[EAI Academy 2nd Term, Lecture 1] Ha Young-sun: "The Young People in History: The 19th and 21st Centuries" Lecture Video and Materials

YouTube Link: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=xml6ot9rTQg

- Date: August 10, 2021, 6:30 PM

- Speaker: Ha Young-sun, Chairman of EAI, Professor Emeritus at Seoul National University

Reading List

1. Ha Young-sun, <The Young People in History: From the Silhak Scholars of the 18th Century to the Complex Scholars of the 21st Century> (EulYoo Publishing, 2011). Chapter 4: The Triple Difficulties of Gu Dang Yu Kil-chun / Chapter 8: Deciphering the Complex Scholars: World Politics in the 21st Century

2. Ha Young-sun, <World Politics of Love: War and Peace> (Huanul Academy, 2019).

Speaker Introduction

■ Ha Young-sun: Chairman of EAI, Professor Emeritus at Seoul National University. He holds a Ph.D. in International Politics from the University of Washington. He has served as a professor in the Department of Diplomacy at Seoul National University, a visiting fellow at the Princeton University Center for International Studies, a visiting fellow at the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, Director of the Seoul National University Institute for Global Social Affairs, Director of the Institute for American Studies, President of the Korean Peace Studies Association, Co-Chair of the Korean side for the Joint Research on a New Era of ROK-Japan Relations, a member of the Presidential National Security Advisory Council, and a member of the Senior Advisory Council for the Inter-Korean Summit Preparation Committee. He is currently the Chairman of EAI and Professor Emeritus at Seoul National University. His recent books and edited works include <World Politics of Love: War and Peace>, <A Correct View of Korean Diplomatic History: Tradition and Modernity>, <The Competition to Build the Asia-Pacific Order between China and the US>, and <The World Politics of Four Journeys: An Analysis of Joseon and Yeon-haengrok from the 16th to 19th Centuries>. He also wrote a column titled "Ha Young-sun's Column" for The Chosun Ilbo and The JoongAng Ilbo for seven years.

Video Transcript

Ah, ah, ah, ah, ah. Welcome. As we begin the second term of the EAI Academy, I am Ha Young-sun, who will be meeting you for nearly 100 minutes. I anticipate you are curious about where the world is heading in the mid-21st century, where our community, including myself, will go, and how we should proceed. However, perhaps unexpectedly, the first lecture is titled "The Young People in History: The 19th and 21st Centuries." I believe the title has been conveyed to you. I also understand that you may have referred to the supplementary reading material.

Yes, it was distributed to the participants. So, why do we start by looking back nearly 200 years ago when we aim to look at the mid-21st century? Let me begin by addressing that. The book titled "The Young People in History" displayed on the first slide of the PPT is, like most of my works, not a book that I initially set out to write with the title "The Young People in History." So, how did it come about? I met and discussed with the people featured there, and the results of those discussions needed to be conveyed to someone, especially to the young people who will shape the future.

Feeling that burden or responsibility, I gave a public lecture at EAI about ten years ago, and feeling it was insufficient, I later published it as a book. Before diving into the main topic, let me share a brief anecdote. The photo at the very end of the book is actually a picture of me in my late twenties. Some pointed out why my photo had to be included, but you can consider it as an author's photo. As I mentioned earlier, my story did not begin with history. My focus was on the 21st century.

Your purpose in applying for this EAI Academy in the 21st century is likely very similar. If you ask why I started looking into the 21st century, the most significant turning point was probably December 24, 1991, Christmas Eve. On December 24, 1991, we received an immense victory as a Christmas present. In fact, this year marks the 30th anniversary of 1991, yet surprisingly, we have largely forgotten it, and there haven't been many significant events.

That day was the dissolution of the Soviet Union. The fall of the Berlin Wall in '89 and the subsequent dissolution of the Soviet Union on December 24, '91, scattering into several countries, can be seen as a tremendous gift of modern history – the end of an order. However, for me personally, it was both a gift and a very difficult period to manage. The reason is that I have been studying international politics for nearly 50 years, and the biggest mistake I made was not properly understanding the end of the Cold War. Of course, the responsibility for not anticipating the end of the Cold War beforehand lies with international politics scholars and modern history scholars worldwide, who were almost non-existent.

Therefore, such things can be said to be a shared responsibility. However, personally, I keenly felt that if one is to study international politics, one should study in a way that imagines and analyzes the coming future world politics and international relations, and based on that, cultivates the insight to discern what one should do, or where the political entity one belongs to should go. Instead of the so-called Minerva's owl, which flies out at dusk, I wanted to contribute my small chirping voice, even if it's just a little, to the dawn of history, before the sun rises on the world order.

Thus, my focus shifted to my studies. As a result, while most international economists began studying the post-Cold War era, my core conclusion was different. I believed that a change far greater than the post-Cold War transition was approaching. This will likely be covered in the latter half of today's lecture. For Korea, it is not the post-Cold War order, but a new order called 'complex interdependence' that is approaching.

This was a resolve to study anew, not just from the perspective of a change in international order, but as a new upheaval in civilization itself. However, a significant problem arose. As I began to study from this perspective, few people agreed with me. This was about thirty years ago, and nearly a generation has passed. Apart from a very small group of study partners, there was not much interest. Consequently, one of the significant changes I experienced was the opportunity to simultaneously study the future world order from a new perspective and to reflect on Korean diplomatic history through the lens of the past.

Looking back to the 19th century, I encountered the young leaders of that era as they contemplated the changing world order and our place within it. This led to a realization. Although I thought a tremendous, civilizational shift was occurring in 1991, the young generation in the mid-19th century faced an even greater shock. Living within a traditional world order for perhaps 2,000 or 3,000 years, they were profoundly impacted by the new modern international order that the West had begun to construct over the preceding 400-500 years.

Since it was a completely new era, I became deeply curious about how people at that time navigated it. While I found that no one listened when I spoke of change, they were shouting about even greater changes, yet no one listened. How did they live their lives, and what became of our history? This interest in their lives emerged alongside my interest in the future. Therefore, my discussion of the 21st century begins with the 19th century for these reasons.

First, let's consider a simple comparison of the changes in the 19th century's international order. I believe many of you may have some familiarity with this, but looking at the mid-19th century, although precise statistics are difficult to obtain, we can observe three major shifts. First, China: the 18th century, under the Qing Dynasty, was China's peak, accounting for approximately 30% of global GDP. As you can see from the data, China's share of global GDP was around 30%.

