[2nd EAI Academy Lecture] Jeon Jae-sung on "The Biden Administration's Diplomatic Strategy and World Order, and ROK-US Relations" Lecture Video and Materials

YouTube Link: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ZAFhmR5f3lI

- Date: August 13, 2021, 6:00 PM

- Speaker: Jeon Jae-sung, Director of the EAI Center for National Security Studies and Professor at Seoul National University

Reading List

1. Kurt M. Campbell and Rush Doshi. 2021. "How America Can Shore Up Asian Order: A Strategy for Restoring Balance and Legitimacy" January 12, 2021

2. Strategic Competition Act of 2021

3. Jeon Jae-sung. [EAI Special Report] US-China Competition 2050 V: Military Security

Speaker Introduction

Jeon Jae-seong, Director of EAI Center for National Security Studies and Professor at Seoul National University. He received his Ph.D. in Political Science from Northwestern University and has served as a policy advisor to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of Unification. His main research areas include international political theory, history of international relations, and studies on the ROK-US alliance and the Korean Peninsula. His major works and edited volumes include "War Threats and Peace Between the Two Koreas" (co-authored), "Is Politics Moral?", and "East Asian International Politics: From History to Theory."

Video Transcript

5 Hello, everyone. My name is Song. I wish I could have met you in person given the various difficult circumstances. But I am very glad to meet you, even if it's online. Since we only have an hour and a half, I will focus on the topic. Today's topic, as you all know well, is the diplomatic strategy of the Biden administration. I will divide it into three main parts. The first part is about the Biden administration's overall foreign policy. I've written 'strategy' here, but it's more about the overall approach.

The second part is about the US's Asia strategy and its importance, which is directly related to the US federal government. And the third part will be about ROK-US relations under the Biden administration and Korea's strategy towards the US. Since ROK-US relations and the Biden administration's foreign policy are being discussed as important issues through various media, I believe many of you have considerable knowledge.

Instead of focusing on minute details, I will focus on how to approach the issues overall. Please refer to the reading list that was sent to you. The US has created a formal bill for competition with China, a very lengthy document. We have also seen speeches from key figures in the Biden administration, and there have been various documents detailing their strategies, including their Asia strategy. So, understanding the content is not difficult. The Biden administration has already been in office for seven months.

Therefore, we need to consider whether the Biden administration's plans and strategies will succeed in the future, and if they do, what impact they will have on Korea and East Asia. First, like all administrations, the Biden administration has a mission for its time. Before the Biden administration took office, there were many discussions about what kind of foreign policy it would pursue if it came to power, which was a hot topic at the end of last year.

Although it's been over a year, the discussions were intense at the time. A major question was whether the Trump era would end with Trump's departure. Even now, when I talk to many scholars in the US, some say that the four years of the Trump era were like a nightmare. This is not just a personal evaluation, but rather a significant departure from the foreign policy the US has traditionally pursued. There were many discussions about whether the paradigm of Trumpism, a foreign policy approach, could be maintained even after Trump himself left office.

Therefore, we had extensive discussions about what Trumpism is. Unlike the traditional US foreign policy we know, Trumpism pursued a foreign policy that prioritized US national interests over global order, an "America First" approach. It also focused on maximizing US interests in the short term rather than long-term foreign policy. There were extensive discussions about whether this policy stemmed from Trump's personal characteristics or from structural factors in the US's domestic and international environment.

Therefore, some argued that Trump's rise was merely a manifestation of the structural problems plaguing the US, and that even if Trump left the presidency, US foreign policy would continue to lean in that direction. The Biden administration's task was to normalize this approach, which was suspected of being Trumpist and criticized by some allies. Therefore, restoring the US's position as the world's sole leader and hegemonic power, providing global public goods at its own expense, was considered a crucial task.

As we have seen so far, the Biden administration is striving to pursue a stable foreign policy that is more familiar to us, a continuation of the traditional US approach. The question is to what extent this foreign policy will succeed. There are various obstacles, including domestic and international challenges, from economic difficulties to political polarization, and the recent rapid worsening of the COVID-19 situation since the Delta variant emerged. For the Biden administration to maintain stability, it must achieve good results in the midterm elections next year to pursue a stable foreign policy for four years. If not, other approaches may emerge at any time.

