EAI Conference “After the Coup, the Future of Democracy in Myanmar”

YouTube Link: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=iJUCo9EAZ5U

The East Asia Institute (Director Yeol Sun) held the conference “After the Coup, the Future of Democracy in Myanmar” to deliver a timely message on democratic cooperation regarding the coup in Myanmar and the civil disobedience movement.

On February 1, 2021, the Myanmar military staged a coup, claiming the 2020 general election was fraudulent. Since the detention of government leaders, including State Counsellor Aung San Suu Kyi, a civil disobedience movement has been spreading. The Myanmar Civil Society Capacity Building team of the East Asia Institute, which operated a post-2020 Myanmar general election survey program, gathered with domestic Myanmar and Southeast Asia experts to discuss the future of democratization in Myanmar.

Watch Video

[Video Timeline Information]

00:00:30 Opening Remarks

00:07:00 Session 1: Presentation and Discussion of Post-2020 Myanmar General Election Survey Results

01:10:40 Session 2: Challenges in Myanmar's Democratic Transition and International Support for Democracy

Video Transcript

We will now begin the East Asia Institute conference, “After the Coup, the Future of Democracy in Myanmar.” Before we proceed, we will have opening remarks from Yeol Sun, Director of the East Asia Institute. Please give him a warm round of applause. Hello, I am Yeol Sun from the East Asia Institute. First, I would like to express my gratitude to our distinguished guests, panelists, Director Sook-jung Lee, and all participants joining us online and offline. We also have participants joining from overseas. Thank you.

The East Asia Institute is holding this conference titled “After the Coup, the Future of Democracy in Myanmar.” The East Asia Institute has been implementing a project called “Myanmar Civil Society Capacity Building” for the past six years, since 2015. We have been collaborating with five nascent NGOs in Myanmar, sharing the experiences and know-how of our institute’s think tank work to enhance their capacity, foster the growth of civil society in Myanmar, and ultimately achieve sound democratic development.

We refer to this as “democratic cooperation,” which includes transferring the experiences of South Korea’s democratization movement. Specifically, since last year, under the theme of “Promoting Civil Society Participation in Myanmar’s Electoral Democracy,” we conducted a survey program after the 2020 Myanmar general election. For this program, we provided statistics training and survey methodology to our colleagues in Myanmar, and subsequently, they conducted actual surveys in anticipation of the new civilian government’s inauguration.

We were preparing for the results presentation when the coup occurred on February 1st. Consequently, it has become practically impossible to operate joint programs with our current partner institutions. Therefore, we have somewhat shifted our objective to “international support and research for Myanmar’s democracy.” Today’s conference, “After the Coup, the Future of Democracy in Myanmar,” is the first step in this direction. It serves as a platform to present the research findings from the post-2020 Myanmar general election survey, which was originally planned in collaboration with our Myanmar partner institutions. Furthermore, it is an opportunity to explore new challenges and responses for strengthening Myanmar’s civil society, which has reached a turning point due to the coup. We particularly anticipate this to be a forum for discussing how the international community, including South Korea, can provide support under the banner of democratic cooperation.

This coup has placed Myanmar's unstable political landscape, where power is shared with the military, at the center of international attention. We must now thoroughly examine the sustainability of Myanmar's gradual and partial democratization model, known as a "pacted transition." Moreover, the civil disobedience of the Myanmar people, reminiscent of South Korea's democratization movement, particularly our experience in Gwangju, evokes memories of past struggles and sacrifices. Witnessing the daily news of their resistance, we recognize that internalizing and solidifying democratic values is a crucial task for democratic transitions in Myanmar and other countries. It also offers significant insights for us to reflect on our own democratic achievements. With this perspective, today's conference will feature an in-depth analysis of the controversies surrounding the recent Myanmar election results, the characteristics of the coup, and the responses from Myanmar citizens and the international community. Following this, we will engage in a comprehensive discussion on how South Korea should pursue its foreign policy towards Myanmar, human rights diplomacy, and democratic diplomacy moving forward. We sincerely hope that our esteemed panelists will contribute significantly to the research and public discourse on the future of democracy in Myanmar after the coup with their sharp analysis and insights. To conclude, let us begin the conference by raising three fingers in solidarity with “Save Myanmar.” Thank you for your kind attention. We will now proceed to Session 1: Presentation and Discussion of Post-2020 Myanmar General Election Survey Results.

We will have a comprehensive discussion on how to advance Myanmar's human rights diplomacy or democracy diplomacy. I sincerely hope that the esteemed panelists will lead this conference to greatly contribute to the research and public discourse on the future of democracy in Myanmar after the coup, with their sharp analysis and insights. Finally, we will begin the conference by raising three new fingers for Save Myanmar. Thank you for your insightful remarks. Now, let us commence Session 1: Presentation and Discussion of the Post-General Election Survey Results in Myanmar.

Session 1 will focus on the presentation of the results from the 2020 Myanmar General Election Post-Survey, conducted through the Myanmar Civil Society Capacity Building Program that the East Asia Institute has been operating for the past seven years. The session will be moderated by Director Son Yeol of the East Asia Institute. Yes. Hello. This is Son Yeol again. I will be moderating Session 1. As I mentioned in my opening remarks, this survey result presentation and discussion was supposed to be conducted jointly with five organizations in Myanmar, but we inevitably had to proceed with it solely. It's a bit of an episode, but for this survey, Professor Bae Jin-seok, who will be presenting today, and Dr. Jeong Hwan, who is beside me, along with our EAI researchers, were going to conduct the survey together with representatives from five Myanmar institutions.

We have held numerous seminars, about 12 sessions, for capacity building. Through these seminars, the techniques were transferred, and the actual survey was conducted. However, due to the coup, it became difficult to present the survey results. Immediately after the coup on February 1st, we contacted the local institutions. The survey results showed findings that directly contradicted the claims of the military junta that has taken power through the coup, and we inquired about how to handle this situation.

A few days later, our partner institution in Myanmar contacted us. They stated that releasing the results and supporting them would be an act of supporting the democratization movement. We were concerned about their safety and cautiously sounded them out, but they actively requested us to release the results, discuss them, and publicize them. Accordingly, as a first step, some of the results were released in an issue brief by Bae Jin-seok and Jeong Hwan on February 16th. Some media outlets also reported on it. Today, as a follow-up, we will formally present our research findings.

