[EAI Online Seminar] COVID-19 and the New World Order Series 9. The Future of the ROK-US-Japan Partnership: Security and Economic Cooperation in a New Era

YouTube Link: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=M3hjdKrzsPs

The East Asia Institute (EAI) (President Yeol Yo) hosted the ninth online seminar in the 'COVID-19 and the New World Order' series, titled “The Future of the ROK-US-Japan Partnership: Security and Economic Cooperation in a New Era.” While security and economic cooperation among South Korea, the United States, and Japan are expected to expand following the joint statements of the ROK-US and US-Japan summits, the intensifying strategic competition between the US and China has exacerbated the strategic dilemma for both South Korea and Japan. In this context, the three countries must define their respective strategic interests and explore ways to maintain friendly relations among them. In this seminar, experts from South Korea, the United States, and Japan engaged in an in-depth discussion on security and economic cooperation among the three nations in the era of US-China strategic competition.

Date & Time: November 19, 2021 (Fri), 09:00–11:00 (KST)

Speakers: Jun-woo Park (Former Chairman, The Sejong Institute), Tomiko Ichikawa (Acting Director-General, Japan Institute of International Affairs), Vincent Brooks (Former Commander, U.S. Forces Korea), Young-ja Bae (Professor, Konkuk University), Fukunari Kimura (Professor, Keio University), Andrew Grotto (Director, Stanford University’s Program on Geopolitics, Technology, and Governance)

Moderators: Ha Young-sun (Chairman, EAI; Professor Emeritus, Seoul National University), Thomas Fingar (Fellow, Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies, Stanford University)

Opening Remarks: Yeol Yo (President, EAI; Professor, Yonsei University), Ki-baik Shin (Director, Stanford University’s Asia-Pacific Research Center)

Developing a Practical Framework for ROK-US-Japan Security and Economic Cooperation

I. Session 1: ROK-US-Japan Security Cooperation

The Future of ROK-Japan Relations and Trilateral Cooperation

• The United States has indicated its intention to strengthen cooperation with South Korea and Japan to establish order in the Indo-Pacific region. Similarly, Japan is placing greater emphasis on the “Free and Open Indo-Pacific (FOIP)” initiative. To achieve this goal, it is crucial for South Korea and Japan to maintain a harmonious relationship.
• Former Chairman Jun-woo Park points out that given the new Prime Minister Kishida's continuation of former Prime Minister Abe's foreign policy, improving ROK-Japan relations will be difficult to resolve within the current Moon Jae-in administration's term. Therefore, the improvement of relations rests with future leaders.
• According to former Commander Vincent Brooks of U.S. Forces Korea, the ROK-US-Japan alliance system is based on common interests such as economic cooperation and mutual defense. He argues that the opportunities facing the new administrations of the three countries will include harmoniously managing and strengthening democracy in the Indo-Pacific based on the existing alliance system.
• Acting Director-General Tomiko Ichikawa of the Japan Institute of International Affairs states that cooperation among allies must extend beyond the realm of military alliances. For example, the Quad comprises small cooperative bodies with various objectives beyond military alliances, such as vaccine development and infrastructure building. Such ad-hoc groupings of alliances will become increasingly important in the region to promote participation among Indo-Pacific nations.
• Commander Brooks emphasizes the pillar of trust in the two pillars of capability and trust within extended deterrence strategy. For instance, if a beneficiary of the US extended deterrence strategy builds strong trust with the US, its willingness to develop independent nuclear capabilities will weaken; however, if trust erodes, it may seek nuclear capabilities. He stresses that the US extended deterrence capability is "always ready" and emphasizes that active diplomacy and trust-building are necessary to achieve a higher level of trust.

The Threat of China's Rise

• China's rise, characterized by state-controlled capitalism and expansionist economics, presents new challenges to free-market democratic nations. The Biden administration has focused on strengthening cooperation with allies to protect its security and economic interests. To counter China's authoritarian regime, the United States will host a Summit for Democracy in December.
• According to Chairman Park Jun-woo, Japan has strengthened military exercises with allies, including the United States. Surveillance activities initially aimed at intercepting illegal ship-to-ship transfers by North Korean vessels are effectively being conducted to counter China's increasing military activities in the East and South China Seas.
• Commander Brooks emphasizes that alliances led by the United States should be viewed not as solely American alliances, but as systems connecting democratic nations, economically strong countries, and military powers.

The North Korean Variable and Maintaining Peace on the Korean Peninsula

• Despite economic difficulties caused by intensified economic sanctions, the COVID-19 pandemic, and natural disasters, North Korea has shown a persistent commitment to building its nuclear arsenal.
• Acting Director-General Ichikawa states that the end of the Six-Party Talks was merely a pause, and high-level diplomacy between North Korea and the United States continued even during the Trump administration. Such high-level engagement with North Korea should be maintained.
• Given that the Biden administration has already attempted dialogue with North Korea, Acting Director-General Ichikawa argues that it is up to North Korea whether to participate in negotiations. However, it is difficult to argue that the North Korean issue is one of the Biden administration's top foreign policy priorities.
• Commander Brooks comments on the declaration of an end-of-war that President Moon Jae-in proposed in his keynote address at the UN General Assembly in September 2021, stating, “While a declaration of an end-of-war carries significant risks, maintaining the status quo also carries risks.” Commander Brooks acknowledges that peace has been sustained on the Korean Peninsula through the armistice, but it is difficult to expect lasting peace through the status quo. He adds that while the value of an end-of-war declaration is recognized, it is important to avoid linking it to political matters such as the withdrawal of the ROK-US Combined Forces Command or UN forces, emphasizing that “the declaration of an end-of-war should be approached from a pragmatic perspective, not a populist one.”

II. Session 2: ROK-US-Japan Economic Cooperation

US-China Tech Competition

• The business environment in East Asia is becoming increasingly unstable due to US-China competition and geopolitical conflicts in the Asia-Pacific region. Andrew Grotto, Director of the Program on Geopolitics, Technology, and Governance at Stanford University’s Cyber Policy Center, emphasizes that the US-China competitive dynamic should not be oversimplified as a great power competition. Instead, he argues it should be viewed as a competition between two systems: the international order based on liberal norms and state-led capitalism characterized by authoritarian regimes.
• The United States is pursuing a decoupling strategy as a goal of its supply chain policy towards China. However, according to Professor Fukunari Kimura of Keio University, decoupling has only been partially implemented so far, excluding sensitive technologies and industries dealing with rare earths/metals.
• Director Grotto stresses that global supply chains are too complexly intertwined for decoupling to be a reality, and it is unrealistic to calculate supply chains for the US and China separately.
• The Chinese market is important for both Japan and South Korea. For South Korea, the US is one of its largest semiconductor export markets, while the Chinese market accounts for more than half of South Korea's semiconductor exports. Professor Young-ja Bae states that allies must seek the optimal path for cooperation, and at the same time, the US should not exert too much pressure on the relationships between its allies and China.

Promoting Trilateral and Regional Cooperation

• The Semiconductor Industry Association estimates that if the United States pursues self-sufficiency in semiconductors, production costs will increase by 35-60%. In this regard, Professor Young-ja Bae points out that it is neither desirable nor feasible for countries like the United States to achieve self-sufficiency in the global semiconductor value chain.
• The United States, Japan, and Taiwan are dynamically cooperating in securing supply chains. The US has requested TSMC and Samsung to build semiconductor plants in the United States, and Japan has encouraged the construction of TSMC plants within Japan. Professor Young-ja Bae notes that while new alliances are emerging in the semiconductor sector, South Korea is lagging behind.

