[Commentary] Controversies Surrounding the Forced Labor Solution and Tasks for Improving South Korea-Japan Relations

YouTube Link: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=lubpF2rXvRM

Son Yeol, President of the East Asia Institute (EAI) and Professor at Yonsei University, assesses that the forced labor solution announced by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs was an unavoidable choice among several alternatives, including the forced implementation of the 2018 Supreme Court ruling, third-party arbitration, or referral to the International Court of Justice, and that it reflects the current trend of improving South Korea-Japan relations. However, he points out that due to the nature of diplomatic agreements on historical issues, controversies surrounding the content will continue, and an agreement that does not gain the consent of the majority of citizens in both countries will hardly be a decisive turning point for improving relations. Son Yeol suggests that the political leaders of both countries should expand strategic cooperation in security and economic fields by reflecting the forward-looking mutual perceptions of the younger generation. He also anticipates that normalizing relations will be facilitated when South Korea's national strength grows, leading to a shift in the perceptions of the older generations in both countries.

■ Son Yeol_President of EAI. Professor at Yonsei University. He earned a Ph.D. in Political Science from the University of Chicago and, after serving at Chung-Ang University, is currently a professor at Yonsei University's Graduate School of International Studies and President of the East Asia Institute. He has served as Dean of Yonsei University's Graduate School of International Studies, Head of the Underwood International College, Director of the Institute for Sustainable Development, and Director of the Institute for International Studies. He was a Visiting Professor at the University of Tokyo, the University of North Carolina (Chapel Hill), and the University of California (Berkeley). He served as President of the Korean Association of International Studies (2019) and President of the Association for Japanese Studies (2012). He was a Senior Fellow at Fulbright, MacArthur, the Japan Foundation, and Waseda University's Advanced Research Center. He has also served as a consultant for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Korea National Diplomatic Academy, the Northeast Asian History Foundation, and the Korea Foundation, and as a specialist committee member for the Committee for the Northeast Asian Era. His research areas include Japanese foreign policy, international political economy, East Asian international politics, and public diplomacy. His recent publications include "Conditions for Presidential Success in 2022" (2021, co-edited), "Policy Recommendations for the New Government in 2022" (2021, co-edited), "The Story of BTS's Global Appeal" (2021, co-edited), "South Korea's Choices After the Crisis" (2021, co-edited), Japan and Asia's Contested Order (2019, with T. J. Pempel), Understanding Public Diplomacy in East Asia (2016, with Jan Melissen), “South Korea under US-China Rivalry: the Dynamics of the Economic-Security Nexus in the Trade Policymaking,” The Pacific Review 23, 6 (2019), and "South Korea's Middle Power Diplomacy" (2017, co-edited).

Video Transcript

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs released its proposed solution for the forced labor issue yesterday. Some media and broadcasts have viewed it negatively, calling it a half-hearted or even humiliating agreement. On the other hand, some argue that it is the best possible outcome under the circumstances. Opinions seem to be quite divided. However, I believe that it is not important to argue now whether this is a well-made or a flawed agreement. What we should first consider is the fundamental nature of the issue related to forced labor.

This is because the issue has been ongoing for four and a half years since the Supreme Court ruling in October 2018. It has been a long-standing issue that has been discussed between the two countries for a considerable period. In a way, reaching an agreement on such an issue was inherently very difficult, perhaps even impossible. Why is it impossible to reach an agreement? Because there is a structure where it is very difficult for the majority to agree on the agreement after it is made. In the case of the solution related to the forced labor ruling, when conducting diplomatic negotiations, the issue of historical perception is fundamentally involved. In other words, was it forced mobilization or not? And is this issue already resolved by the 1965 Treaty on Basic Relations between Japan and the Republic of Korea, or not? Given that the two countries have different perceptions of history, diplomatic negotiations, which are generally about balancing national interests, involve a give-and-take process. Therefore, it is quite difficult to resolve historical issues in such a manner. Thus, it is necessary to acknowledge that various differing opinions are bound to arise regarding the outcome, both within South Korea, within Japan, and between the two countries. After the Supreme Court's forced labor ruling in October 2018, there were broadly three possible solutions. The first was to simply implement, or rather, enforce, the Supreme Court's ruling. The second was to seek third-party arbitration, or in some cases, to jointly file a lawsuit with the International Court of Justice for a judicial decision. The third option is the current diplomatic negotiation.