The presentation will be given by Professor Bae Jin-seok of Gyeongsang National University, and he will be allocated approximately 20 minutes. Professor Bae will be presenting online. So, please note that. Following the presentation, Dr. Jeong Hwan from Korea Research will discuss for about 10 minutes, and then Professor Jang Jun-young from Hankuk University of Foreign Studies will also discuss for 10 minutes. We anticipate approximately 15 minutes remaining. During this time, we will allocate it to responding to questions and comments from the floor or online. So, Dr. Jeong, I apologize, Professor Bae Jin-seok, please come in. Hello, Professor.

Yes, hello. Yes. We would like to request a presentation of about 20 minutes. Yes. Thank you. Yes, hello. I am Bae Jin-seok, a professor in the Department of Political Science and International Relations at Gyeongsang National University. I apologize for participating online due to personal circumstances. Before I begin my presentation, I would like to offer my condolences to the Myanmar citizens who lost their lives during the protests and express my solidarity with them. I will now share my screen to begin the presentation.

Yes. The content I will be presenting today is divided into three parts. Director Son Yeol briefly introduced the Civil Society Capacity Building Project in his opening remarks, and I will briefly touch upon that. Next, I will briefly explain the process through which the 2020 Myanmar General Election Survey was prepared and conducted. Finally, I will discuss the issue that most people are curious and concerned about: the Myanmar coup. How do the citizens of Myanmar view this issue? I will discuss the key findings from our survey with you.

As introduced earlier, this project, the Myanmar Civil Society Capacity Building Project, is in its seventh year. I counted the number of workshops; there have been approximately 30 workshops since the project began in 2015. Director Lee Suk-jong, who will be moderating, initiated the project with the aim of sharing Korea's democratization experience and EAI's experience as a private think tank with Asian countries. I was also involved in the implementation of the project at the time and learned a great deal. The project's objective was not solely to disseminate our experience but also to learn from civil society activists in newly democratized countries or countries still under authoritarian regimes in East Asia.

EAI primarily shared its experiences and accumulated knowledge as a private think tank, such as how to build networks, web services, and financial management, with our partner civil society organizations. In terms of content, we studied how to initiate research, what methodologies to consider, how to write reports, and even how to proceed from data analysis to conducting surveys. Now, I will discuss the 2020 General Election Survey in Myanmar.

I dare say that this is likely the first opinion poll focused on elections and conducted by Myanmar's civil society itself. While there have been previous surveys, EAI has spent seven years preparing and, over the past year, has discussed and considered election-related opinion poll matters in 12 sessions. The primary objective was to be faithful to the core principle of the capacity-building project: that Myanmar's civil society should be able to conduct opinion polls on its own issues with its own capabilities. Therefore, the election opinion poll was conducted with the goal of maximizing the leadership of Myanmar's partner institutions. In fact, the 2018 Asian Barometer Survey was a very systematic opinion poll. However, this time, the focus was on elections, and the planning and execution of the election opinion poll were to be led by Myanmar's partner institutions.

In our preparation process, we focused on three main sub-areas. Theoretically, we discussed electoral systems, voting behavior, and electoral authoritarianism. Secondly, we focused on how to enhance survey capabilities, approaching it from the perspective of building research infrastructure, including research design, methodology, sampling, and data analysis. Finally, the survey planning phase, which was carried out in the last stage, involved preparing and executing survey plans that would best address their concerns and reflect the prospects for democracy and the current situation.

Looking at the workshop content on the website, I found that a total of 12 sessions were held last year. In January, Kim Choon-seok and Dr. Jeong Hwan from Korea Research, along with myself and our EAI staff, participated in a workshop held in Myanmar just before the COVID-19 outbreak. Following that, due to COVID-19, we continued with 12 online workshops. As you can see, they meticulously assisted with sampling methods, statistical program setup, and operational processes. I would like to express my deep gratitude to Kim Choon-seok and Dr. Jeong Hwan from Korea Research, who were in charge of the core tasks. Now, let's move on to the content.

There were various claims regarding the fairness of the 2020 general election. These were opinions expressed by the Myanmar military and the pro-military USDP (Union Solidarity and Development Party). Allegations were made of discrepancies in voter lists involving approximately 860,000 individuals, raising suspicions of organized electoral manipulation. However, the basis for these claims was never properly substantiated. In any case, the Myanmar military began to argue that such electoral manipulation was an obstacle to Myanmar's democratization.

In January of last year, December of last year, and January of this year, various domestic and international organizations that acted as observers for this election confirmed some minor flaws, but stated that these flaws were not significant enough to affect the election results and that there was no large-scale organized electoral manipulation. Despite these announcements, a coup occurred on February 1st. As you are all well aware, following the coup, we saw reports of Myanmar citizens protesting and demonstrating. It was heartbreaking. What we were more curious about was how the citizens of Myanmar truly felt about the election process and its results, as we had encountered many reports about the protests, but we felt a need to share empirical data on their views.

Therefore, we realized that our survey results, conducted immediately after the election and just before the coup, could play an important role in understanding public opinion in Myanmar. Let me briefly explain the election opinion poll conducted in December 2020. Originally, we planned a nationwide opinion poll across all of Myanmar. As you know, due to the COVID-19 situation, a nationwide survey became practically impossible. Thus, the Mandalay region and Kachin State became the focus of our opinion poll. A survey was also conducted in Yangon, the capital city, but after the survey results, we confirmed some sampling issues, so we will focus on sharing the survey findings from these two regions today. The survey was conducted through face-to-face interviews. Sampling was conducted using a systematic method based on stratified random sampling. The sample size was 400 for the Mandalay region and 758 for Kachin State.

We need to examine the demographic and political characteristics of these two regions. As you know, Mandalay region is an administrative division located in the central part of Myanmar and is the second-largest city. It is a region where the ruling party, the National League for Democracy (NLD), has a strong influence. In the recent election, the NLD won 35 out of 36 seats in the lower house and all 12 seats in the upper house. It is also a region where Buddhism, the majority religion in Myanmar, and the Bamar ethnic group are predominant. Therefore, we judged that examining public opinion in this region would be meaningful for understanding the opinions of pro-NLD and mainstream Myanmar groups.

Let's examine Kachin State. Kachin State is located in the northernmost part of Myanmar, bordering China. It is a region where the NLD's influence is relatively weaker. In the lower house, the NLD won 13 out of 18 seats. Consequently, while Shan State is often considered the stronghold of the opposition in Myanmar, we identified Kachin State as the next strongest region for the opposition. In terms of ethnicity and religion, it is very diverse, contrasting with the Mandalay region. In particular, Christianity accounts for about one-third of the population in this region. Therefore, we believed that understanding public opinion in Kachin State would be effective in gauging the opinions of the opposition against the NLD and the influence of minority groups in Myanmar. To reiterate, in a situation where a nationwide opinion poll was not feasible, these two regions we focused on hold significance as they allow us to examine both pro-NLD and anti-NLD opinions simultaneously.

