[4th EAI Academy] ④ Problems and Reform Measures of the Winner-Take-All Electoral System

YouTube link: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=J6-OA5bou1A

Video Transcript

When I lecture, I don't just start unilaterally. I always ask questions to you all before I begin. So, the number of questions I ask during the lecture might be more than the questions you ask me, and we might have more time to discuss among yourselves. Before I delve into the content on the slides, let me first ask you: Why should the Korean electoral system be changed? Why do we need to listen to and consider the voices calling for electoral system reform, which leads to war and conflict between political parties? Why is it bothersome?

So, do you think the current semi-proportional representation system in Korea needs to be changed? Ah, yes. Then, those who didn't raise their hands think it's okay to maintain the current system? Or is that not the case? I believe everyone has their own thoughts. Then, among those who raised their hands, could someone briefly explain why it needs to be reformed or revised? Honestly, it's difficult to use the word 'reform.' Because whenever the system was changed under the guise of reform, the results often worsened. The semi-proportional representation system is a prime example of such an electoral system. So, could someone briefly explain why it needs to be changed, or what is the reason for wanting to change it? A simple, short answer is fine.

No, does Go So-yeon need a microphone? Regarding the current proceedings, it's new, isn't it? Different from how things have proceeded so far. What is meant by the politicization of social cleavages here is that the interests and demands of social groups can be politically represented. So, I think we will talk a lot about representation. And for representation to be properly and justly achieved, the system must guarantee proportionality. Therefore, I believe proportionality and representation are presented as a single goal for an electoral system. Could someone else please speak from a different perspective?

Could you speak louder? Yes, that's correct. The issue of the imbalance between votes and seats. Does anyone else have a different thought? Because it's about changing, it's about improving. Yes, that's right. Yes. The two-party system has its pros and cons. There are pros and cons to both party systems and multi-party systems. I believe you might have discussed this last week or the week before regarding party systems or party politics. Both the two-party system and the multi-party system have their advantages and disadvantages. However, it is said that Korea's electoral system leads to a two-party system, but in reality, it has a very strong winner-take-all characteristic.

This winner-take-all problem means that the winner takes everything and the loser gets nothing, and in this process, the conflict to become the winner intensifies greatly. This is what you see in the National Assembly, the hostile confrontations between lawmakers or political parties. Hostile confrontational politics. But is this hostile confrontational politics a condition that can properly reflect and transform representation into actual policy? No, it is not. So, we are, in a way, striving to transform such confrontational politics into politics of compromise and agreement. Because only then, within that agreement, more...

...diverse interests and demands can be policy-ized, and our citizens can receive benefits from such policies. The term 'benefits' here is insufficient, but it means our interests can be guaranteed. Therefore, we can talk about institutional reform as a means to overcome such confrontational politics. Let me add just one more point: we are engaging in person-centered politics. Because it has a strong single-member district characteristic, what do you do when you see election pledges? Do you consider the policies the party advocates or its future vision for society? Or do you mainly look at the candidate's biography or their past experiences?

When asked this, even if not 100 out of 100, most people say they look at the policies. Is that really true? Honestly, it's hard to look at all of them. Of course, because it's my research topic, I try to read the manifestos, but if it weren't for that research topic, I wonder if I would read them carefully. But because it's person-centered, responsible politics is weakened. The reason we have parties is to ensure collective accountability.

Individual responsibility, of course, can be carried out responsibly in one's legislative or political activities, but that is done within the connection with one's supporters, meaning representing only the interests of a particular region. In the process of processing the budget, you've probably heard of 'note' budgets, right? Nowadays, it's often called 'KakaoTalk' budgeting. In the past, notes were used to allocate more budget to our region. This is connected to patronage politics. It is person-centered politics that we are pursuing, and fandom politics and factionalism, which person-centered politics creates, result in further intensifying such conflicts. It is for these reasons that we are strongly advocating for electoral system reform or revision in civil society, academia, and parts of the political sphere. Was that too long? Anyway, in that context, let's examine what problems our electoral system has and what alternatives can be discussed to overcome them. First, I think you all know the meaning of an electoral system very well, so I'll move on. Is that okay? Regarding the importance of the electoral system, as stated here, we easily consider the electoral system as a tool of democracy. That is, through the electoral system or elections, we guarantee democratic values such as representation, accountability, competitiveness, and even participation. Therefore, popular sovereignty, or rather, national sovereignty, can be said to be a system that clearly assigns responsibility to the rulers. Thus, we can talk about the importance of such an electoral system. Next is the component of the electoral system. There's a lot to talk about here. What is the core of the electoral system reform that the National Assembly Special Committee or President Yoon Suk-yeol is talking about? What aspect are they focusing on changing?

