[1 Year of Russia-Ukraine War] II. America's Dilemma of Simultaneously Confronting Two Nuclear Powers

YouTube Link: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=GBJCwlFq5ng

Jeon Jaesung, Director of the EAI Center for National Security Studies (Professor at Seoul National University), points to the fact that the European order, reorganized under U.S. influence, failed to satisfy Russia's security interests as a cause of the Ukraine war. He also suggests that if the Ukraine war concludes in the form of a ceasefire or armistice, it could lead to a divided situation between Russia and NATO countries. Meanwhile, the Ukraine war has placed a strategic burden on the U.S. to confront both China and Russia simultaneously. While a confrontation between China-Russia and the U.S.-led West may persist in the short term, the U.S. may find it difficult to maintain this dynamic in the long term, making it crucial to observe which country, Russia or China, the U.S. will attempt to mend relations with first.

■ Jeon JaesungDirector of the EAI Center for National Security Studies, Professor at Seoul National University. He earned a Ph.D. in Political Science from Northwestern University and has served as a policy advisor to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of Unification. His primary research areas include international political theory, history of international relations, the ROK-U.S. alliance, and Korean Peninsula studies. His major works include "The Threat of War and Peace Between North and South Korea" (co-authored), "Is Politics Moral?", and "East Asian International Politics: From History to Theory."

Video Transcript

The Ukraine war has now passed its one-year mark. Various structural factors surrounding the war have been extensively discussed, and I believe they will continue to be a subject of significant consensus. Regarding the causes, many scholars have framed the discussion around responsibility, but I believe the structural factors that led to the outbreak of the war are far more important. Broadly speaking, the European security order has been designed since around 1990, but ultimately, we can conclude that a security system capable of sufficiently accommodating Russia's security concerns and interests was not successfully created. There are records indicating that the U.S. and the former Soviet Union verbally agreed not to expand NATO eastward at the time of German reunification in 1990. Many scholars are still conducting documentary research on the specific details of this process. However, subsequent changes in Europe, particularly the U.S. restructuring of the European security framework without sufficient diplomatic compromise or engagement with Russia, have led to events that have fundamentally shaken Europe's security structure.

Furthermore, the democratization of Eastern European countries and the global changes over the past 30 years of the post-Cold War era that drove this democratization seem to have been very important. Ukraine, too, experienced rapid changes in its domestic political system through democratization, and Russia's concern about the impact of such democratization on its own country led to security concerns, which in turn escalated into a security situation. Therefore, we can see that the global trend of democratization and the changes in international relations are having a significant impact on the security structure.

In that regard, there is also a discussion that the Ukraine war has ended the unipolar hegemony system of the U.S. over the past 30 years, the post-Cold War era. Specifically, last year, the U.S. National Security Strategy officially declared the end of the post-Cold War era. From the perspective of international relations scholars, however, the end of the Cold War itself was not predicted, and if the views in that security strategy are correct, the end of the post-Cold War era was also not predicted, nor have the reasons for it been thoroughly elucidated. Therefore, many questions are being raised about the Ukraine war and the temporal shifts in the world order. Secondly, the European order will fundamentally change in the future.

Ideally, wars conclude with peace agreements through the full cooperation of the parties involved. However, as seen in the Korean War, such cases are rare; wars often end in armistices or ceasefires. Statistics from after World War II show that in many instances, wars recur within a few years. The Russian invasion of Ukraine is a recurrence of the 2014 conflict. If the Russia-Ukraine war concludes in a ceasefire due to issues like arms procurement or pressure from neighboring countries, the subsequent security instability in Ukraine could lead to a broader division within Europe, between Russian and NATO forces.

Ukraine will pursue a strongly pro-Western policy, and its military buildup will likely accelerate. NATO will also unite to the greatest extent possible to block Russian influence. Given that China and Russia are showcasing their "unlimited friendship" and solidarity, if the European security order becomes a new Cold War and the competition between the U.S. and China continues, the U.S. will face considerable strategic burdens. Considering the political polarization within the U.S., a protracted war in Ukraine could be fatal for the U.S. The U.S. suffered a political blow from the defeat in the Vietnam War and, more recently, a humiliating withdrawal from Afghanistan. If a similar outcome occurs in Ukraine, the Biden administration could face significant political damage.

This would also significantly reduce the credibility of its commitments to other allies. Therefore, in the short term, the U.S. will provide comprehensive support to Ukraine, as evidenced by Biden's visit to Ukraine. There are also reports of Xi Jinping's potential visit to Russia. In the short term, a confrontation between China and Russia on one side, and the U.S. and the West on the other, is inevitable. However, in the long term, it poses a significant strategic burden for the U.S. Therefore, it is crucial to consider whether the U.S. will shift its direction towards restoring relations with Russia after a ceasefire or end to the Ukraine war. Simultaneously, it is vital to consider whether the U.S. can cooperate with China, which holds considerable leverage over Russia, to swiftly end the Ukraine war and, based on that, create opportunities for further cooperation and compromise between the U.S. and China.

Even after the U.S.-China summit in Bali last November, a subtle atmosphere of seeking compromise and cooperation has emerged this year, alongside strategic competition in essential areas. In this context, the Ukraine war has a significant implication for future U.S.-China competition. Just as the Korean War shaped the norms for conducting the Cold War at its outset, successfully concluding the Ukraine war could play a positive role in establishing the fundamental norms for the evolving world order.

For instance, after President Xi Jinping stated that nuclear war must never be waged, Russia has shown hesitation regarding the use of nuclear weapons. In this sense, the Ukraine war is not merely a conflict between two nations but encompasses changes in the entire international structure. Although it is ongoing, further analysis is necessary. Above all, given the significant loss of life, it is most important that the use of force, whether through a ceasefire or armistice, ceases as quickly as possible. That is my belief.