[2nd EAI ACADEMY Lecture 3] Son Yeol

YouTube Link: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=9tlGrsOE8p8

- Date: August 17, 2021, 6:00 PM

- Speaker: Son Yeol, EAI President, Professor at Yonsei University

Reading List

1. Lee, Yong-hee. 1970. "The Spiritual History of Korea-Japan Relations." Shin Dong-A, August 1970, pp. 291-333.

2. Son, Yeol. 2018. "The International Politics of the Comfort Women Agreement: The Identity-Security-Economy Nexus and the Park Geun-hye Administration's Diplomacy toward Japan." Journal of International Politics, Vol. 58, No. 2, pp. 145-177.

3. Son, Yeol. 2021. "Recommendations for the Next Government's Policy toward Japan: Rebuilding Korea-Japan Relations." Recommendations for the Next Government's Foreign Policy (tentative title), forthcoming.

Speaker Introduction

■ Son Yeol is the President of the East Asia Institute (EAI) and a Professor at the Graduate School of International Studies, Yonsei University. He holds a Ph.D. in Political Science from the University of Chicago. He has served as Dean of the Graduate School of International Studies, Head of the Underwood International College, Director of the Institute for Sustainable Development, and Director of the Institute for International Studies at Yonsei University. He was also a Visiting Professor at the University of Tokyo, and a Visiting Scholar at the University of North Carolina (Chapel Hill) and the University of California (Berkeley). He served as President of the Korean Association of International Studies (2019) and President of the Association for Japanese Studies (2012). He was a Senior Fellow at Fulbright, MacArthur, the Japan Foundation, and the Waseda University Institute for Advanced Study. He has served as an advisor to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Korea National Diplomatic Academy, the Northeast Asian History Foundation, and the Korea Foundation. He was also a specialist member of the Committee for Northeast Asian Affairs and is currently a member of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs' Self-Evaluation Committee. His areas of expertise include Japanese foreign policy, international political economy, East Asian international politics, and public diplomacy. His recent publications include Japan and Asia's Contested Order (2019, with T. J. Pempel), Understanding Public Diplomacy in East Asia (2016, with Jan Melissen), “South Korea under US-China Rivalry: the Dynamics of the Economic-Security Nexus in the Trade Policymaking,” The Pacific Review (2019), 32, 6, and The Middle Power Diplomacy of Korea (2017, co-edited).

Video Transcript

First, I will discuss the structural causes of conflict in Korea-Japan relations. Second, I will address the perceptions of the public in both countries, that is, how the citizens of both nations view the conflicts in Korea-Japan relations. Why is this issue important? Because there is a certain distance between the perception of Japan and Korea-Japan relations held by the general public and the perception held by policymakers or political leaders who are actually implementing policies. I intend to point out this distance. A significant factor contributing to this distance is the issue of the 'three gaps.' That is, there is a gap between the perception of Japan and Korea-Japan relations held by the older generation, the elite, and policymakers, and the perception of Japan and Korea-Japan relations held by the general public, especially by people like you who represent the future generation. I want to highlight this gap.

Then, I will discuss what the problems are with the perception of Japan held by the older generation. Based on that, I will discuss what the future of Korea-Japan relations will be and how we can forecast it. Finally, I will address how we should rebuild the perception of Japan and Korea-Japan relations. Today's lecture will proceed with these points. As I have written here, I view Korea-Japan relations as fundamentally a crisis of trust.

When I say a crisis of trust, it is fundamentally because there are not significant conflicts of interest between Korea and Japan. Let's think about it. When we consider security interests, are there critical differences between Japan and Korea? Is there truly a zero-sum relationship between Korea and Japan? That is, how often does the situation where Japan's security is guaranteed negatively impact Korea's security? If you think about it, it's not that frequent. Compared to other relationships, such as North-South relations, are there really conflicts of security interests with Japan? We need to examine this objectively. Economically, is there a zero-sum relationship between Korea and Japan? It's difficult to say so. As I will explain shortly, there is a significant degree of interdependence between Korea and Japan economically.

A large degree of interdependence does not mean there is no competition. What I mean is, is the Korea-Japan relationship one where if one side gains due to a conflict of economic interests, the other side loses? It's difficult to see it that way. Why, then, have we experienced what I call the 'lost two decades'? That is, we have been fighting for ten years, from 2012 to 2021, with emotional conflicts. These have arisen fundamentally not from conflicts of interest, but from emotional friction. And behind this, there have been no formal bilateral summits between Korea and Japan for the past decade.

Are there people who are surprised by this? We have had formal bilateral summits with North Korea's Chairman Kim Jong-un, and with the United States, China, and Russia. However, for the past decade, there have been no formal bilateral summits with Japan, our close neighbor. This is the current state of Korea-Japan relations. Consequently, in the absence of communication between leaders, emotional disputes arise. This involves mutual criticism. The Korean government criticizes Japan, and the Japanese government criticizes Korea. If you listen to this criticism, it is similar to the criticism leveled in Seoul or Washington, though the degree may differ. However, we do not engage in such emotionally charged criticism even towards countries on the other side of the globe. Yet, we do so towards Japan.