The Biden administration's rebuilding strategy, as President Biden himself has often stated, is to return to being the world's hegemonic power. The term 'hegemony' has various nuances, but neutrally speaking, in international politics, it means a state that prioritizes the provision of global public goods that all countries and the international community need, at its own expense.

Therefore, hegemonic foreign policy can be seen as such a role. Thus, international politics without hegemony and international politics with hegemony are quite different. For Korea, the international political environment since 1945 has been one where hegemony has always existed, and the free and open order has flourished under US hegemony. However, the Trump era, lasting four years, was a period that raised the awareness that international politics without hegemony might be possible. If the Biden administration fails in its rebuilding strategy, the problem of hegemony's absence in international politics may recur.

The rebuilding strategy ultimately requires the US to have the capacity to provide global public goods proactively and voluntarily. Hegemony can only exist if the US is prosperous and powerful. Of course, the US must fundamentally be a hegemonic power. The era without hegemony might be possible, and whether that era will be managed well is something we need to watch. However, for the past 30 years, since the collapse of the Soviet Union and the Eastern Bloc, the US has maintained a unipolar system. It can be said that the US has not fully succeeded in its hegemonic foreign policy. The rebuilding strategy currently led by the Biden administration can be called "Build Back Better."

It can also be seen as rebuilding the world order through US leadership, a "hegemonic rebuilding." Although it is a rebuilding strategy, fundamentally it is a strategy for hegemonic restoration. Therefore, understanding the content of the Biden administration's foreign policy is important, but we also need to consider the theoretical questions. The first question is how to view the post-1945 order. In international relations theory, there are various perspectives such as realism, liberalism, and constructivism, or Marxism. Since the early 1990s, the US has referred to the post-Cold War order as a liberal, rules-based order.

Therefore, it can be seen as an order based on the consensus of states, multilateral and cooperative, rather than on power and might. Because the US has proactively provided the necessary global public goods for such an order, we refer to it as the US-led order. Of course, the US has not always acted in line with liberalism, and it is well aware of this. The question of what specific conditions are necessary for a liberal international order is very interesting and requires considerable discussion.

However, overall, the post-1945 order is significantly different from the minimal order that modern politics has maintained since the Peace of Westphalia. China holds a critical view of this US-led, rules-based order, arguing that it is not orderly and not based on rules. A recent cartoon from China depicted this sentiment. Although China has grown within this US-led order, it holds a critical perspective.

The period when this US-led, multilateral order was most successful was from 1991 to 2010, often referred to as a unipolar system. A unipolar system is generally defined as a state possessing more than 50% of global power. In contrast, a bipolar system involves two states with roughly equal power. The US, in the early 21st century, held a significant portion of global power and, moreover, had most developed countries as allies, thus maintaining the most powerful unipolar system in modern history.

However, while maintaining this unipolar system, the US experienced considerable difficulties and ultimately weakened. Maintaining global public goods required immense resources, and allies and the international community did not support the US as they did during the Cold War, as there was no common security threat, and other allies did not necessarily need US alliances to the same extent. It can be said that the unipolar system is not necessarily stable. If the Biden administration fails to restore the liberal order, it could fall into a "post-hegemonic" danger.

As Charles Kindleberger, a scholar mentioned earlier, stated, the existence of hegemony is the cornerstone of a liberal economic order. As mentioned earlier, since the end of the Cold War, there has been considerable fear of international politics without hegemony, often referred to as a "post-hegemonic" era. More importantly, we face extremely difficult global challenges such as the COVID-19 pandemic, climate change, and pandemics.