Moving Beyond Severed ROK-Japan Relations

• In 2019, as diplomatic friction between South Korea and Japan extended to the semiconductor sector, cooperation between ROK and Japanese semiconductor firms reportedly weakened. South Korea lacks capabilities in materials and equipment, while Japan's semiconductor industry has deficiencies. Therefore, it would be desirable for both South Korea and Japan to restore bilateral cooperation channels. However, despite economic security being one of the top policy priorities, the governments of both countries are not currently implementing policies to build a foundation for cooperation.
• One of the top policy priorities for the Kishida cabinet is economic security. The Japanese government is reportedly planning to establish new economic security laws, including the creation of an economic security agency and strengthening regulations on technology outflows to China. Nevertheless, Japan's economic security strategy has not yet mentioned cooperation with South Korea. Professor Bae emphasizes, "South Korea and Japan must explore ways to strengthen cooperation in the technology sector to navigate the waves of US-China technological competition."III. Biographies of Speakers and Moderators
  ■ Jun-woo Park_ Former Chairman, The Sejong Institute; Former Senior Secretary to the President for Political Affairs. He served for 33 years in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade, and as Korean Ambassador to the European Union and Korean Ambassador to Singapore. After retiring in July 2011, he was appointed as a Koret Fellow at Stanford University’s Walter H. Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center, where he taught a graduate course titled 'Korean Foreign Policy in Transition: Korea’s Bilateral Relations with Her Major Neighboring Countries.' He was appointed as a visiting professor at Yonsei University’s Institute of National Management in September 2012. From August 2013 to June 2014, Ambassador Park served as the Senior Secretary to the President for Political Affairs under the Park Geun-hye administration. Subsequently, for three years from February 2015, he served as the Chairman of The Sejong Institute, a leading independent think tank in South Korea.
  ■ Vincent K. Brooks_ Former Commander of United Nations Command, Combined Forces Command, and U.S. Forces Korea. His areas of expertise include national security, policy, strategy, international relations, military operations, counter-terrorism and non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, diversity and inclusion, leadership in complex organizations, crisis leadership, and building cohesive trust-based teams.
  ■ Tomiko Ichikawa_ Acting Director-General of the Japan Institute of International Affairs (JIIA). She assumed her current position in July 2020. She joined the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in 1985 and has held positions such as Director of the Western Europe Division, European Affairs Bureau, and Director of the Disarmament, Science and Nuclear Energy Division. She also served at the Embassy of Japan in the United Kingdom and as Deputy Permanent Representative to the International Organizations in Vienna. Furthermore, she worked as a Political Affairs Officer for UNPROFOR (UN Peacekeeping Operation in former Yugoslavia) and as a Special Assistant to the Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). Ms. Ichikawa participated in the Six-Party Talks (December 2006 - December 2008) and has researched North Korean issues at the Permanent Mission of Japan to the International Organizations in Vienna (2011-2014) and the IAEA (2014-2020).
  ■ Young-ja Bae_ Professor of Political Science and International Relations at Konkuk University. She graduated from Seoul National University with a degree in Diplomacy and earned a Ph.D. in Political Science from the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill. Her main research areas include international political economy, the political economy of foreign investment, science and technology and international politics, the internet and international politics, and science and technology diplomacy. Her major publications include "International Political Hegemony and Technological Innovation: The Case of US Semiconductor Technology" (2020), "The Rise of Chinese Internet Companies and Internet Sovereignty" (2018), "US-China Hegemonic Competition and Scientific and Technological Innovation" (2016), and "Science, Technology, and Public Diplomacy" (2013).
  ■ Andrew J. Grotto_ William J. Perry Fellow at Stanford University’s Cyber Policy Center and a Fellow at the Hoover Institution. Grotto’s expertise lies in U.S. global leadership in information technology innovation, both in national security and international economic dimensions, and the increasing reliance on innovation for socioeconomic advancement. Grotto served as Senior Director for Cybersecurity Policy at the White House under both the Obama and Trump administrations. He also served as Senior Advisor for Technology Policy to Secretary of Commerce Penny Pritzker. He also has extensive experience on Capitol Hill, having worked as a professional staff member for the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence.
  ■ Fukunari Kimura_ Professor of Economics at Keio University and Chief Economist at the Economic Research Institute for ASEAN and East Asia (ERIA). He graduated from the University of Tokyo with a degree in Law and obtained Master’s and Ph.D. degrees from the University of Wisconsin-Madison in 1990 and 1991, respectively. He served as an Assistant Professor of Economics at the State University of New York at Albany from 1991 to 1994, an Assistant Professor of Economics at Keio University from 1994 to 2000, and has been a Professor of Economics at Keio University since 2000. His areas of expertise include global production networks and East Asian economic integration.
  ■ Ha Young-sun_ Chairman of EAI and Professor Emeritus at Seoul National University. He received his Ph.D. in International Politics from the University of Washington. He has served as Professor of Diplomacy at Seoul National University, Visiting Research Fellow at Princeton University’s Center for International Studies, Visiting Research Fellow at the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, Director of the Institute for Global Social Studies at Seoul National University, Director of the Institute for American Studies, President of the Korean Peace Studies Association, Co-Chair of the Korean side for the Joint Research Project on a New Era for Korea-Japan Relations, Member of the Presidential National Security Advisory Council, and Senior Advisor to the Deliberative Committee for Inter-Korean Summit Meetings. He currently serves as Chairman of EAI and Professor Emeritus at Seoul National University. His recent books and edited volumes include <World Politics of Love: War and Peace>, <A Correct View of Korean Diplomatic History: Tradition and Modernity>, <The Competition for Asia-Pacific Order Construction between the US and China>, and <World Politics of the Four Tributaries: Analysis of Joseon Tongsinsa and Yeonhaengrok Records from the 16th-19th Centuries>. He also wrote a column titled “Ha Young-sun’s Column” for the Chosun Ilbo and JoongAng Ilbo for seven years.
  ■ Thomas Fingar_ Fellow at Stanford University’s Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies and Shorenstein APARC. He was a special research fellow at Oksenberg-Rohlen from 2010 to 2015 and was appointed as a Payne Distinguished Lecturer at Stanford University in 2009. From 2005 to 2008, he served as Deputy Director of National Intelligence and Chairman of the National Intelligence Council. Prior to that, Fingar held various positions at the Department of State, including Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Intelligence and Research (2000-01, 2004-05), Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary (2001-03), Assistant Secretary for Intelligence Analysis (1994-2000), Director of the Office of East Asian and Pacific Analysis (1989-94), and Director of the Office of China (1986-88). From 1975 to 1986, he held several positions at Stanford University, including Senior Research Fellow at the Center for International Security and Arms Control.
   
  
   
  ■ Typeset by Seung Yeon Lee | Research Associate
  
      For inquiries: 02 2277 1683 (ext. 205) | slee@eai.or.kr

Video Script

Greetings everyone. My name is Son, President of the East Asia Institute. I'm honored and pleased to invite distinguished panelists and moderators to this webinar titled 'What's Next for the U.S.-Japan-Korea Partnership: Security and Economic Cooperation in a New Era?' This event is co-hosted with Stanford University's Walter H. Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center. My special thanks to Professor and Director of APARC, Kyu-jin, for his friendship, continuing support, and cooperation to EAI.

Upon the announcement of the two joint statements from the Iraq-U.S. and U.S.-Japan summit meetings, respectively held in Washington D.C. earlier this year, academics and opinion leaders have forecasted a possible expansion of security and economic cooperation among South Korea, Japan, and the United States. However, the geopolitical tension arising from the U.S.-China strategic competition and the severed bilateral ties between Japan and South Korea, among others, have complicated the strategic calculus of the U.S., Japan, and South Korea.

As the U.S. shifts primarily to peer-to-peer competition with China, questions arise: Will North Korea become less of a priority for the United States, or do its location in relation to China increase U.S. intent to open dialogue and encourage closer inter-Korean relations? Will South Korea, Japan, and the United States be able to recover and increase their trilateral security cooperation over several issues? And can Japan and South Korea improve their deeply severed bilateral relationship in the near future?

How does the outlook for our South Korean, United States, American, and Japanese firms look like amidst restraint in the global supply chain? Can these three countries actually foster an open, liberal, and inclusive economic architecture in the region? With these questions and under these circumstances, South Korea, Japan, and the United States must define their economic and security interests and seek ways to maintain friendly relations among them. This seminar will discuss security cooperation, touching upon the issues of

denuclearization of North Korea and geopolitical tension from U.S.-China strategic competition. Panelists will also discuss economic cooperation in the realm of the direction of future technology and trade policies of the three countries and economic security over the global supply chain. Thank you, everyone, and I hope today's webinar stimulates practical and insightful dialogue among the trade policymakers in academia. I will now pass on the mic to Professor Kyu-jin, according to our friends and dears.

in Japan, Korea, and elsewhere in Asia. We have done some joint programs with EAI before, and it's really our pleasure and honor to do so again today. Dr. Son has already mentioned and outlined key issues that we will be addressing today. And I think if there's any positive side of the pandemic, it is that we can do more actively do cultural programs like this. Specifically, as you know, in the United States, we have almost one year with a new Biden administration. In Japan, you have just a new prime minister and

cabinet, and South Korea now in the middle of a presidential campaign. So it's quite a challenging time and a lot of uncertainties. At the same time, there might be some opportunities in the coming months and coming years. So today, we have an excellent lineup of speakers from both academic and critical worlds. And actually, within our center, this is a joint program between the Korean Program and the Japan Program. So, as a whole, this shows a great collaboration among Japan, Korea, and the United States. Hopefully, we can do similar

collaboration in the policy arena as well. So once again, I thank you for joining us today. And without further ado, let me turn to Dr. Ha, who will be moderating the first panel. As you know, Dr. Ha was a professor at Seoul National University, now Chairman of EAI. Dr. Ha is a leading expert on foreign policy and national security in Korea. So it's a real pleasure to have Dr. Ha and all the panelists for today's discussion. So, Dr. Ha, thank you. Professor Shin, it is my pleasure to moderate the first session of the EAI and APARC webinar on the

future of the U.S.-Japan-ROK Partnership in a New Era. We are now facing four different levels of a new era. Primarily, the United States and China are now beginning to enter a period of competition on the stage of economy, technology, norms, and military. Secondly, there are continuing risks of regional confrontations in the Indo-Pacific, such as North Korean nuclear issues, Taiwan, and the South China Sea. Third, we are experiencing new political leadership in the region. And finally, we have to successfully get over with the

COVID-19. Facing this kind of new era, we do need a new type of security and economic cooperation among three partner countries. For our effective discussion, the program organizers prepared five basic questions for this session. First, how does and will South Korea define its own strategic interests in the Pacific? Second, under the strategic competition of the United States and China, what kind of trilateral relations do we expect among the United States, China, and North Korea? Third, can the ROK and Japan, under the new leadership, improve

the deeply severed bilateral relationship? Fourth, how can we coordinate different positions on the sequence of the two-track strategy of complete denuclearization and complete security guarantee among North Korea and other relevant countries? Fifth, how can we develop the strength of the U.S. security guarantee towards South Korea and Japan against the rising threat of North Korea's rapidly growing nuclear capabilities? The first session of this webinar invites three prominent panelists from three countries.

