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[Global NK Interview] The Position of North Korean Human Rights Issues within South Korea's North Korea Policy
YouTube Link: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=NTzoCZFT43g
Seo Bo-hyuk, Senior Research Fellow at the Korea Institute for National Unification, explains that while differences in domestic perspectives on North Korean human rights issues, stemming from differing views on North Korea and unification, still exist, a societal consensus has been formed regarding the severity of the North Korean human rights situation and the necessity of increasing the policy weight of human rights issues within North Korea policy. The author argues that in the current situation where dialogue with North Korea is unlikely, the South Korean government must clearly demonstrate its will to improve North Korean human rights and build trust between the two Koreas through international channels such as the UN. Furthermore, he points out that North Korean human rights issues encompass not only the residents of North Korea but also separated families, prisoners of war, and abductees in South Korea, and suggests that to resolve these issues integrally, the government must maintain continuous exchange and dialogue with North Korea while also forming a consensus through bipartisan North Korean human rights policies that incorporate the opinions of both progressive and conservative factions within South Korea.
■ Seo Bo-hyuk, Senior Research Fellow at the Korea Institute for National Unification.
■ Managed and Edited by: Park Ji-soo, EAI Research Fellow
Inquiries: 02 2277 1683 (ext. 208) | jspark@eai.or.kr
Video Transcript
I believe that the differing views on North Korean human rights issues within South Korean society stem from differing views on North Korea itself. The differences in perspectives on unification, extending from the differences in inter-Korean relations, also influence this, leading to a dichotomous choice in North Korean human rights policy between hardline and cooperative approaches. I believe these two major factors are related to the views on North Korea and unification. During the 'Arduous March' in the mid-1990s, interest in North Korean residents, their human rights, and their quality of life and survival exploded within our society. Of course, there was interest before then, but I recall that period as the most significant surge. Consequently, I remember considerable debate within civil society and research circles at the time regarding the approach to improving North Korean human rights.
There was also debate then about the status of defectors, whether they should be considered refugees or migrants. However, a lot of time has passed. The dire state of North Korean human rights has not improved and continues to persist. Secondly, in response to this situation, not only South Korea but also the international community has shown sustained interest, concern, and considerable response within feasible limits. A prime example is the UN's North Korean human rights resolution, which has been ongoing for over two decades and continues to pass by consensus. It has, in a way, become a tedious routine within the UN human rights mechanism. Amidst this trend, as domestic interest in North Korean human rights issues has grown, I believe there is a phenomenon of opinion convergence within South Korean society between progressives and conservatives regarding North Korean human rights issues and North Korea policy in general. Therefore, despite the lingering differences in positions between progressives and conservatives concerning North Korean human rights issues in South Korean society, the gap is narrowing.
At the very least, a broad consensus has been formed on the severity of the North Korean human rights situation and the need to elevate the policy priority of human rights issues in North Korea policy. Against this backdrop, I believe the differences in positions between progressives and conservatives regarding North Korean human rights issues are ultimately at the core of North Korean human rights policy. I would like to add one more point: the position and weight of North Korean human rights policy within South Korea's North Korea policy, and its interrelationship with other policy issues, are intertwined. I believe there are differences in positions within policy-making circles and civil society regarding this matter. The perception that human rights and humanitarian issues, not just security issues, are not on the periphery of the agenda reflects a rising liberal perspective.
The most distinctive aspect of the difference in positions between the international community in general and South Korean society ultimately lies in how to establish a peace regime on the Korean Peninsula, including denuclearization, and how to manage this process. Specifically, it concerns how to coordinate human rights issues in the process of engaging with North Korea. There are differing views on whether to approach it in conjunction with unification and security issues, adjusting policy priorities accordingly, or whether to grant it independent weight and position based on universal principles. I believe this is a matter of strategic judgment within policy-making groups concerning North Korea policy, rather than an issue separate from progressive-conservative stances.
Of course, individuals with progressive or conservative stances may hold views on the linkage between North Korea policy and North Korean human rights policy, but this cannot be reduced to a progressive-conservative issue. I believe viewing it as such would be somewhat unreasonable. In the international community, North Korean human rights policy is handled differently by countries that have an adversarial relationship with North Korea, such as the United States and Japan, and by those that are normalizing relations or engaging with North Korea, such as the EU. Furthermore, organizations and think tanks that focus intensively on North Korean human rights, like EAI, adopt a highly specialized and, from a critical perspective, aggressive approach. Another group pursues human rights improvements without explicitly discussing human rights issues, opting for approaches such as development, humanitarian aid, or people-to-people exchanges. North Korea selectively responds to these diverse international trends. For instance, when the EU discusses human rights issues while engaging in exchanges and cooperation or providing humanitarian aid to North Korea, it is accepted. Direct engagement with organizations that explicitly address North Korean human rights issues, including UN human rights mechanisms, special rapporteurs, and human rights monitors, is not pursued. Instead, dialogue is maintained with groups focused on development and humanitarian aid, pursuing human rights improvements under controlled conditions, thus exhibiting a limited and selective approach.