This has not always been the case. It has been particularly pronounced in the last five years. Therefore, when governments criticize each other, public opinion deteriorates, and when public opinion deteriorates, political incentives arise to exploit that deteriorated public opinion for political gain. This creates a vicious cycle of escalating emotional confrontation. What is the result of this? As I mentioned earlier, even though there are no particular conflicts, conflicts are created, extending from security issues to economic issues.

Confrontation and conflict occur in these areas as well. Consequently, emotional disputes, primarily stemming from historical issues such as comfort women, forced mobilization, or the Dokdo issue, are now spreading to security and economic fields. As a result, South Korea is downgrading Japan's strategic importance and value. Japan is also downgrading South Korea's strategic importance. There are even discussions of Japan without Korea and Korea without Japan. In Japan, there are discussions about whether South Korea is an enemy, and in South Korea, there are discussions about whether Japan is an enemy. I am exaggerating slightly, but these kinds of discussions are happening in our society and in Japanese society today.

Some of you might think, "But aren't there security conflicts with Japan?" I believe many of you might think so. I would like to give you a recent, relevant example. I was shocked to read an interview with one of the presidential candidates. Some of you might not be surprised, but I was. This candidate said in a media interview not long ago:

When this candidate was asked about inter-Korean relations and the North Korean nuclear issue, they responded, "It's not just a North Korean issue, but a Japanese issue." Why? This candidate has consistently shown a hardline stance on issues related to Japan. The response was: "The Japanese militaristic forces are a major threat. Japan's constant interest in Dokdo and its claims over Dokdo are not simply territorial issues, but are because they see it as a bridgehead for continental expansion. In other words, they view Dokdo as a bridgehead for continental invasion, which is why they constantly claim it."

This statement frames the claim over Dokdo not as a historical or territorial issue, but as a military issue, implying that Japan's security strategy could pose a critical threat to South Korea's security. This is a discussion of a conflict of security interests. Today, we will explore whether this is correct or incorrect. There is a lot of information here, and I will not explain each point individually. However, looking at these slides, you can see that these issues have been raised year after year.

And looking at these slides, we see that the conflicts, as I mentioned earlier, are not about fundamental core security or economic interests between the two countries, but rather about issues like comfort women and various historical matters. If you look at public opinion polls on Korea-Japan relations, you will see a trend like this. This graph, which you have likely seen before, is from a survey conducted by EAI and the Japanese think tank Gaullist FP. We have conducted a joint survey of public opinion in both countries from 2013 to 2020, for eight years, and we are conducting it again this month.

Looking at this, you can see that 88% of South Koreans believe that Korea-Japan relations are bad. That is, about 9 out of 10 people believe that Korea-Japan relations are very bad. In Japan, over 50% also believe that Korea-Japan relations are bad. On the other hand, the percentage of people who believe that relations between the two countries are good is likely below 10%. The next point is favorability, or the degree of positive sentiment towards the other country.

Regarding favorability, it is interesting that Japan's impression of South Korea has fluctuated between 20% and 30% over the past eight years. Meanwhile, South Korea's favorability towards Japan started at 12% and rose to 31.7% in 2019. This is an increase of almost threefold in favorability. However, it sharply declined between 2019 and 2020. Correspondingly, unfavorable impressions increased from around 49-50% to 70%. You can probably guess what happened during that time. Starting in July 2019, Japan imposed export restrictions on South Korea, and South Korea retaliated, leading to a critical deterioration in Korea-Japan relations.

This is reflected in the survey results, showing a decline in favorability. What I want to point out here is that while the sharp drop in favorability last year, and conversely, the increase in unfavorable views towards Japan, can be understood as a result of the issues that erupted between the two countries, the question is, how did it steadily increase for the previous seven years? This is something to consider. On the next page, regarding favorability, there is another graph...

Looking at this, we can see that the generation driving Japan's favorability towards South Korea is the 20s and 30s. Among Japanese citizens, favorability towards South Korea among those in their 20s and 30s is around 27-28%, while it is in the 10% range for those in their 50s and 60s. Similarly, among South Korean citizens, about 42% of teenagers have a positive impression, and 37% of those in their 30s do. In contrast, those aged 60 and above show 26%, and those in their 50s show 31%. This is a comparison of the trends during the sharp decline in favorability last year. The table below shows data for 2018, and the table above shows data for 2019. Simply put, looking at the 10s, 20s, 30s, 40s, 50s, and 60s, we can see that favorability declined similarly across all age groups last year. This is what is being shown here.

Therefore, looking at these results, we can see that the historical issues have been a constant over the past eight or nine years. However, despite these historical issues, government-level emotional conflicts have occurred annually since 2012, as shown by the various emotional exchanges and conflicts. Then why did the favorability among the younger generation increase steadily, despite all this? In other words,

There is a decoupling between the government's approach to Japan and the favorability towards Japan among the younger generation (20s and 30s). How can we explain this? Conversely, we can ask whether the sharp decline in favorability from 2019 to 2020 was due to anti-Japanese sentiment or a temporary reaction to the specific policies of the Abe administration. Within this context, we must consider the issue of how to understand the anti-Japanese sentiment of the older generation in our society.

