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The 9th Korea-Japan Future Dialogue: Korea-Japan Relations Amidst US-China Competition
YouTube Link : https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=NkTd0r9vTl0
The East Asia Institute (Director Son Yeol), in collaboration with the Chey Institute for Advanced Studies and the Genron NPO of Japan, held the 9th Korea-Japan Future Dialogue in a hybrid format on October 2nd. The Korea-Japan Future Dialogue serves as a platform for dialogue where private sector panels, including figures from politics, academia, business, and culture, share opinions and foster understanding on current bilateral issues and future cooperation measures. In this year's dialogue, experts from both countries engaged in in-depth discussions on methods for improving Korea-Japan relations, cooperation between Korea and Japan in the face of China's challenges, and the restoration of democracy and Korea-Japan cooperation, all under the overarching theme of "Korea-Japan Relations Amidst US-China Competition."
Opening Remarks
Congratulatory Remarks
Session 1. "Improving Korea-Japan Relations: Analysis of Public Opinion Survey Results and Discussion"
Session 2. "Korea-Japan Cooperation in the Face of China's Challenges"
Session 3. "Restoring Democracy and Korea-Japan Cooperation"
Youth Session I: "How Can the Younger Generation Transform Korea-Japan Relations?"
Youth Session II: "How Can Korea and Japan Cooperate on Pressing Global Issues?"
Program
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| Date | Program |
| October 2nd (Saturday) | |
| 9:00 - 9:20 | Opening |
| Kudo Yasushi, Representative of Genron NPO | |
| Son Yeol, Director of the East Asia Institute; Professor at Yonsei University | |
| Mibae Daisuke, Director-General for Asian and Oceanian Affairs, Ministry of Foreign Affairs | |
| Choi Jong-gun, First Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs | |
| 9:20 - 10:50 | Session I: "Improving Korea-Japan Relations: Analysis of Public Opinion Survey Results and Discussion" |
| Moderator | Park In-kook, President of the Chey Institute for Advanced Studies; Former UN Ambassador |
| Presenter | Kudo Yasushi, Representative of Genron NPO |
| Son Yeol, Director of the East Asia Institute; Professor at Yonsei University | |
| Panelists | Nam Ki-jung, Professor at the Institute for Japanese Studies, Seoul National University |
| Park Chul-hee, Professor at Seoul National University | |
| Shin Kak-soo, Former Ambassador to Japan | |
| Kwon Yong-seok, Associate Professor at Hitotsubashi University | |
| Nishino Junya, Professor at Keio University | |
| Okunozono Hideki, Associate Professor, Graduate School of International Relations, Shizuoka University; Deputy Director, Center for Contemporary Korean and North Korean Studies | |
| Tsukamoto Soichi, Professor at Obirin University; Former NHK Seoul Bureau Chief | |
| 10:50-11:00 | Break |
| 11:00 - 12:30 | Session II: "Korea-Japan Cooperation in the Face of China's Challenges" |
| Moderator | Ogura Kazuo, Senior Advisor, The Japan Foundation; Former Ambassador to Korea |
| Presenter | Tanaka Hitoshi, Chairman, Japan Institute of International Affairs |
| Jeon Jae-sung, Director of the East Asia Institute; Professor at Seoul National University | |
| Panelists | Kim Hyun-ki, Correspondent-at-Large, JoongAng Ilbo |
| Ryu Je-seung, Former Director General for Policy, Ministry of National Defense; Lieutenant General, Army | |
| Ha Young-sun, Chairman of the East Asia Institute; Professor Emeritus at Seoul National University | |
| Kawaguchi Yoriko, Fellow at the Musashino University Institute for Global Studies; Former Minister for Foreign Affairs of Japan | |
| Kojo Yoshiko, Professor at Aoyama Gakuin University | |
| Okonogi Masao, Professor Emeritus at Keio University | |
| 12:30-13:30 | Break |
| 13:30 - 15:00 | Session III: "Restoring Democracy and Korea-Japan Cooperation" |
| Moderator | Kudo Yasushi, Representative of Genron NPO |
| Presenter | Shinsuke Sugiyama, Former Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of Japan to the United States; Special Professor, Waseda University |
| Lee Sook-jong, Senior Fellow, East Asia Institute; Professor, Sungkyunkwan University | |
| Panelists | Kim Se-yeon, Former Member of the National Assembly |
| Kim Hun-joon, Professor, Korea University | |
| Oh Joon, Former Ambassador to the United Nations | |
| Rui Matsukawa, Parliamentary Vice-Minister of Defense; Member of the House of Councillors, Liberal Democratic Party of Japan | |
| Noriyuki Isozaki, Professor, Faculty of Law, Gakushuin University | |
| Abito Ito, Professor Emeritus, Graduate School of Social Sciences, Tokyo University | |
| 15:00 - 15:20 | Closing |
| 15:20 - 17:30 | Youth Session I: "How Can the Younger Generation Transform Korea-Japan Relations?" |
| Youth Session II: "How Can Korea and Japan Cooperate on Pressing Global Issues?" | |
| Moderator | Cho Yang-hyun, Professor, Department of Asian and Pacific Studies, Korea National Diplomatic Academy; Lead Professor, Center for Japanese Studies |
| Yuu Nishimura, Manager, International Cooperation Department, Genron NPO | |
| Panelists | Kwon Ji-woong, Youth Spokesperson, Democratic Party of Korea |
| Kim Jung-hwang, Former Sergeant, ROK-US Combined Forces Command; Student, Kangwon National University | |
| Kim Ho-jin, Student, Graduate School of Public Policy, Hanyang University | |
| Ahn Jung-hoon, Reporter, Politics Desk, Maeil Business Newspaper | |
| Lee Min-jung, Doctoral Candidate, Department of Political Science and International Relations, Seoul National University | |
| Lee Ha-yeon, Research Fellow, East Asia Institute | |
| Yuseon Ko, Doctoral Candidate, University of Exeter (Development Model Expert) | |
| Kyoka Koizumi, Student, United World College ISAK Japan | |
| Riho Machiko, Graduate Student, Ritsumeikan University | |
| Toshiya Obu, Reporter, International News Department, Asahi Shimbun Tokyo Headquarters | |
| Yeji Yoo, Doctoral Student, Department of Sociology, Chiang Mai University, Thailand | |
| Momoko Kanbe, Intern, Genron NPO |
Video Script
Good morning. I am Park In-tak, Director of the Academic Institute of the National Academy of Sciences, serving as the moderator for the first session of the 9th Korea-Japan Future Dialogue. Around this time last year, when the 8th Korea-Japan Future Dialogue was held, former Prime Minister Abe suddenly passed away due to health issues, and there were high expectations for the new Prime Minister Suga. During his one year in office, there were no particular issues in Korea-Japan relations. This time, on September 29th, Fumio Kishida, former Minister of Foreign Affairs, was elected as the president of the ruling Liberal Democratic Party, becoming the 100th Prime Minister. This raises the possibility of a turning point in Korea-Japan relations, which is of great interest today.
Korean media outlets generally discuss that regardless of who becomes the Prime Minister of Japan, changes in Korea-Japan relations are unlikely. Specifically, Prime Minister Kishida served as the longest-serving Minister of Foreign Affairs for five years during the Abe administration, which took a hardline stance on historical issues. He was also a party to the 2015 Korea-Japan Foreign Ministers' agreement on the comfort women issue. Therefore, some perspectives suggest that resolving the issue may become even more difficult. However, Prime Minister Kishida is also classified as a dove within the LDP and emphasizes dialogue and economic cooperation with neighboring countries. Thus, there are also arguments that he could be a new momentum for changes in Korea-Japan relations.
With this situation in mind, it is highly appropriate that we have gathered nine experts from both Korea and Japan today for analysis and discussion on Korea-Japan relations, co-hosted by the East Asia Institute and Genron NPO. Before the discussion, Director Sohn of the East Asia Institute and Representative Kudo of Genron NPO will present the results of this year's mutual perception survey between Korea and Japan. As the survey results have already been detailed in the media, today we will only present the key points to facilitate a lively discussion.
We will allocate 10 minutes to each speaker. First, I invite Director Sohn. If Mr. Kudo is ready, please proceed first. Ah, yes. Regarding the survey results, what we need to examine in this 9th public opinion survey is the significant change in consciousness, particularly within South Korea, amidst the drastically altered international environment of US-China rivalry. Furthermore, there is a clear trend of connection among the younger generation, centered around culture and popular culture. While government-level relations remain in a state of deterioration, approximately 20% of the public, as you mentioned, are not just hoping for a change with the new Japanese Prime Minister, but are actually expecting it.
However, regarding whether the Japanese public believes that even if the South Korean president changes, nothing will change, nearly 90% of respondents believe so. That is, very few expect change. Thus, despite the government-level exchanges, there is a significant divergence in public perception between the two countries. I want to convey that public consciousness and the government's stance are different. Therefore, what I would like to emphasize first is the perception of each other's importance, which has become a key focus of this survey.
Originally, the perception of each other's importance was not stable. It is a mistake to consider it important or not important at different times. However, for the most part, South Koreans' perception of importance has been stable. In Japan, it suddenly dropped from 2017. Compared to when the survey first began, it fell by 17 percentage points. Why did it fall? The reason is stated in the survey, but it is the distrust towards the other country's government. This is the reason. In Japan, nearly 67% of the population believes that if the government's agreements from the past regarding historical perception are not honored, they cannot be considered a negotiating partner. This deep-seated distrust among the Japanese public is the issue. In fact, South Koreans also exhibit a similar tendency.
What is clearer than this question is the issue of Japan's economic retaliation. Regarding the export control measures, the South Korean public has a very negative view. While some evaluate the South Korean government's stance positively, others believe it was handled poorly. Currently, this distrust towards the other country's government exists among the public. For South Koreans, distrust leads to a decrease in perceived importance. For Japanese people, distrust does not directly affect their perception of importance.