Let me introduce first, Ambassador Park Jin-woo, former Chairman of the Sejong Institute and former Senior Secretary to the President for Political Affairs. He was a career diplomat who served 33 years at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, including as Ambassador to the European Union and Singapore. And next, General Vincent Brooks, former Commander of U.S. Forces in Korea. Recently retired from active duty as a four-star general in command of all U.S. Forces in Korea, UNC, and the ROK-U.S. Combined Forces Command. And

Tomiko Ichikawa, Director General, former Director General at the current Director General at the Japan Institute of International Affairs. She joined the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs in 1985. Her assignments included directorship at the West Europe Division and Nuclear Proliferation Science and Nuclear Energy Division. She participated in the Six-Party Talks and continued to follow DPRK nuclear issues at the Permanent Mission in Vienna and the IAEA for 10 years. Let me turn over my mic to Ambassador

Park. He will have a speech for roughly 10 minutes on the issues we will discuss. Ambassador, thank you, Professor Ha, for your kind and generous introduction. I would also like to thank Professor Shin and Professor Son for giving me this valuable opportunity to join today's online seminar. It is so nice to meet virtually other panelists, Director General Ichikawa, and General Brooks, and especially my old colleague, Tom Finger at APARC. As Professor Ha just explained, today's subject, trilateral cooperation among the U.S.,

Japan, and Korea has been the key mechanism in dealing with North Korean provocations since North Korea started nuclear development in the early 1990s. Since the Biden administration was inaugurated, the United States is strengthening this trilateral cooperation in its efforts to counter China's growing assertiveness. As Korea's dependence on China deepens in trade and supply of raw materials essential to industry, and the current Moon government's inclination to China continues, it is not easy for Korea and the current Moon government

to actively engage in the U.S.-led anti-China alliance. Korea-Japan relationship further worsened by protracted row over territorial and historical disputes also hinders Korea's active engagement in the trilateral cooperation. There is a saying, 'A chain is only as strong as its weakest link.' As Korea-Japan relations deteriorated and remains at the worst level, it has become the weakest link in the U.S.-led trilateral cooperation. As I have only 10 minutes, I will have to focus mainly on this issue.

When the Biden administration was inaugurated last January, expectations were high in Korea for another restoration of the Korea-Japan partnership under U.S. leadership. Many Koreans remember that when the Park Geun-hye government had difficulty in settling the issue of wartime comfort women with Japan, then Vice President Biden played an important role in the process of rapprochement between the two leaders of Korea and Japan. He visited the two main U.S. allies in East Asia and mediated between the two leaders. After year-long negotiations, Korea and

Japan reached the Comfort Women Agreement in December 2015. Since then, Korea-Japan cooperation expanded to other areas, including security issues. In November 2016, Korea and Japan signed an important military information agreement. It was overdue because of Korea's reluctance to engage in security cooperation with Japan. Restored cooperation between Korea and Japan was disrupted with the inauguration of the Moon administration in May 2017.

The Moon administration dissolved the foundation for reconciliation and healing, which was established with the seed money provided by the Japanese government under the Comfort Women Agreement. Japan angrily reacted to this Korean government's decision. The two countries' relations further cooled when a Korean navy ship targeted its fire control radar to a Japanese maritime patrol aircraft in December 2018.

In the meantime, a series of Korean court rulings on comfort women and forced laborers during Japanese colonial rule have worsened the bilateral relations, and Japan retaliated with export control of chemicals vital to Korean semiconductor manufacturing. Worsened relationship between Korea and Japan affects the trilateral cooperation led by the United States. Biden administration's policy to counter Chinese challenges extends globally in all directions and covers the whole areas of East Asia and the Indo-Pacific.

The United States revived Quad cooperation with Japan, Australia, and India. They agreed on the importance of the Indo-Pacific region being free and open and bound by a rules-based order. They called for freedom of navigation in the region, apparently challenging China's territorial claims in the South China Sea. In September, the U.S. launched a new trilateral security partnership with the UK and Australia named AUKUS. The United States promised to provide Australia with technology to build a fleet of nuclear-powered submarines.

On the sidelines of the G20 summit in Rome at the end of October, President Biden hosted a meeting on global supply chain resilience attended by 14 U.S. allies. The Biden administration has been rarely analyzed to reshape the global supply chain and be less dependent on China. Coming December 9th and 10th, President Biden will host a Summit for Democracy, a virtual summit for leaders from more than 100 democratic countries in an apparent railing against authoritarian China. All these initiatives by the United

States since Biden took presidency are aimed at countering challenging ambitions of China and curbing China's growing global influence. In cooperation with the United States, Japan also heightened its military readiness by strengthening joint military exercises with the United States and other U.S. allies in Oceania and Europe. Australia, New Zealand, UK, France, and Germany dispatched navy ships and patrol aircraft to join surveillance activity checking North Korea's violation of the U.N. sanctions. It is said that these unusual military

activities are targeted at illegal transshipping of North Korean ships, but they are actually targeted at checking and containing China's intensifying military activities in the East and South China Seas. Japan's new Prime Minister Kishida confirmed he will closely work with the United States for the peace and stability of the region and realize a free and open Indo-Pacific. Since Xi Jinping took the leadership of China in November 2012, China has been intensifying its assertiveness, starting the Belt and Road

Initiative. China has promised to spend about $1 trillion on building infrastructure in mainly developing countries around the world. During the centennial of the Chinese Communist Party's founding on July 1st this year, he warned that any infringements on China's sovereignty would be met by a 'great wall of steel.' He declared that China would not tolerate preaching from others and unification, which Taiwan remained an unshakeable commitment of the Chinese Communist Party. Tensions across the Taiwan Strait are

ever high due to China's demonstration of its military power in the air and sea. Chinese fleet even held joint exercises with Russian fleet crossing international straits Tsugaru and Osumi in Japanese territory, which raised concern about Chinese threat among Japanese people. With all these developments surrounding the Korean Peninsula, it looks clear that the U.S. and Japan are determined to strengthen and expand the cooperation among the three countries, including Korea. Daniel Brink, Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific

Affairs, who recently visited Japan and Korea, was reported to have discussed with his counterparts about how their alliance can contribute to promote the rules-based international order in the Indo-Pacific and beyond. He also said that the future three countries will be safer and more prosperous when Korea and Japan cooperate for the future, focusing on the common interest. Entering the final year of his presidency, President Moon made gestures for dialogue with Japan during the New Year press conference in

January this year. President Moon said he acknowledged the 2015 Comfort Women Agreement as an official agreement between the two governments. He offered dialogue through his address commemorating the March 1st Independence Movement. Japan's response was cruel and persistent in demanding Korea's action to fully implement the agreement. Japan seems to be indifferent to whatever offers and gestures from President Moon and waiting for the time when Moon's term expires and a new Korean government is inaugurated.

Japan's new cabinet led by Prime Minister Kishida is said to be more open to keeping friendly relations with Korea. Foreign Minister Hayashi expressed his willingness to step up dialogue with Korea to improve their strained ties. Considering the upcoming Korean presidential election in March, chances are for any breakthrough during the remaining Moon tenure are slim. President Moon seems to be more inclined to meet his counterpart in the North and jointly declare the end of the Korean War. In addition,

as the presidential election campaign gets close and harsher, it is almost impossible for President Moon to make concessions and improve relations with Japan. Considering all these aspects, it looks more realistic to work for the improvement of Korea-Japan relations when a new government is inaugurated in Korea next May. Whoever is elected, the new president will face the most difficult tasks to mend the ties with Japan and join the strengthened trilateral cooperation while balancing Korea's national

interests between the U.S. and China. The new government's foreign policy needs to be pragmatic, considering the Moon government's leaning towards North Korea and China's attitude disappointed many Koreans. Japan will also need to be flexible and keep the door open for a compromise with the new Korean government. The Biden administration, if it regards Korea as indeed dispensable for protecting the vital interests of the U.S. in its rivalry with China, must play a bigger role in a quiet and constructive manner. Thank you for

listening. Thank you, Ambassador Park. Ambassador Park gave his speech with special emphasis on the ROK-Japan relations. Our next speaker will be General Vincent Brooks. General Brooks, would you start your speech? Certainly, and I hope everyone can hear me okay. Yes, okay. All right, very good. Well, I first want to thank the organizers from the East Asia Institute and from the Asia Pacific Research Center for arranging this conference and especially for including me in it. I'm very honored to join this

distinguished panel. I'll just begin by saying that it is my belief that the alliance system forged by the United States, especially in the aftermath of the Second World War, is really being put to the test, and this is a period of testing that we must take note of and respond to. It brings questions like, what is the current value of the alliances to the parties involved? What will the alliance system be in the Indo-Pacific region? Will it gain strength under the pressures of really changing realities that are emerging from Chinese

actions to reset the regional order and also by the competing perspectives of self-interest? I would submit that the alliance system, featuring particularly as we're talking about tonight, the U.S.-Korea alliance, the U.S.-Japan alliance, and the U.S.-Australia alliance, is as important now, if perhaps even more important, than it has ever been before. The alliance system capitalizes upon common interests and like-minded affinities. In this case, the democratic nations of the Indo-Pacific have common interests in

economic cooperation, as we'll certainly discuss, and in mutual defense. And these two pillars, just as our discussion tonight is framed, these two pillars have really upheld the extraordinary prosperity and the flourishing societies of the allied countries. The democratic order, in my view, has been repetitively tested through the last 70 years. This is not the first test we're facing, and it has repetitively shown resilience and value. So, in the present time, there's another period of testing, as we will certainly discuss many times