Regarding the first option, simply enforcing the Supreme Court's ruling, we can consider one point: although the South Korean Supreme Court ruled as it did, Japan's Supreme Court reached a completely opposite conclusion on the same issue. Therefore, if South Korea were to proceed with enforcement based on its ruling, there would be various burdens to consider. These burdens include strong backlash from Japan, and if Japan's corporate assets are seized and liquidated to provide compensation according to South Korea's Supreme Court ruling, Japan would likely retaliate with significant opposition and punitive measures. This could lead to a severe deterioration of South Korea-Japan relations. This burden is one reason why there was hesitation domestically in South Korea regarding the enforcement option. As you know, EAI has conducted public opinion surveys. In our surveys, approximately 60% of the public expressed that it would be better to seek alternative solutions rather than enforce the ruling. Regarding the second option, arbitration, it carries significant political risks because the issue itself is not clear-cut. Therefore, the only choice left for the governments of South Korea and Japan was to proceed through diplomatic negotiations. In other words, they chose to mitigate the divergence between the two countries caused by the Supreme Court ruling through diplomacy and find a solution. Consequently, a preliminary conclusion was reached through diplomatic negotiations over the past four and a half years. Therefore, it is inevitable that there will be divided opinions on this conclusion. I must state that this was the only choice available.

The reason why South Korea and Japan negotiated for four and a half years and reached a temporary agreement is that both countries have experienced a significant deterioration in their bilateral relations. By finding a breakthrough on the forced labor issue, they hoped to create a breakthrough for improving relations. Both countries also hoped that this would serve as a turning point. However, as I have just explained, diplomatic agreements are structured in a way that makes it very difficult to gain the consent of the majority of citizens in both countries. In other words, it will be difficult for this decision to mark a decisive turning point in improving South Korea-Japan relations. It is true that there is an expectation that now that South Korea has taken these typical measures, Japan should step forward and fill the remaining half of the cup. However, I believe it will be difficult. Difficult in the sense that the South Korean public will not be satisfied with the measures Japan takes, while Japan will think that is sufficient. When I say Japan here, I am referring to the Japanese political leadership, the ruling party's leadership. They might think, 'What do you mean we filled half the cup? You should have filled 80%, and we should have contributed the remaining 20%.' They fundamentally hold such perceptions. Therefore, it is important not to have high expectations of Japan. I would say that there is no need to overestimate yesterday's agreement. However, it should not be underestimated either.

Because if we consider the essence of the issue, the deterioration of South Korea-Japan relations did not begin with the 2018 forced labor ruling. Relations had already experienced a period of conflict around 2011-2012, and this has continued for the past decade. In other words, political and diplomatic conflicts surrounding historical issues between the two countries have escalated into distrust, and this distrust was expressed through the 2018 Supreme Court ruling on forced labor. Therefore, the severe deterioration of relations between South Korea and Japan did not occur in 2018 but is a continuation of the trend that preceded it.

In that context, the fact that both South Korea and Japan have reached this point suggests that the distrust between the two countries is improving to some extent. Viewed in this light, even if this agreement is unlikely to mark a decisive turning point, it is still possible to see that various situations have improved, leading to this point through various efforts. The reason why this agreement is unlikely to be a decisive turning point is that the wall of distrust still exists between South Korea and Japan. In other words, we can only see it as the new normal. This is because, based on EAI's decade-long surveys on mutual perceptions between South Korea and Japan, there are significant generational differences in favorability towards the other country. The results are highly contrasting. In both South Korea and Japan, young people in their teens, 20s, and 30s have high favorability. However, those in their 50s and 60s have high unfavorability, and those in their 40s are exactly in the median. Looking at the figures, the favorability towards the other country in both nations is around 30%, while unfavorability is between 40% and 50%. The generation with favorability below 30% are those in their 50s and 60s, and those concentrated in the 50% range are teenagers, 20s, and 30s. Therefore, the state of distrust between the two countries largely exists among the older generation. The solution for normalizing relations should not hinder the forward-looking worldview and mutual perceptions of the younger generation, including Gen Z. The political leaders of both countries need to make political efforts to actively reflect these voices in their policies. In this regard, the international order is undergoing a major upheaval. Amidst the escalating US-China strategic competition, South Korea's industrial and technological foundations are being shaken, and issues such as the North Korean nuclear program, as well as regional and global interests, are becoming increasingly difficult to pursue.