There is a perspective that the conflict or emotional entanglement between Korea and Japan stems from the colonial rule. Is it because Japan has not reflected on its 50 years of colonial rule? In 1998, President Kim Dae-jung, after his election, visited Japan and delivered a speech to the Japanese Diet. He said, "It is foolish to let the unfortunate history of less than 50 years overshadow the 100 years of exchange and cooperation."

In other words, he argued that the unfortunate history of colonial rule should not render the history of past exchange and cooperation between Korea and Japan meaningless. I believe this statement is partly correct and partly incorrect. When we examine the historical records, such as the article by Lee Yong-hee on the spiritual history of Korea-Japan relations, which was provided as a reading material, we see that the spiritual issues between Korea and Japan—simply put, the stereotypes or images that each country holds of the other—are largely based on self-contradictory perceptions. Self-contradictory means that the images or perceptions are not consistent or logical.

The text explains why this is the case. This is how the older generation perceives things. Regarding the Olympics, I don't know how many of you watched the closing ceremony directly, but I watched it on TV. Song Seong-an, a KBS commentator, who directed the opening and closing ceremonies of the Pyeongchang Olympics, was invited as a commentator for the Tokyo Olympics opening and closing ceremonies. He made a comment during the closing ceremony:

"My generation, currently in their 60s, worked hard to catch up with Japan and have achieved much. However, upon arriving in Japan, I realized that it is a country that is still ahead of us in many aspects, including the Olympics. Therefore, I hope that future generations will have a broader perspective and continue to bridge the gap with Japan." Hearing this, I wondered why Korea's development should be compared to Japan's.

It is understandable to strive to catch up with Japan due to past grievances. However, is it not a generational issue to compare our achievements with Japan's? As a professor teaching Japanese studies, I find it interesting that many in our society, particularly highly intelligent and accomplished individuals, express such competitive sentiments towards Japan, viewing it as a rival to be surpassed, linking it to patriotism, and expressing it in various ways. Why should we have such a complex towards Japan?

For example, consider the situation where we compare ourselves to France, a former colonial power, as a rival to be surpassed. Or the controversy surrounding the banner displayed in the athletes' village during the Tokyo Olympics: "To my divine general, with 50 million people..."

What feelings would our athletes in their 20s and 30s have experienced, seeing this banner invoking patriotism and the need to defeat Japan? Is this not a syndrome of the older generation? I call this a 'checklist syndrome.' It's not applicable to all members of the older generation, but it represents a certain sentiment. This sentiment is deeply ingrained. The definition of Korea-Japan relations, as presented here, is not easy to grasp as it oscillates between East and West, expressing intense emotions. However, the core issue is this:

This relationship, before Korea was invaded by Japan in modern times, was the one described. Korea and Japan, like sunflowers, focused their attention on the center of the world, China, without looking at neighboring countries. They competed to be closer to civilization and measured their own development and national identity based on their superiority over the other. This is the history that has unfolded. I have summarized this in the table below. Although it is complexly written here, the core point is this:

In the past, Korea was indifferent to Japan. Korea's attention was solely focused on China, the center of culture and civilization. We did not look at Japan, which was behind us. We held a sense of contempt for Japan and a sense of superiority. Meanwhile, Japan, looking towards China, also glanced at Korea. While Japan developed a sense of cultural and civilizational inferiority towards Korea, having received its destiny through Korea, it also harbored a certain resentment towards Korea. This was because Korea was merely copying China, and Japan, in turn, was not just adopting but copying Korea's adoption of Chinese culture. Korea was seen as weak, a vassal state of China, merely imitating it. This was a form of self-deception, a 'spiritual victory.' This perception persisted. Through the Imjin War, Korea experienced severe humiliation as Japan, which it had disregarded and disdained, inflicted military defeat. This humiliation was mixed with a sense of cultural and civilizational contempt towards Japan, resulting in a self-contradictory view of Japan. This culminated in the late 19th and early 20th centuries with various military humiliations at the hands of Japan, ultimately leading to colonial rule. Consequently, Korea developed a sense of inferiority towards Japan.

This was because civilization had changed. The traditional Sinocentric civilization had shifted to modern Western civilization, and Japan had adopted Western civilization faster than any other East Asian country. Looking at Japan, Korea felt a sense of inferiority. However, at the same time, it held a sense of cultural contempt, believing that while it was adopting Western civilization in Japan, it was adopting the essence, not just the form. Meanwhile, Japan's situation regarding Korea was similar to Korea's past situation regarding China.

Japan now has little interest in Korea. Korea is, in a way, an object of indifference. After the unification, Japan developed a sense of civilizational inferiority towards Korea and considered itself superior. What I have been discussing is not just the material changes in Japan and the changes in Korea-Japan relations, but also the underlying currents of thought and the changes in how the people and leaders of both countries perceive each other. This is how I am trying to understand Korea-Japan relations.