However, by the early to mid-19th century, this figure dropped below 10%. This dramatic decline coincided with a rapid ascent of Western Europe, beginning with the Industrial Revolution and continuing through the 19th century. A third significant change to note is that by the early 19th century, the United States was approaching parity with Europe in terms of GDP, and thereafter, while Europe began to decline relatively, the United States started to rise.

One might argue this is solely due to economic indicators. However, using eight composite indicators recently developed, we see a similar pattern. From China's 18th-century peak, through the dramatic shifts of the late 19th and early 20th centuries, to Europe's rise and relative decline, and then the United States' ascent, followed by the Civil War, its subsequent rise, and its position as the dominant power from 1945 onwards, we observe China's curve rising again in the 21st century after its dip to around 10%, with the two curves intersecting around the turn of the millennium.

This may not be entirely new information, but what follows is perhaps more important. While the overall geopolitical shifts are one aspect, I am particularly interested in the internal changes within individuals observing these shifts, especially how the younger generation, who would come to lead the era, perceived these changes. Looking at the mid-to-late 19th century, we encounter a fascinating small study group. It was called 'Professor Park's Study Room.' Although no trace remains today, if you get off at Anguk Station and walk up the alley towards the Constitutional Court, you will find a small building. In a corner of the Constitutional Court's guardhouse, where entry was restricted, there was a stone monument marking the location of Professor Park's Study Room. What transpired in this study room? Professor Park, as those who have studied history know, was a relatively progressive figure of his time. At that time, politics and academia were not strictly separated, so he was actively involved in practical affairs and successfully managed the city government, serving as mayor of Seoul before it was established.

To summarize, Park died in 1877 at the age of 77. Born in 1807, he was younger than I am now when he passed away. He lived a full life, and before his death, he deeply understood the limitations and frustrations of his contemporaries. For about three to four years, he operated this study room with younger individuals who were about half a century his junior. There are no actual photographs of the study room itself; the image displayed is an artist's rendition by KBS. The attendees numbered around ten people.

These were the people they met. Among them were figures familiar to us, such as the 'Gang of Four' from the Gapsin Coup: Kim Ok-gyun, Park Young-hyo, Hong Yeong-sik, and Seo Gwang-beom. For those of you listening to this lecture, you are likely quite young. If we consider that Professor Park's Study Room operated from 1873-1874 to 1877, Kim Ok-gyun would have been thirty-three years old at the time of the Gapsin Coup in 1884. This means he was twenty-three years old at the study room ten years prior. Park Young-hyo was ten years younger than Kim Ok-gyun, making him thirteen. At that age, one is close to middle school. Looking back, we lived our lives relatively young. They accomplished many things back then.

Hong Yeong-sik was around the same age as Yu Gil-jun. Yu Gil-jun was five years older than Kim Ok-gyun, so he would have been around twenty-eight. Seo Gwang-beom was in his teens, perhaps thirteen or fourteen. The study room consisted of teenagers and twenty-somethings, including Kim Ok-gyun. Among the attendees were also the brightest scholars of the time, such as Kim Yun-sik and Yi Ui-jeong, who were serving as assistants. I will briefly discuss Yu Gil-jun, as he is one of them. The reason I want to transition to the 21st century is to explore what the young people of the mid-19th century thought, dreamed, and lived for during that era of upheaval, and what were the consequences.

However, focusing on Yu Gil-jun, most of these young men experienced lives of frustration, even though they were not entirely unsuccessful. The Gapsin Coup failed, and their subsequent endeavors also failed. Consequently, very little of their writings remains. Although I have tried to invoke the spirits of those who departed prematurely to speak on their behalf, the writings that do remain, relatively speaking, are primarily from Yu Gil-jun, who managed to navigate the difficulties of the time with some distance.

Therefore, revisiting the young people of the mid-19th century through Yu Gil-jun is not just a story from 150 years ago, but a narrative that speaks to your own approaching future. This photograph illustrates the complexity of Yu Gil-jun's life. It depicts the Korean diplomatic mission to the United States in 1883. In modern terms, when diplomatic relations were established with Western countries, it was customary to set up legations. In 1882, the United States established its legation here, but Korea, due to Qing Dynasty obstruction and its own caution, did not establish a legation.

There was hesitation regarding the establishment of a legation in Washington D.C. As a workaround, since the U.S. had already established a legation here, this was designated as a special diplomatic mission to the United States. Why is this photograph important? It features eleven young men from the mid-19th century. The official head of the mission was Min Yeong-ik, standing in the center. For those of you who are fans of BTS, you may not remember, but in the 1990s, a music group called Shinhwa was as popular as BTS is today. The lead singer of Shinhwa, Eric, is married and older now, but when I taught in Korea in the 1990s, students were captivated because Min Yeong-ik looked just like Eric. Although they disliked studying, they were interested in the life of this '19th-century Eric.' Even with reluctance, they diligently studied Min Yeong-ik. This photograph shows him in his early twenties.

Washington D.C. is cautious about engaging in that particular activity. Therefore, as a workaround, the United States has already established a presence here, meaning it is a U.S. diplomatic mission. However, why is this photograph important? It features eleven young individuals from the mid-19th century. The official envoy is Min Yeong-ik, who is in the center. Students listening to this lecture today are from the BTS generation and may not recall this, but in the 1990s, a musical group called Shinhwa, which had popularity comparable to BTS, existed. Shinhwa had a main vocalist named Eric. When I taught in Korea in the 1990s, students were enthusiastic because Min Yeong-ik looked just like Eric. Although they disliked studying, they were interested in the life of 19th-century Eric, and despite their reluctance, students diligently listened to stories about Min Yeong-ik. This photograph even shows Min Yeong-ik in his early twenties.

As a member of the Min clan, he was a close relative of the powerful Min Yeong-mun, and thus naturally held a high position in the government. We might wonder why he went on this mission, but most of the eleven individuals were interpreters. At that time, there were few who could speak English. They relied on double interpretation. An American would speak English, which would be interpreted into Japanese, and then a Korean interpreter would translate it for Min Yeong-ik, Hong Yeong-sik, or Seo Gwang-beom, who were part of the official delegation. The rest were interpreters. Two individuals, identifiable by their physique, were responsible for personal security. The friend named Mi-gu was a first-year student at Tokyo Imperial University, about to enter his second year. Why did he accompany the mission? He was known at the time as one of the most proficient English speakers among the youth.

