[Global NK: Zoom & Connect Online Discussion] Discussing Inter-Korean Relations and the Future

YouTube Link: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=rslZVbgnXgA

The East Asia Institute (Director: Son Yeol) launched the web journal Global NK: Zoom & Connect and held an inaugural event titled <Inter-Korean Relations, Discussing the Future> on August 17th as part of its North Korea Strategy and Research Project. This event was an online discussion forum designed to explore future-oriented unification perspectives and inter-Korean relations across generations. Panels from both younger and older generations gathered to engage in discussions on various topics surrounding the Korean Peninsula, including inter-Korean relations, unification, and North Korea.

- Date and Time: Tuesday, August 17, 2021, 14:00 - 15:30 (KST)

- Moderator: Ha Young-sun (Chairman of EAI, Professor Emeritus at Seoul National University)

- Panelists: Kwon Ji-woong (Spokesperson for Youth, Democratic Party of Korea), Ma Sang-yoon (Professor, Catholic University of Korea), Park Myung-lim (Professor, Yonsei University), Yang Jun-woo (Spokesperson, People Power Party), Jeong Da-eun (Graduate Student, Seoul National University)

- Opening Remarks: Son Yeol (Director of EAI, Professor, Yonsei University)

- Congratulatory Remarks: Lee In-young (Minister of Unification)

- Panelist Introductions (in Korean alphabetical order)

■ Panelist: Kwon Ji-woong - Representative of 'Rentable People,' Member of the Youth Future Council of the Democratic Party of Korea. Previously served as the representative of the "MinDal-paeng-i" (Snail) Union and the MinDalpaeng-i Housing Cooperative, and operated the Seoul Youth Policy Network as an honorary youth vice-mayor of Seoul. Participated in the movement to enact the Youth Basic Act and the Seoul Metropolitan Government Youth Basic Ordinance. Ran as a proportional representative for the National Assembly in the 2020 general election and served as the spokesperson for youth for the Democratic Party of Korea.

■ Panelist: Kim Yeon-ho - Associate Director and Research Professor at the Institute for Korean Studies, George Washington University. Senior Research Fellow at the Korea-US Institute (USKI), Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS); Editor of USKI Washington Review; Senior Correspondent for Voice of America Korean Service; Reporter for Radio Free Asia Korean Service; Former Assistant Director at the Program on Korea in Transition, Atlantic Council. Recent publications include 'North Korean Phone Money: Airtime Transfers as a Precursor to Mobile Payment System' (2020), 'North Korea’s Mobile Telecommunications and Private Transportation Services in the Kim Jong-un Era' (2019), and 'Normalization of US-North Korea Economic Relations: An American Perspective' (2019).

■ Panelist: Ma Sang-yoon - Professor, Division of International Studies, Catholic University of Korea. Served as Director for Policy Planning and Director for Diplomatic Strategy at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs for three years (2016-2018). Also served as an Air Force officer in military intelligence for three years (1989-1992). Formerly served as Dean of International Affairs and as a Research and Secretary Director for the Korean Association of International Politics. Conducted research as a visiting scholar at the Brookings Institution and the Woodrow Wilson Center in the United States. Obtained a Ph.D. in Political Science for his dissertation analyzing US policy toward Korea in the 1960s with a focus on South Korea's democratization issues. His main research areas include East Asian international politics, US foreign policy, ROK-US relations, and Cold War history.

■ Panelist: Park Myung-lim - Professor, Interdisciplinary Program in Area Studies, Graduate School, Yonsei University. Graduated with a B.A., M.A., and Ph.D. in Political Science and International Relations from Korea University. His specialization is Korean politics and East Asian international relations. His books include 'The Outbreak and Origins of the Korean War, Vol. 1 & 2' (1996, Nanam), 'Korea 1950: War and Peace' (2002, Nanam), 'Perceptions of the Post-Liberation Period, Vol. 6' (co-authored, 2003, Hangilsa), 'Writing Historical Terms Correctly' (co-authored, 2006, History Criticism Inc.), and 'Is a New Constitution Necessary?' (co-authored, 2008, Daehwa Cultural Academy).

■ Opening Remarks: Son Yeol - Director of EAI, Professor, Graduate School of International Studies, Yonsei University. Ph.D. in Political Science from the University of Chicago. Recent publications include 'South Korea's Choices After the Crisis' (2020), 'Japan and Asia's Contested Order' (2019, with T. J. Pempel), and 'Understanding Public Diplomacy in East Asia' (2016, with Jan Melissen).

■ Panelist: Yang Jun-woo - Spokesperson, People Power Party. Graduated from the Department of Political Science and International Relations at Sungkyunkwan University and was appointed spokesperson through a public competition.

■ Congratulatory Remarks: Lee In-young - Minister of Unification. Graduated with a Bachelor's degree in Korean Language and Literature from Korea University and a Master's degree in Media and Communication from the Graduate School of Journalism and Mass Communication, Korea University. Served as the first Chairperson of the National Council of University Student Representatives (1987), a member of the National Democratic Movement Union (1988), and the first president of the 'Jeondaehyup Dongwoohoe' (Association of Former National Student Representatives) (1993). Entered politics in 1999 as a founding committee member of the Millennium Democratic Party.

■ Panelist: Jeong Da-eun - Currently pursuing a Master's degree in International Relations at Seoul National University. Graduated with a degree in Politics and International Relations from the University of Bristol, UK. 15th cohort of EAI Sarangbang (Love Room). Nuclear Non-Proliferation Research Scholar at KAIST NEREC (5th cohort).

■ Moderator: Ha Young-sun - Chairman of EAI, Professor Emeritus at Seoul National University. Obtained a Ph.D. in International Politics from the University of Washington. Formerly served as Professor in the Department of Political Science and International Relations at Seoul National University, Director of the Institute of International Affairs, Director of the Institute for the Study of the United States, and President of the Korean Peace Studies Association. His major works include 'Theories of Complex World Politics: Strategy, Principles, and a New Order,' 'Korea-Japan New Era and Symbiotic Complex Networks,' 'World Politics of Transformation,' and 'The US-China Competition for the Asia-Pacific Order.'

Video Script

5 lou Ah, ah, oh, uh, uh, Ha Young-sun. It is my pleasure to announce that Global NK, with the support of the Ministry of Unification, has been launched in a new format. As part of this celebratory event, we are holding a session today titled 'Inter-Korean Relations, Discussing the Future: An Honest Talk Between Youth and Older Generations.' I will proceed as follows: First, I will introduce the panelists, and then I will explain the format and order of our honest talk.

