EAI ACADEMY Session 7: Kim Hun-joon

YouTube Link: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=YVpl4Sicqfs

- Date: August 31, 2021, 6:00 PM

- Speaker: Kim Hun-joon, Professor, Korea University

Reading List

1. Hun Joon Kim. 2020. "The prospects of human rights in US–China relations: a constructivist understanding," International Relations of the Asia-Pacific, Volume 20, Issue 1, Pages 91–118.

2. Alastair Iain Johnston; China in a World of Orders: Rethinking Compliance and Challenge in Beijing`s International Relations. International Security 2019; 44 (2): 9–60.

3. John Shattuck; Kathryn Sikkink, "Practice What You Preach," Foreign Affairs 100, no. 3 (May/June 2021): 150-160.

Speaker Introduction

■ Kim Hun-joon: Professor in the Department of Political Science and International Relations at Korea University. He graduated from Seoul National University with a degree in Diplomacy and earned a Ph.D. in Political Science from the University of Minnesota. He previously served as an Associate Professor and Senior Researcher at Griffith University in Australia and as a Visiting Assistant Professor at St. Olaf College in the United States. His related research includes "The Massacres at Mt. Halla: Sixty Years of Truth-Seeking in South Korea," "Transitional Justice in the Asia Pacific," and "The Prospect of Human Rights in US-China Relations: A Constructive Understanding."

Video Transcript

Hello everyone, it's nice to see you all. I'm a bit disappointed that we can't meet in person and I can't see your faces or receive your questions in real-time due to this online format. However, as this is part of the "Future Korean Diplomacy Seminar" series, a project to cultivate the next generation of leaders, I will be discussing the conflict between US-China values and norms today.

My name is Kim Hun-joon, and I am a professor in the Department of Political Science and International Relations at Korea University. My primary research areas are international human rights, and I also focus on US-China relations and international norms. The fact that these topics have gained more attention this year compared to last year indicates that we are living in a rapidly changing world. It also signifies that new issues, issues that did not exist before, have emerged and require our attention.

The title of my talk today is "US-China Value Norm Conflict and Korean Diplomacy." I plan to cover five main points. First, I will discuss values and norms in international politics, focusing on the concepts of values and norms themselves. I will explore what values and norms are, and why we need to consider them on this particular day, August 31, 2021. Second, I will examine the interactions between the US and China, particularly in the realm of values and norms, from the Obama to the Biden administrations, looking at each administration's approach. Third, I will discuss the relationship between values and norms in international politics and the concept of "orders." Some might think this is a typo, but it is not. While the first part focused on values and norms, the third part will focus on the "orders" in international politics. Therefore, I have included a reading list that includes articles discussing the differences between the US and China in their approaches to international order, and how we should understand these differences and similarities. Fourth, I will discuss the US-China value norm conflict and South Korea's response. I will examine South Korea's actions since the conflict became prominent and evaluate those responses. Finally, if time permits, I will discuss the future direction of South Korean diplomacy. While this part may be brief, it involves practical considerations and can change depending on the situation. Therefore, while I will offer my thoughts, I acknowledge that listeners may have different perspectives.

First, let's discuss values and norms in international politics. To talk about values and norms, we first need to consider their definitions. In international politics, values and norms can be defined as the collective expectations that states hold about what constitutes proper international conduct. In English, this is often referred to as "collective expectations for the behavior of states" or "normative identity." While the terminology might seem complex, the core idea is that when various actions occur in international politics—such as state interventions, human rights violations, or coups d'état—there are collective judgments from the international community about whether these actions are appropriate or inappropriate, acceptable or unacceptable. These collective judgments form a framework of values, either implicit or explicit, that guides behavior. Norms, therefore, can be seen as a collection of these values. When we talk about norms, we are referring to a cluster of values. In international politics, value judgments are made across various domains. While individual values are included, collective value judgments are more significant. As indicated here, "collective expectations" refer to the shared and socialized value judgments that emerge from the aggregation of individual judgments about the appropriateness of specific actions by states.

These can be considered the definitions of values and norms. As I mentioned, norms are essentially agreements on values, so they are similar and can be used interchangeably in some contexts. I would also like to introduce the concept of "soft power," coined by Joseph Nye. To summarize it concisely, soft power is the ability to influence others and achieve desired outcomes through attraction, shared values, or legitimacy, rather than coercion or payment.

I differentiate soft power from values and norms. Soft power, as typically understood, refers to a country's attractiveness, legitimacy, or the appeal of its values, and its ability to influence the behavior of other countries. It lacks the social and collective dimensions inherent in values and norms. Values and norms, as I've explained, involve collective actions and complex values, thus possessing a social dimension. I use the term "values and norms" rather than "soft power" because soft power can be perceived as a unique attribute of a state, and I want to emphasize the importance of collective and social aspects.

The interaction of US-China values and norms has been ongoing, with significant exchanges occurring since the 20th century. I have divided this into 20th and 21st-century international norms and domestic norms. The extent to which values and norms are shared is illustrated here. In the 20th century, there were various norms and values such as alliance politics, non-alignment, humanitarian aid, international economic order, non-proliferation, human rights, sovereignty, nationalism, development, and transparency. In the 21st century, while some concepts overlap, new ones have emerged, including development cooperation, disaster response, climate change, humanitarianism, human rights, democratic development models, macroeconomic policies, and populism. The COVID-19 pandemic has also led to significant value judgments and norm formation, such as global health norms. Therefore, values and norms are crucial elements.

