questions, and I have had experiences where it was very difficult to answer. I felt relieved and reassured that you all seem to understand the facts objectively and calmly within the scope of the questions asked.

Regarding the discussion that China has reached its peak, it means that only decline lies ahead, and some even predict that China will become a failed state. However, I don't think it will go as far as failure. If it fails, what will happen to me? It won't go as far as failure. Then, on the contrary, does China have the will and capability to create a new order? This can be viewed differently depending on the timeline. Even if we look far into the future, does it truly possess the will and capability? My argument is that by the timeline China has set for itself, by 2050, the centenary of its founding, when it aims to achieve its set goals, will China have the will and capability to create a new international order, a new Sinocentric international order? My answer is neither the will nor the capability.

I am presenting this answer in a somewhat provocative way so that you will have questions and engage with the topic. Now, regarding the impact and perception on the Korean Peninsula, if I were to give the answer first, it would be that there is no significant change in China's perception and policy towards the Korean Peninsula. The current 'two Koreas' policy that China is maintaining is the most beneficial for China's national interest, so it is highly likely to be maintained. This is the core of the argument.

So, the talk is over. If I were to summarize, it's over. However, I will try to elaborate on this. One of the reasons for reaching this conclusion is by examining the flow of how China has participated in, influenced, and thought about the existing international order and system over a period of about 50 years. China began to participate in international organizations in earnest in the 1980s, following its reform and opening up in 1978. However, even in the 1980s, China's participation was highly selective.

This was the period when China began its reform and opening up in 1978, focusing on economic development. China began to participate selectively only in international organizations that would aid its economic development. Representative examples include the IMF, World Bank, ADB, and WTO. Throughout the 1980s, China participated only in these. Participating in international organizations is like participating in a club activity; you gain benefits, but you also have responsibilities and obligations. However, China was a state that strictly pursued only its own interests, a free rider. It was criticized for maximizing its benefits while minimizing its obligations and responsibilities, such as cleaning the club room or carrying things. However, this began to change in the 1990s. In the 1990s, China actually turned towards full participation.

A prime example is the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF). As you know, the ARF is arguably the first regional security organization in Asia. Although it was created primarily by Southeast Asian countries to contain China's rise, China joined it. It entered by saying, 'I want to join too.' China also began participating in international agreements that it had previously avoided, such as the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) and covenants related to human rights, although the latter were referred to as social covenants. China began to participate in international organizations related to security and human rights, which it had previously been reluctant to engage with. This marked a shift to full participation, signaling that it was no longer a free rider. It began to participate actively, promoting a discourse of a responsible great power, a great power that fulfills its responsibilities. Its participation in international systems became more active. Is there a slide for this?

This is in Chinese, but it expresses active participation and a constructive role. It went further, stating that it would not only participate but also lead and increase its influence within the organization. This led to the creation of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), the first international organization named after a Chinese city. The emergence of the G20 was a significant development for China, making it believe that the change it had envisioned was finally beginning. As you may recall, the G20 emerged in the context of the 2008 US financial crisis, when it became apparent that the G7 was insufficient.

The first G20 summit was held in Seoul. Many countries, including China, had high expectations. At that time, China expressed its intention to become not only a participant and advocate of the international system but also a builder, intending to lead. Then, under Xi Jinping, it was upgraded another level. Beyond just leading, China began to suggest that the existing system had problems and needed reform. If reform was not possible, it would create alternatives. A prime example is the Asian Development Bank (ADB); China created the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB). It was around 2013 that discussions began about whether China, under Xi Jinping, was seeking to dismantle the US-centric international order established since the Bretton Woods system and create a new Sinocentric order. This coincided with Xi Jinping's strong charismatic leadership, and these discussions gained momentum.