Yes, that's right. To ensure proportionality and representation, what needs to be changed? Okay, the size of the electoral district. They are talking about the size of the electoral district. So, the current single-member district system results in many wasted votes, and due to its winner-take-all nature, the two parties monopolize, and diversity is weakened. Therefore, they suggest expanding the electoral districts and talk about the multi-member district system. However, we are all students studying this, and I am also in a learning position. As learners, we should not simply talk about electoral systems as multi-member districts or single-member districts.

These terms are used by the media for convenience. When we talk about electoral systems, there are key elements: the size of the electoral district and the method of allocating seats. These are combined to create the type of system. Therefore, we need to understand the elements that constitute the electoral system, and within that understanding, we can propose what to modify or revise, and what kind of system model to create, which can ensure the development of electoral system reform in Korean society. So, within that context, what are the components? How are seats allocated? How do we move up?

Ah, yes. Regarding the allocation of seats, as you all know, there is the majority system and the proportional representation system. The majority system is a method of determining the winner by receiving even one more vote. There is also absolute majority. Right? Then there is the proportional representation system, where the seats are converted according to the votes received by the party. This is called the proportional representation method. The size of electoral districts is referred to as single-member districts, medium-sized districts, large districts, and complex districts. Generally, single-member districts are for one or two people. I apologize. Medium-sized districts are also mentioned so often that I keep getting confused.

Medium-sized districts are for two to five people. However, the media sometimes refers to them as two to four people, while some scholars extend this to two to ten people. Therefore, frankly, rather than these terms like single-member, medium-sized, and large districts, it is more appropriate to classify them as single-member districts and multi-member districts. It is very difficult to distinguish between medium-sized and large districts. Therefore, we need to classify them as single-member districts and multi-member districts. Then there are complex districts, which Italy, for example, uses.

That is, there are single-member districts where one person is elected, and large districts where more than ten people are elected. So, there is a wide spectrum from single-member districts to multi-member districts, referred to as small, medium, and large. We call such electoral districts complex districts. In Korea's case, we currently have a semi-proportional representation system. Therefore, one person is elected in a district, and seats are allocated based on party proportionality. This can also be considered a complex district, combining single-member districts and multi-member districts, and national electoral districts. It can be called a combined complex district.

Next is the voting method, which includes categorical voting and preferential voting. Categorical voting is very familiar to you. It's the method where you go and stamp a seal or write a name. That is called categorical voting. What about preferential voting? It's where you can rank candidates in order of preference on a candidate list. Australia, for example, uses this preferential voting system. Ireland also uses preferential voting. In Australia, if there is a candidate list, you have to rank them all.

Otherwise, the vote becomes invalid. In contrast, in Ireland, you can mark only your first preference, or your third or fourth preference. These methods are used together. Next is the electoral threshold, which refers to the minimum percentage of votes a party needs to receive to be represented. This is usually discussed in the context of proportional representation. So, these combinations form the type of electoral system.

Now, electoral system types in 218 countries. Of course, we know there are 197 countries, but the reason for 218 is that it includes even small regions. As you can see here, the FPP, or First-Past-the-Post, which is a majority representation system, is used in 60 countries. Proportional representation is used in 84 countries, and various other types exist in between. In the case of mixed electoral systems, what does 'MM' mean? It probably means parallel proportional representation, which you've heard of a lot. That's what it signifies, and it's used in 24 countries.