today. The rise of China, offering what is fundamentally a different political system centered on the Chinese Communist Party guiding a state-controlled capitalist and expansionist economy, is presenting a very fresh challenge to free-market democracies. So maintaining a healthy alliance system really preserves alternatives to the Chinese model being exported around the world. The economic interests, in my view, are paramount. The security interests follow. I've spoken many times about the

relationship among North Korea, South Korea, China, Russia, Japan, and the United States. And I've described it as being like a hand with North Korea at the palm and the other countries on each finger. So, for example, if this is China and Russia, and South Korea and the United States and Japan, alliance solidarity joins two fingers as one, and with increased cooperation, three as one. And I'm referring, of course, to South Korea-U.S. and Japan cooperation. The two alliances operating in harmony, not necessarily an alliance. I think

that's a step that's beyond the current reach, but operating with harmony is not beyond reach. North Korea would always seek to separate the fingers, and so would China, and so would Russia, who prefer to have each finger operating independently. And this is a design for weakness, whereas solidarity and mutual support represent a design for strength. So the alliance system should not be viewed as a U.S. construct representing a previous international order, rather it should be viewed as a modern construct

that joins several of the world's most robust economies, liberal democracies, and militarily capable nations. And ladies and gentlemen, I think my key point is cooperation matters. The opportunities on the horizon for the new administrations in the United States, Japan, and ROK, and I will treat them all as new, since they will each of them have 18 months or less in position by mid-2022, this will include an opportunity to build upon the existing alliance system and to strengthen it by ensuring the

democracies of the Indo-Pacific operate in harmony. Now, each country has its own history, each country has its own interests, but success will come in recognizing the commonalities and building upon them, while also certainly recognizing the unique perspectives that are brought on any issue. The reality is alliances are fed by the balancing of self-interest with collective interest. No single point of view should win all the time, and it's my hope that the Republic of Korea, the United States, and Japan, as the alliances of

Northeast Asia will look for strengthening opportunities and will recognize the value of harmonious relations. Leadership in each country will have the obligation to communicate the value of the alliances domestically and to also demonstrate the value of the alliances internationally. I'm of the view that cooperation enhances security. Some political risk will be required to improve trust within the triad of Korea, the United States, and Japan. Trust is not sufficient at the present time. You know, during my service in Korea, I

witnessed firsthand the limitations of operating without direct communications among the allies of the United States, and this was particularly manifested in the experiences that I had during the missile launches of 2016, especially as North Korea continued to test with greater and greater success an array of missiles with ranges and capabilities to threaten the United States, as well as the two Northeast Asian allies. I would add, for that matter, Australia as well, but especially among those three. And as

North Korea conducted those tests, those demonstrations, those provocations, the tests would trigger sensing and warning systems in each of the three countries, and in fact, each had a different set of puzzle pieces. I'll refer to this metaphorically, looking at the same puzzle. The U.S. as the common ally had direct communication and the fullest picture of the puzzle because it had its own picture and it had Korean and Japanese information, but the other two, Korea and Japan, without direct communication with one

another, were each frustrated time after time that the United States, complying with the information security restrictions and requirements established by each ally, could not share the full awareness or would have to relay information that was permitted to be shared across the alliance boundary. It was slow, it created unneeded frustration, while also impacting the quality of the responses. As was already mentioned, the General Security of Military Information Agreement in 2016 created a conduit to overcome these limitations.

The U.S. was not the relay, and trust began to rise between the Korean and Japanese governments, even in the conditions of great pressure. Some political risk had to be taken to create the GSOMIA, and political risks had to be taken to preserve it when dissolution of the GSOMIA appeared to be imminent. The sharing of military information is a minimal level of cooperation. Much more can be done and should be done. China and Russia have both challenged the quality and the resilience of the alliances

and they have routinely exploited the seams and the sensitive points. To particularly come to mind, the overlapping air defense identification zones of Japan, China, and South Korea, for example, that's where Russia and China both fly to challenge not only the officiality of the zones but also the responses to penetrations of the zones. Or an even more sensitive point than that is the contested Takeshima/Liancourt Rocks, whichever you choose to name it, which further aggravates existing political sensitivities, and we see how

sensitive that is even today, and it complicates military responses and can lead to some of the friction points that have already been highlighted. This is, in my view, an unacceptable status quo because it works to the disadvantage of the alliance system. I would submit to you that exercises, whether they are small and quiet tabletop discussions or alternatively full-scale military actions coordinated multinationally to rehearse and to normalize procedures for interaction, these exercises would make a substantial

improvement in security and in deterring Chinese and Russian adventurism, while also building some bridges of trust among the democracies of Northeast Asia. And this is just one example among numerous opportunities. Finally, let me just say that each country must see itself as threads in a tapestry of international relations and to seek complementary opportunities to enhance the regional as well as the international order based on the alliance system. Groupings like the Quad, we've heard that mentioned already, and even agreements

like AUKUS, which we've also heard mentioned and is most newly created, these are reflections of an outward-looking awareness. The cooperation among the democracies of the Indo-Pacific is clearly in the interest of each, and the synergy being, of course, greater than the sum of its parts. Of any cooperative arrangement will be a critically important factor in shaping the international order for a new era, one that includes and also impacts a very capable emergent China, which is pushing a contrary order.

The presence of trust precludes the exploitation of seams, while the absence of trust is an attractive target for exploitation. The building of trust can't occur in an instant, while the fracturing of trust can occur in a single incident. So it's time now for the democracies of the Indo-Pacific and the allies of the United States to build the trust needed to shape the emerging order for the remainder of this century. Those are my opening thoughts, and I look forward to the rest of the dialogue and conversation. Thank you very much.

Thank you. Yes, thank you very much. First of all, I'd like to thank the East Asia Institute and Stanford University for organizing this event, and I'm very honored and happy to join this opportunity to discuss a very interesting and important agenda. I will maybe make just two or three points here, maybe to offer a bit longer perspective of the North Korea's nuclear situation, and also the U.S.-Japan-ROK trilateral cooperation, mainly based on my own experience. First of all, the DPRK nuclear

situation and the U.S. policy. I think the question was asked whether the current U.S. administration under President Biden is rather prioritizing China and not prioritizing the DPRK. I think it is clear that the Biden administration itself made it clear that its number one priority is strategic competition with China. And we heard that the Biden administration had completed its policy review on the DPRK and said that it is waiting for the DPRK to decide whether or not to engage in negotiation. From the outside

observers, it does not seem that the U.S. is really putting the priority in terms of timing in engaging with the DPRK. On the other hand, I do not believe that addressing the issue of the nuclear and missile issue of the DPRK is of low priority for the U.S., because I think General Brooks can, he's already telling us and can tell us more, maybe how important it is to address the increasing threat of the DPRK's missile capabilities when you know, imagining that it can be coupled with its nuclear capabilities.

And the DPRK seems to be determined to continue its nuclear and missile development activities despite all the difficulties it faces. General Brooks just mentioned his experience with the DPRK's missile tests in 2016. This year, we are witnessing again many missile tests by the DPRK of probably various different kinds. It means the DPRK has been so far not conducted ICBM or long-range missile tests or nuclear tests. Probably the DPRK is also watching the Biden administration's approach and

policies. We are not quite sure how the DPRK might react in the near future when it sees no prospect or little prospect of improving its relations with the U.S. in the near future. So we will have to see how the policies, both on the U.S. side and the DPRK side, might develop. My second point is on the U.S.-Japan-ROK trilateral cooperation, and on that, I'd like to offer a bit longer timeline than just focusing on right now, because actually in the late 1990s, when the DPRK was going through the

so-called Arduous March hardship period, and almost immediately after the first U.S.-DPRK agreement was concluded, it was at that time in the late 1990s that the U.S., Japan, ROK really started discussing specifically the DPRK agenda at the high government officials level at trilateral meetings. The first such meeting took place actually in Hawaii in January 1996, and actually, as a young diplomat, I was part of the Japanese delegation there. So since then, this type of trilateral meetings, sometimes at foreign minister levels,

sometimes, and quite more often at high government official levels, continue till today. As we saw, I think just two days ago, I understand that the public aspect of that event was affected by the bilateral relations, but on the other hand, the trilateral meeting itself took place at such a high level, at a very high government official level, and which is, I believe, important to continue. So I think there are two aspects on this. We can't see the current Japan-ROK relations as difficult. I think no one

can deny that. On the other hand, there are discussions and cooperation going on at such levels, which is also, I think, worth noting. So we have to probably continue with that kind of dialogue, particularly trilateral dialogues. And actually, I see so many meetings this year, probably in response to so many DPRK missile tests, but the discussions among these countries at that level is continuing, and I think this is very important to note. I'm not a security expert, but just to mention, just to respond to what I think.

