How to Support the Restoration of Democracy in Myanmar? : Special Online Seminar on the First Anniversary of the Myanmar Coup

YouTube Link: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=7EA7bAD5dxU

As part of its capacity-building initiatives for Myanmar's civil society, the East Asia Institute (EAI) hosted the online seminar "How to Support the Restoration of Democracy in Myanmar?" on January 27, 2022. This event was designed to deliver a timely message of democratic cooperation regarding the Myanmar coup and the civil disobedience movement. Addressing the waning international and South Korean attention to the situation in Myanmar, the seminar provided a platform for candid discussion among Myanmar activists residing in Korea, activists from South Korean civic organizations, and policy experts, ahead of the first anniversary of the coup on February 1, 2021.

- Date and Time: January 27, 2022 (Thursday) 11:00 - 12:30 (KST)

- Moderator: Lee Sook-jong (EAI Senior Fellow, Professor at Sungkyunkwan University)

- Panelists: Kang In-nam (Representative, Overseas Residents Movement Solidarity)

Kim Hun-jun (Professor, Korea University)

Neom (President, Gyeongnam Myanmar Overseas Residents Association)

Myo Hein (Information Officer, Representative Office of the Republic of the Union of Myanmar in Korea)

Woo Seung-hoon (Activist, Community Alliance for International Development Cooperation)

Video Transcript

Hello, everyone. Today, we have organized a special seminar. The East Asia Institute, in commemoration of the 60th anniversary of the coup in Myanmar, has invited five panelists to discuss "How to Support the Restoration of Democracy in Myanmar?" We have two Korean panelists and two Myanmar panelists. The East Asia Institute has a special interest and affection for Myanmar. We have been engaged in capacity-building projects for Myanmar's civil society and think tanks for a long time. Therefore, when the coup occurred, we had to suspend much of our activities. Last year, we held a seminar to support democracy in Myanmar, and we plan to continue these activities this year.

As you all know, the coup occurred last year, and the NLD government led by State Counsellor Aung San Suu Kyi was overthrown before completing its term, placing Myanmar under military rule. The Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces has stated that elections will be held in the summer of 2023, but given the initial promise of elections within a year, it is understandable that many people, both within Myanmar and in the international community, lack confidence. Following the coup, a civil disobedience movement began in Myanmar.

Approximately 1,500 people have been killed and 8,700 people have been detained, according to reports. However, we believe these numbers are likely much higher. In response, those working for democracy in Myanmar have formed a National Unity Government and established People's Defence Forces. Thus, Myanmar can be said to be in a state of civil war. However, with the worsening COVID-19 situation, the civil resistance movement has somewhat subsided. South Korea had also shown great interest and responded to the situation in Myanmar, but attention from the international community, including South Korea, has begun to wane.

We need to consider how to rekindle this interest not only in Korea but also in the United States, the European Union, and ASEAN. I will now briefly introduce the panelists. Following the order on our poster, Ms. Myo Hein is the Information Officer of the Representative Office of the Republic of the Union of Myanmar in Korea. I understand that the Myanmar Interim Government was first established in Korea and has since expanded to countries like the UK, Japan, and Australia. She is actively working after establishing the first office in Korea.

The second panelist is Mr. Neom, who serves as the President of the Gyeongnam Myanmar Overseas Residents Association. He is engaged in community activities centered around approximately 2,000 migrant workers in the Gyeongnam region. Since the coup, he has been continuously raising funds for democratization in Myanmar and introducing Myanmar's domestic and international culture through cultural festivals. The third panelist is Mr. Kang In-nam, Representative of Overseas Residents Movement Solidarity. He previously served as the Secretary-General of the Korean Residents Association and has led activities such as community organizing and training for overseas residents.

We anticipate valuable insights from him today. The fourth panelist is Mr. Woo Seung-hoon, an activist with the Community Alliance for International Development Cooperation. This alliance, formed in March last year, is a network of experts in development cooperation, with a particular focus on Myanmar. Mr. Woo has previously worked with the Global Sharing Movement, focusing on the East African region, and operates the African List, a blog on international development cooperation. Finally, the fifth panelist is Professor Kim Hun-jun of Korea University. Professor Kim previously taught at the University of Queensland in Australia and has conducted valuable research connecting human rights diplomacy, democracy, and international politics.

I am very pleased to have these five distinguished individuals with us today. Before we begin the presentations and discussions, we will hear congratulatory remarks from First Vice Minister Choi Jong-gun of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Vice Minister Choi was previously a professor at Yonsei University and played a key role in formulating the South Korean government's sanctions against Myanmar. Let us now watch his congratulatory remarks via video. Esteemed Director of the East Asia Institute, Professor Lee Sook-jong, distinguished panelists from Korea and Myanmar, and seminar participants, good morning.

This is Choi Jong-gun, First Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs. First, I would like to express my gratitude to the East Asia Institute for organizing this timely special seminar on the restoration of democracy in Myanmar amidst the challenging circumstances of COVID-19. In February last year, the Myanmar military staged a coup. Denying the results of the November 2020 general election and declaring a state of emergency, the Myanmar military instantly shattered the efforts of the Myanmar people towards democracy.

For me, the past year has been one of contemplating the fundamental values of democracy and the role of our government, in solidarity with the Myanmar people yearning for the restoration of democracy. The Republic of Korea has developed into a dynamic and mature democracy through the persistent efforts and aspirations of its people for democratization. Through this experience, democratic values have become an integral part of our identity. Our gaze towards the struggle of the Myanmar people for democracy is therefore more empathetic and special. Today, in the struggle of the Myanmar people, we see our own past.

We earnestly hope that the ordinary lives of the Myanmar people will not be subjected to the forceful and unjust rule of the military, and that democracy will once again flourish in Myanmar. The democracy we cherish is deeply rooted in the efforts and sacrifices of our predecessors and the continuous struggle of civil society. Our government will continue to support the aspirations of the Myanmar people for democracy to lead to the restoration of democracy in Myanmar, just as it has done so far. Our government has made unceasing efforts to contribute to resolving the situation in Myanmar.