Therefore, looking back at the long history of Korea-Japan relations, spanning approximately 2,000 years, before the colonial period, it is difficult to describe it as a history of cooperation, as President Kim Dae-jung suggested. Korea and Japan have always had a certain level of emotional friction, and they have held significantly self-contradictory perceptions of each other. This is vividly illustrated in Lee Yong-hee's article.

I believe this is a very important point. Because when we discuss Korea-Japan relations today, we easily talk about the colonial period and Japan's lack of apology. However, it is not solely about that. This article shows us that. Therefore, I recommend it. Now, let's consider the older generation. We can define the older generation as those who were educated and grew up after the normalization of Korea-Japan relations in 1965. This includes people in their 70s, 60s, and 50s.

Towards Japan, there is the humiliation of the colonial era and the resulting resentment. You sometimes use the term 'yeol-pok' (intense anger). There are such feelings. On the other hand, as mentioned earlier, Japan is significantly ahead of Korea in terms of modern Western civilization, so there is a sense of inferiority, a feeling that we must catch up with Japan. Therefore, on one hand, there is a sense of humiliation, and on the other hand, a sense of inferiority. These feelings are channeled into emotions towards Japan. On the other hand, there is a sense of moral superiority. This stems from the fact that Korea was closer to the traditional Sinocentric civilization. Secondly, through colonial rule, there are the comfort women statues. Even by current modern standards, Korea is in a superior position. This is how the older generation, or the current political leadership, perceives Japan. This is what we are seeing today. When we engaged in the trade dispute with Japan, we heard such arguments.

The current ruling party declared, "We will build a nation that will not be shaken." "We will overcome economic challenges." "We will declare independence from Japan." I asked my students about this declaration in the fall of 2019. One student asked, "When was the first 'shaking'?" "We will not be shaken." Are we being shaken by Japan? Japan imposed export controls on essential materials like semiconductor chemicals and hydrogen fluoride. They claimed these were strict export controls. When they temporarily suspended exports, we said Japan was undermining our economy. But my students asked me:

"Is it an invasion when they withhold essential goods from us?" While I understand it's a bad thing, why use the term 'invasion'? Hearing this, I realized that the language used by those in power, or those making policy decisions, is somewhat disconnected from the language of the younger generation, who will be responsible for the future. This is a significant decoupling. Next page. So, is this all our problem? Professor, is Japan doing well?

No, it's not. This is the reality of Japan in the 2010s. Have you heard of the 'declining giant syndrome'? This refers to the psychological syndrome that occurs when a great power or a developed nation begins to decline. This concept emerged when the United States was being caught up by Japan in the 1980s and 90s. Japan did not ultimately surpass the US, but it rapidly closed the gap. At one point, it reached 70% of the US GDP.

At that time, scholars identified two trends. First, there is a tendency to try to restore past glory and再現 it when facing national decline. This is what we call 'restoration nationalism' or 'revivalism.' Think about it. When the US was in decline in the 1980s, what was said? During that period, the US was at its lowest point since the 1950s and 60s. When Trump came to power in the last five years, he advocated for "Make America Great Again" and "America First." He promised to restore America's glorious past. Similarly, when Russia occupied Crimea, the Russian people were mobilized. This was because they were shown the glorious past of the Soviet Union.

Japan, under the Abe administration, has also been experiencing growth. Let me give you an example. In 2010, China surpassed Japan in GDP. China's GDP reached $5 trillion, surpassing Japan's. In 2000, China's GDP was only 40% of Japan's.

In 2020, Japan's GDP is 49% of China's. In other words, in 2000, Japan's GDP was 2.5 times that of China. In 2010, they were equal. By 2020, China's GDP is 1.67 times that of Japan, meaning Japan's GDP is only 40% of China's. This relative decline compared to China, and similarly to other countries, has led to a desire to revive past glory. The 'past glory' referred to is, of course, the 1964 Tokyo Olympics. However, to achieve this, they look back to the time when Japan became the first Asian country to possess colonies, the first imperialist power, and a member of the great powers. Abe's slogan was to restore that glorious Japan.

This is a typical example of restoration nationalism. Where was the first colony? Some say Taiwan in 1895. But the truly major Japanese colony was the Korean Peninsula. Therefore, Abe's glory is linked to Japan's colonization of Korea in 1910. The source of Korea's shame and humiliation is 1910. This leads to historical conflict and clashes of national identity between the two countries. This is the first point. Second, further complicating the 'declining giant syndrome' is that while looking back to past glory is one aspect, they also try to shift the blame for their current decline onto others.

In the 1980s and 90s, the declining US blamed Japan for its decline, leading to agreements like the Plaza Accord and various trade sanctions against Japan. Where is the blame now? It's placed on China. The decline of the US, the loss of American jobs, the collapse of the American middle class – all attributed to China. Japan is exhibiting the same pattern. And Korea is caught in the middle. Therefore, the ruling powers in Japan, including presidential candidates who have referred to Japan's militaristic forces, are essentially the same group. Abe and his associates engage in identity politics and conflicts with Korea, while also feeling anxious about Korea's rise. At some point, they feel the need to confront and punish Korea, expressing superiority and contempt. This is how it manifests. What I have been discussing is not only the material changes in Japan and the changes in Korea-Japan relations, but also the underlying spiritual currents and the changes in how the people and leaders of both countries perceive each other. This is how I am trying to understand Korea-Japan relations.