the both mr park and general brooks mentioned about quad orcas and the security situation in the region uh i think on the front japanese point of view it is also important for japan to really think through its policy and security framework and the future cause of its policy under the new kishida government and we understand that the prime minister kishida already announced his intention to review the japan's current national security framework in a kind of overall as a whole package not only the defense

posture but the national security uh policy itself which i think is really timely and unnecessary under the current security situation in this region and uh regarding quad and ocus uh japan is really kind of strongly promoting the free and open in the pacific and within that framework this quad group is a very important uh cooperative framework for japan and as both speakers prior to me just mentioned u.s announced this new cooperative framework of focus with australia and uk i think in addition to the quite well

established security alliances many small kind of so-called military or small groups for various purposes on the flexible and adopt way will certainly enhance the cooperation in this region and japan i think is really putting its emphasis in promoting free and open into pacific concept and quad is really kind of a very important central piece in it but not only that i think engaging many other countries in this region including and particularly asean countries will be also important in trying to address the current

security situation in this region maybe i will stop here as my initial remarks and i'm looking forward to the discussions thank you very much for three panelists who gave us a very much interesting uh presentations on the issues we will further discuss for our second round of discussions i will give a very brief uh questions towards each panelists and we will continue the second round discussions and there are a couple of also a couple of questions from the audi from the audience i will include such questions toward ah panelists first

ambassador park based on new experience of the career diplomat and also senior secretary to the president how would you recommend the first step for for the new government of next president's presidential election for the betterment korea and japan relations and also how would you forecast the chances of betterment of career japan relations during the next administration that is the first uh point second point if you have time or if you don't mind as you give a little bit further comments on the

next government's basic position on the dilemma of the strategy competition between us and china that is the first questions for the ambassador park and the next couple of questions to our the general uh bruce question two there is a question from the audience there have been diverse views on the end of world declaration the most recent being former u.s forces in korea commander abram stating that it could be reopened the door to hostilities on the peninsula what are your thoughts on the prospects

of the declaration and second question of mine as related about the there are some kind of discussions and and are okay the how should we respond to the continuing development of north korean nuclear capability from that aspect unju explain a little bit about the efficiency of extended deterrence or strengthening the capability of extended deterrence towards that such kind of the north korean nuclear capabilities and finally the toward the tomiko ichikawa as i briefly mentioned and the basic questions

it seems that there are different types of two-track policies of north korea u.s china even an rok how can we manage those kind two different type of the the two track policies one as the complete denuclearization another one is complete security guarantee how can we manage the sequence of those kind of two basic points that the first questions and second one crude issues we all know the china is of com complaining about the possibility of the anti-china partnership in the context of quad how can we

successfully manage that kind of the uh effectiveness of quote not only as the a uh military partnership and also the non-military partners at powell county accommodated those kind of dilemma that issues so i will turn over my microphone to the ambassador park would you start the questions okay uh well it's not easy to predict how the next new korean government will act now we have 110 about 10 days until the presidential election in early march next year both ruling and opposition candidates have not yet made clear their campaign

pledges on foreign policy but one thing is clear as i have already mentioned in my statement the moon government's leaning towards north korea and china attitude has been disappointed many koreans even allies so the next government whoever will it will be elected should be pragmatic some diplomats who joined the camps in both ruling and opposition candidates they already expressed the policy line that the new government will be pragmatic in their approach to diplomacy so i hope that the new government whoever is elected

will be pragmatic to mend the ties with japan 23 years ago when kim jejung was inaugurated in 1998 at that time i was the director of japanese affairs at the ministry of foreign affairs i worked for the restoration of bilateral relations for almost a year when the president kim jejung was inaugurated japan uh scrapped the fisheries packed with korea so the relations was at a very uh low so it was a urgent task for the new government to restore the relationship at that time kim daejung and japanese prime minister

obuchi trusted each other and after almost a year of negotiations we had a joint declaration by kim daejung and so i hope that the new government in korea we'll learn a lesson from the kim awaits declaration with and made make progress with japanese new prime minister kishida and regarding the security cooperation between japan and korea it has been a taboo for korean people to cooperate in security issues with japan it started only about 20 years ago as general brooks mentioned it is very important for not only for

united states but for korea and japan to share military information in coping with the north korean provocations i hope that when korea and japan overcome the difficulties and resolve the current disputes they can join hand in countering regional risks and north korean provocations thank you next general vincent okay thank you dr ha the questions are very interesting ones and i'll try to be somewhat brief in my my response first i'd i'd say with regard to end of war declaration i know it's certainly a

hot topic that is becoming politically charged and so i certainly want to be careful about that because it's not my intention to inflame the circumstances at all i would first say taking note of what uh general abrams has commented on there are absolutely significant risks to an end of war declaration i also believe however that there are significant risks to maintaining the status quo it is possible to maintain the armistice for an extendedly long period of time as has already been the case since 1953

but the armistice was always intended to be a temporary condition until a lasting peace could be attained it's my opinion that a lasting peace will not come from a perpetuation of armistice that that doesn't lead to peace unless there's something else that is a more unique step perhaps even a disruptive step to go there and not to get in the way of uh of uh director general ichikawa's response that will come here in a moment but the sequencing question that she posed to her is relevant here also

again i am taking this as my opinion certainly not any official view but i believe that there is what i've called a cultural conundrum the view in the west on how the sequence of actions should occur in the relationship between trust relationship and denuclearization among those three the western view has certainly been for many years show denuclearization actions real concrete actions and then trust can be built and then the relationship can change but it's been my impression from north korea that that's not what they seek

i believe that they will release their possession of nuclear weapons not everyone agrees with me on that it is a long road before that will happen but it will begin with a changed relationship so it's the exact 180 degree opposite of the western view change of relationship comes first which then builds trust and then uh there will be denuclearization actions when there is a depth of security guarantees that has been reached which has not been reached before so i i believe this is fundamentally about

north korea sense of economic security as well as physical security and the superficial discussions will always begin with physical security so the end of war declaration i believe has value and does also have great risk some of which we've talked about if it becomes politically charged and becomes equated to a reason to reduce u.s force presence on the korean peninsula or to eliminate united nations command abruptly these are mistakes that would be made by any political leaders if they follow that path those are mistakes they're not

fundamentally linked to an end to war declaration but if they're allowed to be linked then it will be a mistake so the danger of moving forward with an end of war declaration is is one that is mostly driven by thoughtfulness in the approach and it cannot be it cannot be blown by the political winds in such a significant way that it is done for populist reasons rather than pragmatic reasons that's my that's my opinion on that now to to the extended deterrence question uh extended deterrence to me is first

about capability but more importantly about trust does the beneficiary of extended deterrence in this case japan and south korea do those two countries believe that the u.s will stand by its commitments and provide extended deterrence so that neither of the two countries requires a nuclear capability themselves if that trust question erodes and i believe it has eroded and may continue to erode then national self-interest begins to rise and a desire to have some equilibrium in the capabilities possessed by each

nation relative to north korea begins to rise again so we're having these kinds of discussions i i had the opportunity i'll end on this point to try to convey the realities of extended deterrence which are difficult to do because of the nature of the systems that are used to provide that extended deterrence but we took some members of the south korean national assembly and the chairman of the south korea joint chiefs of staff to board a nuclear submarine with ballistic missiles aboard and to show them the reality of what it

is that the us provides it's always in the neighborhood and so just because you don't see it doesn't mean it's not there and trying to get to the level of trust that makes it possible to recognize that it is there and that the relationships among the countries will determine the nature of the use but the capability is absolutely there and should never be doubted that's easier said than done and requires strong diplomatic work and confidence building on multiple levels in order to try to get extended deterrence back where it

belongs an open dialogue about extended insurance i think is uh is very needed among the three new administrations okay thank you miss ishikawa would you respond to the questions yeah thank you very much uh first of all i'd like to thank ambassador park for reminding me of the time that we worked uh together on the bilateral relations and actually regarding the first question asked about the security guarantee uh actually general brooks already made quite a very important and interesting remarks from the security

military perspective so i'd like to maybe add just one or two points uh from diplomatic and non-proliferation perspective i think from actually my point of view and from the japanese government point of view i think too whatever the mode or the time frame of the negotiation or agreement in the future i think what is very important is not to lose the site of the kind of goal to achieve in terms of denuclearization because quite often in the past although north korea at that time maybe not now committed to complete

denuclearization of the korean peninsula when we get into the concrete negotiations on the steps to taken there were so many small steps which were reversible that the dprk committed and took but in the end well we see all of us where we are now because we are much worse off in terms of the north korean nuclear capability and threat to the region and the countries in the region as well as the countries beyond the region if we compare the situation a current situation with where we were when for example the

u.s north korea framework agreement was abandoned and also when the six party talks uh ended well we didn't think at that time as i was participating in india so now last meeting of the six party talks in december 2008 we never believed it was the end of the six party talks it we all believed it was a short interruption but since then six party talks was never revived but now u.s uh tried another way of doing it particularly under the trump administration he engaged the top at he did the top

level diplomacy with mr kim jong-un but then again we ended up with really little to no uh progress on the nuclear front and north korea still continues to develop its nuclear missile capabilities so whatever the mode of the negotiations i think that kind of end point needs to be security aspect from a wider perspective but under the current u.s china u.s russia bilateral relations maybe it's a bit difficult to think about such kind of multilateral framework uh i don't have much time so i'll just touch on upon quote

uh actually quad uh is an interesting group uh particularly involving india and it is not not at all an alliance and it is not so much limited to military security because in the quad meetings in this year they have been talking about provisional vaccine vaccines or the provision of quality infrastructure assistance so it's much wider than security it's not an alliance and it's definitely not asian nato but it's a very interesting group of very important major democratic countries in the region which is i think a very particular

feature of quad and this kind of very flexible and kind of ad-hoc kind of type of grouping of friends rather than very strict military alliances may become even more important in this region in the coming years and decades ahead that is my impression thank you time is off for the first session but there is the urgent question from thomas finger why does there seems to be no agreement on what should be considered the most important challenge in northeast asia i will ask each panelist just to respond