I can outline three key points regarding their importance. First, contrary to the belief that values and norms are solely about military power or coercion, I argue they are social and crucial elements. Many scholars agree that values and norms possess a logic distinct from other domains, implying their autonomy. While they are influenced by military, economic, and technological factors, resolving issues in these other areas does not automatically resolve norm-related issues; norm issues are ongoing. Second, as I will discuss later, norms are interconnected with other domains. For instance, in recent US-China relations, trade issues have become intertwined with norm issues. In the Biden administration, technology development is linked to human rights issues. Third, values and norms possess latent explosiveness. Norms are closely related to nationalism, culture, and emotions, making them difficult to eradicate. Once triggered, they can resurface. As seen in the interconnectedness between international and domestic levels, value judgments are not made in isolation; domestic and international judgments are closely linked, as are international and domestic factors in diplomacy. This interconnectedness gives them latent explosiveness. While not discussed today, the COVID-19 pandemic has highlighted the prevalence of various strategies and norms, demonstrating their applicability in such contexts.

Let's now examine the US-China relationship and how value norms have evolved. While various value norms exist, and some scholars focus on issues like the international order or non-alignment, I will focus on human rights and democracy.

When discussing US-China value norms, there are two extreme viewpoints. Many of you may be familiar with these two perspectives, and some may even agree with one of them. However, I believe we need to move beyond these extremes and adopt a more rational, moderate, and empirically grounded perspective. To do so, we must first understand these extreme viewpoints. The first viewpoint, as articulated by a prominent scholar in South Korea, suggests that human rights issues between the US and China are no longer a problem; they are a settled matter. This perspective often cites the 1994 US-China human rights dialogue, which began after the US granted China Most Favored Nation status without linking it to human rights. This led to a management-level dialogue, implying the issue was resolved. This view sees human rights as mere rhetoric or a tool for attacking other countries. I consider this an extreme viewpoint.

This element is a crucial factor for growth, and I would like to elaborate on its importance. There are approximately three points of significance. Firstly, contrary to what many might believe, norms are not solely about the coercive force of military power. I do not believe they are merely social elements or important factors in that sense. Through their research, many scholars have concluded that norms and other fields are distinct, possessing their own unique logic and, ultimately, autonomy.

While norms are influenced by military, economic, and technological factors, their resolution is not simultaneous with the resolution of other domains. Norms represent an ongoing issue. Secondly, as I will discuss shortly, norms are significantly interconnected with other domains. This can be referred to as interconnectedness. For instance, trade issues have recently become a focal point in US-China relations, and under the Biden administration, technological advancement has become linked with human rights issues.

Although it involves complexity, it evolves in conjunction with other areas. Furthermore, when it evolves, it adapts to specific contexts. Thirdly, norms possess latent potential. This is because they are closely related to elements such as nationalism and cultural sentiment, making them susceptible to change or volatility. In many cases, this latent potential is evident when international and domestic levels of value judgments are closely linked. We do not make separate domestic and international judgments; they are intertwined. In diplomacy as well, international and domestic elements are inextricably linked, which is why we speak of latent potential. While I will not discuss it in detail today, the COVID-19 pandemic, for example, has demonstrated this.

As you can see, numerous strategies and norms are being discussed. This aspect can also be applied to the present situation. Now, let us examine the dynamic relationship. We will explore how norms have evolved to date. There are various norms, and some researchers focus on issues of sovereignty, others on non-alignment, non-proliferation, or arms reduction. From the perspective of human rights and democracy, however, I will focus on human rights and democracy.

When discussing norms, there are two extreme viewpoints. Perhaps some of you here today are familiar with the term 'three-body problem' or the 'two-body problem.' You may agree with one of these perspectives. However, I would like to discuss the issues with these two viewpoints and propose my own perspective, which I believe offers a more balanced approach. To briefly summarize, the first viewpoint is that human rights and democracy are not important.

This perspective is supported by various discussions. For example, during the Obama administration, Secretary of State John Kerry stated in an interview in Seoul that if human rights issues did not hinder cooperation with China, the US would not raise them. He indicated that the US would not interfere in matters that China found inconvenient or difficult. While I acknowledge that other factors are important, this viewpoint suggests that priorities can shift depending on the context, and it is extreme to insist that human rights are always paramount. Similarly, during the Trump administration, when asked about China's human rights issues, then-White House Chief of Staff John Kelly stated in an interview that it was not the US's place to tell China what to do regarding human rights. However, I believe this perspective is short-sighted, hasty, and an extreme judgment. The reason is that after the COVID-19 pandemic, the US has become more assertive, and the subsequent developments have been largely overlooked, creating a distorted perception.

However, there are numerous examples demonstrating that this view is flawed. To illustrate, across the Obama, Trump, and Biden administrations, the US has never been silent on human rights issues with China. Many people believe the human rights issue is settled, much like how the situation in Myanmar might fade from public attention if it receives less media coverage. However, this does not mean the issue is resolved.