In the past, a hegemonic power could largely resolve such issues. However, in the future, even a powerful US will find it difficult to handle these problems alone. Therefore, we must question whether a hegemonic power can even exist in future international politics. Theoretically, there have been cycles of hegemony, with ascents and descents over centuries. However, it is possible that such cycles may no longer exist. In short, the Biden administration's foreign policy can be understood as a return to the pre-Trump era US foreign policy. However, in the broader context of international politics, the Biden administration holds a crucial variable that will shape future international politics.

I would like to elaborate on this structural context further. One is the crisis of the unipolar system. When the Soviet Union collapsed in 1990-1991, the international community was profoundly shocked. Many believed that the "end of history" had arrived, and the era of liberalism had begun, with the US creating the international order that Woodrow Wilson had envisioned.

Conversely, Samuel Huntington's "Clash of Civilizations" thesis suggested that international politics would change significantly, with the US playing a central role. Twenty to thirty years later, there have been three major crises: the September 11th terrorist attacks in 2001, the 2008 financial crisis, and the ongoing COVID-19 pandemic, which began last year. It is difficult to say whether these crises have ended. Following the September 11th attacks, the US launched military operations in Iraq and Afghanistan.

The Biden administration is pursuing a new strategy to end these interventions, with plans to withdraw all US troops from Afghanistan by the end of August. The withdrawal from Afghanistan, the longest war in US history, waged during its most powerful period, carries significant symbolic meaning. The US called the war on terror an "unfinished war." The question of whether the US can withdraw from the Middle East, even after withdrawing from Iraq and Afghanistan, and whether the Middle East will let the US go, remains a persistent issue, as reported in the news. There is also ongoing debate and speculation about the extent to which the Taliban forces in Afghanistan may expand their influence.

The 2008 financial crisis was triggered by numerous factors, but it is largely attributed to the excesses of financial capital within the US financial sector. Consequently, criticism of financial capitalism intensified, and the Obama administration made considerable efforts to resolve it. However, the financial system remains incomplete, and the awareness that a crisis could occur at any time persists. Therefore, it is not an exaggeration to say that the problem has not been resolved, even with the unipolar system.

The COVID-19 pandemic, as mentioned in the paper "The End of History and the Last Man," is a prime example. Even with a powerful hegemonic effort and global public goods provided by a single nation, international politics has become increasingly difficult for one country to manage. The problems that arose then remain unresolved and are ongoing. It is against this backdrop of crisis that Trumpism emerged. Obama's solutions were partially successful, and the Trump administration promised to resolve these issues and received considerable support. However, even during the Obama administration, there was some consensus on diagnosing the problems, but many of the solutions proposed by the Trump administration, such as trade wars with China and pressure on allies,

were not necessarily effective models for resolving US crises. Therefore, the gap between the rapidly increasing complexity of international political issues (global commons or public goods) and the US's capacity to manage them, both domestically in terms of political will to garner support for hegemonic pursuits and economically, as well as its hegemonic capacity internationally, is widening.

Consequently, some US international relations scholars argue that the era of grand strategy, or "grand strategy" as it is known, is no longer possible for the US. In the early 21st century, the Bush administration pursued a "primacy" strategy to make it the American century, but it resulted in the global war on terror and the financial crisis. The Obama administration pursued a hegemonic restoration strategy to address the Bush administration's problems, but due to China's rise, it achieved only partial success. The Trump administration, advocating "America First," gained significant support initially but faced the unexpected COVID-19 pandemic. While many predicted Trump's re-election in 2018-2019, the outcome was different. It is difficult for any administration's grand strategic vision, set at its inception, to be maintained and implemented today.

It is difficult to predict how the Biden administration will end, given the rapid changes in international politics. However, as we have examined, the Biden administration recognizes these issues and aims to address the structural problems that have accumulated in the US's unipolar system and to restore the liberal, rules-based order that the US has traditionally pursued. I will elaborate on this further, but due to time constraints, I will not go into excessive detail. Since the 9/11 attacks, the US has incurred significant political and economic costs, with estimates suggesting expenditures of up to $6 trillion.