As you know, including the moderator, today's event brings together a mix of experienced and young individuals, fitting the description 'youth and older generations.' We anticipate an engaging discussion on the future of inter-Korean relations with participants from their 20s and 50s. The participants will be introduced in reverse chronological order of age, considering the atmosphere and nature of the discussion. First, Jeong Da-eun, a graduate student at Seoul National University, who is currently pursuing a Master's degree in International Relations, having completed her undergraduate studies in the UK. Next, I would like to introduce two individuals who represent the younger generation, as we believe it is important to hear their voices amidst the ongoing generational shifts in society. These are two notable spokespersons from the ruling and opposition parties, whom I have observed with interest on television.

From the ruling party, we have Kwon Ji-woong, a member of the Youth Future Council of the Democratic Party of Korea. Correspondingly, from the opposition party, we have Yang Jun-woo, who has recently garnered attention through the selection process and currently serves as the spokesperson for the People Power Party, having graduated from the Department of Political Science and International Relations at Sungkyunkwan University. Following these three, we will introduce the older generation panelists.

From academia, we have invited Professor Ma Sang-yoon and Professor Park Myung-lim. Professor Ma Sang-yoon, who recently served as Director for Policy Planning and Director for Diplomatic Strategy at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, is a professor at the Catholic University of Korea's Division of International Studies, bringing practical experience to his academic expertise. Professor Park Myung-lim is a world-renowned scholar of the Korean War and has conducted research that is essential for anyone studying modern Korean history.

Professor Park Myung-lim is currently a professor in the Interdisciplinary Program in Area Studies at Yonsei University. Lastly, given the global scope of our web journal and its interest in inter-Korean relations and North Korea, we felt it necessary to invite someone with a deep understanding of the situation in Washington D.C. Therefore, we introduce Kim Yeon-ho, Associate Director and Research Professor at the Institute for Korean Studies at George Washington University.

We anticipate the discussion to last approximately 90 minutes. For the first round, each of the younger panelists will speak for about 3 minutes. Following their presentations, the older generation panelists will offer their thoughts and comments on the younger generation's insights, reflecting on their own considerations of modern Korean history, inter-Korean relations, and North Korean issues, each for about 3 minutes. After the first round, we will allow the younger generation about 2 minutes to respond to the points raised or to add any further remarks.

Finally, the older generation panelists will have about 2 minutes for their closing remarks. We estimate 30 minutes for each of the three questions. To facilitate our discussion, we have prepared three questions. The first question is as follows: As you know, this year marks the 30th anniversary of the end of the Cold War. Following Christmas in 1991, we received a rather unexpected Christmas gift.

However, unfortunately, the Korean Peninsula, which was the epicenter of the global Cold War, has not yet emerged from it and continues to face difficulties in inter-Korean relations. So, why do you think the Korean Peninsula remains trapped in the Cold War, even after three decades? Please share your thoughts without being overly academic, focusing on your personal feelings or discussions you've had with peers.

If the first question concerns the past, the second question addresses the present issue. While there are various complexities, one undeniable issue is the denuclearization of North Korea. Successfully resolving this issue is crucial not only for the Korean Peninsula but also for the future of North Korea, and furthermore, it is a significant challenge on a regional and global scale. Despite numerous attempts over the past 30 years, including initiatives in the 1990s, 2000s, and recent efforts, this issue remains unresolved. How can we approach this problem, perhaps through collaborative thinking, during the remaining period of the current administration or within a new five-year term?

The final question looks to the future, building upon the past and present. Looking ahead to the 21st century, the advancement of North Korea is a critical issue. This is important for the 25 million people of North Korea, the 50 million people of South Korea, and indeed for the 80 million people on the Korean Peninsula. If we are to seek the advancement and prosperity of North Korea, what should be our top priority? This question can likely be discussed under the premise of denuclearization and North Korea's future.

Therefore, we will begin with the first question based on these three themes. As mentioned earlier, the younger panelists will speak first for about 3 minutes, followed by the older generation panelists for about 3 minutes each in the first round. Without further ado, perhaps Spokesperson Kwon Ji-woong could begin? Thank you. I am Kwon Ji-woong. I believe that the hostile relations between North and South Korea still significantly hinder South Korean society, and overcoming this is a crucial issue for us.

However, how should we view the end of the Cold War? Should we see it as a conflict between past allies and the US, or should we redefine it for this current era? I believe that in addition to the military hostility between North and South Korea, we cannot end the Cold War without shedding the belief that one system is inherently superior to another.

Therefore, regarding the question of how North Korea can advance, if we consider how North Korea should engage, I believe that instead of pursuing superiority, more effort should be directed towards open communication and genuine engagement. Otherwise, it leads to problems where exchanges and meetings are not facilitated. Thus, I believe the first step is to move beyond the idea of ideological competition. Nevertheless, given the current state of affairs, it would be ideal if denuclearization, peace, or a declaration of the end of the war could be achieved. If that is difficult, I believe it is necessary to pursue various efforts to establish a peace regime or declare the end of the war even before denuclearization.

I felt very optimistic at the end of 2008. At that time, I thought that with the summits between the leaders of North and South Korea, participation in international organizations, and joint investigations, we could expect a completely different form of exchange, even if full unification was difficult. However, as you know, the situation has become very challenging. Even if complete denuclearization cannot be achieved immediately, there were various measures that could have been taken in the preceding stages. For instance, tourism and the operation of the Kaesong Industrial Complex were pursued after the Six-Party Talks. Therefore, I propose we consider how to re-engage by addressing our respective shortcomings based on existing agreements like the June 15th Joint Statement.

I have heard that, for example, when engaging in research exchanges, North Korea does not allow laptops to be brought in. Even for humanitarian aid, when attempting to deliver aid through video conferencing, such items are reportedly not permitted. I believe this approach is counterproductive. While I understand that military measures are often intensified during periods of heightened conflict, gradually easing these restrictions is crucial for peace. I will now proceed.

Although I have posed three questions, my intention was not to elicit definitive answers but rather to encourage a broad and honest discussion encompassing the past, present, and future. Therefore, panelists, please do not feel overly burdened and speak freely as you think. It is possible that some points may overlap with the second question, but please feel free to share your thoughts. Spokesperson Yang Jun-woo, please proceed with a relaxed mindset, as if engaging in a casual conversation.

Yes, hello. As a politician and as a youth representative, I have my own perspectives, but I was still a university student until recently, receiving guidance from professors. Therefore, I will speak from the perspective of a young person, and if there are any dogmatic or biased remarks, I would appreciate your guidance. Regarding the initial point made by Spokesperson Kwon Ji-woong about needing to compete with systems, I believe that the Cold War was fundamentally about ideological competition.

