[EAI在线研讨会] 新冠疫情与新世界秩序系列 9. 韩美日伙伴关系未来：新时代的安全与经济合作

YouTube 链接 : https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=M3hjdKrzsPs

东亚研究院（院长孙烈）举办了“新冠疫情与新世界秩序”系列第九场在线研讨会——“韩美日伙伴关系未来：新时代的安全与经济合作”。随着韩美、美日联合声明的发布，韩美日之间的安全与经济合作预计将扩大，而中美战略竞争的加剧则加重了韩日两国的战略困境。在此背景下，韩美日三国必须明确各自的战略利益，并寻求维持三国友好关系的方法。本次研讨会汇聚了韩美日三国的专家，就中美战略竞争时代下的韩美日安全与经济合作进行了深入探讨。

时间: 2021年11月19日（周五），09:00–11:00 (KST)

发言人: 朴俊雨（前世宗研究所理事长）、市川富美子（日本国际问题研究所所长代理）、华盛顿·布鲁克斯（前驻韩美军司令官）、裵英子（建国大学教授）、木村福成（庆应大学教授）、安德鲁·格罗托（斯坦福大学地缘政治、技术与治理项目主任）

主持人: 河英善（EAI理事长；首尔大学名誉教授）、托马斯·芬格（斯坦福大学弗里曼·斯波格利国际研究中心研究员）

开幕致辞: 孙烈（EAI院长；延世大学教授）、申基旭（斯坦福大学亚太研究中心主任）

构建韩美日安全•经济合作的实用框架

I. 第一场会议：韩美日安全合作

韩日关系与三国合作的未来

• 美国正展现出加强与韩国、日本合作以确立印太地区秩序的立场。同样，日本也更加注重“自由开放的印太（FOIP）”构想。为实现这一目标，韩日两国保持和谐关系至关重要。
• 前世宗研究所理事长朴俊雨指出，鉴于岸田新首相继承了安倍首相的外交政策，韩日关系改善可能难以在文在寅政府任期内解决。也就是说，关系的改善取决于未来的领导人。
• 据前驻韩美军司令官华盛顿·布鲁克斯（Vincent Brooks）称，韩美日同盟体系基于经济合作和共同防御等共同利益。他认为，韩美日三国新政府将面临的机遇包括在现有同盟体系基础上和谐运作和加强印太地区的民主。
• 日本国际问题研究所所长代理市川富美子表示，同盟国之间的合作应超越军事同盟的范畴。例如，四方安全对话（Quad）由超越军事同盟的、具有疫苗和基础设施建设等多种目的的小型合作体组成。为了促进印太国家之间的参与，这类临时性的同盟集团将在地区内变得更加重要。
• 布鲁克斯司令官在延伸威慑战略中强调了能力和信任这两大支柱中的信任支柱。例如，如果延伸威慑战略的受益国与美国建立了深厚的信任，那么其拥有自主核武器的意愿就会减弱；但如果信任减弱，则会寻求拥有核力量。他强调美国的延伸威慑能力“随时准备就绪”，并指出需要通过积极的外交和信任建设来达到更高的信任水平。

中国崛起带来的威胁

• 以国家控制的资本主义和扩张性经济为代表的中国崛起，给自由市场民主国家带来了新的挑战。拜登政府一直努力加强与盟国的合作，以保护其安全和经济利益。为对抗威权主义体制的中国，美国将于12月召开民主峰会。
• 据朴俊雨理事长称，日本加强了与包括美国在内的盟国的军事演习。最初旨在打击朝鲜船只非法转运的相互监视活动，实际上是为了遏制中国在东海和南海日益增长的军事活动。
• 布鲁克斯司令官强调，应将美国主导的同盟视为连接民主国家、经济强国和军事强国的体系，而不仅仅是美国的同盟。

朝鲜变量与朝鲜半岛和平维持

• 尽管面临严峻的经济制裁、新冠疫情大流行和自然灾害造成的经济困难，朝鲜仍表现出持续发展核武器的意愿。
• 市川所长代理表示，六方会谈的结束仅仅是中断，朝美之间的高级别外交在特朗普政府时期仍在继续。她认为，应维持与朝鲜的高级别会谈。
• 考虑到拜登政府已尝试与朝鲜对话，市川所长代理认为，是否参与谈判取决于朝鲜。然而，很难说朝鲜问题是拜登政府的首要外交政策之一。
• 布鲁克斯司令官在谈到文在寅总统于2021年9月在联合国大会基调演讲中提出的终战宣言时表示，“终战宣言伴随着相当大的风险，但维持现状同样伴随着风险。”布鲁克斯司令官指出，虽然朝鲜半岛的和平确实通过休战得以维持，但难以期待通过维持现状实现永久和平。他补充说，虽然承认终战宣言的价值，但应避免将其与韩美联合司令部或联合国军的撤离等政治问题联系起来，并强调“终战宣言应从务实的角度而非民粹主义的角度来处理。”

II. 第二场会议：韩美日经济合作

中美技术竞争

• 中美竞争和亚太地区的地缘政治冲突正使东亚的商业环境日益不稳定。斯坦福大学网络政策中心地缘政治、技术与治理项目主任安德鲁·格罗托（Andrew Grotto）强调，不应将中美竞争简单化为大国竞争，而应将其视为基于自由主义规范的国际秩序与威权性质的国家主导资本主义这两种体系之间的竞争。
• 美国正推行“脱钩”战略，作为其对华供应链政策的目标。然而，据庆应大学教授木村福成（Fukunari Kimura）称，除了涉及敏感技术和稀土/金属的产业外，“脱钩”迄今为止仅在部分领域实施。
• 格罗托主任强调，全球供应链过于复杂，难以实现“脱钩”，将美中供应链分开计算是不现实的。
• 中国市场对日本和韩国都至关重要。对韩国而言，美国是韩国最大的半导体出口市场之一，而中国市场则占韩国半导体出口的一半以上。建国大学教授裵英子表示，盟国应寻求最佳的合作途径，同时美国不应给盟国与中国之间的关系施加过大压力。

推进三国及地区合作

• 据半导体产业协会称，在美国，如果试图实现半导体自给自足，生产成本将增加35%-60%。在此背景下，裵英子教授指出，美国等国家在半导体全球价值链中实现自给自足既不理想也不可行。
• 美国、日本和台湾在确保供应链方面进行了积极合作。美国已请求台积电（TSMC）和三星（Samsung）在美国建设半导体工厂，日本也鼓励在日本建设台积电工厂。裵英子教授表示，尽管在半导体领域出现了新的联盟，但韩国却落后了。

超越中断的韩日关系

• 2019年，韩日外交摩擦蔓延至半导体领域，导致韩日半导体企业合作减弱。韩国在材料和设备产业方面存在不足，而日本在半导体产业方面也存在不足。因此，韩日两国恢复双边合作渠道是可取的。然而，尽管经济安全是两国政府的首要政策课题之一，但目前并未制定建立合作基础的政策。
• 岸田内阁的首要政策课题之一是经济安全。据悉，日本政府计划在设立经济安全局的同时，制定新的经济安全法，加强对向中国技术泄露的管制。尽管如此，迄今为止，日本的经济安全战略中并未提及与韩国的合作。裵教授强调，“韩日两国应寻求加强技术领域合作的途径，以应对中美技术竞争的浪潮。” 
   
  
   
