[Global NK Interview] Director Koh Yu-hwan (Korea Institute for National Unification)

YouTube Link: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=pF0LFF6aMx4

[Editor's Note]

Global NK Zoom&Connect <Interview> meets with leading South Korean researchers specializing in North Korea to understand the current state of North Korean studies through their voices. In this issue, we interviewed Koh Yu-hwan, Director of the Korea Institute for National Unification (KINU), the nation's sole state-funded research institute dedicated to unification, prosperity, and North Korea, to hear his proposals for realizing peace and prosperity on the Korean Peninsula in the post-COVID-19 era and for the success of peace and denuclearization negotiations. This interview was anticipated for the role KINU plays in striving to achieve the mission of our times: finding a path toward irreversible peace and prosperity on the Korean Peninsula from a new perspective.

Video Transcript

The inter-Korean relations, spurred by the 2018 Pyeongchang Winter Olympics, saw a major trend toward the so-called "Korean Peninsula Spring," encompassing peace and denuclearization. Although groundbreaking inter-Korean and North Korea-U.S. agreements were reached, such as the Panmunjom Declaration and the North Korea-U.S. Singapore Joint Statement, they failed to bear fruit and the situation has currently fallen into a stalemate. While the Moon administration is in its final year and the U.S. Biden administration is in its early stages, if this process, which began with a top-down approach between North Korea and the U.S., continues without yielding results and remains in a state of deadlock, a significant amount of time will be wasted. Therefore, even with a slight gap in timing between the new U.S. administration and the outgoing Korean administration, it is crucial to create a certain level of irreversible agreement within the process so that the next Korean government can inherit this process. We have entered a very important period.

Above all, since North Korea has been advancing its nuclear capabilities after completing its nuclear armament in November 2017, its nuclear capabilities are gradually being enhanced even while inter-Korean talks or North Korea-U.S. dialogue are not progressing. From this perspective, the instability cannot be ignored. Therefore, we are at a critical juncture where we must decide whether to resume denuclearization negotiations to establish a lasting peace regime on the Korean Peninsula and reactivate the process toward denuclearization, or to acknowledge North Korea's nuclear capabilities and nuclear tests and establish a balance of terror accordingly.

However, North Korea also faces repercussions if the dialogue initiated by Chairman Kim Jong-un ends without results. Thus, on July 27th, they proposed a simultaneous declaration of the end of war between North and South Korea. They have presented the basic stance that a turning point must be created. However, North Korea's position will be determined by whether the U.S. and South Korea can meet the preconditions for dialogue that North Korea demands. Currently, although the stalemate in North Korea-U.S. military consultations continues, North Korea, through statements by Vice Director Kim Yo-jong, has shown interest in the end-of-war declaration proposed by President Moon, and has also expressed a basic willingness to reopen inter-Korean communication liaison offices and even hold inter-Korean summits.

Therefore, it seems that North Korea also feels burdened by breaking the stalemate. In any case, it is clear that the current period is a crucial one that will determine future developments. The next government's position may differ depending on whether the current situation is maintained and passed on to the next government, or whether the Korean Peninsula peace process is reactivated and some results are achieved before the next government takes office.

However, the next South Korean government will have to decide whether to continue denuclearization efforts or to focus on establishing a balance of terror. This will likely be a point of contention during the presidential election campaign. Some candidates may argue for continuing the efforts made so far, while others may advocate for establishing a balance of terror. This implies acknowledging the reality of North Korea's nuclear capabilities and assuming that North Korea has no intention of denuclearizing. The options for balancing against North Korea's nuclear capabilities include redeploying U.S. tactical nuclear weapons, establishing nuclear sharing agreements, or South Korea independently developing nuclear weapons. However, as you know, these options are unlikely to be easy in light of the U.S.'s non-proliferation policy. Nevertheless, as our citizens are understandably anxious, establishing a balance commensurate with North Korea's advancing nuclear capabilities is a crucial task.

As you know, from the perspective of the U.S. non-proliferation policy, such options are unlikely to be easy. However, as our citizens are understandably anxious, establishing a balance commensurate with North Korea's advancing nuclear capabilities is a crucial task. Looking back at the fundamental reasons, our division has persisted for over 70 years. Despite the efforts of successive governments and the aspirations of many citizens for unification, unification seems to be moving further away. Currently, it appears we are heading towards a de facto two-state system. Furthermore, the nuclear issue, which emerged in earnest in the early 1990s, has paradoxically become more entrenched over the past 30 years of attempts to resolve it.

Moreover, agreements made with North Korea, whether through the Six-Party Talks or North Korea-U.S. agreements, and various inter-Korean agreements, have been difficult to reach and, once reached, have often become defunct. This raises the question of where the fundamental problem lies. It is necessary to explore solutions to these fundamental issues from a governmental perspective, looking back at the past. Reflecting on this, I believe that the U.S., as the sole superpower after the collapse of the Soviet Union in the early 1990s, has struggled to resolve North Korea's nuclear issue, which is difficult even for a superpower to handle. This is a difficult aspect.

Ultimately, this suggests that North Korea's motivation for possessing nuclear weapons was stronger than the efforts to denuclearize it. However, delving deeper, we can also consider the failure of strategic efforts. Initially, there was likely a significant focus on North Korea's collapse. Even during the Agreed Framework negotiations, while promising to build two light-water reactors, there was a hope that North Korea would collapse before their completion. During the Obama administration, there was a policy of "strategic patience," and the South Korean government also adopted a waiting policy. These policies were based on the assumption of North Korea's collapse and reflected vague hopes and expectations. Subsequently, early North Korean nuclear efforts were largely based on a freeze-for-compensation approach.