We need to reform. If reform doesn't happen, I will create a new alternative. A prime example is the ADB, but why create the AIB? This is the kind of thing. Since Xi Jinping came to power, discussions have emerged around 2013 asking: What is China doing? What is it thinking? Is China trying to dismantle the US-centric global order established by the Bretton Woods system and create a new order centered on China? Around the same time, Xi Jinping began to display strong charismatic leadership, and these discussions started to intertwine.

This is a table summarizing what I just discussed. It shows that China's diplomatic discourse, or rhetoric, is one of the strongest aspects of the country. The changes in discourse, participation in the system, and concurrent events are closely intertwined. The key point is the Xi Jinping era. Let's focus on the Xi Jinping era and the CPC. This refers to the foreign policy tasks and missions announced annually by then-Foreign Minister Wang Yi starting in the 2020s. Several common points are noteworthy. In 2021, point 5 states: "Proactive participation in the reform of the global governance system."

In 2022, point 3 states: "Actively lead the reform of the global governance system." While it may seem like a play on words, there is a subtle shift. The expression changed from 'lead' to 'actively lead,' indicating a clear, albeit gradual, evolution. Some things remain unchanged. As you can see here, and this will be discussed later as one of the reasons why China lacks the will and capability, the first item every year is the focus of Chinese diplomacy: "Focus on domestic development." This is stated in 2020, 2021, and 2022. Another core point is the protection of "core interests." I will explain later that this demonstrates an inherent limitation in China's ability to create a new world order. I interpret it this way. A key characteristic of the Xi Jinping era is the promotion of "major power diplomacy with Chinese characteristics." Before this, it was uncommon for China to openly use the term "major power diplomacy." This term sparked controversy, suggesting that China was openly pursuing such a path, similar to its creation of the AIIB. However, in China, there is a distinction between a "major power" (大国) and a "strong power" (强国). When expressed this way, domestic media and most observers interpret it as "strong power diplomacy." China claims to be advocating for "major power diplomacy." However, "major power" and "strong power" are not the same. A major power may or may not be a strong power. Can anyone tell me how China itself defines its national identity and strength?

It's the same for 2020, 2021, and 2022. Another core interest is that it must be protected. I will explain later that this shows the inherent limitations of China's efforts to create a new world order. That's how I interpret it. A characteristic of the Xi Jinping era is, just a moment, one of the major diplomatic discourses promoted in the Xi Jinping era is "Major Power Diplomacy with Chinese Characteristics." Before this, it was uncommon for China to openly and publicly use the term "Major Power Diplomacy." This expression, coupled with China's creation of the AIB, stirred controversy, signaling that China was now openly pursuing its ambitions.

However, in China, there is a distinction between a "major power" (大国, dàguó) and a "strong power" (强国, qiángguó). When expressed this way, domestic media and most observers in Japan tend to interpret it simply as "strong power diplomacy." China is indeed asserting its status as a "major power." However, "major power" and "strong power" are somewhat different. While a strong power can be a large country, being large does not necessarily make it strong. Can anyone here tell me how China describes its own national identity and national strength?

What do we call ourselves? Some refer to it as "soft power." The US calls it "superpower." What about China? I wanted to bring this up. Precisely. There's a prefix attached. "The world's largest developing country." It is a large country, but is it a "strong power"? China still maintains this designation. Do you find this argument convincing? Does China calling itself the world's largest developing country seem like an understatement? Or is it appropriate? Or perhaps an overestimation? What are your thoughts?

It's an understatement. Why do you say it's an understatement? Why would it be an understatement? There are benefits to maintaining that status, especially within the WTO, where many exemptions can be received. Some suspect this is the reason. So, what would be the appropriate way for China to describe itself? Do you agree with that? No? Why not? Frankly, when I look at the domestic situation, China has many problems and is very different from the US.

Since we're on the topic, most people don't think highly of China, right? Public opinion polls reflect this. Especially among the university students here, and perhaps the MZ generation, those in their 20s and 30s. Wouldn't those in their 20s feel a bit unfairly grouped? Let's laugh together. The 20s and 30s. Why group the 20s and 30s together, like grouping the 60s and 70s or 60s to 80s? This is a very sensitive age group. Anyway, public opinion polls consistently show that young people in their 20s and 30s in South Korea, and globally, dislike China.