The proportions of respondents in the opinion poll conducted after this election also reflect this. In the Mandalay region, approximately 77%, nearly 80%, of respondents supported the NLD candidate. In Kachin State, between 45% and 50% of respondents supported the NLD. As mentioned, we will examine the contrasting opinions of these two regions simultaneously. Now, let's examine the most crucial question: Was the election fair?

In both regions, a positive assessment of the election process and results was observed. The question of whether all voters were given equal opportunities and whether it was a democratic election based on majority rule demonstrates the gap between the justification put forth by the coup forces and the public opinion of Myanmar citizens. The responses to this survey question showed no significant difference, not only in the pro-NLD Mandalay region but also in the anti-NLD Kachin region. Let's delve deeper.

The proportion of respondents in the Mandalay region who answered that it was a free and fair election was close to 90%. While some responses indicated 'don't know' or neutral opinions, the proportion of those who disagreed was only 1% to 2%. Let's examine the anti-NLD Kachin State. This table also confirms that there was no pressure at the polling stations. Regarding the election process, over 90% of respondents expressed satisfaction. Regarding the election results, Kachin State, being an anti-NLD region, shows this here as well. The proportion of those satisfied with the election results was about 77%, while those who disagreed or were dissatisfied with the results were around 9.1% to 1%. As mentioned earlier, in Kachin State, less than 50% of respondents supported the NLD. Nevertheless, the acceptance of the election results was confirmed to some extent through this table. Of course, it is also confirmed that there were no perceived flaws in the election process. Now, let's examine the election evaluation by party support in the anti-NLD Kachin State.

As shown earlier, in Kachin State, less than 50% of respondents supported the NLD. Nevertheless, the acceptance of the election results was confirmed to some extent through this table. Of course, it is also confirmed that there were no perceived flaws in the election process. Now, let's examine the election evaluation by party support in the anti-NLD Kachin State. Naturally, it was easily predictable that NLD supporters would be satisfied with and trust the election process and results. What interested us more were the opposition supporters. In Kachin State, we were particularly interested in how the KSPP (Kachin State People's Party), a regional party in Kachin State, viewed the election results and process. Also, how did the supporters of the pro-military USDP (Union Solidarity and Development Party) view the election results and process? These were our points of interest. The results in the middle and right of this graph represent that process.

Among the 780 PSPP supporters, 88.8% were satisfied with the election process, and 62% trusted the election results. The USDP showed similar results. 63.5% were satisfied with the election process. These respondents were likely supporters of the pro-military party, and we can infer that they may have been influenced by the military's allegations of electoral fraud that emerged immediately after the election. As we have seen, only a very small minority of Myanmar citizens expressed doubts about the fairness of the election results. We found that not only among pro-NLD respondents but also among the majority of respondents with anti-NLD sentiments, very few doubted the fairness of the election process and results.

This result confirms that the justification for the coup put forth by the Myanmar military is in direct contradiction to Myanmar's public opinion. Following this, we became more interested in another aspect. The election was fair. However, we need to examine some characteristic aspects of Myanmar's public opinion that emerged after the NLD's victory. Is Myanmar heading in the right direction after the election? This is a common question used in election surveys. Let's compare the opinions of the two regions on this question.

In the Mandalay region, about 85% of respondents believe that Myanmar is heading in the right direction after the election. Only about 2% believe it is heading in the wrong direction. 'Don't know' or no response accounts for the rest. What we found more interesting was the result from Kachin State. Approximately 44% of respondents believed it was heading in the right direction.

Conversely, 12% of respondents believed it was heading in the wrong direction. And about 41.9% responded 'don't know.' What does this mean? While the majority in the NLD-supporting Mandalay region believes Myanmar is heading in the right direction, in Kachin State, over 40% of respondents have a reserved attitude, stating 'don't know' or that they are unsure if Myanmar is heading in the right direction. And about 12% believe it is not heading in the right direction. From this, we believe we could confirm that the civilian government, which has effectively lost power due to the coup, faces numerous challenges. The expectations of the Kachin State respondents towards the new government are also reflected here. They expect the new government to provide quality public services and create more jobs. The right to participate in protests...

The proportion of positive views, such as the right to participate in protests, was expressed by respondents in Kachin State. However, despite the strong public opinion for constitutional amendments, even by the NLD government, the success of constitutional amendments was not even 40%. The agreement rate for this question was only 39.3%. This alone indicates that the civilian government, which lost power due to the coup, faces considerable challenges.

We will enjoy the right to participate. This is the proportion of positive responses from Kachin respondents. However, despite considerable public opinion calling for amendments to the 2008 Constitution, upon which this election was based, by the NLD government, the success of constitutional amendment remained uncertain, with less than 40%. The proportion agreeing with this question was only 39.3%. This alone indicates the formidable challenges facing the second government led by the NLD, which was overthrown by the coup, and the civilian government that lost power due to the coup.

Finally, how do Myanmar citizens view international intervention in human rights abuses? These are the response results from Kachin. Myanmar has a history of human rights abuses related to ethnic minorities, which have been issues for the international community. In this case, the proportion agreeing to international intervention was about 72%, while opposition was less than 10%. We believe these results have implications for what stance the international community should take towards the resisting Myanmar society following the recent military coup.

Finally, how do Myanmar citizens view international intervention in human rights abuses? This is a response from Kachin State. Human rights abuses, particularly concerning ethnic minorities, have been an ongoing international issue for Myanmar. In this case, 72% of respondents agreed with international intervention, while less than 10% opposed it. We believe this result has implications for what stance the international community should take regarding the ongoing resistance in Myanmar following the current military coup.

In summary, we confirmed the Myanmar public's view that the 2020 Myanmar general election was fair. We could confirm that the military's declaration of a state of emergency lacked justification. Nevertheless, public opinion in Myanmar after the general election still shows active agreement from pro-NLD circles regarding whether Myanmar is heading in the right direction. However, opinions from anti-NLD sentiments and Myanmar's minority and marginalized groups remain skeptical and reserved. I will conclude my presentation here and would like to have a discussion with Dr. Jeong Hwan, who conducted the survey with us, and Dr. Jang Jun-young, an expert on Myanmar, to synthesize our findings.

