[Visible Commentary] Misconceptions and Truths about the 'Washington Declaration': It is Neither an 'Empty Cart' nor a 'Nuclear Shield'

YouTube link: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=gRfUOc2MxHU

Amidst the announcement of the 'Washington Declaration,' which outlines measures to strengthen US extended deterrence provided to South Korea on the occasion of the ROK-US summit, Kim Yang-gyu, Senior Research Fellow at EAI, evaluates the significance of this declaration and discusses the effectiveness of nuclear extended deterrence and South Korea's future security strategy. The Nuclear Consultative Group (NCG), highlighted as an achievement of the summit, has limitations in enabling South Korea to exert influence at the same level as NATO in nuclear operations planning and execution due to the absence of US tactical nuclear assets deployed domestically. However, considering the introduction of a new consultative channel and the deployment of strategic assets such as nuclear submarines, extended deterrence can be seen as strengthened. Furthermore, as the transparency and accuracy revolution brought about by advancements in cutting-edge technology will gradually reduce the utility of nuclear weapons on future battlefields, South Korea should focus on strengthening its capabilities in advanced technologies such as space and semiconductors from a long-term perspective, rather than solely concentrating on enhancing the credibility of extended deterrence, which is a necessary short-term measure.

■ Kim Yang-gyuSenior Research Fellow at the East Asia Institute (EAI), Lecturer at the Department of Political Science and International Relations, Seoul National University. He holds a Bachelor of Education in French and a Bachelor of Arts in International Relations, as well as a Master of Arts in International Relations from Seoul National University, and a Ph.D. in Political Science from Florida International University. He has served as an Adjunct Professor in the Department of Political Science and International Relations at Florida International University and as a Visiting Scholar at the Arnold A. Saltzman Institute of War and Peace Studies at Columbia University. He has received the Fulbright Graduate Study Award and the Smith Richardson Foundation's World Politics and Statecraft Fellowship. His main research areas include coercive diplomacy, nuclear strategy, power transition, US-China relations, the North Korean nuclear issue, and international politics and security theory. His recent works include "At the Brink of Nuclear War: Feasibility of Retaliation and the U.S. Policy Decisions During the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis" and "The Feasibility of Punishment and the Credibility of Threats: Case Studies on the First Moroccan and the Rhineland Crises."

■ Managed and Edited by: Park Ji-soo, EAI Research Fellow

    Inquiries: 02 2277 1683 (ext. 208) | jspark@eai.or.kr

Video Script

The Washington Declaration was announced early this morning. Public evaluations seem to be divided. Some say the nuclear umbrella has become a nuclear shield, while others dismiss it as mere wordplay. So, how significant is this Washington Declaration from a military strategy perspective? Is it sufficient to deter North Korea's advanced nuclear capabilities? And what security policies should South Korea pursue going forward? I will address these questions in this order.

First, regarding the extent of change brought about by this Washington Declaration, to state the conclusion upfront: it is not a fundamental change. However, does this mean there is no change at all, or that it is merely wordplay? Clearly, that is not the case. President Yoon Suk-yeol had already revealed his intention to establish a NATO-style nuclear-sharing system on the Korean Peninsula through his interview with Reuters on April 19th. Therefore, this was something that was anticipated. What President Yoon emphasized at the time was the need for a system slightly stronger than NATO's to counter a powerful nuclear attack. This led to speculation about what this 'powerful system' might be. To conclude, it is not a system stronger than NATO's current nuclear sharing. However, this outcome was foreseeable, and there are fundamental differences that are unavoidable. NATO is an alliance that already includes nuclear powers like France and the United Kingdom, so...

...there are fundamental differences, making it difficult to establish a stronger system. So, how does the Nuclear Consultative Group (NCG) between South Korea and the US differ from NATO's Nuclear Planning Group (NPG)? The crucial difference lies in whether US tactical nuclear assets are deployed or not. This point must be made clear. However, does this mean there is no change at all? No. The existing system between South Korea and the US was called the Extended Deterrence Strategy Consultation Group, which was a vice-ministerial level meeting, held perhaps once a year at most.