On February 2nd last year, the day after the incident, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs issued a spokesperson's statement expressing deep concern over the situation in Myanmar and reaffirming the Myanmar people's aspiration for democracy, as demonstrated in the November 2020 general election. In early December, we also expressed serious concern over the first-instance verdict against State Counsellor Aung San Suu Kyi and urged the implementation of the five points agreed upon by ASEAN leaders. Our government has closely monitored the situation in Myanmar and has issued four spokesperson's statements urging an immediate cessation of violence, the release of detainees, and the restoration of democracy.

In March and this year, the President directly condemned the violent suppression by the Myanmar military and police and sent SNS messages expressing his earnest hope that the spirit of Gwangju, which represents democracy in Myanmar, would become a hope for Myanmar. Furthermore, in close cooperation with the international community, we have participated in eight joint statements condemning violence against civilians, urging respect for human rights, and supporting the efforts of the ASEAN Special Envoy for the restoration of democracy. Our government's efforts to resolve the situation have not been limited to words.

In March, our government announced response measures for Myanmar, suspending new cooperation in defense and security sectors and the export of military supplies to Myanmar, while strictly reviewing the export of industrial strategic materials. Additionally, by re-examining Official Development Assistance (ODA) to Myanmar, we have reduced ODA to Myanmar from 14 billion won last year to 1.34 billion won this year, a decrease of over 85%. In April last year, I also held a meeting with Myanmar students studying in Korea to explain our government's position and measures and to hear directly about their difficulties.

Accordingly, Myanmar nationals residing in our country are being granted temporary residency status until the stabilization of the situation in Myanmar, and forced departures are being refrained from. We are implementing humanitarian special stay measures allowing them to stay voluntarily until the situation stabilizes. Thus, since the early stages of the incident, our government has consistently sought ways to contribute based on the principles of democracy and respect for human rights. These government efforts are ongoing until democracy is restored in Myanmar. ASEAN will also strive to resolve the situation in Myanmar.

In April, ASEAN leaders met and issued a five-point agreement for resolving the Myanmar crisis, including an immediate cessation of violence, constructive dialogue among all parties, and the visit of an ASEAN Special Envoy to Myanmar. Although ASEAN appointed the Brunei Foreign Minister as its special envoy, the envoy's visit to Myanmar did not materialize due to the military's lack of cooperation. The UN has also issued Security Council statements strongly condemning the Myanmar military's use of violence and supporting the Myanmar people, and has adopted General Assembly resolutions.

The United States, the United Kingdom, and the EU have also imposed sanctions on key Myanmar military officials and organizations. Despite the efforts of the international community, including our country, over the past year to support the resolution of the Myanmar crisis and the restoration of democracy, and to pressure the Myanmar military, it is regrettable and frustrating that there has been no progress. The Myanmar military continues its bloody crackdown on civilians, and armed conflicts persist between the military and ethnic armed organizations in ethnic minority regions such as Karen, Kayah, and Chin states. On Christmas Eve last year, at least 35 people, including women, children, and international aid workers, were killed in an attack by the Myanmar military in Kayah State.

We express our deepest condolences to all victims of the military's violence. Furthermore, the trial of State Counsellor Aung San Suu Kyi is ongoing in the Myanmar courts. Our government will continue to call for the release of detainees, including State Counsellor Aung San Suu Kyi. Our people, who achieved democracy through numerous sacrifices and struggles, empathize with the struggle of the Myanmar people as their own and offer their support. Our government also hopes for the peaceful and democratic restoration of democracy in Myanmar through legitimate and democratic procedures and will continue to strive to contribute to resolving the situation.

As the late President Kim Dae-jung said regarding the Saffron Revolution in Myanmar in 2007, the idea that we can achieve democracy for Myanmar and present it as a gift to the Myanmar people is misguided. We support and encourage democratization in Myanmar, but the primary actors in this arduous process, bearing its weight and difficulties, are the Myanmar people. Our government provided humanitarian assistance totaling $1.1 million last year in response to the deteriorating humanitarian situation in Myanmar. In this way, together with the international community, we will provide all possible support to make the Myanmar people's journey towards democracy less lonely and less arduous.

I understand that today's seminar will feature discussions among Myanmar panelists, our civil society, and academic panelists. Through this meeting between the civil societies of Myanmar and Korea, we can discuss how the Myanmar people can restore democracy and how we can support them. Just as our democracy was not achieved in one or two years, the struggle of the Myanmar people for democracy may be even longer. As the darkest hour is just before dawn, democracy will eventually be restored in Myanmar. Because democracy will surely be restored in Myanmar, I hope that the discussions between the civil societies of both countries will not be limited to the restoration of democracy in Myanmar.

I pray that the civil societies of both countries will continue to contemplate the future direction of Myanmar for the consolidation of democracy after its achievement. Seeing our citizens supporting the Myanmar people gives us confidence that our government is moving in the right direction, and it also gives us the strength to continue seeking ways for our country to contribute to the restoration of democracy in Myanmar. I wish success for today's event and will make valuable use of the insights gained today in pursuing future Myanmar policies. Thank you. First Vice Minister Choi Jong-gun has delivered a powerful message. The statement, "In today's Myanmar, we see yesterday's Gwangju," reflects the sentiment not only of the President but also of all Korean citizens. First, I would like to invite Representative Myo Hein to speak. We would like to ask about the activities of the National Unity Government both domestically and internationally, and what they expect from the South Korean government. We also hope to hear about what policies the next government should pursue regarding Myanmar.

I wish for the success of today's event and will carefully utilize the discussions today for future policy implementation for Myanmar. Thank you. Chairman Choi Jeong-hwa, who gave a very strong message, has now left. The statement, 'Looking at Myanmar today, we see Gwangju yesterday,' reflects the feelings not only of the President but also of the Korean citizens. First, I would like to ask Representative Hooi for her opening remarks. Could you please tell us about the activities of the National Unity Government both domestically and internationally? Specifically, what do you hope for from the South Korean government? We will receive new information today, and we would like to hear what policies you hope the next government will pursue.