However, what is important here is not that. I was also surprised, but regarding the perception of importance, there has been a significant change in three areas. First, as mentioned earlier, within the context of the alliance with the United States, there is what is called a 'commonality.' That is, the item stating that South Korea and Japan, which are allied with the United States, share common interests has increased by about 10 percentage points in South Korea. The shared value of democracy also increased by 10 percentage points.
Furthermore, the perception that cooperation between South Korea and Japan would be mutually beneficial in the context of US-China rivalry is also increasing, by about 30 percentage points. As a result, in the 21st century, nearly 60% of South Koreans are beginning to align with Japan on the basis of shared common ground, given the unstable international environment. Japanese people are also exhibiting similar behavior.
Among the Japanese public, there is also a growing awareness that Korea and Japan must cooperate properly amidst the US-China confrontation and within the framework of democracy. It is significant that this is happening amidst such a bleak outlook. In this year's survey, we were also surprised to find that South Korean public opinion is changing significantly based on this. The threat from China is increasing. Until now, North Korea was considered the primary threat. However, there were people in South Korea who considered Japan a threat. The number of people who consider Japan a threat is increasing, and in this regard, they are facing the same situation as Japan's perception of threats in Northeast Asia. Furthermore, they believe that the military alliance among Korea, the US, and Japan should be strengthened. Also, more than 51.1% of South Koreans believe that they should participate in the new cooperation framework that Japan is pursuing in the Pacific.
Japan may not have been prepared for this. Japan did not originally need to consider this. However, domestic discussions have not reached that point. Economically, the perception that Japan is significantly important to the South Korean economy is also increasing. The international changes, particularly the US-China rivalry, have significantly altered the perceptions of South Koreans. This has also changed their view of Japan. For example, half of the people believe that the historical perception issue is difficult to resolve. However, a growing number of people believe that historical issues should be resolved gradually through future-oriented cooperation. Such significant changes are occurring. On the other hand, there is a significant shift in the consciousness of the younger generation and those interested in popular culture. The younger generation generally prefers better relations between the two countries.
A growing number of people prefer better relations. They hold a completely different perspective. Even based on popular culture consumption patterns, although there are some differences with South Korea, there are particularly many enthusiastic K-pop fans among the Japanese public. This indicates that people want to enjoy Korean popular culture regardless of the state of Korea-Japan relations. In other words, the fact that public consciousness is changing in this way, even while government-level relations are deteriorating, signals to us how we should interpret this. Such changes are prompting us to concretize solutions for the current situation, including the government's response.
We intend to address these issues. Thank you. Since Representative Kudo has already provided a comprehensive overview, I will focus on three points from the perspective of the Korean side. First, the increasing necessity of cooperation with Japan, particularly among the South Korean public, and how we should interpret this. Second, in relation to this, I will discuss the China factor, specifically the US-China relationship and China. Third, I will elaborate further on the issue of popular culture consumption between Korea and Japan. Overall, there is a desire for cooperation emerging from the South Korean side. What I particularly focus on here is the concept of 'future orientation.' The statement 'We must overcome the existing confrontation between Korea and Japan in a future-oriented manner' is the most frequently cited response from the South Korean side, at approximately 46%.
I would like to present these issues. Thank you. Since Representative Kudo has already provided a comprehensive overview, I will focus on three points from the perspective of the Korean side. First, the increasing necessity of cooperation with Japan, particularly among the South Korean public, and how we should interpret this. Second, in relation to this, I will discuss the China factor, specifically the US-China relationship and China. Third, I will elaborate further on the issue of popular culture consumption between Korea and Japan. Overall, there is a desire for cooperation emerging from the South Korean side. What I particularly focus on here is the concept of 'future orientation.' The statement 'We must overcome the existing confrontation between Korea and Japan in a future-oriented manner' is the most frequently cited response from the South Korean side, at approximately 46%.
Third, I will elaborate further on the issue of popular culture consumption between Korea and Japan. Overall, there is a desire for cooperation emerging from the South Korean side. What I particularly focus on here is the concept of 'future orientation.' The statement 'We must overcome the existing confrontation between Korea and Japan in a future-oriented manner' is the most frequently cited response from the South Korean side, at approximately 46%. On the other hand, the response regarding 'future-oriented cooperation' is relatively lower in Japan. Second, similarly, as you can see, the item on 'future-oriented cooperation' specifically mentions areas such as economy, technology, and environment. In the past, South Korea's response to the idea that historical issues would be resolved gradually by building such cooperative relations was quite low, but it has significantly increased this time, by about 14%. Therefore, it seems that the sentiment that Korea and Japan should move forward together with a view toward the future is taking root among the general public.
Second, similarly, as you can see, the item on 'future-oriented cooperation' specifically mentions areas such as economy, technology, and environment. In the past, South Korea's response to the idea that historical issues would be resolved gradually by building such cooperative relations was quite low, but it has significantly increased this time, by about 14%. Therefore, it seems that the sentiment that Korea and Japan should move forward together with a view toward the future is taking root among the general public. Regarding the Supreme Court ruling on forced mobilization, which is a major issue, the fundamental position of South Korea, that is, that enforcement and liquidation should proceed according to the rulings of the South Korean government and judiciary, was 63% in 1999. Last year, it decreased to 36%, and this year to 32%. The remaining respondents suggest finding diverse solutions, meaning that proceeding strictly according to the current judicial rulings is not ideal, and thus diverse approaches should be sought, with about 30% of the public holding this view.
Regarding the Supreme Court ruling on forced mobilization, which is a major issue, the fundamental position of South Korea, that is, that enforcement and liquidation should proceed according to the rulings of the South Korean government and judiciary, was 63% in 1999. Last year, it decreased to 36%, and this year to 32%. The remaining respondents suggest finding diverse solutions, meaning that proceeding strictly according to the current judicial rulings is not ideal, and thus diverse approaches should be sought, with about 30% of the public holding this view. As mentioned earlier, there is an increase in cooperation in military and security matters, specifically in Korea-US-Japan cooperation. The issue of participation in the Quad is also mentioned. Interestingly, in terms of economy, when asked about important countries for the South Korean economy, China is at the top, around 80%. However, interestingly, the response that the United States is important has jumped from 74% last year to 86%, which is even higher than China. Japan has also increased from 41% to 52%. Therefore, the public is strongly considering Korea-US cooperation, and there is a growing trend towards cooperation with Japan and the United States in the economic sphere.
As mentioned earlier, there is an increase in cooperation in military and security matters, specifically in Korea-US-Japan cooperation. The issue of participation in the Quad is also mentioned. Interestingly, in terms of economy, when asked about important countries for the South Korean economy, China is at the top, around 80%. However, interestingly, the response that the United States is important has jumped from 74% last year to 86%, which is even higher than China. Japan has also increased from 41% to 52%. Therefore, the public is strongly considering Korea-US cooperation, and there is a growing trend towards cooperation with Japan and the United States in the economic sphere.
This requires in-depth analysis, and the results are indeed interesting. Regarding the reasons for these changes, first, it is natural to consider that since the situation has changed, a change in perception is necessary. Second, the change in Japanese prime ministers has had an effect. While unfavorable views of former Prime Minister Abe were very high in South Korea, favorable views of Prime Minister Suga have not changed, but unfavorable views have decreased significantly. Therefore, I believe this has had an impact. Lastly, there is the issue of China. I will skip the political perception aspect.
Regarding military threats, if we look at perceptions again, North Korea remains at around 80-85%. It dropped to 67.5% in 2018 when relations improved, but has since returned to its previous level. For Japan, the threat perception was high in 2015 and has been on a downward trend since then. This year, it has decreased significantly. In contrast, China's threat perception, which was around 36% in 2016, similar to Japan's, jumped in 2017 due to the THAAD deployment. The perception, which was around 50-45%, has significantly increased this year to 61.8%. Therefore, South Koreans perceive a significant military threat from China, and their impression of China is not good, with the perception of negativity rising to 87.13.8%. On the other hand, favorable views are only 10%, which is about half of the current favorable view of Japan among South Koreans. Therefore, the perception of threat from China, and the resulting preference for Korea-US-Japan cooperation in both military and economic spheres, may be leading to a relative preference for cooperation with the US and Japan. Consequently, rather than a fundamental improvement in bilateral relations with Japan, it is necessary to pay considerable attention to the relationship with Japan within the context of broader East Asian and Asia-Pacific dynamics, especially in light of changes related to China and the US-China relationship. This is the trend of public opinion, and I believe this is the direction it is heading.
Therefore, the perception of threat from China, and the resulting preference for Korea-US-Japan cooperation in both military and economic spheres, may be leading to a relative preference for cooperation with the US and Japan. Consequently, rather than a fundamental improvement in bilateral relations with Japan, it is necessary to pay considerable attention to the relationship with Japan within the context of broader East Asian and Asia-Pacific dynamics, especially in light of changes related to China and the US-China relationship. This is the trend of public opinion, and I believe this is the direction it is heading. Lastly, as mentioned, there is the consumption of popular culture. In terms of popular culture consumption, South Koreans have a generally positive impression of Japan, with nearly 70% of those who consume Japanese culture having a positive impression. This is even higher on the Japanese side: over 80% have a good impression of South Korea. Therefore, popular culture significantly influences perceptions of the other country, and as mentioned, the willingness to continue consuming it even when Korea-Japan relations deteriorate is much higher in Japan (64%) compared to South Korea (32%).
Lastly, regarding the consumption of popular culture, there is a difference by age group, with younger people consuming more popular culture. This applies to both Korea and Japan. In Korea, it's K-pop, and in Japan, it's anime and manga. The trend is similar. Also, regarding the willingness to continue consuming Japanese culture even if Korea-Japan relations worsen, younger generations show high loyalty, whereas among those aged 60 and above, 73.9% say they would reduce consumption if Korea-Japan relations deteriorate. On the other hand, loyalty remains high in Japan.