If this were to be in the NATO format, it would be at the ministerial level, and it would be a consultative body meeting much more frequently throughout the year. Therefore, it certainly has the effect of strengthening extended deterrence. However, in terms of practical content, the deployment of US nuclear submarines holds much greater significance than the Nuclear Consultative Group (NCG). Therefore, that aspect is considered more important. Then, the question arises: with these capabilities, is deterrence against North Korea sufficiently established on the Korean Peninsula? The conclusion, as mentioned earlier, is that there is not much difference from the existing situation.

Of course, the deployment of nuclear submarines is a significant change, but one might argue that deterrence capabilities have not increased significantly. However, I always emphasize that deterrence against North Korea has been very strong even before. Considering that, there isn't a major change with this summit, but it's also not a major problem. I would like to state that. So, how does deterrence work? I need to explain that first. Deterrence broadly consists of two types.

One is deterrence by punishment, and the other is deterrence by denial. Let's start with deterrence by denial. This involves preventing the enemy from altering the status quo by impeding their ability to do so. In other words, it aims to prevent any attempt to change the status quo. Deterrence by punishment, on the other hand, is achieved by threatening to inflict severe punishment, unacceptable to the enemy, if they alter the status quo, thereby preventing such changes. So, the question is, which of these two types of deterrence should we establish against North Korea? Currently, with the launch of the Hwasong-18 missile and the development of solid-fuel missiles, if they can deliver nuclear warheads, it's considered a game-changer.

This is in relation to the United States. However, on the Korean Peninsula, a game-changer already occurred in 2019. This point seems to be overlooked. North Korea successfully tested the launch of short-range missiles of the same type as the Russian Iskander, and it is believed that they can carry nuclear warheads with a yield of about 100 kilotons. Therefore, a game-changer had already occurred on the Korean Peninsula in 2019. Since then, South Korea has been consistently preparing, and the United States is well aware of this. Furthermore, as emphasized through the Extended Deterrence Strategy Consultation Group, all capabilities and all types of US military influence will be provided, and if North Korea uses nuclear weapons, it will face a swift, powerful, and decisive blow. Additionally, the Nuclear Posture Review Report released late last year warned that if the Kim Jong-un regime uses nuclear weapons, it will inevitably lead to the regime's demise. Thus, the provisions and systems for deterrence by punishment are very robust. South Korea also has many provisions for deterrence by punishment in its own systems, such as 501 and the 'three-axis system,' and has incorporated many capabilities. Therefore, we have been preparing for this, and it is already established in a fairly solid manner. Thus, deterrence against North Korea has, from the outset, not been significantly shaken. As North Korea's nuclear capabilities have advanced and it has developed a blockade-oriented nuclear strategy, the ROK-US alliance has continuously augmented its capabilities in response. Therefore, it is difficult to argue that there was a significant problem from the beginning.

In conclusion, some argue that there was no significant difference in this decision, suggesting that South Korea has lost out by giving up its right to independently possess nuclear weapons, making it a disadvantageous deal. From the US perspective, it is simply establishing a slightly weaker version of the consultative body that it already has with NATO allies. From South Korea's perspective, it is securing a channel that allows for greater reflection of its voice, which is a somewhat stronger nuclear operations consultative body than previously existed. In return, South Korea gives up nuclear armament.

В заключение, некоторые говорят, что поскольку на этот раз не было существенной разницы, Корея, отказавшись от права на собственное ядерное вооружение, почти ничего не получила и поэтому заключила крайне невыгодную сделку. С точки зрения США, это создание еще одного, хотя и менее формального, консультативного органа с Кореей, в дополнение к уже существующим с союзниками по НАТО. С точки зрения Кореи, это получение более мощной формы консультаций по ядерным операциям, чем существовали ранее, что позволяет усилить голос Кореи в этом канале. Взамен Корея отказывается от ядерного вооружения.

However, this was already a pre-agreed scenario. And if South Korea were to pursue NATO-style nuclear sharing, abandoning nuclear armament is a natural consequence. The NPG was established before the NPT treaty, and its core principle was to prevent allies from developing nuclear weapons. In essence, it was to alleviate security concerns by the US. Therefore, if one pursues a nuclear sharing system, abandoning nuclear armament is a given. Objectively speaking, from our perspective, it can be summarized as not having given up much and not having gained much.