In the 1980s and 1990s, a declining United States blamed Japan for its woes. Consequently, they reached the Plaza Accord and imposed trade sanctions on Japan, among other actions. Where is the blame now? It's directed at China, isn't it? Thus, the narrative in the U.S. is that China is responsible for the decline in American jobs and the collapse of the American middle class. This is a pattern that Japan also exhibited, and South Korea is caught in the middle of it. The ruling powers in Japan, including presidential candidates, have described Japan's militaristic forces as such.

Therefore, starting around 2015-2016, the Abe administration shifted from a defensive to an offensive stance towards South Korea. What does this mean? Previously, Korea-Japan relations were characterized by Japan's superior position, where Korea needed assistance as a developing country. Furthermore, due to Japan's 30 years of colonial rule and the resulting damages, Japan tended to defensively accommodate Korea's demands or respond passively to them. However, from 2015-2016 onwards, this dynamic reversed. When historical issues arise, instead of discussing the historical issues themselves, the focus shifts to whether South Korea has kept its promises regarding these issues.

The argument is that South Korea cannot be trusted. In October 2018, there was the Supreme Court ruling on forced mobilization. The argument was: "We signed the Korea-Japan agreement in 1965, which settled issues like forced mobilization. How can you reopen this issue? Isn't this a violation of international legal order?" The reason given is that South Korea is an untrustworthy nation. This offensive stance towards South Korea, while also being persuasive to the Japanese public, has yielded results. Therefore, when EAI conducts surveys on historical issues, we ask questions like:

When asked about the reasons for negative impressions of the other country, Japanese respondents cited the following: "South Korea constantly criticizes Japan over historical issues," "South Korean emotional words and actions," and "South Korean actions that are difficult to understand." In other words, while criticizing South Korea, they no longer question whether Japan has issues with its historical perception. The current issue is not about right or wrong; it's about South Korea's problems. The argument is that South Koreans, or more accurately, the South Korean government, are not engaging with historical issues but are using them to criticize Japan and handle relations emotionally.

This is the logic being employed, and it is gaining traction in Japan today. Consequently, public opinion in Japan has deteriorated. This image shows some Japanese right-wing individuals. You may have heard of Zaitokukai. They are a group that openly expresses xenophobia towards non-Japanese ethnic groups in Japan. Here, it says, "Korea is not evil, Korea is the devil, and should be destroyed."

This is the logic being propagated, and it is the reality of today that Japan is becoming increasingly hostile towards us. Therefore, public opinion in Japan has deteriorated. This image depicts Japanese right-wing extremists. You may have heard of Zaitokukai, an organization that openly expresses animosity towards non-Japanese ethnic groups residing in Japan. The sentiment expressed is that Koreans are not merely 'bad,' but 'evil,' and thus should be reviled.

This is why such sentiments are being expressed. In Japan today, such extreme groups are emerging. As a result, the relationship between the two countries has deteriorated significantly, with actions such as export controls on strategic items, boycotts, and retaliatory measures from both sides.

There are four main points. First, as the governments of both countries have clashed, the sense of threat has intensified. The perception of Japan as a threat to South Korea has grown. This leads to a reluctance to engage in any form of security cooperation with Japan. Consequently, trilateral security cooperation among Korea, the US, and Japan has weakened. This, in turn, has weakened cooperation on North Korea and negatively impacted Korea-US relations. Therefore, the current administration, the Biden administration, has been working on these issues. You have all discussed and studied this extensively in previous sessions.

The most significant strategic goal of the Biden administration is to counter China, and to counter China, it will pursue close security and economic cooperation with Japan and Australia. Japan and Australia are the most important allies in Asia for the United States, and security cooperation with them is essential. The US is strongly urging the two countries to cooperate strategically, even if it means separating their historical disputes. Let's look at the public opinion polls on Japan's military threat.

North Korea is at 84%, China at 44.4%, and Japan at 44.1%. China and Japan are nearly identical in terms of military threat. At 44%, one in two citizens considers Japan a military threat. The perception of threat is increasing. Why has this increased over the past eight years? First, Japan claims sovereignty over Dokdo. Second, Japan maintains an ambiguous stance on its war responsibilities. Third, Japanese politicians are becoming more right-wing. Japan is a psychological threat to Korea.

In other words, you may have heard concepts like 'ontological security' and 'existential security.' If Japan is perceived as a threat to my identity, then it is a threat. It threatens my reason for existence. However, the question was not asked in that way. It asked if Japan would pose a military threat to Korea. 44% of citizens answered 'yes,' and when asked why, the reason given was Japan's claim to Dokdo's sovereignty. This implies that Japan might use military force over the Dokdo issue.