MMP is used in 8 countries. We need to add one more here: semi-proportional representation. Where should we add it? Anyway, up to MMN, these are electoral systems with a strong majority representation characteristic. The rest, up to STV, are easily proportional representation systems. Then there is 'other.' When you elect members of local councils, how many people are elected from one electoral district? In which electoral district? Generally speaking, if we talk about the number of people, it's from 2 to 4 or 5. Last time, it was even possible to elect up to 7 people. So, the winners are determined according to the ranking of each candidate's vote share. Then there is 'other,' as mentioned elsewhere, such as limited voting.

Explaining each of these in detail would be better suited for a separate course on electoral politics. Fundamentally, in the case of majority representation systems, they primarily adopt single-member districts. In contrast, mixed electoral systems decide on multiple winners. Next is the change in the Korean electoral system. Time is almost halfway through, but we haven't even covered half yet. The changes in the Korean electoral system have been organized from 1948 onwards. You can find this in various textbooks.

However, one thing we should consider is that in 1963, after the military coup, the Third Republic was established, and the 'national constituency' was created. Some scholars refer to this as proportional representation, but honestly, it was not intended to guarantee proportionality. What was the reason? It was a means to ensure stable rule for a regime lacking legitimacy. We need to understand this clearly. Then, there was also a period when a two-member district system with a plurality vote was adopted.

This is also the case. Therefore, the changes in the electoral system before democratization were not reforms to strengthen democracy, but rather a means to ensure regime stability. You need to understand this point. So, what has changed since democratization? Yes, things have changed. To further enhance proportionality, we adopted the parallel proportional representation system in 2004. However, in the end, what is important in electoral system reforms, whether parallel or semi-proportional, is related to the interests of politicians. That is, the discussion of political reform has proceeded with a focus on the interests of parties and politicians, rather than on the aspect of democracy demanded by the people, or on increasing representation and proportionality. This is why we are constantly emphasizing that political reform is necessary.

Therefore, I hope that this political reform will be somewhat different. We will discuss the possibility of implementation later. The comparison of the characteristics of the semi-proportional representation system is likely in the materials I sent you, so you can refer to them. You probably know them well enough. Basically, when we talk about proportional representation, seats are determined by the party's vote share. This semi-proportional system applies only half of that. There are various reasons, but that's the gist of it. Also, the 'linked proportional representation' was applied only to the 21st general election, so even if it were to be maintained, it would not be applied now. So, you can look at it this way.

Therefore, within these changes in the electoral system, how has the rate of wasted votes changed? I recently attended a public hearing of the Special Committee on Political Reform. I was asked to present as a witness, and the lawmakers who attended kept talking about wasted votes. They said many wasted votes occur. But simply put, when using semi-proportional representation, wasted votes decrease. Of course, it's difficult to generalize from just one instance, but the institutional characteristic of what we call the semi-proportional representation system has led to a reduction in wasted votes.

Therefore, in this regard, when proportionality increases and expands, wasted votes can be reduced, and the will of the people can be properly reflected. I believe this can be sufficiently argued even with the wasted vote rate. Now, post-democratization electoral disproportionality. As you know well, from the 13th to the 16th terms, it was not a one-person, two-vote system, so it was treated as a single item. As you can see, the blue line represents the disproportionality of proportional representation.

Despite having proportional representation characteristics, it has been continuously increasing from the 17th to the 21st terms. In contrast, the disproportionality in district constituencies remained above 7 until the 20th term, dropping slightly to 6. It didn't drop significantly, but it rose again to 12 in the 21st term. Why did the proportionality in district constituencies decrease so much in the 20th term? That's right. The election was held under a three-party system or a multi-party system. However, a multi-party system does not necessarily lead to decreased disproportionality. At that time, the People's Party existed.

Centered in Honam, the Democratic Party could only secure one seat in Honam, perhaps, and one seat for Joo Seok. Therefore, proportionality decreased to that extent. From this, we can also learn a lesson: when the competitiveness between parties is high, proportionality increases. If there are only two dominant parties and minor parties have no influence, proportionality will inevitably increase. Even within two parties, if one party is strong and the other is weak, proportionality will decrease. We can consider that point. Therefore, to increase representation and electoral proportionality, a multi-party structure can be presented as a necessary condition. So, let's look at the party-specific vote shares in the 21st general election. We saw that the aspect of satellite parties was very prominent. Anyway,

The Democratic Party received 1.00, and the United Future Party received 0.80, and so on. The standard for this vote share is 1, which means the most fair representation. If it's 1 or more, it means over-representation; if it's 1 or less, it means under-representation. As you can see, except for the Democratic Party, all others are under-represented in district constituencies. In proportional representation, satellite parties of major parties are over-represented, and the People's Party is somewhat under-represented.