  III. 发言人及主持人简介
  ■ 朴俊雨_ 前世宗研究所理事长、政务首席秘书。在外交与贸易部工作33年，曾任驻欧盟韩国大使、驻新加坡韩国大使。2011年7月退休后，担任美国斯坦福大学沃尔特·肖伦斯坦亚太研究中心科雷特研究员（Koret Fellow），负责“转型中的韩国外交政策：韩国与其主要邻国的双边关系”研究生课程。2012年9月被任命为延世大学国家管理研究院客座教授。朴大使于2013年8月至2014年6月担任朴槿惠政府总统秘书室政务首席秘书官。之后，从2015年2月起担任韩国代表性独立智库——世宗研究所理事长三年。
  ■ 华盛顿·布鲁克斯（Vincent K. Brooks）_ 前联合国军司令部、韩美联合司令部、驻韩美军司令官。专业领域包括国家安全、政策、战略、国际关系、军事行动、反恐及大规模杀伤性武器扩散防止、多样性与包容性、复合组织中的领导力、危机领导力、建立凝聚力强的信任型团队。
  ■ 市川富美子（Tomiko Ichikawa）_ 日本国际问题研究所（JIIA）所长代理。于2020年7月就任现职。1985年进入外务省，曾担任欧洲局西欧课长、裁军与核不扩散、科学与核能课长等职务。此外，曾在日本驻英国大使馆、驻维也纳国际组织日本代表处担任常任理事官。还曾担任前南斯拉夫联合国维和部队（UNPROFOR）政治事务官员、国际原子能机构（IAEA）总干事特别助理。市川所长代理曾参加六方会谈（2006年12月-2008年12月），并在维也纳常驻代表处（2011-2014年）和IAEA（2014-2020年）研究朝核问题。
  ■ 裵英子_ 建国大学政治外交学系教授。毕业于首尔大学外交学系，在美国北卡罗来纳大学获得政治学博士学位。主要研究领域为国际政治经济学、海外投资的政治经济学、科学技术与国际政治、互联网与国际政治、科技外交。主要论文包括《国际政治霸权与技术创新：以美国半导体技术为例》（2020）、《中国互联网企业的崛起与互联网主权》（2018）、《中美霸权竞争与科技创新》（2016）、《科技与公共外交》（2013）等。
  ■ 安德鲁·格罗托（Andrew J. Grotto）_ 斯坦福大学网络政策中心威廉·J·佩里国际安全研究员，胡佛研究所研究员。格罗托的专业领域是美国在全球信息技术创新方面的领导力以及社会经济层面日益增长的对创新的依赖。格罗托曾在奥巴马政府和特朗普政府担任白宫网络安全政策高级主任。他还曾担任Penny Pritzker商务部长的技术政策高级顾问。他还在参议院情报委员会担任专业幕僚，在国会拥有丰富的经验。
  ■ 木村福成（Fukunari Kimura）_ 庆应大学经济学部教授，亚洲及东亚经济研究中心（ERIA）首席经济学家。毕业于东京大学法学部，并于1990年和1991年在威斯康星大学麦迪逊分校获得硕士和博士学位。曾任纽约州立大学经济学系助理教授（1991-1994年），庆应大学经济学部助理教授（1994-2000年），自2000年至今担任庆应大学经济学部教授。专业领域为国际生产网络和东亚经济一体化。
  ■ 河英善_ EAI理事长，首尔大学名誉教授。在美国华盛顿大学获得国际政治学博士学位，曾任首尔大学外交学系教授、美国普林斯顿大学国际问题研究所访问学者、瑞典斯德哥尔摩国际和平研究所访问学者、首尔大学国际问题研究所所长、美国学研究所所长、韩国和平学协会会长、韩日新时代共同研究韩方共同委员长、总统国家安保咨询团、南北首脑会谈筹备委员会元老咨询会议委员等职务。现任EAI理事长及首尔大学名誉教授。近期著作及合著包括《世界政治的爱：战争与和平》、《正视韩国外交史：传统与近代》、《中美在亚太秩序构建上的竞争》、《四行国际政治：16-19世纪朝天•燕行录分析》等，并曾在《朝鲜日报》和《中央日报》连载“河英善专栏”七年。
  ■ 托马斯·芬格（Thomas Fingar）_ 斯坦福大学弗里曼·斯波格利研究所Shorenstein APARC研究员。他曾是Oksenberg-Rohlen特别研究员（2010-2015年），并于2009年被任命为斯坦福大学Payne特别讲师。2005年至2008年，他担任国家情报局副局长兼国家情报委员会主席。此前，芬格曾担任美国国务院情报研究局助理国务卿（2000-01年、2004-05年）、首席副助理国务卿（2001-03年）、分析局副局长（1994-2000年）、东亚太平洋分析局局长（1989-94年）、中国局局长（1986-88年）等职。1975年至1986年，他在斯坦福大学担任多个职务，包括国际安全与军备控制中心高级研究员。
   
  
   
  ■ 由...排版李承延 | 研究員
  
      諮詢：02 2277 1683 (分機 205) | slee@eai.or.kr

视频脚本

大家好，我是东亚研究所所长孙哲。非常荣幸能邀请到各位尊敬的专家和主持人参加我们题为“美日韩伙伴关系新时代的走向：安全与经济合作”的网络研讨会。本次活动由斯坦福大学沃尔特·肖伦斯坦亚太研究中心联合主办。我特别感谢APARC主任、教授Kyung-won Lee的友谊、持续支持与合作。

在今年早些时候于华盛顿特区分别举行的韩美和美日首脑会晤宣布了两份联合声明后，学者和意见领袖预测韩美日三国之间在安全与经济领域的合作可能会扩大。然而，中美战略竞争的地缘政治紧张以及日韩之间已断裂的双边关系等因素，都使美日韩三国的战略考量变得复杂。

随着美国主要转向与中国的竞争，人们不禁会问：朝鲜在美国的优先事项中是否会变得不那么重要？或者，朝鲜的地理位置及其与中国的关系是否会增加美国开启对话和鼓励韩朝之间更紧密关系的意愿？韩美日三国能否在若干问题上恢复并加强三边安全合作？日本和韩国能否在不久的将来改善其严重断裂的双边关系？

我们韩国、美国和日本的公司的前景如何？在全球供应链中存在的限制因素，这三个国家能否真正促进该地区开放、自由和包容的经济体系？在这些问题和背景下，韩美日三国必须明确自身的经济和安全利益，并寻求维持彼此之间友好关系的方法。本次研讨会将讨论安全合作，并触及以下问题：

朝鲜无核化以及中美战略竞争带来的地缘政治紧张。与会专家还将讨论经济合作，涉及三国未来科技和贸易政策的方向，以及全球供应链中的经济安全。感谢大家，我希望今天的网络研讨会能激发政策制定者和学界之间富有实践性和深刻的对话。现在我将把话筒交给我们的朋友和同事Kyung-won Lee教授。

在日本、韩国及亚洲其他地区，我们曾与东亚研究所（EAI）合作举办过一些联合项目，今天能再次合作，我们感到非常荣幸。孙博士已经概述了我们今天将要讨论的关键问题。我想说，如果说疫情有什么积极的一面，那就是我们可以更积极地开展此类文化项目。具体来说，正如大家所知，美国已经迎来拜登政府近一年，日本刚刚迎来新首相，

内阁，而韩国目前正处于总统竞选之中。因此，这是一个充满挑战和不确定性的时期，但同时也可能蕴含着未来几个月和几年的机遇。今天，我们汇聚了来自学术界和关键领域的杰出演讲者。实际上，我们中心的项目是韩国项目和日本项目之间的联合项目，这充分展示了日本、韩国和美国之间的伟大合作。希望我们也能在政策领域开展类似的

合作。再次感谢大家今天的参与。现在，我将把话筒交给主持第一场会议的Hayan博士。众所周知，Ha博士曾是首尔国立大学教授，现任东亚研究所（EAI）主席。Ha博士是韩国外交政策和国家安全领域的顶尖专家。因此，非常荣幸能邀请到Ha博士和所有与会专家参加今天的讨论。Ha博士，谢谢您。李教授，我很荣幸能主持东亚研究所（EAI）和APARC联合举办的关于

新时代美日韩伙伴关系未来的网络研讨会。我们正面临四个不同层面的新时代：首先，美国和中国已开始在经济、技术、规范和军事领域展开竞争；其次，印太地区持续存在地区对抗的风险，如朝鲜核问题、台湾和南海问题；第三，该地区正在经历新的政治领导层更迭；最后，我们必须成功克服

新冠疫情。面对这样的新时代，我们需要三个伙伴国家之间建立新型的安全与经济合作。为了有效讨论，本次会议准备了五个基本问题：第一，韩国如何以及将如何定义其在太平洋地区的战略利益？第二，在中美战略竞争的背景下，我们期望美国、中国和朝鲜之间建立何种三边关系？第三，在新的领导层下，韩国和日本能否改善

其严重断裂的双边关系？第四，我们如何协调各方在朝鲜无核化和完全安全保障这两个战略上的不同立场？第五，在朝鲜核能力迅速增长的威胁下，我们如何发展美对韩日安全保障的效力？本次研讨会的第一场会议邀请了来自三个国家的三位杰出与会者。

首先请允许我介绍朴钟郁大使，前世宗研究所所长，前总统政治事务高级秘书。他是一名职业外交官，在外交部任职33年，曾担任驻欧盟和新加坡大使。接下来是文森特·布鲁克斯将军，前驻韩美军司令，最近刚从美国驻韩部队、联合国军司令部和韩美联合司令部四星上将军衔的现役职位上退役。

市川富美子总干事，曾任日本国际问题研究所总干事，现任该所总干事。她于1985年加入日本外务省。她的职务包括担任西亚非司司长和核不扩散科学与核能司司长。她曾参与六方会谈，并在维也纳常驻代表团和国际原子能机构（IAEA）工作十年，持续关注朝鲜核问题。现在我将话筒交给朴大使。

朴大使，感谢Ha教授您如此亲切和慷慨的介绍。我也要感谢李教授和孙教授给我这个宝贵的机会参加今天的在线研讨会。很高兴能在线上与各位专家——市川总干事、布鲁克斯将军，尤其是我的老同事Tom Finger——以及APARC的各位同仁见面。正如Ha教授刚才解释的，今天的主题——美、日、韩三边合作——自朝鲜在20世纪90年代初开始发展核武器以来，一直是应对朝鲜挑衅的关键机制。自拜登政府上任以来，美国在努力遏制中国日益增长的挑战中，正在加强这种三边合作。由于韩国在贸易和工业必需的原材料供应方面对中国的依赖日益加深，以及现任文政府的亲华倾向，韩国和文政府很难积极参与以美国为主导的反华联盟。韩日关系因领土和历史争端旷日持久而进一步恶化，这也阻碍了韩国积极参与三边合作。有句俗话说，链条的强度取决于其最薄弱的环节。随着韩日关系的恶化并停留在最糟糕的水平，它已成为美主导的三边合作中最薄弱的环节。由于我只有10分钟的时间，我将主要集中讨论这个问题。

日本和韩国自朝鲜在20世纪90年代初开始核开发以来，一直是应对朝鲜挑衅的关键机制。自分裂政府成立以来，美国一直在加强这种三边合作，以应对中国日益增长的挑战，因为韩国在工业必需品的贸易和原材料供应方面对中国的依赖日益加深，而现任文政府的亲华倾向仍在继续，这对韩国和现任文政府来说并非易事。

文政府解散了以日本政府根据慰安妇协议提供的启动资金而建立的“和解与治愈基金会”。日本对韩国政府的这一决定感到愤怒。两国关系开始降温，当时韩国海军舰艇在2018年12月用火控雷达瞄准了一架日本海上巡逻机。