As researchers, if we look closely, we can see that the US has consistently focused on human rights issues. During the Obama administration, there were concerns about the suppression of Tibetan activists, the detention of human rights lawyers and dissidents, the crackdown on foreign NGOs, and the ban on the Dalai Lama's visit. Even during the Trump administration, which was perceived as having a honeymoon period with China, there were concerns about freedom in cyberspace, the detention of US citizens, the imprisonment of human rights lawyers like Ding Jiaxi, and the disappearance of activists. For instance, the case of Ding Jiaxi's wife, Luo Shengchun, who attempted to flee China with her daughter to seek asylum in the US after her husband's detention, highlights the diplomatic tensions between China and the US. Although the details of her escape and subsequent events are complex, the US intervened to help her reach the airport for her flight to the US. This occurred during the Trump-Xi summit. The incident nearly led to a physical confrontation between Chinese security forces and US Secret Service agents at the airport.

These events, though seemingly minor, are significant. Therefore, I believe this perspective is not only hasty but also an oversimplification, especially considering the US-China relationship since 2017. It is clearly not a settled issue. The other extreme viewpoint uses analogies like "clash of civilizations" or "new Cold War" to describe the US-China relationship. I also consider this an extreme viewpoint that hinders our understanding of the US-China relationship, particularly the conflict over values and norms.

Analogies such as "clash of civilizations," "new Cold War," or "ideological war" have been used. These terms suggest a sudden escalation and a clear divide. For example, some scholars, like Fukuyama after the Cold War, viewed the confrontation with China as a civilizational struggle, arguing that China presents a unique challenge because its political philosophy differs from Western thought. This perspective suggests that the conflict with China is a clash of civilizations, not just an international relations issue. Similarly, some, like Niall Ferguson, refer to a "new Cold War." The term "ideological war" is also frequently used, even by prominent figures in South Korea. However, I believe this perspective is biased and does not benefit us in understanding the US-China relationship. While there have been instances of actual conflict, such as the US Department of State's "China Strategy" report released on May 24 last year, which explicitly stated that past US foreign policy towards China had failed and that a new approach was needed, emphasizing the separation of the Chinese people from the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and criticizing the CCP's actions. The report highlighted three challenges: economic, value-based, and security-based. The value-based challenge was ranked second, underscoring the emphasis on ideology and the declaration of an "ideological war."

While the Trump administration's claims and direction were indeed strategic, and some aspects continue under the Biden administration, this does not mean the entire US-China relationship, particularly the conflict over values and norms, is a war. As a researcher, I have examined both the first and second viewpoints. We often seek clear-cut answers when analyzing international politics, hoping for definitive solutions.

However, the reality is far more complex and nuanced. I will now present my perspective as a researcher on the US-China relationship, particularly since the conflict escalated in 2017. While there have been conflicts surrounding human rights and democracy between the US and China even before 2017, I have summarized the interactions regarding norms and values since the Cold War in an article I wrote, which I highly recommend. It details the interactions concerning norms and values between the US and China, particularly since the Cold War.

If you read that article, you will gain a deeper understanding of the historical context. Now, let's focus on the period after 2017. How should we understand the US-China relationship since then? First, traditional human rights issues have persisted. These issues were present before, continue now, and remain largely unchanged. I have identified three keywords for the post-2017 period: proactive vs. reactive, holistic vs. issue-specific, and normalization. I will explain each keyword to demonstrate that the US-China human rights and democracy relationship is more complex than it appears. This understanding is crucial for achieving the objectives of this lecture. Third, traditional issues persist. Traditional issues, common to all international relations, arise from differences in historical context, culture, and policy approaches. These issues have been ongoing since around 2015-2017 and continue to be relevant. Examples include the disappearance of Hong Kong booksellers, the detention of activists, and the suppression of dissent.

The individuals shown here are the Hong Kong booksellers who were detained in 2015 for selling and printing books critical of China. They disappeared, only to be found later in mainland China. Also pictured is the case of Lam Wing-kee, one of the booksellers. Another example is the Dalai Lama's visit to South Korea, which has been an annual event. The report mentioned is the human rights report. And next to it is the case of Wang Quanzhang, a human rights lawyer who was detained in 2018 and later released. These traditional issues continue to be relevant. However, I want to emphasize that these are not the only issues.

We have examined three aspects of these issues. History often repeats itself, and human events tend to follow patterns. The case of the Hong Kong booksellers, for instance, was seen by many as a reflection of China's suppression of democracy. Similarly, the Holocaust and other historical events involving the persecution of Jews demonstrate the cyclical nature of such atrocities. Hong Kong's situation, with its erosion of freedoms and suppression of democracy, also reflects this pattern.

These issues are deeply intertwined with democracy and human rights, attracting significant attention. Now, let's move on to the second keyword: proactive vs. reactive. This signifies a shift towards a more proactive approach. In a 2016 article, I wrote that China, while not yet openly expressing its position on human rights, was showing signs of change. Specifically, regarding human rights situations within China, it was adopting a proactive and offensive stance. When I wrote this in 2016, China's position was largely passive and defensive, emphasizing the uniqueness of its human rights situation and its developmental context. However, since 2017, there has been a noticeable shift towards a more offensive posture.

The image on the left shows Wang Yi at the First South-South Cooperation Forum held in Beijing in December 2017, attended by representatives from about 70 countries in Asia and Africa. He emphasized the challenge to existing human rights norms and proposed a new model. This was followed by China's proposal at the Human Rights Council in March 2018. The key takeaway is that China began to define its own values and take a more active stance on US human rights issues. This goes beyond simply responding to criticism or engaging in dialogue. China is now proposing its own alternatives and values. While this was challenging in 2018, it became easier with the shift in US policy under the Trump administration, which de-emphasized values and international norms, creating a vacuum that China sought to fill. This effort intensified in 2019 and 2020. Another key aspect is the "core interests" of China, which is my research focus.

