[Conditions for Presidential Success in 2022] Short Interview with the Author: ⑦ "The Failure of the Constitution, the Failure of the Judiciary, the Failure of the President (Kim Jeong)"

YouTube Link: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Lj3VyHudY9I

Ahead of the 20th presidential election scheduled for March 9, 2022, the East Asia Institute (EAI) launched the project <Conditions for Presidential Success in 2022>, targeting presidential candidates, election campaigns, politicians, media, and influencers as potential readers. Following a working paper stage, a book was published. The nine researchers summarize the conditions for success in the roles of head of the executive branch, politics of harmony and coexistence, and balanced national development and communication as 'decentralization, integration, and coexistence.' We are releasing a short interview with the author along with the web publication of the working paper series, which aims to present the conditions for the next president's success by analyzing the failures of past presidents.

Chapter 7, "The Failure of the Constitution, the Failure of the Judiciary, the Failure of the President" – Kim Jeong (University of North Korean Studies)

Read the Working Paper

■ Author: Kim Jeong_Associate Professor, University of North Korean Studies. Ph.D. in Political Science, Yale University. Visiting Professor at the Graduate School of International Studies, Yonsei University; Chair of the Unification and Security Research Division Committee, Korean Political Science Association; Regional Coordinator, Asian Democracy Research Network; Policy Advisor, Ministry of National Defense and Defense Intelligence Agency. Previously served as Visiting Researcher at the Graduate School of Global Arts, Tokyo University; Senior Researcher at the East Asia Institute; and Principal Researcher at the Institute for Far Eastern Studies, Kyungnam University. Research interests include comparative political institutions, comparative political economy, inter-Korean relations, and East Asian international relations. Authored articles such as "South Korean Democratization: A Comparative Empirical Appraisal" (2018), "The Legal Production Capacity of a Democratic Constitutional State: The Case of South Korea's Divided Government" (2020), "A Working Parliament, a Talking Parliament, a Confrontational Parliament: Macro-level Consequences and Micro-level Foundations of Parliamentary Distrust" (2020), and "Conditions for the Success of COVID-19 Quarantine Policies: A Comparative Study of the Korean Case" (2021).

Video Transcript

The chapter I wrote concerning the judiciary is fundamentally composed of three keywords. The first keyword is the failure of the constitution, the second keyword is the failure of the judiciary, and the third keyword is the failure of the president. Speaking about the first keyword, the failure of the constitution: the constitution, as a system, grants the legislature the power to impeach judges, which can be seen as a check on the abuse of power by the judiciary. However, impeachment by the legislature should ideally be an act of mutual restraint and self-discipline, a built-in mechanism to prevent such occurrences. As you are well aware, the National Assembly impeached a judge this year, and the Constitutional Court, while ruling on it, ultimately upheld the impeachment. Nevertheless, the very fact that impeachment occurred signifies that the logic of checks and balances embedded in the 1987 Constitution of the Republic of Korea has, in a sense, broken down.

In this regard, it can be said to symbolize a crisis within the South Korean constitutional order. The impeachment of a judge, in fact, became apparent during the Park Geun-hye administration, and is a symbolic event of the so-called "judicial corruption" scandal. This scandal represents the second keyword I mentioned: the failure of the judiciary. The failure of the judiciary fundamentally stems from two propositions: first, that the judiciary must be independent from the influence of the executive and legislative branches; and second, that within the judiciary, mechanisms for accountability must function properly when a judge's rulings or conduct violate the constitution or laws. The judicial corruption scandal demonstrated that various mechanisms that should have been functioning, both in terms of independence and accountability, failed to do so. Therefore, as I mentioned earlier, because the judiciary failed to perform its functions, particularly its functions of independence and accountability, it has become one pillar of the constitutional crisis I mentioned.

Looking more closely at the failure of the judiciary, the most important position within the judiciary is naturally the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court Justices' Conference would then serve as a check on the Chief Justice's judicial administrative power. Therefore, to examine how the Supreme Court and the Justices' Conference, the core decision-making bodies within the judiciary, operate, I conducted research on the appointment of the Chief Justice, which is handled by the president, and the appointment of Supreme Court Justices. Specifically, I investigated whether the appointments have been made in a way that enhances political neutrality while increasing diversity within the Justices' Conference. The results indicated that, to an extent that is difficult to deny, the appointments made during the Moon Jae-in administration, which many people refer to as 'code appointments,' have indeed raised concerns regarding political neutrality. This suggests that by appointing Supreme Court Justices who are close to the president's ideological and policy leanings, the Justices' Conference has become less effective as a mechanism for maintaining political neutrality within the judiciary.

In this sense, I believe the third keyword, the failure of the president, is constituted. Thus, to summarize, the failure of the president, specifically the failure to appoint Supreme Court Justices based on political neutrality, led to the collapse of the judiciary's independence and accountability. This, in turn, created a chain of events culminating in the impeachment of a judge, symbolizing the failure of the constitution. Tracing this chain in reverse, the most critical judicial reform task for the president who wins the next election and forms a new administration is how to exercise the presidential appointment power for Supreme Court Justices with greater restraint, thereby selecting excellent candidates who can enhance both diversity and neutrality within the Justices' Conference. If this task can be achieved to some extent, it will be possible to implement institutional reforms that enhance both the independence and accountability of the judiciary. Then, as I mentioned at the beginning, a clue may be found to overcome the crisis of the Korean constitutional system, which is the most macro-level issue, namely, the failure of the constitution.

I believe this constitutes the third keyword: the failure of the president. Thus, to summarize, the failure of the president, specifically the failure to appoint Supreme Court Justices based on political neutrality, led to the collapse of the judiciary's independence and accountability. This, in turn, created a chain of events culminating in the impeachment of a judge, symbolizing the failure of the constitution. Tracing this chain in reverse, the most critical judicial reform task for the president who wins the next election and forms a new administration is how to exercise the presidential appointment power for Supreme Court Justices with greater restraint, thereby selecting excellent candidates who can enhance both diversity and neutrality within the Justices' Conference. If this task can be achieved to some extent, it will be possible to implement institutional reforms that enhance both the independence and accountability of the judiciary. Then, as I mentioned at the beginning, a clue may be found to overcome the crisis of the Korean constitutional system, which is the most macro-level issue, namely, the failure of the constitution.

I believe this constitutes the third keyword: the failure of the president. Thus, to summarize, the failure of the president, specifically the failure to appoint Supreme Court Justices based on political neutrality, led to the collapse of the judiciary's independence and accountability. This, in turn, created a chain of events culminating in the impeachment of a judge, symbolizing the failure of the constitution. Tracing this chain in reverse, the most critical judicial reform task for the president who wins the next election and forms a new administration is how to exercise the presidential appointment power for Supreme Court Justices with greater restraint, thereby selecting excellent candidates who can enhance both diversity and neutrality within the Justices' Conference. If this task can be achieved to some extent, it will be possible to implement institutional reforms that enhance both the independence and accountability of the judiciary. Then, as I mentioned at the beginning, a clue may be found to overcome the crisis of the Korean constitutional system, which is the most macro-level issue, namely, the failure of the constitution.

I believe.