To summarize, there is a growing consensus on the need for Korea-Japan cooperation, at least from the South Korean side, and to some extent from the Japanese side as well. As Representative Kudo mentioned, this is a response to future threats or anxieties, such as the US-China competition, the China factor, and the issue of declining democracy, which will be discussed today. In this context, there is a growing public perception that Korea-Japan cooperation is necessary. This is precisely the theme chosen for this year's Korea-Japan Future Dialogue. Second, the difference in the level of enthusiasm for cooperation between the Korean and Japanese publics is an important issue that the experts should address. Third, while there is a significant decoupling between the government and the public in South Korea, this decoupling is less pronounced or even coupled in Japan. Therefore, I believe further discussion among experts is needed on this point. I will conclude my presentation here. Thank you. All participants have worked hard. Before we proceed to an in-depth discussion on Korea-Japan relations, I would like to pose a few common questions as moderator. First, despite the Supreme Court's ruling on compensation for forced mobilization victims in October 2018, the Seoul Central District Court dismissed the lawsuit filed by 80 victims against 16 Japanese companies in June of this year. However, the issue arises if the liquidation based on last year's Supreme Court ruling proceeds, regardless of the Seoul court's decision. Second, regarding the argument that anti-Japan sentiment is being exploited for domestic political purposes, or that tensions between Korea and Japan are being used as a political bargaining chip. Third, the approach of separating historical issues from security and economic cooperation, the so-called 'two-track' approach, has not yielded significant results. However, there is a growing perspective, particularly among the younger generation, that focusing more on revitalizing private exchanges, such as culture and arts, as recently briefed, may be more effective than government-led initiatives. Fourth, in the context of key global supply chain strategies, such as semiconductors, batteries, and life sciences, which the Biden administration is actively pursuing, the strained Korea-Japan relations are posing a significant burden on the United States. Therefore, unlike in the past, active US involvement is expected. What are your analyses and expectations regarding this? Representatives from the Korean and Japanese sides will each present their positions for five minutes, followed by an opportunity for further answers to your questions as time permits.
To summarize, while the ROK and, to some extent, Japan are already familiar with the concept of bilateral cooperation, as you mentioned, it is significantly driven by the need to respond to future threats or anxieties. This includes factors such as competition with China, and issues related to the decline of democracy, which will be discussed today. Against this backdrop, there is a growing public awareness that bilateral cooperation is necessary. The ROK-Japan Future Dialogue has selected this as a theme to address the need for cooperation in response to future challenges.
Second, the difference in the level of public enthusiasm for cooperation between the ROK and Japan is an important issue that experts should address. Lastly, while there is a strong coupling between government and private sectors in Korea, this appears to be loose decoupling or loose coupling in Japan. Therefore, I believe further discussion among experts is needed on this point. Thank you. All of you have worked hard. Before we proceed to an in-depth discussion on ROK-Japan relations, I would like to ask a few common questions as the moderator. First, despite the Supreme Court's ruling on forced labor compensation in October 2018, the Seoul Central District Court dismissed the lawsuit filed by 80 victims of forced labor against 16 Japanese companies in June. The issue is whether the payment of damages based on last year's Supreme Court ruling will proceed, irrespective of the Seoul court's ruling. Second, the argument that anti-Korean sentiment is being politically exploited domestically, i.e., ROK-Japan
The presentations will proceed with the Korean and Japanese sides respectively. First, may I ask Ambassador Shin of the Korean side to present? Yes, thank you. It is an honor to have the opportunity to participate in the 9th Korea-Japan Future Dialogue, and I would like to express my gratitude to everyone who prepared this event. In fact, this year marks the 10th year since Korea-Japan relations began to deteriorate, a lost decade. The Korea-Japan Future Dialogue was initially launched when relations were worsening, with the aim of restoring relations from a future-oriented perspective. This dialogue has now reached its 9th iteration, and as Representative Kudo mentioned earlier, we are still far from emerging from this dark and long tunnel.
The presentations will proceed with the Korean and Japanese sides respectively. First, may I ask Ambassador Shin of the Korean side to present? Yes, thank you. It is an honor to have the opportunity to participate in the 9th Korea-Japan Future Dialogue, and I would like to express my gratitude to everyone who prepared this event. In fact, this year marks the 10th year since Korea-Japan relations began to deteriorate, a lost decade. The Korea-Japan Future Dialogue was initially launched when relations were worsening, with the aim of restoring relations from a future-oriented perspective. This dialogue has now reached its 9th iteration, and as Representative Kudo mentioned earlier, we are still far from emerging from this dark and long tunnel.
It is an honor to have the opportunity to participate in the 9th Korea-Japan Future Dialogue, and I would like to express my gratitude to everyone who prepared this event. In fact, this year marks the 10th year since Korea-Japan relations began to deteriorate, a lost decade. The Korea-Japan Future Dialogue was initially launched when relations were worsening, with the aim of restoring relations from a future-oriented perspective. This dialogue has now reached its 9th iteration, and as Representative Kudo mentioned earlier, we are still far from emerging from this dark and long tunnel.
Therefore, the hacker is almost hindered. Oh my, the conversation about the car is... Next year, this year, the government will release 7 songs, and next year, the government will release... However, with the advent of the new government in Korea and Japan, there is a great opportunity to move forward, so in that sense, it will be a good opportunity for honest dialogue and communication between the two countries to prepare a roadmap for improving Korea-Japan relations. I believe it will be helpful. Director Park In-gu raised various issues, but it is difficult to answer them all within 5 minutes, so among them, I would like to focus on the current state of Korea-Japan relations and how to resolve them, based on the points raised by Director Sohn Seok-hyo in his presentation of the Korea-Japan public opinion poll.
As you know, Korea-Japan relations have been on a downward trend for the past 10 years, so the foundation of mutual trust, which is the basis of bilateral relations, is at rock bottom. As a result, even issues that would normally be resolved easily between Korea and Japan are handled emotionally, leading to a vicious cycle. This is the current state of Korea-Japan relations, isn't it? And as relations have deteriorated for such a long time, starting with political deterioration, it seems to have spread considerably to other areas such as the economy, security, and culture.
However, when we look at the domestic and external circumstances surrounding Korea-Japan relations, there is a greater emphasis on cooperation. In a sense, it is a situation where we should strengthen cooperation, especially given that both countries are facing a period of complex crises. However, the reality is that we are moving backward, which is a significant phenomenon. Actually, as Vice Minister Choi Jong-kun mentioned earlier this year, there was an opportunity with the Tokyo Olympics to create a turning point through dialogue and communication between the leaders of Korea and Japan, wishing for the successful hosting of the event. It is a pity that this opportunity was missed, and both Korea and Japan have entered a political season.
Prime Minister Kishida has been appointed and will likely become Prime Minister on Monday. There will be a general election in November, and elections in July next year. Until the end of the term, Japan will be in a political season, and Korea will have a presidential election in March next year, and until the new government is inaugurated in May, it will likely be a political season. However, as you know, the biggest obstacle currently hindering Korea-Japan relations is the historical issues. Resolving historical issues requires immense political will, which is difficult to expect in the current situation. Therefore, I believe that both Korea and Japan should make efforts to manage Korea-Japan relations so that they do not deteriorate further until the opportunity arises next year, perhaps around the time of the G7 summit, and to create an environment where we can move forward more vigorously when that opportunity comes.
In that regard, we need to consider the timing and perspective for a reset. It could be considered a counter-intuitive approach: focusing on the future rather than the past, the region and the world rather than bilateral relations, reason rather than emotion, and youth rather than the older generation. By adopting such a counter-intuitive perspective, I believe we can escape the current dark and long tunnel. To that end, during this transitional period, we must prevent further deterioration. The most crucial issue is likely the problem of the Japanese assets being liquidated due to the forced mobilization issue.
However, as you know, a liquidation order has been issued, and although there is still some time left for immediate execution, the process is actually in its final stages of monetization. Personally, I believe it is important to first block this through a method such as a third-party payment, and based on that, we should move towards seeking concrete diplomatic solutions. I will conclude here. Thank you.
Thank you. We can emphasize the need for various measures regarding the issue of asset liquidation to manage the current situation and prevent further deterioration until the new momentum arises by April next year. Next, I will hand over the microphone to Professor Shin So-young of Yonsei University. Arigato gozaimasu. The time is limited. I am not sure if it is a wise choice for Korea, but the Japanese side has been continuously making noises. Time is running out. I will try to adhere to the 5-minute limit. I will respond while considering the remarks of Director Sohn Seok-hyo and the moderator. First, there is no doubt that there is fatigue in Korea-Japan relations. Therefore, we must use the advent of the new government as an opportunity. Perhaps, in my personal opinion, compared to former Prime Minister Abe, Prime Minister Kishida may adopt a more cautious approach and deliver more positive messages towards Korea. I believe this is the case.
Will this lead to the resolution of fundamental issues? Certainly not. However, I believe that changing the atmosphere first will be of some help in resolving the current gloomy situation. And the main theme of today's meeting is Korea-Japan relations in the context of the US-China rivalry. Regarding relations with China, the sentiments of the Korean and Japanese people are strictly aligned. However, if we consider whether the foreign policy of Korea and Japan is aligned, it is ultimately not the case.
Whether that leads to an essential resolution of pending issues, and when it does, it is never the case. However, first, changing the atmosphere is now considered to be of some help in resolving the issues in the current situation where a sense of grayness is felt. And the major agenda of today's meeting is the Korea-Japan relations, specifically the introduction of the intermediary role. Regarding relations with neighboring countries, the sentiments of the Korean and Japanese people are strictly aligned. However, even if that is the case, are the diplomatic stabilization policies of Korea and Japan aligned? When examined closely, ultimately, they are not.
I was interested in the results of this public opinion poll when I saw the question about which countries are important for economic relations. Similar to last year, the Japanese respondents answered the United States, China, India, ASEAN, the EU, and Korea was sixth. However, for Koreans, the important economic partners are the United States, China, and Japan. We often say that Koreans no longer attach much importance to Japan, but on the other hand, the Japanese side, including the government and the public, is increasingly wondering if it is worth cooperating with Korea given the deterioration of relations. This is also reflected in the data I have just presented.