to that question for 10 seconds response to that questions ambassador park would you have a brief comments well i think the colonial rule by japan and also the chinese civil war which ended in 1949 and the communist china which conquered the whole continent has no diplomatic relations with united states and also no relations with south korea and japan until early 1970s so we didn't have enough time to have have contacts and discuss about the common interests and at this mo at this moment i think the

most urgent and important challenges should be the u.s china rivalry and north korean provocations i think uh the countries in northeast asia can agree on that thank you next general vincent brooks it's a very interesting question of course i think the answer is has many parts but one of them is where you stand depends on where you sit and to establish something as the most important challenge will be somewhat dependent on what it is that is actually faced each country faces a different combination of challenges i i think

perhaps one of the challenges that must be acknowledged as we're discussing tonight is that the challenge of gaining a cooperative spirit among the three countries in northeast asia including the united states and if that can be addressed then perhaps the other ones can be addressed as well and i don't know that it's necessary to say the most important but to acknowledge the common uh problems that need to be addressed by that cooperation so whether it's china on a much larger geopolitical scale or whether it's north korea as a

very specific extent threat that can be debated on which is most important to each one of the countries but the acknowledgement that both of them must be addressed with a collective approach i think is the more important outcome okay and next uh mr tomiko ichikawa yes it's a very difficult question to answer and i cannot answer in a kind of better way than my two previous speakers maybe just to say that it really depends again on where you are and what kind of time frame you have i had really difficulty in explaining to

for example our european uh friends that the cold war hasn't ended in this region in the east asia or northeast asia because everyone talks about the end of the cold war but the cold war framework still remains in this region and in addition to that long-standing framework now as everyone is talking about this u.s china competition is really kind of playing uh most obviously and visibly and fiercely in this in the pacific region so the combination of the both would be maybe the most important kind

of overall situation but again uh what is important is depending on where you are i think thank you time is up for the first session thanks for the very much thoughtful uh speech and also very much interesting questions from the audience i think there will be further discussions on the second session thank you very much all the panelists and also the participant thank you very much all right hearing hearing no objection i will begin the second section uh by saying i too am very happy to be included in this discussion

i thank the organizers on both sides of the pacific and i welcome any who have joined in this conversation uh specifically for the economic portion the goal of this session is to assess the implications for japanese and korean firms and for the u.s japan rok partnership of u.s policies toward china and policies limiting the sales and transfer of certain technologies our speakers will refine this core question as they think appropriate in doing so we hope to illuminate different dimensions of economic

cooperation and calculations of our three countries and their business communities we have three excellent panelists to leave the discussion to maine maintain continuity as we move from one speaker to another i will introduce all of them now and to maximize time for discussion i will provide only very brief and therefore inadequate introductions but i refer you to the biographic materials that have been provided each of our speakers will talk for 10 minutes we will go in this order the first is professor of political science at

concord university she obtained her ba and ma degrees in diplomacy from seoul national university and earned her phd in political science at the university of north carolina her research interests include international political economy and technology and international politics recent publications include network and national security and north korea and the world our second speaker is andrew grotto andy is a william j perry fellow at the cyber policy center and a research fellow at fellow at the

hoover institution both at stanford university he received his ba from the university of kentucky mpa from harvard and jd from uc berkeley before coming to stanford he was senior director for cyber policy in both the obama and the trump administrations our final speaker is kimura fukunari professor of economics at ko university he received his bachelor of laws from the university of tokyo and his m.a and phd degrees in economics from the university of wisconsin his research interests include international production networks

and economic integration in east asia and i will ask each of our speakers to limit the remarks to 10 minutes so that we can have time for discussions and we'll begin with ms bai hello uh i'm young japan i'm honored to join this webinar and talk and hear from you today i'll talk briefly on technology cooperation among u.s korea japan in the age of u.s china technology rivalry especially focusing on semiconductor sector u.s china japan korea and other asian countries have formed a highly interdependent relationship

within the global value chain over the past decade the industrial development of korea has been carried out and the close cooperation with the united states and china within this global value chain the recent u.s china technology rivalry and u.s government's export controls and investment restrictions against china have posed a great challenge to the korean government and firms the korean government does not provide clear guidelines on the firm's strategy in this situation so far so the companies have adjusted their business

strategies watching the u.s regulations and the china's response in the case of a semiconductor sector korean firms on the one hand have decided to make a large-scale investment in the u.s in response to the u.s government request and on the other hand continued to cooperate with china to the extent that u.s regulations are not violated the reorganization of global supply chains in the high-tech sector would become evident and it could tension between u.s and china would go high the space might gradually shrink

samsung has planned to build a state-of-the-art chip processing facility in texas austin maybe in the united states the final negotiations are currently in progress korean firm's investment in the united states would be helpful to complement u.s manufacturing capabilities and contribute to stabilize the u.s supply chains korean companies could also have opportunities for the stable growth and continuous technological innovation however we all know that this decision has made with made out of political and diplomatic

consideration rather than the market logic in fact the reason that advanced semiconductor manufacturing facilities have not been operated in the u.s until now is mainly due to the market factors some estimate that korean firms should have to bear extra 30 percent cost if they operate semiconductor fafsa in the u.s so i think the continuous support from the u.s government for the korean investment is kind of very necessary if the ongoing technological cooperation between korea and u.s could develop into

a solid foundation for the korea and u.s alliance it would at least two or three more years of preparation and need continuous support for a long time maybe after biden administration from for korean firms to successfully construct and operate advanced semiconductor manufacturing facility in the us in 2019 when the japanese government restricted the export of semiconductor materials to korea due to diplomatic conflict between two countries it caused a great disruption in the supply chain of korean

semiconductor industry since then korean firms have been trying to localize semiconductor materials in order to decrease the risk but this localization strategy has a clear limitation the semiconductor industry association of united states report uh insists that if all consist semiconductor manufacturing is done in the united states instead of importing manufactured chip the production cost is expected to increase by 35 to 60 percent the report argues that it is neither desirable nor possible for the united

states and other state to pursue self-sufficiency in the global semiconductor value chain many countries now have been trying to secure supply chain by strengthening cooperation with the other countries the u.s government has requested tsmc taiwanese firm and samsung to construct a semiconductor manufacturing facility in the u.s while supporting aggressive investment by u.s domestic firms like intel and micron japanese government also have prepared a new semiconductor industry policy and supported tsmc's construction of

manufacturing facility in japan and it was reported that micron u.s company is also planning to build semiconductor manufacturing facilities in japan while dynamic cooperation across the u.s japanese and taiwanese semiconductor firms stand out there is no cases of korean semiconductor forms new cooperation trial with a japanese and taiwanese company and korea seems to be somewhat lagging behind in a newly emerging coalition in semiconductor sector korean and japanese firms have been competitors in the semiconductor

sector but they have also maintained a long-term cooperative relationships as the diplomatic friction between two countries in 19 2019 extended to semiconductor sector korea and japanese semiconductor farms cooperation have weakened it would be good restore the channel of cooperation between two countries you know korea has global stars like samsung and sk hynix but the ecosystem to support them is pretty much weak there is no korean companies among world's top 10 materials and equipment firms on the other hand japan does not

have any you know major big shot in semiconductor field but there are many top level materials and equipment firms although there exists some conditions for mutually complementary cooperation between two countries it is true that prospects of cooperation between two countries are not bright economic security is one of the top policy agenda in new gishida cabinet and ministry of economic security was newly established the japanese government is reported to plan to enact new economic security law strengthening regulation on technology

leakage to china japan's economic security strategy do not mention any cooperation with korea so far the korean government is also responding to supply chain stability by organizing economic security task force so on so forth but there is no strategy on how to build a korean you know technology alliance network including japan and taiwan and other asian firms as well as our u.s and eu economic security and securing supply chain would be one of the top priorities no matter what government take office

next year korea and japan should try to find out a way to step up cooperation in the technology sector so that they could uh tide over the waves of u.s china technology right lively thank you we'll go right to andrew grotto andy great well thanks tom uh thank you to the organizers for including me in our discussion today it's really good to be here i've already learned a ton from the conversation um so far um so i i want to cover two topics um one is why uh decoupling is the wrong phrase to guide um u.s

and allied a strategy and why um reimagined or recalibrated interdependence ought to be our uh collective uh north star as far as policy goes and the second topic i want to talk about is why there's there's far more to the u.s china rift than the united states and china and hint it's it's not simply a great power uh competition so you know decoupling is this phrase that you know it's often heard in washington dc is the goal of u.s supply chain policy uh toward china you know the phrases fall a little

bit out of favor um but it's you know since since the administration took over but you still hear shades of it and debate um and you know i want to pick on that phrase a little bit um you know i think it's it's meaning is opaque at best and it gestures uh towards an outcome that is both uh fantastical uh and not ultimately in uh us and allied interests even if it were possible to um decouple and i'll use semiconductors as a as a topic to illustrate some of these points as i move along here uh it's

fantastical because um supply chains are simply too complex intertwined and global to ever be cleaved into decoupled american and chinese supply chains counterproductive because america and its allies benefit uh from the ecosystem of comparative advantages and free trade that make the global economy hum and accrued benefits to allied economies now let's take the case of semiconductors you know america's uh intensifying geopolitical competition with china and the global shortage of semiconductors have generated a lot

of momentum in washington to strengthen uh the resilience of the global uh semiconductor supply chain and to prevent china uh from from dominating it um this you know this uh has has generated a lot of momentum um key initiatives include a 52 billion dollar legislative proposal uh to shore up the semiconductor industrial base as well as actions deny china access uh to semiconductor materials and technologies that contribute uh to that could contribute to its military um power this is legislation the u.s