This idea, I believe, is outdated, dating back 20 or 30 years. Liberal democracy, which respects individual freedom, and market economies, which respect market freedom, have already triumphed. What else do we need to persuade North Korea of? The system competition is already over. The ongoing conflict between North and South Korea is not a competition between systems but rather a result of the Kim Il-sung family's ideology-based regime, which perpetuates conflict.

Fundamentally, it is difficult for countries with dictatorial systems to engage with democratic countries. When nations interact, the more civilian exchanges flourish, the more the weaknesses of the dictatorial regime become apparent. Consequently, they are compelled to move towards a more open system. It is in this context that the conflict between North and South Korea persists; the era of ideological confrontation is long past.

Therefore, I agree with Spokesperson Kwon Ji-woong's point that we should move beyond system competition and engage in dialogue. I anticipate that this will naturally lead to more active discussions. Third, let's hear from Jeong Da-eun. The primary reason for the ongoing division and conflict on the Korean Peninsula is the continuation of the armistice regime. I have considered four reasons for the difficulty in ending the Cold War, both internationally and on the Korean Peninsula: the international geopolitical structure, the regional structure, the inter-Korean structure, and the societal structure.

Firstly, as many of you are aware, although the international Cold War has ended, the Korean Peninsula remains in a state of confrontation stemming from the Korean War. Recently, with the intensifying US-China competition, there are concerns that security tensions on the Korean Peninsula could escalate into a strategic pawn for major powers. Furthermore, North Korea's nuclear program is a significant issue. In its pursuit of regime survival, North Korea has strengthened its adherence to Cold War-era ideology and its own form of socialism, demonstrating that the Korean Peninsula is not yet free from conflict surrounding nuclear development.

Secondly, due to the dynamics of great power politics and the issue of national identity, there is a constant confrontation and competition for mutual recognition. Simultaneously, there is a pursuit of modern goals, such as establishing a unified national identity, which raises the question of whether this is still valid in the 21st century. Thirdly, on a societal level, South Korean society is rapidly changing, and recently, there has been a strengthening of national identity, particularly in terms of territorial and political community. While a sense of national or ethnic identity persists, a new political identity is emerging. In contrast, North Korea maintains a strong Cold War-era identity, increasing resistance to perceived threats to its political system and ideology.

Fourthly, while the youth generation exhibits a stronger tendency towards this, it is not limited to them but reflects a broader societal shift in attitude. Furthermore, over the past 30 years of inter-Korean policy, we have experienced significant conflicts, demonstrating limitations in mobilizing national resources and securing national consensus. Current negotiations are also at an impasse, failing to bring about fundamental changes in social identity. In the current global political landscape, where new actors are emerging and diverse forms of cooperation and coexistence are needed, South Korea's national identity has adapted to some extent. However, the inter-Korean Cold War seems to be regressing. I would like to discuss whether there is a way to overcome this.

Now, let's turn to the older generation panelists. Professor Park Myung-lim, please offer your concise yet impactful comments. First, I congratulate the East Asia Institute on the launch of Global NK: Zoom & Connect. As I was directly taught by Professor Son Yeol, I am unsure if the 'honest talk' between the younger generation and the older generation can be effectively bridged. While you have discussed current issues, I believe the reason the Korean Peninsula remains trapped in the Cold War might be due to differences in global and regional dynamics.

The Cold War confrontation may have ended globally, but on a regional level, including US-China relations, US-North Korea relations, US-North Korea relations, North Korea-Japan relations, and North Korea-South Korea relations, the Cold War persists. According to Professor Son Yeol's teachings, the division on the Korean Peninsula is not merely a remnant of the Cold War but a continuation of the security framework established after the Korean War, a system of confrontation and ideological conflict that persists even today. This, I believe, is the decisive factor behind the current situation on the Korean Peninsula.

Therefore, the differing perspectives on the current issues, as discussed by the two spokespersons, ultimately stem from how we view the past and how we interpret North Korea's strategy of transforming the armistice regime into a nuclear regime in the post-Cold War era. This seems to be the core of the issue. Following this, Professor Ma Sang-yoon will continue. I was particularly struck by the idea that North and South Koreans have formed significantly different identities. This point, raised by the student panelist, resonated with me.

Perhaps this is why there are discussions about whether our younger generation views North Koreans as compatriots to be unified with or simply as a group to be unified with. I found this particularly interesting. Previously, I read an article by a researcher specializing in Korean studies abroad, which stated that young Koreans' sense of nationalism is such that they feel closer to friendly foreigners than to North Koreans, whom they consider fellow countrymen.

I found this assertion both intriguing and shocking. Does unification with North Korea, which should naturally occur, need to be a subject of our discussion? This is the first point I wanted to make. Next, regarding the discussion by Spokesperson Kwon Ji-woong and Spokesperson Yang Jun-woo about system competition and inter-Korean relations, listening to them made me realize that I belong to the older generation. In the 1980s, when I was a university student, this issue was paramount. Which system, South Korea's or North Korea's, was more legitimate? This was a crucial topic of debate for university students and young people at the time. However, with the end of the Cold War and the collapse of the Soviet Union, this question became somewhat meaningless.

Since then, I haven't really thought about North Korea's system. I recall that even those who held such beliefs at the time wondered what had gone wrong. In that sense, system competition itself no longer seems to be a significant question for us. The question then becomes: why, despite the end of system competition, do inter-Korean confrontation and the Cold War on the Korean Peninsula continue? I believe this is a question that deserves examination. A simple answer might be that the hereditary regime of North Korea, passed down from Kim Il-sung to Kim Jong-il and now to Kim Jong-un, still exists, which could be a significant factor. We need to explore why this is the case.

I will conclude here. As the final comment for the first round, let's hear from Kim Yeon-ho, Associate Director. Thank you for inviting me. Professor Ha Young-sun always emphasized that we must view the Korean Peninsula issue holistically. Looking at today's discussion, I believe the comprehensive approach you advocated is being sufficiently realized. From that perspective, I would like to discuss the variable of the United States, given my position in Washington.

I suspect you might have expected me to offer such insights. I will now share some thoughts on practical issues. Haven't there been numerous opportunities to ease the Cold War dynamic on the Korean Peninsula? For instance, the Agreed Framework was concluded in 1994, and President Clinton even considered visiting Pyongyang. In 2006, following the US midterm elections, North Korea-US nuclear negotiations saw rapid progress. However, from the US perspective, it often seems that there is no long-term strategy for North Korea policy. Even when I ask people in Washington, they struggle to articulate a clear long-term strategy.

