1 Year of the Russia-Ukraine War: ⑤ Counterarguments on the Theory of Offensive Superiority and the High Utility of Nuclear Weapons

YouTube Link: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=JQUFSYnqz6I

Kim Yang-gyu, Senior Research Fellow at EAI, explains the implications of the first year of the Ukraine war for international and Korean security in terms of the offense-defense balance, the utility of nuclear weapons, and South Korea's defense policy. He argues that despite advancements in long-range reconnaissance and precision strike capabilities, the current stalemate on the battlefield shows that offense cannot easily be said to be superior to defense. Nuclear weapons are too destructive to be used on the battlefield, and Putin's likelihood of actually using them is low. Furthermore, as the United States pursues the linkage of Atlantic and Indo-Pacific alliances in the wake of the Ukraine war, a systematic response is necessary. He points out that South Korea's 2022 Defense White Paper does not adequately address the establishment of a US-led integrated deterrence system.

■ Kim Yang-gyuSenior Research Fellow at the East Asia Institute (EAI), Lecturer at the Department of Political Science and International Relations, Seoul National University. He holds a Bachelor of Arts in French Education and International Relations and a Master of Arts in International Relations from Seoul National University, and a Ph.D. in Political Science from Florida International University. He served as an Adjunct Professor in the Department of Political Science and International Relations at Florida International University and as a Visiting Scholar at the Arnold A. Saltzman Institute of War and Peace Studies at Columbia University. He is a recipient of the Fulbright Graduate Study Award and the Smith Richardson Foundation's "World Politics and Statecraft Fellowship." His main research areas include coercive diplomacy, nuclear strategy, power transition, US-China relations, the North Korean nuclear issue, and international politics and security theory. His recent publications include "At the Brink of Nuclear War: Feasibility of Retaliation and the U.S. Policy Decisions During the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis" and "The Feasibility of Punishment and the Credibility of Threats: Case Studies on the First Moroccan and the Rhineland Crises."

Video Transcript

February 24th marked the one-year anniversary of the war in Ukraine. Many scholars are discussing its various implications. I intend to discuss the implications of this war for weapon systems and South Korea's defense posture in three aspects. The first is the offense-defense balance. The offense-defense balance concerns whether investing the same resources yields a superior force in offense or defense. It is considered one of the most crucial variables in forecasting future war patterns, defense policies, and regional security orders. For example, if one hundred million won is spent on defense, is it more advantageous to purchase offensive weapons, develop offensive doctrines, or deploy offensive units, or is it better to invest in defense? This is a decisive factor. If offense is superior, wars will be decided quickly, the cost of war will be lower, and the attacking side will win. Therefore,

the expected utility of war itself increases. This leads to an arms race among nations, with each striving to acquire greater offensive capabilities. This makes the order highly unstable because the side that attacks first has an advantage. Consequently, even a minor crack in the balance of power can rapidly escalate into a major war, as seen in World War I. Scholars refer to the pre-WWI phenomenon where major powers primarily invested in offense as the "cult of the offensive." So, what changes has this war brought to the offense-defense balance? The images we frequently see in the media are as follows:

The Ukrainian military has used commercial drones, not military-grade ones, to carry out suicide attacks, destroying Russian tanks, and has used Javelin anti-tank missiles to destroy Russian tanks, and HIMARS multiple rocket launchers to attack Russian forces. Images like these are prevalent. A Ukrainian drone costs about ten million won, while a main battle tank used by Russia costs about six hundred million won. From a cost-effectiveness perspective, has the era of offensive superiority arrived? With the development of long-range reconnaissance and precision strike capabilities, is the future battlefield one where offense is superior? Data from the Brookings Institution's Ukraine Index, which tracks Russian-occupied Ukrainian territory, shows that within a month of the invasion, Russia occupied 22% of Ukraine's total territory.

Then, starting around September, Ukraine, after receiving significant weapons support from Western countries, launched a counteroffensive and recaptured 5% of the territory within a month. This might lead one to think that the era of offensive superiority has truly arrived and that the future security landscape will become unstable again, reverting to the pre-World War I situation. However, this assessment may be somewhat premature. This is because, during the initial Russian offensive and the Ukrainian counteroffensive, attacks were launched against thinly spread defensive lines with inadequate logistical support and insufficient reserves. Offensive operations can be highly effective against such weak defensive positions.