The Chinese government is employing these core interests. One significant change is that when conflicts arise between the US and China, they increasingly involve China's core interests. This is twofold: first, China is expanding the definition of its core interests, and second, these issues are indeed becoming closer to its core interests. While the US shows interest in many issues, such as the Uyghur situation, it does not seem to have the same level of engagement with issues like Taiwan. However, this is a topic for another discussion.

The US, particularly under the Trump administration, has maintained this stance, and it continues to be visible under the Biden administration. However, this does not mean that the US-China relationship, especially the conflict over values and norms, is a war. As a researcher, I have analyzed both perspectives. We often seek clear-cut answers in international politics, hoping for definitive solutions.

The reality is far more complex and nuanced. I will now present my perspective as a researcher on the US-China relationship, particularly since the conflict escalated in 2017. While there have been conflicts surrounding human rights and democracy between the US and China even before 2017, I have summarized the interactions regarding norms and values since the Cold War in an article I wrote, which I highly recommend. It details the interactions concerning norms and values between the US and China, particularly since the Cold War.

If you read that article, you will gain a deeper understanding of the historical context. Now, let's focus on the period after 2017. How should we understand the US-China relationship since then? First, traditional human rights issues have persisted. These issues were present before, continue now, and remain largely unchanged. I have identified three keywords for the post-2017 period: proactive vs. reactive, holistic vs. issue-specific, and normalization. I will explain each keyword to demonstrate that the US-China human rights and democracy relationship is more complex than it appears. This understanding is crucial for achieving the objectives of this lecture. Third, traditional issues persist. Traditional issues, common to all international relations, arise from differences in historical context, culture, and policy approaches. These issues have been ongoing since around 2015-2017 and continue to be relevant. Examples include the disappearance of Hong Kong booksellers, the detention of activists, and the suppression of dissent.

The individuals shown here are the Hong Kong booksellers who were detained in 2015 for selling and printing books critical of China. They disappeared, only to be found later in mainland China. Also pictured is the case of Lam Wing-kee, one of the booksellers. Another example is the Dalai Lama's visit to South Korea, which has been an annual event. The report mentioned is the human rights report. And next to it is the case of Wang Quanzhang, a human rights lawyer who was detained in 2018 and later released. These traditional issues continue to be relevant. However, I want to emphasize that these are not the only issues.

We have examined three aspects of these issues. History often repeats itself, and human events tend to follow patterns. The case of the Hong Kong booksellers, for instance, was seen by many as a reflection of China's suppression of democracy. Similarly, the Holocaust and other historical events involving the persecution of Jews demonstrate the cyclical nature of such atrocities. Hong Kong's situation, with its erosion of freedoms and suppression of democracy, also reflects this pattern.

These issues are deeply intertwined with democracy and human rights, attracting significant attention. Now, let's move on to the second keyword: proactive vs. reactive. This signifies a shift towards a more proactive approach. In a 2016 article, I wrote that China, while not yet openly expressing its position on human rights, was showing signs of change. Specifically, regarding human rights situations within China, it was adopting a proactive and offensive stance. When I wrote this in 2016, China's position was largely passive and defensive, emphasizing the uniqueness of its human rights situation and its developmental context. However, since 2017, there has been a noticeable shift towards a more offensive posture.

The image on the left shows Wang Yi at the First South-South Cooperation Forum held in Beijing in December 2017, attended by representatives from about 70 countries in Asia and Africa. He emphasized the challenge to existing human rights norms and proposed a new model. This was followed by China's proposal at the Human Rights Council in March 2018. The key takeaway is that China began to define its own values and take a more active stance on US human rights issues. This goes beyond simply responding to criticism or engaging in dialogue. China is now proposing its own alternatives and values. While this was challenging in 2018, it became easier with the shift in US policy under the Trump administration, which de-emphasized values and international norms, creating a vacuum that China sought to fill. This effort intensified in 2019 and 2020. Another key aspect is the "core interests" of China, which is my research focus.

The Chinese government is employing these core interests. One significant change is that when conflicts arise between the US and China, they increasingly involve China's core interests. This is twofold: first, China is expanding the definition of its core interests, and second, these issues are indeed becoming closer to its core interests. While the US shows interest in many issues, such as the Uyghur situation, it does not seem to have the same level of engagement with issues like Taiwan. However, this is a topic for another discussion.

The US, particularly under the Trump administration, has maintained this stance, and it continues to be visible under the Biden administration. However, this does not mean that the US-China relationship, particularly the conflict over values and norms, is a war. As a researcher, I have analyzed both perspectives. We often seek clear-cut answers in international politics, hoping for definitive solutions.

The reality is far more complex and nuanced. I will now present my perspective as a researcher on the US-China relationship, particularly since the conflict escalated in 2017. While there have been conflicts surrounding human rights and democracy between the US and China even before 2017, I have summarized the interactions regarding norms and values since the Cold War in an article I wrote, which I highly recommend. It details the interactions concerning norms and values between the US and China, particularly since the Cold War.