与此同时，一系列韩国法院关于日本殖民统治时期慰安妇和强征劳工的判决加剧了双边关系。日本则以出口管制对韩国半导体制造至关重要的化学品作为报复。韩日关系的恶化影响了由美国主导的三边合作。拜登政府遏制中国挑战的政策在全球范围内延伸，并覆盖了东亚和印太地区的整个区域。

美国与日本、澳大利亚和印度恢复了四方（Quad）合作。他们同意印太地区保持自由开放和基于规则的秩序的重要性。他们呼吁在该地区享有航行自由，显然是在挑战中国在南海的领土主张。9月，美国与英国和澳大利亚启动了一项名为AUKUS的新三边安全伙伴关系。美国承诺向澳大利亚提供建造核动力潜艇舰队的技术。

在10月底罗马G20峰会期间，拜登总统主持了一场关于全球供应链韧性的会议，有14个美国盟友参加。拜登政府一直在大力分析如何重塑全球供应链，减少对中国的依赖。12月9日至10日，拜登总统将主办一次民主峰会，邀请100多个民主国家的领导人参加，这显然是为了对抗威权主义的中国。拜登总统就任以来，美国发起的所有这些举措，都是为了遏制中国挑战性的野心，并与中国合作，限制中国日益增长的全球影响力。日本也通过加强与美国和其他美国盟友在太平洋和欧洲的联合军事演习，提高了其军事准备水平。澳大利亚、新西兰、英国、法国和德国派遣了海军舰艇和巡逻机参加监视活动，检查朝鲜违反联合国制裁的行为。据说，这些不同寻常的军事

与此同时，一系列韩国法院关于日本殖民统治时期的慰安妇和强征劳工的裁决加剧了双边关系，日本则以出口管制对韩国半导体制造至关重要的化学品作为报复。韩日关系的恶化影响了由美国领导的三边合作。拜登政府旨在应对中国挑战的政策在全球范围内、全方位地延伸，并涵盖了东亚和印太的整个区域。

活动旨在打击朝鲜船只的非法转运，但实际上是为了检查和遏制中国在东海和南海日益加剧的军事活动。日本新首相岸田文雄确认，他将与美国密切合作，维护该地区的和平与稳定，并实现自由开放的印太。自习近平于2012年11月执掌中国领导权以来，中国一直在加剧其侵略性，启动“一带一路”倡议。

中国承诺在世界各地，主要是在发展中国家，投入约1万亿美元用于基础设施建设。在中国共产党成立100周年之际，即今年的7月1日，他警告说，任何侵犯中国主权的企图都将遭到钢铁长城的反击。他宣称，中国不会容忍他人的说教，并且统一台湾是中国共产党不可动摇的承诺。由于中国在中国海和东海展示其军事力量，台湾海峡的紧张局势一直很高。中国舰队甚至与俄罗斯舰队举行联合演习，穿越日本领土的津轻海峡和大隅海峡，这引起了日本民众对中国威胁的担忧。鉴于朝鲜半岛周边所有这些事态发展，很明显，美国和日本决心加强和扩大包括韩国在内的三国之间的合作。负责东亚和太平洋事务的助理国务卿Daniel Brink最近访问了日本和韩国，据报道，他与对方讨论了他们的联盟如何有助于促进印太及其他地区的基于规则的国际秩序。他还表示，当韩国和日本为共同利益而合作时，三国未来将更安全、更繁荣。在总统任期的最后一年，文在寅总统在今年1月的年度记者会上向日本发出了对话的姿态。

文总统表示，他承认2015年的慰安妇协议是两国政府之间的官方协议。他在纪念3月1日独立运动的讲话中提出了对话的建议。日本的回应是严厉而持续的，要求韩国完全执行该协议。日本似乎对文总统提出的任何提议和姿态都漠不关心，并等待文总统任期届满，新一届韩国政府上台。

这些活动的目标是朝鲜船只的非法转运，但实际上目标是检查和遏制中国在东海和南海日益加剧的军事活动。日本新首相岸田文雄确认，他将与美国密切合作，维护该地区的和平与稳定，并实现自由开放的印太。自2012年11月习近平执掌中国以来，中国一直在加强其挑战，开始实施“一带一路”倡议。

岸田首相领导下的日本新内阁据称更愿意与韩国保持友好关系。林芳正外相表示愿意加强与韩国的对话，以改善两国紧张关系。考虑到即将于3月举行的韩国总统大选，在文总统剩余任期内取得任何突破的可能性都很小。文总统似乎更倾向于与朝鲜会晤，并共同宣布朝鲜战争结束。此外，

随着总统选举竞选活动越来越激烈，文总统几乎不可能做出让步并改善与日本的关系。考虑到所有这些因素，在新的韩国政府于明年5月就任后，为改善韩日关系而努力似乎更为现实。无论谁当选，新总统都将面临严峻的任务，即修复与日本的关系，并加入强化的三边合作，同时平衡韩国在美中竞争中的国家

最近访问日本和韩国的（一位官员）据报道与他的同行讨论了他们的联盟如何为促进印太及其他地区的基于规则的国际秩序做出贡献。他还表示，当韩国和日本为共同利益而合作时，这三个国家未来将更安全、更繁荣。总统文在任期的最后一年，在新年记者会上向日本发出了对话的姿态。

今年1月，文总统表示，他承认2015年的慰安妇协议是两国政府之间的官方协议。他通过纪念“三一”独立运动的讲话提议进行对话。日本的回应是残酷而固执的，要求韩国采取行动全面执行协议。日本似乎对文总统提出的任何提议和姿态都无动于衷，并等待着文总统任期届满，新一届韩国政府就职的时机。

利益。新总统的外交政策需要务实，考虑到文政府倾向于朝鲜和中国的态度令许多韩国人失望。日本也需要灵活，并为与新韩国政府达成妥协敞开大门。如果拜登政府认为韩国对其在与中国竞争中保护美国核心利益至关重要，那么它必须以一种安静而建设性的方式发挥更大的作用。谢谢大家。

聆听。谢谢朴大使。朴大使发表了他的演讲，特别强调了韩日关系。我们的下一位演讲者将是文森特·布鲁克斯将军。布鲁克斯将军，您能开始您的演讲吗？当然，希望大家都能听到我的声音。好的。首先，我要感谢东亚研究所和亚太研究中心组织这次会议，尤其感谢邀请我参加。我非常荣幸能加入这个

杰出的专家小组。我首先要说的是，我认为美国建立的联盟体系，尤其是在第二次世界大战后，正面临严峻考验，这是我们必须注意并做出回应的考验时期。这引发了诸如联盟对相关方目前的价值是什么？印太地区的联盟体系将是什么样的？它会在中国

重塑地区秩序的行动以及自私自利观点的竞争压力下获得加强吗？我想说，联盟体系——尤其正如我们今晚所讨论的，包括美韩联盟、美日联盟和美澳联盟——现在和以往一样重要，甚至更加重要。联盟体系利用了共同利益和志同道合者的亲和力。在这种情况下，印太地区的民主国家在经济合作方面（正如我们今晚肯定会讨论的）和在共同防御方面拥有共同利益。这两大支柱——正如我们今晚的讨论框架一样——支撑了盟国的非凡繁荣和蓬勃发展的社会。在我看来，民主秩序在过去70年中一再受到考验，这不是我们第一次面临考验，它一再显示出韧性和价值。因此，在当前时期，正如我们今天肯定会多次讨论的那样，又一个考验时期来临了。中国的崛起，提供了一种根本不同的政治体系，以中国共产党为中心，领导着国家控制的资本主义和扩张主义经济，这给自由市场民主国家带来了全新的挑战。因此，维持健康的联盟体系可以为中国模式向世界各地输出提供替代方案。在我看来，经济利益至关重要，安全利益随之而来。我曾多次谈到

朝鲜、韩国、中国、俄罗斯、日本和美国之间的关系，并将其描述为像一只手，朝鲜在手掌，其他国家在每个手指上。所以，例如，如果这是中国和俄罗斯，韩国和美国，以及日本，联盟的团结将两个手指联成一个，随着合作的增加，三个手指联成一个。我指的是韩国、美国和日本的合作。这两个联盟和谐运作，而不是结成联盟，我认为这超出了目前的范围，但和谐运作并非不可能。朝鲜将永远试图分离这些手指，中国和俄罗斯也会如此，它们更愿意让每个手指独立运作。这是一种导致软弱的设计，而团结和相互支持则代表着一种强大的设计。因此，联盟体系不应被视为代表旧国际秩序的美国构想，而应被视为一种现代构想，

它联合了世界上一些最强大的经济体、自由民主国家和军事强国。女士们先生们，我认为我的关键观点是合作很重要。对于美国、日本和韩国的新政府来说，地平线上充满了机遇（我将它们都视为新的，因为到2022年中期，每个政府的任期将只有18个月或更短）。这将包括一个建立现有联盟体系并加强它的机会，方法是确保印太地区的民主国家和谐运作。每个国家都有自己的历史，每个国家都有自己的利益，但成功在于认识到共同点并在此基础上发展，同时也要认识到在任何问题上带来的独特视角。现实情况是，联盟是由平衡自身利益与集体利益而形成的。没有一个观点应该永远占上风。我希望大韩民国、美国和日本，作为东北亚的联盟，将寻求加强合作的机会，并认识到和谐关系的重要性。每个国家的领导层都有义务在国内宣传联盟的价值，并在国际上展示联盟的价值。我认为合作可以增强安全。为了改善韩国、美国和日本三角关系中的信任，将需要承担一些政治风险。目前信任不足。在我服役韩国期间，