58% believe there is a possibility of that. Among the 120 people in this class, 58% believe that Japan, which claims sovereignty over Dokdo, might resort to military conflict to seize it. This is the same as the survey mentioned earlier, where the top candidate was the threat of invasion by Japanese militarist forces, leading to the danger to Dokdo. Similar views are held by others. Second, Japan maintains an ambiguous stance on its war responsibilities.

Why? Because Japan has not taken responsibility for its past colonial war crimes, is there a possibility of military threat? Let's examine if this logic holds. However, many people think this way: Japanese politicians are becoming more right-wing. This implies that right-wing politicians are more inclined towards militarism and the possibility of using military force cannot be ruled out. Such suspicions may arise.

However, we need to consider whether this is truly possible. Objective data will be presented shortly to demonstrate this. The result of this conflict is the strengthening of the perceived threat from Japan. I have already shown the increase in perceived threat with a graph. Second, regional influence is shrinking. Since 1945, after its defeat, Japan has re-emerged as the world's second-largest economy and remains the third largest. However, Japan's diplomacy has never actively led in the Asia-Pacific or Indo-Pacific region.

However, in the last five to seven years, Japan has been pursuing a policy of a free and open Indo-Pacific. One of these initiatives is the rise of the Free and Open Indo-Pacific. The Quad, as you know, is a four-country strategic dialogue among the US, Japan, Australia, and India. Japan is actively pursuing this and the TPP, a free trade agreement that was initially led by President Obama, but the US withdrew under President Trump. This left the TPP in limbo, but Japan actively utilized its diplomatic leadership to recreate it as the CPTPP.

This established the TPP without the US. Therefore, Japan is showing considerable diplomatic initiative at the regional level. However, due to the conflict with Japan, South Korea has been in a very difficult situation to actively participate in these initiatives. Was there a plan for this? Not really. Therefore, I believe that a significant reason for the considerable shrinkage of South Korea's diplomatic influence, at least at the regional level, in the Asia-Pacific or East Asian region, is the conflict with Japan. Thirdly, what about the economic aspect?

Bilateral trade volume has significantly decreased. As you can see from the chart, after a slight increase in 2015-16, it has been declining since 2011. The problem is that East Asia is the center of the world economy. It's a rapidly expanding economic region, yet the trade volume between two major developed countries is shrinking. This cannot be explained solely by economic factors; we must consider that political reasons are influencing trade as well. I believe that is the case.

Japan is also implementing various measures against South Korea, such as FDI restrictions and export controls. In other words, as the two countries have been in confrontation, trade imbalances have occurred, and trade retaliation measures were implemented in 2019. Looking at South Korea's trade balance with Japan, the surplus decreased in 2019 because bilateral trade decreased. The South Korean government's policy in response to Japan's trade surplus was to reduce dependence on Japan, particularly in the sectors where Japan imposed trade restrictions.

The goal was to achieve domestic production. If we reduce dependence on Japan, the trade deficit with Japan should decrease. However, looking at the data, it increased in 2018 and further increased in 2019. If we estimate for 2020 based on the first half, it is projected to reach 24,000. So, the trade deficit is widening. Despite the mutual trade retaliation measures, and in Japan's case, the proportion of South Korea in Japan's trade, which briefly decreased in 2019, is increasing again.

What this means is that in the long term, bilateral trade and FDI are gradually declining amidst political conflicts. While this is a negative trend, the effect of implementing trade retaliation measures and further retaliatory measures within this decline is not as significant as expected. I am showing this with a graph. This is a chart from a report that caused quite a stir in Japan recently. It shows the three key products targeted by Japan's export controls: photoresist, fluorinated polyimide, and etching gas. Despite Japan's restrictions, Japanese exports of these products, except for browser, have not significantly decreased.

This indicates that the market continues to demand these critical export items from Japan. Conversely, South Korea has been unable to achieve self-sufficiency in these materials. This implies that both the Abe administration's export controls and the Moon administration's policy of achieving self-reliance in materials, parts, and equipment have limitations. The current outcome suggests that South Korea and Japan are economically interdependent. Particularly, in the context of export controls, the targeted items are crucial for South Korea's semiconductor industry, Samsung Electronics and SK Hynix, which are the pillars of the Korean economy.

Semiconductors are vital to the economy. These three critical materials are supplied from Japan. However, Japanese companies need to sell these to Samsung Electronics and SK Hynix, and South Korea cannot achieve self-sufficiency in these three items with its current technological capabilities. Economically, it does not make sense to sever ties with Japan. In other words, in terms of the semiconductor supply chain, South Korea and Japan are closely integrated and interdependent. Therefore, external political interference cannot easily disrupt this relationship; it has resilience.

Therefore, this should not be tampered with lightly. Interfering with these matters for political reasons not only yields no positive effect but also results in irrational outcomes, causing harm. The current state of South Korea-Japan economic relations illustrates this. As you know, Samsung Electronics is investing $3 billion to build a new semiconductor production line in Xian, China. Of this investment, 70% is sourced from Japanese semiconductor equipment manufacturers. Thus, South Korea invests $3 billion in China through FDI, utilizing China's cheap labor to produce semiconductors and selling them to China, the world's largest market for semiconductors.