Therefore, Percival, an American residing in Japan, played a role in interpreting English into Japanese for Mi-gu. Yu Gil-jun and others had lived in Japan for about a year, so they received the Japanese interpretation and relayed it into Korean. It is important to note the attire and hairstyles of the eleven individuals. Several styles are present: some wear traditional Korean hats (gat) and hanbok, others wear Western suits, and one even wears a typical Chinese robe. Yu Gil-jun is pictured next to Mi-gu, wearing a topknot, in a style that appears to be a Western suit.

In other words, it is a quintessential photograph showcasing a complex blend of tradition and modernity. Now, let's discuss what Yu Gil-jun was primarily struggling with and contemplating during that period. As mentioned earlier, Yu Gil-jun, from a yangban family, was preparing for the state examinations. He possessed exceptional talent, reportedly capable of achieving the top rank. He was already known for his brilliance even before the initial examination. Despite the fact that Park Gyu-su and Yu Gil-jun's families had been sworn enemies for about five generations due to a dispute over burial sites, Park Gyu-su, sensing the changing times and showing concern for the next generation, invited Yu Gil-jun.

This was their first meeting. Around 1873-1874, as Park Gyu-su's study sessions at his residence near the Constitutional Court became more regular, Yu Gil-jun's home was also in the same area. Park Gyu-su saw Yu Gil-jun, who was coming up the hill, and called him over. During their second meeting, Park asked, 'What are you studying these days?' Yu Gil-jun replied respectfully, 'Grandfather, the first stage of the state examination has concluded, and I am preparing for the final stage. I expect to achieve the top rank, as is widely rumored.' Park Gyu-su then said, 'Would you like to come in separately?' and invited him to the study room.

There, Park Gyu-su told Yu Gil-jun, 'Your current Confucian studies, focused solely on the Four Books and Five Classics, are insufficient for navigating the world. You should also study practical matters.' He then gave Yu Gil-jun a 50-volume compilation titled 'Hai Guo Tu Zhi' (Illustrated Record of Maritime Nations). This is a very famous book, compiled by Wei Yuan, a prominent Chinese intellectual of the time, after the Opium War, presenting accounts of the West. Yu Gil-jun received it from his grandfather and took it home. Upon reading 'Hai Guo Tu Zhi,' he found it entirely different from anything he had read before.

It described Western countries and how to interact with them. After contemplating this all night, he informed his parents that he would forgo the state examinations. This caused an uproar in his family. They lamented that Park Gyu-su, who had become a sworn enemy, was now ruining their son. However, Yu Gil-jun abandoned the examinations and entered Park Gyu-su's study room, beginning his studies with 'Hai Guo Tu Zhi.' What was so different? The historical period we commonly refer to as the 'Chunhwa' (Sinocentric) order, from the end of the Xia, Shang, and Zhou dynasties through the end of the Qing Dynasty, was centered around China.

The nation-state, or 'Nations' State,' began to be constructed in the West around the 15th and 16th centuries. It came into full contact with us in the mid-19th century through encounters with the West. The 'complex state,' which I refer to as a composite state or a network state, represents another new form of change that you will encounter later. What is the difference, and how significant is it? To summarize simply, we can divide it into three aspects: the protagonist, the stage, and the performance. First, the protagonist in the Chunhwa order was characterized by a hierarchical structure centered on China, with surrounding tributary states maintaining various relationships.

In contrast, the modern nation-state is not a single empire but is composed of several core European powers like Britain, France, and later Germany and Italy. The international order is formed by these states. The complex state, or network state, in the latter half of the 20th century, differs from the modern state we have lived with for the past half-century in that it involves a much more intricate web of relationships, both externally and internally.

The term 'li' (禮, rites/propriety) is difficult for us to fully grasp today, but originally, the ancient Chinese character for 'li' depicted a sacrificial altar. A sacrificial altar is where ancestors are honored, so one must offer their best thoughts and actions with utmost respect. This is 'li.' The idea that this could be central to international politics is quite surprising to those accustomed to modern international relations. However, in our language, even today, we emphasize the importance of being a 'country of etiquette in the East.' This was a primary descriptor until the mid-19th century. In contrast, the modern Western nation-state did not necessarily operate this way. The core stage was not necessarily one of benevolence but of power. Perhaps it was a stage of 'strong nation.' As you may know from North Korean expressions, they refer to a 'strong and prosperous nation.' I have often told North Korean officials that this term is outdated and should be changed. 'Strong and prosperous nation' is a term from the 19th-century world order, a standard of civilization at the time. How can we explain our world, looking ahead a century, with a model from 200 years ago? They often appear quite bewildered.

Even personally, it's similar. While today, income is the sole determinant of success or failure, it wasn't necessarily the case then. As seen in the traditional social hierarchy of scholars, farmers, artisans, and merchants (sa-nong-gong-sang), merchants and artisans were considered lower in status. However, this value system was completely reversed. The result was that the standards of the two civilizations clashed, leading to a period of adjustment. The traditional civilization's standards were superseded by modern ones, establishing the paradigm of 'rich country, strong military.' Why do I repeatedly emphasize the shocking changes of the 21st century? Because if the goal is solely 'rich country, strong military,' and the spirit is neglected, we face the reality we are experiencing today.

The current situation, where over a hundred people are meeting in this confined, non-face-to-face setting, is attributed by many to the COVID-19 pandemic and the failure of the United States or others to produce and distribute vaccines effectively. However, from a fundamental perspective, this is the stark reality brought about by the existing order. If we do not create an order that addresses this, we may increasingly find ourselves in a situation where even non-face-to-face interactions become difficult.

The makeshift solution to overcome this will likely involve a much more complex stage, which I will explain in detail later. However, if we do not prepare a new stage that overcomes the inherent contradictions of modernity, such as the pursuit of wealth and strength alone, that order will struggle to survive. Furthermore, the foundations of new changes—information, knowledge, and technology—are being shaken beyond imagination. We need a unit that can encompass, embrace, and govern these elements simultaneously to become the protagonist of the 21st century. A generation capable of such thoughts and actions will be the one to save the Earth, or even the universe. The performance aspect is also similar. The performances of protagonists on such stages, as opposed to the 'great for the small, small for the great' principle, are now approached with great caution. However, if appropriately compensated...