For example, the Japanese government is pursuing a policy of a free and open Indo-Pacific, but Korea is not actually included among its cooperation partners. In Korea, there are many responses advocating for the deepening of cooperation between Korea and Japan, and between Korea, Japan, and the US. This is a welcome development. The Japanese side also needs to pay attention to such Korean perceptions. However, the fundamental perceptions are still different. For example, the Japanese government's position is to resolve historical issues in Korea-Japan relations and restore healthy relations before expanding cooperative relations. However, as can be seen from the remarks of the Korean Vice Minister and the public opinion poll results, Koreans believe that even though historical issues exist, cooperation should be pursued first, adopting a two-track approach. The Japanese side also needs to cooperate in areas where cooperation is possible, especially in the context of the US-China rivalry.
I believe that a shift in perspective is needed, such as cooperating to protect common interests between Japan and Korea. As the moderator mentioned earlier, we cannot know how much cooperation the United States expects from Korea and Japan. It is likely to demand strongly. However, regardless of the US's demands, I believe we have reached a time when Korea and Japan must pool their wisdom for greater cooperation.
Thank you. Thank you for giving me the opportunity to express my opinion. I am also grateful to the two institutions that have been continuously surveying the perceptions of the citizens of both countries for a long time. First, regarding the survey methodology, I would like to mention a point that caught my attention. We need to consider that the proportion of respondents aged 60 and above was high in the age-based survey, and the proportion of respondents aged 29 and below was low. If we could see the differences by gender and region, we might be able to identify more micro-level trends. I also need to consider that the survey period overlapped with the Olympic and Paralympic Games. The results showed a slight increase in the number of Koreans who want to visit Japan, while the number of people wishing to visit the other country remained largely unchanged. Considering this, my overall impression is that if we focus on the changes rather than the absolute numbers, there is a greater possibility for improving Korea-Japan relations and a greater willingness to accept efforts for improvement.
This seems to be the stance from the Korean side. It can also be said that Korean civil society is opening up opportunities for both governments. Second, the relationship between Korea-Japan relations and history seems to be changing, with the status of historical issues shifting. This is a noteworthy result. The number of people who believe that historical issues will be gradually resolved if future-oriented cooperative relations are established between the two countries is increasing. While the opinion that future-oriented cooperative relations are difficult without resolving historical issues is also increasing, there was an option to choose that historical issues will not be resolved. Choosing this option instead of the latter indicates that there is an expectation that historical issues can be resolved, but also a demand that historical issues must be resolved for future-oriented cooperation.
Third, support for flexible solutions to historical issues is increasing. While some emphasize the need for principled solutions, the support for the forced liquidation of assets by the Korean side has slightly decreased, and support for alternative measures has slightly increased. This is something that deserves attention. This connects to the first question raised by the moderator. The issue of liquidation is currently in the process of being executed in Korea. Therefore, it will take at least eight months, or possibly longer, to resolve this issue, indicating that a considerable amount of time is still needed. Furthermore, for those who consider it a judicial resolution, it may be a fait accompli. Therefore, both governments need to put their heads together and make efforts to resolve the issue. In this regard, the open attitude towards flexible solutions in Korea is noteworthy. The Korean government has room to maneuver, and the Japanese government should not exert excessive pressure to prevent the liquidation. This would allow the Korean government to approach the issue with more flexibility.
Second, there was a question about whether anti-Japan or anti-Korea sentiment is being exploited for domestic political purposes. In this regard, concerning the evaluation of the Moon administration, the opinion that the issue is being exploited for domestic politics is decreasing among Koreans who hold negative views of the Moon administration, which may offer a glimmer of hope for a solution. It is important to note that the perception that the issue is being exploited for domestic politics is decreasing in Korea compared to the past. Third, regarding diplomacy that avoids confrontation, there is a state of dysfunction in diplomatic functions. However, if we look at the perceptions of various issues, it seems that there is a demand for more proactive solutions directed at the Korean government. This is related to the fourth question. Regarding future cooperation, it seems that the Korean public is making such demands. The government is presenting three main pillars for its foreign policy: first, emphasis on democracy, human rights, and the rule-based order; and third, proactive diplomacy on global issues. If the Korean government takes a proactive approach to the first and third pillars, a different possibility may open up. I will conclude here. First, regarding the issue of asset liquidation, which appears to be a ticking time bomb in Korea-Japan relations, you have mentioned the possibility of resolving it to some extent. I am deeply impressed by your insights into the future. Next, Professor Park Cheol-hee of Seoul National University will present. Thank you. Although it is online, I am honored to participate in the Korea-Japan Future Dialogue. I am Korean, but I am participating as a member of the Japanese delegation. I apologize for speaking in Japanese. First, as the professors pointed out, the public opinion poll shows that the Korea-Japan relationship is still in a difficult situation, but there is hope. I believe that the Korean and Japanese people are making realistic judgments in a broad, macroscopic context. Especially in the context of regional dynamics, there is consensus on the need for Korea-Japan relations to improve and for cooperation. What I found very interesting is that along with the increase in favorable views towards the US and the perceived need for cooperation, anti-China sentiment or aversion in Korea is significantly increasing. I believe this presents a great opportunity for Korea-Japan relations. The fact that the negative judgment towards China has reached 73% is a very high figure. Furthermore, the fact that the nuclear and missile threat from North Korea and the security threat from China are high in both countries is also linked to the need for security cooperation between Korea and Japan. In particular, the fact that Koreans' perception of democracy and human rights is improving, leading to increased cooperation between Korea and Japan, shows that the Japanese people are making very realistic and comprehensive judgments. However, when it comes to bilateral relations, it is very pessimistic. This is because the realistic solution for resolving Korea-Japan relations cannot be solely dependent on the US; Korea and Japan must resolve it themselves. The possibility of the two countries resolving this is almost nil, which is a regrettable reality. Negative perceptions of each other are still strong. In Korea, negative perceptions of Japan are moderate, but in Japan, they remain strong. It is as if the door to their hearts is still closed. In Korea, there is an active desire to overcome confrontation in a future-oriented manner, but in Japan, there is only a passive desire to avoid confrontation. There is still a significant gap in this regard. Both sides confirm that historical issues, territorial issues, and historical perceptions must be resolved first to solve the problem. Therefore, it is not an issue that can be easily resolved, and consequently, there is still no hope for improving relations. In particular, the perception of both leaders is very poor. Koreans view Japanese leaders positively at 2.0, while Japanese view the Moon administration at 2.0. It is difficult to express this in numbers, but the low perception of the other party is not necessarily a distrust of the people, but rather a distrust of the leaders and the government. This is a regrettable aspect from the perspective of the issue. So, what should be done? Regarding the two-track approach, what do you think? I believe the two-track approach should be implemented. Both Korea and Japan are still on one track. As Vice Minister Choi mentioned earlier, Korea-Japan relations must proceed on a two-track basis, but he also said that there can be no improvement in Korea-Japan relations without resolving historical issues. Japan also says that there can be no improvement without resolving historical issues. I believe both countries have neglected the historical issues. Both sides must make greater efforts to resolve historical issues, and we must foster the perception that we will build the future together through cooperation in security, economy, and culture, not just future-oriented cooperation. To achieve this, the perceptions of political leaders must change first. I believe that political leaders who think of the people first, the region first, and the international environment first will change, and in the long term, changes in government may occur.
This may connect to the answer to the first question among the issues raised by the moderator. The issue of the process is currently being left to the Korean side within the framework of the bilateral relationship. Therefore, it will take at least eight months, or possibly longer, meaning that a considerable amount of time is still needed to resolve the pending issues. For the victims, this may still be a matter of legal resolution. Therefore, the governments of both countries must put their heads together and make efforts to resolve the issue.
In that regard, it is worth noting that Korea has an open attitude towards flexible solutions. The Japanese government should not excessively demand that the Korean government refrain from such actions. This would allow the Korean government to approach the issue with more flexibility. Second, there was a question about whether anti-Japan or anti-Korea sentiment is being exploited for domestic political purposes.
In relation to this, regarding the evaluation of the Moon administration, the fact that there is an opinion among the Korean public that the issue is being exploited for domestic politics suggests that we may find some possibility for a solution. It is worth noting that in Korea, the perception that the issue is being exploited for domestic politics is less prevalent than in the past. Furthermore, regarding diplomacy with Japan, the functional status of diplomacy with Japan is in a state of disrepair.
Rather, if we look at the various perceptions of the issues, it seems that there is a demand for more proactive solutions directed towards the Korean government. This seems to be related to the fourth question: regarding future cooperation, it appears that the Korean public is making such demands. The government is presenting three key principles for its foreign policy: first, an emphasis on democracy, human rights, and the rules-based order; and third, actively pursuing diplomacy on global challenges. If the Korean government takes a proactive approach in the first and third areas, a different possibility may open up. I will conclude my remarks here. First, regarding the issue of wartime labor, which appears to be a time bomb, the possibility of resolving it to some extent has been mentioned.
This is also related to various thoughts about the future. Professor Suzuki, from the University of Tokyo, presented his findings. His research indicates that in December 2010, then-President Lee Myung-bak made a statement regarding the satisfaction of the Japanese people, and since then, Korea-Japan relations have followed this trend. This is my understanding.
If we consider this, then the 'lost 20 years' that Professor Shim mentioned may not be an exaggeration. This survey also suggests that over the past 20 years, the mutual perceptions of the Korean and Japanese people have become normalized. In this context, while there may not be a complete solution, if we share the understanding that we must move forward, we will have to strategically proceed with what we can do and continue with what we cannot stop.
Amidst this, the survey results also clearly show changes on the Japanese side. From the Japanese perspective, in the section asking about the importance of Korea-Japan relations, the figure indicating that Korea does not prioritize cooperation with Japan was very high. On the other hand, regarding how to engage in exchanges and how to cooperate, the number of Japanese respondents who answered 'I don't know' rapidly increased. They don't know how to proceed.
