[Commentary] The Taiwan Issue, Potential US-China Conflict, and South Korea's Response

YouTube Link: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=KU-cous2YEI

Seol In-hyo, professor at the National Defense University, warns that in the context of accelerating US-China hegemonic competition, continued military tension and confrontation surrounding the Taiwan Strait could lead to an unintended armed conflict at any time. Furthermore, he predicts that if a military conflict occurs in the Taiwan Strait and the United States redeploys its Indo-Pacific forces to the Taiwan Strait to counter its numerical disadvantage, North Korea might misjudge that US security commitments to South Korea have weakened and engage in high-level military provocations on the Korean Peninsula. Therefore, he points out that the logic that increasing South Korea's contribution to the Taiwan issue, as some argue, could lead to demands for strengthened US extended deterrence on the Korean Peninsula is an overly simplistic calculation. He argues that South Korea's primary task is to develop a sophisticated response that deters North Korean military actions and maintains the military balance on the Korean Peninsula.

Video Script

The Taiwan issue has become a symbolic point representing the strategic competition between the United States and China. As it serves as a symbol for both countries to express their determination not to lose in this competition, a vicious cycle of offense begetting offense continues. Especially with the outbreak of the war in Ukraine, the US has strengthened its military support and various military preparations for Europe, which could be perceived as neglecting the Taiwan issue. This has acted as a significant crisis for the US and an opportunity for China, drawing further attention to the matter. The US is emphasizing the maintenance of the status quo in Taiwan as the minimum level of its One China policy. However, China perceives that this has crossed the red lines based on the standards of the One China principle as understood by China in the past, particularly in relation to the US and other major powers.

This is a manifestation of the changes in US-China relations from the past to the present, creating a vicious cycle where conflict breeds further conflict. The US is strengthening military support and enhancing joint exercises with key allies and partners in the region to demonstrate deterrence that the status quo in Taiwan will be maintained. Taiwan, on the other hand, perceives that China has crossed the red lines that it had previously set and declared it would not cross regarding the existing regional order, thus showing a stronger military response. The expression of strong will can be appealing domestically and to related countries as justification for actual military action. This is the current atmosphere surrounding Taiwan. A few years ago, there were concerns about potential events in Taiwan around 2026 or 2027, primarily related to political schedules such as elections in Taiwan and Xi Jinping's bid for a third term. On the other hand, it was also discussed as the target timeframe for China's People's Liberation Army to establish a system capable of militarily occupying Taiwan or completely blocking external military intervention. In contrast, the US and surrounding countries have been strengthening their preparations to counter and block such activities by the PLA, leading to a perception that this period is one where the military balance has become highly uncertain.

This is why military experts and defense officials have discussed such timeframes. Even before the war in Ukraine, there were discussions about this period being a critical juncture. However, with the outbreak of the war in Ukraine, it has become more difficult for the US to defend Taiwan, while China has made military preparations. Furthermore, with Xi Jinping's decision to seek a third term, domestic political changes have coincided, intensifying focus on the Taiwan situation. Both countries are demonstrating their unwavering resolve, and the US, in particular, is seeking to lead a system with its allies and partners to deter the Taiwan situation. They view the war in Ukraine as a failure of such efforts and are determined not to allow miscalculations in this region. This necessitates a significantly stronger form of military support than in the past, as evidenced by joint exercises with surrounding countries. China perceives this as a threat and responds accordingly, perpetuating a cycle of escalation. Recently, there was an incident where a Russian fighter jet collided with a US drone, and a similar incident occurred between the US and China in 2001. When military tensions rise, accidental collisions can occur at any time, including collisions between warships.

However, when such incidents occur during periods of high tension, military actions beyond political intent or government control can take place. This could escalate beyond a mere collision or minor skirmish, leading to unpredictable consequences. If such a possibility is acknowledged, preparations must be made. These preparations involve various military activities, which are perceived as threats by the opposing side, further exacerbating the situation. Examining the history of past wars, if one believes that war is inevitable and merely a matter of time, then it is possible that war could occur not just through accidental collisions but through deliberate and planned preparations and the achievement of specific strategic conditions. These are the arguments being raised. What I have described are not my personal opinions but the views of experts who study this field. The basis for these views lies in their judgment and understanding of the situation, which gives them significance. To summarize, the Taiwan issue serves as a crucial outlet for US-China competition, perpetuating a vicious cycle where offense leads to offense. It appears unlikely that this situation will ease in the near future. Secondly, the possibility of accidental collision is quite high, and since an accidental collision could escalate into a larger conflict, preparations are being made for such an eventuality. This, in turn, is perceived as offensive by the other side, creating another vicious cycle. Finally, as these factors accumulate, it is possible to conclude that a conflict in Taiwan is inevitable, leading to the possibility of a larger-scale war. However, overall, the likelihood of an actual conflict in Taiwan is not high. In particular, if the US and China were to clash, a nuclear war, which neither side desires, could occur. Therefore, there is a general calculation that beyond a certain level of escalation, the situation becomes uncontrollable.