This amount is comparable to the budget the Biden administration plans to use for its rebuilding strategy. Despite these massive expenditures on post-9/11 measures, the problems in the Middle East and the developing world have not been fully resolved. During the Obama administration, the US pursued a "pivot to Asia" strategy, shifting military and financial resources from the Middle East and Europe to Asia, largely in response to China. However, in the later years of the Obama administration, the Middle East situation worsened again, and there was also the Crimean crisis.

As stated in English below, the US cannot easily withdraw from the Middle East, as illustrated by various metaphors. You can refer to this later when you review the materials. Second, the 2008 financial crisis and neoliberalism. I believe the professors teaching international political economy will be able to explain this in more detail according to their expertise. The Biden administration's core effort is to address the aftermath of the 2008 financial crisis, the challenges of de-globalization, and the widening economic gap within the US, while also tackling the economic crisis caused by COVID-19.

Furthermore, the current international political and economic order has significantly shifted towards protectionism and national interests. The Biden administration aims to restore a liberal international economic order based on free trade. However, it must also address the vulnerabilities in the US supply chain, particularly concerning China, which were further highlighted by the COVID-19 pandemic, and the rise of "friend-shoring." Therefore, since the 1980s, with the Reaganomics and the model proposed by scholar John Ruggie, there has been an agreement that while states should pursue strong domestic economic intervention policies, they should cooperate closely within free trade areas to maintain a liberal economic order, including free trade and orderly financial regulation. Starting in the 1980s, led by the UK and the US, neoliberal responses began to emerge domestically. In the 1990s, with the establishment of the WTO, the neoliberal system, characterized by the free movement of capital, financial deregulation, and privatization, spread, providing a strong economic foundation for the US to maintain global hegemony. However, as mentioned earlier, this resulted in the problems seen in the financial crisis. While neoliberal globalization has achieved global success in poverty reduction, it has also exacerbated wealth inequality between nations and within countries. In the US, the income gap between the rich and the poor has widened dramatically, as indicated by the Gini coefficient. Therefore, there is a widespread perception that it is difficult for the US to maintain the neoliberal paradigm.

This perception contributed to the election of President Trump. Thus, the Biden administration's economic policy and rebuilding strategy are shifting from the neoliberal capitalist model towards greater state intervention to address the problems of neoliberalism. However, the extent to which this shift can occur, whether these US actions can fundamentally change the international economic order from a neoliberal one, and how these changes will relate to US-China economic competition are complex issues. The economic crisis is therefore a crucial factor influencing the Biden administration's foreign policy.

Next, the Biden administration's foreign policy and domestic economic policies are rapidly progressing amidst the COVID-19 pandemic. As we know, the administration's approach, dubbed "Bidenomics," involves strengthening the role of the state, increasing government spending, and promoting investment. The administration is pursuing a massive economic stimulus plan, comparable to the New Deal, with unprecedented government spending.

In addition, the Biden administration is continuously proposing legislation related to job creation, such as the recently agreed-upon infrastructure bill. The scale of this fiscal spending, estimated at trillions of dollars, aims to revitalize the US economy. There is ongoing debate about its potential success, and concerns about inflation are also being raised by economists. Amidst the COVID-19 pandemic, the Biden administration's economic policies are being pursued with a mix of concerns and expectations. From an international political perspective, the key question is whether these economic policies will provide sufficient strength for the US to fulfill its hegemonic role, or whether, even if the US economy recovers, it will be in a state that makes it difficult to maintain its hegemonic position.

Furthermore, given China's rapid rise, the US must maintain its military superiority over China while bolstering its economic and hegemonic foundations. If the US cannot adequately pursue its economic interests while China bypasses it militarily, maintaining hegemony will be extremely difficult. Therefore, the success of the Biden administration's domestic economic policies has significant structural implications for international politics. The following graph shows the trend of US government investment as a percentage of GDP, which has been gradually declining. This indicates the state of US infrastructure.

Many Americans, when visiting South Korea, are surprised by its development, particularly its infrastructure like Incheon Airport and 5G technology. This highlights the neglect of US infrastructure investment. If the US views this neglect as a necessary sacrifice for its hegemonic strategy, arguing that it has prioritized global interests over domestic needs, it will be difficult to garner domestic political consensus for hegemonic pursuits. Therefore, the Biden administration must pursue policies that are closely linked to domestic politics, which is reflected in its "foreign policy for the middle class."