In short, the distrust or uncertainty regarding how Korea intends to proceed with its relations with Japan is reflected in these figures. On the other hand, regarding the Abe administration's policies, the Japanese results show a significant number of respondents believe that these policies have not contributed to reducing the negative impact on bilateral relations. Furthermore, support for Japan's policies towards Korea has clearly decreased. In this sense, it seems that the Japanese side is also beginning to feel the need to take some action on various levels.
In addition, support for policies towards Japan has clearly decreased. In this sense, it seems that the Japanese side is also beginning to feel the need to take some action on various levels. In this context, Tokyo has concluded its discussions, and a new government is emerging in Japan. Considering these points, while the current Korea-Japan relations are not solely due to the Abe administration, which has already been defeated, and are a structural issue, it is not something that can be expected to improve solely due to the administration's policies. However, looking at the trend continuing from the Abe administration to the current administration, the Suga administration, while born under the Abe administration, may have a limited scope of action. However, if they can successfully navigate the upcoming Upper House election, the Suga administration may be able to express its own colors to some extent.
If the Upper House election is successfully passed, the Suga administration may be able to express its own colors to some extent. On the Korean side, the presidential term is also nearing its end. After the end of the presidential term, will the judicial rulings in Korea prevail? Following the press conference, a judicial ruling to the contrary was issued. The scope of action available to the president may be limited. Therefore, a certain opportunity for the president to make a political decision has arrived, and it can be seen as a good opportunity for a political decision.
Specifically, what kind of measures can be proposed? While discussions are ongoing, and depending on the situation, a basket of measures may be considered. Thank you. There is a change in the perception that something must be done. However, the future-oriented comments were made. Next, Professor Cheon, from Seoul National University, will present. Thank you. Although our Japanese friends are online, the discussion has concluded. Upon reviewing this public opinion survey, I believe that the people of Korea and Japan are making judgments realistically within a broad, macro context. Especially within this major regional dynamic, the Korea-Japan relationship should improve.
I believe there is a consensus on the necessity of cooperation. What I found particularly interesting was that alongside increased favorable views and the need for cooperation with the United States, anti-China sentiment or even hatred is rising in South Korea. I believe this presents a significant opportunity for South Korea-Japan relations. The fact that the negative perception of China has reached 73% in numerical terms is a very high figure. Furthermore, the continued threats from North Korea's nuclear weapons and missiles, along with the security threats from China, are both high on the agenda for both countries, which is being confirmed as connecting to the necessity of South Korea-Japan security cooperation. Especially in South Korea, as awareness of democracy and human rights has been enhanced, the view that cooperation with Japan will also increase is being observed, and I believe the Japanese public is making very realistic and broad judgments. However, when it comes to bilateral relations, the outlook is very pessimistic. This is because
For everyone, the United States cannot play a decisive role in realistically resolving South Korea-Japan relations; rather, South Korea and Japan must resolve it themselves. However, the possibility of South Korea and Japan resolving this bilaterally is almost nonexistent. I believe it is a regrettable reality that this view is held very pessimistically. Negative perceptions of each other remain strong. In South Korea, while the negative perception of Japan is moderate, in Japan, it is still intense. It's as if the door to their hearts remains closed. In South Korea, there is an active desire to overcome confrontational issues in a future-oriented manner, but in Japan, there is a tendency to only passively seek to avoid confrontation. In this respect, a considerable gap still exists.
Second, how to overcome populism? I believe the root of populism lies in the victim mentality or the weak mentality in Korea, and the perception in Japan of looking down on Korea from a superior position. This fuels nationalism. The public opinion surveys show that Korea and Japan are on equal footing and are moving forward as equals. Therefore, as the perception of Korea and Japan as equal partners expands, the temptation of populism will decrease. Lastly, I agree that revitalizing private exchanges should precede government efforts. Ultimately, those who consume culture, especially the younger generation, have increased favorability, and this is particularly true for those in their 20s and 30s. Therefore, we need to secure a fan base centered on the youth of both countries, expand exchanges, and increase dialogue for the future, as the saying goes. I believe that continuing dialogue for the future between Korea and Japan is the way to resolve relations. Thank you.
Thank you. Next, Professor Shin So-young of Yonsei University will present. I am honored to have been given this valuable opportunity. The results of this public opinion poll also indicate that Korea-Japan relations are still in a difficult situation. However, if we look for bright spots, we can say that the situation is such that our perceptions of each other are not falling further. However, we are unable to travel freely, and the many exchanges that used to take place are now regulated or severed. In such a situation, although there has not been significant improvement, I believe there has been some progress. In particular, in Korea, despite Japan's export restrictions, there has been a spread of economic self-reliance in materials, parts, and equipment. However, the fact that the number of people who want economic cooperation with Japan is increasing is a positive factor. Furthermore, under the US-China conflict, the perceptions of Koreans have changed. Perceptions of China are changing. The gap in perceptions between Korea and Japan regarding China has narrowed, and in this regard, I believe there is room for cooperation between Korea and Japan. A new question in this survey asks whether people would choose multilateral cooperation including the US and China, or cooperation with Japan and Korea. 36% of respondents chose the former. I believe it is desirable to pursue multilateral cooperation, as it is easier for Korea and Japan to cooperate within a multilateral framework than in a one-on-one situation. I will now focus on the subculture aspect of the survey. I believe it is good to be interested in subculture. A survey conducted by the Japanese Cabinet Office shows that particularly among women, many consider Korea-Japan relations to be important. I believe this is also due to the influence of popular culture and subculture. Although the results were not broken down by gender in this survey, I believe that the proportion of women who responded positively was high. While interest in subculture is good, it is not enough to connect Korea and Japan. Tourism, which was very active before the COVID-19 pandemic, did not help improve Korea-Japan relations. Therefore, this is clearly not the way. So, what should we do? We need to not just consume popular culture and subculture, but to consciously empathize and actively connect with them. This will be important going forward. To achieve this, we need a leverage point, a core substance. I believe it will be very difficult to find this. One hint could be the novel "Kim Ji-young, Born 1982," which created a huge sensation in both Korea and Japan. It was a novel that was difficult for women to read. Gender issues are also serious in Japan. Prime Minister Suga made a sexist remark and resigned from the Olympic organizing committee. Such incidents could provide an opportunity for Korea and Japan to connect. Of course, for the younger generation, due to COVID-19, we cannot travel freely, but we need to encourage them to study abroad and travel again, and to work in Japan. In terms of business, cooperation between Korean and Japanese companies in third countries is already happening everywhere. This should be continuously pursued. However, political and diplomatic confrontation, and the influence of great powers, are obstacles. Therefore, forming a deeper space for cultural exchange and popular culture, not just consumption, will sustain Korea-Japan relations. Fundamentally, it must be resolved politically and diplomatically, but I believe it is possible to achieve fundamental resolution. Thank you for shedding new light on the role of women in subculture. Lastly, Professor Kwon Young-seok of Hankuk University of Foreign Studies will present. Thank you.
Moving forward, both sides must make greater efforts to resolve issues more intensely, and they need to foster an awareness of jointly building the future through security, economic, and cultural cooperation, not just in a future-oriented manner. To achieve this, ultimately, the perception of political leaders must change first. Political leaders who prioritize the public, the nation, and the international environment must change their perceptions, and in the long term, I believe changes in government are possible.
Secondly, how can we overcome populism? I believe the roots of populism lie in South Korea's victim/underdog consciousness and Japan's sense of superiority. By looking down on South Korea from a position of superiority, nationalism takes root. As surveys of public opinion show that South Korea and Japan are on equal footing and moving forward as equals, I believe that as the perception of South Korea and Japan as equal partners expands, the temptation of populism will decrease.
Lastly, I agree that the revitalization of civilian exchanges should precede government efforts. Ultimately, those who consume culture, particularly younger demographics, show increasing favorability towards the other country, with this trend being particularly strong among those in their 20s and 30s. Therefore, by securing a cultural consumer base centered around the younger generations of both countries and expanding exchanges, we must increase dialogue for the future, literally for the future generations. I believe that for South Korea and Japan to resolve their relationship issues, they must continue to engage in dialogue for the future.
Yes, thank you. Next, Professor Ohviner of the East Asia Institute at Pusan National University will present. He is from the university that everyone knows is Pusan National University. Thank you for giving me this valuable opportunity. The results of this public opinion survey also indicate that South Korea-Japan relations are still in a difficult situation. However, looking at the bright side, we can say that the situation is not one where mutual perceptions of each other are falling significantly.
It is an honor to participate in the Korea-Japan Future Dialogue again this year. I am Korean, but I am participating as a member of the Japanese delegation. I apologize for speaking in Japanese. As the professors pointed out, the public opinion poll and the reality show that the Korean side has a very high level of open-mindedness and willingness to improve relations, despite feeling fatigued by the worsening Korea-Japan relations. The fact that improvement and the importance of Korea-Japan relations are recognized is very positive. The deterioration of relations is not entirely negative. In a way, Korea has had a predetermined answer for important relationships, such as 'Japan must be like this,' but now Japan has changed, and it is difficult for Korea to unilaterally impose its logic. Therefore, the Korean side has become very flexible. In Japan, they call it a mature response, but in Korea, they have responded in a more 'Japan-like' manner. It seems that Japan has regressed to the past and is trying to pass the buck. In the past, Koreans were principled and had predetermined answers, and there was a gap between the government's position and public perception, which was a problem. Regarding political populism, Japan's foreign policy has been characterized by pragmatic diplomacy, regardless of economic considerations, value judgments, or ideology, and has been globally oriented. However, recently, they have taken a particularly hardline stance towards Korea. This was not the case in the past. Considering the dignity and cultural mentality of the Japanese people, there are some negative aspects. This is a reflection of Japan's relative decline and Korea's rise over the past decade. I believe that Japan should be cautious about being too aggressive towards Korea, as it can lead to negative consequences for Japanese politics and society. Regarding culture, the most important thing is that, as Professor Park Cheol-hee mentioned, there is a perception that Korea-Japan relations are equal and have become closer, especially among the younger generation. Looking at the cultural power of K-quarantine, BTS, and Parasite, and digital power, Koreans believe that Korea is leading. However, Japan has not yet fully accepted Korea's rise. This gap is a problem in Korea-Japan relations. Japan needs to quickly and accurately assess Korea based on correct information and recognize that Korea is an equal partner, and in some aspects, is even leading. This is also related to culture. Culture is not just about positive aspects; it can also be problematic. Relations with China are not good, and there is a tendency not to properly evaluate Korean culture, such as the Hallyu wave and BTS, due to cultural factors. China claims to be the originator. Young people in Korea highly value their pride and fairness. Therefore, if Japan continues to use issues like the forced mobilization issue for political purposes, or claims that Korean content is a copy, it could become a new source of friction. Therefore, it is important to properly assess the other party and, from a comprehensive perspective, evaluate Japan's potential and rebuild trust and relations at the national level. I will conclude here. Thank you.