我亲眼目睹了在没有与美国盟友直接沟通的情况下运作的局限性。尤其是在2016年导弹试射期间，当朝鲜继续以越来越大的成功测试一系列射程和能力足以威胁美国以及两个东北亚盟友（甚至可以说还有澳大利亚，但尤其是在这三个国家之间）的导弹时，我体会到了这一点。当朝鲜进行这些测试、展示和挑衅时，测试会触发这三个国家各自的传感和预警系统。事实上，每个国家都有不同的拼图碎片，我将比喻性地称之为看着同一张拼图。美国作为共同盟友，拥有直接沟通和最完整的拼图画面，因为它有自己的画面，并且拥有韩国和日本的信息。但另外两个国家——韩国和日本——由于缺乏直接沟通，

一次又一次地感到沮丧，因为美国遵守每个盟友建立的信息安全限制和要求，无法分享全部情况，或者不得不通过联盟边界传递被允许共享的信息。这很慢，造成了不必要的挫败感，同时也影响了应对措施的质量。正如前面已经提到的，2016年《韩日军事情报保护协定》（GSOMIA）的签署建立了一个克服这些限制的渠道。

朝鲜、韩国、中国、俄罗斯、日本和美国之间的关系，我将其描述为像一只手，朝鲜在手掌上，其他国家在每个手指上。所以，例如，如果这是中国、俄罗斯、韩国、美国和日本联盟，团结就是将两个手指连成一个，随着合作的增加，就是三个手指连成一个。我当然指的是韩国、美国和日本的合作。这两个联盟协调运作，不一定是联盟，我认为。

美国不再是转接者，信任开始在韩日两国政府之间上升，即使在巨大的压力下。为了建立GSOMIA，必须承担一些政治风险，也必须承担政治风险来维持它，当GSOMIA的解散似乎迫在眉睫时。军事信息的共享是合作的最低水平，还可以做更多，也应该做更多。中国和俄罗斯都挑战了联盟的质量和韧性，

并且它们经常利用这些缝隙和敏感点，尤其值得一提的是日本、中国和韩国重叠的防空识别区，例如，俄罗斯和中国都在那里飞行以挑战这些区域的合法性，以及对穿越区域的回应，甚至更敏感的点是存在争议的竹岛或利扬科特岩（无论你选择哪个名字），这进一步加剧了现有的政治敏感性，我们看到

印太地区的民主国家协调运作。每个国家都有自己的历史，每个国家都有自己的利益，但成功在于认识到共同点并在此基础上发展，同时也要认识到在任何问题上带来的独特视角。现实情况是，联盟是由自我利益与集体利益的平衡驱动的。没有一个观点应该永远占上风，我希望大韩民国、美国和日本作为印太地区的联盟，

东北亚将寻求加强机会，并认识到和谐关系的重要性。每个国家的领导层都有义务在国内沟通联盟的价值，并在国际上展示联盟的价值。我认为合作可以增强安全。为了改善韩国、美国和日本三边关系中的信任，需要承担一些政治风险。目前信任尚不充足。在我服务韩国期间，

我亲眼目睹了在没有与美国盟友直接沟通的情况下运作的局限性，尤其是在2016年导弹发射期间，朝鲜不断进行更大、更成功的各种导弹试验，威胁到美国以及两个东北亚盟国，我还要补充一点，澳大利亚也是如此，但尤其是在这三个国家之间，当朝鲜进行这些试验、展示、挑衅时，

这些试验会触发这三个国家各自的传感和预警系统，事实上，每个国家都有不同的拼图碎片，我将比喻性地称之为“看同一张拼图”。美国作为共同盟友，拥有直接沟通和最完整的拼图画面，因为它有自己的画面，并且拥有韩国和日本的信息，但另外两个国家，韩国和日本，由于没有直接沟通，

彼此之间，一次又一次地感到沮丧，美国遵守每个盟友建立的信息安全限制和要求，无法分享全部情况，或者不得不转达被允许在联盟边界共享的信息。这很慢，造成了不必要的沮丧，同时也影响了响应的质量。正如前面已经提到的，2016年的《一般军事情报保护协定》（GSOMIA）创建了一个渠道来克服这些限制。

美国不再是中介，韩国和日本政府之间的信任开始上升，即使在巨大的压力下。为了创建GSOMIA，需要承担一些政治风险，并且在GSOMIA似乎即将解散时，也需要承担政治风险来维持它。军事情报共享是最低限度的合作，还可以做更多，也应该做更多。中国和俄罗斯都对联盟的质量和韧性提出了挑战。

即使在今天，这一点是多么敏感，它使军事应对复杂化，并可能导致一些已经强调过的摩擦点。在我看来，这是一种不可接受的现状，因为它不利于联盟体系。我向各位提出，演习——无论是小型、安静的桌面讨论，还是协调一致的多国军事行动，以排练和规范互动程序——都将大大

敏感，甚至今天仍然如此，这使军事应对复杂化，并可能导致一些已经强调的摩擦点。在我看来，这是一种不可接受的现状，因为它不利于联盟体系。我建议，演习，无论是小而安静的桌面讨论，还是协调多国进行的全面军事行动，以演练和规范互动程序，这些演习将产生实质性影响。

改善安全，并威慑中俄的冒险主义，同时也在东北亚的民主国家之间建立信任的桥梁。这只是众多机会中的一个例子。最后，我想说，每个国家都必须将自己视为国际关系挂毯中的一根线，并寻求互补的机会来加强基于联盟体系的区域和国际秩序。像四方（Quad）这样的团体，我们已经听过提到了，甚至像AUKUS这样的协议，我们也听过提到了，而且它是最新的协议。这些都反映了一种外向型的意识。印太地区民主国家之间的合作显然符合每个国家的利益，并且协同效应肯定大于其组成部分的总和。任何合作安排都将是塑造新时代国际秩序的关键因素，这个新时代包括一个有能力且正在崛起、推行相反秩序的中国，并对其产生影响。

信任的存在可以防止缝隙被利用，而信任的缺失则成为被利用的诱人目标。信任的建立不能一蹴而就，而信任的破裂可能在一瞬间发生。因此，现在是印太地区的民主国家和美国的盟友建立建立信任、塑造未来秩序所需信任的时候了。以上是我的开场发言，我期待着接下来的对话和讨论。非常感谢。

谢谢。是的，非常感谢。首先，我要感谢东亚研究所和斯坦福大学组织了这次活动，我非常荣幸和高兴能有机会讨论这个非常有趣且重要议程。我可能会提出两三个观点，或许可以提供一个更长远的视角来看待朝鲜的核问题以及美日韩三边合作，主要基于我个人的经验。首先，朝鲜的核

谢谢，是的，非常感谢。首先，我要感谢东亚研究所和斯坦福大学组织了这次活动，我非常荣幸和高兴能有机会讨论这个非常有趣且重要议程。我可能会提出两三个观点，也许是基于我个人的经验，提供对朝鲜核局势以及美日韩三边合作的更长远视角。首先，朝鲜核问题，

而朝鲜似乎决心继续其核导开发活动，尽管面临所有困难。布鲁克斯将军刚才提到了他在2016年朝鲜导弹试验方面的经验。今年，我们又目睹了朝鲜进行了许多导弹试验，可能种类各不相同。这意味着朝鲜迄今为止还没有进行洲际弹道导弹或远程导弹试验和核试验。朝鲜可能也在观察拜登政府的方法和

政策。我们不太确定朝鲜在不久的将来，当它看到改善与朝鲜关系的前景渺茫或微乎其微时，可能会如何反应。所以，我们必须关注美国和朝鲜双方的政策将如何发展。我的第二个观点是关于美日韩三边合作，我想提供一个比仅关注当前更长远的时间线，因为实际上在20世纪90年代末，当时朝鲜正经历所谓的“艰难行军”困难时期，并且在第一次美朝协议达成后不久，正是在20世纪90年代末，美日韩三国才开始具体讨论朝鲜议题，并举行了高级别政府官员级别的三边会议。第一次此类会议实际上于1996年1月在夏威夷举行，作为一名年轻的外交官，我曾是日本代表团的一员。从那时起，这种三边会议，有时是外长级别，

有时，而且更频繁的是高级政府官员级别，一直持续到今天。正如我们所见，我认为就在两天前，我了解到这次活动的公开方面受到了双边关系的影响，但另一方面，三边会议本身是以非常高级别的政府官员级别举行的，我认为这很重要，需要继续下去。所以，我认为这有两个方面。我们不能将当前韩日关系视为困难，我认为没有人

能否否认这一点。另一方面，正在进行讨论与合作，并且正在如此高级别进行，我认为也值得注意。所以我们可能需要继续进行这种对话，特别是今年进行了如此多的对话，可能是为了回应如此多的朝鲜导弹试验，但这些国家之间的讨论仍在继续，我认为这一点非常重要。我不是安全专家，但只是想提一下，以回应我认为

是。

拜登政府于去年1月就任时，韩国对在美方领导下恢复韩日伙伴关系寄予厚望。许多韩国人记得，当朴槿惠政府在解决慰安妇问题上与日本发生困难时，时任副总统拜登在两国领导人关系和解过程中发挥了重要作用。他访问了东亚的两个主要美国盟友，并在两国领导人之间进行调解。经过一年多的谈判，韩日于2015年12月达成了慰安妇协议。此后，韩日合作扩展到包括安全问题在内的其他领域。2016年11月，韩日签署了一项重要的军事信息协议。由于韩国不愿与日本进行安全合作，这项协议的签署是迟早的事。韩国与日本恢复的合作，随着文在寅政府于2017年5月上任而中断。

可以否认这一点。另一方面，正在进行一些层面的讨论和合作，我认为这一点也值得注意。所以我们可能需要继续进行这种对话，特别是三边对话。实际上，我看到今年有这么多会议，可能是为了回应朝鲜如此多的导弹试射，但这些国家之间的这种层面的讨论仍在继续，我认为这一点非常重要。我不是安全专家，只是想提及，以回应我认为是...