From a military-strategic perspective, both sides are making efforts to de-escalate tensions and establish mechanisms for resolving accidental collisions through political negotiations. These efforts are being manifested. For instance, the US National Security Strategy and Defense Strategy, released late last year, dedicate significant portions, more than in the past, to the importance of crisis management and the construction of communication channels. However, despite these declarations, the recent balloon incident, which disrupted various US-China exchanges, has led to a resurgence of conflict. Currently, while the necessity of such mechanisms is acknowledged, the emphasis is on escalating conflict and attempting to subdue the opponent, rather than on building these systems. Therefore, the prospects for establishing systems to de-escalate and control tensions appear bleak.

However, when such a situation arises and tensions remain high, there is a possibility of military actions that go beyond political intentions or government control, which could escalate beyond mere clashes or minor skirmishes. If we cannot predict the aftermath or acknowledge such possibilities, we must prepare for them. Therefore, various military activities follow to prepare for such situations, which are then perceived as threats by the other side, further exacerbating the situation. Thus, looking at the history of past wars, if one concludes that war is inevitable

it is only a matter of time, then it is thought that war could occur not as an accidental clash but in a significantly intentional and planned manner, if certain strategic conditions are met. These opinions are being raised. What I am discussing now is not my personal opinion but the views of experts who study this field. Therefore, these views are meaningful as they form the basis for judging and understanding the situation. To summarize, the military tension surrounding Taiwan, as a significant outlet for US-China competition, is caught in a vicious cycle where offense provokes offense. Therefore, it does not seem likely that this will ease anytime soon. Second, the possibility of accidental clashes is quite high, and since accidental clashes could escalate into a larger war, preparations are being made for it, which in turn appears offensive to each side. Thus,

there is a vicious cycle. And finally, as these factors accumulate, it is possible to conclude that a clash in Taiwan is inevitable, which could lead to a larger-scale war. However, overall, the probability of an actual clash in Taiwan is not high. In particular, if the US and China were to clash, a nuclear war, which neither side desires, could occur. Therefore, there is a general calculation that beyond a certain level of escalation, the situation becomes uncontrollable.

From a military-strategic perspective, both sides are making efforts to de-escalate tensions or, as mentioned earlier, to establish mechanisms for resolving accidental clashes through political negotiations. These efforts are being manifested. For example, the US National Security Strategy and National Defense Strategy, released in late last year, dedicate a significant portion of their pages, more than in the past, to the importance of building a crisis management and communication system.

With the outbreak of the war in Ukraine, the attention of military experts worldwide has turned to Taiwan, as the global geopolitical system is interconnected. Given that the US and China are major powers engaged in a hegemonic rivalry, any crisis in Taiwan is likely to create a power vacuum in other regions, with the Korean Peninsula being one such area. The military deterrence system on the Korean Peninsula operates under the ROK-US alliance. In the event of a conflict or other situation, responses are initially made by forces stationed on the Korean Peninsula, followed by the deployment of forces from the US Indo-Pacific Command, and eventually, forces from the US mainland and around the world are mobilized sequentially to deter war. However, if a crisis occurs in Taiwan, as recent monitoring suggests, the US may face a numerical disadvantage.

If the Taiwan situation unfolds under such circumstances, it is highly predictable that the existing military deterrence system on the Korean Peninsula will not function effectively. Therefore, the primary military-strategic judgment is that there is a possibility of simultaneous military provocations from North Korea. Secondly, it is difficult to easily ascertain North Korea's strategic intentions. However, it is likely that North Korea aims to negotiate a reduction in sanctions, particularly those related to civilian and livelihood issues, by offering to halt or partially reduce its nuclear development, in exchange for substantive nuclear disarmament negotiations, given its possession of nuclear weapons.

However, since it is expected that South Korea, the US, and the international community will not recognize North Korea's de facto nuclear status, North Korea will likely first seek to demonstrate the danger of neglecting the nuclear issue on the Korean Peninsula. By doing so, it could then negotiate from a more advantageous position. We see a parallel in Putin's situation in Ukraine, where if the conventional war becomes unfavorable, he brandishes the threat of tactical nuclear weapons, hinting at their potential use if Western support intensifies. Similarly, North Korea might engage in high-level provocations, not just to showcase its military capabilities but also to conduct limited regional provocations on land or at sea, as seen in the past. By escalating the situation, North Korea could then leverage its nuclear arsenal to demonstrate the dangers it poses, before entering into negotiations. This could be considered North Korea's strategic intention.