From the perspective of international politics, it is crucial to observe how domestic politics in the US evolve. For those who specialize in US politics, research on these issues is also very important. The trends in US public opinion and domestic politics have become crucial in this era. I have already discussed the preceding points. Within this overall flow of foreign policy, the US's world strategy and Asia strategy, and its China strategy, are evolving. Kurt Campbell, the Indo-Pacific Coordinator, plays a crucial role in this.

You may have seen his recent article, which was posted as reading material. He has had extensive exchanges with the East Asia Institute since its inception. He was involved in exchanges when he served as Deputy Assistant Secretary of State, and his views on Asia are well-known. He is now playing a crucial role in shaping US foreign policy. You can quickly update yourselves on the content of Campbell's Asia-Pacific strategy through these materials. I recommend you do so. Recent discussions suggest that the core of US policy is Asia.

Campbell also co-authored the book "The Pivot: The Future of American Statecraft in Asia." He discusses the risks associated with the concepts of "pivot" and "rebalance." The Democratic Party administration has recognized the importance of Asia since the late Obama administration, and with the current administration, the emphasis on Asia as the core of US strategy has been repeatedly stressed. This is not a new development; the idea that Asia is a crucial strategic region for the US has been discussed since the Bush administration.

In terms of military strategy alone, from around 2016-2017, the main focus of US military deployment shifted to Asia, particularly China. Previously, the war on terror and the Middle East were important, but the focus has gradually shifted eastward. China lies at the heart of this strategy, but predicting the future of US-China relations is not easy. This is often referred to as American exceptionalism. The US is a unique country.

Looking solely at military power, the main area of US military engagement has shifted to Asia, particularly China, starting around 2016-2017. Before that, while the Middle East was important for war, it has gradually become the central focus of geopolitical configuration. At its core lies China, but predicting the future of US-China relations is not easy. This is often referred to as American exceptionalism, the phenomenon of the United States being a unique nation.

It has not experienced feudalism and possesses a unique political system due to its powerful status. Although it has been a great power, it has not openly pursued colonialism. China is also an exceptional country; it has historically existed as the hegemonic power in Asia. The US is also an exceptional country. Therefore, it is very difficult to analyze US-China relations using existing international relations or social science research frameworks. It is particularly difficult to easily explain and predict US-China relations by incorporating factors of change in the international political landscape. The analogy of Thucydides' Trap, which refers to the great power competition between Athens and Sparta over 2,000 years ago, is not directly applicable today.

While this simplified analogy offers analytical insights, predicting the future of US-China relations requires observing the actual unfolding of these relations rather than relying solely on theoretical or historical precedents. The US's China strategy is constantly evolving, and it is difficult to argue for a unified view within the US. We often hear in the news that despite the deep polarization in US politics, there is bipartisan consensus on containing China.

However, while there may be agreement on the broad concept of containment, there are significant differences in specific China policies, not only within the Democratic Party but across the entire political spectrum. Against this backdrop, the Biden administration, like the Trump administration, firmly believes that China is the primary threat to the US-led liberal international order and that China seeks a world order based on coercion.

The difference from the Trump era is that while the Trump administration did not articulate an overall East Asia strategy, focusing primarily on bilateral economic pressure on China, the Biden administration is pursuing a broader strategy to contain China by focusing on the entire Indo-Pacific region. The key keyword in the China strategy of the Biden administration is "competition, cooperation, and confrontation." You have likely heard this term before. Given the high stakes in US-China relations, there are areas where cooperation is possible, areas of competition, and areas of confrontation.

This is referred to as the "3C strategy." Secretary of State Blinken has elaborated on this specifically. Therefore, the US recognizes the different dynamics within US-China relations. Areas that are zero-sum, where one side's gain is the other's loss, are typically areas of confrontation. Conversely, areas based on norms and rules, which allow for cooperation rather than zero-sum outcomes, are areas of competition. Areas determined by military power and decisive force are considered areas of confrontation.