Thank you. Yes. Thank you. Professor Bae Jin-seok. You have explained the survey results in great detail. The summary is provided on the last page, so I will not elaborate further and will proceed directly to the discussion. We have invited two discussants today. Dr. Jeong Hwan from Korea Research's Public Opinion Division, as mentioned earlier, is an expert in survey methodology and has provided extensive training in this area. Therefore, we anticipate a discussion from that perspective. Professor Jang Jun-young from Hankuk University of Foreign Studies is a leading expert on Myanmar, a country that is crucial for South Korea, yet Myanmar specialists are quite rare. Given his expertise and active engagement, we have high expectations for his contribution today. Dr. Jeong Hwan will speak for 10 minutes, followed by Professor Jang Jun-young for 10 minutes. Yes. Ah, yes. I am Jeong Hwan from Korea Research, who was just introduced. Although I am currently introduced as being from Korea Research, I also worked at the East Asia Institute for about 13 years. When the Myanmar project first began, I was the secretary-general and negotiated with Myanmar institutions to launch the project. At that time, when I first went to negotiate with about 20 Myanmar institutions about future plans, what was impressive was that their positions were completely divided. We, especially me, as I only know about opinion polls, tried to persuade them by explaining how useful this could be for emerging institutions. About half of the institutions, especially those composed of younger members, responded very positively. However, about half of the institutions, particularly those that had been involved in the democratization movement for a long time, were skeptical, saying that in Myanmar's reality, such surveys and research capacity building were not feasible at that time, especially since opinion polls were controlled by the military before the 2015 election. Nevertheless, we developed a research capacity building program, focusing on surveys, with the institutions that responded positively, especially those who called themselves the 'young generation.' After the victory in the 2015 election, many opinion polls were conducted. As mentioned earlier, organizations like Asian Barometer Survey and organizations like Phandeeyar conducted numerous opinion polls. Although these were mainly social surveys, we conducted programs with great interest for several years, addressing the question of whether opinion polls were necessary and feasible in Myanmar. However, this February, unexpectedly, we returned to a time when we worried about whether opinion polls would be possible in the future and when they might become possible again. Today, as Professor Bae Jin-seok has covered the main points, I will focus on the aspects he did not cover, particularly the value of this data, with the intention of conveying the efforts and passion of the local institutions who worked hard to collect and analyze this data, even though discussing this data now might seem somewhat detached from the current situation.

Regarding the program, it has already been explained, so I will skip it. I will briefly explain the content of this survey. This is the second survey conducted with the team. The first was a satisfaction survey on public administration services in Yangon conducted in 2019. And as mentioned earlier, in 2020, we conducted an election opinion poll in anticipation of the election. However, these institutions generally prefer governance and policy research, so it wasn't solely about election-related surveys. In fact, many of the questions were related to policy demands, such as what administrative services the new government should provide. Additionally, we decided to cover the area of foreign policy to some extent, with special sections on the China-US relationship and perceptions of foreign direct investment.

On the next page, I need to provide a bit more explanation on the methodology. The report states that both were conducted using stratified random sampling. However, upon closer review yesterday, I found that the sampling method for the Mandalay region was not stratified probability sampling but PPS (Probability Proportional to Size) sampling, where random sampling is done based on population size. In any case, we aimed to conduct the survey based on probability sampling. The Mandalay region was conducted faithfully according to the initially set sampling plan, while Kachin State deviated slightly from the initially planned probability sampling method. However, overall, I believe the data quality is very high. On the next page, you can see the data composition.

The data composition shows Mandalay on the left and Kachin State on the right. In Kachin State, the gender ratio and age distribution are represented relatively evenly and representatively. However, regarding education level, given the low education levels in Myanmar, about 20% in both regions have a university education, suggesting that the proportion of university students might be overrepresented. This should be taken into account when interpreting the data. In the Mandalay region, religion is predominantly Buddhism, which is fine, but as mentioned earlier, Kachin State has a significant Christian population. While Christians were well-represented in the actual survey, the exact proportion might not be accurate, so this should be kept in mind.

Therefore, despite the sampling training and principles we provided, I believe the data collection was quite successful. From the next page onwards, I will introduce some interesting findings related to the content. These would have been fascinating research topics if the coup had not occurred. First, the evaluation of election fairness was covered by Professor Bae Jin-seok. This can be used as evidence to refute the legitimacy of the coup. On the next page, regardless of the coup, if the situation had been normal, this would have been valuable data related to voting behavior and determinants of voting decisions in Myanmar's elections. In the Mandalay polling stations, there was a general tendency for NLD support among young people in their 20s in urban areas, but this was not statistically significant. However, there was a significant difference between urban and rural areas; residents in urban areas were more likely to support the NLD.

In the Kachin polling stations, as mentioned earlier, although the NLD won overwhelmingly, it is a region where opposition parties like the USDP and KSPP have relatively strong representation. Here, there was a tendency for men in their 50s with higher incomes to support the NLD. However, what is noteworthy is that among white-collar workers and those with higher education, there was a strong tendency to support the KSPP. This suggests a need for further research. Among KSPP supporters, there were many Christian supporters, whereas NLD support was higher among Buddhists and Bamar people. On the next page, even based on the noticeable results alone, it seems that the urban-rural gap, or the theory of modernization, could be a significant theoretical resource for explaining voting behavior in Myanmar.

Although the data was collected after the initial sampling and training, I believe it is a well-conducted survey. On the following pages, I will introduce some interesting findings related to the content. These are topics that could have been fascinating research subjects if the coup had not occurred. First, regarding the assessment of election fairness, which was conducted by Professor Bae Jin. This can be used as evidence to refute the legitimacy of the coup. On the next page, regardless of the coup, if the situation had been normal from the beginning, this would have been valuable data related to election studies, specifically on voting behavior and factors influencing voting decisions in Myanmar. Firstly, in Mandalay, there is a strong tendency for support towards the NLD among students in their 20s in urban areas. However, this was not statistically significant. Nevertheless, there were significant differences between urban and rural areas; urban residents were more likely to...