If you read that article, you will gain a deeper understanding of the historical context. Now, let's focus on the period after 2017. How should we understand the US-China relationship since then? First, traditional human rights issues have persisted. These issues were present before, continue now, and remain largely unchanged. I have identified three keywords for the post-2017 period: proactive vs. reactive, holistic vs. issue-specific, and normalization. I will explain each keyword to demonstrate that the US-China human rights and democracy relationship is more complex than it appears. This understanding is crucial for achieving the objectives of this lecture. Third, traditional issues persist. Traditional issues, common to all international relations, arise from differences in historical context, culture, and policy approaches. These issues have been ongoing since around 2015-2017 and continue to be relevant. Examples include the disappearance of Hong Kong booksellers, the detention of activists, and the suppression of dissent.

The individuals shown here are the Hong Kong booksellers who were detained in 2015 for selling and printing books critical of China. They disappeared, only to be found later in mainland China. Also pictured is the case of Lam Wing-kee, one of the booksellers. Another example is the Dalai Lama's visit to South Korea, which has been an annual event. The report mentioned is the human rights report. And next to it is the case of Wang Quanzhang, a human rights lawyer who was detained in 2018 and later released. These traditional issues continue to be relevant. However, I want to emphasize that these are not the only issues.

We have examined three aspects of these issues. History often repeats itself, and human events tend to follow patterns. The case of the Hong Kong booksellers, for instance, was seen by many as a reflection of China's suppression of democracy. Similarly, the Holocaust and other historical events involving the persecution of Jews demonstrate the cyclical nature of such atrocities. Hong Kong's situation, with its erosion of freedoms and suppression of democracy, also reflects this pattern.

These issues are deeply intertwined with democracy and human rights, attracting significant attention. Now, let's move on to the second keyword: proactive vs. reactive. This signifies a shift towards a more proactive approach. In a 2016 article, I wrote that China, while not yet openly expressing its position on human rights, was showing signs of change. Specifically, regarding human rights situations within China, it was adopting a proactive and offensive stance. When I wrote this in 2016, China's position was largely passive and defensive, emphasizing the uniqueness of its human rights situation and its developmental context. However, since 2017, there has been a noticeable shift towards a more offensive posture.

The image on the left shows Wang Yi at the First South-South Cooperation Forum held in Beijing in December 2017, attended by representatives from about 70 countries in Asia and Africa. He emphasized the challenge to existing human rights norms and proposed a new model. This was followed by China's proposal at the Human Rights Council in March 2018. The key takeaway is that China began to define its own values and take a more active stance on US human rights issues. This goes beyond simply responding to criticism or engaging in dialogue. China is now proposing its own alternatives and values. While this was challenging in 2018, it became easier with the shift in US policy under the Trump administration, which de-emphasized values and international norms, creating a vacuum that China sought to fill. This effort intensified in 2019 and 2020. Another key aspect is the "core interests" of China, which is my research focus.

The Chinese government is employing these core interests. One significant change is that when conflicts arise between the US and China, they increasingly involve China's core interests. This is twofold: first, China is expanding the definition of its core interests, and second, these issues are indeed becoming closer to its core interests. While the US shows interest in many issues, such as the Uyghur situation, it does not seem to have the same level of engagement with issues like Taiwan. However, this is a topic for another discussion.

The US, particularly under the Trump administration, has maintained this stance, and it continues to be visible under the Biden administration. However, this does not mean that the US-China relationship, particularly the conflict over values and norms, is a war. As a researcher, I have analyzed both perspectives. We often seek clear-cut answers in international politics, hoping for definitive solutions.

The reality is far more complex and nuanced. I will now present my perspective as a researcher on the US-China relationship, particularly since the conflict escalated in 2017. While there have been conflicts surrounding human rights and democracy between the US and China even before 2017, I have summarized the interactions regarding norms and values since the Cold War in an article I wrote, which I highly recommend. It details the interactions concerning norms and values between the US and China, particularly since the Cold War.

If you read that article, you will gain a deeper understanding of the historical context. Now, let's focus on the period after 2017. How should we understand the US-China relationship since then? First, traditional human rights issues have persisted. These issues were present before, continue now, and remain largely unchanged. I have identified three keywords for the post-2017 period: proactive vs. reactive, holistic vs. issue-specific, and normalization. I will explain each keyword to demonstrate that the US-China human rights and democracy relationship is more complex than it appears. This understanding is crucial for achieving the objectives of this lecture. Third, traditional issues persist. Traditional issues, common to all international relations, arise from differences in historical context, culture, and policy approaches. These issues have been ongoing since around 2015-2017 and continue to be relevant. Examples include the disappearance of Hong Kong booksellers, the detention of activists, and the suppression of dissent.

Qualitatively, the conflict is likely to persist in the short term and continue for about 30 years in the medium to long term. It is highly probable that trade issues, technological issues, or other problems will erupt.

As I mentioned earlier, the value norm element has its own distinctiveness and is linked to other areas, which is important for Korea. This is because instead of broadly categorizing it as conflict, we can find solutions and approaches by examining which elements are linked to which. Therefore, it has become interconnected and is a part that neither the US nor China can easily change. Consequently, if the conflict continues potentially, it will inevitably escalate. If it escalates by combining with other elements, there is a possibility of an explosion. Conflicts that proceed in this manner, even if conflicts in other areas are resolved, will inevitably be difficult to resolve.