In such circumstances, can we afford to be preoccupied with these emotional issues regarding Japan? I cannot help but think this way. 104 years ago, in the March 1st Declaration of Independence, it was written that we do not have time to blame Japan's lack of sincerity and injustice; we must focus on pioneering our new civilization. I believe this applies precisely to the present situation. South Korea's pursuit of a middle power role, its efforts to achieve freedom, peace, and prosperity in the Indo-Pacific, and its endeavor to restore a more open and resilient international economic order should not be hindered by South Korea-Japan relations. Instead, perhaps we need a magnanimous mindset and a grand perspective that actively embraces Japan. We need trilateral cooperation with the US and Japan for our national interests, and we must effectively utilize frameworks like the Quad, which includes the US, Japan, Australia, and India. We also need to actively expand free trade agreements. In all these endeavors, Japan is involved and plays a crucial role. Therefore, even if it is currently unsatisfactory or lacking, it is time to actively move forward with Japan. From this perspective, we must gradually broaden the scope of cooperation between the two countries.

By doing so, I believe that in the long run, the wall of distrust between the older generations will gradually lower. Finally, to secure trust between the older generations of both countries in the long term, I believe that ultimately, we must do better than we are now. When our national strength approaches, and sometimes surpasses, Japan's, then South Korea-Japan relations will enter a normal state. Only then will Japan look at South Korea anew, feel its absence, and thus cooperate. In that process, historical perceptions will also change. Similarly, when we catch up with Japan in terms of national strength, we can overcome the inferiority complex, anger, and outbursts of the older generation. From this perspective, while efforts to understand and make each other understand regarding historical issues should continue, as the March 1st Declaration of Independence stated, to pioneer our new civilization, we must strengthen our national power.

By strengthening our economic power, military strength, and cultural power and normative moral standing as soft power, South Korea-Japan relations will finally enter a new era. In this sense, the government's decision this time is merely the first step towards a new era for South Korea-Japan relations. Therefore, while the efforts of both governments are necessary, ultimately, it is only when all our citizens unite and move forward that South Korea-Japan relations can enter a normal state. Thank you.

In the long term, to secure trust between the older generations of both South Korea and Japan, I believe that ultimately, we must do better than we are now. When our national strength approaches, and sometimes surpasses, Japan's, then South Korea-Japan relations will enter a normal state. Only then will Japan look at South Korea anew, feel its absence, and thus cooperate. In that process, historical perceptions will also change. Similarly, when we catch up with Japan in terms of national strength, we can overcome the inferiority complex, anger, and outbursts of the older generation. From this perspective, while efforts to understand and make each other understand regarding historical issues should continue, as the March 1st Declaration of Independence stated, to pioneer our new civilization, we must strengthen our national power.

By strengthening our economic power, military strength, and cultural power and normative moral standing as soft power, South Korea-Japan relations will finally enter a new era. In this sense, the government's decision this time is merely the first step towards a new era for South Korea-Japan relations. Therefore, while the efforts of both governments are necessary, ultimately, it is only when all our citizens unite and move forward that South Korea-Japan relations can enter a normal state. Thank you.

We need trilateral cooperation with the US and Japan for our national interests, and we must effectively utilize frameworks like the Quad, which includes the US, Japan, Australia, and India. We also need to actively expand free trade agreements. In all these endeavors, Japan is involved and plays a crucial role. Therefore, even if it is currently unsatisfactory or lacking, it is time to actively move forward with Japan. From this perspective, we must gradually broaden the scope of cooperation between the two countries.

By doing so, I believe that in the long run, the wall of distrust between the older generations will gradually lower. Finally, to secure trust between the older generations of both South Korea and Japan, I believe that ultimately, we must do better than we are now. When our national strength approaches, and sometimes surpasses, Japan's, then South Korea-Japan relations will enter a normal state. Only then will Japan look at South Korea anew, feel its absence, and thus cooperate. In that process, historical perceptions will also change. Similarly, when we catch up with Japan in terms of national strength, we can overcome the inferiority complex, anger, and outbursts of the older generation. From this perspective, while efforts to understand and make each other understand regarding historical issues should continue, as the March 1st Declaration of Independence stated, to pioneer our new civilization, we must strengthen our national power.

By strengthening our economic power, military strength, and cultural power and normative moral standing as soft power, South Korea-Japan relations will finally enter a new era. In this sense, the government's decision this time is merely the first step towards a new era for South Korea-Japan relations. Therefore, while the efforts of both governments are necessary, ultimately, it is only when all our citizens unite and move forward that South Korea-Japan relations can enter a normal state. Thank you.