[Commentary] Misconceptions and Truths About the 'Washington Declaration': Neither an 'Empty Cart' nor a 'Nuclear Shield'

YouTube Link: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=gRfUOc2MxHU

Amid the announcement of the 'Washington Declaration,' which outlines enhanced U.S. extended deterrence measures for South Korea in conjunction with the ROK-U.S. summit, Kim Yang-gyu, Senior Research Fellow at EAI, evaluates the significance of this declaration and discusses the efficacy of nuclear extended deterrence and South Korea's future security strategy. The Nuclear Consultative Group (NCG), highlighted as an achievement of the summit, has limitations in enabling South Korea to exert influence at the same level as NATO in nuclear operational planning and execution due to the absence of U.S. tactical nuclear assets deployed on its soil. However, considering the establishment of a new consultative channel and the deployment of strategic assets such as nuclear submarines, extended deterrence can be assessed as having been strengthened. Furthermore, as the transparency and precision revolution brought about by advancements in cutting-edge technology will gradually diminish the utility of nuclear weapons on future battlefields, South Korea should focus on enhancing its capabilities in advanced technologies such as space and semiconductors from a long-term perspective, rather than solely concentrating on bolstering the credibility of extended deterrence, which is a short-term necessity.

■ Kim Yang-gyu, Senior Research Fellow at the East Asia Institute (EAI), and Lecturer at the Department of Political Science and International Relations, Seoul National University. He holds a Bachelor of Arts in French Education and International Relations and a Master of Arts in International Relations from Seoul National University, and a Ph.D. in Political Science from Florida International University. He previously served as an Adjunct Professor in the Department of Political Science and International Relations at Florida International University and as a Visiting Scholar at the Arnold A. Saltzman Institute of War and Peace Studies at Columbia University. He is a recipient of the Fulbright Graduate Study Award and the Smith Richardson Foundation's World Politics and Statecraft Fellowship. His primary research areas include coercive diplomacy, nuclear strategy, power transition, U.S.-China relations, the North Korean nuclear issue, and international political and security theory. His recent publications include "At the Brink of Nuclear War: Feasibility of Retaliation and the U.S. Policy Decisions During the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis" and "The Feasibility of Punishment and the Credibility of Threats: Case Studies on the First Moroccan and the Rhineland Crises."

■ Managed and Edited by: Park Ji-soo, EAI Researcher

    Inquiries: 02 2277 1683 (ext. 208) | jspark@eai.or.kr

Video Transcript

The Washington Declaration was announced early this morning. Public evaluations seem to be divided. Some view it as strengthening the nuclear umbrella into a nuclear shield, while others dismiss it as mere wordplay with no real substance. This presentation will assess the actual military-strategic significance of the Washington Declaration, its sufficiency in deterring North Korea's advanced nuclear capabilities, and South Korea's future security policy direction.

To begin with, regarding the extent of change brought about by the Washington Declaration, the conclusion is that it does not represent a fundamental shift. However, to say there is no change at all, or that it is mere wordplay, would also be incorrect. President Yoon Suk-yeol had already revealed his intention to establish a NATO-style nuclear-sharing system on the Korean Peninsula through his interview with Reuters on April 19th. Therefore, this was largely anticipated. What President Yoon emphasized at the time was the need for a system slightly more robust than NATO's to counter a strong nuclear attack. This led to speculation about what this stronger system might entail. In conclusion, it is not a system more robust than NATO's current nuclear sharing. This outcome was foreseeable, and a significant difference is unavoidable. NATO is an alliance that includes nuclear-weapon states such as France and the United Kingdom, hence...