Therefore, it can maintain its relationship. We must view diplomacy and security from this perspective. Why do I explain it this way? I have nine reasons. The first is theoretical grounds, and the second is empirical evidence. I will not go into detail about the theoretical grounds, but you can read them. For example, the current conflict between the US and China did not suddenly emerge.

I have three main points. First, the US-China relationship is historically and socially constructed. This means it's not something that just appeared. When we have a conflict in our daily lives with someone, even if the cause of the conflict is resolved, the conflict itself doesn't disappear. This is because there's a history that led to the conflict, and the surrounding people, which we call society, are involved. Therefore, we must understand this and try to resolve it.

Therefore, the nature of the US-China conflict is not unilateral. In my paper, I argue that China has also made efforts to establish the current human rights system to some extent, although whether these efforts are genuine needs to be evaluated. In terms of interaction, there are certain limitations. Furthermore, the interaction between the US and China is not simply a matter of the US pointing out and attacking China's human rights. As I wrote in my paper, when Mao Zedong published two declarations regarding the civil rights movement, he used racial conflict for propaganda. You are aware that this was primarily for the civil rights movement.

The George Floyd incident occurred, and when the conflict erupted, China's response, media coverage, and official statements were quite critical. Looking at these things, it's simplistic to say that the US-China relationship is solely based on the current power dynamics and that the US is using human rights as a tool. Some argue that it's merely a means to achieve other goals. However, there are reasons behind this.

History does not show this. If we look at history, it has continuously existed, and it is not merely a tool used to maintain or expand specific hegemony or relationships. It is one of the factors that constitute the order, and secondly, looking at the Sino-US relationship, once a conflict begins, whether or not the parties desire it, it tends to expand. If you look at the US-China trade war that began after the incident involving Huawei, you will easily understand this.

Many scholars, particularly those specializing in human rights and China, argue that China's multilateral diplomacy is becoming increasingly pragmatic. This has led to a situation where both the US and China may not have intended such outcomes. Furthermore, these outcomes cannot be resolved simply by resolving other issues. Third, the interconnectedness of the system, as Professor Li mentioned, is also a factor. This is because China's domestic values and foreign policy are intertwined, making these conflicts inevitable and persistent. They also have a certain degree of sustainability.

This is the first theoretical ground. The second theoretical ground is the work of scholars like John Mearsheimer and Stephen Walt. Their 2019 paper, which we often study in political science, discusses how to define good theories or good weapons. While there are various definitions, in terms of clear methodology, it's not a standardized approach. Nevertheless, it provides insight into the US-China relationship from the perspective of understanding China's significant power in international politics.

Those who are interested should definitely read this paper. The title itself suggests the content. Many scholars, including famous ones, argue that the world order is changing, or that the liberal international order is ending. Others argue that the liberal international order is flawed. The question is whether there is a flaw in the liberal international order. Ultimately, in the context of the US-China relationship, the answer is no.

When we look at the historical trajectory, we can see that the US-China relationship is not a simple bipolar order. There are at least eight different orders. I emphasize this perspective because, from a realist viewpoint, scholars always see things this way. However, those who try to theorize or explain the big picture of international politics tend to simplify the order and focus on the most important aspects. For example, scholars like Kenneth Waltz argue that we should not look at it that way, but rather as it is. When viewed as it is, these are the pictures that emerge.

There are various supporting and opposing views on the US-China relationship. This is the reality. What I will show you in the section on international law is similar. We cannot understand it by simply accepting it as it is. We need to extract keywords and identify key points, understanding what is changing and what is not. This is crucial for you.

As you can see, there are about eight orders. I won't go into detail, but if you read it, you'll see that while human rights and other issues are debated, in some orders, China has significant influence, while in others, there is significant conflict or challenge. This is how John Mearsheimer understands it. Of course, there are no problems with this way of understanding.

The first problem is that it's an incomplete explanation. It tries to understand things through this framework. However, we are at a crossroads. If we take the wrong first step, no matter how fast we go or how hard we try, we won't reach the desired destination. For example, imagine we take the first step of viewing the US-China relationship as a conflict over values and norms, and then formulate policies based on that. Even if we work hard and diligently, the reality may be different.

In that sense, this work can be seen as an ongoing project, but it's a good start. Of course, some might argue that it's too simplistic, focusing on too few variables. However, when dealing with complex political issues, it's important to simplify them to understand them. In a situation with many complex factors, we need to find opportunities. This is why it's important to simplify.

In that sense, this order can be a path forward. Can we make a hasty start? This is the last point I will discuss later when we talk about Korea. Before that, there are other approaches, and even in this complex situation, there are ways to find solutions. Of course, just because there are solutions doesn't mean all of them are feasible, or that implementing them will yield the desired results.

That's why we need to consider various options, try them out, and analyze them. The theoretical grounds are there, and the empirical grounds are also there. First, this situation has not changed. The situations during the Trump administration, while influenced by the pandemic and other factors, have largely remained the same. While the content of foreign policy has changed, the underlying principles have not significantly altered.

The US-China relationship, and the subsequent developments, have been consistent. Even with the change in administration, the core principles remain. The G7 summit, the statements from leaders of countries like Japan, and the analyses from think tanks like CSIS all point to this continuity. Therefore, this trend is likely to continue even with the Biden administration.