I want to discuss this further later. Why do they dislike China so much? As someone who analyzes this, I always ask students, but I don't quite grasp the reason. Student Park Young-bum suggests it's a country challenging for hegemony. On the other hand, it's... how should I put it? Is it perhaps that communication with China is difficult? I should be careful, as there might be Chinese people here. However, I want to explain what China intends to convey through its language and actions, and what its intentions are.

However, I believe there are misunderstandings, exaggerations, and misconceptions. Take the concept of "major power diplomacy" mentioned earlier. The interpretation of China as a "strong power" rather than a "major power" is crucial here. China aims to build a "new type of international relations." While advocating for a "community of shared future for mankind," it suggests this could be an "alternative value." The concept of "alternative" is important. Why must there only be American-style universalism or Western-centricism? Can't other countries accept China's proposed alternative as a universal value? It presents itself as a "community of shared future for mankind." The "new type of international relations" is a very sensitive topic. What does China aim to achieve by advocating for this? Until now, it was the "old type," and China is initiating the "new type." It signifies moving beyond existing international policies and power politics.

It is centered on great power politics. If one considers great power politics, many might think of it as a jungle where constant conflict occurs, inevitably leading to a struggle for hegemony. If China is a country challenging for hegemony, as mentioned earlier, its rise must be prevented at all costs, as it could lead to war. Specifically, at first, it was "new major power relations," which later expanded to "new international relations." When discussing major power relations, the emphasis was on avoiding the "Thucydides Trap."

It emphasizes that China's rise will not lead to war with the United States. The expansion of this concept into "new international relations" questions why international politics must be interpreted through the lens of great powers. It further proposes concrete actions, such as the Belt and Road Initiative and Global Security Initiative, which need to be re-examined. The Global Security Initiative is consistently advocated for, but discussions are expanding on whether this is merely a proposal for developing countries. China's language is currently interpreted by the international community as an attempt to dismantle the existing international order. It has presented three initiatives consecutively since 2021: the Global Development Initiative (GDI), the Global Security Initiative (GSI), and the Global Civilization Initiative (GCI).

It's GDI. Global Security Initiative (GSI), and then Global Civilization Initiative (GCI). These are presented in China's language. The content of each initiative seems to focus on cooperation with developing countries, similar to the GDI. The GSI, officially promoting security cooperation, essentially calls for abandoning Cold War mentality, opposing US unilateralism, and rejecting bloc formation. The GCI advocates for the rejection of "clash of civilizations."

A clash of civilizations is impossible; civilizations are diverse and must coexist. That is China's argument. It's hard not to be swayed when constantly immersed in Chinese discourse. But nodding along and being interpreted? Overall, considering the trends shown in the graph, I believe China has undergone the most dramatic transformation. However, this dramatic change is not perceived because it has occurred gradually over a long period. As recently as the 1970s, just 40 years ago, China was an outlier, an anomaly in the existing international order.

China itself criticized the existing international order, calling it a "dirty stock market." Instead, China, which once despised the international order, now actively participates and leads within it. It seeks to remodel it. It has transformed into a nation that wants to reform it. How dramatic is this change? The transformation over the past 50 years has been continuous, and this trend suggests further changes are possible. This trend is related to what was shown in the previous chart.

As China's national strength has grown, it has changed decade by decade. With increased national strength, it has increasingly asserted its influence within the existing international system, albeit one created by the US. Now, it has reached a stage where it feels the system doesn't quite fit and needs to be remodeled. From the US perspective, this looks like an attempt to dismantle its system and build a new one. Should I stop it? Or should I expel it from my house? That's the situation. Will China stop at remodeling the house, or will it build an entirely new one? That is the central question now. How should we interpret this? To conclude, at least until 50 years ago... As for the period after that, I cannot be responsible for it, as I may not be alive then. Based on the standards up to that point...