chips act that's uh made it through the u.s senate is awaiting action in the house i i think there's a pretty good chance that um it will uh uh get get funded um before the end of the year through the national defense authorization act um other countries of course are pursuing uh resilience strategy as well when it comes to semiconductors although china looms less explicitly large um in them so in the case of semiconductors um you know decoupling is again you know fantastical and counterproductive um

so you know the intense uh capital requirements for many links in the supply chain for semiconductors favors suppliers that can achieve economies of scale this has resulted in consolidation of suppliers at certain key links in the supply chain fabs are a great example those new fabs cost tens of billions of dollars to build um on top of that um the supply chain um you know features extensive pre-commercial research specialized design equipment libraries of intellectual property uh hundreds of specialty

and commodity inputs and dozens of classes of precision engineering equipment many of these inputs are themselves the products of still more specialty and commodity inputs this complexity and especially the myriad technologies involved in the supply chain uh makes vertical integration really hard across multiple links um in the supply chain and favors firms that's come to specialize in a particular uh link um in the supply chain and what's what what's happened is you know comparative advantage including subsidies um

and low international trade costs have organized these specialties on a largely geographic basis uh so in the us um with our innovation ecosystem we we lead in the most r d intensive area in semiconductors chip design asia where there's a broad government support for capital intensive processing and manufacturing industries uh leads and materials and manufacturing and of course within asia uh there's still further differentiation you know for example taiwan um you know it's really you know the only place in the world

or i think it says something like 92 percent of the capacity to produce semiconductors below kind of the benchmark 10 nanometer node um korea you know is exceptional in areas like advanced memory manufacturing japan in areas like equipment and materials uh for assembling and packaging that third step in the process um uh it's less capital intensive more sensitive to labor costs uh so asia leads uh as well there with china even countries like malaysia uh making making inroads well the problem is this the supply chain is brittle

against natural disasters this is not new um you know kovid um and some of the the problems that have affected the industry of the last uh 18 24 months are not new problems um there have been other episodes in really recent history that have highlighted the brittleness of the supply chain against natural disasters um the supply chain may be purposefully manipulated by by states uh china is obviously uh top of mind for those of us in the united states um but i think as some have mentioned you know there's

been this dispute between japan um and south korea involving access to some key uh precursor chemicals that um subject to export control from japan to south korea um uh there's also uh um uh and then of course um you know concerns driven by semiconductors being a key contributor to china's uh military rise um so to decouple this uh industry uh you know easily uh one trillion dollars up front for the u.s to achieve self-sufficiency according to the the semiconductor industry association report that was mentioned a moment ago

um 35 to 65 price increase in semiconductors that's just the economic cost there's a lot more there are other costs as well that are important to to to talk about here one is that decoupling would concentrate more risk in north america which is problematic especially when we think about how climate change is affecting uh north america and then of course the broader globe um allies would suffer uh i think great economic harm respond with with subsidies of their own and then innovation would suffer too

semiconductor um you know the supply chain you know is not as resilient as we would like but the impressive run how that moore's law has had now for you know almost 50 years um it really highlights how productively innovative sector has been it's hard to imagine this innovation not suffering significantly in a decoupling scenario so what should the goal instead be well from my perspective i would argue that um we've got to do is recalibrate interdependence and this can't be done with without without allied cooperation i see at

least um five um elements uh one is to understand uh the dependencies um and the relationships business and geopolitical behind them within the supply chain uh the second is to develop market driven uh non-discriminatory options uh for uh enhanced resilience the third element is to avoid overreach on export controls by focusing on technologies um really that that meeting one of four uh characteristics um they if you know either stacking as a choke point um so for example uh rare earth is a choke point

for many um technology for many modern digital technologies semiconductors are another one um technologies that uh could erect competitive barriers uh you know so for example um access things like uh uh photolithography equipment talk about semiconductors uh technologies that that provide direct military application that's sort of the most obvious one and then last but not least technologies that serve as accelerants for other technologies um so semiconductors again is a big one here uh because uh you know semiconductors

underpin uh you know innovation and advancements in 5g quantum computing artificial intelligence you name it um the the fourth um uh element um um for recalibrating interdependence um i think is is to strive i will never get there but to strive for zero asymmetric interdependencies aka dependencies with china and then last uh but certainly not least and i hope we'll spend some more time talking about this in the q a is uh the fifth element is is managing disputes among allies um overall i think that the u.s chips

act is a pretty good job capturing much of this but it's the allied part that i think uh still need some refinement i'm happy to dive deeper into that during the q a uh just to wrap up um i want to spend a moment talking about why i think there's a lot more to the u.s china rift than just the united states and china uh too often um this this this competition is ripped as talked about as though it were simply you know air quote simply a matter of great power competition you asked first china with sort of the rest of the world

you know caught up in tidal forces caused by the two superpowers i i think in fact it's competition uh between two distinct systems picking up on on general brooks's comments earlier a state like capitalism with authoritarian characteristics versus liberal democracy embedded in a rules-based international order um it's funny you know decoupling as a concept came into vogue in u.s policy debate relatively recently but it's been an explicit goal of china's industrial policy now for decades to achieve technological

self-sufficiency and supplant the existing titans of cutting edge technology in japan korea the us and beyond and so you know i know there's a lot of talk about picking sides in the conflict and how some allies don't want to pick sides i think this is way too simplistic i think i would submit that we are all in this competition whether we whether we like it or not it's not so much about picking sides i think it's about thinking through how to recalibrate interdependence um now of course the reality is that

liberal democracies be precisely because we're liberal democracies and thus responsive to our electorates we'll chart a slightly different courses as we navigate this tension um but the challenge is going to be how to chart uh this course in a manner consistent with our economic interests while at the same time holding core liberal democratic principles and the rules based on international order it is fundamentally an optimization problem and it's a problem uh to close out here that requires to pick up

general brooks's phrase of bringing the three uh fingers together in harmony um i look forward to your questions and and yield the floor thank you professor yeah thank you for the the kind introduction uh it's great honor to be here um uh i'd like to talk about how the private sector in japan is looking at economic security policies uh of the japanese government maybe my starting point is economic reality in east asia so one aspect is that we observe we are observing the weakening of the rule-based trading regime in east asia

east asia actually including north east and south east asia that's my definition this region has aggressively utilized the mechanics of international production networks or the second unbundling and has achieved rapid economic growth and poverty alleviation so both japan and korea have played active roles in uh factory asia actually partially together with china of course the rule-based trading regime has been one of the necessary conditions for factory asia so for the u.s china confrontation and also the

recent geopolitical tension started jeopardizing each stage as a stable and predictable business environment that's one background the other is the economic relationship with china despite geopolitical tension decoupling has so far been partial except industries products with sensitive technologies and rare as rare metal as well as just a small part of medical essential goods so with the earliest recovery of the of chinese economy uh from makovic 19 a trade and the investment related to china has been very strong actually with

uh with japan korea and also even the us so so as i said despite uh enhancing criticism on its political system we are really uh worrying about that and we are uncomfortable with the political system in china but china is still a very important business partner for our private sector so so those also the background and then looking at uh investment at trade investment related security issues i think a three a little bit different kinds of uh issues are mixed up probably the government is intentionally doing that

but the nature is a bit different so i'd like to talk about the three kinds of uh security uh economic security issues uh one is uh to avoid or reduce policy risks uh in the form of a discretionary trade policy by a superpower say china as an example is a rare earth rare metal issue uh in 2012.

uh the sudden changes in trade and related policies by a superpower or a threat of them are perceived as policy risks uh by the private sector so we usually say that don't put all the eggs in one basket i think that's a very mild expression the real issue is policy risks so super bowl can manipulate policies uh time time by time uh to uh make make the counterpart uncomfortable so that's uh that's one thing that we have to take care of that this is uh we have to take care of ourselves and definitely so the private sector is

certainly optimizing the balance between uh efficiency in uh division of labor and the risk management so how far the government can help the private sector is the issue and in the case of firms with a possibly sensitive technology technologies or rare earth rare metal government is trying to quietly promote a reduction on of the dependency on china that doing that very quietly but one of the really evident uh uh thing move was uh the metis subsidies for this purpose accelerate reshoring of factories related to sensitive

technologies rare earth rare metal and personal protective equipment so so i think the communication with the private sector by the government was not so bad in this front and also our government is not forcing private sector to do this and do that but the private sector will make a judgment so i think it's a sort of healthy way to do so we have to we know that private sector knows also the policy risks uh working with china definitely but still china is important a business partner the second is the trade investment directly

connected to hardcore national security uh i think this is uh this these are the realm in uh the international conventions like uh russian agreements and others i i think that the scope is a pretty well defined uh relatively uh so many japanese still remember the bitter experience in toshiba konberg scandal in 19 1887 and also recently we are observing the enhancing geopolitic political tension in this region so the government definitely uh should strengthen the system so the interface with the private sector is not too bad

in that sense actually the security export control section of net is taking care of that uh for the interface with the private sector this is actually completely uh clearly separated from trade policy section in betty uh they are not really communicating with each other quite often uh but but uh i think that the communication with a customs office and also minister of defense uh is not so bad uh from the from outsiders viewpoint uh we we have to make a little bit more amendment in other sectors like universities uh