The approach has largely been reactive to North Korean provocations, and North Korea issues have been relegated to lower priority diplomatic matters. Only when North Korea provokes does the White House seriously engage. This is further complicated by the US domestic political cycle, with presidential elections every four years and midterm elections in between, which can lead to a loss of momentum. The Clinton administration achieved a temporary halt to North Korea's nuclear program through diplomatic negotiations, but there are lingering doubts about whether there was a long-term strategy beyond that.

In exchange for the denuclearization of North Korea, they provided two light-water reactors, offered economic sanctions relief, and promised normalization of relations. However, it is widely believed that these promises were made with the expectation that Kim Il-sung would die within a few years, and that time was on America's side. In 1998, when tensions escalated due to the Taepodong missile launch, Secretary Albright visited Pyongyang, and President Clinton's visit was considered, but it was too late in his term, and as mentioned, political momentum was lost. Similarly, in 2006, after losing the midterm elections, President Bush strongly pushed for North Korea negotiations, but again, the momentum was lost due to the end of his term, halting at the verification stage.

President Trump, despite much criticism, showed an exceptional approach. However, his efforts ultimately ended in rhetoric due to a lack of a meticulous strategy. President Biden, on the other hand, appears to be returning to strategic patience, reverting to the old pattern. Therefore, I have realistic concerns that even if negotiations progress under Biden, they may lose momentum due to the domestic political election cycle. Regarding the first question, although time is limited, we will proceed with this brief round. Initially, for this honest talk, we considered inviting someone from the 10s generation.

However, due to various reasons, they could not be present. While I am furthest from that generation, I will offer a few thoughts based on a hypothetical scenario of what a 10s individual might think after listening to our discussion so far. A simple perspective might be that the authoritarian regime in North Korea is the primary reason for the ongoing conflict between North and South Korea, and that other issues can be resolved once this is addressed. Another perspective might be that if South Korea were more accommodating and respected North Korea's pride, a breakthrough could be achieved. A third perspective, perhaps more complex, might consider the unique characteristics of North Korea, the limitations of South Korea, and the international factors that, despite the end of the Cold War, do not significantly aid in resolving these issues. If these perspectives are considered, I would like to ask the three younger panelists, especially those from the youth generation, for their brief thoughts. Perhaps Spokesperson Yang Jun-woo could begin?

You mentioned a counter-argument earlier regarding the three points. Could you elaborate on that? My understanding is that Spokesperson Yang Jun-woo emphasizes the importance of North Korea's unique system, while Spokesperson Kwon Ji-woong suggests that if South Korea adopts a more accommodating stance and acknowledges North Korea's pride, it could lead to progress, even if not immediate denuclearization or a peace treaty. What is your response to this?

In relations between countries, the underdog often faces misunderstandings. Instead of a confrontational approach, I believe a more constructive method is needed. The reason I consistently emphasize the issue of the system is that the conclusion is clear: the liberal democratic system has historically proven to be successful. Despite our efforts to engage with North Korea, it is difficult for them to open up. As civilian exchanges expand, it becomes increasingly challenging for them to maintain their closed system. Consequently, North Korea becomes even more insular. If North Korea were to open up and prioritize the welfare of its citizens, perhaps engaging with South Korea would be beneficial. However, the current North Korean regime's top priority is maintaining its dictatorial rule, and it seems unlikely they would prioritize the welfare of their people.

Therefore, I believe strict adherence to the system is necessary. Spokesperson Kwon Ji-woong, you may respond. I believe it is important to criticize the system and societal issues in North Korea. If intervention is possible, I believe other countries should intervene.

However, separately from that, I believe that defining a country's system as inherently inferior and refusing to engage with it will ultimately hinder exchanges. Therefore, instead of such an approach, I believe we should engage with them while respecting their system and culture. I once met some young friends in China who seemed quite constrained by their policies, and I felt I could not easily criticize them. Similarly, the friends I meet in North Korea, I believe, are in a similar situation. Therefore, rather than seeing them as needing drastic change, I believe it is more natural to engage with them from the perspective that they are simply different.

Professor Park Myung-lim asked why, despite the seemingly friendly relationship between South and North Korea when viewed in isolation, we have not achieved a peace regime or a declaration of the end of the war, but rather remain in an armistice state. I believe this is partly due to the influence of external factors. Nevertheless, even considering these factors, establishing a peace regime is crucial. I would like to add one point: exchanges are necessary not only for the restoration of national identity but also to maintain the momentum for peaceful exchanges. If these exchanges cease, even that momentum will likely diminish. The question of why we should get along with North Korea is likely to arise if we continue on this path. Therefore, exchanges at various levels are very important.

The history goes up to this point. If you were to answer only one of the three questions about the party, the incumbent, and the comment, what would you answer? Well, first of all, I will briefly answer the three questions you asked and the professor's answer regarding my identity. You talked a lot about the superiority of the system, but rather than debating the superiority of the system, it is currently necessary to overcome the Cold War by gradually reducing the differences arising from the heterogeneity of systems and the gaps that result from them. I thought this was the most necessary thing to do.

The Korean Peninsula has not been able to think future-orientedly due to fierce competition during the long Cold War period. To move beyond this Cold War mentality and see beyond it, I believe it is necessary to make cold-headed judgments based on national interest and practical considerations, rather than on abstract ideals and justifications. Therefore, I believe the issue of young people is actually a transition in perception. As I mentioned earlier, it is a fact that young people have a very Cold War-like perception of unification and North Korea issues, and it is most important to seek practical proposals for this, not just to worry about it. For example, the current generation of young people has a complex identity as a generation that has experienced diverse global experiences while having some interest in unification and division issues, and in that respect, as mentioned earlier, unification...

I believe they have the intellectual resources to think about alternatives, and that there is potential to promote universal human values such as peace, human rights, and food. I believe that in the future, perhaps at the Advanced Institute of Science and Technology, I will mention this again, but in the future, we will be able to lay the groundwork for creating an environment that promotes coexistence between individuals and society, the nation, the world, and the ecological environment. I think we need to consider such measures.

Professor, if you could just say one more thing, what would you say? It's a complex issue, and I think it's a very concise and powerful statement. I briefly mentioned the durability of North Korea. Why is North Korea's internal durability strong? Perhaps even now, despite facing severe food shortages, economic difficulties, and various other challenges such as the COVID-19 pandemic and border closures, it seems to be enduring. I think it will endure for quite some time.

We must base our North Korea policy on the premise that it will likely last for a considerable time. We need to consider whether it will last long or not. While socialist countries collapsed entirely in the early 1990s, some in Eastern Europe have persisted for a long time. There are various factors to consider when determining this. First, North Korea's emphasis on its own ideology and nationalism. Second, the highly effective control system that is easy to manage. Third, and this will likely be discussed in the next round, the nuclear development program, which serves as a shield against perceived external threats, and the strong hostility towards external forces, particularly the United States and Japan, and to some extent, South Korea. This hostility is also...