Recently, there have been reports about the US-China relationship, including the summit in Alaska and the establishment of the Quad. However, what's more important is that the US position has not changed, and China's assertiveness has increased significantly. While you may not be aware of every statement from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs spokesperson, you can see this trend in various statements and actions.

Specifically, in areas like democracy and human rights, they are clearly articulating their positions. The JSP's stance on these issues is also emphasized. This is a propaganda effort. They are promoting democracy and human rights, and in international forums, they are consistently advocating for these values. You are aware that they are also employing technological means, such as the "Belt and Road" initiative, which is one of China's key talking points. This is a historical narrative that cannot be changed.

This narrative continues, especially the idea that history is on their side. This situation will ultimately overwhelm the US. While previously this was discussed domestically, it is now being presented to an international audience. What was once propaganda is now a narrative that can be used to justify actions. This is evident in the actions of the Chinese Communist Party, and you can see a similar pattern in subsequent events. This is a crucial point.

Previously, the US's economic policy was... However, China is also taking a stance on human rights and democracy. This is a critical point. Second, the topic I wanted to discuss is the "Tripolar World" theory, which was proposed by Harvard professor Graham Allison in 2007. While advocating for values is important, the US also has issues to address. It must first resolve its own problems. Of course, this does not mean that they are advocating for China or other countries.

Their argument is that when values and norms enter the realm of diplomacy, it becomes very difficult. China is also facing significant criticism. Whether these criticisms are justified and will continue to be leveled against China remains to be seen. However, it is important to note that these criticisms, particularly regarding values, human rights, and democracy, are persistent. From a diplomatic perspective, it is very difficult to respond. The nature of values and norms is such that they are easy to attack but difficult to defend.

This makes it easy to attack, but difficult to defend. Given these circumstances, it is unlikely that the two countries will remain in a state of confrontation. Now, let's consider Korea. What should Korea do? Many people ask what Korea should do in its diplomacy. Is there an answer? If there is an answer, we can solve the problem. However, can that answer be adapted to reality? And what will be the consequences when it is integrated with other areas? These are the questions that must be addressed in real-world politics. Considering the US-China relationship and these factors, there is a conclusion to be drawn.

I often show students this cartoon from 1905, drawn by Thomas Nast, depicting the balance of power before the Russo-Japanese War. It shows a situation where Russia and Japan are poised for conflict. This is similar to the situation in 1900, when Korea was facing similar challenges. The situation in 1900, with the balance of power between the US and China, is also relevant. How should we respond in such a situation?

If you look for it, you'll find many similar depictions of conflict. But how long will it continue? Is there a way we can utilize it? Or is it destiny? This is the question that drives my research and my work. While people have different opinions, Korea's position is quite precarious. Therefore, what should we do? I will focus on evaluating how we have responded and how we should respond in the future.

Regarding what we should do, please do not act hastily. After reading these materials and listening to my lecture, you will each have your own areas of expertise. Whether it's in economics, politics, or journalism, you should set your own diplomatic goals and strategies. I will discuss these aspects.

In the context of the US-China conflict, the Hong Kong extradition bill, the Xinjiang human rights abuses, and the South China Sea disputes are particularly important. Therefore, I will show you how the Korean government responded to these issues in 2017. When discussing this, it's inevitable to point out shortcomings, regardless of the government in power. However, I will not criticize any specific government or its policies.

This is because diplomacy is inherently difficult, and the challenges are immense. As explained by Secretary of State Blinken in his press conference, the situation is complex. However, even from that alone, we can understand the difficulty. While it's easy to criticize what hasn't been done, as scholars, we must consider what is possible and what could have been done differently. This is my task.

First, as a scholar, I believe that when addressing complex issues, we must first understand the reality. How can we best adapt to it and find solutions? This is not an easy task. Second, I will present possible foreign policy options. In this regard, I believe that the situation is complex. The US's foreign policy under Trump was characterized by strong rhetoric, communication issues, and the "America First" policy. This, along with the May 2020 statement and the shift in foreign policy, created a challenging environment. In such a situation, the government inevitably maintained a cautious and principled policy.

The government has consistently stated its commitment to the principles of the joint statement. However, beyond the general statements, there are specific points that deserve attention. For example, the joint statement on the "One Country, Two Systems" principle regarding Hong Kong emphasizes the importance of safety and stability. This is a clear expression of concern. However, what is more significant is the mention of the "One Country, Two Systems" principle, which was not previously emphasized. This can be seen as a proactive expression of our position. However, this is mentioned alongside the joint statement on Hong Kong and the Basic Law. Is this sufficient?

These subtle nuances highlight our emphasis on our own values while also acknowledging China's perspective. Furthermore, Korea has not participated in joint statements on human rights issues at the UN, and has expressed a cautious stance on the situation in Xinjiang. This indicates a generally cautious and principled approach. However, in the current rapidly changing environment of 2017, this approach may not be sufficient.

In a rapidly changing geopolitical landscape where values and diplomacy are intertwined, sticking to general principles can lead to a predictable foreign policy or a loss of initiative. Therefore, I believe a more indirect and proactive approach would have been beneficial. We have faced similar situations before, such as the extradition bill controversy and the issue of Korean residents in Hong Kong being subject to its provisions. By clearly articulating our position on these matters, we could have better expressed our stance.