However, North Korea might face significant backlash for such actions. The timing when it might expect minimal backlash is precisely when a military conflict occurs in Taiwan. Furthermore, if the confrontation between the US and China intensifies, North Korea would need to demonstrate its strategic value to countries opposing the US, such as China and Russia. If a Taiwan contingency occurs and North Korea launches provocations on the Korean Peninsula during that period, it could significantly disrupt the strategic redeployment of US forces.

Therefore, North Korea may perceive this as an opportunity to showcase its geopolitical and strategic value. Consequently, research within the US, not just statements by the President, suggests a potential link between a Taiwan contingency and North Korean provocations. This assessment stems from considering both the purely military-strategic aspects and North Korea's strategic intentions, leading to the conclusion that both events could occur simultaneously.

While the likelihood of such an event is not high, the structural conditions make it impossible to dismiss, necessitating significant preparation. Firstly, there is a considerable gap between the views of general security strategists and pure military strategists. Many military experts believe that deterring North Korea on the Korean Peninsula is paramount in the event of a Taiwan contingency. Although South Korea is a key US ally, they argue that its military contribution to Taiwan could instead incite North Korean provocations due to a potential strategic power vacuum. Therefore, they believe South Korea's primary role should be to maintain deterrence on the Korean Peninsula by maximizing the utilization of its available forces, including those in a ready state, rather than transferring some US forces or delaying reinforcements.

If a Taiwan contingency occurs and the military balance on the Korean Peninsula is significantly disrupted, it could lead to doubts among US allies and partners worldwide about the US security commitment. Therefore, rather than risking such a scenario, it is considered more crucial for the ROK military to proactively maintain deterrence on the Korean Peninsula. Even if North Korea does not provoke, ensuring a robust posture to prevent provocation is preferable to transferring some ROK forces to Taiwan, as the latter offers little comparative benefit. Secondly, the ROK-US alliance and combined forces have historically developed their capabilities with North Korea's provocations in mind. Taiwan, as can be seen on a map, is geographically distant. Therefore, the number of ROK forces that could effectively project power to Taiwan is limited. From this perspective,

South Korea is not a significant factor in military strategy. Numerous reports, including several this year alone, have described various military scenarios in a Taiwan contingency at the tactical level, yet most make no mention of ROK forces. This contrasts with the general security and alliance strategy perspectives, which emphasize strengthening deterrence against China in the Indo-Pacific region, thereby achieving two effects: deterring Chinese provocation and enabling force deployment in the event of an actual crisis. The emphasis, it seems, is on demonstrating unified strength to prevent China from finding vulnerabilities. From a purely military-strategic standpoint, deterring North Korea is more critical, and South Korea's force structure is not well-suited to significantly contribute to Taiwan's defense.

Secondly, South Korea's geopolitical location must be considered. In a metaphorical sense, South Korea's position is analogous to Cuba's during the Cold War US-Soviet rivalry, with the US position now replaced by China. Specifically, its proximity to mainland China, particularly Beijing, is a critical factor. Therefore, if South Korea intervenes militarily in a Taiwan contingency, it would signify a development beyond naval or air combat between the US and China. Consequently, China would likely exercise restraint to avoid providing South Korea with a pretext for intervention. From the US perspective, given the potential for nuclear war, it would not desire South Korea's active military involvement. Japan, due to its proximity to Taiwan, its involvement in East China Sea issues, and the interconnectedness of US forces in Japan, is expected to intervene swiftly and provide full support to the US. This is a crucial factor that will significantly influence subsequent military developments, as indicated in many reports.

In contrast, the situation in South Korea is largely unaddressed. If South Korea were to become involved in this issue, it could lead to a truly dangerous situation. While it is possible to consider such scenarios given the uncontrollability of war, the military conflict scenarios between the US and China are often difficult for the general public to comprehend or grasp the implications of. Therefore, the focus is primarily on security experts' recommendations, which call for cooperation in strengthening deterrence in the Indo-Pacific region to prevent China from exploiting vulnerabilities during peacetime. In this regard, further research is needed, and given the sensitive nature of the issue, it is difficult for the government to publicly state its position. However, it is important to consider that our actions in a real military situation need to be examined more comprehensively from a military-strategic perspective, even from the US standpoint.