...a fundamental difference is unavoidable, making it difficult to establish a more robust system than that. The crucial difference between the Nuclear Consultative Group (NCG) established by South Korea and the U.S. and NATO's Nuclear Planning Group (NPG) lies in whether U.S. tactical nuclear assets are deployed. This point must be made clear. However, does this mean there is no change at all? No. The existing system between South Korea and the U.S. was called the Extended Deterrence Strategy Consultation Group, which was a vice-ministerial level meeting, held perhaps once a year. If this were to be modeled after NATO, it would be at the ministerial level and meet much more frequently throughout the year. Therefore, it certainly has the effect of strengthening extended deterrence. However, in terms of substantive content, the deployment of U.S. nuclear submarines holds greater significance than the NCG itself, making that aspect somewhat more important.

Does this enhanced capability provide sufficient deterrence against North Korea on the Korean Peninsula? The conclusion, as mentioned earlier, is that there is not a significant difference compared to the past. While the deployment of nuclear submarines is a meaningful change, one might argue that the deterrence capability has not significantly increased. However, I consistently emphasize that the deterrence against North Korea was already very strong. Considering this, the recent summit did not bring about a major change, but this does not necessarily pose a significant problem either. Let me first explain how deterrence works. There are broadly two types of deterrence.

One is deterrence by punishment, and the other is deterrence by denial. Deterrence by denial aims to prevent the adversary from altering the status quo by impeding their ability to do so in the first place. Deterrence by punishment, on the other hand, relies on threatening to inflict unacceptable levels of pain and punishment if the adversary alters the status quo, thereby preventing such actions. The question then arises as to which of these two types of deterrence South Korea should establish against North Korea. With North Korea's launch of the Hwasong-18 missile, which is a solid-propellant missile, and its potential to carry nuclear warheads, some argue it's a game-changer.

One is deterrence by punishment, and the other is deterrence by denial. Regarding deterrence by denial, it is to place a brake on the enemy's ability to change the status quo, thereby preventing the enemy from attempting to alter the status quo in the first place. Deterrence by punishment is to prevent a change in the status quo by threatening to inflict severe punishment, to an unacceptable degree, on the enemy if they alter the status quo. Then, the question arises as to which of these two types of deterrence we should build against North Korea. Currently, with the launch of the Hwasong-18 missile, which is a solid-fuel missile, and the ability to carry nuclear warheads on such missiles, it is considered a game-changer.

That argument pertains to the U.S. context. However, on the Korean Peninsula, a game-changer already occurred in 2019. This point seems to be largely overlooked. North Korea successfully tested short-range missiles similar to Russia's Iskander, and it is believed to be capable of mounting a nuclear warhead with a yield of approximately 100 kilotons. Thus, a game-changer situation already existed on the Korean Peninsula in 2019. South Korea has been preparing for this consistently since then, and the U.S. is well aware of this. Furthermore, as emphasized through the Extended Deterrence Strategy Consultation Group, all U.S. military capabilities have been committed, and any use of North Korean nuclear weapons would result in a swift, severe, and decisive blow. Additionally, the Nuclear Posture Review Report released late last year strongly warned that any use of nuclear weapons by the Kim Jong-un regime would inevitably lead to the regime's demise. Therefore, the provisions and systems for deterrence by punishment are very robust. South Korea also has numerous provisions and capabilities for deterrence by punishment within its own framework, such as the 501 plan and the 'three-axis system.' We have been preparing for this, and it is already robustly established. Consequently, deterrence against North Korea has fundamentally been stable. As North Korea has advanced its nuclear capabilities and developed a strategy of blockade, the ROK-U.S. alliance has continuously enhanced its capabilities in response. Therefore, it is difficult to argue that there were significant problems from the outset.

In conclusion, some argue that this was a disadvantageous deal for South Korea, as it gave up the right to pursue its own nuclear armament without gaining much in return. From the U.S. perspective, it is establishing a slightly weaker version of the consultative body it already has with NATO allies. From South Korea's perspective, it is securing a channel that allows for greater reflection of its voice in nuclear operational matters, which is a more robust consultative body than previously existed. In return, South Korea forgoes nuclear armament.