Anyway, we can confirm these points. The reasons for the increase in disproportionality are summarized as follows: The average vote share of third parties in district constituencies has significantly decreased. The People's Party did not run in district constituencies; they only ran in proportional representation. Therefore, there were no competitive third parties. I apologize to any fans of the Justice Party, but satellite parties were created in district constituencies. And third, there is the psychological effect of vote splitting. In other words, due to the fear of wasted votes, people tend to vote for candidates who are likely to win. But this is reversed: when the system changes, people's expectations of winning seats increase.

The Democratic Party of Korea receives a score of 1, while the United Future Party scores 0.80. The criterion for this index is that a ratio of 1 indicates fair representation based on votes. A ratio above 1 signifies overrepresentation, and a ratio below 1 signifies underrepresentation. Currently, with the exception of the Democratic Party of Korea, all parties are underrepresented in their respective districts. In the proportional representation system, some major parties' satellite parties are overrepresented, while parties like the People's Party are underrepresented.

In any case, these aspects can be confirmed. The reasons for the increase in disproportionality can be summarized as follows: the local district vote share of third parties has significantly decreased. The People's Party did not run candidates in district races, participating only through proportional representation. Consequently, there was no presence of competitive third parties. I apologize to any supporters of the Justice Party, but they established satellite parties for district races. Thirdly, there is the psychological effect of reverse vote splitting. In other words, due to the 'wasted vote' phenomenon, people tend to vote for candidates with a higher chance of winning. However, this is reversed: when the system changes, people's expectations of securing seats under the new system are heightened.

As a result, parties proliferate and participate in elections. With a larger number of parties, actual vote shares become very low, leading to increased disproportionality. This issue arises from the disproportionality between proportional representation seats and district seats. What percentage of total seats in the National Assembly are proportional representation seats in Korea? Typically, scholars suggest that to compensate for the disproportionality of the plurality-majority system, the proportion of proportional representation seats should be at least 25%.

That is, one-fourth. Otherwise, we cannot compensate for the disproportionality. But we have a proportion of seats far below that. So, that point can be discussed. Furthermore, the combination of proportional representation, semi-proportional representation, and parallel allocation methods also contributes to increasing disproportionality. Therefore, based on these electoral results, it can be said that the tendency towards a two-party system has been observed overall since democratization, and this has been further intensified in the 21st term. The orange line, 2.09, represents the number of parties that participated in the election.

Regarding the causes of the two-party tendency, as you may have learned in political party studies, I will briefly explain. It is related to Duverger's law, the 'hurdle effect.' When structured national parties exist and exert significant influence, what kind of outcome emerges even with proportional representation? While the theory of proportional representation suggests a multi-party system, this is not always the case. Due to the aforementioned hurdle effect, even with proportional representation, a two-party tendency can be observed.

Additionally, there was the strategy of forming satellite parties. Another point to discuss, at the voter level, is the weakening of split voting among supporters. Supporters of Democratic Party candidates, in the past, used to split their votes to some extent towards the Justice Party. However, this time they did not. They engaged in 'sense of voting,' or voting with conviction, concentrating votes for the Democratic Party. I must be careful with editing, but this concentration of votes was evident. These factors were present.

Regarding the causes of the two-party system, I believe you have heard about this in party politics class, so I will briefly mention it. It's called the Duverger's Law effect. When there is a structurally established party nationwide, and those parties have significant influence, what happens? Even with proportional representation, what kind of result will occur? We tend to understand the effect of Duverger's Law as proportional representation leading to a multi-party system, but that is not the case. Due to such a barrier effect, a two-party tendency is observed even with proportional representation.