In Kachin State, ethnic issues and ethnic divisions seem to significantly influence voting behavior. The figure on the left shows the ethnic composition in Kachin State from the current survey results, and the figure on the right shows voting patterns by ethnicity. Among the Bamar, the NLD is the leading party, but the military party, USDP, received the second-highest support. However, among the Shin-Phaw, a non-Bamar majority ethnic group, the KSPP received the majority of votes, indicating an ethnic divide in voting patterns. On the next page, regarding voting behavior, there are significant findings not only in terms of voting preferences by social class but also in the changes between the last election and the current one. In the Mandalay region, NLD support slightly increased between the 2015 and 2020 elections, within a 5% margin, so it cannot be described as a complete rise. On the right, in Kachin State, NLD support decreased, falling outside the 5% margin. If we consider only the election results, the decline in NLD support in specific regions could be a significant area for analysis. On the next page, regarding the coup, in the Mandalay region, along with overwhelming support for the NLD, there was a generally optimistic atmosphere regarding the realization of democracy. However, the figure on the right shows the survey results from Kachin State immediately after the election. When asked to evaluate the current situation, 34% responded that it was stable, while more than half responded that it was unstable. This suggests that even before the coup, there were signs of instability. The views on the election results differed significantly between the two states. On the next page, regarding voting behavior, while there are researchable aspects, there are also noteworthy findings regarding Myanmar people's perceptions of foreign countries. Regarding foreign direct investment, both regions showed a generally positive perception, believing it would contribute to job creation and improve the lives of local residents.

On the next page, regarding voting behavior, there are significant findings not only in terms of voting preferences by social class but also in the changes between the last election and the current one. In the Mandalay region, NLD support slightly increased between the 2015 and 2020 elections, within a 5% margin, so it cannot be described as a complete rise. On the right, in Kachin State, NLD support decreased, falling outside the 5% margin. If we consider only the election results, the decline in NLD support in specific regions could be a significant area for analysis. On the next page, regarding the coup, in the Mandalay region, along with overwhelming support for the NLD, there was a generally optimistic atmosphere regarding the realization of democracy. However, the figure on the right shows the survey results from Kachin State immediately after the election. When asked to evaluate the current situation, 34% responded that it was stable, while more than half responded that it was unstable. This suggests that even before the coup, there were signs of instability. The views on the election results differed significantly between the two states. On the next page, regarding voting behavior, while there are researchable aspects, there are also noteworthy findings regarding Myanmar people's perceptions of foreign countries. Regarding foreign direct investment, both regions showed a generally positive perception, believing it would contribute to job creation and improve the lives of local residents.

On the next page, regarding voting behavior, there are significant findings not only in terms of voting preferences by social class but also in the changes between the last election and the current one. In the Mandalay region, NLD support slightly increased between the 2015 and 2020 elections, within a 5% margin, so it cannot be described as a complete rise. On the right, in Kachin State, NLD support decreased, falling outside the 5% margin. If we consider only the election results, the decline in NLD support in specific regions could be a significant area for analysis. On the next page, regarding the coup, in the Mandalay region, along with overwhelming support for the NLD, there was a generally optimistic atmosphere regarding the realization of democracy. However, the figure on the right shows the survey results from Kachin State immediately after the election. When asked to evaluate the current situation, 34% responded that it was stable, while more than half responded that it was unstable. This suggests that even before the coup, there were signs of instability. The views on the election results differed significantly between the two states. On the next page, regarding voting behavior, while there are researchable aspects, there are also noteworthy findings regarding Myanmar people's perceptions of foreign countries. Regarding foreign direct investment, both regions showed a generally positive perception, believing it would contribute to job creation and improve the lives of local residents.

On the next page, regarding voting behavior, there are significant findings not only in terms of voting preferences by social class but also in the changes between the last election and the current one. In the Mandalay region, NLD support slightly increased between the 2015 and 2020 elections, within a 5% margin, so it cannot be described as a complete rise. On the right, in Kachin State, NLD support decreased, falling outside the 5% margin. If we consider only the election results, the decline in NLD support in specific regions could be a significant area for analysis. On the next page, regarding the coup, in the Mandalay region, along with overwhelming support for the NLD, there was a generally optimistic atmosphere regarding the realization of democracy. However, the figure on the right shows the survey results from Kachin State immediately after the election. When asked to evaluate the current situation, 34% responded that it was stable, while more than half responded that it was unstable. This suggests that even before the coup, there were signs of instability. The views on the election results differed significantly between the two states. On the next page, regarding voting behavior, while there are researchable aspects, there are also noteworthy findings regarding Myanmar people's perceptions of foreign countries. Regarding foreign direct investment, both regions showed a generally positive perception, believing it would contribute to job creation and improve the lives of local residents.

If you look at the last page, this might be of interest to those involved in diplomacy. The region on the left is the Mandalay region, and it was ranked first as a country requiring careful relations, with China overwhelmingly chosen. The image on the right shows the Kachin State, where when asked about preferred countries between the US and China, the US was overwhelmingly chosen. This indicates that China is not receiving much support or favor in the Myanmar region, which is a noteworthy result.

There are a few points not covered in the introduction. If normalization occurs, these are areas that truly require in-depth research. I will conclude my discussion here. Yes. Thank you. Regarding the additional opinion poll results, much has been said, and perhaps it will be discussed during the Q&A session. In relation to external perceptions of Myanmar, there are quite interesting results that may be discussed further in this or the next session. Next, we have Professor Jang Jun-young. Yes, please take about 10 minutes.

Yes, I am Jang Ju-young, who was just introduced. I listened with great interest to the presentation and Professor Jeong Hwan-ho's discussion. Personally, as I research Myanmar, there are not many Myanmar specialists in Korea, so I am always very pleased to meet fellow researchers. I have personally written papers related to the elections in 2010, 2015, and 2020, all three elections. Before writing my papers, I visited the country about four to five months prior to gauge public opinion, understand the advantages and disadvantages of the NLD and USDP, and observed election campaigns. However, there are many issues that cannot be resolved through personal observation. I believe that this survey has helped to resolve many of those issues.

Personally, I found this to be a very satisfying survey. I have no specific questions to ask. I would like to make a few points to supplement the content related to this survey. First, you selected two regions: Kachin State, which is now called 'Kachin' rather than 'Kachin' in the local pronunciation, and Mandalay State. In Kachin State, early on during the colonial period, American and British missionaries came, and before that, most people believed in animism, but many converted to Christianity. Christians now make up about 30% of the population. As mentioned in Dr. Jeong Hwan-ho's discussion paper, there is the Jingpo people in Kachin State, who can be considered a rather ambiguous ethnic group within Kachin State. Although Myanmar generally refers to the state as Kachin State, when you actually go to Kachin State,

they do not refer to themselves as the Kachin people. Among them, the Jingpo people constitute the largest number. Furthermore, about six other ethnic groups are collectively given the invented ethnic name 'Kachin' by the government. Therefore, apart from Buddhists, the indigenous people, including the Jingpo people, who originally lived in Kachin, have largely converted to Christianity.