the both mr park and general brooks mentioned about quad orcas and the security situation in the region uh i think on the front japanese point of view it is also important for japan to really think through its policy and security framework and the future cause of its policy under the new kishida government and we understand that the prime minister kishida already announced his intention to review the japan's current national security framework in a kind of overall as a whole package not only the defense

posture but the national security uh policy itself which i think is really timely and unnecessary under the current security situation in this region and uh regarding quad and ocus uh japan is really kind of strongly promoting the free and open in the pacific and within that framework this quad group is a very important uh cooperative framework for japan and as both speakers prior to me just mentioned u.s announced this new cooperative framework of focus with australia and uk i think in addition to the quite well

established security alliances many small kind of so-called military or small groups for various purposes on the flexible and adopt way will certainly enhance the cooperation in this region and japan i think is really putting its emphasis in promoting free and open into pacific concept and quad is really kind of a very important central piece in it but not only that i think engaging many other countries in this region including and particularly asean countries will be also important in trying to address the current

security situation in this region maybe i will stop here as my initial remarks and i'm looking forward to the discussions thank you very much for three panelists who gave us a very much interesting uh presentations on the issues we will further discuss for our second round of discussions i will give a very brief uh questions towards each panelists and we will continue the second round discussions and there are a couple of also a couple of questions from the audi from the audience i will include such questions toward ah panelists first

ambassador park based on new experience of the career diplomat and also senior secretary to the president how would you recommend the first step for for the new government of next president's presidential election for the betterment korea and japan relations and also how would you forecast the chances of betterment of career japan relations during the next administration that is the first uh point second point if you have time or if you don't mind as you give a little bit further comments on the

next government's basic position on the dilemma of the strategy competition between us and china that is the first questions for the ambassador park and the next couple of questions to our the general uh bruce question two there is a question from the audience there have been diverse views on the end of world declaration the most recent being former u.s forces in korea commander abram stating that it could be reopened the door to hostilities on the peninsula what are your thoughts on the prospects

of the declaration and second question of mine as related about the there are some kind of discussions and and are okay the how should we respond to the continuing development of north korean nuclear capability from that aspect unju explain a little bit about the efficiency of extended deterrence or strengthening the capability of extended deterrence towards that such kind of the north korean nuclear capabilities and finally the toward the tomiko ichikawa as i briefly mentioned and the basic questions

it seems that there are different types of two-track policies of north korea u.s china even an rok how can we manage those kind two different type of the the two track policies one as the complete denuclearization another one is complete security guarantee how can we manage the sequence of those kind of two basic points that the first questions and second one crude issues we all know the china is of com complaining about the possibility of the anti-china partnership in the context of quad how can we

successfully manage that kind of the uh effectiveness of quote not only as the a uh military partnership and also the non-military partners at powell county accommodated those kind of dilemma that issues so i will turn over my microphone to the ambassador park would you start the questions okay uh well it's not easy to predict how the next new korean government will act now we have 110 about 10 days until the presidential election in early march next year both ruling and opposition candidates have not yet made clear their campaign

pledges on foreign policy but one thing is clear as i have already mentioned in my statement the moon government's leaning towards north korea and china attitude has been disappointed many koreans even allies so the next government whoever will it will be elected should be pragmatic some diplomats who joined the camps in both ruling and opposition candidates they already expressed the policy line that the new government will be pragmatic in their approach to diplomacy so i hope that the new government whoever is elected

will be pragmatic to mend the ties with japan 23 years ago when kim jejung was inaugurated in 1998 at that time i was the director of japanese affairs at the ministry of foreign affairs i worked for the restoration of bilateral relations for almost a year when the president kim dejung was inaugurated japan uh scrapped the fisheries packed with korea so the relations was at a very uh low so it was a urgent task for the new government to restore the relationship at that time kim daejung and japanese prime minister

obuchi trusted each other and after almost a year of negotiations we had a joint declaration by kim daejung and so i hope that the new government in korea we'll learn a lesson from the kim awaits declaration with and made make progress with japanese new prime minister kishida and regarding the security cooperation between japan and korea it has been a taboo for korean people to cooperate in security issues with japan it started only about 20 years ago as general brooks mentioned it is very important for not only for

united states but for korea and japan to share military information in coping with the north korean provocations i hope that when korea and japan overcome the difficulties and resolve the current disputes they can join hand in countering regional risks and north korean provocations thank you next general vincent okay thank you dr ha the questions are very interesting ones and i'll try to be somewhat brief in my my response first i'd i'd say with regard to end of war declaration i know it's certainly a

hot topic that is becoming politically charged and so i certainly want to be careful about that because it's not my intention to inflame the circumstances at all i would first say taking note of what uh general abrams has commented on there are absolutely significant risks to an end of war declaration i also believe however that there are significant risks to maintaining the status quo it is possible to maintain the armistice for an extendedly long period of time as has already been the case since 1953

but the armistice was always intended to be a temporary condition until a lasting peace could be attained it's my opinion that a lasting peace will not come from a perpetuation of armistice that that doesn't lead to peace unless there's something else that is a more unique step perhaps even a disruptive step to go there and not to get in the way of uh of uh director general ichikawa's response that will come here in a moment but the sequencing question that she posed to her is relevant here also

again i am taking this as my opinion certainly not any official view but i believe that there is what i've called a cultural conundrum the view in the west on how the sequence of actions should occur in the relationship between trust relationship and denuclearization among those three the western view has certainly been for many years show denuclearization actions real concrete actions and then trust can be built and then the relationship can change but it's been my impression from north korea that that's not what they seek

i believe that they will release their possession of nuclear weapons not everyone agrees with me on that it is a long road before that will happen but it will begin with a changed relationship so it's the exact 180 degree opposite of the western view change of relationship comes first which then builds trust and then uh there will be denuclearization actions when there is a depth of security guarantees that has been reached which has not been reached before so i i believe this is fundamentally about

north korea sense of economic security as well as physical security and the superficial discussions will always begin with physical security so the end of war declaration i believe has value and does also have great risk some of which we've talked about if it becomes politically charged and becomes equated to a reason to reduce u.s force presence on the korean peninsula or to eliminate united nations command abruptly these are mistakes that would be made by any political leaders if they follow that path those are mistakes they're not

fundamentally linked to an end to war declaration but if they're allowed to be linked then it will be a mistake so the danger of moving forward with an end of war declaration is is one that is mostly driven by thoughtfulness in the approach and it cannot be it cannot be blown by the political winds in such a significant way that it is done for populist reasons rather than pragmatic reasons that's my that's my opinion on that now to to the extended deterrence question uh extended deterrence to me is first

about capability but more importantly about trust does the beneficiary of extended deterrence in this case japan and south korea do those two countries believe that the u.s will stand by its commitments and provide extended deterrence so that neither of the two countries requires a nuclear capability themselves if that trust question erodes and i believe it has eroded and may continue to erode then national self-interest begins to rise and a desire to have some equilibrium in the capabilities possessed by each

nation relative to north korea begins to rise again so we're having these kinds of discussions i i had the opportunity i'll end on this point to try to convey the realities of extended deterrence which are difficult to do because of the nature of the systems that are used to provide that extended deterrence but we took some members of the south korean national assembly and the chairman of the south korea joint chiefs of staff to board a nuclear submarine with ballistic missiles aboard and to show them the reality of what it

is that the us provides it's always in the neighborhood and so just because you don't see it doesn't mean it's not there and trying to get to the level of trust that makes it possible to recognize that it is there and that the relationships among the countries will determine the nature of the use but the capability is absolutely there and should never be doubted that's easier said than done and requires strong diplomatic work and confidence building on multiple levels in order to try to get extended deterrence back where it

belongs an open dialogue about extended insurance i think is uh is very needed among the three new administrations okay thank you miss ishikawa would you respond to the questions yeah thank you very much uh first of all i'd like to thank ambassador park for reminding me of the time that we worked uh together on the bilateral relations and actually regarding the first question asked about the security guarantee uh actually general brooks already made quite a very important and interesting remarks from the security

military perspective so i'd like to maybe add just one or two points uh from diplomatic and non-proliferation perspective i think from actually my point of view and from the japanese government point of view i think too whatever the mode or the time frame of the negotiation or agreement in the future i think what is very important is not to lose the site of the kind of goal to achieve in terms of denuclearization because quite often in the past although north korea at that time maybe not now committed to complete

denuclearization of the korean peninsula when we get into the concrete negotiations on the steps to taken there were so many small steps which were reversible that the dprk committed and took but in the end well we see all of us where we are now because we are much worse off in terms of the north korean nuclear capability and threat to the region and the countries in the region as well as the countries beyond the region if we compare the situation a current situation with where we were when for example the

u.s north korea framework agreement was abandoned and also when the six party talks uh ended well we didn't think at that time as i was participating in india so now last meeting of the six party talks in december 2008 we never believed it would be the end of the six party talks it we all believed it was a short interruption but since then six party talks was never revived but now u.s uh tried another way of doing it particularly under the trump administration he engaged the top at he did the top

level diplomacy with mr kim jong-un but then again we ended up with really little to no uh progress on the nuclear front and north korea still continues to develop its nuclear missile capabilities so whatever the mode of the negotiations i think that kind of end point needs to be security aspect from a wider perspective but under the current u.s china u.s russia bilateral relations maybe it's a bit difficult to think about such kind of multilateral framework uh i don't have much time so i'll just touch on upon quote