Therefore, there are limitations in holding voters accountable. When we look at politicians frequently mentioned in the National Assembly's Ethics Committee, many National Assembly members are re-elected and return to the Assembly. I will not name specific individuals; you can imagine them. We must discuss these issues. Furthermore, there is frequent merging and splitting among political parties. Parties are not cohesive entities based on unique ideologies or policies but rather groups formed around individuals, thus exhibiting strong personalistic characteristics.

Therefore, they probably talk more about such content. By continuously choosing strategies to actively mobilize these regions, we face the problem of making it difficult to evaluate politics and policies. Therefore, demands for the revision of the Korean electoral system are erupting. The reasons are what you all mentioned: representation due to electoral disproportionality, political polarization, hostile confrontational politics, the lack of proper responsible party politics, the problem of satellite parties, and the maintenance of regional party systems. We can say that these need to be changed.

Consequently, they seem to be discussing these issues more extensively. By continuously adopting strategies to mobilize these specific regions, it becomes difficult to evaluate political parties and their policies. Thus, demands for the reform of the Korean electoral system have emerged. The reasons are those you have all mentioned: the lack of representational fairness due to electoral disproportionality, polarized and adversarial politics, the failure to achieve responsible party politics, the issue of satellite parties, and the maintenance of the regional party system. These are the aspects we need to change.

Therefore, discussions on electoral system reform are proceeding with those objectives and under those circumstances. I believe they are proceeding with three major points of contention. I examined them based on the bills submitted to the 21st National Assembly. I looked at them as of January 9th. A total of 15 bills were introduced, 16 for the semi-proportional representation system revision. There was a typo; there are 14 revision bills. There are 2 revision bills related to satellite parties. The main content of these revision bills is the introduction of the multi-member district system, changing the single-member district system to a multi-member district system. Second, regional proportional representation.

Third, expanding the linked proportional representation system to 100%, or pure proportional representation. Kim Sang-hee and Park Ju-min proposed pure proportional representation. Fourth, measures to suppress satellite parties, increase the number of seats, or expand proportional representation seats. First, although we will discuss this later, let me ask you first: what are your thoughts on increasing the number of seats in the National Assembly? I'm asking this question without context, but what do you think about increasing the number of National Assembly members?

Does anyone have an opinion? Should we increase them? Or decrease them, like Ahn Cheol-soo, the current lawmaker? Are there any such opinions? Why should they be increased? Could you please use the microphone? Then, of course, the number of people in the metropolitan area will increase, but the concerns of people in rural areas will decrease, so they will be able to work harder. I understand. We will discuss this further during the debate later. So, regarding the proposed electoral system revisions, this is a bill from 2020, from lawmaker Jeon Joo-hee to lawmaker Kim Eun-hye. It proposes reverting to the parallel proportional representation system, arguing that the semi-proportional system has many problems.

Then, in 2022, bills were mainly submitted by the Democratic Party. This includes lawmakers Kim Du-kwan, Lee Sang-min, Kim Yong-bae, and others like Lee Ta-ni, Jeon Jae-soo, Kim Sang-hee, Park Ju-min, and Lee Eun-ju. Let's look at them one by one, although it's difficult to examine each in detail. Lawmaker Kim Du-kwan, for instance, proposed a revision bill related only to proportional representation. That is, there was no particular mention of the current district constituency system. I haven't directly asked him, so I can't say for sure, but that seems to be the case. He proposes adopting a regional proportional representation system with six regions and an open-list system.

Next, lawmaker Lee Sang-min proposes 127 district seats, to be elected through a multi-member district system. However, the method of seat allocation is unclear, whether it's majority representation or proportional representation. And regional... I apologize. I'm not used to using the microphone because I don't use it even in lecture halls. Time is running out. It's difficult to explain each one individually, so you can look at them. The key points being discussed are regional representation, multi-member districts, and open lists within regional representation.

What is noteworthy here is the bill proposed by lawmaker Park Ju-min and the bill proposed by lawmaker Lee Eun-ju. You probably received them and read them, right? We will discuss which one is more suitable for our reality and why. Regarding the introduction of the multi-member district system, which involves electing two to five people per district, I am personally opposed to it, although it might seem like my personal opinion is too much. This is because the disadvantages outweigh the advantages. The argument for it is that wasted votes are reduced.