From this perspective, Kachin State, unlike administrative states, is a region primarily inhabited by the Bamar people, while autonomous states are centered around ethnic minorities. Thus, it can be seen as a very unique region. Mandalay State was the capital of the last dynasty and is currently the capital. Naypyidaw is located within this region, and there is also a military city called Meiktila in Myanmar. It is a city between Naypyidaw and Mandalay where soldiers reside collectively. While it exhibits a degree of ethnic and religious homogeneity, its historical background and composition differ significantly. Therefore, the selection of these regions itself is quite interesting. Additionally, regarding election fraud, I recently received and reviewed a 14- or 15-page report from someone who was in charge of the polling stations during the general election. According to the report,

the 1.06 million cases of election fraud claimed by the military did not occur, and only about 290 cases of election fraud were officially filed. The author claims that as early as the 2010 and 2015 general elections, the voter lists themselves had significant problems. This is due to the large number of people with similar names in Myanmar, the lack of proper death registrations, the lack of proper birth registrations, and even simple typos. For example, there are cases where someone born in 1991 is listed as born in 1919. The military's claims are therefore largely unsubstantiated. The Election Commission also held a press conference after the election stating that there were no major issues. However, Human Rights Watch and other Myanmar-based organizations had consistently raised concerns about the neutrality of the Election Commission prior to the general election. If the government had controlled the creation of such controversies from the outset, perhaps the current tragedy could have been avoided. One significant point is that party politics in Myanmar is not very old and is highly polarized. As seen in the previous two general elections, in the 2010 general election, the NLD did not participate. Out of the 24 parties that participated in this election, only about a dozen won seats. In the central politics, excluding local councils, only a few small parties advanced. Currently, it is largely a two-party system between the NLD and the USDP. For the public, it is a black-and-white logic where if you do not support the NLD, you support the USDP, indicating a highly polarized party politics. In Kachin State, as mentioned earlier, the KSPP merged before the election. However, in previous elections in 2010 and 2015, the party was fragmented, allowing other parties to win seats. Despite this, a party called the NDP, the Democratic Party of Kachin, has emerged, and the process of integration with them remains. When the Asian Barometer Survey was conducted in 2010 and 2015, about 60% of respondents believed the elections were not fair, but in the recent survey by Pew, 94% expressed high confidence. Therefore, election fairness does not seem to be as significant an issue as the military claims. One important aspect is the trust in state institutions. As I mentioned in my discussion paper, Myanmar people are more interested in the system of state counselors than in political parties or the military. This is overwhelmingly evident in the Mandalay region, which is predominantly inhabited by the Bamar people. However, this is not the case in Kachin State.

In reality, the approximately 10.6 million cases of election fraud claimed by the military were not present; officially, only about 290 cases of alleged election fraud were filed. Furthermore, this individual claims that as early as the 2010 and 2015 general elections, the voter registry itself was highly problematic, with issues such as similar-sounding names, deaths not being properly reported, births not being properly registered, and even simple typos. For example, someone born in 1991 was listed as born in 1919. Therefore, the claims made by the military do not hold up.

This is how the argument goes. After the election, the Election Commission held a press conference stating that there were no major issues. However, it is true that Human Rights Watch and Myanmar-based organizations like Free Expression Asian Network (FEAS) had continuously raised concerns about the neutrality of the Election Commission prior to the general election. If the government had controlled the creation of such controversies from the outset, perhaps the current tragedy could have been avoided. This is my thought. Another significant point is that party politics in Myanmar is not very old and is highly polarized. In previous general elections as well...

...the NLD did not participate in the 2010 general election. Among the many parties that participated in this election, only about ten or so actually won seats. Furthermore, in the central politics, excluding local councils, only a few minor parties advanced. Amidst this, it is proceeding as a two-party system, primarily between the NLD and the USDP. For the citizens, party politics is polarized into a black-and-white logic where if you don't support the NLD, you support the USDP. This is a rather unique aspect. In Kachin State, our KSPP, as mentioned earlier, merged before the election. However, these parties had been consistently splitting in the 2010 and 2015 general elections, leading to...

From this perspective, the NLD, while advocating for a nationwide party, is thoroughly a Bamar-centric party. This presents significant challenges for the NLD in achieving national unity. Even after democracy is restored, the NLD faces many tasks. In fact, over the past five years, the NLD's governance has not shown many policies that accommodate ethnic minorities; in many cases, conflicts have arisen. In the 2017 and 2018 by-elections, the NLD lost seats in many local areas. Therefore, as Dr. Jeong Hwan-ho mentioned, we are not just discussing the present but also the future vision of Myanmar through this election, and how it can develop into a federal union by achieving national unity. In this regard, the survey is very meaningful. Personally, I hope that if there is an opportunity, perhaps in the future, or in conflict-affected areas like Rakhine State, conducting such surveys could yield different and interesting results. I look forward to that possibility.

In that sense, the NLD is thoroughly a Bamar-centric party, a nationwide party in name but Bamar-centric in practice. This presents significant challenges for the NLD in achieving national unity. Even after democracy is restored, the NLD faces many tasks. In fact, over the past five years, the NLD's governance has not shown many policies that accommodate ethnic minorities; in many cases, conflicts have arisen. In the 2017 and 2018 by-elections, the NLD lost seats in many local areas. Therefore, as Dr. Jeong Hwan-ho mentioned, we are not just discussing the present but also the future vision of Myanmar through this election, and how it can develop into a federal union by achieving national unity. In this regard, the survey is very meaningful. Personally, I hope that if there is an opportunity, perhaps in the future, or in conflict-affected areas like Rakhine State, conducting such surveys could yield different and interesting results. I look forward to that possibility.

As Dr. Jeong Hwan-ho mentioned, we are not just discussing the present but also the future vision of Myanmar through this election, and how it can develop into a federal union by achieving national unity. In this regard, the survey is very meaningful. Personally, I hope that if there is an opportunity, perhaps in the future, or in conflict-affected areas like Rakhine State, conducting such surveys could yield different and interesting results. I look forward to that possibility.

Thank you. The two speakers have provided valuable insights. It seems there are no specific questions for the presenters. We have about 10 minutes remaining. During this time, we will take questions. You may ask questions from the floor, or you can submit them online, as many are already coming in. If anyone from the floor wishes to ask a question, please raise your hand, and our staff will bring you a microphone.

Are there any questions? While you consider, an online question has just come in. I will read it: "Given the polarized political landscape in Myanmar, as you mentioned, even before the coup, Myanmar's electoral democracy was precarious. How will Myanmar's electoral democracy change as a result of this coup? Professor Jang, please respond." "We can consider two scenarios. First, if the military suppresses the situation and a military regime era begins. Second, if democracy is restored and the NLD or the democratic forces regain strength. In the first scenario, where the military takes power, it is highly likely that the electoral system will be significantly revised."