This is used internally and is considered a very important factor. Therefore, how can we continue to engage in exchange and cooperation with North Korea, which harbors such hostility? This is a difficult point, and finding a solution is a very challenging task for us. Next, if you have an opportunity to speak, Professor Park Myung-lim. Yes, yes. The issue of the durability of the North Korean system has been debated for a long time. Interestingly, those who argued that the North Korean system was weak many years ago, in the 1990s and early 2000s, are now very cautious.

And although this issue surfaces from time to time, the conclusion is always that it's not this time either. This is something we need to think about very carefully. One more thing I'd like to add is that when discussing inter-Korean economic cooperation, the main discussion in South Korea seems to be about viewing North Korea as an object of development. In that context, there are two important questions that arise in Washington: How well do we know North Korea? Is the information updated? And does North Korea want that kind of development model? I haven't heard many clear answers to these two questions. Therefore, I think more thought is needed on that aspect.

Finally, Professor Park Myung-lim's remarks. I believe these two issues are connected. During the Cold War era, when studying the victory of the South, we needed to understand the truth of the two Koreas. When they clashed, didn't we need to understand the truth of the two Koreas? Was there a Cold War on the Korean Peninsula? The durability is intertwined with the fact that despite the collapse of the Soviet Union, China, North Korea's ally, not only survived but also grew strong enough to confront the United States. Furthermore, North Korea has been able to block external influences by maintaining a relatively autonomous, isolated, and closed system. These two factors seem to be intertwined. However, in your remarks, you mentioned the idea of coexistence. In the framework of the Cold War, if we use a paradigm that prioritizes the nation or unification, we used to emphasize national culture and language, and homogeneity. But after living separately for 70 years, this independence...

The emergence of sovereign states and their independence has led to the recognition of their growth and independence. Therefore, instead of a confrontation of identities, I believe that coexistence in division, or peaceful coexistence in division, is more realistic and fact-based. Yes. Regarding the first question, we have more time to discuss than the allocated time, but I think we can save time on the second and third questions as they have already been discussed extensively.

One thing I would like to add is that the end of the Cold War on a global scale in the early 1990s has recently been re-examined, albeit belatedly. Especially from the perspective of scholars, they have dug through numerous documents that were previously inaccessible. However, the variable of Gorbachev should still be considered the most important factor. Therefore, the factors for the end of the Cold War that international political scholars have argued so far are quite flawed. Conversely, what do international political scholars think? They argue that the systemic factors, such as the Soviet Union's internal changes that led to Perestroika, ultimately led to the end of the Cold War.

Perhaps the conclusion is that for those living on the Korean Peninsula, the individual leadership or the political nature of the North and South Korean regimes is important. Can problems be solved without sincere dialogue? Or does sincere dialogue create opportunities for engagement? These fundamental questions remain. The specific manifestation of this is likely the issue of North Korea's denuclearization. North Korea insists on its own claim that it must possess nuclear weapons, while the international community, from their perspective, asks whether it is possible to start sincere dialogue without North Korea abandoning its nuclear weapons, and in some cases, to strengthen exchange and cooperation, and to seek individual solutions.

If we counter with the question of why this is not accepted, what should we think? This is an important issue. And if we tentatively agree that North Korea's nuclear weapons must be eliminated, and if we reach the conclusion that it is better for North Korea itself to eliminate them, not just for South Korea or surrounding powers, how can that be possible? With these difficult questions, we will discuss the second question in depth.

I will proceed concisely, as much of the first question has already been covered. This will help us adhere to the schedule. Shall we start with Ambassador Yang? What are your thoughts on North Korea's denuclearization? There are doubts about whether denuclearization is methodologically feasible. Ultimately, denuclearization, whether it's for North Korea, South Korea, or the United States, involves changing North Korea internally. It's about carrots and sticks, but it's about change from the outside. I believe that without North Korea's own will, denuclearization is impossible.

As long as the dictatorial regime is maintained, there are virtually no incentives for North Korea to abandon its nearly complete nuclear weapons. In this situation, I believe we have entered an era of division and coexistence, as Professor Park mentioned. Maintaining a system of division and coexistence while continuing to strengthen the ROK-US alliance is, in my opinion, the most realistic approach. If the regime's survival is prioritized, North Korea's nuclear weapons have been developed primarily for regime survival. Even if promises are made to maintain the regime, there is a question of whether North Korea will genuinely accept them.

In Ukraine, stability was received in exchange for abandoning nuclear weapons, but as seen in the annexation of Crimea, this can be revoked at any time, as Ukraine has experienced. Even if pressure is applied to maintain the regime, can it be trusted? In such a situation, how can these advanced nuclear weapons be eliminated from the outside using carrots and sticks? In that context, as you mentioned, we must consider the era of division and coexistence.

I believe that division and coexistence based on the ROK-US alliance is the right approach. Ambassador Kwon, would you like to add something? Yes, I have some critical points as well. First, nuclear weapons are a militarily critical and highly sophisticated weapon. Therefore, achieving denuclearization on the Korean Peninsula is essential for establishing a peace regime. However, what I would like to hear from you here is that if denuclearization does not occur, sanctions cannot be lifted, and exchange and cooperation are blocked. For three years, exchange and cooperation have been significantly hindered by this principle. But must it be this way? Are there not various ways to maintain a peace regime or achieve reconciliation even before denuclearization? Thinking back, there were various measures during the Kim Dae-jung and Roh Moo-hyun administrations.

Even then, denuclearization was not fully confirmed. Why are such measures impossible now? I am curious about this. I would like to hear your thoughts on this, as there are experts here. We will now change the order. We will first hear brief answers from Professor Park and Director Kwon regarding what Ambassador Kwon is curious about, and then proceed. Director Park, what is your response? Regarding Ambassador Kwon's question about whether exchange and cooperation can proceed even with nuclear weapons, I understand that you are asking about the possibility of coexistence with nuclear weapons.

Assuming that North Korea possesses nuclear weapons, compared to the Kim Dae-jung and Roh Moo-hyun administrations, North Korea's nuclear weapons have significantly proliferated and have become highly sophisticated. They pose a threat not only to us but also to Japan, and even to the United States. Therefore, I believe the situation now is different from the early 2000s. Furthermore, is peace or coexistence possible with nuclear weapons? If that is possible, it must be based on a nuclear deterrence framework. In other words, the argument for developing our own nuclear weapons would arise from this. If North Korea possesses nuclear weapons, how can we deter their threats? How can we discuss this? This is the problem. Therefore, if peace and coexistence are not pursued with North Korea's nuclear weapons, the subsequent discussion will likely be about our own nuclear development or at least about allowing the United States to deploy nuclear weapons here.