uh actually quad uh is an interesting group uh particularly involving india and it is not not at all an alliance and it is not so much limited to military security because in the quad meetings in this year they have been talking about provisional vaccine vaccines or the provision of quality infrastructure assistance so it's much wider than security it's not an alliance and it's definitely not asian nato but it's a very interesting group of very important major democratic countries in the region which is i think a very particular

feature of quad and this kind of very flexible and kind of ad-hoc kind of type of grouping of friends rather than very strict military alliances may become even more important in this region in the coming years and decades ahead that is my impression thank you time is off for the first session but there is the urgent question from thomas finger why does there seems to be no agreement on what should be considered the most important challenge in northeast asia i will ask each panelist just to respond

to that question for 10 seconds response to that questions ambassador park would you have a brief comments well i think the colonial rule by japan and also the chinese civil war which ended in 1949 and the communist china which conquered the whole continent has no diplomatic relations with united states and also no relations with south korea and japan until early 1970s so we didn't have enough time to have have contacts and discuss about the common interests and at this mo at this moment i think the

most urgent and important challenges should be the u.s china rivalry and north korean provocations i think uh the countries in northeast asia can agree on that thank you next general vincent brooks it's a very interesting question of course i think the answer is has many parts but one of them is where you stand depends on where you sit and to establish something as the most important challenge will be somewhat dependent on what it is that is actually faced each country faces a different combination of challenges i i think

perhaps one of the challenges that must be acknowledged as we're discussing tonight is that the challenge of gaining a cooperative spirit among the three countries in northeast asia including the united states and if that can be addressed then perhaps the other ones can be addressed as well and i don't know that it's necessary to say the most important but to acknowledge the common uh problems that need to be addressed by that cooperation so whether it's china on a much larger geopolitical scale or whether it's north korea as a

very specific extent threat that can be debated on which is most important to each one of the countries but the acknowledgement that both of them must be addressed with a collective approach i think is the more important outcome okay and next uh mr tomiko ichikawa yes it's a very difficult question to answer and i cannot answer in a kind of better way than my two previous speakers maybe just to say that it really depends again on where you are and what kind of time frame you have i had really difficulty in explaining to

for example our european uh friends that the cold war hasn't ended in this region in the east asia or northeast asia because everyone talks about the end of the cold war but the cold war framework still remains in this region and in addition to that long-standing framework now as everyone is talking about this u.s china competition is really kind of playing uh most obviously and visibly and fiercely in this in the pacific region so the combination of the both would be maybe the most important kind

of overall situation but again uh what is important is depending on where you are i think thank you time is up for the first session thanks for the very much thoughtful uh speech and also very much interesting questions from the audience i think there will be further discussions on the second session thank you very much all the panelists and also the participant thank you very much all right hearing hearing no objection i will begin the second section uh by saying i too am very happy to be included in this discussion

i thank the organizers on both sides of the pacific and i welcome any who have joined in this conversation uh specifically for the economic portion the goal of this session is to assess the implications for japanese and korean firms and for the u.s japan rok partnership of u.s policies toward china and policies limiting the sales and transfer of certain technologies our speakers will refine this core question as they think appropriate in doing so we hope to illuminate different dimensions of economic

cooperation and calculations of our three countries and their business communities we have three excellent panelists to leave the discussion to maine maintain continuity as we move from one speaker to another i will introduce all of them now and to maximize time for discussion i will provide only very brief and therefore inadequate introductions but i refer you to the biographic materials that have been provided each of our speakers will talk for 10 minutes we will go in this order the first is professor of political science at

concord university she obtained her ba and ma degrees in diplomacy from seoul national university and earned her phd in political science at the university of north carolina her research interests include international political economy and technology and international politics recent publications include network and national security and north korea and the world our second speaker is andrew grotto andy is a william j perry fellow at the cyber policy center and a research fellow at fellow at the

hoover institution both at stanford university he received his ba from the university of kentucky mpa from harvard and jd from uc berkeley before coming to stanford he was senior director for cyber policy in both the obama and the trump administrations our final speaker is kimura fukunari professor of economics at ko university he received his bachelor of laws from the university of tokyo and his m.a and phd degrees in economics from the university of wisconsin his research interests include international production networks

and economic integration in east asia and i will ask each of our speakers to limit the remarks to 10 minutes so that we can have time for discussions and we'll begin with ms bai hello uh i'm young japan i'm honored to join this webinar and talk and hear from you today i'll talk briefly on technology cooperation among u.s korea japan in the age of u.s china technology rivalry especially focusing on semiconductor sector u.s china japan korea and other asian countries have formed a highly interdependent relationship

within the global value chain over the past decade the industrial development of korea has been carried out and the close cooperation with the united states and china within this global value chain the recent u.s china technology rivalry and u.s government's export controls and investment restrictions against china have posed a great challenge to the korean government and firms the korean government does not provide clear guidelines on the firm's strategy in this situation so far so the companies have adjusted their business

strategies watching the u.s regulations and the china's response in the case of a semiconductor sector korean firms on the one hand have decided to make a large-scale investment in the u.s in response to the u.s government request and on the other hand continued to cooperate with china to the extent that u.s regulations are not violated the reorganization of global supply chains in the high-tech sector would become evident and it could tension between u.s and china would go high the space might gradually shrink

samsung has planned to build a state-of-the-art chip processing facility in texas austin maybe in the united states the final negotiations are currently in progress korean firm's investment in the united states would be helpful to complement u.s manufacturing capabilities and contribute to stabilize the u.s supply chains korean companies could also have opportunities for the stable growth and continuous technological innovation however we all know that this decision has made with made out of political and diplomatic

consideration rather than the market logic in fact the reason that advanced semiconductor manufacturing facilities have not been operated in the u.s until now is mainly due to the market factors some estimate that korean firms should have to bear extra 30 percent cost if they operate semiconductor fafsa in the u.s so i think the continuous support from the u.s government for the korean investment is kind of very necessary if the ongoing technological cooperation between korea and u.s could develop into

a solid foundation for the korea and u.s alliance it would at least two or three more years of preparation and need continuous support for a long time maybe after biden administration from for korean firms to successfully construct and operate advanced semiconductor manufacturing facility in the us in 2019 when the japanese government restricted the export of semiconductor materials to korea due to diplomatic conflict between two countries it caused a great disruption in the supply chain of korean

semiconductor industry since then korean firms have been trying to localize semiconductor materials in order to decrease the risk but this localization strategy has a clear limitation the semiconductor industry association of united states report uh insists that if all consist semiconductor manufacturing is done in the united states instead of importing manufactured chip the production cost is expected to increase by 35 to 60 percent the report argues that it is neither desirable nor possible for the united

states and other state to pursue self-sufficiency in the global semiconductor value chain many countries now have been trying to secure supply chain by strengthening cooperation with the other countries the u.s government has requested tsmc taiwanese firm and samsung to construct a semiconductor manufacturing facility in the u.s while supporting aggressive investment by u.s domestic firms like intel and micron japanese government also have prepared a new semiconductor industry policy and supported tsmc's construction of

manufacturing facility in japan and it was reported that micron u.s company is also planning to build semiconductor manufacturing facilities in japan while dynamic cooperation across the u.s japanese and taiwanese semiconductor firms stand out there is no cases of korean semiconductor forms new cooperation trial with a japanese and taiwanese company and korea seems to be somewhat lagging behind in a newly emerging coalition in semiconductor sector korean and japanese firms have been competitors in the semiconductor

sector but they have also maintained a long-term cooperative relationships as the diplomatic friction between two countries in 19 2019 extended to semiconductor sector korea and japanese semiconductor farms cooperation have weakened it would be good restore the channel of cooperation between two countries you know korea has global stars like samsung and sk hynix but the ecosystem to support them is pretty much weak there is no korean companies among world's top 10 materials and equipment firms on the other hand japan does not

have any you know major big shot in semiconductor field but there are many top level materials and equipment firms although there exists some conditions for mutually complementary cooperation between two countries it is true that prospects of cooperation between two countries are not bright economic security is one of the top policy agenda in new gishida cabinet and ministry of economic security was newly established the japanese government is reported to plan to enact new economic security law strengthening regulation on technology

leakage to china japan's economic security strategy do not mention any cooperation with korea so far the korean government is also responding to supply chain stability by organizing economic security task force so on so forth but there is no strategy on how to build a korean you know technology alliance network including japan and taiwan and other asian firms as well as our u.s and eu economic security and securing supply chain would be one of the top priorities no matter what government take office

next year korea and japan should try to find out a way to step up cooperation in the technology sector so that they could uh tide over the waves of u.s china technology right lively thank you we'll go right to andrew grotto andy great well thanks tom uh thank you to the organizers for including me in our discussion today it's really good to be here i've already learned a ton from the conversation um so far um so i i want to cover two topics um one is why uh decoupling is the wrong phrase to guide um u.s

and allied a strategy and why um reimagined or recalibrated interdependence ought to be our uh collective uh north star as far as policy goes and the second topic i want to talk about is why there's there's far more to the u.s china rift than the united states and china and hint it's it's not simply a great power uh competition so you know decoupling is this phrase that you know it's often heard in washington dc is the goal of u.s supply chain policy uh toward china you know the phrases fall a little

bit out of favor um but it's you know since since the administration took over but you still hear shades of it and debate um and you know i want to pick on that phrase a little bit um you know i think it's it's meaning is opaque at best and it gestures uh towards an outcome that is both uh fantastical uh and not ultimately in uh us and allied interests even if it were possible to um decouple and i'll use semiconductors as a as a topic to illustrate some of these points as i move along here uh it's