taking care of some sort of sensitive technologies we have to do a little bit more carefully to to expand the scope to some extent but it was not too bad that government is uh taking care of this aspect uh so it was very unfortunate that the japan korea issue was highly politicized but from the viewpoint of the japan japanese side are still uh we believe that some proper export control is a real issue to be solved before talking about the sort of political context uh the third is technology competition

so the u.s and perhaps the whole western world would need to be engaged in a technology competition against china so this is a deliberately mixed with others actually it's mixed with the national security court and quote and in the context of japan national security may have three kinds of meaning one is of course a direct indirect technological links with hardcore national security second is the strategic thought on technology competition those are not equal actually the third is uh that we

don't know the logic uh but uh the the russian technician said that we should do this and this and we have to follow that's that's another context of national security uh yeah so so i think the definition of national security is really multi-faceted from the viewpoint of a japanese government so so allah and so private sector in japan would like to know the scope of the coupling definitely because they are uncomfortable in working in supply chains but the u.s does not seem to make it clear so there are

various stakeholders in the u.s probably and then the clear consensus building may not be easy or we have some doubt that some of the stakeholders in the u.s may want to make the borderline deliberately blurred uh so that they could take advantage in the international competition so knowing that the coupling would be limited in scope at the end allies or private sector must seek the optimum path of scope of cooperation so so for the third one uh the private sector may feel that the japanese government makes a little

effort uh to make the scope of the coupling clearer and just policies then policies that the private sector without showing clear-cut criteria so uh which would generate shrinkage effects over economic activities so this is not good uh but uh how we could do that that's probably difficult as for the semiconductor case uh japan uh is likely to follow the strategic move of the us but we at the same time we have some skeptical view on the effectiveness of a strategic industrial policy the kisuda government

set up a minister of economic security under the cabinet office cabinet secretariat but the scope and function of the office are not well defined yet so the most important task for the government is to maintain the rule-based trading regime as far as possible to make the atomic dynamism in east asia alive there's no perfect answer but probably at least we have to take care of the wto reform and the effective utilization of mega ftas like that thank you very much thank you to all three of our speakers

that we have a few questions in here that uh if i could compress and combine it with uh a question of my of my own which is now it's the same question to to all three panelists that we've heard different dimensions of tension between governments and firms and at least in the way this has been cast this evening it's u.s government uh policies that put pressure on the governments of japan and korea and either directly or indirectly present pressure on firms in japan and korea and of course in the united states

so the question is since firms are responsible for profit that's why they exist they have no responsibility for overall economic performance or for national security however defined that's a government responsibility what what is the proper balance between firms following the market doing what is economically in their interest and in the interest of shareholders and government ability to guide and therefore to limit the activities of of firms and where are we on that balance uh has has have u.s government

statements if not policies move too far in the direction of infringing on the private sector and firms or not far enough uh because we are not getting again general brooks the three fingers we're not getting the cooperation technological cooperation security cooperation political cooperation among the three allies in northeast asia uh are these technology measures making that situation worse or can they be an instrument for enhancing cooperation across a wide range of activities and let's just go in the

order that people spoke initially this pie yeah uh i think uh it's not clear whether it is desirable for the government you know uh to play an active role in the process of private sectors adjustment i think it would be better for the firm to decide and the government play a supportive role as a professor fukunari said in his presentation if necessary policies like you know subsidies or reassuring for the companies that are affected by a shrinking relationship with chinese firms could be helpful

so in korea currently a special law is being uh prepared to support high-tech sectors such as semiconductors and i'm also watching with interest uh you know what measures uh the uh new uh kishida cabinet uh in uh its economic security law will contain i think uh i uh here uh today uh it is nice for me to find a lot of commonalities uh uh among our presenters uh to consider the cooperation among uh us and uh korea and uh japan i think uh andrew mr andrew growth said uh the u.s china rivalry is a kind of you know

competition between two distinct systems state uh led authoritarian capitalism versus uh rule-based uh liberal democracy uh and korea like and also japan uh needed to find a way to navigate in a manner uh consistent with our economic interest while at the same time uh upholding core liberal democratic principle i totally agree with iu but in the case of korea this principle you know does not solve the problem we still have to deal with the difficulties caused by u.s china conflict obviously you know south korean

would not want to choose china's authoritarian political economy however chinese market and economic relations with china is very critical to korean economy you know so uh i think south korean people would first choose a security and value first and then strive uh maintain economic relations with china and minimize economic damage caused by u.s china rivalry so uh i think uh allies must as uh fukunari mr professor fukunari said we must seek the optimal path of the scope of cooperation so given this situation

in china and japan i think the united states should not put too much pressure on its allies on its relationship with china and should give them kind of you know space and room to adjust themselves okay thank you thank you to my mic andy hey um so i i appreciated professor vi's uh comments um and and the question you asked tom was a hard one um maybe i'll um respond briefly to professor baez um uh comments and then come to your your question so you know from my perspective i i i don't think it's about picking

sides um and i think that that that framing of the problem i think obscures uh the the range and uh of our policy options for uh responding to you know china's um rise in the region it's it's and and it's uh you know things that that that whether it's in the economic front on the human rights front on the military front that we all i think object to um you know i think you know i heard um jake sullivan uh earlier this year i often get asked by by um you know visitors to stanford uh from abroad you know what is the u.s policy

towards china um and i'm gonna do my best to try to summarize what i have heard the administration say which i i agree with um all of which is consistent i think with both um respecting the um the unique uh political economy that exists in all countries but especially in liberal democracies who have to be responsive to um you know populist uh citizen uh sentiment um so i think you know shore up democracy at home and abroad i think is a key pillar uh repair relationships with and among allies i think is a key

pillar and then work with china where interests align say climate change and then push back on china where necessary preferably um with with allies um allies i would argue all none of these are possible without allied engagement and support right so talk about showing up democracy at home and abroad you know my earlier point about this being a competition between systems i think um really hammers home how it's not just you know the resilience of a democracy but the system globally that's really at stake here

um when i think about repairing you know relationships with allies you know it's not just the the the damage uh wrought during the trump administration i think there's there's a lot of work to be done we've talked about the you the the south korean the rock japan relationship um to name one um so you know i i just i i don't i don't see it as as a picking sides um activity i see it as thinking through you know looking ahead to the future where you know we accept that um we have i think no choice but to accept that some

degree of interdependence is inevitable what can we do to maximize uh the prospect of that interdependence doesn't corrode our economic strength and our our uh you know democratic uh way of life tom's question you know it's funny you know i i've been in silicon valley now for four years i spent most of my life in dc you know most of my career in dc beforehand until a few years ago and the very word industrial policy was like a bad word in washington right you just never heard it right it was something

that other countries did and now it's it's in vogue and i think um you know the backlash you know the the the shift really began to occur when um largely in response to china um and in particular you know the congress's uh um changes to u.s export control law and syphilis the committee and foreign investment uh uh laws in 2018 and that the several year process before then um kind of i think broke the ice right where you had profit-oriented companies um who were taking action that was not in the u.s

national security interest and uh that so in some ways i think that's kind of the gateway drug i think we're still trying to figure out you know what what what is the appropriate balance between um you know uh government um intervention what is the right you know form um i don't have a good answer for you um maybe perhaps uh professor fukunari does christopher clare yeah thank you um i think uh for example uh government officials in metis and others still we have we have some big fans of the old

industrial policy so their idea would be that the one context is of course decoupling another context is a kovit 19 and they like to make supply chains transparent and then try to pick up choke points and the government should take care of that so that's a sort of idea that of a new industrial policy but why supply chains are not completely transparent you have to think of that as a big companies uh taking care of the whole supply chains they like to see everything of course but the small medium enterprise do not want to

disclose that kind of information who is who are their business partners and others or what was the price is they don't want to disclose those kind of information so there's a reason uh why uh supply suppressions are not completely transparent so so i think that even if uh a new um sort of revival of what industrial policy is coming uh private sector does not follow that so so i think that uh i think that's a relationship right now uh between uh methi kasamigaseki and the private sector in japan uh so so from the

viewpoint of the private sector definitely they like to know the borderline scope of the coupling uh we know that alliance relationship with the u.s is extremely important even if the logic doesn't convince us that this is the right one but we will follow that but we would like to know the borderline uh what the scope of a decoupling then then the rest of the economic activities can be under the realm of economic logic so i think that's probably the private sector japan is really hoping for thank you very much to all of you for

the responses we have uh very quickly come to the end of the allotted time for this discussion uh i thank all of those who participated on this panel i wish there were more time to respond to more of the questions but let me turn it over to your shin okay thanks tom uh for moderating and you know we covered a lot of issues today and then we have more to discuss but uh you know it's very hard to for more than two hours uh on the zoom so we have to look for other opportunities but i think this kind of intellectual

and policy dialogue engagement are very very important and i learned a lot from today's discussions and i really hope that we can meet in person uh you know as pandemic is getting you know close to the end as therefore we are pretty much back to normal but still uh we have to do a lot of measures like wearing masks inside and uh weekly testing and and so on but it's great to see people uh from korea japan and united states and thanks to our speakers moderators and audience uh for very stimulating presentation and

discussions and one thing uh before we end i was asked by eai that there is some uh survey question uh for the audience so please fill out uh before you exit the zoom but uh thanks again uh for joining uh from asia and united states and it's uh getting late in the evening here and i'm sure it's morning in japan korea so have a great evening and uh great rest of the day so hopefully see you again then thanks again to eai uh for real leading uh to organize this event thank you so much goodbye thank you

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