I agree with that point. I acknowledge it. However, regarding the claims that proportionality will increase and that candidates from minor parties will have a greater chance of entering the assembly, I can raise counterarguments. Proportionality will increase compared to the single-member district system. However, it is difficult to achieve the level of proportionality we expect. That's what they say. Generally, as the size of the electoral district increases, proportionality increases. You probably studied this.

Right? But there is a premise. When it comes to proportional representation, as the size of the electoral district increases, proportionality increases. However, in the case of majority representation, there is a limit to the increase in proportionality. It doesn't increase indefinitely. In fact, a regressive phenomenon can occur. You can fully understand this by looking at the results of our local council elections. So, I can talk about those points. Consequently, the possibility of minor party candidates being elected is not very high.

Then there was the satellite party strategy. Another point to discuss is at the voter level: the division of votes among supporters has weakened. Supporters of Democratic Party candidates, in the past, used to divide their votes to some extent towards the Justice Party. But this time, they didn't. They voted sincerely, as we say, and concentrated their votes on the Democratic Party. This leads to too much editing content. Anyway, there was that aspect.

Next, I believe the electoral disproportionality of the semi-proportional representation system strengthens this two-party system. Furthermore, I can mention that responsible party politics has disappeared. Person-centered, winner-take-all systems tend to select or recruit candidates who gain popularity, rather than focusing on policies or parties. As a result, personal connections become very strong, and furthermore, patronage politics occurs.

Therefore, there are limitations in holding voters accountable. And when we look at the politicians often discussed in the National Assembly Ethics Committee, many of them get re-elected and return to the Assembly, right? I won't name specific individuals, but you can imagine. We cannot help but talk about such matters. Next, there are frequent mergers and splits between parties. Parties are not cohesive groups based on unique ideologies or policies, but rather groups formed around individuals, so they have a strong personal character.

Therefore, sometimes individuals leave the party to form a new one or merge with another party. This also makes responsible politics difficult. And it keeps popping up here, I don't know why. Furthermore, regional support systems, or regional party systems, can be pointed to as another reason that weakens responsible politics. Frankly, it is more cost-effective for parties to gain support from voters by saying, 'I am a candidate from this region,' or 'I grew up here,' rather than by incurring the cost of creating policies.

The National Election Commission also mentions this. Therefore, it can alleviate the monopoly of seats by a specific party in Honam and Yeongnam, thus mitigating the regional party system. Second, as mentioned earlier, in areas with a very small population, such as agricultural and fishing villages, their representation can be protected or supplemented through this regional proportional representation. Okay. Third, when creating candidate lists, until now, the central party has exerted influence.

Right? Of course, the Justice Party creates its candidate list through member votes, but in most cases, it's done through coordination between factions within the central party. Therefore, the nomination process has been centralized. However, with regional proportional representation, candidate lists are created in each region, so authority is decentralized. This can be pointed out as an advantage. However, a disadvantage is that regional interests may be excessively represented. That is, if we elect candidates from district constituencies and then elect candidates from regional proportional representation, they may become immersed in and loyal to the interests of that region to secure re-election. This can lead to patronage politics or what we call consumerism.

So, those aspects exist. Therefore, the purpose of proportional representation can be significantly weakened. The original purpose of proportional representation was to represent the interests of various social forces that cannot be represented in elections, such as the socially vulnerable or functional representatives. However, this is being weakened. Furthermore, with linked proportional representation, excess seats can be generated. For example, in Germany, the number of seats is 598, but due to excess seats, around 720 or 710 seats are created.

The reason for the generation of excess seats will be discussed at another time. Therefore, to reduce the generation of such excess seats, regional proportional representation is not necessarily positive. So, when a party with a strong regional base exists, excess seats are generated. That's what we're talking about. If we were to adopt pure proportional representation, there would be a challenge to regional representation. Who represents our region?