Competition implies agreeing on the basic rules of the game. Therefore, the areas where the US and China have competed so far can be seen as areas where they compete according to existing rules and norms. An interesting phenomenon is the emergence of new issues in US-China relations and the international community, even within the framework of a "rules-based order." These include cyberspace, artificial intelligence (AI), and new technologies created by the fourth industrial revolution. In these areas, rules to support competition have not yet been established.

Therefore, competition unfolds in two dimensions: the competition to create rules and the competition to implement issues based on those self-created rules. This is often referred to as competition in the "meta-economy" and the "real economy." In games, not only is achieving the objective important, but also who sets the rules. There are also areas of cooperation. Some of you may be having trouble hearing. There are areas where the US and China must cooperate to achieve certain outcomes.

There is a scholar named Graham Allison. He has written extensively, particularly on international politics. His important point is that we must prevent great power competition from escalating into conflict, citing the Peloponnesian War as an example. He uses the term "minimet" metaphorically, similar to the concept of mutually assured destruction (MAD) in nuclear deterrence. However, if the US and China fight, both will inevitably lose.

The international politics going forward, although it may appear to be a power struggle at first glance, is actually a struggle where both sides are bound to fail, a mutual assured destruction. Or, it is a problem of collective action that the US and China are facing, such as the issue of climate change, as seen in the COVID-19 pandemic. Therefore, there must be five areas. Because there are common issues that the international community, including the US and China, is facing, it is a very important issue whether to lead to collective action between the US and China. Thus, the US is also dividing the US-China relationship into areas of confrontation, competition, and cooperation.

From that perspective, the question often discussed in the Korean media and domestically, 'Which side should Korea choose between the US and China?', is a very foolish one. This is because the US is already engaging in very detailed, issue-specific approaches with China. Therefore, the idea of having to choose between the US and China, regardless of the issue, within the larger framework already established by the US and China, can be a very foolish thought. We need to think much more sophisticatedly and meticulously than that. I will briefly mention those kinds of books at the end.

The background for these discussions is the existence of an area of US-China confrontation. And because this area is very large, especially concerning the military domain, the East Asia Institute, where I was previously affiliated, recently published a series of reports on US-China relations. These reports analyze the US-China relationship in various domains, and I am presenting the report on the military aspect today. We can consider how the military relationship between the US and China will change in the next 30 years if the current situation continues. I will discuss this immediately.

The military domain, in fact, may function in terms of deterrence or crisis management, but ultimately it must involve the possibility of war or resistance and conflict. Therefore, the military domain can be considered an area of confrontation. And the atmosphere of confrontation is indeed intensifying. However, this does not mean that confrontation is becoming a reality or can be viewed as such. First, the immediate news concerns Taiwan and the cross-strait relations. Events in Hong Kong, Xinjiang, and Tibet are continuing, and the international community is increasingly criticizing China's coercive stance on human rights issues and the issue of cross-strait unification. Therefore, there are genuine concerns that the Xi Jinping administration may pursue a more forceful pressure policy toward Taiwan, or even a unification policy.

Of course, this carries significant risks, and many believe that China is pursuing a peaceful coexistence and eventual unification policy toward Taiwan, so it is unlikely to happen immediately. Nevertheless, the possibility of a shift in the balance of power based on military might is increasing within the US, and this is closely related to the geopolitical competition between the US and China. Therefore, the Taiwan issue can clearly be seen as an area of confrontation. The South China Sea is similar. The South China Sea involves issues of territory, resources, and freedom of navigation. Therefore, US-led military exercises are continuously being conducted in the South China Sea, and recently, there have been reports of significant criticism from China regarding the simultaneous naval exercises conducted by the US in the South China Sea, with some articles expressing strong disapproval.