This is a profitable venture. On the other hand, Japan exports semiconductor equipment worth 70% of Samsung Electronics' semiconductor equipment investment to the Xian production line. Therefore, Japan exports, China gains FDI and employment effects, and produces memory and DRAM semiconductors stably in China for its market. This is beneficial for all parties involved. This illustrates the economic relationship between South Korea and Japan. The current situation demonstrates this.

Therefore, some in our society argue that while Japan was once a developed country we aspired to catch up to, it is no longer important. They argue that China is more important. However, even if China is more important, Japan remains significant. As we have seen, the economies are closely interconnected. Furthermore, Japan is not unimportant from a security perspective either. Ignoring Japan can also create problems in our relationship with the United States.

Therefore, it is not wise to discount Japan lightly, as is often done when discussing Japan. I am conveying this through this lecture. The same applies to Japan. Japan's ruling elites must also recognize this. They might think, 'South Korea is far behind us and still a developing nation, but their politicians constantly bother us with historical issues. We should distance ourselves and use economic leverage to discipline them.' Such thinking must be abandoned. The South Korea-Japan relationship is not that simple. This is the first point. Now, regarding the future, if this relationship continues, what can be said about the future, and are there any alternatives at the regional level? I will discuss this now. The long-term trend is as follows.

This table was created by EAI. Looking at the future of South Korea-Japan relations, the most significant variable in the foreign policies of both countries will be the relationship between the US and China, specifically the US-China competition. This table, which extends to 2050, reflects this. I introduced this table at the opening ceremony. Currently, China's GDP is about 60% of the US GDP. However, by 2030, in nine years, China will surpass the US.

Just as China surpassed Japan in 2010, by 2030, in twenty years, China will surpass the US in GDP and achieve economic parity. Therefore, it is highly likely that the US and China will engage in fierce competition regarding economic issues, as neither side will want to yield. Let's consider up to 2050. We have analyzed the ratio of GDP to defense spending. Currently, the defense spending ratio between the US and China is 3:1. The US spends three times more on defense.

Although China's GDP is only 60% of the US, the US spends significantly more on defense. Based on the average over the last ten years, China spends about 1.7% of its GDP on defense, though some argue it is higher, perhaps around 2%. Accepting these figures at face value, the ratio is 3:1. With the GDP reversal, by around 2040, China's defense spending will reach two-thirds of the US defense budget, and by 2050, it will be almost on par, according to our estimates.

Thus, by 2030, US-China GDP will be similar, and by 2050, US-China military spending will be comparable. History shows that a period of crisis can occur every 20 years. As you know from the classic work 'The Peloponnesian War,' between 1919 and 1939, after World War I, World War II occurred 20 years later. Similarly, a similar event could occur between 1930 and 1950, or even later.

I mentioned on the first day that by 2030, you will be in your prime, in your 30s and 40s, and by 2050, in your 50s and 60s. The US and China will be in that state. Significant conflict is expected between them. If you have the opportunity, I recommend reading the report 'US-China Competition 2030' on our website, as it will be very helpful. I am presenting this in the context of South Korea-Japan relations.

According to the table, the current US GDP is $20 trillion, approaching $21 trillion. China's GDP is between $10 trillion and $15 trillion. Japan's GDP is $5 trillion. South Korea's GDP, as you know, is $1.6 trillion. The US has $20 trillion, and China is rapidly catching up with $14 trillion. Japan is about one-third the size of the US. South Korea is about one-third the size of Japan, at $1.6 trillion. By 2030, the US will be between $23 trillion and $24 trillion, and China will also be between $23 trillion and $24 trillion.

Japan will remain at $5 trillion, or at best $5.7 trillion. South Korea will be at $2 trillion, or at best $2.1 trillion. While Japan and South Korea remain at $5 trillion and $2 trillion respectively, the US and China will reach $23-24 trillion. This means that Japan, with its $5 trillion economy, will become a middle power. While we are discussing US-China competition, the current economic power of Japan ($5 trillion) and South Korea ($1.6 trillion to $2.1 trillion) will remain stagnant, whereas the US ($20 trillion) and China ($14 trillion) will converge at $24 trillion.

In Northeast Asia and the Asia-Pacific region, South Korea and Japan lag significantly behind the US and China. If these two countries are to maintain diplomatic autonomy in the face of US-China competition, must they continue to fight over historical issues or past grievances? That would be foolish. They will be relegated to the annals of history. Therefore, for your generation, there is no hope if you view each other in the same way as the previous generation. This will become a reality in nine years. To illustrate this, I will now discuss the future of South Korea-Japan relations and their respective power dynamics. I mentioned Samsung Electronics earlier. Samsung Electronics' purchasing power parity (PPP) is already comparable to Japan's, and its GDP has surpassed Japan's.