One characteristic of China's dramatic transformation over the past 50 years is that it has occurred within the US-created order. Some argue that figures like Trump were angered by this. Why should someone who benefited the most and pursued the greatest interests within the US-created liberal economic order, namely China, now act as if it's the owner? China has risen. When one intends to change or demolish a house and build a new one, a certain situation must exist.

The existing house must be inconvenient and unsatisfactory. China has benefited the most from it. Looking back at the period around 2016 when Trump emerged, many discussions revolved around this. Comparing Trump's speeches with Xi Jinping's, Trump consistently advocated for protectionism, while Xi Jinping argued for reform and opening up centered on the WTO. From China's perspective, its goal in rising from a developing nation to its current status has been clear: to achieve national prosperity and strength. This remains the goal for 2050 as well.

The question is whether the current system is so inconvenient and flawed that it needs to be dismantled. The controversy has intensified during the Xi Jinping era. One notable characteristic of Xi Jinping's discourse is the sheer volume of it. As mentioned, there are numerous discourses. Even Chinese scholars struggle to understand them. Xi Jinping also enjoys wordplay, frequently drawing on classical texts to explain his points.

What is he trying to say? Interpretive books have even been published, explaining the meaning of Xi Jinping's words. In any case, there is too much. Why does he feel the need to explain so much? Despite this, there is a continuity in the fundamental characteristics. That is the theory of national prosperity and strength, the community of shared future for mankind, new international relations, and new major power relations. The focus of all these is China's desire for national prosperity and strength. "Don't hinder my pursuit of prosperity and strength. If you don't interfere, I won't bother you. I will pursue prosperity and strength on my own."

It's the Chinese version of "America First." It's no different. If China wants to dismantle the US-created international order and build a new one, it needs to gain consensus from the international community. Can it achieve this by consistently advocating for "China First"? It appears to be advocating for something like "Global First" or a "community of shared future for mankind," but the core message is: "China's rise will bring opportunities and benefits to you." "I am within you, and you are within me." This is the kind of language used.

It's not like dating, is it? The expression "community of shared future for mankind" can be quite chilling at first hearing. "You and I share a destiny." If someone said that to you, how would you feel? Uncomfortable, right? The Chinese term is "命运共同体" (mìngyùn gòngtóngtǐ). What I wanted to convey is that China's rise should be seen as an opportunity, not a threat, and thus, we should cooperate to build a community for mutual development.

In other words, it's about creating a sense of community, but the underlying message is "Don't hinder my growth." When it was first introduced, there was interest in how to translate "community of shared future for mankind" into English. It seems the Chinese term was directly translated. Initially, translating it as "common destiny" likely made Westerners feel apprehensive. "What is this? You and I are destined to be together?" Consequently, the English version was later changed.

To "shared future," which is much better. However, in Chinese and within the Asian sphere using Chinese characters, it remains "community of shared future." From our perspective, hearing this inevitably brings to mind the past tributary system. While the tributary system maintained peace at the time, it represented a hierarchical order, making it difficult to accept. In any case, all these expressions suggest "China First," not "Global First." This leads me to believe there's a lack of genuine global leadership. To be a global leader, one should express a willingness to embrace the world and sacrifice for global development. But that's not happening.

Perhaps I'm being too critical. In any case, there's that aspect. Another difference is that past concepts, such as multipolarization, partnership diplomacy, responsible major power, and peaceful development, were post-hoc diplomatic discourses aimed at creating an international environment conducive to China's rise. However, during the Xi Jinping era, concepts like "new international relations" and "community of shared future for mankind" represent a proactive, forward-looking vision for shaping the future international order. This is a significant difference.

In the past, China presented diplomatic discourse aimed at creating a favorable environment for its rise, emphasizing peaceful rise and responsibility. Now, it speaks of shaping the future international order. This marks a distinct shift. However, upon closer examination, the content remains largely focused on "China First." This explains why the diplomatic discourse is so thoroughly centered on "China." Despite Xi Jinping's high standing and role, his words do not remain confined within China.