This is likely to lead to such discussions. Therefore, ultimately, if the problem is eliminated, denuclearization will be resolved, and true coexistence or peace without nuclear weapons will be more easily achieved. I cannot help but say this. How would you phrase this sentence? Yes. At the time of the Kim Dae-jung administration, there were many doubts about whether North Korea actually possessed nuclear weapons, and what could be done before they actually possessed them. In such a situation, the room for negotiation was relatively wide. However, as Professor Park mentioned, with North Korea's nuclear capabilities highly advanced, that room has significantly narrowed. Therefore, if we bring back the discussions from the 1990s without considering the significant variable of North Korea's advanced nuclear capabilities in our approach to denuclearization, we will face strong objections, especially in Washington. Another point is that a peace treaty would be meaningless without the involvement of the United States.

Politically, it seems impossible to proceed with a peace treaty before denuclearization. Next, I would like to discuss the relationship between North Korea's denuclearization and exchange. First, regarding the current situation, as mentioned earlier, it seems to be a matter of what kind of framework North Korea and the United States have. I believe the most urgent issue is to accurately assess this and then jointly develop a new framework based on it. Currently, the United States is trying to confirm North Korea's willingness for complete denuclearization, while North Korea is demanding the abolition of hostile policies towards it. In negotiations, there is a fierce exchange of arguments regarding denuclearization, sanctions relief, normalization of relations, and a peace regime.

Therefore, before discussing denuclearization, I believe it is necessary to objectively assess the purpose and will behind North Korea's nuclear development, despite its difficulties. Although much research has been done, I see nuclear weapons not only as a means of security but also as a symbol of nationalism and identity, with a strong emphasis on responsibility and self-reliance. Given this, I believe it will be difficult for North Korea to make a decision to abandon its minimum deterrence for regime security. Therefore, to resolve the issue of North Korea's denuclearization, we must aim for a strategic decision by North Korea that allows for coexistence while maintaining the system, based on denuclearization. In terms of extended deterrence, it is necessary to diagnose possibilities through scenario-based approaches. The most urgent need is to establish a process and a comprehensive and concrete timeline.

If we sit down at the table without actual negotiation procedures or detailed agreements, we cannot expect the same progress as before. Since immediate denuclearization is impossible, a long-term and phased approach is necessary. However, there is still much debate, both domestically and internationally, about the order of priorities: security guarantees first, then denuclearization, or corresponding measures. Therefore, comprehensive discussions are needed. It is not just about inter-Korean relations, but also about the structural weakness of the region, so it is necessary for the surrounding countries to discuss these issues comprehensively.

Professor Park Myung-lim, based on the discussions so far, I have a comment. In the 1990s, from the perspective of the South, the forecast was that the North would collapse within 3 to 5 years. However, North Korean high-ranking officials have shown interest in the idea of a confederation, such as the one proposed by Professor Park. But when I asked them about it, they said it was a matter for the South and North Korean authorities. They said, 'Let's try to achieve it through inter-Korean cooperation and international cooperation.' Then, the highest authorities in North Korea responded with a document of several pages. I have been thinking about this while listening to your remarks, and I wonder if these two will converge.

Professor Park Myung-lim: Based on what I've heard so far, and my comments from this morning, the period from 3 to 5 years, which was the focus of the 1990s, was characterized by a certain perspective. Regarding the 'Baegilho 0032p' that was mentioned, it seems to be related to a disease called 'Cheol' in Pyongyang, which has been discussed extensively. While there have been instances where high-ranking North Korean officials have expressed views similar to those of South Korean figures like Yang Sang-min or Min Joon-ki, the issue is that the South Korean government's response, including the telephone hotlines and the North Korea-US talks, was not effective. I believe that if we had pursued international cooperation more proactively, North Korea's highest authorities would have been more receptive to dialogue. I've been thinking about how these two approaches might converge.

From North Korea's perspective, the Ukraine model or a similar formula for economic and security cooperation is difficult to accept, and the international community would likely react negatively. Therefore, from South Korea's perspective, we need to shift the focus of the problem, and at the inter-Korean level, we need to proceed with the idea of coexistence and peaceful coexistence, which is linked to inter-Korean relations, by decoupling it from the concept of unification.

North Korea will not pursue unification by abandoning its nuclear weapons, and it is unrealistic for South Korea to unify with a nuclear-armed North Korea. Therefore, the issue of the nation and unification has become separated. We must fully acknowledge this. The nuclear experiments of Kim Il-sung, Kim Jong-il, and Kim Jong-un have gone beyond the era and have been conducted in the 21st century. In the current international system, it is difficult to reject nuclear weapons as a national strategy and a long-term strategy. Therefore, I believe it is time to consider this. Even if we go to the North, it will not be resolved without international cooperation.

The Kaesong Industrial Complex is not being shut down. Inter-Korean exchange will promote inter-Korean relations. The issue will be positively resolved. In that case, if there is no surveillance, it will be subject to inspection. If it is inspected, it will be inspected. Special inspections, general inspections, nuclear freeze, light water reactor, sunshine policy, etc., in response to the improvement of North Korea-US relations, the improvement of North Korea-Japan relations, and the normalization of North Korea-US relations, we proposed the Inter-Korean Basic Agreement. Therefore, based on international cooperation, we will exchange nuclear freeze for the establishment of North Korea-US liaison offices, the exchange of resident representatives, and the exchange of ambassadors. We will also do the same for North Korea-Japan relations. We will provide security guarantees through international cooperation and pursue the path of nuclear 폐기 (disarmament) and the opening of inter-Korean exchange and cooperation. Is there any other long-term strategy besides withdrawing from the NPT and pursuing nuclear development?

This is not a matter for us to debate, but rather for the moderator, who specializes in international relations, to hear your thoughts and then move on. We don't have much time, but we will proceed as follows. We cannot go on indefinitely, so we will combine the third question and continue the discussion. As Professor Park Myung-lim pointed out, I believe that I, like others, bear some responsibility for the fact that denuclearization on the Korean Peninsula has not been achieved. For nearly half a century, I have been grappling with this issue, yet we have failed to present a solution that is acceptable to both North and South Korea, or even to the United States.

I would like to point out one thing. When Ambassador Kwon mentioned that we should just leave it alone, and that it might not be abandoned immediately, I wanted to express this from North Korea's perspective, but I was told not to. However, from North Korea's perspective, there are two reasons. First, North Korea emphasizes that it did not possess nuclear weapons because it wanted to, but because it believes they are necessary for its survival and development in the 21st century.