As a result, parties are created and participate in elections in large numbers. As the number of parties increases, the actual vote share becomes very low, leading to increased imbalance. This problem arises from the disproportionality between proportional representation seats and district constituency seats. What percentage of the total seats are proportional representation seats in Korea? It's 17.5%. Generally, scholars argue that to compensate for the disproportionality of the majority representation system by mixing proportional representation, the proportion of proportional representation seats should be at least 25%.

That's right, it's about expanding proportional seats while keeping the number of district seats the same. Regarding the necessity of increasing the total number of seats, I have organized various opinions and written down my own. By reducing the number of constituents per legislator, we can further strengthen representativeness and accountability. I wrote a paper on this, and when I analyzed it with statistics, the results were highly significant. Specifically, we can observe a tendency for the quality of democracy to be higher when the number of constituents per legislator is lower.

Next, we can reduce the privileges of National Assembly members. We often talk about needing to reduce the privileges of National Assembly members. Privileges are related to scarcity. The scarcer something is, the stronger its power becomes. Therefore, if we increase the population, the scarcity will decrease accordingly, and privileges can be reduced. Well, we'll have to see how it plays out. Anyway, that's the logic I can offer. Furthermore, the executive branch has become very bloated, and its expertise has greatly increased. However, the National Assembly still lags behind in terms of expertise. And in terms of its role and activities in checking the executive branch, there are significant limitations, not so much in restrictions but in terms of numerical capacity. Because they have to do so much, they cannot properly investigate, analyze, and check the executive branch. This problem arises. Therefore, by increasing the number of members, we can check the executive branch, and thus, we need to strengthen the separation of powers, which is referred to as the separation of powers. Next, the number of National Assembly members...

Through an increase in the number of seats, we can expand proportionality. This is the conclusion. Therefore, regarding electoral system reform measures, these are measures to limit the emergence of proportional representation, representativeness, and effective parties. The goal is to reduce the gap between district seats and proportional seats. This proposal is made within the context of maintaining a mixed electoral system, whether it be a proportional representation system or a semi-proportional representation system. Next, if we adopt a pure regional proportional representation system, similar to what is done in Sweden, Denmark, and Norway, we need to introduce compensatory seats. This is because even if we have a pure proportional representation system, it is not the case that proportionality will be 100%.

There is a threshold effect, and votes for parties that do not cross the threshold become wasted votes. They are not converted into seats. Furthermore, if we divide by region, there will be wasted votes created by the regional division, meaning wasted votes are generated. Okay. Therefore, due to these factors, which easily lead to an increase in wasted votes and votes not converted into seats, disproportionality exists. Compensatory seats are introduced precisely to adjust and compensate for such disproportionality. Thus, if we are to implement a pure regional proportional representation system, we need to establish such compensatory seats. I would like to state this.

Next, if we were to choose electoral districts with 2 to 5 members, it would be better to adopt a preferential voting system rather than a plurality-at-large system. Here, STV stands for Single Transferable Vote system. This is a form of transferable voting. Ireland and Malta use this system, and the Australian Senate also adopts this method. Voters rank their preferences, and the votes are tallied accordingly. In a way, this can be considered the best electoral system.

Theoretically, it optimally aggregates voters' preferences. In that sense, it is the best theoretically, but it is very complex. Therefore, we need to consider such a method in Korea as well. When I explained the Irish case to some members of the National Assembly, they went on a study tour. I don't know about the results, or what lessons or help they received. This is a rule for seat allocation using the single transferable vote method. Currently, the total valid votes are about 70,000, and the quota for determining the election winner is about 17,000 votes. This calculation shows the percentage of first-preference votes received by each candidate.

It appears that only one candidate has been elected with 24,000 votes. This person has surplus votes, 6,961 votes. These surplus votes are then redistributed to voters who chose other candidates as their second preference. Okay. These are then summed up to reach the indicated vote counts. The second elected candidate is Candidate Ma, with 18,000 votes. This person also had 630 surplus votes, which were then redistributed. In this manner, candidates are determined. Consequently, it becomes difficult for candidates at the extremes to be elected.

That's right. Rather than electing those who are most preferred or least preferred, it is better to elect those whose preferences are concentrated in the center of the normal distribution. These aspects can also contribute to resolving political polarization. I would like to state this.