Please proceed, Representative Myo Hein. Hello, everyone. First, I would like to explain the entity referred to as the interim government, or NUG, rather than the National Unity Government. Myanmar's history, like Korea's, can be seen as an unfinished nation-building process. However, Myanmar is not so much a developing nation as it is a territory unified under the iron fist of the military. Therefore, it is meaningful that the NUG has been formed by various ethnic groups and ethnic leaders, united against military dictatorship.

I will explain the cooperation within and outside the NUG again. The starting point of the NUG was the 2020 election. The NUG was formed through successful consultations between the NUG, representing the federal parliament, and ethnic leaders. In my view, one of the most important things the NUG is doing is the formation of the Committee for Consultations on Federal Union, or UCC.

This is because, looking at the democratization process in Korea, the unity of all forces opposing dictatorship was crucial. Therefore, the NUG plays a role in bringing together the fragmented and diverse forces within Myanmar to fight together. The UCC includes eight ethnic armed organizations, women's organizations, civil society organizations, and resistance alliances. The UCC also serves as a platform for dialogue among diverse forces.

The role of the UCC is more significant than we might think. This is because the UCC is tasked with dismantling the dictatorial regime through the solidarity of various forces and drafting a federal constitution. This is also a plan to resolve the ethnic conflicts and civil wars that have plagued Myanmar for seventy years. The NUG is also continuously striving for cooperation with the international community. The international community criticizes the Myanmar coup and does not recognize the military regime. Myanmar was excluded from the ASEAN summit. The NUG has established representative offices in various countries and is making efforts to engage directly with governments and civil societies in those countries. The NUG has great hope for Korea.

Korea is a representative country that Myanmar people look up to when they face a coup. The Myanmar people dream of a country like Korea that has overcome dictatorship and developed. Therefore, the NUG also yearns for diplomatic engagement with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. We communicate with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs every month. This is what the NUG expects from Korea. Meanwhile, the resistance of the Myanmar people continues. Although large-scale protests have ceased due to the military's violent crackdown, the Myanmar people are still resisting in various ways. Last month, there was a silent protest in Yangon. The entire city was quiet, with all the shops closed. This shows how much our people are looking forward to and yearning for change. We are very satisfied with the support from civil society and ordinary citizens in Korea. Over the past year, we have received significant support and empathy from the Korean people for the Myanmar people, more so than in other countries. However, we would like to urge the executive branch to actively cooperate with ASEAN, Cambodia, China, and the United States, which have significant influence in Myanmar, to quickly resolve the situation and actively promote the restoration of democracy in Myanmar, even more so than planned.

This concludes my presentation. Thank you, Representative Myo Hein. Next, we will hear from Mr. Neom. As you are involved with civil society organizations and have extensive interaction with the local community, we would like to hear your thoughts on how South Korean civil society could provide further assistance. You also mentioned, Representative Myo Hein, that the Myanmar crisis could be an opportunity to resolve ethnic conflicts within Myanmar and foster unity and integration. Are such discussions taking place within the Myanmar diaspora community in Korea? How is the Myanmar civil society, with its diverse student and activist groups, structured? We would appreciate it if you could share this information. Hello, I am Neom, President of the Gyeongnam Myanmar Overseas Residents Association.

We are very satisfied with the support and solidarity from the South Korean civil society and general public. This is because, over the past year of our activities, the empathy and support from the Korean public have been greater compared to other countries. However, what we would like to request from the executive branch is for South Korea to cooperate with countries that can have a significant impact on Myanmar's situation, such as ASEAN, Cambodia, China, and the United States, within its existing diplomatic framework, to quickly resolve the situation in Myanmar and to actively support the restoration of democracy in Myanmar with greater force than before.

This concludes the presentation. Thank you, Representative Hooi. Next, I would like to hear from Mr. Lee Nae-young. Given your extensive interactions with civil society organizations and local communities, we would appreciate your insights on how South Korean civil society could offer further assistance. As Representative Hooi mentioned, the current situation in Myanmar could be an opportunity to end conflicts among ethnic minorities within Myanmar, foster harmony, and achieve national integration. Are similar discussions taking place within the Myanmar community in South Korea? How is the Myanmar civil society in South Korea, which likely consists of various groups, structured? We would be grateful for your insights. Yes, hello. I am Ko Yin, Chairman of the Myanmar Community in Korea.

It is nice to meet you all. We have various organizations in the Gyeongnam region. In Gyeongnam, there are approximately 2,000 migrant workers from about 14 countries, including Myanmar. We have organizations for migrant workers, and the Migrant Center in Gyeongnam is also involved. The government has established the Migrant Solidarity Network, comprising representatives from 14 countries, and the Migrant Center in Gyeongnam is part of this network.

Through these organizations, we hold weekly meetings and events. We also create content, such as photos, videos, and news, about Myanmar's situation and translate it into Korean. We then send this content to media outlets and organizations in Korea to raise awareness among the Korean public. Of course, this is not easy for us in Gyeongnam, as we lack Korean language proficiency, and we rely on the support of the Migrant Center and other organizations to disseminate information.

Also, I would like to mention that about 99.5% of the Myanmar diaspora in Korea are migrant workers. Most of them are in their 20s and 30s, with some older individuals. We are also continuously engaged in fundraising activities. Regarding the Gyeongnam Myanmar Overseas Residents Association, we have a Myanmar diaspora association in Busan and another in Ulsan.

There are also Myanmar diaspora associations in other regions across the country. These associations primarily focus on cultural exchange, such as organizing Myanmar cultural festivals. Since the coup in February 2021, all our organizations have been participating in solidarity and protest activities for democratization in Myanmar. You also asked about ethnic minorities. The military regime's rule in Myanmar has primarily been characterized by conflict with ethnic minorities. I believe this is the case.