Furthermore, issues of peace regime and unification were deferred. In the Six-Party Talks, they were discussed in separate forums. Consequently, efforts to remove North Korea's motivation for abandoning nuclear weapons—which North Korea consistently frames as a product of the North Korea-U.S. adversarial relationship—such as efforts to establish a peace regime based on the Armistice Agreement, were pushed aside. This did not facilitate North Korea's denuclearization. The current discussion of an end-of-war declaration seems to stem from the logic of first establishing an end-of-war status as a precursor to a peace treaty, and then pursuing a peace regime in the long term to drive denuclearization. However, even as these discussions take place, North Korea's nuclear capabilities have already been significantly advanced. Moreover, China's involvement in North Korea-related negotiations has been inconsistent, and in that process, it has been difficult to receive China's constructive assistance. Furthermore, in the context of strategic competition with China, the North Korean threat has been leveraged as a factor in U.S. strategies toward China, the Indo-Pacific, and the continent, thus losing focus.

In addition, recent efforts have attempted to transcend all these issues through a top-down approach. However, the leaders' willingness was met with domestic opposition, particularly in the U.S., where domestic political considerations such as re-election concerns were strongly reflected, preventing the leaders' willingness from being fully realized due to domestic opposition.

Finally, there is North Korea's stance. Above all, the other party is North Korea, and there is a need to properly understand and utilize North Korea's intentions. However, these intentions have been ignored or, at times, misunderstood or disregarded, leading to a focus on bringing the other party to the negotiating table. These complex factors have combined to lead us to the current situation, making resolution extremely difficult. The timing for resolution has passed, and with North Korea possessing nuclear weapons, estimated to be between 40 and 60, achieving complete denuclearization has become an arduous process. The current Biden administration is only offering abstract concepts like "calibrated, pragmatic approach" without presenting a concrete roadmap. In fact, the U.S. has likely exhausted all available options.

Therefore, the choice of which path to take is now a matter of selection for the Biden administration, the current South Korean government, and the next government. All options are on the table, and the question is which one to choose. The Biden administration's stance during the election campaign was that a summit could be held if North Korea agreed. It is unclear whether they agree to a freeze on nuclear weapons and complete denuclearization through arms control, such as freezing nuclear weapons while acknowledging current capabilities. However, if this is the approach, North Korea may be somewhat receptive. Currently, in inter-Korean relations, North Korea emphasizes "mutual respect," implying recognition of each other and negotiation, and acknowledgment of the power balance on the Korean Peninsula. This ultimately means negotiating while acknowledging their nuclear capabilities.

Therefore, for this process to be reactivated, the question is whether South Korea and the United States are willing to negotiate under the condition of acknowledging North Korea's nuclear capabilities, as demanded by North Korea, and pursue arms reduction. Previously, they insisted on a "denuclearization first" approach (CVID). The question is whether there is a willingness to resolve issues incrementally and in stages, acknowledging the reality and reducing nuclear capabilities. Of course, all options are on the table, but the question is which option to choose.

This is the question. The Korea Institute for National Unification (KINU) is a state-funded research institution that utilizes significant human resources and budget. It oversees the government's North Korea policy, unification policy, and the overall Korean Peninsula issue. Therefore, I feel that our institute also bears responsibility, albeit with limitations, for the various unresolved issues and must strive to provide support. Frankly, the current government prioritizes peace over unification, aiming to establish peace on the Korean Peninsula above all else, which has both positive and negative aspects.

Therefore, we must strive to resume efforts on denuclearization, stability, and other issues while pursuing peace on the Korean Peninsula. One of the management goals I set upon joining was the formation of an "inter-Korean community of life." This concept may have become somewhat neglected due to the difficulties associated with unification and nuclear issues, and the exhausting nature of the divided system. However, our surveys indicate that 58% of respondents prefer unification, and 50% prefer cooperation. Furthermore, a significant portion believes that inter-Korean relations will worsen in the future. This reflects skepticism about the lack of tangible progress and the failure of deliberate efforts within the current divided system to yield results. Therefore, the management principle we adopted was that the daily lives of the residents of North and South Korea must first be made comfortable and peaceful, and that the government should strive to form a community of life.

However, with the advent of COVID-19, the concept of a community of life has gained traction. Previously, the nuclear issue presented a clear enemy. But with the emergence of COVID-19, a common enemy has appeared, blurring the lines of security. Therefore, while denuclearization and unification efforts may continue as routine matters, the unification government must play a significant role in managing the daily lives of North and South Korean residents, who are becoming increasingly estranged, and in restoring a sense of community in their daily lives.

The areas I focused on were systematizing operations, strengthening the role of team leaders and division heads, so that the institute can function effectively through its systems regardless of who the director is. One of the ongoing efforts, which I hope to fully implement, is related to the institute's project-based approach, with annual tasks and outcomes. While there should be a repository of accumulated knowledge over 30 years, such as data, that researchers can access when needed, I felt this has been lacking. Therefore, in the remaining period, I intend to diligently work on establishing a data platform that aggregates accumulated research achievements within our field and external resources, to support researchers.

The part I focused on yesterday was systematizing the work and the central role of the team leader and director in June. In other words, I worked hard to systematize it so that the organization could run well regardless of who comes in, based on the system. One of the things I am currently working on and am still in the process of doing is that the research institute carries out projects on a yearly basis, which is like a year's harvest. However, there should be a repository accumulated over 30 years. This includes data, and data that researchers need should be available and integrated. I thought this had been somewhat precarious until now. Therefore, I plan to work hard in the remaining period to build a data platform that collects and organizes all accumulated achievements of the research institute in our field, as well as external resources, to support research.