Conversely, as long as it possesses nuclear weapons, the possibility of North Korea's survival and development in the 21st century, and its engagement in international cooperation, will only decrease, not increase. This is an unfair argument in principle, but it is not a solution in reality. What we must not overlook is that nuclear weapons are formally military weapons, but internally, they are political weapons. Therefore, for sincere dialogue in inter-Korean relations, as long as North Korea possesses nuclear weapons, it is inevitable that they will be used to some extent in political and military relations between North and South Korea.

As you can see, from that perspective, it is difficult to say that it is a desirable choice for South Korea's strategy for North Korea's advancement in the 21st century. I will begin with this point. We have about 25 minutes left, so I will try to use the remaining time. We have only covered why denuclearization is important. If it must be achieved, how can inter-Korean relations improve and North Korea's future in the 21st century be secured? This may be the first step towards North Korea's advancement in the 21st century. It is not only about strengthening military power, but also about development.

Even if economic sanctions are eased by eliminating nuclear weapons, it will be relatively difficult for North Korea to enter the global economic stage as a proud member. Therefore, how can we overcome these challenges together? How can we solve these problems? In this regard, North Korea has a plan for its own advancement. No one in South Korea is reading it, but Pyongyang is likely paying close attention. How can we become an advanced country by 2040? This is something that goes beyond North Korea's own considerations; we must consider it together. This is not a discussion based on the superiority of any particular system, but rather a discussion about how North Korea can move towards advancement, and how inter-Korean relations can naturally find a place for sincere dialogue. This time, we will change the order of discussion. Should the younger generation only listen to comments? We will allow the older generation to speak first, and then give the younger generation an opportunity to respond with comments or critiques. Professor Na, would you like to start? Yes. I believe it is difficult to find solutions for North Korea's advancement in the North itself. Because recently, our government and the United States have been discussing humanitarian aid, but North Korea is not responding. There are various reasons, but perhaps such exchanges feel burdensome to North Korea. A slight change could be perceived as a threat to the regime, and perhaps this sense of crisis is why they are limiting exchanges, especially humanitarian exchanges.

I believe that when dialogue began in 2018, and dialogue with the United States began, the most significant factor for change was Kim Jong-un's determination to develop North Korea into an advanced country as a leader. Perhaps this thought still exists. However, the more important reason is likely that from Kim Jong-un's perspective, this does not have to happen immediately.

When dialogue began between South and North Korea in 2018, and also with the United States, I believed that a key factor for change would be Chairman Kim Jong-un's commitment to developing North Korea into a strong nation. I still believe this may be the case. However, from Chairman Kim Jong-un's perspective, it might not be an immediate priority.

He likely thinks that it would be good to become a normal country and eventually an advanced country, but when asked if it needs to happen immediately, he probably thinks not now, and asks for more time. This is because expanding exchanges could potentially threaten the regime. Therefore, they tend to avoid such exchanges. Given the nature of the North Korean system, it can endure. The leader is young, and whether his son or grandson will succeed him is unknown, but the North Korean regime can continue for generations. While it may be difficult now, it is not a simple matter of one or two years. North Korea can wait indefinitely. This is a unique characteristic of the system.

On the other hand, our society and the international community view this differently. Therefore, if they continue to think 'let's wait,' exchanges will be limited. Therefore, before engaging in exchanges with North Korea, we must first do our homework. We must create a situation where our society's stance and approach towards North Korea do not change over time.

This should not only be within our society but also in concrete terms. Even if ten years pass, and North Korea is rebuilt, our approach to North Korea remains largely unchanged and principled. Only when such a prospect is established can North Korea be willing to engage in dialogue on difficult issues. To prepare for this, it is crucial to establish a clear concept for our North Korea policy. Today, in that sense, sincere dialogue is very important.

I completely agree with Professor Park Myung-lim's remarks. When I was studying in the Soviet Union, I started using the term 'North-South division' instead of 'South-South division.' It has become a common term, but I believe it is very important to have a 'North-South division' in our policy towards peace, rather than a 'South-South conflict.' What is the extent of possible agreement, and what are the differences? I believe it is time to bridge the gap between conservative and progressive views by agreeing on common national points and identifying differences. Therefore, we can establish a North-South dialogue. Second, I believe that as the liberal international order becomes more integrated, some countries, like China, dream of a different order.

Therefore, whether it is the G7 or the G20, the United States has been strengthening its alliances. Countries like China and North Korea, which do not adhere to the existing order, are leading countries in export controls and sanctions. Therefore, if we combine these two, perhaps we can move towards a new order that goes beyond the G7. I believe that by combining these, we can pursue a new order that goes beyond the G7. Therefore, instead of the power-based order that the United States pursued in the past, and the ideological order that North Korea pursues, we can combine the international community's efforts to counter the ideological order pursued by North Korea with the development of a new order based on international cooperation.

If we can set a clear standard that freedom, democracy, and market principles can be guaranteed through democratization, then coexistence is possible. The most important means is not peace, but peace is the goal. Coexistence and unification are not means, but rather the goal. I believe it is important to persuade and pressure North Korea to understand that peace and coexistence are the goal.

Director Yeon, before I hand over the microphone, I would like to briefly mention something interesting from the questions asked by the students. It is predictable, but there are two questions. First, must we achieve unification? If unification is so difficult, wouldn't it be better to spend the resources on maintaining the current divided state rather than pursuing unification? Second, we have lightly touched upon it, but what if North Korea does not denuclearize?

Is it necessary to solve that problem? What happens if it is not solved? I am curious about this. We don't have much time, but I will now hand over the microphone to Director Yeon. We have approached the North Korean issue from a security perspective for decades, and therefore, there has been no significant progress. Although there was a brief period of such sentiment, ultimately, deep skepticism and fatigue have accumulated in the United States and South Korea.

However, in the midst of this discussion, perhaps it sounds unpleasant, but since we have not achieved significant results from a security perspective, we should consider the economic system guarantees, as Professor Ha mentioned earlier. The price North Korea has paid for developing nuclear weapons is enormous. Its socialist economy has been severely eroded. The market generation has become accustomed to profit-seeking behavior, and even the North Korean regime will find it difficult to change this.

Furthermore, when talking to defectors, the concept of trust plays a very important role among market participants. These are aspects that cannot be found in the past North Korean socialist system. These changes may seem rapid from the outside, but they are rapid changes from within. However, there is too little consideration given to whether these changes can bring about a chemical transformation within North Korea. While there are experts in South Korea, in Washington, they are preoccupied with security issues, and there are few people who can answer when this issue is raised in discussions.