That is, 'benevolent in the small, strict in the great.' This was considered 'li' at the time, reflected in institutional structures like the tributary system. Modern nation-states, however, operate differently. It's not about 'great for the small, small for the great,' but rather 'strengthen yourself first.' Build your own power, and then use that power to supplement what you lack by balancing with stronger neighbors. This is the principle of survival in the modern international order. Institutional manifestations include treaties and alliances, as mentioned earlier. As for the performance aspect, it involves a balance between competition, cooperation, and conflict, which is familiar in contemporary international politics. However, it might be a form of competition that does not escalate to the level of conflict, allowing both sides to survive and thrive.

This means a new form of performance is being sought in the latter half of the 21st century. The institutional aspects will involve complex networks and diplomacy. Therefore, what shocked Yu Gil-jun were the crossroads between the first and second paradigms. Why must it be Yu Gil-jun? Of course, at that time, figures like Kim Ok-gyun, who left behind writings, would be considered historical victors. Kim Ok-gyun was arguably the leading figure among the 'Gang of Four' of that era. However, Yu Gil-jun was more of a follower.

However, Yu Gil-jun was closer to a follower. While the Gapsin Coup occurred in 1884, he became the actual mastermind behind the Gabo Reforms ten years later, in 1894. He was the primary architect. Yu Gil-jun pondered the transition from the first to the second civilizational paradigm. The actual mission lasted about a year and a half. After returning from the diplomatic mission in 1883, he did not immediately return home but chose to study further in the United States, attending a prep school near Boston for about a year and a half. In total, he spent about three years abroad. During this time, the Gapsin Coup occurred, and the forces advocating for enlightenment and reform were essentially wiped out. Consequently, there was no one to provide material support.

However, Yu Gil-jun was closer to a follower. While the Gapsin Coup occurred in 1884, he became the actual mastermind behind the Gabo Reforms ten years later, in 1894. He was the primary architect. Yu Gil-jun pondered the transition from the first to the second civilizational paradigm. The actual mission lasted about a year and a half. After returning from the diplomatic mission in 1883, he did not immediately return home but chose to study further in the United States, attending a prep school near Boston for about a year and a half. In total, he spent about three years abroad. During this time, the Gapsin Coup occurred, and the forces advocating for enlightenment and reform were essentially wiped out. Consequently, there was no one to provide material support.

In fact, he was there with Min Yeong-ik's financial support. After spending about a year and a half there, he returned. Upon arriving in Incheon, he was immediately arrested because he had met with Kim Ok-gyun in Japan. His actions were clearly seen as pro-Japanese. Fortunately, Yu Gil-jun survived because he could speak English. He was placed under house arrest for about seven to eight years. Following the failure of the Gapsin Coup, Korea entered a period of isolation centered around the Qing Dynasty's influence. However, since foreign relations were maintained, there was a need for someone to read foreign documents and draft responses. As there were virtually no others who could speak English, he was spared.

As compensation for this service, his life was spared. He lived in this state until just before the Gabo Reforms. Through the Gabo Reforms, he briefly served as the brain behind the reforms, and it seemed his personal fortunes might turn. However, as we know, this did not last long. Following the assassination of Queen Min, he went into exile in Japan for ten years. Upon his return, he watched his country fall into ruin for six to seven years, passing away with great frustration and regret. Despite this, a considerable number of his writings remain. While not all are included in the 'Yu Gil-jun Jeonjip' (Complete Works of Yu Gil-jun), there are about five volumes, containing many writings. My interest lies in how he sought answers to the question of where Joseon should go amidst the traditional Chunhwa order and the Atlantic order. I will explain this through three points: first, the theory of civilizational enlightenment; second, the dualistic system; and third, a brief look at national politics. Many people say, 'What's so new about this? A lot of it is copied from Japan, or based on discussions that took place in Japan at the time.' Those who read it for general knowledge, and even those who have dedicated their lives to studying Yu Gil-jun, might feel a sense of frustration.

I think differently. While it is true that a significant portion may have been influenced by Fukuzawa, and some parts clearly introduce the theory of civilizational enlightenment being discussed in Japan at the time, what is important is not the extent of the citations, but the nature of his contemplation. Were the concerns of that era, the concerns of Fukuzawa and his contemporaries in Japan, the concerns of Yu Gil-jun in Joseon, and the concerns of figures like Liang Qichao in China, the same? I believe not. In terms of the depth of contemplation, Yu Gil-jun and the young people of mid-19th century Joseon faced a problem so profound that it was unsolvable, yet they did not give up and desperately tried to find a solution. This is evident in their frustrated efforts.

Therefore, in that sense, the depth of their contemplation cannot be compared. Why do I think this way? Shortly before I left, a student from Beijing sent me an email requesting to join this non-face-to-face session. They mentioned that reading about civilizational enlightenment in textbooks felt very different from the reality. They asked if I could recommend some texts. They wrote a very long email, but to put it bluntly, it was written in a mixed script of Korean and Hanja.

Therefore, to truly understand the writer's frustration, their desire to express their grievances, and their dreams, it is best to read it in the original language. Most of the 100+ people watching this site today cannot read this mixed Korean-Hanja script, which is frustrating. In Beijing, one can read it if they know some Hanja. Therefore, it is essential to be able to read the mixed script. That is why I intentionally included the mixed script here.

This is very different from what we call modern Korean. It uses almost all Hanja, with only particles and endings written in Korean. There are several translations available that are easy to read, but I felt hesitant to single out one. For example, Professor Jang Hyeong-seong of Seoul National University, a political scientist, has published a translation. However, he only translated up to the 14th chapter, stating that it is difficult to introduce beyond that point, even though there are 20 chapters. Recently, a translation aimed at younger readers, making the 'Seoyu Gyeonmun' ( a book by Yu Gil-jun) more accessible, has been published by Professor Mo Gwan-seok. There is also a translation by Heo Jeong-jin, who is more familiar to many.

They learn only the bad aspects of the West, imitate Western clothing, and engage in frivolous talk while sitting on Western-style chairs, calling it 'enlightenment.' This was my first shock. Who are the 'enemies of enlightenment'? They are those who advocate for a new Western standard, arguing that clinging solely to tradition is insufficient. They lack respect for tradition and are considered enemies of enlightenment. Thus, there was a desperate need to integrate tradition and modernity. Conversely, those who solely pursue tradition and dismiss modern change as superficial are the enemies of enlightenment. Therefore, the three points regarding enlightenment are still highly relevant today. Yu Gil-jun particularly emphasized the challenge of integrating tradition and modernity, a task that remains unresolved even as I conclude this lecture with a discussion of BTS. It is a homework assignment that has been pending for 150 years.