fantastical because um supply chains are simply too complex intertwined and global to ever be cleaved into decoupled american and chinese supply chains counterproductive because america and its allies benefit uh from the ecosystem of comparative advantages and free trade that make the global economy hum and accrued benefits to allied economies now let's take the case of semiconductors you know america's uh intensifying geopolitical competition with china and the global shortage of semiconductors have generated a lot

of momentum in washington to strengthen uh the resilience of the global uh semiconductor supply chain and to prevent china uh from from dominating it um this you know this uh has has generated a lot of momentum um key initiatives include a 52 billion dollar legislative proposal uh to shore up the semiconductor industrial base as well as actions deny china access uh to semiconductor materials and technologies that contribute uh to that could contribute to its military um power this is legislation the u.s

chips act that's uh made it through the u.s senate is awaiting action in the house i i think there's a pretty good chance that um it will uh uh get get funded um before the end of the year through the national defense authorization act um other countries of course are pursuing uh resilience strategy as well when it comes to semiconductors although china looms less explicitly large um in them so in the case of semiconductors um you know decoupling is again you know fantastical and counterproductive um

so you know the intense uh capital requirements for many links in the supply chain for semiconductors favors suppliers that can achieve economies of scale this has resulted in consolidation of suppliers at certain key links in the supply chain fabs are a great example those new fabs cost tens of billions of dollars to build um on top of that um the supply chain um you know features extensive pre-commercial research specialized design equipment libraries of intellectual property uh hundreds of specialty

and commodity inputs and dozens of classes of precision engineering equipment many of these inputs are themselves the products of still more specialty and commodity inputs this complexity and especially the myriad technologies involved in the supply chain uh makes vertical integration really hard across multiple links uh and favors firms that's come to specialize in a particular uh link um in the supply chain and what's what what's happened is you know comparative advantage including subsidies um

and low international trade costs have organized these specialties on a largely geographic basis uh so in the us um with our innovation ecosystem we we lead in the most r d intensive area in semiconductors chip design asia where there's a broad government support for capital intensive processing and manufacturing industries uh leads and materials and manufacturing and of course within asia uh there's still further differentiation you know for example taiwan um you know it's really you know the only place in the world

or i think it says something like 92 percent of the capacity to produce semiconductors below kind of the benchmark 10 nanometer node um korea you know is exceptional in areas like advanced memory manufacturing japan in areas like equipment and materials uh for assembling and packaging that third step in the process um uh it's less capital intensive more sensitive to labor costs uh so asia leads uh as well there with china even countries like malaysia uh making making inroads well the problem is this the supply chain is brittle

against natural disasters this is not new um you know kovid um and some of the the problems that have affected the industry of the last uh 18 24 months are not new problems um there have been other episodes in really recent history that have highlighted the brittleness of the supply chain against natural disasters um the supply chain may be purposefully manipulated by by states uh china is obviously uh top of mind for those of us in the united states um but i think as some have mentioned you know there's

been this dispute between japan um and south korea involving access to some key uh precursor chemicals that um subject to export control from japan to south korea um uh there's also uh um uh and then of course um you know concerns driven by semiconductors being a key contributor to china's uh military rise um so to decouple this uh industry uh you know easily uh one trillion dollars up front for the u.s to achieve self-sufficiency according to the the semiconductor industry association report that was mentioned a moment ago

um 35 to 65 price increase in semiconductors that's just the economic cost there's a lot more there are other costs as well that are important to to to talk about here one is that decoupling would concentrate more risk in north america which is problematic especially when we think about how climate change is affecting uh north america and then of course the broader globe um allies would suffer uh i think great economic harm respond with with subsidies of their own and then innovation would suffer too

semiconductor um you know the supply chain you know is not as resilient as we would like but the impressive run how that moore's law has had now for you know almost 50 years um it really highlights how productively innovative sector has been it's hard to imagine this innovation not suffering significantly in a decoupling scenario so what should the goal instead be well from my perspective i would argue that um we've got to do is recalibrate interdependence and this can't be done with without without allied cooperation i see at

least um five um elements uh one is to understand uh the dependencies um and the relationships business and geopolitical behind them within the supply chain uh the second is to develop market driven uh non-discriminatory options uh for uh enhanced resilience the third element is to avoid overreach on export controls by focusing on technologies um really that that meeting one of four uh characteristics um they if you know either stacking as a choke point um so for example um rare earth is a choke point

for many um technology for many modern digital technologies semiconductors are another one um technologies that uh could erect competitive barriers uh you know so for example um access things like uh uh photolithography equipment talk about semiconductors uh technologies that that provide direct military application that's sort of the most obvious one and then last but not least technologies that serve as accelerants for other technologies um so semiconductors again is a big one here uh because uh you know semiconductors

underpin uh you know innovation and advancements in 5g quantum computing artificial intelligence you name it um the the fourth um uh element uh um for recalibrating interdependence um i think is is to strive i will never get there but to strive for zero asymmetric interdependencies aka dependencies with china and then last uh but certainly not least and i hope we'll spend some more time talking about this in the q a is uh the fifth element is is managing disputes among allies um overall i think that the u.s chips

act is a pretty good job capturing much of this but it's the allied part that i think uh still need some refinement i'm happy to dive deeper into that during the q a uh just to wrap up um i want to spend a moment talking about why i think there's a lot more to the u.s china rift than just the united states and china uh too often um this this this competition is ripped as talked about as though it were simply you know air quote simply a matter of great power competition you asked first china with sort of the rest of the world

you know caught up in tidal forces caused by the two superpowers i i think in fact it's competition uh between two distinct systems picking up on on general brooks's comments earlier a state like capitalism with authoritarian characteristics versus liberal democracy embedded in a rules-based international order um it's funny you know decoupling as a concept came into vogue in u.s policy debate relatively recently but it's been an explicit goal of china's industrial policy now for decades to achieve technological

self-sufficiency and supplant the existing titans of cutting edge technology in japan korea the us and beyond and so you know i know there's a lot of talk about picking sides in the conflict and how some allies don't want to pick sides i think this is way too simplistic i think i would submit that we are all in this competition whether we whether we like it or not it's not so much about picking sides i think it's about thinking through how to recalibrate interdependence um now of course the reality is that

liberal democracies be precisely because we're liberal democracies and thus responsive to our electorates we'll chart a slightly different courses as we navigate this tension um but the challenge is going to be how to chart uh this course in a manner consistent with our economic interests while at the same time holding core liberal democratic principles and the rules based on international order it is fundamentally an optimization problem and it's a problem uh to close out here that requires to pick up

general brooks's phrase of bringing the three uh fingers together in harmony um i look forward to your questions and and yield the floor thank you professor yeah thank you for the the kind introduction uh it's great honor to be here um uh i'd like to talk about how the private sector in japan is looking at economic security policies uh of the japanese government maybe my starting point is economic reality in east asia so one aspect is that we observe we are observing the weakening of the rule-based trading regime in east asia

east asia actually including north east and south east asia that's my definition this region has aggressively utilized the mechanics of international production networks or the second unbundling and has achieved rapid economic growth and poverty alleviation so both japan and korea have played active roles in uh factory asia actually partially together with china of course the rule-based trading regime has been one of the necessary conditions for factory asia so for the u.s china confrontation and also the

recent geopolitical tension started jeopardizing each stage as a stable and predictable business environment that's one background the other is the economic relationship with china despite geopolitical tension decoupling has so far been partial except industries products with sensitive technologies and rare as rare metal as well as just a small part of medical essential goods so with the earliest recovery of the of chinese economy uh from makovic 19 a trade and the investment related to china has been very strong actually with

uh with japan korea and also even the us so so as i said despite uh enhancing criticism on its political system we are really uh worrying about that and we are uncomfortable with the political system in china but china is still a very important business partner for our private sector so so those also the background and then looking at uh investment at trade investment related security issues i think a three a little bit different kinds of uh issues are mixed up probably the government is intentionally doing that

but the nature is a bit different so i'd like to talk about the three kinds of uh security uh economic security issues uh one is uh to avoid or reduce policy risks uh in the form of a discretionary trade policy by a superpower say china as an example is a rare earth rare metal issue uh in 2012.

uh the sudden changes in trade and related policies by a superpower or a threat of them are perceived as policy risks uh by the private sector so we usually say that don't put all the eggs in one basket i think that's a very mild expression the real issue is policy risks so super bowl can manipulate policies uh time time by time uh to uh make make the counterpart uncomfortable so that's uh that's one thing that we have to take care of that this is uh we have to take care of ourselves and definitely so the private sector is

certainly optimizing the balance between uh efficiency in uh division of labor and the risk management so how far the government can help the private sector is the issue and in the case of firms with a possibly sensitive technology technologies or rare earth rare metal government is trying to quietly promote a reduction on of the dependency on china that doing that very quietly but one of the really evident uh uh thing move was uh the metis subsidies for this purpose accelerate השני sharing of factories related to sensitive

technologies rare earth rare metal and personal protective equipment so so i think the communication with the private sector by the government was not so bad in this front and also our government is not forcing private sector to do this and do that but the private sector will make a judgment so i think it's a sort of healthy way to do so we have to we know that private sector knows also the policy risks uh working with china definitely but still china is important a business partner the second is the trade investment directly

connected to hardcore national security uh i think this is uh this these are the realm in uh the international conventions like uh russian agreements and others i i think that the scope is a pretty well defined uh relatively uh so many japanese still remember the bitter experience in toshiba konberg scandal in 19 1887 and also recently we are observing the enhancing geopolitic political tension in this region so the government definitely uh should strengthen the system so the interface with the private sector is not too bad

in that sense actually the security export control section of net is taking care of that uh for the interface with the private sector this is actually completely uh clearly separated from trade policy section in betty uh they are not really communicating with each other quite often uh but but i think that the communication with a customs office and also minister of defense uh is not so bad uh from the from outsiders viewpoint uh we we have to make a little bit more amendment in other sectors like universities uh