This creates a dissonance. When such statements are made, they are perceived as China finally revealing its true intentions, such as "Major Power Diplomacy with Chinese Characteristics," which can provoke anxiety. Furthermore, what exactly is "Chinese style"? Historically, terms modified with "Chinese style" or "Korean style" have not been positive. For instance, "Yushin Constitution" is just that; why add "Korean style Yushin Constitution"? Adding lengthy explanations often indicates something is amiss. The term "Chinese style" in diplomatic discourse, like "Major Power Diplomacy with Chinese Characteristics," appears to be a first.

Terms like "socialist market economy with Chinese characteristics" or "primary stage of socialism with Chinese characteristics" have been used extensively in domestic politics. However, using such terms internationally for the first time raises questions about whether they can achieve global universality. To be a leader, one needs global universality, doesn't one? Like the US, with concepts like free markets and universal human rights, which are widely accepted as legitimate. What do you think? Perhaps the ability to present universally valid values and norms is backed by power. When a powerful nation speaks, its words become universally valid, aren't they? There's that aspect, isn't there?

Does China believe this? That as its power grows, its words will gain legitimacy? It aims to surpass the US, differentiating itself from the US while being universally accepted. This is necessary in the current era, not the age of imperialism where force prevails. "Attractive diplomacy" and persuasion are needed. Other members of the international community must be persuaded. They must believe that the US is declining and China is the new leader, and that they can adopt China's standards for growth. But if "Chinese style" is constantly attached, will they accept it?

Does China not know this and say these things? That's unlikely. So, is there a lack of will? Before Xi Jinping, China was strictly a follower nation, chasing after the US. There are advantages to being a follower. For example, in industry, China skipped stages. Remember VHS tapes? We went from VHS to CDs, then to USB drives, and now to OTT. China skipped all these steps. It went directly to OTT. The same applies to finance. While we went through various stages, China skipped them and moved directly to Alipay and similar platforms. This was possible due to a lack of regulations. This is the advantage of being a follower nation.

Now, China is no longer a follower. If it truly surpasses the US, it will have to lead. Is it demonstrating the readiness and language to do so? If not, won't it remain a number two or three nation? My time is running out. The emergence of "new" and "with Chinese characteristics" has generated much suspicion and debate. "New" undoubtedly implies something different and a new alternative. The meaning of "new" is essentially: "China's rise is not a threat."

In traditional international politics, or what China calls the "old type," the rise of a new hegemon leads to conflict and crisis. But if that's the case, China cannot rise. Therefore, it argues that the emergence of a new great power does not necessarily lead to war; rather, a new type of global governance will be created. This is not about creating a new order, but rather about creating an environment where it can rise. China often speaks of "Chinese characteristics," "Chinese solutions," "Chinese wisdom," and "the Chinese path." While some interpret this as revealing its true intentions, China argues differently: "Why must there be only one universal standard?"

There should be various options, as each country and region has different circumstances and characteristics. Why must all countries adopt the American-style market economy and liberal political order? Some countries can develop while maintaining an authoritarian system if needed. China could serve as a model for such countries. This is its explanation. Xi Jinping's analogy is that "shoes should fit the wearer's feet." The best shoes are those that fit your feet, not necessarily American shoes. China does not claim that "Chinese characteristics" should become the global universal standard. Instead, it is challenging the US's assertion of a single universal standard. If the US advocates for a single universal standard, China advocates for diverse universal standards in culture, economic models, and political systems.

Despite all this, China faces a decisive limitation. This became particularly evident during the Xi Jinping era: it exposes China's vulnerabilities. As mentioned earlier, some view China as the world's largest developing country, while others see it as a power seeking hegemony. Yet, it is a country that cannot protect its own territory. Since World War II, it has not fully recovered its territorial integrity as an independent nation. This is the core issue.