Under the US-China conflict, the perceptions of Koreans have changed. Perceptions of China are changing. The gap in perceptions between Korea and Japan regarding China has narrowed, and in this regard, I believe there is room for cooperation between Korea and Japan. A new question in this survey asks whether people would choose multilateral cooperation including the US and China, or cooperation with Japan and Korea. 36% of respondents chose the former. I believe it is desirable to pursue multilateral cooperation, as it is easier for Korea and Japan to cooperate within a multilateral framework than in a one-on-one situation.
I will now focus on the subculture aspect of the survey. I believe it is good to be interested in subculture. A survey conducted by the Japanese Cabinet Office shows that particularly among women, many consider Korea-Japan relations to be important. I believe this is also due to the influence of popular culture and subculture. Although the results were not broken down by gender in this survey, I believe that the proportion of women who responded positively was high. While interest in subculture is good, it is not enough to connect Korea and Japan. Tourism, which was very active before the COVID-19 pandemic, did not help improve Korea-Japan relations. Therefore, this is clearly not the way. So, what should we do? We need to not just consume popular culture and subculture, but to consciously empathize and actively connect with them. This will be important going forward.
To achieve this, we need a leverage point, a core substance. I believe it will be very difficult to find this. One hint could be the novel "Kim Ji-young, Born 1982," which created a huge sensation in both Korea and Japan. It was a novel that was difficult for women to read. Gender issues are also serious in Japan. Prime Minister Suga made a sexist remark and resigned from the Olympic organizing committee. Such incidents could provide an opportunity for Korea and Japan to connect. Of course, for the younger generation, due to COVID-19, we cannot travel freely, but we need to encourage them to study abroad and travel again, and to work in Japan. In terms of business, cooperation between Korean and Japanese companies in third countries is already happening everywhere. This should be continuously pursued.
However, political and diplomatic confrontation, and the influence of great powers, are obstacles. Therefore, forming a deeper space for cultural exchange and popular culture, not just consumption, will sustain Korea-Japan relations. Fundamentally, it must be resolved politically and diplomatically, but I believe it is possible to achieve fundamental resolution. Thank you for shedding new light on the role of women in subculture.
Thank you. Lastly, Professor Kwon Young-seok of Hankuk University of Foreign Studies will present. It is an honor to participate in the Korea-Japan Future Dialogue again this year. I am Korean, but I am participating as a member of the Japanese delegation. I apologize for speaking in Japanese. As the professors pointed out, the public opinion poll and the reality show that the Korean side has a very high level of open-mindedness and willingness to improve relations, despite feeling fatigued by the worsening Korea-Japan relations. The fact that improvement and the importance of Korea-Japan relations are recognized is very positive. The deterioration of relations is not entirely negative. In a way, Korea has had a predetermined answer for important relationships, such as 'Japan must be like this,' but now Japan has changed, and it is difficult for Korea to unilaterally impose its logic. Therefore, the Korean side has become very flexible.
In Japan, they call it a mature response, but in Korea, they have responded in a more 'Japan-like' manner. It seems that Japan has regressed to the past and is trying to pass the buck. In the past, Koreans were principled and had predetermined answers, and there was a gap between the government's position and public perception, which was a problem. Regarding political populism, Japan's foreign policy has been characterized by pragmatic diplomacy, regardless of economic considerations, value judgments, or ideology, and has been globally oriented. However, recently, they have taken a particularly hardline stance towards Korea. This was not the case in the past. Considering the dignity and cultural mentality of the Japanese people, there are some negative aspects. This is a reflection of Japan's relative decline and Korea's rise over the past decade. I believe that Japan should be cautious about being too aggressive towards Korea, as it can lead to negative consequences for Japanese politics and society. Regarding culture, the most important thing is that, as Professor Park Cheol-hee mentioned, there is a perception that Korea-Japan relations are equal and have become closer, especially among the younger generation. Looking at the cultural power of K-quarantine, BTS, and Parasite, and digital power, Koreans believe that Korea is leading. However, Japan has not yet fully accepted Korea's rise. This gap is a problem in Korea-Japan relations. Japan needs to quickly and accurately assess Korea based on correct information and recognize that Korea is an equal partner, and in some aspects, is even leading. This is also related to culture. Culture is not just about positive aspects; it can also be problematic. Relations with China are not good, and there is a tendency not to properly evaluate Korean culture, such as the Hallyu wave and BTS, due to cultural factors. China claims to be the originator. Young people in Korea highly value their pride and fairness. Therefore, if Japan continues to use issues like the forced mobilization issue for political purposes, or claims that Korean content is a copy, it could become a new source of friction. Therefore, it is important to properly assess the other party and, from a comprehensive perspective, evaluate Japan's potential and rebuild trust and relations at the national level. I will conclude here. Thank you.
It is an honor to participate in the Korea-Japan Future Dialogue again this year. I am Korean, but I am participating as a member of the Japanese delegation. I apologize for speaking in Japanese. As the professors pointed out, the public opinion poll and the reality show that the Korean side has a very high level of open-mindedness and willingness to improve relations, despite feeling fatigued by the worsening Korea-Japan relations. The fact that improvement and the importance of Korea-Japan relations are recognized is very positive. The deterioration of relations is not entirely negative. In a way, Korea has had a predetermined answer for important relationships, such as 'Japan must be like this,' but now Japan has changed, and it is difficult for Korea to unilaterally impose its logic. Therefore, the Korean side has become very flexible.
In Japan, they call it a mature response, but in Korea, they have responded in a more 'Japan-like' manner. It seems that Japan has regressed to the past and is trying to pass the buck. In the past, Koreans were principled and had predetermined answers, and there was a gap between the government's position and public perception, which was a problem. Regarding political populism, Japan's foreign policy has been characterized by pragmatic diplomacy, regardless of economic considerations, value judgments, or ideology, and has been globally oriented. However, recently, they have taken a particularly hardline stance towards Korea. This was not the case in the past. Considering the dignity and cultural mentality of the Japanese people, there are some negative aspects. This is a reflection of Japan's relative decline and Korea's rise over the past decade. I believe that Japan should be cautious about being too aggressive towards Korea, as it can lead to negative consequences for Japanese politics and society. Regarding culture, the most important thing is that, as Professor Park Cheol-hee mentioned, there is a perception that Korea-Japan relations are equal and have become closer, especially among the younger generation. Looking at the cultural power of K-quarantine, BTS, and Parasite, and digital power, Koreans believe that Korea is leading. However, Japan has not yet fully accepted Korea's rise. This gap is a problem in Korea-Japan relations. Japan needs to quickly and accurately assess Korea based on correct information and recognize that Korea is an equal partner, and in some aspects, is even leading. This is also related to culture. Culture is not just about positive aspects; it can also be problematic. Relations with China are not good, and there is a tendency not to properly evaluate Korean culture, such as the Hallyu wave and BTS, due to cultural factors. China claims to be the originator. Young people in Korea highly value their pride and fairness. Therefore, if Japan continues to use issues like the forced mobilization issue for political purposes, or claims that Korean content is a copy, it could become a new source of friction. Therefore, it is important to properly assess the other party and, from a comprehensive perspective, evaluate Japan's potential and rebuild trust and relations at the national level. I will conclude here. Thank you.
This was not the case in the past. Considering the dignity and cultural mentality of the Japanese people, there are some negative aspects. This is a reflection of Japan's relative decline and Korea's rise over the past decade. I believe that Japan should be cautious about being too aggressive towards Korea, as it can lead to negative consequences for Japanese politics and society. Regarding culture, the most important thing is that, as Professor Park Cheol-hee mentioned, there is a perception that Korea-Japan relations are equal and have become closer, especially among the younger generation. Looking at the cultural power of K-quarantine, BTS, and Parasite, and digital power, Koreans believe that Korea is leading. However, Japan has not yet fully accepted Korea's rise. This gap is a problem in Korea-Japan relations. Japan needs to quickly and accurately assess Korea based on correct information and recognize that Korea is an equal partner, and in some aspects, is even leading. This is also related to culture. Culture is not just about positive aspects; it can also be problematic. Relations with China are not good, and there is a tendency not to properly evaluate Korean culture, such as the Hallyu wave and BTS, due to cultural factors. China claims to be the originator. Young people in Korea highly value their pride and fairness. Therefore, if Japan continues to use issues like the forced mobilization issue for political purposes, or claims that Korean content is a copy, it could become a new source of friction. Therefore, it is important to properly assess the other party and, from a comprehensive perspective, evaluate Japan's potential and rebuild trust and relations at the national level. I will conclude here. Thank you.