taking care of some sort of sensitive technologies we have to do a little bit more carefully to to expand the scope to some extent but it was not too bad that government is uh taking care of this aspect uh so it was very unfortunate that the japan korea issue was highly politicized but from the viewpoint of the japan japanese side are still uh we believe that some proper export control is a real issue to be solved before talking about the sort of political context uh the third is technology competition

so the u.s and perhaps the whole western world would need to be engaged in a technology competition against china so this is a deliberately mixed with others actually it's mixed with the national security court and quote and in the context of japan national security may have three kinds of meaning one is of course a direct indirect technological links with hardcore national security second is the strategic thought on technology competition those are not equal actually the third is uh that we

don't know the logic uh but uh the the russian technician said that we should do this and this and we have to follow that's that's another context of national security uh yeah so so i think the definition of national security is really multi-faceted from the viewpoint of a japanese government so so allah and so private sector in japan would like to know the scope of the coupling definitely because they are uncomfortable in working in supply chains but the u.s does not seem to make it clear so there are

various stakeholders in the u.s probably and then the clear consensus building may not be easy or we have some doubt that some of the stakeholders in the u.s may want to make the borderline deliberately blurred uh so that they could take advantage in the international competition so knowing that the coupling would be limited in scope at the end allies or private sector must seek the optimum path of scope of cooperation so so for the third one uh the private sector may feel that the japanese government makes a little

effort uh to make the scope of the coupling clearer and just policies then policies that the private sector without showing clear-cut criteria so uh which would generate shrinkage effects over economic activities so this is not good uh but uh how we could do that that's probably difficult as for the semiconductor case uh japan uh is likely to follow the strategic move of the us but we at the same time we have some skeptical view on the effectiveness of a strategic industrial policy the kisuda government

set up a minister of economic security under the cabinet office cabinet secretariat but the scope and function of the office are not well defined yet so the most important task for the government is to maintain the rule-based trading regime as far as possible to make the atomic dynamism in east asia alive there's no perfect answer but probably at least we have to take care of the wto reform and the effective utilization of mega ftas like that thank you very much thank you to all three of our speakers

that we have a few questions in here that uh if i could compress and combine it with uh a question of my of my own which is now it's the same question to to all three panelists that we've heard different dimensions of tension between governments and firms and at least in the way this has been cast this evening it's u.s government uh policies that put pressure on the governments of japan and korea and either directly or indirectly present pressure on firms in japan and korea and of course in the united states

so the question is since firms are responsible for profit that's why they exist they have no responsibility for overall economic performance or for national security however defined that's a government responsibility what what is the proper balance between firms following the market doing what is economically in their interest and in the interest of shareholders and government ability to guide and therefore to limit the activities of of firms and where are we on that balance uh has has have u.s government

statements if not policies move too far in the direction of infringing on the private sector and firms or not far enough uh because we are not getting again general brooks the three fingers we're not getting the cooperation technological cooperation security cooperation political cooperation among the three allies in northeast asia uh are these technology measures making that situation worse or can they be an instrument for enhancing cooperation across a wide range of activities and let's just go in the

order that people spoke initially this pie yeah uh i think uh it's not clear whether it is desirable for the government you know uh to play an active role in the process of private sectors adjustment i think it would be better for the firm to decide and the government play a supportive role as a professor fukunari said in his presentation if necessary policies like you know subsidies or reassuring for the companies that are affected by a shrinking relationship with chinese firms could be helpful

so in korea currently a special law is being uh prepared to support high-tech sectors such as semiconductors and i'm also watching with interest uh you know what measures uh the uh new uh kishida cabinet uh in uh its economic security law will contain i think uh i uh here uh today uh it is nice for me to find a lot of commonalities uh uh among our presenters uh to consider the cooperation among uh us and uh korea and uh japan i think uh andrew mr andrew growth said uh the u.s china rivalry is a kind of you know

competition between two distinct systems state uh led authoritarian capitalism versus uh rule-based uh liberal democracy uh and korea like and also japan uh needed to find a way to navigate in a manner uh consistent with our economic interest while at the same time uh upholding core liberal democratic principle i totally agree with iu but in the case of korea this principle you know does not solve the problem we still have to deal with the difficulties caused by u.s china conflict obviously you know south korean

would not want to choose china's authoritarian political economy however chinese market and economic relations with china is very critical to korean economy you know so uh i think south korean people would first choose a security and value first and then strive uh maintain economic relations with china and minimize economic damage caused by u.s china rivalry so uh i think uh allies must as uh fukunari mr professor fukunari said we must seek the optimal path of the scope of cooperation so given this situation

in china and japan i think the united states should not put too much pressure on its allies on its relationship with china and should give them kind of you know space and room to adjust themselves okay thank you thank you to my mic andy hey um so i i appreciated professor vi's uh comments um and and the question you asked tom was a hard one um maybe i'll um respond briefly to professor baez um uh comments and then come to your your question so you know from my perspective i i i don't think it's about picking

sides um and i think that that that framing of the problem i think obscures uh the the range and uh of our policy options for uh responding to you know china's um rise in the region it's it's and and it's uh you know things that that that whether it's in the economic front on the human rights front on the military front that we all i think object to um you know i think you know i heard um jake sullivan uh earlier this year i often get asked by by um you know visitors to stanford uh from abroad you know what is the u.s policy

towards china um and i'm gonna do my best to try to summarize what i have heard the administration say which i i agree with um all of which is consistent i think with both um respecting the um the unique uh political economy that exists in all countries but especially in liberal democracies who have to be responsive to um you know populist uh citizen uh sentiment um so i think you know shore up democracy at home and abroad i think is a key pillar uh repair relationships with and among allies i think is a key

pillar and then work with china where interests align say climate change and then push back on china where necessary preferably um with with allies um allies i would argue all none of these are possible without allied engagement and support right so talk about showing up democracy at home and abroad you know my earlier point about this being a competition between systems i think um really hammers home how it's not just you know the resilience of a democracy but the system globally that's really at stake here

um when i think about repairing you know relationships with allies you know it's not just the the the damage uh wrought during the trump administration i think there's there's a lot of work to be done we've talked about the you the the south korean the rock japan relationship um to name one um so you know i i just i i don't i don't see it as as a picking sides um activity i see it as thinking through you know looking ahead to the future where you know we accept that um we have i think no choice but to accept that some

degree of interdependence is inevitable what can we do to maximize uh the prospect of that interdependence doesn't corrode our economic strength and our our uh you know democratic uh way of life tom's question you know it's funny you know i i've been in silicon valley now for four years i spent most of my life in dc you know most of my career in dc beforehand until a few years ago and the very word industrial policy was like a bad word in washington right you just never heard it right it was something

that other countries did and now it's it's in vogue and i think um you know the backlash you know the the the shift really began to occur when um largely in response to china um and in particular you know the congress's uh um changes to u.s export control law and syphilis the committee and foreign investment uh uh laws in 2018 and that the several year process before then um kind of i think broke the ice right where you had profit-oriented companies um who were taking action that was not in the u.s

national security interest and uh that so in some ways i think that's kind of the gateway drug i think we're still trying to figure out you know what what what is the appropriate balance between um you know uh government um intervention what is the right you know form um i don't have a good answer for you um maybe perhaps uh professor fukunari does christopher clare yeah thank you um i think uh for example uh government officials in metis and others still we have we have some big fans of the old

industrial policy so their idea would be that the one context is of course decoupling another context is a kovit 19 and they like to make supply chains transparent and then try to pick up choke points and the government should take care of that so that's a sort of idea that of a new industrial policy but why supply chains are not completely transparent you have to think of that as a big companies uh taking care of the whole supply chains they like to see everything of course but the small medium enterprise do not want to

disclose that kind of information who is who are their business partners and others or what was the price is they don't want to disclose those kind of information so there's a reason uh why uh supply suppressions are not completely transparent so so i think that even if uh a new um sort of revival of what industrial policy is coming uh private sector does not follow that so so i think that uh i think that's a relationship right now uh between uh methi kasamigaseki and the private sector in japan uh so so from the

viewpoint of the private sector definitely they like to know the borderline scope of the coupling uh we know that alliance relationship with the u.s is extremely important even if the logic doesn't convince us that this is the right one but we will follow that but we would like to know the borderline uh what the scope of a decoupling then then the rest of the economic activities can be under the realm of economic logic so i think that's probably the private sector japan is really hoping for thank you very much to all of you for

the responses we have uh very quickly come to the end of the allotted time for this discussion uh i thank all of those who participated on this panel i wish there were more time to respond to more of the questions but let me turn it over to your shin okay thanks tom uh for moderating and you know we covered a lot of issues today and then we have more to discuss but uh you know it's very hard to for more than two hours uh on the zoom so we have to look for other opportunities but i think this kind of intellectual

and policy dialogue engagement are very very important and i learned a lot from today's discussions and i really hope that we can meet in person uh you know as pandemic is getting you know close to the end as therefore we are pretty much back to normal but still uh we have to do a lot of measures like wearing masks inside and uh weekly testing and and so on but it's great to see people uh from korea japan and united states and thanks to our speakers moderators and audience uh for very stimulating presentation and

discussions and one thing uh before we end i was asked by eai that there is some uh survey question uh for the audience so please fill out uh before you exit the zoom but uh thanks again uh for joining uh from asia and united states and it's uh getting late in the evening here and i'm sure it's morning in japan korea so have a great evening and uh great rest of the day so hopefully see you again then thanks again to eai uh for real leading uh to organize this event thank you so much goodbye thank you

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