Taiwan, Hong Kong, Tibet, etc., are China's Achilles' heels. The "wolf warrior diplomacy" mentioned in the previous question is directly related to these issues. Therefore, China's stance is uncompromising. It cannot afford to be anything but uncompromising on these issues. All the aggressive, threatening, and negative perceptions of China stem from this. China's stance remains uncompromising. This is its core vulnerability. However, compared to Deng Xiaoping's era, there was more flexibility.

When normalizing relations with Japan, Deng Xiaoping famously said, "Let's not discuss that issue; it's difficult to normalize relations if we do. Let's set it aside." When meeting Nixon, he described the Taiwan issue as a "tail of a monkey" that would eventually disappear on its own, questioning why they should fuss over it. He agreed to a delayed troop withdrawal, saying, "Let's discuss it again after Nixon's term." This appeared very flexible. While Xi Jinping projects strong leadership, I believe he is hindering himself on core interests.

This is a core issue that cannot be compromised. Taiwan is now described as the "core of the core interests." Why is it expressed in such a way? In the past, when teachers paired students in elementary school, if a boy was paired with a girl he liked, what would happen? Usually, he'd say, "Cut off my finger!" But he wouldn't actually do it, would he? So, he'd put his hand back. That boundary then ceased to be a hard line.

It's not a core issue anymore. China has fallen into a self-inflicted trap regarding Taiwan. The US is continuously taking actions that should absolutely be avoided. However, China is in a situation where it cannot help but react. This is holding China back. China shares borders with the most countries in the world: 14 land borders. The US, protected by oceans, has Canada and Mexico to the north and south, making it a thousand-year fortress. Historically, the US mainland has never been successfully invaded.

Hasn't it? Not the mainland, though. The mainland was never reached. Think about the shock of 9/11, how absurd it was for a state to be attacked by an asymmetric force. Comparing Japan, I must say Japan is also an amazing country. It's the only nation that has attempted to invade both the US and China. We call them "wako" (Japanese pirates), thinking of them as small. And indeed, when you meet Japanese people individually, they are very shy, aren't they? I experienced this often while learning Chinese in China. In a typical class, Korean students are the most numerous. Korean students often hesitate to speak, but if you initiate conversation, they won't talk. "Please change my class; I don't think I match the level." Yet, they get perfect scores on exams. American students, on the other hand, talk so much in class but can barely write a character. It makes you wonder about the Japanese. Anyway, there seems to be a significant difference compared to that. The US is surrounded by oceans, with Canada and Mexico acting as buffers. China borders 14 countries. Are there any countries among these 14 that China can truly trust as a friend?

Are there? Will they be helpful to China? North Korea is not mentioned. Why? Perhaps North Korea is not considered a friend. If you agree, I will not elaborate further. In any case, China's core issue lies in territorial disputes with these neighboring countries. Conflicts arise with ASEAN nations, South Korea, Japan, and Taiwan, making the region inherently unstable. Wait, what time is it? I've spoken quite a bit. I'll finish quickly within five minutes, as instructed. What a surprise. Anyway, the structural constraints that make it difficult for China to establish its "Chinese characteristics" and create a new world order are...

I believe these structural constraints are related to what I mentioned earlier...

The surrounding symptoms we discussed are very unstable, and the surrounding environment is unstable. And the core issue is that a country that must protect its territorial sovereignty, a superpower like the United States, would say, 'I can never forgive you if you infringe upon my territorial sovereignty.' Who would dare infringe upon the territorial sovereignty of the United States? And I was asked a question: Is nationalism excessive in the Xi Jinping era? It began again in the 1990s. But when we say to Chinese people, 'Why are you so nationalistic and overusing this term?', they don't think their nationalism is excessive. In fact, if you look closely, they don't even use the term 'nationalism'; they avoid it. Why do you think that is? The reason they want to use the term 'nationalism' is to employ it as an ideology of integration, but it could easily lead to division. Tibetan nationalism, Han Chinese nationalism, Korean-Chinese nationalism, Uyghur nationalism—all these can be articulated. Of course, they are currently controlled, but for how long can this control be maintained? Therefore, China, instead of using the term 'nationalism,' uses the term 'patriotism.' It's the same word, but they never use the term 'patriotism.' They don't express it as 'Zhonghua minzu zhuyi' (Chinese nationalism).