In conclusion, some argue that since there was no decisive difference in this instance, South Korea has made a very disadvantageous deal, having gained almost nothing in return for abandoning its right to independent nuclear armament. From the U.S. perspective, it is establishing a consultative body with South Korea, albeit at a lower level, similar to the one it already has with NATO allies. From South Korea's perspective, it is securing a channel that allows for greater reflection of its voice, which is a more robust consultative body related to nuclear operations than previously existed. In return, South Korea forgoes nuclear armament.

This was already a pre-agreed framework. Furthermore, pursuing NATO-style nuclear sharing inherently implies abandoning nuclear armament. The NPG was established before the NPT, and its core principle was to prevent allies from developing nuclear weapons. The primary objective was to alleviate security concerns by providing security assurances. Therefore, pursuing a nuclear sharing system naturally entails abandoning nuclear armament. Objectively speaking, from our perspective, we have not conceded much and have not gained significantly.

Is extended nuclear deterrence truly so crucial for the Korean Peninsula that it warrants losing sleep over it? The answer is yes, currently, for several reasons. Nuclear weapons are unique, and the logic that only nuclear weapons can counter nuclear weapons is difficult to refute entirely. This was the core logic that maintained the Cold War. Professor Scott Sagan, for instance, refers to it as a 'nuclear revolution,' arguing that the introduction of nuclear weapons fundamentally altered strategic games. Therefore, it is a critical aspect. However, I would like to make two points regarding nuclear weapons. First, as mentioned, nuclear weapons are a terrible threat.

A nuclear detonation generates heat comparable to the sun, creating winds equivalent to a Category 5 hurricane—stronger than Typhoon Maemi in Korea. Subsequently, radioactive fallout can cause prolonged suffering and death for months, years, or even decades. Thus, it is undeniably a horrific weapon. Consequently, nuclear strategy should focus on deterrence rather than defense. A single 100-kiloton nuclear bomb, the estimated yield of North Korea's current arsenal, detonating in Seoul could result in over 5 million casualties.

This thought is indeed terrifying. However, my second point is that nuclear weapons have never been used since Hiroshima and Nagasaki. They are also a very old technology, developed 78 years ago. While nuclear weapons are undeniably a critical weapon system today, will this remain the case in the future? I would argue no. The utility of nuclear weapons on future battlefields will continue to diminish. Why? Consider this:

As mentioned earlier, imagine North Korea actually using such nuclear weapons. This would mean North Korea is killing millions of parents, siblings, friends, relatives, and acquaintances in a horrific and agonizing manner. Would this lead to the complete destruction of South Korea? Not necessarily. A single nuclear weapon or two cannot destroy South Korea. However, the moment such a horrific means of warfare is chosen, the victim's side is justified in unleashing any level of fury. Therefore, the U.S. statement that no scenario exists for the Kim Jong-un regime to survive a nuclear attack is not an empty threat. The political cost of using nuclear weapons is immense, making their use extremely difficult. Furthermore, considering the counterattack after their use, South Korea would mobilize all its military capabilities in response, and the U.S. would provide full support with all its military power. Consequently, the destruction of the North Korean regime is almost certain. At best, it would lead to mutual destruction, and it is more probable that the North Korean regime would be destroyed first. Can nuclear weapons be used so easily? This is one question. Moreover, with the advancement of cutting-edge technology, the nature of future battlefields is changing significantly. Let me highlight two major changes: the revolution in long-range reconnaissance capabilities. Through the utilization of satellites and drones, a highly dense surveillance system is being established, enabling the monitoring of enemy movements almost 24 hours a day, regardless of weather conditions. The precision revolution means that while in the past, missile launches might have had an error margin of several hundred meters, now it is within tens of meters. Current assessments of delivery systems indicate success rates of 97% to 98%.