Since the coup, we have been deeply pained by the suffering of ethnic minorities in Myanmar, as we have not been able to adequately inform or assist them. We feel ashamed and regretful. With this coup, we have realized the pain and suffering of ethnic minorities. We have witnessed horrific acts, such as the military beating women and children and arbitrarily arresting people, even without evidence. We are deeply saddened by these atrocities committed by the military. The struggle against the military is becoming increasingly difficult for all Myanmar people, including ethnic minorities. The days are dark and long.

This is a situation that is inevitable for all ethnic minorities. We are all deeply saddened and pained by the suffering of ethnic minorities. However, we believe that by overcoming these difficulties together, we can achieve a future where democracy and human rights are respected, not only for Myanmar but for all nations. This is our hope.

I am in my 30s, and I have lived through the military regime my entire life. Since I was born, I have only seen the military regime and its propaganda. I lived without freedom, without knowing about mobile phones or the internet, much like living in North Korea. Most of us in our 20s and 30s, and even those in ethnic minority regions, were taught that those who oppose the military are traitors. When the military regime failed to achieve its goals, we, along with most people in Myanmar, rejoiced and felt relieved.

I feel that the burden on each other has increased, and we are living in a state of mutual suspicion. I also wonder if the people of Burma will ever be able to step forward. They fought for democracy in the past. I am beginning to understand why they fought. In 2015, our election was successful, and the NLD won. Since then, while governing, we began to understand the meaning of democracy and the issues concerning ethnic minorities in 2017. We knew these problems existed, but we were unable to address them. Until then, people in Burma and ethnic minorities could not speak out. However, most people in Burma in their 20s and 30s have now sided with us. We have come to realize that the military is the cause of all problems, and we now understand this.

Our struggle has not stopped, and we have been fighting for a year. Even during this fight, many people in their 20s and 30s have received support from ethnic minorities. We have lived with misunderstandings, but now they understand our sincerity and are siding with us, realizing they can no longer trust the military. We believe we are succeeding. Ethnic minorities are participating in the Civil Disobedience Movement, and we are advocating for a federal democratic union system, not just a federal union, as the future of Myanmar. We are also advocating for a federal union system in terms of military and foreign affairs. The federal democratic union is being realized through the efforts of ethnic minorities.

The federal democratic union, which has been a long-standing aspiration for ethnic minorities for 70 years, is now being realized through the Myanmar Spring Revolution. This is what we are discussing within the civil society. Furthermore, I believe that the military regime's failure and the success of our revolution are inevitable. If our revolution succeeds, as we have discussed, we will move forward with the concept of "people's power," as mentioned by Mr. Kang. We acknowledge that there are issues with individuals and long-standing problems with ethnic minorities, but we are committed to addressing them humanely and working together.

I would like to share something with the Korean public. I was fortunate enough to have this opportunity. We are truly grateful and appreciative of the Korean public and civil society organizations for their unwavering support and active assistance to Myanmar, more so than any other country. This is because they have supported and comforted us as if we were their own parents or siblings, providing the utmost support.

Thank you. I am grateful for this opportunity to speak about the efforts of young people in their 20s and 30s, including myself, who are part of the Myanmar diaspora in Korea, and to discuss the promotion of democracy in Myanmar and Burma. Thank you. Thank you. Both Representative Myo Hein and Mr. Neom have expressed their gratitude for the support of Korean civil society and organizations. It is now an opportune moment to hear from Mr. Kang In-nam, Representative of Overseas Residents Movement Solidarity, who has been actively involved in supporting the Myanmar people. Please share your activities.

Hello. I deeply admire and firmly believe that the democratization movement in Myanmar will ultimately succeed through the efforts of its citizens. I am Kang In-nam, representing Overseas Residents Movement Solidarity, also known as KOKO, and I practice solidarity by walking alongside the people of Myanmar. I initially declined invitations for external lectures for the past two years, but I have broken that rule today. Although I may not be eloquent, I wish to share my experiences and insights as someone who cares about Myanmar.

I have prepared a short presentation to accompany my talk. Given the excellent work of Representative Myo Hein and Mr. Neom, I will keep my presentation brief. I would like to begin by commemorating and remembering the citizens who have sacrificed their lives for the democratization of Myanmar over the past decade. I am involved in the Asian People's Solidarity Network, which connects grassroots movements in nine Asian countries. My goal is to connect people, connect communities, and connect villages through grassroots organizing in Asia.

The Asian People's Solidarity Network currently involves people from nine countries. It originated in the 1970s as a grassroots movement and was renamed the Asian People's Solidarity Conference in 1993. KOKO is one of the member organizations of this network. Our central focus is on how people facing common problems can organize themselves and achieve social change through solidarity.

The vision of KOKO is to collaborate with grassroots organizations and support and nurture activists who meet and organize people at the community level. This is our core objective. When the coup occurred in Myanmar and the people's resistance began, I focused on three key principles: first, how to ensure the agency of the Myanmar people; second, how to understand the situation in Myanmar and build solidarity with the people on the ground; and third, how to build the organizational strength of the people who will lead Myanmar society through these two principles of agency and localization. Based on these principles, I have worked with civil society organizations in Korea and formed a youth network of Myanmar youth in Korea to engage in unprecedented activities. We have held press conferences for Asian youth, organized rallies with youth from ethnic minority communities, facilitated exchanges among Myanmar youth in Korea and youth leaders from eight ethnic minority democratic communities, and raised nearly 600 million won in solidarity funds for Myanmar. We have also interviewed Myanmar stakeholders involved in the movement to convey their voices to the Korean public and have worked to ensure that the situation in Myanmar remains in the memory of the Korean public, thereby strengthening our resolve. We have pushed boundaries and worked tirelessly based on our convictions.

Many people ask how we have been able to sustain this effort for a year without getting tired. I believe this is due to the passion, enthusiasm, and conviction of ordinary young people in Myanmar since 2015. Since the 1960s, and especially since 2015, people seeking freedom and human rights have continuously strived to achieve their rights and democracy. As an example, I would like to mention Klay Ya Than.