Therefore, the theory of civilizational enlightenment, often discussed, differs somewhat from my perspective. I am cautious because Professor Jang Hyeong-seong, in his translation, also holds a similar view. However, considering the current interpretations, he labels Yu Gil-jun as a 'traditional conservative.' I find this somewhat problematic because it overlooks his critique of those who pursue tradition without embracing modernity, labeling them as enemies of enlightenment. If I were to bring Yu Gil-jun back from the dead, I would call him a proponent of the 'complex theory.'

They learn only the bad aspects of the West, imitate Western clothing, and engage in frivolous talk while sitting on Western-style chairs, calling it 'enlightenment.' This was my first shock. Who are the 'enemies of enlightenment'? They are those who advocate for a new Western standard, arguing that clinging solely to tradition is insufficient. They lack respect for tradition and are considered enemies of enlightenment. Thus, there was a desperate need to integrate tradition and modernity. Conversely, those who solely pursue tradition and dismiss modern change as superficial are the enemies of enlightenment. Therefore, the three points regarding enlightenment are still highly relevant today. Yu Gil-jun particularly emphasized the challenge of integrating tradition and modernity, a task that remains unresolved even as I conclude this lecture with a discussion of BTS. It is a homework assignment that has been pending for 150 years.

Therefore, the theory of civilizational enlightenment, often discussed, differs somewhat from my perspective. I am cautious because Professor Jang Hyeong-seong, in his translation, also holds a similar view. However, considering the current interpretations, he labels Yu Gil-jun as a 'traditional conservative.' I find this somewhat problematic because it overlooks his critique of those who pursue tradition without embracing modernity, labeling them as enemies of enlightenment. If I were to bring Yu Gil-jun back from the dead, I would call him a proponent of the 'complex theory.'

What is the dualistic system, balancing conservatism and progressivism? If this was Yu Gil-jun's dream, how should the international dynamics of that time be woven together to realize it? This is his own contemplation, expressed in the dualistic system. This is from 140 years ago, but even today, those interested in international politics and other fields hear the same refrain daily: experts, the media, and governments all emphasize the importance of both the United States and China.

I don't know what to do. But in fact, such talk already existed in the late 1870s, when Yu Gil-jun, under house arrest for two years, called it 'Yangjeol Chireoni' in his work 'Seoyang Munjip'. He argued that we cannot help but utilize the power of modernity from the West. However, realistically, at that time, with the political turmoil of the Qing dynasty unfolding over ten years while he was under house arrest, leaving China would have meant death for him personally. Therefore, he advocated for the 'Yangjeol Chireon' (dual system) approach, believing that the special relationship with China must be maintained. Thus, our current dilemma has already begun in that context. The third point is the 'Gukmin Gonghwajeong' (National Republic System). In my view, it means the nation should be governed by both the ruler and the people. This is not a new idea. While it may not be common today, at that time, in the relationship between the ruler and the minister, the ruler could be considered 'Guk' (ruler), but the minister could not be considered 'Min' (people).

To put it another way, 'Min' corresponds to democracy, which was unacceptable. Therefore, within those five categories, he could not outright recommend the National Republic System. If he had moved beyond the dual system to the modern international order, he would have been killed by the Qing dynasty. If he had pursued the National Republic System, he would have been killed within the Joseon Dynasty. Thus, very cautiously, he proposed a system of 'Gukchi' (rule by the ruler), but also suggested incorporating 'Min' (people) to some extent, leading to the 'Gukmin Gongchi' (National Rule by Ruler and People). This can be seen as a manifestation of his contemplation on domestic capabilities.

Why did Fukuzawa Yukichi think differently from Yu Gil-jun? Japan's experience in adopting Western civilization standards was easier than ours. Japan was not as deeply entrenched in its traditional order, allowing for a relatively quicker escape. Furthermore, Japan faced fewer difficulties in leveraging international capabilities for this transition. Internally, while there were conflicts during the Meiji Restoration stemming from the traditional order, Japan's circumstances were incomparable to ours. If we consider the difficulties, it's like winning a special medal in the Olympics. Yu Gil-jun's philosophical approach is profound. But then, why did it fail? All three dreams were frustrated. The first idea, a composite of tradition and modernity in a new civilization standard, was, I believe, a very insightful conception.

The task was to seek a synthesis of these elements. However, there was insufficient time to concretize this, and the minimal core effort required to contemplate this together was also difficult to achieve. Therefore, while the direction was set, it was somewhat clumsy. To borrow the expression of my teacher, Dongju, it was like arriving at a well and asking for hot rice water, leaving a sense of regret. In terms of international capabilities, it was practically impossible to achieve the balance of the dual system. Instead, the forces seeking balance through the dual system ended up controlling us. We had naively thought that through the dual system or balance, we could quickly achieve independence. If you read the Independence News from that era, it suggests that now that Qing has withdrawn, we could achieve balance and reform domestically to build a modern nation. But what was checked? It didn't even last ten years. We couldn't maintain a balance of power.

We were drawn into Japan's sphere of influence. The domestic forces were fragmented at the time, and there was no political power capable of unifying them. The elements of civilization and enlightenment, the traditional order, and the reform movements based on popular support were all scattered. If these had been able to unite around a central point, history might have unfolded differently. My explanation has become somewhat lengthy, but based on this, I will now transition to the 21st century.

The reconstruction of a new civilization in the 21st century and the Korean Peninsula. As mentioned earlier, are we facing a transformation as profound as the shift to new civilization standards in the 19th century? Yu Gil-jun pondered this. What dreams should we pursue in such circumstances? Will these dreams be realized? Firstly, following the geopolitical landscape of the 19th century, let's examine the Asia-Pacific order of the 21st century. From today's perspective, the United States leads with 22 trillion dollars, China is approaching with nearly 10 trillion, Japan with 5.5 trillion, and Germany with 4 trillion. These are the distributions. While similar to the explanation provided earlier, what will this outlook be in 2050 or 2060, when you are at the center of the stage? There are various projections, but the one that appears most plausible to me is that by around 2050 to 2060, the US and China will nearly converge in terms of GDP, perhaps around 40 to

50 trillion dollars. Germany and Japan will be far behind. This is a military trend. Overall, the US and China are converging at a very rapid pace. China, through its 14th Five-Year Plan announced at the recent Two Sessions, and its 'Made in China 2035' project, clearly aims to surpass the US in GDP by the 2030s. However, whether their military power will also converge is debatable. It is difficult to agree with certainty.