A possible model for this could be the Thai electoral system. More specifically, the current system where 25% of parliamentary seats are allocated to the military could be abolished and replaced with proportional representation. The current first-past-the-post system could be changed to a larger electoral district system. This would allow minority ethnic parties, or regional parties, to be incorporated into the central government, the Union Parliament, not just local councils. This is a strategy for the military to co-opt them to some extent. In this case, the NLD might not be able to participate in the next general election. Regarding the latter scenario, where democracy is restored, I don't have high expectations. This is because there is a significant reliance on State Counsellor Aung San Suu Kyi, and there is currently no one who can replace her. Therefore, the current situation...

...will likely continue. If Aung San Suu Kyi returns, the question of how the NLD will address its past mistakes and errors is uncertain, and I am not optimistic about it in the short term. Therefore, even if democracy is restored, the development of party politics will likely only occur after several elections, when new parties or new leaders emerge. That is my belief.

Thank you. Are there any questions from the floor? I have a question myself. Was this coup predictable? From your perspective, Professor Jang, having observed the local atmosphere, how do you see it? Second, you have been working closely with five civil society organizations in Myanmar. Did these friends express serious concerns about the coup? I am curious about your experience.

Professor Bae Jin-seok could also answer, but Dr. Jeong is here next to me, so Dr. Jeong, please go first. "During the seminar preparation process, we held workshops until January of this year, and there were signs of a coup, but not definitive ones. Before the election, as you mentioned, concerns about election fraud were consistently raised by organizations based in Kachin State. We included many such questions in our surveys. However, even as late as January, the atmosphere was more about controversy surrounding election fraud rather than an impending coup. Therefore, I was also very surprised when I heard the news in February. I was completely unaware."

However, when I looked at the survey results yesterday, there was already significant public sentiment about instability in Kachin State. I am curious about what that instability meant. Was the coup somewhat predictable? The current view on the coup is largely divided into two: the personal ambition of Commander-in-Chief Min Aung Hlaing and the military's desire to maintain its vested interests as a group. A common thread in the military's political interventions throughout history has been the justification of preventing the division of the Union, or the nation. This has always been the rationale behind their political involvement. Myanmar is a federal state, and if it splits, Kachin State could potentially be incorporated into China.

Similarly, Karen State could be incorporated into Thailand. Then, only the Bamar ethnic group, numbering less than 30 million, would remain. Some fear that they too would eventually be absorbed and disappear. The military, however, almost blindly believes this. Therefore, before Min Aung Hlaing initiated this coup, he had mentioned the possibility of a coup twice in 2016 and 2017. In 2017, following the large-scale atrocities in Rakhine State, a commission of inquiry was formed. The military opposed the inclusion of foreigners in the commission. Eventually, former UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan became the chairman, and the commission was established. At that time, a coup almost happened; it was quite serious.

Although the situation was eventually managed, the results of the recent general election posed a significant crisis for the military. They anticipated continuous pressure and demands for the next five years, including attempts to amend the constitution. Feeling uncomfortable with this prospect, they initiated the coup as a preemptive measure against the future challenges they foresaw. In fact, there were several attempts at negotiation before this action was taken. The media reported that the last negotiation took place on January 28th. However, the NLD, and Aung San Suu Kyi herself, maintained a strong stance of not recognizing the military as a partner in governance. It is likely for this reason that the military launched the coup. Thank you. Our session time has expired. However, regarding Question 2, we have two online questions. It seems that the nature of these questions is better suited for the next session. Let me briefly introduce them before concluding this session. If the Myanmar democratization movement fails, what are the implications for the international political order? Please consider this in the next panel. Next question, could you please move that?

Question 3 asks: How can Myanmar's democracy be interpreted from ASEAN's regional perspective? Specifically, what will be the dynamic relationship with Thailand? These questions will be addressed in the next session, and we will now conclude the current session. As mentioned at the beginning, this session was dedicated to the public release of the opinion poll jointly conducted by EAI and a local organization. I believe it was very informative. We will now conclude the first session and move on to the next. To conclude this session, we will have a moment of silence for the "Save Myanmar" campaign. Please stand. Thank you.

This concludes the first session of the East Asia Institute's conference on the Future of Myanmar's Democracy after the Coup. We will have a 20-minute break and begin the second session at 3:30 PM. The theme of the second session is "Challenges in Myanmar's Democratic Transition and International Support for Democracy Protection." This session will discuss the recent issue of the Myanmar coup and the long-term theme of Myanmar's democratic transition, sharing Korea's democratization experiences as a reference. The session will be conducted in a round-table format, moderated by Professor Lee Sook-jong, a Senior Fellow at the East Asia Institute.

Hello, everyone. I am Lee Sook-jong, moderating this session. In Korea, when Myanmar is mentioned, older generations often remember it as Burma. Due to the long period of military dictatorship, those who value democracy still refer to it as Burma. Myanmar shares many similarities with Korea. It gained independence in 1948, its population is about 53 million, similar to ours, and the year of the military coup was only one year apart. There were demands for democracy in the early 1970s, followed by a one-party dictatorship, reminiscent of our Yushin system. In 1988, the so-called 8888 Uprising for democracy occurred, but it did not lead to a successful transition to democracy.

In contrast, as you know, Korea achieved constitutional reform in 1987 and has been consolidating its democracy since the 1987 system. Although both countries started similarly, they have walked vastly different paths of democratization since the 1980s. In the 1990s, election victories were not recognized. After much effort, under the 2008 constitutional framework, the military and civil society, advocating for democracy, reached an agreement for a phased liberalization plan. Despite the NLD's landslide victories in 2015 and 2020, a military coup occurred on February 1st.

When we prepared for this conference, the casualty count was around 400. Today, I don't know the exact number, but it has far exceeded 700. Among the many casualties, there are many children, especially young students, which deeply saddens us all. This session will focus not on analyzing electoral democracy itself, but on how to resolve the February incident, the military coup, and what kind of support the international community should provide. This is the focus of our discussion.

We have invited several panelists. As their backgrounds are detailed in the pamphlet, to save time, I will only state their affiliations and names and briefly mention their topics. First, Professor Park Geun-hong from Sungkonghoe University will discuss the structural problems of Myanmar's democratic transition, exploring why democratization is so difficult. Second, Dr. Lee Jae-hyun, Senior Research Fellow at the Asan Institute for Policy Studies, will address ASEAN's response to the Myanmar military coup, focusing on how the ten ASEAN member states are responding to the situation in Myanmar. Third, Professor Kim Heon-jun from Korea University will discuss Korea's response, particularly after this incident, and how it will support Myanmar's democracy, a topic of great interest to us.