Many people ask how we can continue to struggle without getting tired for over a year. While it might be the spirit, passion, or determination of ordinary young people in Myanmar since 2015, I believe that the people who have been demanding freedom and human rights since the 1960s and 2015 have continuously strived to achieve their own human rights and democracy. As an example, I would like to mention Khing Thida.

About a 40-minute drive northwest of Yangon lies a community inhabited by 100,000 residents. Originally, this was barren land with no houses or infrastructure. In 2008, residents began migrating to Yangon in search of employment and livelihood, and a community began to form as people settled there. Within this community, there are approximately 1,400 small factories, including garment, shoe, and bag factories, that have relocated to Asia in search of cheap labor. As this community grew, the residents continuously organized to fight for their rights and livelihoods. Following the coup on February 1st, this community immediately mobilized and was the first to organize protests in downtown Yangon.

The residents were placed on the land, and the people who were injected into the two-ten were the current king's family. About a month or two ago, a large-scale departure occurred. There are various reasons and causes for such departures, but some say it was due to their organizational power. Others claim that the region was withdrawn to protect the multinational factories located here. We don't know how the issue will unfold later, but there are stories that the residents tore down the fences to reclaim the land together with the powerful, the companies, and the military. In any case, as these villages were formed, they sometimes followed the norms of the 'mahabis' and sometimes self-governed the region for its protection. Regardless, due to the persistent stigma of being 'persecuted' or 'oppressed,' they changed their own village names and had a self-defined concept. Furthermore, the youth were continuously fighting for their rights and for the right to be free from the constraints of adolescence and the lack of rights.

They have been continuously fighting for their rights, and this has not only been a struggle for the residents but also for ethnic minorities and various other groups. It is believed that the citizens' movements, which have created social perspectives and a sense of belonging for the residents, have served as the foundation for leading the current situation. As of yesterday, the number of deaths was 1,773, and the number of injured was 11,737. The map on the right shows the seven states and the legal system, detailing where massacres occurred, how many people were displaced, the number of casualties, the extent of property damage, and the number of refugees generated. Currently, the most significant issue is in Chin State. In Chin State, in areas like Hakha and Falam, the military has been actively engaged in operations, making it impossible for residents to live there. Most of the displaced people are from IDP camps in Chin State...

They are in a state of refuge in the coffee and pineapple plantations in the forest. Not only are the people in the north suffering, but the people in the south are also enduring hardships. As a result, there have been many casualties and displaced persons due to the destruction of homes. As I mentioned earlier, the photos are somewhat disturbing. I am using them to share how widespread the military's massacres are and how dire the situation is. However, the citizens of Myanmar are still holding onto their dignity and will continue their struggle.

There are citizens who are fighting for democracy in the country. Currently, there are various civil society organizations that are playing a role in supporting the interim government, such as those advocating for the restoration of democracy, those supporting the resistance, and those providing humanitarian aid to refugees. There are also international solidarity groups at the central level, such as economists and activists who are raising awareness about Myanmar in other countries. These civil society organizations are actively engaged in various movements, both large and small, in the community, by group, and by region, to promote and strengthen the capabilities of the citizens. It can be said that the Myanmar democracy movement is continuing with these efforts.

Many people ask what the difference is between the NUG and the previous government, and some even question the NLD's commitment. However, the NUG has a vision and goals that differ from the previous NLD government. While it is regrettable that the NUG has not yet issued a direct apology for the past actions of the NLD, it is likely due to the current situation where various civil society groups have not yet been able to unite the people. It is important to consider how the NUG will overcome the limitations of the past NLD government. Nevertheless, the NUG must seriously consider what the people believe in and expect from them.

Looking at the Korean civil society's solidarity with Myanmar, there are mainly organizations centered around Myanmar residents. As mentioned by Mr. Mingyu and Ms. Yewon, there are student unions, Myanmar diaspora organizations, and regional organizations. Key activities include supporting the NLD and CDM to continue their struggle in Myanmar, and online support for Myanmar ministers and ministers of education. These are organizations that are creating a pro-democracy movement in Korea. Additionally, there are regional networks such as those in Gyeonggi, Pyeongtaek, and Cheonan, as well as preparatory committees. For example, in cities like IEM, they are actively engaged in various activities, such as the Myanmar Democracy Support Movement, Buddhist Action, and the People's Power Movement, while preserving their unique characteristics. In Korea, there are 105 organizations working together to form a coalition.

They are operating websites and building solidarity networks, such as the 'Myanmar Democracy Movement Archive' page. They are also engaged in activities to pressure the military regime through economic sanctions and by raising awareness among the international community. I believe there are four key areas for the Korean civil society to continue its struggle for democracy. First, the unwavering support of the citizens. Despite the fatigue and frustration, and the lack of visible progress, the citizens' voluntary participation and various forms of resistance must be sustained. This is a crucial area that Korean civil society must focus on.

Second, how to impose economic sanctions. Currently, there are various economic backings that allow the military to sustain itself, such as support from North America and various corporations. However, companies like Chevrolet and Total have announced their withdrawal, and while they are providing legal support to the displaced residents, companies like Chevron and Shell are still continuing their joint ventures and operations, allowing resources to flow into Myanmar. Therefore, the second key issue is how to cut off the military's funding through economic sanctions. Third, the international community must have a strategy regarding the situation in Myanmar, both internally and externally. In August 2020, the election results were protested with candlelight vigils.

The international community must have a strategy to ensure that the elections are conducted fairly and through proper procedures. Since the citizens will surely win, the NLD must also develop an election strategy and collaborate with the international community to establish a constitutional framework and a federal democratic system in Myanmar. This election strategy is essential. Finally, since the communities are currently fragmented, it is crucial to restore the communities by creating jobs and establishing educational and healthcare systems at the community level.