Furthermore, regarding the East China Sea, the US, as you well know, believes that China is pursuing a policy of containment around China's overall military buildup and expansion. The US also holds a critical view of the 2016 incident involving the Philippines, stating that it is pursuing policies that are not in line with international law. On the other hand, China argues that the US should not interfere in issues concerning China and its neighboring countries, as it is a matter for third parties, and criticizes US intervention in regional affairs.

This is a very significant issue. The issue of the East China Sea is also closely related to territorial disputes, resource competition, and US-China geopolitical competition. Therefore, the issue of resources in the East China Sea, the competition between the US, Japan, and China over continental shelves, and the issue of air defense identification zones, as you know well. However, what is interesting is whether the Korean Peninsula will also become an area of US-China confrontation. This is a very important issue for us. Recent developments, such as North Korea's missile provocations, criticism of joint US-ROK military exercises, the current de facto suspension of these exercises, and China's diplomatic stance, as well as the significant criticism from some quarters regarding US-ROK joint military exercises, which could be perceived as a 'Korean War scenario,' are closely intertwined. Therefore, for us, the North-South issue and the North Korean nuclear issue are increasingly becoming intertwined with the issue of US-China geopolitical competition. This is a cause for concern on the Korean Peninsula as well.

It is true that the possibility of the Korean Peninsula, which is currently in a state of armistice, transitioning from an area of cooperation to an area of confrontation between the US and China is increasing. And the issue of systems: the confrontation between the US's democratic system and China's authoritarian system is a matter of values, and thus it is largely an area of confrontation rather than competition and cooperation. The US is making efforts to unite democratic countries to form a bloc against authoritarianism.

Therefore, the US government announced plans to hold a Summit for Democracy at the end of this year, similar to the Paris Democracy Summit. However, it remains to be seen whether the Summit for Democracy will be effectively held and what agenda items will be discussed. Since human rights issues are continuously being raised, there are direct conflicts with the issue of national sovereignty. Therefore, although there will be discussions on human rights later, this is an issue that is bound to be of great importance in international politics.

The areas of confrontation are indeed very diverse. From Korea's perspective, it is natural to desire an expansion of cooperation rather than confrontation. The non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction is a crucial issue. If nuclear weapons or related resources and equipment fall into the hands of terrorist groups, it will pose a significant threat to the security of many countries, including the US and China. Therefore, the non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction is an area where the US and China must cooperate.

We can see that the core issues in this regard are the North Korean nuclear issue and Iran's nuclear program. The US government is already making significant efforts regarding Iran's nuclear program, and while the denuclearization of North Korea is currently a lower priority, the Biden administration is making considerable efforts toward North Korea's denuclearization. Currently, efforts are being made to maintain cooperation with China on this issue. However, the crucial question is how much this US-China cooperation, limited to denuclearization, will be influenced by the overall US-China competition and confrontation. Climate change is also a very important area for US-China cooperation.

I will now discuss climate change, which is a very important issue. Health issues, such as the COVID-19 pandemic, are also essentially issues of cooperation. Currently, there is competition between the US and China over who can resolve the pandemic more effectively, and there is also competition over vaccine distribution. However, the US is experiencing many difficulties after the Delta variant, and more severe variants may emerge after Delta. As you can see from the news, it is very difficult for a significant portion of the world's population, over 90%, to be vaccinated before the emergence of new variants. Therefore, we all know that global health issues, which transcend national borders, are directly linked to the health issues of individual countries, and thus US-China cooperation is urgently needed.

We can see that poverty issues arising from global economic inequality, and the resulting violence and climate change response issues, require US-China cooperation to be resolved. Otherwise, as mentioned earlier, there is a real perception that areas of conflict are inevitable. The desire for such areas to expand is widespread. Furthermore, competition is the most diverse and difficult area to address. Competition in the economic sphere, technological strategic partnerships, and competition for spheres of influence are related to the US's strategy of strengthening alliances and securing strategic partners.