This was not the case in the past. Considering the dignity and cultural mentality of the Japanese people, there are some negative aspects. This is a reflection of Japan's relative decline and Korea's rise over the past decade. I believe that Japan should be cautious about being too aggressive towards Korea, as it can lead to negative consequences for Japanese politics and society. Regarding culture, the most important thing is that, as Professor Park Cheol-hee mentioned, there is a perception that Korea-Japan relations are equal and have become closer, especially among the younger generation. Looking at the cultural power of K-quarantine, BTS, and Parasite, and digital power, Koreans believe that Korea is leading. However, Japan has not yet fully accepted Korea's rise. This gap is a problem in Korea-Japan relations. Japan needs to quickly and accurately assess Korea based on correct information and recognize that Korea is an equal partner, and in some aspects, is even leading. This is also related to culture. Culture is not just about positive aspects; it can also be problematic. Relations with China are not good, and there is a tendency not to properly evaluate Korean culture, such as the Hallyu wave and BTS, due to cultural factors. China claims to be the originator. Young people in Korea highly value their pride and fairness. Therefore, if Japan continues to use issues like the forced mobilization issue for political purposes, or claims that Korean content is a copy, it could become a new source of friction. Therefore, it is important to properly assess the other party and, from a comprehensive perspective, evaluate Japan's potential and rebuild trust and relations at the national level. I will conclude here. Thank you.
As Professor Park Cheol-hee mentioned, there is a perception that Korea-Japan relations are equal and have become closer, especially among the younger generation. Looking at the cultural power of K-quarantine, BTS, and Parasite, and digital power, Koreans believe that Korea is leading. However, Japan has not yet fully accepted Korea's rise. This gap is a problem in Korea-Japan relations. Japan needs to quickly and accurately assess Korea based on correct information and recognize that Korea is an equal partner, and in some aspects, is even leading. This is also related to culture. Culture is not just about positive aspects; it can also be problematic. Relations with China are not good, and there is a tendency not to properly evaluate Korean culture, such as the Hallyu wave and BTS, due to cultural factors. China claims to be the originator. Young people in Korea highly value their pride and fairness. Therefore, if Japan continues to use issues like the forced mobilization issue for political purposes, or claims that Korean content is a copy, it could become a new source of friction. Therefore, it is important to properly assess the other party and, from a comprehensive perspective, evaluate Japan's potential and rebuild trust and relations at the national level. I will conclude here. Thank you.
This is also related to culture. Culture is not just about positive aspects; it can also be problematic. Relations with China are not good, and there is a tendency not to properly evaluate Korean culture, such as the Hallyu wave and BTS, due to cultural factors. China claims to be the originator. Young people in Korea highly value their pride and fairness. Therefore, if Japan continues to use issues like the forced mobilization issue for political purposes, or claims that Korean content is a copy, it could become a new source of friction. Therefore, it is important to properly assess the other party and, from a comprehensive perspective, evaluate Japan's potential and rebuild trust and relations at the national level. I will conclude here. Thank you.
Therefore, it is important to properly assess the other party and, from a comprehensive perspective, evaluate Japan's potential and rebuild trust and relations at the national level. I will conclude here. Thank you.
Thank you. You have raised a new point about the "reverse overtaking phenomenon," which is the subject of a recent book by a scholar, and how it is perceived in Japan and Korea. This serves as a starting point for a new cultural approach. We have about 5 minutes left. First, I will take a few questions, and then I will give the presenters a chance to make additional remarks or ask new questions on points they could not cover in the limited time. I will now take questions. Since I cannot see everyone, I would appreciate it if those who wish to ask questions could first briefly introduce themselves and then ask a short question in Japanese. It seems that many people are currently connected online and are divided into various rooms, so there may be some confusion in asking questions. Now, based on our discussion so far, I would like to ask the presenters to provide brief additional remarks or new questions and answers for about 1-2 minutes each. Let's start with Professor Shim Sang-seok. I have listened carefully to your presentation.
Overall, there seem to be many commonalities. The general sentiment is that although it is difficult, there is hope, and we must move forward. I would like to briefly comment on a few points from the questions raised by Professor Park Cheol-hee. The phenomenon of exploiting anti-Japan or anti-Korea sentiment for political purposes clearly exists in both countries. The only way to block this is for an open civil society to exercise checks and balances through public opinion.
Regarding the two-track approach, as Professor Park Cheol-hee also mentioned, I believe it is a counter-intuitive approach. While we must seek a swift resolution to the historical issues themselves, I believe that both Korea and Japan should adopt an open attitude and pursue a two-track approach, resolving the past through the present and future. Lastly, regarding the role of the United States, while Korea and Japan must take the lead, there is no need to deny the US's past role in agreements, such as the comfort women issue. Therefore, we should take the initiative, but also maintain an open attitude that a third party can help.
I will now speak provocatively regarding Professor Shin So-young's remarks. You mentioned the Upper House election in July next year, which means we have to wait another year. Regardless, even after the general election, Korea will have a presidential election in March. Therefore, we need to continuously create an environment where we can begin full-scale improvement of relations after the presidential election in March. Regarding the issue of asset liquidation worth 1 billion won, I believe President Moon Jae-in's press conference is very important, both for Japan and likely for Korea. Japan expects Korea to make efforts based on the President's remarks. Korea should make efforts in that direction. It would be problematic if liquidation is deemed impossible, as President Moon stated. President Moon also stated that the official agreement on comfort women in 1965 is a diplomatic agreement. He also stated that the issue of not recognizing sovereign immunity for the 1 billion won asset liquidation is problematic. I urge you to carefully consider these points. Regarding cooperation between the US, Korea, and Japan, it will continue to evolve regarding the North Korean issue. The important thing is how much cooperation can be achieved between Korea and Japan in other areas. In particular, the concept of the Indo-Pacific is currently receiving a lot of attention. We need to think about what kind of cooperation Korea and Japan can and should pursue within this concept and region.
That is all. Thank you. Overall, it seems that most people agree that civil society is concerned about the worsening trend in Korea-Japan relations and that it has hit rock bottom and is starting to rebound. I also see it that way. In particular, as I emphasized at the beginning, if we only look at the absolute numbers, the changes may not be apparent. For example, the noticeable increase in favorable views of Japan in Korea is also a case in point. Furthermore, this trend is particularly pronounced among those under 29 years old. As I mentioned earlier, the number of respondents under 29 is significantly smaller than those over 60. If those under 29 are leading this trend, it suggests that there is a greater potential for a rebound. Therefore, it is crucial to explore what is driving this change. Perhaps, as Professor Park Cheol-hee suggested, it is a manifestation of the sense of crisis felt by the Korean government and people. Or perhaps it is a natural recovery process that is unfolding over time. Or perhaps there have been conscious efforts, conscious efforts that we are not aware of. We need to investigate this. I do not know how much influence it has had, but I have heard that there was an unwritten agreement among Korean and Japanese journalists to try to avoid anything that could be misunderstood by the public or create negative perceptions. Perhaps this had some influence. For your reference, we also conducted a survey of media coverage in Korea and Japan with the support of the HG Foundation. Last year, there were no award-winning entries, indicating a lack of substance. However, this year, there are some entries that are worth reviewing, which can be considered an indicator. I have shared a few points. Thank you.
This is a matter of the Korean government's process. Therefore, it will take a considerable amount of time, at least eight months, or possibly longer, to resolve this issue. Furthermore, for those who consider it a judicial resolution, it may be a fait accompli. Therefore, both governments need to put their heads together and make efforts to resolve the issue. In this regard, the open attitude towards flexible solutions in Korea is noteworthy. The Korean government has room to maneuver, and the Japanese government should not exert excessive pressure to prevent the liquidation. This would allow the Korean government to approach the issue with more flexibility. Second, there was a question about whether anti-Japan or anti-Korea sentiment is being exploited for domestic political purposes. In this regard, concerning the evaluation of the Moon administration, the opinion that the issue is being exploited for domestic politics is decreasing among Koreans who hold negative views of the Moon administration, which may offer a glimmer of hope for a solution. It is important to note that the perception that the issue is being exploited for domestic politics is decreasing in Korea compared to the past. Third, regarding diplomacy that avoids confrontation, there is a state of dysfunction in diplomatic functions. However, if we look at the perceptions of various issues, it seems that there is a demand for more proactive solutions directed at the Korean government. This is related to the fourth question. Regarding future cooperation, it seems that the Korean public is making such demands. The government is presenting three main pillars for its foreign policy: first, emphasis on democracy, human rights, and the rule-based order; and third, proactive diplomacy on global issues. If the Korean government takes a proactive approach to the first and third pillars, a different possibility may open up. I will conclude here. First, regarding the issue of asset liquidation, which appears to be a ticking time bomb in Korea-Japan relations, you have mentioned the possibility of resolving it to some extent. I am deeply impressed by your insights into the future. Next, Professor Park Cheol-hee of Seoul National University will present. Thank you. Although it is online, I am honored to participate in the Korea-Japan Future Dialogue. I am Korean, but I am participating as a member of the Japanese delegation. I apologize for speaking in Japanese. First, as the professors pointed out, the public opinion poll and the reality show that the Korean side has a very high level of open-mindedness and willingness to improve relations, despite feeling fatigued by the worsening Korea-Japan relations. The fact that improvement and the importance of Korea-Japan relations are recognized is very positive. The deterioration of relations is not entirely negative. In a way, Korea has had a predetermined answer for important relationships, such as 'Japan must be like this,' but now Japan has changed, and it is difficult for Korea to unilaterally impose its logic. Therefore, the Korean side has become very flexible.
President Moon also stated that the official agreement on comfort women in 1965 is a diplomatic agreement. He also stated that the issue of not recognizing sovereign immunity for the 1 billion won asset liquidation is problematic. I urge you to carefully consider these points. Regarding cooperation between the US, Korea, and Japan, it will continue to evolve regarding the North Korean issue. The important thing is how much cooperation can be achieved between Korea and Japan in other areas. In particular, the concept of the Indo-Pacific is currently receiving a lot of attention. We need to think about what kind of cooperation Korea and Japan can and should pursue within this concept and region.