This is especially urgent for the ethnic minority groups. It is crucial for Korean society to support the residents so that they do not abandon democracy and their rights due to livelihood issues. I believe this will be a crucial factor and a direction for future civil society solidarity in Myanmar. Therefore, the activities of Kokko AJ, which are not limited to civil society, and the various activities they are undertaking, aim to help resolve the current situation. Solidarity that helps resolve the current situation is needed. Furthermore, to respond to the demands of the citizens and to promote the process of democratization within Myanmar, it is important to consider how to build a network of solidarity among Asian citizens and ASEAN democratic organizations, such as the ASEAN Summit. It is important to create a process that leads to such results.

It is important to establish a vision for this. I don't think much will change significantly in 2021. The Myanmar democracy community in Korea will continue to play an educational role to ensure that the values of humanistic and egalitarian democracy are practiced in everyday life. We will connect Korean communities with Myanmar communities to restore them. How can Korean communities, not just central organizations, but also local and regional communities, support and connect with Myanmar communities? We will continue to strengthen the solidarity functions of the Myanmar democracy movement and continue to pursue and build momentum together. This solidarity is not new; it is the aspiration of Kokko and the aspiration of Asian democracy.

Thus, through the activities of Asian communities and organizations, we have proposed a direction for solidarity among civil society organizations. This concludes my presentation. Thank you. Representative Kang In-han has provided very specific proposals. Next, we will hear from Ms. Woo Seung-eun. Earlier, Professor Choi Jung-un mentioned that the Korean government's official development assistance (ODA) to Myanmar was cut by 83% last year. This was an unprecedented move for the Korean government's ODA, and there is significant interest in how this can be linked to future aid for overseas democracy support. Ms. Woo Seung-eun will share her experiences, particularly from Africa.

Hello, I am Woo Seung-eun, a member of the Network of International Cooperation Activists, 'Kokko,' and I am also active in civil society. Kokko, which is often abbreviated as 'Kukko,' was formed on March 25th of last year, following an online meeting between Myanmar youth and Korean international development cooperation activists on the theme of Myanmar's democratization and the military coup. The goal and activities of Kukko are reflected in the statement by Korean international development cooperation practitioners in solidarity with the Myanmar civil disobedience movement, which can be considered Kukko's first activity.

This statement was released on April 7th, and through the joint statement issued before and after its release, we were able to gather the support of 763 individuals. Through this statement, international organizations, civil society, and international development cooperation activists made three pledges. First, they pledged to stand in solidarity with the people of Myanmar until the end. Second, as actors in development cooperation, they pledged to strive to contribute to the restoration of democracy in their respective fields and to cooperate with various actors in development cooperation. Third, they pledged to urge the Korean government to promptly review and provide support.

Typically, statements often urge a particular entity to take action, but I believe this statement from KCOC was characterized by its pledges. It was a pledge by development cooperation activists to stand with Myanmar, and perhaps even to engage in activities related to national self-determination, by first urging ourselves to act. After the illegal coup d'état in Myanmar on June 1, 2021, development cooperation activists found themselves in a dilemma and felt a sense of powerlessness. It felt as though everything they had built up was collapsing overnight, and they grappled with the conflict between what they believed should be done in the face of injustice and the safety of their current organizations and colleagues.

They struggled with the reality of being unable to act. They also felt frustrated by their inability to do anything. KCOC is working to ensure that activists' pledges are realized and that Korean society continues to pay attention to Myanmar. The first initiative, as introduced by Director Kang In-han, is the creation and operation of an archiving page for the Myanmar democracy movement, called 'Myanmar Archive.' This page collects information on past and present events in Myanmar, as well as documents and records.

We are also collecting documents and records. Every week, we share news from Myanmar through social media card news and organize various seminars and forums on the theme of Myanmar's democratization. In addition, we participate in rallies and dialogues with various civil society organizations, raising our voices as international development cooperation practitioners. Regarding the role of the Korean government, as mentioned, the government announced that it would review all ODA to Myanmar, excluding projects and humanitarian aid that directly benefit the lives of the Myanmar people, following the coup.

However, it is important to note that this review does not necessarily mean suspending ODA or shifting to a new direction. Looking at the government's 2022 Comprehensive ODA Implementation Plan, announced in July last year, and the records of parliamentary budget deliberations, projects such as the Myanmar power transmission and distribution network construction project and the integrated e-government data construction project are continuing as ongoing projects. Conversely, grant aid projects, such as those in health and sanitation which are closer to the lives of the Myanmar people, have been reduced to approximately 1 million USD in total project funding.

This is a significant point of divergence from countries like the United States, the United Kingdom, and Sweden, which have announced that they will redirect ODA funds intended for the Myanmar government towards supporting civil society and strengthening democracy. While there are plans and scales announced for humanitarian aid projects targeting refugees in Myanmar's border regions and health support projects for citizens within Myanmar, specific details are difficult to ascertain.

Furthermore, although the Korean government, through the Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs, has publicly declared its support for democracy in Myanmar, and the Korean public has shown unprecedented support for the democratic forces in Myanmar, the information available so far regarding the government's activities is somewhat disappointing. However, international development cooperation does not solely involve government actions. In a complex situation like Myanmar's, civil society can play a more significant role than the government.

Consequently, there are cases where Korean and Myanmar civil societies cooperate to provide basic services such as education and health, which have been suspended or rejected by the people due to the non-functioning of the Myanmar government. There are also initiatives to support refugees in border areas. It is also possible that some individuals are participating in direct support for the Myanmar democracy movement, which is occurring behind the scenes. Reflecting on the experiences in Myanmar, we have learned many lessons about how to conduct international development cooperation.

We have had many discussions about this. In the past, Korean development cooperation has been closely coordinated with the government and has tended to maintain a distance from politics. While it is important to respect the government and avoid unwarranted interference in internal affairs, a different approach is clearly needed when the government lacks legitimacy and is oppressing its citizens, as is the case in Myanmar. It is regrettable that this was not the case before the coup. Even before the coup, there were voices pointing out that Myanmar's democracy was fragile, controlled and manipulated by the military, and that mechanisms for genocide were clearly in place. Similar situations and patterns were observed in other countries, yet Korean development cooperation either ignored or overlooked these facts.