China is pursuing an influence strategy centered on the Belt and Road Initiative, primarily utilizing its economic power. Furthermore, it can simultaneously adopt more assertive diplomacy, as suggested by the phrase 'For Real People,' indicating a slightly more aggressive approach. In the long term, competition over norm-setting and participation in international institutions is crucial. Therefore, considering a paper written by the former NSC advisor, China's challenge is not only a competition for spheres of influence around the Indo-Pacific but also, independently or more abstractly, a struggle over who sets the norms of international law and governance.

Therefore, fighting over specific regions is important, but the struggle over who leads in establishing the rules of the order, as mentioned earlier, can also be a struggle. We can clearly see that China recognizes this. It is very important to determine on what principles and with how much support from other powers norms are established. We can easily understand this. Next is the Biden administration's Indo-Pacific strategy. While this is important, it is something you have likely heard a great deal about, even if not from me today. As I mentioned at the beginning, we do not have much time to go into the details. Therefore, the commitment to a free and open international order, liberal norms, and maintaining a favorable balance of power in the Indo-Pacific region are very important.

This means that by negotiating from a position of strength, the US can achieve its desired outcomes with China. Furthermore, it utilizes multilateralism, bilateral alliances, trilateral cooperation, or new forms of quadrilateral cooperation, and multilateral cooperation across the entire Indo-Pacific. In other words, it is continuously seeking to create a favorable situation in the Indo-Pacific by mobilizing all sectors.

Therefore, the cooperation of allies is very important for this. There are various interpretations regarding the core of US alliance treaties. There are aspects of forward deployment that deeply involve the security dimension, and as a scholar recently argued, the role of alliances remains important. Furthermore, Professor Lee Jung-hoon of Korea University, in his recent paper, suggests a strategy of maintaining this paradigm, such as 'alliance leadership,' but emphasizing the roles and responsibilities of allies rather than direct US intervention, which is also a significant observation.

Therefore, various plans are being developed regarding how the US will utilize its allies on this spectrum to maintain stability in the Indo-Pacific region. This includes ensuring open seas and skies, promoting transparency and openness in the maritime domain, and so on. However, rather than focusing on the details, which you can find in meeting materials, we need to consider what kind of consensus we should pursue. As I mentioned earlier, there is a lack of consensus within the US regarding its strategy toward China. How should we view China?

Within the Democratic Party, there is a debate about the priority of China policy. Some adhere to the 2005 view that China is a responsible stakeholder, while others argue that engagement and strategic cooperation with China are possible. However, there is also a view that we must continue long-term engagement and cooperation through rule-based competition between the US and China. On the other hand, there is a sentiment that China's rise itself must be frustrated to some extent, akin to a new Cold War.

These discussions are ongoing, and I believe they are healthy and meaningful. However, it is crucial for us to understand whether the US is formulating its strategy toward China based on an objective understanding and strategy, or whether it is viewing China's strategy based on impressions or ideology. Furthermore, it is also important to note that strategies that are swayed by events as they occur can be detrimental to both the US and China.

For example, Secretary Pompeo's speech on July 23rd of last year, which emerged during the late Trump administration, is a representative case. He publicly stated a preemptive judgment that China, being an ideological dictatorship based on authoritarianism, would find it very difficult to cooperate with the US. It is quite difficult to make such public pronouncements. Therefore, it is necessary for us to understand how the US's strategy toward China is being pursued, and we must continuously ask the US about the specific legislative measures related to its China strategy.

And as one of the US's closest allies, we need to have active discussions about the US's strategy toward China. Kurt Campbell, who is now in the Biden administration, and others, have written about this. According to the content of their writings, there are two camps regarding the US strategy toward China: one believes that China is pursuing hegemony, and the other holds a more reserved view, stating that it is too early to tell. They are divided into these two camps.

This perspective suggests that China has been consistently pursuing a strategy of seeking hegemony since its founding 500 years ago, and that it is making efforts to achieve this. This can be seen as a scholarly assessment. However, we must question whether this is a perspective that we can truly share, or whether it can guide the US's strategy toward China. Therefore, a review of our own strategy toward China and our view of US-China relations is essential.

The debate within the US, including within the Democratic Party, is ongoing regarding policy priorities, such as China policy and climate change.