However, attacking well-established defensive positions, fortified defenses, and units with ample reserves and robust logistical support remains difficult. If we look at the territorial control ratio between Russia and Ukraine after September, Russia's territorial occupation fell to 17% in September, and there has been virtually no change since then. This means the situation has reached a stalemate. In the current situation, where both sides have thoroughly fortified their defenses, it is difficult to break through, even with the support of offensive weapons, tanks, and various other systems provided to Ukraine, if Russia has established defensive positions. A professor at Columbia University has pointed out that it is difficult to consider this war as having brought about revolutionary changes in terms of offense and defense. I fully agree with this assessment. The second point concerns the utility of nuclear weapons. Putin

has issued numerous threats since the beginning of the war, stating that nuclear weapons could be used for the defense of Russian territory and the safety of its citizens. More recently, he announced Russia's withdrawal from the New START treaty and plans to significantly strengthen Russia's nuclear arsenal by increasing the production of hypersonic missiles, continuing to issue threats. This has led many to worry that Russia is lowering the threshold for nuclear use, posing a grave danger, and that nuclear weapons could be used at any moment. I hold the opposite view. The fact that Russia has not used nuclear weapons thus far, despite unfavorable circumstances, paradoxically demonstrates that using nuclear weapons on the future battlefield remains extremely difficult. Nuclear weapons are horrific weapons. They cause immense destruction through intense heat, powerful winds, and radioactive fallout, killing countless combatants and non-combatants instantly or over generations. From a strategic perspective,

any policy pursued by a nation subjected to a nuclear attack becomes justifiable. However, can one or two nuclear weapons truly annihilate me? That is not the case. Therefore, the moment nuclear weapons are used, any subsequent action taken by the attacked party is justified. This is why even in the US's strategic reports, such as the Nuclear Posture Review published last October, it is stated unequivocally that scenarios in which the Kim Jong Un regime can use nuclear weapons and survive do not exist. The US is not typically known for making such definitive statements, especially concerning strategic weapons. This suggests that the use of nuclear weapons will remain difficult in the future, as it would leave the user with no justification for any retaliatory measures, potentially provoking an extremely aggressive response. Therefore, the decision to use nuclear weapons to gain an advantage on the battlefield is highly irrational. Consequently, as mentioned earlier,

the balance of conventional weapons, the offense-defense balance, will likely continue to play a crucial role. Finally, what are the implications for South Korea's defense posture? Coincidentally, around the one-year anniversary of the Ukraine war, on February 16th, the South Korean Ministry of National Defense released its 2022 Defense White Paper. The white paper states that North Korea is South Korea's primary adversary and outlines plans to counter North Korea's growing nuclear and missile threats through the Korean-style three-axis system, including the Kill Chain, Korean Air and Missile Defense (KAMD), and Mass Punishment and Retaliation. It also mentions the integration of unmanned systems and AI for Defense Reform 4.0. While I generally agree with these points and find no significant issues, one regrettable aspect is that the direction of US-led integrated deterrence, clearly demonstrated in the Ukraine war, does not seem to be adequately reflected in the South Korean defense posture. The Biden administration had already been using the concept of integrated deterrence to prepare its defense strategy even before the Ukraine war. This concept involves not just military power but also economic strength, diplomatic capabilities, and other aspects of national power. It integrates conventional and nuclear forces, as well as space and cyber domains, into a comprehensive national power for defense policy. Furthermore, it aims to build a comprehensive operational capability not only for the US but also in collaboration with its allies. Therefore, ensuring a high degree of interoperability with the weapons systems of the US-led alliance network has become a critical issue. Indeed, the Ukraine war has led to the revitalization of NATO and the linkage between US allies in the Indo-Pacific and NATO.

Japan released its National Security Strategy in December last year, fully incorporating the concept of integrated deterrence into its documents. In contrast, while the term "integrated deterrence" is mentioned in South Korea's 2022 Defense White Paper, it is not addressed in sufficient depth. This raises concerns that South Korea might fall behind as the US-centric security and world order evolves. Therefore, preparations are needed to address these issues. That is what I would like to convey.

The concept of integrated deterrence, which involves not only military power but also economic strength, diplomatic capabilities, and other aspects of national power, integrates conventional and nuclear forces, as well as space and cyber domains, into a comprehensive national power for defense policy. Furthermore, it aims to build a comprehensive operational capability not only for the US but also in collaboration with its allies. Therefore, ensuring a high degree of interoperability with the weapons systems of the US-led alliance network has become a critical issue. Indeed, the Ukraine war has led to the revitalization of NATO and the linkage between US allies in the Indo-Pacific and NATO. Japan released its National Security Strategy in December last year, fully incorporating the concept of integrated deterrence into its documents. In contrast, while the term "integrated deterrence" is mentioned in South Korea's 2022 Defense White Paper, it is not addressed in sufficient depth. This raises concerns that South Korea might fall behind as the US-centric security and world order evolves. Therefore, preparations are needed to address these issues. That is what I would like to convey.

Japan released its National Security Strategy in December last year, fully incorporating the concept of integrated deterrence into its documents. In contrast, while the term "integrated deterrence" is mentioned in South Korea's 2022 Defense White Paper, it is not addressed in sufficient depth. This raises concerns that South Korea might fall behind as the US-centric security and world order evolves. Therefore, preparations are needed to address these issues. That is what I would like to convey.