The North Korean Human Rights Act was enacted, and based on this, the Ministry of Unification... This suggests that, firstly, the publicly released North Korean human rights report was not as provocative or intended solely to attack the North Korean regime as might have been expected. Instead, it was compiled based on international human rights norms, covering civil and political rights, economic, social, and cultural rights, and the human rights situation of vulnerable groups, drawing on testimonies from defectors. It was evaluated according to international human rights standards. This framework is not significantly different from the North Korean Human Rights White Paper published annually by our institute, nor could it be, as it is based on international standards. In terms of the intensity or provocativeness of the content, I do not consider it to be particularly strong. In some cases, there were even evaluations suggesting a subtle response, with some changes regarding legal systems or the punishment of individuals deemed to have violated human rights by the North Korean regime. This indicates that considerable effort was made to provide a balanced and objective assessment. Therefore, the North Korean government may not have had a strong political reason to react negatively. Perhaps by not reacting, it intended to dismiss it. Thus, I believe that if such international frameworks and objective, balanced assessments continue, the purpose of releasing the human rights report—to achieve... [sentence incomplete]
I believe it is best to continue to hold them accountable. The Yoon Suk-yeol administration's North Korea human rights policy likely operates through several channels. There are bilateral channels directly with North Korea, international channels through the international human rights mechanism, and indirect bilateral approaches through other international actors engaging with North Korea, regardless of whether relations have been normalized. These are possible methods. Inter-Korean relations currently show no signs of dialogue, and the possibility of dialogue is unlikely in the near future. Given this, our government's North Korea human rights policy must rely on international channels as the primary channel. Within international channels, there are also various options. For instance, the UN has been continuously adopting resolutions on North Korean human rights, monitoring and criticizing the human rights situation, and raising international awareness. The resolutions adopted by the General Assembly are representative. Now that our government serves as a non-permanent member of the UN Security Council, it can argue that North Korean human rights issues pose a threat to international peace and security, thus necessitating their discussion on the UNSC agenda.
Japan also holds a non-permanent seat. There have also been reports that Japan and the US intend to cooperate on this matter within the UN Security Council. From North Korea's perspective, the offensive regarding North Korean human rights within the UN human rights mechanism is not insignificant, particularly from a principled standpoint. How can these be harmoniously pursued in parallel? The policy environment surrounding this is also considerably deteriorated domestically, making it quite challenging. I believe fostering an atmosphere conducive to dialogue and relationship-building with North Korea is important. Paradoxically, it is important to demonstrate consistent messages and consistent actions of support and cooperation towards North Korea through international channels. The principle guiding our government's current approach to normalizing inter-Korean relations is to approach North Korean human rights issues within the framework of law, human rights, and prosperity. However, one point to note here, which we are all aware of, is that for us, North Korean human rights issues are not just about the human rights of North Korean residents for which the North Korean regime is responsible. In the Unification White Paper and the unification affairs report currently submitted to the National Assembly by the government, issues concerning the human rights of North Korean residents and humanitarian issues between the two Koreas are addressed together. These are issues that must ultimately be resolved through inter-Korean channels, dialogue, and trust-building. For example, the issue of separated families is also a matter of human rights for the individuals and their families involved.
It is a matter of the right to life, the right to family reunion, and the right to pursue happiness. This understanding, transcending progressive-conservative divides and government-civil society differences, has now formed a consensus in our society. Therefore, if we are to pursue our North Korean human rights policy through international channels in parallel with inter-Korean channels, it ultimately leaves us with no option but to foster trust through support, exchange, and dialogue. Otherwise, the only recourse is pressure through the international community, but that method alone will not move North Korea. It is important to converge the divided opinions domestically and integrate them in a rational, moderate direction to create a bipartisan North Korean human rights policy consensus that garners public support.
It is important to create a policy consensus by converging the diverse opinions of the entire public, while considering international norms, North Korea's receptiveness, and broad public support—in essence, optimizing the various conditions for governance. In relation to this, the Ministry of Unification is currently undertaking unification and public outreach, and the Unification Minister also has a role, so it would be beneficial to utilize these effectively.
The right to life, the right to family reunion, and the right to pursue happiness. This understanding, transcending progressive-conservative divides and government-civil society differences, has now formed a consensus in our society. Therefore, if we are to pursue our North Korean human rights policy through international channels in parallel with inter-Korean channels, it ultimately leaves us with no option but to foster trust through support, exchange, and dialogue. Otherwise, the only recourse is pressure through the international community, but that method alone will not move North Korea. It is important to converge the divided opinions domestically and integrate them in a rational, moderate direction to create a bipartisan North Korean human rights policy consensus that garners public support.
It is important to create a policy consensus by converging the diverse opinions of the entire public, while considering international norms, North Korea's receptiveness, and broad public support—in essence, optimizing the various conditions for governance. In relation to this, the Ministry of Unification is currently undertaking unification and public outreach, and the Unification Minister also has a role, so it would be beneficial to utilize these effectively.
It is important to create a policy consensus by converging the diverse opinions of the entire public, while considering international norms, North Korea's receptiveness, and broad public support—in essence, optimizing the various conditions for governance. In relation to this, the Ministry of Unification is currently undertaking unification and public outreach, and the Unification Minister also has a role, so it would be beneficial to utilize these effectively.
*This text is an AI translation of an original written in Korean. Some translations or nuances may be inaccurate.