Thank you. Overall, it seems that most people agree that civil society is concerned about the worsening trend in Korea-Japan relations and that it has hit rock bottom and is starting to rebound. I also see it that way. In particular, as I emphasized at the beginning, if we only look at the absolute numbers, the changes may not be apparent. For example, the noticeable increase in favorable views of Japan in Korea is also a case in point. Furthermore, this trend is particularly pronounced among those under 29 years old. As I mentioned earlier, the number of respondents under 29 is significantly smaller than those over 60. If those under 29 are leading this trend, it suggests that there is a greater potential for a rebound. Therefore, it is crucial to explore what is driving this change. Perhaps, as Professor Park Cheol-hee suggested, it is a manifestation of the sense of crisis felt by the Korean government and people. Or perhaps it is a natural recovery process that is unfolding over time. Or perhaps there have been conscious efforts, conscious efforts that we are not aware of. We need to investigate this.
I do not know how much influence it has had, but I have heard that there was an unwritten agreement among Korean and Japanese journalists to try to avoid anything that could be misunderstood by the public or create negative perceptions. Perhaps this had some influence. For your reference, we also conducted a survey of media coverage in Korea and Japan with the support of the HG Foundation. Last year, there were no award-winning entries, indicating a lack of substance. However, this year, there are some entries that are worth reviewing, which can be considered an indicator. I have shared a few points. Thank you.
As Professor Park Cheol-hee suggested, it could be seen as a manifestation of the sense of crisis felt by the Korean government and people. Or perhaps it is a natural recovery process that is unfolding over time. Or perhaps there have been conscious efforts, conscious efforts that we are not aware of. We need to investigate this. I do not know how much influence it has had, but I have heard that there was an unwritten agreement among Korean and Japanese journalists to try to avoid anything that could be misunderstood by the public or create negative perceptions. Perhaps this had some influence. For your reference, we also conducted a survey of media coverage in Korea and Japan with the support of the HG Foundation. Last year, there were no award-winning entries, indicating a lack of substance. However, this year, there are some entries that are worth reviewing, which can be considered an indicator. I have shared a few points. Thank you.
I do not know how much influence it has had, but I have heard that there was an unwritten agreement among Korean and Japanese journalists to try to avoid anything that could be misunderstood by the public or create negative perceptions. Perhaps this had some influence. For your reference, we also conducted a survey of media coverage in Korea and Japan with the support of the HG Foundation. Last year, there were no award-winning entries, indicating a lack of substance. However, this year, there are some entries that are worth reviewing, which can be considered an indicator. I have shared a few points. Thank you.
Thank you. The night is... I, just you, this bastard. The professor should come out. Isn't that what we should do? The market price, album, again, God, Corona. Ah, to some extent, thankfully, the novel... it is increasing. It is said that it will subside soon. In that sense, we need to prepare for the resumption of personnel exchanges like that after Corona. We must actively prepare for the resumption of personnel exchanges, including BCS and Muhak. It is not that the decision to do so is not being repeated at the level of awareness of the British public. Therefore, I think it is important.
Another point is that if you look at the Korean perspective, there is a view that the Kishida administration is simply an avatar of the Abe administration, to put it in Korean terms. However, I sincerely hope that you do not see it that way. At least, I have lived in Mr. Kishida's constituency for a long time, and I have an awareness of the extreme wariness. I believe it will be difficult to change the picture if Mr. Kishida completely abandons that aspect. Also, as Mr. Nishina mentioned, the press conference statement by President Moon Jae-in is quite important.
In a way, the opposite judgment has been made in Korea. In a way, President Moon Jae-in seems to be trying to prevent the relationship from ending with the president who normalized relations, or perhaps he does not want to pass on the legacy of the previous administration. Therefore, the division of the judiciary and the prosecution suggests that there is room for President Moon Jae-in to make political decisions until his term ends. Therefore, we should not adopt a mindset that there is no hope just because we look at the two sides too simply.
Yes, thank you. I have been told that a question has come in from the Japanese side. If you could ask it briefly, I would appreciate it. I am the MC for NHK's "Global Viewpoint." A question has come in from Alex Tay. How about emphasizing the importance of Prime Minister Kishida's expression of willingness to improve relations? And secondly, even if it is difficult to accept President Moon Jae-in's apology through dialogue, it will have a positive effect on Mr. Kishida. You mentioned that. Are there any Japanese viewers who have questions?
Thank you. One of the keywords in the pledges of the Kishida administration and the Kishida administration's policy is "trust." He emphasizes building trust, so I think building a relationship of trust is important. What Japan can do is to continue to send signals. However, we are in a situation where we cannot even meet with the Foreign Minister, let alone the Prime Minister, and we cannot even have a summit. I believe we can start with what we can do. And as you mentioned, I think it is important to prepare for the resumption of personnel exchanges. Thank you.
I will make two points. While the Korea-Japan relationship is often compared to the inter-Korean relationship, I believe there is too much strategic distrust in the Korea-Japan relationship. However, strategic distrust does not benefit either side. It only exacerbates the situation. In fact, I believe the positions of both governments are strategically negligent. While they say they are making efforts, they are not taking any concrete actions. This kind of status quo cannot lead to a relationship.
In that sense, I believe the Korea-Japan relationship must shift from strategic neglect to strategic engagement to actively resolve issues and improve relations. If possible, Korea should do so within the current administration, and if not, within the next administration. When the next administration takes office, Japan should strengthen its efforts to engage strategically. Secondly, as revealed in this survey, I believe there is hope for the Korea-Japan relationship among the future generations in their 30s. They recognize each other's strengths. They do not feel inferior or superior.
And they do not operate within the framework of nationalism. Therefore, they are fully open to accepting each other, and I believe that to improve Korea-Japan relations, we should learn from the future generations, not the older generation, and build Korea-Japan relations centered on the future generations. Thank you. Professor Chi-a, thank you. Regarding the issue of reconciliation, as briefly pointed out by Mr. Sakamoto, there is a negative perception in Korea of the Kishida administration. For example, yesterday, the Chief Cabinet Secretary Matsuno was scheduled to attend, but there were reports of strong vigilance.
Conversely, there were also reports that expressed expectations for Mr. Kishida, with the anecdote that Prime Minister Kishida persuaded the Abe administration. I hope you will look at it with a flat perspective, without wearing colored glasses. It is unfortunate that there are still people who dismiss the fact that Korea is partially surpassing Japan economically, with reports that Korea's economy will collapse appearing in some media and online forums. There are quite a few people who dismiss this.
Therefore, how can we eliminate these aspects and create a rational reporting environment? Fostering an atmosphere that values reporting is a continuous demand. Thank you. Lastly, Professor Kwon Young-seok. In terms of democracy and Korea-Japan relations, if you look at comments on cultural exchange, you can see young people or students who are exposed to Korean culture. There are comments that criticize anti-Korean sentiment and try to correct it. I would like to introduce the power of culture, not the power of the state. If Japan is to become a global standard, a model nation of universal values, it needs to consider whether it is moving again in relation to the history issue with Korea. The most important challenge for Japan is the lack of Korean studies.
In this country, Korea has no presence, and even in the third quarter, participation and cultural influence are important. As a neighboring country, I think it is important, but Korean studies are not being newly created. Although there is some support from the Korean government for short-term programs, in terms of research and education, Korean studies, including the entire Korean Peninsula, are all about Korea. Perhaps by creating something like a cyber university and combining various content with pop culture, we can create programs that can be used for citizen diplomacy, which could help change perceptions of Korea in Japan.
We plan to hold a joint project for the 10th anniversary of the establishment of diplomatic relations between Korea and Japan, where we can learn from each other. I am also a student of international relations, and I think discovering programs that can revitalize exchanges is important. Thanks to your cooperation, we started 10 minutes late, but in terms of our actual time, we finished 3 minutes early. I have 3 minutes left, and I need to summarize what I have said. As someone who is not an expert on this issue, I will not draw any definitive conclusions, but I will conclude by reminding you of a few particularly interesting points that emerged during today's discussion. First, regarding when we will find new momentum, some say that the general election in Japan next July will be an important momentum, but others say that we cannot wait until then. If the presidential election in Korea in March leads to such a mood, then...
We will make efforts to ensure that this happens. Second, regarding the issue of the Korean Supreme Court's enforcement of asset liquidation, there is a period of about 10 months remaining before the execution, and we will make efforts to consider various alternatives during that time. Third, regarding the perception of President Kishida as an avatar of the Abe administration, the Korean media should be cautious about predicting the situation in such a one-sided manner. It would be good to try to create new momentum through President Moon Jae-in's press conference. It was also suggested that the results of this meeting be conveyed to the leaders of both countries, which I think is worth considering.
Another point is that on the two-track approach, we need to emphasize expectations and new perceptual changes from civil society and the younger generation regarding new changes. Furthermore, the role of the United States in the process of mediation between the two countries is becoming more important, especially in the issue of global supply chains, as I mentioned earlier. It would be better to use this as an opportunity to accelerate the resolution of issues between Korea and Japan before the United States exerts pressure or plays a role.
Also, regarding the media, as I mentioned briefly earlier, the restraint and future-oriented attitude of the media are important. In particular, there are rumors in Japan that the Korean economy will collapse soon, and conversely, in Korea, there is confidence that Korea has already surpassed Japan in this regard. There is a significant gap in perception, and the media's role is crucial in bridging this gap. Finally, Korean studies need to be expanded, and the expansion of Korean studies through cyberspace, which is not costly, was a particularly concrete direction and idea that was impressive.
I think so. If I may add one more point, regarding the role of the United States, although there are various security issues, such as the North Korean nuclear issue, there is a significant alignment of interests between Korea and Japan on the North Korean nuclear issue. For example, while the United States is more concerned about North Korea's ICBM development, Japan, due to the immediate threat of North Korea's short-range and medium-range nuclear development capabilities, has a more direct and aligned interest. Therefore, we agreed that we need more frequent and in-depth discussions between Korea and Japan, even for security issues like the North Korean nuclear issue.
I don't know if I have explained it well, but I believe that through your precious time today, you have gained a lot of understanding and made many resolutions. Thank you for your cooperation, attention, and thorough preparation.
*This text is an AI translation of an original written in Korean. Some translations or nuances may be inaccurate.