Recently, security and military experts in South Korea have argued that to strengthen US extended deterrence in the face of escalating North Korean nuclear threats, the ROK-US alliance must be reinforced. This aligns with the US desire for South Korea's contribution at this juncture, as the US prioritizes deterring China in the Indo-Pacific region, particularly concerning Taiwan. However, the notion that increased South Korean contribution to Taiwan will strengthen US extended deterrence and thereby deter North Korea is not that simple. It is necessary to develop a highly sophisticated response based on a thorough understanding of the evolving dynamics of the situation, particularly its military dimensions.

From a military-strategic perspective, there is a need for a more multi-faceted approach. While the likelihood of actual conflict is not high, the structural conditions make it impossible to dismiss, necessitating significant preparation. Firstly, there is a considerable gap between the views of general security strategists and pure military strategists. Many military experts believe that deterring North Korea on the Korean Peninsula is paramount in the event of a Taiwan contingency. Although South Korea is a key US ally, they argue that its military contribution to Taiwan could instead incite North Korean provocations due to a potential strategic power vacuum. Therefore, they believe South Korea's primary role should be to maintain deterrence on the Korean Peninsula by maximizing the utilization of its available forces, including those in a ready state, rather than transferring some US forces or delaying reinforcements. If a Taiwan contingency occurs and the military balance on the Korean Peninsula is significantly disrupted, it could lead to doubts among US allies and partners worldwide about the US security commitment. Therefore, rather than risking such a scenario, it is considered more crucial for the ROK military to proactively maintain deterrence on the Korean Peninsula. Even if North Korea does not provoke, ensuring a robust posture to prevent provocation is preferable to transferring some ROK forces to Taiwan, as the latter offers little comparative benefit. Secondly, the ROK-US alliance and combined forces have historically developed their capabilities with North Korea's provocations in mind. Taiwan, as can be seen on a map, is geographically distant. Therefore, the number of ROK forces that could effectively project power to Taiwan is limited. From this perspective, South Korea is not a significant factor in military strategy. Numerous reports, including several this year alone, have described various military scenarios in a Taiwan contingency at the tactical level, yet most make no mention of ROK forces. This contrasts with the general security and alliance strategy perspectives, which emphasize strengthening deterrence against China in the Indo-Pacific region, thereby achieving two effects: deterring Chinese provocation and enabling force deployment in the event of an actual crisis. The emphasis, it seems, is on demonstrating unified strength to prevent China from finding vulnerabilities. From a purely military-strategic standpoint, deterring North Korea is more critical, and South Korea's force structure is not well-suited to significantly contribute to Taiwan's defense. Secondly, South Korea's geopolitical location must be considered. In a metaphorical sense, South Korea's position is analogous to Cuba's during the Cold War US-Soviet rivalry, with the US position now replaced by China. Specifically, its proximity to mainland China, particularly Beijing, is a critical factor. Therefore, if South Korea intervenes militarily in a Taiwan contingency, it would signify a development beyond naval or air combat between the US and China. Consequently, China would likely exercise restraint to avoid providing South Korea with a pretext for intervention. From the US perspective, given the potential for nuclear war, it would not desire South Korea's active military involvement. Japan, due to its proximity to Taiwan, its involvement in East China Sea issues, and the interconnectedness of US forces in Japan, is expected to intervene swiftly and provide full support to the US. This is a crucial factor that will significantly influence subsequent military developments, as indicated in many reports. In contrast, the situation in South Korea is largely unaddressed. If South Korea were to become involved in this issue, it could lead to a truly dangerous situation. While it is possible to consider such scenarios given the uncontrollability of war, the military conflict scenarios between the US and China are often difficult for the general public to comprehend or grasp the implications of. Therefore, the focus is primarily on security experts' recommendations, which call for cooperation in strengthening deterrence in the Indo-Pacific region to prevent China from exploiting vulnerabilities during peacetime. In this regard, further research is needed, and given the sensitive nature of the issue, it is difficult for the government to publicly state its position. However, it is important to consider that our actions in a real military situation need to be examined more comprehensively from a military-strategic perspective, even from the US standpoint.

From a military dimension, it is necessary to examine the issue in a much more multi-dimensional way. Recently, security and military experts in South Korea believe that as the threat of North Korea's nuclear weapons escalates, strengthening the ROK-US alliance is essential to reinforce the U.S. extended deterrence commitment. In this context, the U.S. desires South Korea's contribution, extending from this mindset. Ultimately, the U.S. considers deterring China in the Taiwan contingency as its most critical task in the Indo-Pacific region and expects South Korea to play a role. However, the notion that an increased South Korean contribution to Taiwan will strengthen U.S. extended deterrence and thereby deter North Korea is not that simple. Therefore, it is necessary to sufficiently understand the dynamics of the situation's progression, particularly in its military context, and develop a highly sophisticated response accordingly.