This is close to 100%. The ability to strike targets with near-perfect accuracy, while monitoring them almost 24 hours a day, what does this imply? This suggests that an era of deterrence by denial is becoming possible. Recent warfare patterns employed by the U.S. in its counter-terrorism operations, such as the use of 'ninja missiles' to assassinate terrorist leaders and their successors, or IS leaders, demonstrate the precise elimination of targets with minimal collateral damage. This approach involves identifying the most vulnerable points of the enemy and surgically removing them. This is not exclusive to the U.S.; China is also pursuing a strategy known as 'intelligentized warfare.' The U.S. refers to this as 'integrated deterrence,' mobilizing capabilities across multiple domains and levels. This is becoming the mainstream and a key feature of future battlefields.

What changes does this bring about? Imagine this scenario: if, at the moment Kim Jong-un decides to use nuclear weapons on the Korean Peninsula and attempts to press the button, he could be assassinated, how much utility would North Korea's nuclear weapons retain? This question is inevitable. This would enable a truly perfect deterrence by denial. While the feasibility of such technology is debatable, what is certain is that without adequately keeping pace with the ongoing technological changes and reflecting them in South Korea's security strategy, the notion that only nuclear armament or the redeployment of tactical nuclear weapons can secure the Korean Peninsula's security seems somewhat out of sync with the evolving landscape of future battlefields from a scientific and technological standpoint. It might even suggest being trapped in a Cold War mindset.

Although it received little media attention, the Washington Declaration concludes with a statement about strengthening the integrated connectivity of South Korea's new Strategic Command and the Combined Forces Command. I find it regrettable that this aspect has not garnered much attention, as it is a crucial measure. South Korea's newly established Strategic Command will oversee missile defense units, space command, cyber operations units, and other assets, effectively becoming the core strategic command for South Korea's future security assets. Integrating this with the existing Combined Forces Command represents a significant and meaningful change.

I am somewhat disappointed that this has not received sufficient attention. During my visit to the U.S., my primary focus was not on extended deterrence measures or the establishment of the nuclear consultative body, although these are significant changes. My greater interest lay in President Yoon Suk-yeol's visit to NASA and cooperation in the semiconductor sector. This is because space is becoming a critical domain for long-range reconnaissance, and the U.S. is emphasizing its Space Force. South Korea also needs to enhance its space force capabilities, as space is expected to be a crucial battlefield in the future. Therefore, preparations in this area are more important. Regarding semiconductors, the current focus is on how South Korean companies can receive U.S. subsidies while minimizing losses in the Chinese market and securing U.S. interests. However, a more critical issue is that semiconductors are the core infrastructure for AI technology. Building future capabilities without them is extremely difficult. Therefore, issues related to space and semiconductors are far more important for South Korea's future security than extended deterrence.

Therefore, I would like to emphasize that when South Korea pursues future capabilities, particularly 'Defense Innovation 4.0,' it is crucial to fully consider and prepare for future technological changes in military technology that enable deterrence by denial. Expanding agreements and emphasizing joint R&D cooperation with the U.S. for technological sharing are far more important. As highlighted at the end of the declaration, preparing these aspects is crucial.

While it is understandable to feel some security anxiety as North Korea's nuclear capabilities advance, it is essential to keep pace with the evolving future battlefield and technological changes and to incorporate these into South Korea's strategic considerations. Maintaining strong deterrence against North Korea throughout this process is, of course, important; it does not mean it is insignificant. Therefore, while it is necessary to continue strengthening extended deterrence through the newly established ROK-U.S. Nuclear Consultative Group, the substantive content of this effort lies in building the technological capabilities required for future battlefields. This is how I would summarize it.

Therefore, while it is understandable to feel some security anxiety as North Korea's nuclear capabilities advance, it is essential to keep pace with the evolving future battlefield and technological changes and to incorporate these into South Korea's strategic considerations. Maintaining strong deterrence against North Korea throughout this process is, of course, important; it does not mean it is insignificant. Therefore, while it is necessary to continue strengthening extended deterrence through the newly established ROK-U.S. Nuclear Consultative Group, the substantive content of this effort lies in building the technological capabilities required for future battlefields. This is how I would summarize it.