The Russia-Ukraine War After One Year: III. Can China Mediate the Ukraine War?

YouTube Link: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=bnyYTpppTTI

Lee Dong-ryul, Director of the EAI Center for Chinese Studies (Professor at Dongdeok Women's University), explains the background of China's recent move to position itself as a mediator, driven by concerns over the strengthening of the US alliance network in the Asia-Pacific region, its cooperative relationship with Russia, and its previously neutral stance on the Ukraine war. He further points out that China, which needs to avoid escalating competition with the US due to the urgent need to restore its economy domestically, is unlikely to provide the level of military support Russia expects. Moreover, with the Taiwan issue at stake, similar to this situation, China faces difficulties in proposing active mediation measures, thus revealing the limitations of China as a vulnerable great power solely focused on its own interests.

■ Lee Dong-ryul_ Director of the EAI Center for Chinese Studies. Professor at Dongdeok Women's University. He obtained a Ph.D. in Political Science from the School of International Studies at Peking University and served as the President of the Association for Modern Chinese Studies. He is currently a member of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs Policy Advisory Committee. His main research areas include China's foreign relations, Chinese nationalism, and minority issues. Recent research includes "China's Strategy and Role in Korean Peninsula Denuclearization and Peace Process," "Evolution and Current Implications of Chinese Diplomatic Discourse Since the 1990s," "Geoeconomic Approach and Geopolitical Dilemmas of the Xi Jinping Administration's 'Maritime Power' Initiative," "Deciphering China’s Security Intentions in Northeast Asia: A View from South Korea," and "China's Territorial Disputes" (co-authored).

Video Transcript

China has maintained a rather ambiguous stance throughout the past year of the Russia-Ukraine war, not expressing a position of neutrality. Yet, at the same time, it has strengthened its relationship with Russia, targeting the US, and has faced international criticism. Now, on the first anniversary of the war's outbreak, China has stepped forward as a mediator in the Ukraine conflict. This marks China's most active diplomatic engagement since the Ukraine war. For instance, on February 28th, Wang Yi, Director of the Office of the Central Commission for Foreign Affairs, considered the chief diplomat of China, used his attendance at the Munich Security Conference to hold a series of bilateral meetings with the foreign ministers of major involved countries.

He met with US Secretary of State Blinken, and after a long time, with Ukrainian Foreign Minister Kuleba. He then held talks with the EU High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy. Subsequently, he traveled to Russia and met with the Russian Foreign Minister and even President Putin. Following this, on the 24th, China released a 12-point document outlining its position on the political settlement of the Ukraine crisis. While the content of China's proposed position on the political settlement of the Ukraine crisis is detailed across 12 comprehensive points, it does not significantly deviate from China's existing stance.

It is difficult to consider it a new solution, and it does not contain very detailed or specific content for resolution. China itself stated that this position paper represents the greatest common denominator among the involved parties, ultimately aiming to reflect the maximum common ground and interests of these parties. For example, it includes a call for the prohibition of nuclear weapon use, mindful of European concerns, which undoubtedly carries a message directed at Russia. Simultaneously, it also incorporates Russia's demand for the cessation of unilateral sanctions.

Furthermore, it addresses Ukraine's position by including content on the guarantee of territorial integrity and sovereignty. On the other hand, it sends a message targeting the US, urging it to abandon Cold War mentality. This signifies the complexity of the Ukraine issue, but it is difficult to view it as a proposed solution, as China claims. In fact, the reactions from the US and Europe immediately following the release of this document do not appear to be particularly positive. The US has even issued a warning that China might be considering providing lethal weapons to Russia.

Both Russia and Ukraine seem to be more focused on decisive combat rather than peace talks, suggesting limited effectiveness for China's initiative. Despite this, why has China undertaken the role of mediator with seemingly low effectiveness? The first reason is that as the Ukraine war shows signs of becoming prolonged and potentially expanding beyond initial expectations, China likely determined that it could no longer maintain its previous principled and ambiguous stance. Reading between the lines of the 12 points, one might infer that they reflect China's own dilemmas and concerns. As China observes the war with apprehension, it shares Russia's concerns about NATO expansion. China fears that the US's Indo-Pacific strategy is essentially an attempt to expand NATO into Asia, thereby pressuring China. This explains why China, while proclaiming neutrality, has not condemned Russia's invasion and has not participated in sanctions against Russia, continuing its strategic alignment with Russia.

Simultaneously, although China's relationship with Russia is deepening, it does not wish for this to lead to deteriorating relations with Europe or heightened conflict with the US. This is reflected in its hesitant stance on providing the level of firm support or military aid that Russia might expect. Another significant reason why China finds it difficult to offer strong support to Russia is the Taiwan issue. China views the Taiwan issue as the forefront of its competition with the US and has consistently asserted it as an internal affair and a matter of territorial sovereignty. In this context, while Russia is an important partner, China faces a difficult situation where it cannot compromise its crucial diplomatic principle of respecting sovereignty and territorial integrity, especially when the Taiwan issue is at stake.

A distinction can also be drawn from North Korea's position. North Korea, invoking the concept of a "new Cold War," is attempting to create a confrontation between China, Russia, and the US-Japan alliance, seeking cooperation from China and Russia to revitalize its diplomacy. In early February, Chinese leaders, including Wang Yi, announced six key tasks for China in 2023. Among these, a notable point is the strengthening of China's voice and discourse power in the international community. In line with this, China has expressed its intention to play an active role in two areas: promoting peace talks and participating in post-war reconstruction and development.

Ultimately, this can be seen as an attempt by China to enhance its international standing by projecting an image of leading peace and dialogue, differentiating itself from the US. However, as mentioned earlier, although China has proposed peace talks and claims it as a Chinese solution and a manifestation of Chinese wisdom, it lacks concrete solutions. The space for China to effectively act as a mediator is limited, suggesting that China is still revealing its limitations as a vulnerable great power primarily focused on its own interests.