It is currently around 2023. Military parity between the US and China, where the US remains dominant but they are close to balance, is likely to be projected around the 2050s. The reason I am showing this is to discuss the current situation. Today, we see presidential candidates from both major parties, or their campaign teams, discussing issues. Many domestic experts are contemplating these matters. However, in my view, none of them are considering the GDP distribution, military distribution, intellectual property, or the development of the ecosystem and cultural order in the world of 2050, and how to lead the nation accordingly.

If asked, no one can answer. Therefore, the answer must come from you and me, and we must contemplate it together in the time we have left. While I have shown military and economic aspects in the North, as one example of the complexity of the 21st century, knowledge is extremely important. The specific manifestations of revolutionary technological changes are varied, but one very simple example is what are called think tanks.

Globally, there are generally over 10,000 think tanks. The University of Pennsylvania's Lauder Institute publishes annual statistics on think tanks, and among the top-ranked ones, more than half are still in the US, followed by Europe. If you look for Asian or Latin American think tanks, you'll be lucky to find one or two. What about Korea? Fortunately or unfortunately, we have about 50 to 60. So, those in economics might ask, 'Korea's economy ranks so high, why are there only about 50 think tanks?' Perhaps this is an ironic expression of the fact that the leading nations, like the US, already understand the importance of think tanks.

If we look at the changes we are currently experiencing through this data, the order is as follows: the traditional order, the international order, and the complex order experienced during the Cold War. What I am trying to conclude with now is the formation and development of this complex order. Therefore, as I began to explain earlier, Yu Gil-jun's concern was about modernity. Then, your and my concern is how we can successfully navigate and, if possible, lead the transition from modernity to complexity in the 21st century. What is the comparison? It is the 'long cycle of superpower' comparison, showing how similar or different our current situation is to the late 19th century. In the context of the Asia-Pacific order, as China rapidly pursues the US, what is the current structure of this order?

Understanding this is probably crucial for discussing the 21st century. I mentioned earlier that we are still stuck at the level of Yu Gil-jun's concerns, with little progress beyond the 'dual system' discussions of the mid-19th century. This applies to today's experts and political actors. The reason is that what the US and China are currently experiencing is different from the cyclical patterns of the late 19th century. Generally, when a new world order's dominant power emerges, it operates that order for about 100 years. After the initial establishment of the order, it is maintained for a certain period. However, after about 50 years, or the second generation, dissatisfied forces begin to emerge. Is this order truly equitable in distributing its benefits? Today, China exemplifies this, questioning whether American values are truly global values, and whether the existing global institutional mechanisms equitably distribute benefits. These dissatisfactions begin to surface, corresponding to the third phase.

This is perhaps the phase we are in regarding US-China relations. If the conflict is not resolved, the struggle will inevitably escalate, leading to increased conflict. Historically, this has often resulted in war. This is what we will experience from the mid-21st century to the latter half. Within this unique order, what standards should we establish? Previously, Yu Gil-jun dreamed of a modern international order based on the traditional 'Tianxia' (all under heaven) system, proposing three transformations: a modern civilization integrating tradition and modernity, a dual system of 'Gukchi' and 'Minchi' (rule by ruler and people) blending 'Tianxia' and modern order. However, it is difficult to overcome the 21st century with only these concepts. So, what should we do? Firstly, in terms of actors, the shift to complexity means that if Yu Gil-jun's concern was the modern nation-state, then in the mid-21st century, while the nation-state remains important, the problem lies in how to intricately weave transnational networks. Secondly, at the non-state level, how can we create new actors capable of networking with NGOs and individuals? This is the first challenge. The second stage is security transformation. In the 19th century, this standard was established, but in the 21st century, it is insufficient. As we keenly feel, issues like climate change and the coronavirus are typical results of prioritizing national security and maximizing national interests without considering ecological balance.

This is the future we must cultivate from the middle to the latter half of the 21st century. Within this unique order, what standards should we establish for architecture? Previously, the modern international order, envisioned by Yu Gil-jun within the traditional Sino-centric order, was characterized by a blend of tradition and modernity, a civilizational plan that mixed the Sino-centric order with Westernization, and a combination of royal and popular governance. It is difficult to overcome the 21st century with only that level of understanding. What should we do then? First, in terms of the protagonist, while Yu Gil-jun's concern was centered on the modern nation-state, in the mid-to-late 21st century, the nation-state is undoubtedly important, but the problem lies in how to intricately weave in supranational networks. Second, at the supra-state level, how can we create new protagonists capable of finely networking with non-governmental organizations and individuals?

This is the first challenge. The second stage is security, which was established as a standard in the 19th century, but it is not enough in the 21st century. As we keenly feel, issues like climate change and the coronavirus are typical results of prioritizing national interests and maximizing national gains without considering ecological balance. Culture, within such an order, is about how much the identity of each individual protagonist is guaranteed. Perhaps the problems faced by groups like the Rohingya are related to this. These correspond to the first and second stages of the so-called four central stages.

If the first central stage was Yu Gil-jun's concern in the 19th century, then you must naturally consider the second central stage in conjunction with the third. The third stage, 'underlying layer,' signifies one of the most important changes that have occurred since the 19th century: the emergence of politics as a foundational layer in the modern nation-state. Representative examples include the formation of modern nation-states and subsequent conflicts. In the 19th century, the economy became the core underlying layer. As we enter the 21st century, the technological revolution has brought forth a new underlying layer of technology, information, and knowledge.

Therefore, the final stage is the 'interplay' stage, which emphasizes how to balance these elements. In modern nation-states, cooperation was considered a minimal effort to prevent fierce competition from escalating into conflict. However, in the 21st century, new concepts have emerged, particularly from evolutionary biology, such as self-organization and co-evolution. While these may sound like complex terms, self-organization refers to the ability to reconfigure oneself in response to new, changing environments. Simultaneously, it involves adapting along with the changes of others, leading to a dynamic process of coexistence, which is the core of international relations in the 21st century. To visualize this more concretely, let's delve into a specific example. We will likely discuss three main objectives, similar to the three objectives mentioned previously. The PPT currently shows the efforts of the US and China amidst these changes, laying the groundwork for Korea's path forward. However, due to time constraints,

let's proceed at a faster pace to examine the efforts of the US and China. The Biden administration in the US, to put it concisely, also senses that the changes are profound. The mention of 'NSS' with a 'G2' in parentheses indicates that a mid-term report for the 'National Security Strategy' is expected by the end of this year. The interim report stated that we are at a critical inflection point. The core emphasis is, inevitably, on the US, but learning from the lessons of the Trump era, the US cannot go it alone.