We simply interpret it that way. We express it as 'the great revival of the Chinese nation is the resurgence of nationalism,' but that's not the case. That's one aspect. Another aspect is that externally, the manifestation of nationalism becomes an ideology that China should still be wary of, expanding the 'China threat theory.' Isn't it? One of the things you might dislike about China is that they are too nationalistic or statist. That seems to be part of it. Another point is that, originally, socialist ideology and nationalism are values that are difficult to reconcile. The rise of nationalism in Europe is associated with the formation of nation-states during the French Revolution. Nationalism, through Japan, influenced Manchuria and China. China did not originally have the concept of nationalism; it was introduced from Japan during the process of modernization. If we were to compare, China had 'culturalism' rather than 'nationalism.' However, in practice today, it is highly stimulated. Is this good? Generally speaking, nationalism is a double-edged sword.

We express it as a double-edged sword, don't we? China is not much different. It can provoke the nationalism of ethnic minorities, it can invoke the 'China threat theory,' and it can lead to diplomatic self-inflicted wounds. Furthermore, if not careful, the civic consciousness that has gathered around nationalism could spread to other areas and potentially escalate into political issues. Despite this, the reason it is being promoted is that there are no other integrating mechanisms or ideologies available right now. Chinese people do not dislike Xi Jinping as much as you might think. It's strange, isn't it? I apologize. They also have great expectations for Xi Jinping. This is because nationalism and patriotism are resonating. And it makes sense, as the Communist Party has achieved a century of great achievements. People who struggled to make ends meet, who were concerned about food, have been transformed into people who enjoy luxury goods over the past 40 years. This is an achievement of the Communist Party. They have the expectation that in the next 20 to 30 years, they will build a beautiful and strong advanced nation. The Chinese people have expectations for a strong and modern China.

But the problem is, can these expectations be met? What will be the repercussions if they are not met in the future? So, from Xi Jinping's perspective, what is ultimately most important? He has served three terms, and if his health allows, he will serve a fourth term, right? He wants to do it for a long time. These words are all being recorded now. Please edit them later. To achieve that, what is most necessary? Exactly, that is the most important thing. So, earlier, earlier, we kept talking about this in diplomacy: this is not just rhetoric. To make it a reality, what needs to happen? The international environment must be favorable. The surrounding environment of the 14 countries must be stable.

There should not be intense regional conflicts. And China, although it talks about dual circulation, is still a country where the external sector has a significant weight. External cooperation and openness. Looking at this, it consistently includes multilateralism, international cooperation, regional cooperation, supply chain stability, and vaccines. These are all included. This is likely the actual situation. So, the idea that China, facing serious internal problems, can be a global leader seems unlikely, isn't it? Furthermore, the nature of Xi Jinping's foreign policy discourse is strongly geared towards domestic consumption.

Therefore, although he has served three terms and seems to wield immense power, the crucial basis of legitimacy that has sustained the Communist Party until now does not exist. The credibility of socialist ideology has already declined, economic growth has peaked and is on a downward trend, and recovery is not proceeding well. On what grounds can they ask people to just trust them and have expectations? Therefore, in my opinion, the easiest method in the short term is to demonstrate to the international community that China cannot be underestimated and to showcase its international status and influence. This is not too difficult.

In the short term, although there may be repercussions, this is likely the result. However, even this is happening at a time when anti-China sentiment is high globally, and the perception of risk is spreading. As this transcends the level of individual countries, it may be an unavoidable phenomenon. The international community's checks and balances on challenging nations, centered around the United States, and the extent to which China can break free from this is the question. China has these structural limitations. Despite this, China is still advocating for China's development first and foremost, and there is no sign of it moving beyond this to global leadership or universal values and standards.