If one asks whether the US extended deterrence, or nuclear extended deterrence, is truly important enough for us to lose sleep over and meticulously analyze, then currently, yes, it clearly has that aspect. This is because nuclear weapons are a unique weapon system, and the logic that only nuclear weapons can deter nuclear weapons is not entirely flawed. This was the core logic that maintained the Cold War during that era. Therefore, scholars like Professor Jervis argue that it is a 'nuclear revolution,' a 'revolution in military affairs,' where the introduction of nuclear weapons has led to a completely different strategic game. Thus, it is a very important aspect. However, I would like to make two points regarding nuclear weapons. First, as I just mentioned, nuclear weapons are a terrible weapon.

When a nuclear weapon detonates, it generates heat comparable to the sun, creating winds of Category 5 hurricane strength – stronger than Typhoon Maemi in Korea – and subsequent radioactive fallout can cause suffering and death to people for months, years, or even decades. Therefore, it is undoubtedly a horrific weapon. Consequently, nuclear weapons should not be pursued as a defensive strategy but as a means of deterrence. The detonation of just one 100-kiloton nuclear bomb, which North Korea is believed to possess, in Seoul could result in over 5 million casualties.

Thinking about that makes it a truly dreadful weapon. However, the second point I want to make is that nuclear weapons have never been used since Hiroshima and Nagasaki. And nuclear weapons are a very old technology, developed 78 years ago. So, while nuclear weapons are undeniably a crucial weapon system today, will this continue to be the case in the future? I would venture to say no. The utility of nuclear weapons on future battlefields will continue to diminish. Why? Because of the following reasons.

As mentioned earlier, let's imagine North Korea actually used such nuclear weapons. In that scenario, North Korea would be killing millions of parents, siblings, friends, relatives, and acquaintances in a horrific and agonizing manner. Would South Korea be completely destroyed by this? No. A single nuclear weapon or two cannot destroy South Korea. However, the moment such a horrific means of warfare is chosen, the victim's side is justified in unleashing any level of fury. Therefore, even the US acknowledges that there is no scenario where the Kim Jong-un regime can survive after using nuclear weapons. This is not an empty threat. Using nuclear weapons carries immense political costs, making it extremely difficult to use them. Furthermore, considering the military costs and the subsequent counterattack, South Korea would mobilize all its military capabilities for retaliation, and the US would also provide support with all its military power. Consequently, the destruction of the North Korean regime is almost certain. So, at best, it would be mutual annihilation, and it is more likely that the North Korean regime would be destroyed first. This raises the question of whether nuclear weapons can be used so easily. Moreover, with the advancement of cutting-edge technology, the nature of future battlefields is changing dramatically. Let me mention two major changes: the revolution in long-range reconnaissance capabilities. By utilizing satellites and drones, a highly dense surveillance network is being established, allowing for the monitoring of enemy movements almost 24 hours a day. This is achieved regardless of weather conditions. And the accuracy revolution: in the past, missile launches might have had an error of several hundred meters, but now it is within tens of meters. Therefore, current launch systems have success rates of 97-98%.

Военная сила будет использована для поддержки, поэтому уничтожение северокорейского режима почти наверняка. В лучшем случае это будет взаимное уничтожение. Кроме того, существует вероятность того, что режим в Северной Корее падет первым, но будет ли ядерное оружие так легко применено? Это один из вопросов. Кроме того, с развитием передовых технологий будущее поле боя претерпевает значительные изменения. Упомянем два наиболее значительных изменения: изменение в возможностях дальнего наблюдения. С использованием спутников и беспилотных летательных аппаратов создается плотная система наблюдения, позволяющая отслеживать действия противника почти круглосуточно, независимо от погодных условий. Говорят о революции в точности: раньше погрешность при запуске ракеты могла составлять сотни метров, но сейчас она составляет десятки метров. Таким образом, если оценить процент успешных запусков, он составляет 97-98%.