Therefore, 'going together' is the first point the US is emphasizing in the 'X in P' framework. The second point is the significant diversification of the stages. Among these, 'values and norms,' which correspond to culture in our previous diagram, are being emphasized. Interestingly, in early March, the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) released a major report, spanning seven to eight sections, on AI.

This highlights the importance of changes in the underlying layer. The foundation of all changes in this new era is undoubtedly the transformation of technology, with AI at its core. While AI will be followed by technologies like AB D, data, and communication infrastructure, the explanation primarily focuses on AI. Two key points are being made: first, China is identified as a significant threat in this regard, and it must be effectively managed. Second, the final sentence of the CSIS final report, attributed to a certain individual, states, 'AI is...' It's challenging to grasp whether politicians and future leaders are truly internalizing the profound changes in the underlying layer of the 21st century's new order. I am not sure if they are more distressed than Yu Gil-jun.

The final sentence emphasizes the need to 'move forward.' It implies a commitment to lead in AI. The US should be at the forefront. The semiconductor sector, like the memory chip segment, is a notable area. While it represents a small part of the overall technological revolution (ABCD), we should neither exaggerate nor underestimate our position. Our location is clear, but our direction must also be unambiguous.

China's objective is clear: 2020 was a crucial year, and looking ahead to 2035 and 2049, China envisions its dream of becoming a global power. The direction of China's dream largely follows the path currently pursued by the US until 2050. The PPT outlines a multi-layered approach encompassing diplomacy, economy, and technology. Diplomacy, broadly termed 'new international relations,' aims to avoid the Thucydides Trap, as discussed by figures like Elise. The goal is to maintain US hegemony while avoiding conflict with China. China's vision of 'new major power relations' and 'new neighborhood relations' is centered on its relationship with the US. Therefore, we should focus on the primary goal of new major power relations: avoiding conflict and confrontation. Collaboration, or 'cooperation' in our terms, is also crucial, but more important to us are neighborhood relations. From China's perspective, we are still in its neighborhood.

However, in neighborhood relations, China prioritizes securing its core national interests over confronting the US. These core interests include national security, external sovereignty, and economic development. China is resolute in pursuing these objectives. Like the US, China also places great importance on technology, as evidenced by its AI goals set in 2017. Thus, a fierce competition is underway in these complex stages, far more intricate than what Yu Gil-jun envisioned.

This dynamic is reflected in the recent US-China meeting in Alaska in March, which showcased the interplay of diplomacy, economy, technology, and norms. Contrary to common perceptions, the meeting involved intense verbal exchanges. Broadly, the discussions can be divided into three areas: first, areas of absolute non-negotiability, characterized by fierce competition; second, areas for maximizing mutual benefit, primarily in economics and, to some extent, technology; and third, areas where cooperation is unavoidable, such as health and ecological issues like the coronavirus.

In American parlance, people like Eliasing have been discussing how to lead the world centered on the U.S. without a U.S.-China conflict, preventing them from falling into a trap like QWERTY. China's approach is the 'new type of great power relations' and 'new type of neighborly relations.' The most crucial element for new great power relations is the relationship with the U.S. Therefore, what we need to focus on is the core of new great power relations, which is the first objective: avoiding conflict and confrontation. Cooperation, which corresponds to collaboration in Korean, is one aspect, but what is more important for us are neighboring countries. From China's perspective, we are still neighbors.

Yu Gil-jun spoke of his dream. Similarly, Korea's dream in the 21st century begins with becoming a participant in the 'five networks.' This is because the current world order is neither the traditional Sino-centric order nor a simple iteration of the 19th-century international order; it is far more complex. I recommend focusing on weaving five key networks within this intricate web. First, when young people are asked about their interests, unification often comes up. However, to our surprise, unification may be the third most important issue. The most urgent task is weaving the Asia-Pacific order's network. This is natural, as the Asia-Pacific region is home to over half the world's population, accounts for over half the global GDP, and consumes over half the global military expenditure. Even the combined military spending of North and South Korea is less than 200 billion dollars, while global GDP is trillions, and their combined military expenditure is less than 100 billion dollars.

Regardless of the metric, unification alone cannot enable us to exert sufficient influence in the 21st century. Therefore, while unification is a necessary condition to overcome the challenges of the modern era, the immediate priority is to maximize our capabilities within the Asia-Pacific. Amidst areas of conflict, cooperation, and tension, we have two key takeaways from the previous diagram. First, the US is not declining as rapidly as depicted. Second, while China is growing noticeably, it is not rising as quickly as anticipated. So, how can we maximize our capabilities? Solidifying the US-ROK alliance network is no longer optional. Simultaneously, establishing robust networks with China is crucial, though challenging. The remaining area is the Indo-Pacific. This network poses a challenge. The second challenge is the global stage. While a significant portion is in the Asia-Pacific, the remaining half of the globe still exists.

In the short term, observing phenomena like the rise of Netflix suggests that the era of a singular world may be over. The pandemic might lead us to believe we are moving further away from globalization. This is a misconception. A third wave of globalization, where individual units operate effectively while the whole coexists, is inevitable, and contemplating this reality may be more critical for the Korean Peninsula than for the US or China. The third challenge is the Korean Peninsula. Unification is a belated task. Although time is limited, I will briefly touch upon two points. Efforts to achieve denuclearization have been met with varying approaches, both forceful and diplomatic, but largely unsuccessful. Should we give up? This is not an option, as it is not desirable for North Korea, South Korea, or Northeast Asia. Therefore, it is imperative to demonstrate to North Korea that pursuing this path is not in its best interest. Maximizing the benefits of denuclearization while expanding inclusivity is paramount. The East Asia Institute particularly emphasizes the final aspect: domestic transformation. The end of the Cold War in 1991 was a historical turning point for us. The primary contributor to this was Gorbachev. Recent historical analyses and reports by international relations scholars suggest that while the US's intense competition contributed to the Soviet Union's economic decline, Gorbachev's reforms were also crucial. Therefore, the question is how North Korea can achieve a 'new thinking' for its transformation into a new nation based on denuclearization, rather than adhering to rigid 19th-century models. The ability of North Korea to self-evolve, akin to self-organization in evolutionary biology, will be a critical challenge.