In terms of purchasing power parity, there is no difference between South Korea and Japan. By 2030, the per capita GDP of South Korea and Japan will be equal. While there will be a difference in overall size due to Japan's population of 120 million compared to South Korea's, the per capita income will be similar. Let's look at defense spending. In three years, South Korea's defense spending will equal Japan's. Is the claim that Japan harbors ambitions for continental invasion and might seize Dokdo objectively supported? If that were possible, it would imply a scenario where Japan, under militaristic fascism, abandons democracy and is driven to war and invasion by revanchist forces. This is how I see it. Therefore, when discussing future South Korea-Japan relations, we must consider three points. First, we must acknowledge that economically, South Korea is important to Japan, and Japan is important to South Korea. Second, this reality will continue into the future, and as the US and China dominate the world, South Korea and Japan will face immense challenges if they do not cooperate. Third, when viewing Japan, we must abandon the perspective of the older generation, which sees Japan as a rival and potential aggressor. The current indicators show that the relationship between South Korea and Japan is changing in a way that makes this view untenable.

Therefore, we must keep these three points in mind when considering how to approach issues related to Japan. Regarding low birth rates and aging populations, this is a given. Look at this: by 2030, Japan's working-age population will be less than twice its elderly population (65+). It will be about 1.8:1, meaning 1.8 working-age individuals will support one elderly person. Japan is heading towards this situation, and South Korea is rapidly following suit, though I haven't included the data here.

By 2030-2040, two working-age individuals will have to support one elderly person. We need to compete and cooperate with Japan. As the older generation argued, rivals are good. I teach at Yonsei University, and when Yonsei excels, Ko-dae follows closely. Sometimes, restructuring is needed to keep up, requiring significant investment. However, because they are rivals, they must invest to catch up.

Conversely, functional competition is highly beneficial. The desire to beat Japan in the competition in Busan enhances our skills, which is excellent. However, going beyond that, to embody Admiral Yi Sun-sin and win at all costs, by any means necessary – this is the thinking of the older generation. Therefore, we should compete where competition is appropriate, cooperate where cooperation is needed, and address historical distortions. However, focusing solely on historical distortions while neglecting hard power, economic power, soft power competition, and functional cooperation, as I have argued, is foolish. It is a mistake to let historical issues overshadow everything else. Thus, in these three areas, as we saw with the Biden administration's recent election in the US, we must move forward with competition, cooperation, and coexistence, just as we do with China.

Conversely, functional competition is truly beneficial. For instance, the desire to defeat Japan in Daegu would enhance our skills to achieve that victory. However, going beyond that, the mindset that we must win against Japan, no matter the means, as exemplified by Admiral Yi Sun-sin, is a product of the older generation's thinking. Therefore, we must engage in competition for its own sake and cooperate where functional cooperation is needed. But we cannot simply overlook historical distortions just because they concern areas where we should cooperate. To halt power competition, economic and soft power competition, and functional cooperation due to historical distortions and focus solely on that issue would be, as I have mentioned, a foolish act when considering the present and future conditions we face. Thus, in these three aspects, as we saw in the past when the Biden administration of the United States adopted a strategy towards China, the same approach should be taken with Japan and the world: competition and cooperation.

Therefore, what is the outlook? Frankly, I do not have much hope. This is being recorded, and it will be posted on the EAI website. Some presidential campaigns might watch this, and I might be criticized. However, looking at the statements and actions of the current candidates, I cannot help but think that it will be difficult for them to move beyond the mindset of the older generation. In other words, they will not be able to handle relations with Japan from a broader, national perspective.

This requires viewing Japan from the three perspectives I have mentioned. However, we must still place hope in the next government. Here is a possible scenario: First, regarding the historical issues of comfort women and forced mobilization, I believe these cannot be resolved before the next president takes office. I think the next government should resolve these within a year of taking office. Otherwise, these issues will continue to cause friction for the entire five-year term.

The resolution of past issues depends on the political and strategic decisions of the president. If you have questions, I am happy to answer them. Second, as mentioned earlier, there are numerous opportunities for joint responses to regional structural issues, including security and economics. These extend to technological advancements and other areas, which you may have seen. Cooperation with Japan is necessary here, but little has been achieved through bilateral cooperation. We must engage with the US, China, and other countries. The venue for South Korea-Japan cooperation should be within multilateral frameworks.

Within these frameworks, Japan is a valuable partner, and South Korea is equally valuable to Japan. We can achieve more by working together. This is the third point. Fourth, if we move forward together, how will we deal with China? The US will likely advocate for excluding China or, at best, forming supply chains that place China in the lowest value-added segments. The key is for East Asian countries to unite. There are differences in perspective between South Korea and Japan regarding China, but these are not insurmountable. Therefore, adjusting these differences is crucial.

Finally, regarding the various discussions about South Korea-Japan relations and the concept of national identity, it is not enough to simply overcome them from a broader national perspective. We must find common ground in our shared identity as Asian nations. As mentioned earlier, the issue of identity is linked to how we interpret history. Therefore, in the long run, we need to reduce mutual interference and strive for a relationship of coexistence and shared identity. With this, I will conclude the session on South Korea-Japan relations.