I believe that the Global NK, which is being launched here, can play a very important role in this regard. Time is almost up, but we have been asked to finish soon. We will take about 5 more minutes. I think we should give the younger generation a final chance to speak. Three people will speak for 1 minute and 30 seconds each, and if there is time, I will take 30 seconds to conclude.

I believe today was a time to learn. Thank you. Regarding North Korea's advancement, I had the thought that perhaps instead of the expression 'advancement,' we could create an opportunity to restore solidarity among citizens in this process. That is, instead of the concept of 'who develops whom,' there is room to create a slightly different civilization. In that sense, as a neighboring country, could North Korea help solve energy inequality or climate change issues that South Korean society cannot solve? If we can think of it that way, there will be much to learn.

I will conclude. Ambassador Yang, please speak. Thank you for inviting me. It's simple. Professor Park, North Korea's time zone cannot be changed. It's impossible. I believe the root of all these problems lies there. The current economic sanctions against North Korea are based on a societal agreement not to tolerate additional nuclear weapons. And the question is whether North Korea prioritizes its people's living conditions or regime survival.

This is the issue. The economic sanctions against North Korea are based on the societal agreement not to tolerate additional nuclear weapons on Earth. South Korea does not have the capacity to provide significant assistance. In this situation, if North Korea has good intentions, even the surrounding major powers, including South Korea, would want to help and strive for advancement. If the obstacles are removed, advancement can be achieved at any time. Lastly, regarding the question asked by the student, 'Must unification be achieved?' In my personal opinion, I believe it is acceptable not to pursue immediate unification as long as North Korea can exist without external influence.

We can pursue exchange and cooperation while taking a long-term view of unification and gradually expanding it. I don't think it's a problem if we don't unify immediately. I will conclude by adding this. Thank you for inviting me. Thank you. I seem to have to give closing remarks unexpectedly. My answers may be somewhat disorganized, but regarding the question about how to proceed without resolving denuclearization, North Korea is currently talking about pursuing complete denuclearization as the final stage. However, this seems difficult, and from the US perspective, they are aiming for complete denuclearization within a larger framework. The discussion of arms reduction seems impossible, and in reality, the US has chosen a path of partial arms reduction while acknowledging the issue of India and Pakistan. However, the issues of India and Pakistan are not resolved, and I don't think this is a good outcome for denuclearization either. Therefore, I believe a plan to pursue denuclearization is necessary. Regarding North Korea's advancement, as you mentioned, the most crucial factor is North Korea's own will and effort to move away from its 19th-century survival strategy and develop a new strategy. There are various obstacles, and besides the nuclear issue, there is the question of whether fundamental change can be brought about from the North Korean regime. On the other hand, there is also a consensus on strengthening South Korea's capabilities and fostering understanding. However, there is too little information about North Korea, and much of it may be inaccurate. Despite these negative perceptions, I believe that advancement is only possible if North Korea has the stability to accept it. Therefore, based on this foundation, pursuing survival and development is much more efficient than the current approach.

Furthermore, within North Korea, although currently limited, there are market economies, socio-cultural changes, and advancements in science and technology that are being emphasized. How can these be utilized in conjunction with the outside world? In this process, we must also consider ways for various actors, beyond just state-to-state interactions, to engage in new ways. Lastly, regarding peace and unification, I also wanted to ask this question while preparing for the discussion. Recently, the demand for peace has increased, and the perception of separating peace from unification is gaining significant attention.

Therefore, peace is essential as a gradual step towards unification. However, this public opinion is still strong. If there is another opportunity, I would like to explore this further. Thank you. We will conclude the session here. As a concluding remark, I would like to briefly point out one thing. First, is unification absolutely necessary? In relation to this, Professor Park Myung-lim pointed out that it is difficult to overcome our current reality without simultaneously resolving the North-South Cold War and the international Cold War. Personally, I believe that the discussion of unification, whether conservative or progressive, is very outdated.

For the 21st century, unification discussions should focus on two aspects. First, it should go beyond a unipolar unification or a federal unification. The 21st century is moving very rapidly. Therefore, paradoxically, I believe it is time for the younger generation to newly consider networked unification, open both domestically and internationally. Therefore, I believe it is time to discard modern unification theories in the trash can.

Second, regarding the question of whether we must resolve the North Korean nuclear issue, I stated that it must be resolved for North Korea's sake. Based on that premise, I have spent the last decade grappling with this issue, but I have personally felt frustrated that neither conservatives nor progressives, nor the United States or China, have listened to the answer. What is required is that if sanctions and deterrence are necessary, they should not be used to punish North Korea, but rather as a good-faith card to guide North Korea towards a different choice. Second, North Korea has its own justification.

The guarantee of sovereignty and development rights is a meaningful expression. However, the premise is that in the reality of international politics, we must strengthen sincere efforts at the national, international, and inter-Korean levels to guarantee North Korea's survival and development rights, which it considers in its own way, based on denuclearization. I especially emphasize one last card: ultimately, as Ambassador Kwon mentioned, this is not a matter of who helps whom or who receives help, but a matter of North Korea itself making a decision for its survival and development in the 21st century. Therefore, in biological terms, it requires continuous self-organization.

What was new half a century ago is very difficult to make new in the 21st century. Therefore, information is crucial for such continuous self-organization. Therefore, North Korea's advancement is essential for us, but perhaps in the 21st century, we should consider how we can jointly consider desirable information for North Korea, not just information that shakes its domestic system, but information that maximizes North Korea's national interests. Paradoxically, our domestic North-South conflict and Cold War conflict also suffer from a poverty of information.

Looking at the tone of domestic South-North knowledge, media, or academic discourse, we are still wandering without finding a place that simultaneously pursues our true national interests and global interests in the 21st century, based on a very poor level of information. Therefore, I feel a sense of regret that not only Global NK but also Global RSK are needed. I hope to have an opportunity for sincere dialogue again after the COVID-19 pandemic, and I believe this will be the first step in resolving the divisions within South Korea, North Korea, and internationally. Unfortunately, I must conclude here. Thank you again to the six participants. This concludes the session.

Observing the domestic discourse among South Korean intellectuals and media, it is evident that our understanding is quite limited. We seem to be struggling to identify a path that simultaneously serves our 21st-century interests in this region and global interests. This leads me to believe that we need both a global NK strategy and a global R&S strategy. I regret that we haven't been able to achieve this yet. I hope that once the COVID-19 pandemic subsides, we will have another opportunity to gather and engage in such discussions. I believe this would be a crucial first step in resolving divisions within South Korea, between North and South Korea, and internationally. Unfortunately, we must conclude here. I would like to express my gratitude once again to the six participants. This concludes the session.