In such circumstances, we have re-evaluated our role, which has focused on economic growth or providing basic services without challenging the existing social structure. Looking back, I believe that the direction for Korean international development cooperation to contribute to democratic development should involve a fundamental change in methods and approaches. It should not only involve the government but also various members of society, such as political parties, the media, and community organizations and labor unions. Instead of simply providing technical training and services, we should pursue genuine empowerment.

To this end, it is essential to prioritize democracy and human rights in international cooperation in areas such as agriculture, education, and health. For example, even in rural development projects, it is necessary to carefully examine the local power structures and to enable democratic decision-making within various civic organizations, allowing them to become agents of change. While grassroots development activities that challenge existing structures do exist, as mentioned earlier, there is a growing trend towards more technical approaches.

Programs planned and executed without careful consideration of the socio-political and cultural governance structures may, in fact, serve to maintain or even reinforce existing structural inequalities and vested interests. Second, I believe that international development cooperation should move beyond a government-centric approach. Most authoritarian regimes implement various policies to maintain their oppressive structures, such as regulating the scope of activities for registered civil society organizations, allowing access to government and organizational data at any time, or politically designating regions and ethnic groups included in the government's mid- to long-term development plans. Consequently, organizations focused on democracy and human rights face difficulties in registration, and development cooperation projects may inadvertently legitimize authoritarian regimes. Therefore, while previously, approval from the partner government and formal registration with implementing agencies were basic requirements, and Korean institutions and organizations took the lead in development cooperation, it is now necessary to consider direct support and empowerment of various forms of organizations and institutions, such as local NGOs or community-based organizations in Myanmar, depending on the situation.

This could be tested through methods such as establishing non-governmental organizations focused on democracy, like NDI or the National Endowment for Democracy (NED), which are sponsoring today's event, or through other international organizations in the respective countries. Finally, I would like to emphasize the need for a fundamental review of the philosophy and vision of Korean international development cooperation. Last year, the Third Comprehensive ODA Plan was announced. While it included concepts such as inclusive growth, corporate advancement, and support for economic growth in developing countries, the terms democracy and governance were not even mentioned.

I believe that what Korea can achieve through development cooperation is not limited to economic growth know-how, such as the "Miracle on the Han River." I hope that the government and civil society can jointly consider how to contribute to democratic development tailored to the context of each country, moving beyond economic growth and a state-centric approach, and that this can be discussed here today. Thank you. Thank you. Many thanks for your valuable insights. When democracy and human rights are mentioned, it is often perceived as interference in internal affairs, but this is absolutely not the case. Even without such words, many people in local communities are suffering greatly, and a broader perspective is needed.

Professor Kim Won-jin, many discussions have taken place. Currently, both South Korea and the international community seem to be overlooking the situation in Myanmar due to the continuous occurrence of major global events. How can we re-emphasize this issue in our foreign policy? Beyond general statements, we would appreciate your insights on how the next government will prioritize human rights and democracy in its foreign policy. Yes, I have heard from many people working on the ground, including those from Myanmar, and I have listened to their stories. As a researcher focusing on international politics, particularly human rights, I have had to continuously observe the situation in Myanmar since the coup, and even before that, due to the Rohingya issue. I will address the two questions you have raised regarding this matter.

First, to bring the neglected situation in Myanmar to the forefront, we need to compare it with other ongoing crises, such as those in Syria or Yemen. One approach, though undesirable, is to highlight extreme human rights violations. Currently, the situation is moving in that direction. The photos shown by Director Kang In-han earlier, the brutality and cruelty of the military, and the increasing evidence of atrocities are becoming more apparent. In addition to this, there are numerous instances of arson, and as mentioned earlier, the displacement of people within the country, leading to the emergence of IDPs. These developments suggest a movement in that direction. Recently, there have been cases of mass killings, human shields, and retaliatory killings, as well as instances of vehicles deliberately running over protesters. When such events occur, the international community is compelled to act.

While it would be preferable if such events did not occur, this is one possibility, and if it does happen, the international community and various stakeholders will inevitably have to discuss it, thus drawing attention. Another factor is the strategic mistakes and chaos caused by the military or ruling powers. The Myanmar military, for instance, is currently facing significant international attention. If they continue their past practices of engaging in warfare with ethnic minorities and employing scorched-earth tactics—cutting off supplies, food, information, and personnel—by committing massacres of civilians or arson, international attention will inevitably increase. Human Rights Watch and other organizations are currently gathering information on these matters.

Internet control, for example, is being monitored by an Australian university. The accumulation of such evidence can serve as proof for the international community. These actions by the military represent strategic errors and can become a catalyst for future developments. As mentioned earlier, the role of internally displaced persons and their activities, particularly in Thailand and India, will attract attention. The economic situation is also a factor to watch. According to reports, the Myanmar economy contracted by approximately 25% in 2021, and in some cases, by 18%, which clearly reflects the failures of the Myanmar military regime. Furthermore, depending on the outcome of the trials, which are yet to unfold,

countries will engage in discussions, and momentum will build. This momentum needs to be leveraged by the international community, including South Korea. These events are likely to occur, and preparations must be made. Beyond these issues, there are aspects that we should focus on more positively, such as the role of public opinion and attention, as described by Thomas Andrews. The three key vulnerabilities of the military are weapons, funds, and legitimacy. These are the areas that need to be targeted. Such incidents have continued to occur. For instance, in October, Singapore, Malaysia, and Indonesia opposed the invitation of the Commander-in-Chief of the Myanmar Army. While Cambodia's Prime Minister visited Myanmar, Malaysia and Singapore reacted negatively.