Furthermore, the summit was viewed favorably in terms of values and norms. The joint statement mentioned shared values such as democracy, human rights, and the rule of law, as well as the Taiwan Strait and the South China Sea. The commitment to promoting human rights and the rule of law domestically and internationally was also highlighted. While these points were significant, the response to the development of the South China Sea was generally downplayed as a mere "verbal expression." This suggests an attempt to downplay the issue. Especially concerning the G7 joint statement, we could have proactively asserted our position.

There is some regret. While I believe we did what we could within our capabilities, I think there were opportunities for a more indirect approach. I regret that we did not explore more options. Regarding China, I believe that our stance on human rights and democracy should be clearer and more consistent with our values. This aspect of our foreign policy is somewhat disappointing.

Yes, in the remaining time, I will discuss my thoughts on Korea's foreign policy direction. I have also collaborated with EAI on this topic, so please read it if you are interested. It analyzes Korea's response to the US-China conflict and its implications. I have outlined two main principles and three supporting strategies.

The first principle is to uphold our unique values and norms while also embracing universal values. This means that in value-based diplomacy, we should pursue what we aim for domestically and internationally, and clearly define what we accept and what we do not. For example, in the case of Afghanistan, we have a national consensus on certain issues. However, despite this consensus, we must also consider international norms. Should we compromise our principles for the sake of international cooperation?

This is something we can learn from and declare to the world. By establishing principles and communicating our values, we can build trust. However, I believe this requires further consideration. It is important to have values that we can uphold, but it is also important to consider whether these values are advantageous to us, especially in the context of international relations. When our values align with international norms, we can gain a relative advantage in diplomacy, particularly in the US-China relationship.

There are various factors to consider when making foreign policy decisions. We can establish principles that do not require further explanation, or we can create consensus through bipartisan agreement. Many foreign policy experts discuss these issues. However, in reality, foreign policy is not always straightforward. There are political divisions, media influence, and public opinion to consider. Experts in foreign affairs often say that it is difficult to navigate these complexities. Nevertheless, it is important to establish clear principles for foreign policy.

First, the Summit for Democracy, and second, the Indo-Pacific strategy. The Summit for Democracy was held virtually this year and will likely be held in person next year. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs is also considering participation. Regarding our participation in the Summit for Democracy, there are three main considerations.

Frankly, I don't think we need to participate in such events. Our identity and diplomatic efforts have been revealed through our participation in various international forums. Therefore, participating in the Summit for Democracy is not necessarily a problem. However, the issue is that we tend to join after others have already established their positions. We need to be more proactive. Instead of passively joining, we should actively participate and play a role. This is especially true for initiatives like Quad Plus and the economic cooperation framework.

Second, through the Summit for Democracy, we can address sensitive issues such as progressive democracy. While this may be limited to North Korea, it is important to establish our position and communicate it. In bilateral relations with China, we should also convey our stance on these issues. This is a valuable opportunity. Third, at the Summit for Democracy, we can contribute to discussions on issues that are still uncertain, such as the specific actions to be taken and the deterrents to be established. The US is also facing similar uncertainties. Therefore, we have an opportunity to play a proactive role.

It is not yet clear what specific actions will be taken or what deterrents will be established. Therefore, we have an opportunity to play a proactive role. As you can see, there are offensive aspects, such as the US's assertive stance towards China, and defensive aspects, such as the Quad's role in the Indo-Pacific. While the Taiwan issue is sensitive from our perspective, it is not a burden. However, in areas where there is a clash between the two sides, we can play a role. In areas that have not yet been codified or are still under discussion, we must actively participate in shaping norms and values.

Especially from a geographical perspective, we have experienced aggressive nationalism from China, such as the protests during the 2008 Beijing Olympics and the actions of Chinese students. We have also seen incidents like the attack on the Korean consulate in Shanghai. These are examples of aggressive nationalism, which is also evident in cultural exports and other areas. Authoritarian regimes often exhibit such aggressive nationalism. In these areas, Korea can take a leading role.

In these areas, Korea can take a leading role in establishing norms. This is not simply about joining existing frameworks, but about actively participating and playing a role. This is one approach, and it is also a strategic direction we can consider. Especially concerning China, while public opinion is important, the US's foreign policy is not always stable. It may not proceed in the direction we desire or expect.

This is because we have experienced the results of the Trump administration and the strong "America First" policy. This policy continues to influence US foreign policy, prioritizing "America First" and "American citizens first." Therefore, we must consider how the US will formulate its policies and whether they will be disadvantageous to us. However, a more pressing issue is the need to balance our relationship with China.

The US-China competition is intense. In terms of diplomatic relations, there have been recent incidents involving Chinese companies that have raised concerns. The issue of Hong Kong's autonomy is particularly sensitive. While initially there were discussions about the role of the US and other countries, recent statements by the Korean Foreign Minister have been perceived as coercive. Initially, there were subtle responses, but the situation has become more complex. The US has shown a willingness to engage in dialogue, but the situation remains delicate. We need to consider how to balance these aspects.

We can achieve this not only by leveraging our own strengths but also by utilizing international norms and frameworks. This will allow us to navigate the current situation and manage our relationship with China. While the government's efforts are important, public participation is also crucial. If the public is informed about the current diplomatic situation and supports the government's foreign policy, it will strengthen our position. Otherwise, it will be difficult to set ambitious goals.

These historical lessons are important. Therefore, I believe this is a crucial strategic element that we need to establish. We need to secure our position. This is more important than we think.