Many people discuss unification in terms of modern unification, which is a 19th-century approach. The 21st-century approach requires us to reconsider how North and South Korea can network within their respective contexts. This is the time to contemplate 21st-century unification. This is your task. The fourth challenge is securing cyberspace. As mentioned earlier, the US, particularly the Biden administration, strongly emphasizes this. The current conflicts are clearly not limited to traditional warfare. If China is controlled, it will have significant repercussions, even on global economic competition. Therefore, we must quickly grasp technological advancements. However, technology already possesses networked elements, making unilateral control difficult. For the US, this is the most intense battleground. For us as well, the most crucial space will be cyberspace, and how we position ourselves there is paramount. South Korea has its own AI national strategy, but to truly engage in this competition, it requires robust dialogue among presidential candidates and a heightened sense of awareness. As time is nearly up, I will conclude with my final remarks and a few questions.

When people ask young generations what their concerns are, they often start with unification. I don't know if this is heard in the West, but for us now, unification might be the third most urgent issue. The most pressing concern is the problem of establishing a comprehensive framework for the Asia-Pacific order. This is natural, as the Asia-Pacific region accounts for over half of the world's population, over half of the global GDP, and over half of military expenditures. Even if North and South Korea were combined, their GDP would be less than 2 trillion dollars, and their military spending combined would not even reach 100 billion dollars, while the global military spending is 2 trillion dollars.

Based on any metric, unification alone will not allow us to fully exert our influence in the 21st century. Therefore, while unification is a necessary condition that must be addressed as a task of modernity, the urgent issue is how to maximize our capabilities within the Asia-Pacific region. Amidst the complex dynamics of conflict, cooperation, and competition, we have two homework assignments. First, as the preceding diagram suggested, the U.S. is not declining as rapidly as anticipated.

Second, however, its relative decline is a fact. Second, China is not rising as rapidly as it imagines. While its growth is noticeable, the question is how to maximize our capabilities within this context. Firstly, the U.S.-ROK alliance network must be solidified; it is no longer an option to discard it. However, simultaneously, it is not easy to establish a network connecting the ROK and China. The remaining area is the Indo-Pacific. This network is a problem for us, and the second homework assignment is the issue of the remaining half of the globe. Over half of the population is currently in the Asia-Pacific, but the remaining half of the globe still exists.

In the short term, looking at phenomena like the 'Fruity Flex' (likely referring to global economic integration or specific trade agreements) and events like the pandemic, one might think the era of 'three worlds' is over, or that we are moving further away from multilateralism. Such thinking would be a mistake. A third wave, where individual actors operate effectively while coexisting as a whole, is inevitable, and it is time to consider this paradigm, perhaps more urgently for the Korean Peninsula than for U.S.-China relations. The third homework assignment is the Korean Peninsula. Unification is a delayed task. Although time does not permit a lengthy discussion, regarding denuclearization as one aspect, various efforts have been made, both assertive and conciliatory, but none have been largely successful.

This leads to thoughts of giving up, but giving up is not an option, as it is not desirable for North Korea, South Korea, or the Asia-Pacific region. Therefore, the primary task is to demonstrate to North Korea that pursuing nuclearization is not in its best interest. Maximizing the benefits of denuclearization and expanding inclusion are key. Particularly emphasized in the concluding remarks is the concept of 'domestic transformation.' The end of the Cold War in 1991 marked a historical turning point for us.

The importance of domestic networking is highlighted by the reason for today's academy: the 'post-Cold War democratization generation' (formerly the 386 generation), who now occupy central positions in all areas of our society, lack the preparation and resolve to handle the complex transformations of the 21st-century new civilization order. Therefore, this responsibility inevitably falls upon the 'complex digital generation'—you. How you weave these elements together is crucial. Just as Yu Gil-jun envisioned, this does not mean completely abandoning the past, but rather integrating tradition, modernity, and complexity. You must prepare yourselves to live as complex digital individuals, embodying tradition, modernity, and complexity simultaneously. Furthermore, you must navigate your respective stages and advance them accordingly. Your predecessors will not have adequately prepared you for this; paradoxically, this means you have a great deal of work to do, which may be a blessing. Thank you for listening attentively and for your time. I will conclude here. Thank you.

Therefore, understanding the 21st-century US-China relationship solely through the simplistic lens of 19th-century bipolarity is inadequate. The East Asia Institute's work over the past 30 years has led to these conclusions. As you listen to the remaining lectures, you will encounter these themes repeatedly. The next 30 years will be characterized by competition, cooperation, and conflict in a complex arena, unfolding from 2020 to 2050. Therefore, it is with great caution that I approach the task of offering simple advice. Let me elaborate on this in the remaining time.

The final point is the importance of domestic networking, which is why we are holding this academy today. The 'post-Cold War democratization generation' (formerly the 386 generation), who now occupy central positions in all areas of our society, lack the preparation and resolve to handle the complex transformations of the 21st-century new civilization order. Therefore, this responsibility inevitably falls upon the 'complex digital generation'—you. How you weave these elements together is crucial. Just as Yu Gil-jun envisioned, this does not mean completely abandoning the past, but rather integrating tradition, modernity, and complexity. You must prepare yourselves to live as complex digital individuals, embodying tradition, modernity, and complexity simultaneously. Furthermore, you must navigate your respective stages and advance them accordingly. Your predecessors will not have adequately prepared you for this; paradoxically, this means you have a great deal of work to do, which may be a blessing. Thank you for listening attentively and for your time. I will conclude here. Thank you.

The final point is the importance of domestic networking, which is why we are holding this academy today. The 'post-Cold War democratization generation' (formerly the 386 generation), who now occupy central positions in all areas of our society, lack the preparation and resolve to handle the complex transformations of the 21st-century new civilization order. Therefore, this responsibility inevitably falls upon the 'complex digital generation'—you. How you weave these elements together is crucial. Just as Yu Gil-jun envisioned, this does not mean completely abandoning the past, but rather integrating tradition, modernity, and complexity. You must prepare yourselves to live as complex digital individuals, embodying tradition, modernity, and complexity simultaneously. Furthermore, you must navigate your respective stages and advance them accordingly. Your predecessors will not have adequately prepared you for this; paradoxically, this means you have a great deal of work to do, which may be a blessing. Thank you for listening attentively and for your time. I will conclude here. Thank you.

Your predecessors will not have adequately prepared you for this; paradoxically, this means you have a great deal of work to do, which may be a blessing. Thank you for listening attentively and for your time. I will conclude here. Thank you.