These internal divisions within ASEAN can be seen as significant events and positive factors that can be exploited. Furthermore, in December, Total and Chevron announced the suspension of their operations in Myanmar. This was not a sudden decision but followed a prior suspension of cash flow and subsequent monitoring. Many other companies, including Japan's Kirin, Telenor, Metro, and British American Tobacco, had already withdrawn. This trend is continuing, and it is crucial to maintain this momentum. We must also observe the developments at the UN. In June, the General Assembly adopted a strong resolution, particularly emphasizing the need to prevent the flow of weapons into Myanmar.

China abstained from this vote, which is significant. This abstention can be seen as a crucial point that civil society can present to challenge China's legitimacy. While China continues to supply military equipment, such as submarines, to Myanmar, its abstention sends a different message to the international community. Furthermore, a resolution was adopted by the Third Committee, and interestingly, Singapore, Japan, Thailand, and Timor-Leste voted in favor. At the UN Security Council, China and Russia, along with India and Vietnam, voted against a resolution related to Myanmar. These are countries that need to be pressured by their respective civil societies. This is particularly true for countries like Singapore, Japan, Thailand, and Timor-Leste.

Therefore, it is essential for domestic and international civil society to leverage these factors to maintain positive momentum. Regarding the Korean government, I would like to briefly mention a few points. Firstly, I understand that there was a meeting regarding Myanmar at the UN Human Rights Council recently, involving several individuals. It is necessary to verify whether the current measures are being effectively implemented. Specifically, regarding the extension of stay for Myanmar nationals, which was mentioned by the Vice Minister and has been a strong measure, the question arises as to how effectively it is being utilized by Myanmar nationals residing in Korea. This issue was raised, and it needs to be reviewed. Secondly, concerning the ODA reduction, we need to examine which sectors have been affected and how.

Thirdly, regarding the dialogue between Korean businesses and Myanmar, held in December, organized by KOTRA and the Myanmar Chamber of Commerce, critical voices were raised. We need to assess whether there are things we should not be doing or should be doing more of, and whether the implemented measures are operating effectively. Secondly, similar to Total and Chevron, we have POSCO and Korea Gas Corporation. We are involved in the Shwe gas field, the second gas field. In 2020, POSCO reportedly earned approximately 300 billion KRW, and Korea Gas Corporation earned around 200 billion KRW. The regrettable aspect is that if companies like Total and Chevron withdraw, our companies might follow suit. However, POSCO International announced in April last year that it would cease its joint venture in the steel industry, a symbolic measure.

This is a relatively symbolic measure compared to the gas field operations. However, the Korean government has a greater stake in these matters, particularly concerning Korea Gas Corporation and POSCO, which is funded by the National Pension Service. Therefore, there is room for action. We are doing a considerable amount in Asia, being one of the few countries to participate in joint statements and, in some cases, acting independently. The Chief of Staff and the Chief of Staff's name appeared in joint international statements along with Japan, and in the case of the four-point call, Korea and Timor-Leste acted alone.

In essence, while Korea is actively criticizing, the question remains whether companies like Korea Gas Corporation and POSCO are acting accordingly. POSCO, for instance, argues that if they withdraw, Russia or China might step in, which would be detrimental to the Myanmar people. However, given that Total and Chevron are preparing to withdraw over a period of six months, it is questionable whether this argument can continue to persuade the public. Further reflection on this matter is needed. I will conclude my remarks here.

Professor Kim Ae-jeong has provided a very detailed account with numerous examples, highlighting how Korea has actively engaged in statement diplomacy and taken unilateral sanctions. However, she rightly pointed out that these measures, such as POSCO's actions or ODA, are insufficient, and it is time for self-assessment. Time has passed quickly, and I cannot give each speaker another turn. If you have any additional remarks, please raise your hand. I would like to give Director Yoon once more the opportunity to speak, as he represents the Myanmar Democracy Network and its Korean chapter.

Many are curious about the internal situation in Myanmar. From the looks of it, it does not seem strong enough to significantly weaken the civil resistance or the military dictatorship. If the situation continues as it is, the elections scheduled for the summer of 2023 will likely proceed. In this context, Director Kang In-han's point about strategy is very pertinent. The election strategy is indeed a critical issue for us as well, and we are considering it. The military has not yet drafted the 2008 constitution, and it is unclear how they will proceed politically. In 2010, they initiated political changes, not for democracy, but to establish legitimacy and create a semblance of order.

However, there was a sudden change in the system: the winner-take-all electoral system, which was a weakness of the military dictatorship. When drafting the 2008 constitution, the scholars involved were experts in law, but not necessarily in political science or electoral systems. Therefore, they may not have been able to fully assess its implications. I read the 2008 constitution last year.

I speculated that the military might change the electoral system because the NLD won overwhelmingly in the elections. This led me to believe that a coup might occur. And indeed, it did. The military is still appointing election officials and is in the process of changing the electoral system. This is evident in Thailand, where the Senate is appointed by the military, and the Prime Minister is elected by a joint session of the Senate and the House of Representatives, with a proportional representation system. In Myanmar, although 25% of the parliamentary seats are reserved for the military, the NLD won overwhelmingly due to the winner-take-all system, preventing the military from appointing the president.

If the electoral system is changed to proportional representation, the military-backed USDP could win more than 50% of the seats. Combined with the 25% reserved seats in parliament, they could form a government and appoint the president. The military staged a coup precisely to change the electoral system and achieve this outcome. However, there will be considerable opposition to this, and some argue that it is too difficult to defeat the military through armed struggle, as it is the most organized force. Consequently, significant casualties may occur in the process.

The military staged a coup precisely to change the electoral system and achieve this outcome. However, there will be considerable opposition to this, and some argue that it is too difficult to defeat the military through armed struggle, as it is the most organized force. Consequently, significant casualties may occur in the process.

The military staged a coup precisely to change the electoral system and achieve this outcome. However, there will be considerable opposition to this, and some argue that it is too difficult to defeat the military through armed struggle, as it is the most organized force. Consequently, significant casualties may occur in the process.