Close to 100%. This means that with a nearly 100% probability, the enemy can be targeted. And if you can monitor the enemy's targets for almost 24 hours, what does that imply? This suggests that an era of deterrence by denial is becoming possible. In fact, if we look at the warfare conducted by the US in its recent counter-terrorism operations, such as the assassination of terrorist leaders and the killing of IS leaders using 'ninja missiles' that precisely eliminate only the target, it demonstrates a method of warfare that minimizes collateral damage and precisely removes the enemy's most vulnerable points. This is not something only the US is doing; China is also pursuing a strategy called 'intelligentized warfare.' The US calls this 'joint all-domain command and control,' which involves mobilizing various domains, levels, and all dimensions of influence to build such capabilities. This is becoming the trend and the main picture of future battlefields.

So, what changes does this bring? Imagine this: if the Kim Jong-un regime decides to use nuclear weapons on the Korean Peninsula and is about to press the button, but can be assassinated at that moment, how much utility would North Korea's nuclear weapons actually have? This question inevitably arises. This would then enable perfect deterrence by denial in its true sense. Of course, whether this is technologically feasible is debatable, but what is certain is that without fully embracing the ongoing technological changes and reflecting them in South Korea's security strategy, the notion that only nuclear armament or the redeployment of tactical nuclear weapons can secure the Korean Peninsula's security seems somewhat out of sync with the future battlefield that is evolving at a physical and scientific level. Rather, it suggests being trapped in a Cold War mindset.

Although it received little attention from the media, the Washington Declaration includes a phrase about strengthening the integrated connectivity of South Korea's new Strategic Command and the Combined Forces Command. I am somewhat disappointed that this has not received much attention. This is a very important measure. South Korea's newly established Strategic Command will control units such as the Missile Defense Command, Space Command, and Cyber Operations Command, and will be the core strategic unit for South Korea's future security assets. Integrating this with the existing Combined Forces Command is a significant and meaningful change, yet it is not receiving sufficient attention.

Therefore, during my recent visit to the US, what I was most focused on was not actually these extended deterrence measures. Establishing the Nuclear Consultative Group is a significant change, but what I am more interested in is President Yoon Suk-yeol's visit to NASA and cooperation in the semiconductor sector. This is because space is becoming a critical domain for long-range reconnaissance capabilities, and the US is emphasizing its Space Force. It is also important for South Korea to enhance its space capabilities, as space is expected to be a crucial battlefield in the future. Therefore, preparations for that are more important. Regarding semiconductors, South Korean companies are currently focused on how to receive US subsidies while avoiding losses in the Chinese market and how to gain US understanding. However, the more important issue is that semiconductors are the core infrastructure for AI technology. Without them, it is very difficult to build South Korea's future capabilities. Therefore, issues like space and semiconductors are far more important for South Korea's future security than extended deterrence.

Therefore, what I would like to emphasize is that in the future, when South Korea pursues its capabilities, especially 'Defense Innovation 4.0,' it is crucial to fully consider and prepare for the future technological changes in military technology that will enable deterrence by denial, and to build those capabilities. To this end, it is much more important to expand and emphasize agreements on technology sharing and joint R&D cooperation with the US, as was emphasized at the end of the statement. While it is understandable to feel some security anxiety due to North Korea's advancing nuclear capabilities, it is essential to consider the changing future battlefield and the evolution of science and technology and to strategize accordingly. Maintaining strong deterrence against North Korea during this process is, of course, important. This is not to say it is meaningless. Therefore, while it is necessary to continue strengthening extended deterrence through the newly established ROK-US Nuclear Consultative Group, the actual substance of this will be built by developing the technological capabilities required for future battlefields. This is what I would like to say.

Therefore, while it is understandable to feel some security anxiety due to North Korea's advancing nuclear capabilities, it is essential to consider the changing future battlefield and the evolution of science and technology and to strategize accordingly. Maintaining strong deterrence against North Korea during this process is, of course, important. This is not to say it is meaningless. Therefore, while it is necessary to continue strengthening extended deterrence through the newly established ROK-US Nuclear Consultative Group, the actual substance of this will be built by developing the technological capabilities required for future battlefields. This is what I would like to say.