This is the situation. There are various points here. Regarding the agreements reached between the US and China at the Bali Summit last November, I have deliberately provided the original text for you to review. Some of you may have studied in China; perhaps someone could translate it, rather than me just explaining the meaning. The first point is the expression of agreement. You may not trust Xi Jinping, but what do you think? Does my explanation sound like I'm exaggerating, lying, or being deceptive, not revealing the true intentions? The third point is that there is no intention to challenge or replace.

And we will not try to change the international order we have discussed. I want to focus on my development. Let's see after 2050. The US strategy seems to be: after 2050, when it might be more feasible to compete, but not now. Therefore, the conflict with the US, the power competition with the US, has arrived sooner than expected. Two factors seem to have converged: the emergence of Trump and the COVID-19 pandemic, which brought about the US-China power competition earlier than anticipated. China also seemed taken by surprise. The text below is what China heard from the US, what the US demanded. The core of the US demand is related to this: Do not try to change China's system. Do not pursue a new Cold War. Do not strengthen alliances to oppose China. Do not support Taiwan's independence. This is what China demanded from the US, and this is China's expression of receiving it.

These are the four points of agreement. It shows what China is concerned about. However, I am also curious about the first point: is China trying to change its system? I am also curious about the US's intentions. It is clear that the US is pressuring and containing China. As for the end state, I have asked US experts, but the US government does not seem to have a clear answer. There are various interpretations, but can the system really be changed?

During the Trump administration, the Secretary of State, Mike Pompeo, spoke extensively about this. He said, 'We must differentiate between the Chinese people and the Chinese Communist Party. We cannot accept Xi Jinping and the CCP.' But is that possible? If North Korea cannot be changed, how can China be changed? However, I think China has a different perspective. To put it somewhat extremely, China might prioritize maintaining the CCP's one-party rule over becoming the world's number one power. This possibility exists.

Let's just protect the system. Perhaps Xi Jinping's thinking is along these lines. Or, more narrowly, it's about maintaining his own power. More broadly, if we consider this, is it possible that if Xi Jinping is removed, the CCP will also collapse? If Xi Jinping is removed, it will have a fatal impact on the CCP. Therefore, they will likely introduce a second, new leader. This is my hypothesis. In any case, from the CCP's perspective, as long as the CCP is in power, maintaining the CCP's system is paramount. Becoming a global leader is secondary. If becoming a global leader would help strengthen the CCP's system, they would pursue it, but given the arduous path involved, it is unlikely to be easy.

Is it about maintaining the system? Perhaps Xi Jinping's thinking is along these lines. Or, more narrowly, it's about maintaining his own power. More broadly, if we consider this, is it possible that if Xi Jinping is removed, the CCP will also collapse? If Xi Jinping is removed, it will have a fatal impact on the CCP. Therefore, they will likely introduce a second, new leader. This is my hypothesis. In any case, from the CCP's perspective, as long as the CCP is in power, maintaining the CCP's system is paramount. Becoming a global leader is secondary. If becoming a global leader would help strengthen the CCP's system, they would pursue it, but given the arduous path involved, it is unlikely to be easy.

Is it about maintaining the system? Perhaps Xi Jinping's thinking is along these lines. Or, more narrowly, it's about maintaining his own power. More broadly, if we consider this, is it possible that if Xi Jinping is removed, the CCP will also collapse? If Xi Jinping is removed, it will have a fatal impact on the CCP. Therefore, they will likely introduce a second, new leader. This is my hypothesis. In any case, from the CCP's perspective, as long as the CCP is in power, maintaining the CCP's system is paramount. Becoming a global leader is secondary. If becoming a global leader would help strengthen the CCP's system, they would pursue it, but given the arduous path involved, it is unlikely to be easy.