Fourth, due to the overlap with the Gwangju Uprising, many civil society and Buddhist organizations in Korea have been providing support for Myanmar's democracy. Ms. Lee Hyun-yoon from the Korea Democracy Foundation will speak from the perspective of civil society on how we can help. Following the presentations by these four panelists, we have invited two distinguished discussants. To my left is Win Hlaing, leader of the Action Myanmar Youth Network, who speaks Korean so fluently that no interpretation is needed. And Mr. Bae Hyun-jin, Director of the Southeast Asia Division at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, will share valuable insights on how the Korean government is responding to this rapidly changing situation.

Now, each panelist will have 10 minutes for their presentation. Professor Park Eun-hong, please begin. Thank you. I would like to express my gratitude to the East Asia Institute and all the organizers for this invitation. Given the limited time of 10 minutes, I will proceed by reading my prepared presentation. Myanmar is once again in crisis. The civilian government led by the NLD, headed by Aung San Suu Kyi, was overthrown by the military led by Commander-in-Chief Min Aung Hlaing just before its term was to begin. The Commander-in-Chief claimed this was a legitimate transfer of power based on the constitution. This marks the end of the unstable coexistence between the NLD and the military, a system of dual power, and an orderly transition.

The military claimed the November 2020 general election results, in which the NLD achieved a landslide victory, were fraudulent and sought to nullify them. The Myanmar military, the Tatmadaw, has a history of 'refusal coups,' where they refused to accept the unexpected landslide victory of the NLD in the 1990 general election and responded with suppression. This 'refusal coup' has been re-enacted after 30 years. An orderly transition, under constitutional guarantees, refers to a 'pacted democratization' where Myanmar and the military agreed on a partial withdrawal. The decisive moment for this agreement was the meeting between then-President Thein Sein and NLD leader Aung San Suu Kyi in Naypyidaw on August 19, 2011.

In essence, the core of the agreement was that the NLD would accept the 2008 constitution, which guarantees the military's continued political involvement, in exchange for the military accepting the political outcomes of free and fair elections. The current constitution, enacted in 2008, was largely drafted by the military during the period of military rule (1988-2011). The 2008 constitution was established according to the '7-step roadmap for democratic transition' announced in 2003, to prevent a scenario like the 1990 general election, where the military could lose everything.

Under the current constitution, the Commander-in-Chief holds authority over the Ministry of Defense, the police under the Ministry of Home Affairs, and border security under the Ministry of Border Affairs. In the legislature, 25% of seats in both the upper and lower houses are allocated to military personnel. Furthermore, Article 11, Section 417, which was misused to justify the overthrow of the NLD government, states that the President can transfer power to the Commander-in-Chief in a state of emergency. In this coup, the military faction led by Min Aung Hlaing claimed legitimacy based on this provision. However, since the President was detained and the military-appointed Vice President declared a state of emergency, the military has effectively violated the 2008 constitution itself. The military's claim of legitimacy is a distortion. Ultimately, the hardline faction of the military led by Min Aung Hlaing overturned the agreement made with Suu Kyi in 2011 by nullifying the results of the November 2020 general election through a coup. This has also destroyed the achievements of the 7-step democratic transition roadmap followed thus far.

The Committee Representing Pyidaungsu Hluttaw (CRPH), urgently formed by 298 elected MPs immediately after the coup, has designated the coup military forces as a terrorist group and requested the international community not to recognize them. They have also declared a complete rejection of the 2008 constitution, which was misused in this coup. Myanmar has experienced a socialist system and entered a transition to democracy through a prolonged and inclusive political struggle between the military and democratic forces. The first stage of this transition begins by crossing the threshold of freedom, termed 'political opening,' and concludes by establishing a democratically legitimate government, crossing another threshold. In the freedom stage, political prisoners are released, public discourse is permitted, elections for public office are allowed, and civil society is revived. However, fair electoral competition for the highest power is not permitted. The April 1, 2012 by-election can be seen as the culmination of the freedom stage. In this election, Aung San Suu Kyi was elected to parliament, and the NLD won a majority of the 44 seats, a surprising outcome. Finally, in the 2015 general election, the NLD achieved an overwhelming victory. The November 11, 2015 general election was a critical election that could transition from disciplined democracy to representative democracy. Elections are institutions that peacefully alleviate political conflict and enable political compromise.

In other words, elections are essential conditions for building a disarmed democracy, moving beyond the politics of war. If elections are conducted freely and fairly, the losers accept the results and strive for victory in the next election. Samuel Huntington pointed out the importance of leaders internalizing and believing in democracy as the spirit of the times during the democratization process, including the establishment of electoral democracy. However, the Myanmar military, the Tatmadaw, has never abandoned its logic of statism led by the military, which asserts that democracy without discipline is impossible – 'disciplined democracy.' This implies a strong adherence to the 2008 constitution, which legitimizes disciplined democracy. The 7-step democratization roadmap announced in 2003 outlined the steps towards a military-managed disciplined democracy.

However, the NLD's landslide victories in the 2015 and 2020 general elections, and the crushing defeat of the pro-military USDP, shattered the walls of military-managed disciplined democracy and raised hopes for the establishment of representative democracy where civilian supremacy operates over the military. However, the Tatmadaw has completely rejected the spirit of the times, which is the expansion of democracy, through this coup. Huntington, in discussing the general factors of the so-called 'third wave' of democratization in the 1970s and 1980s, stated that democratization in a specific country is the result of a combination of several general factors and the country's unique factors. What is noteworthy here is that general factors only create favorable conditions for democratization; they do not inevitably lead to it. In other words, democracy is made not by factors (causes) but by actors (causers) such as political leaders and the public.

Specifically, the acceptance of democracy as the spirit of the times by leaders within authoritarian military forces is a prerequisite for democratization. The military coup in Myanmar on February 1st was the result of a conflict between the military's desire to maintain a semi-disarmed democracy by seizing legitimate instruments of violence such as parliament, the Ministry of Home Affairs, and the Ministry of Defense, and the NLD civilian government's attempt to transition to a disarmed democracy, a civilian-led representative democracy, through constitutional amendments. From the perspective of democratization strategy, the recent military coup failed to create reformist elements within the military that accepted democracy as the spirit of the times, adopting a strategy of 'divide and conquer' with State Counsellor Aung San Suu Kyi and the NLD civilian government in 2015. The strategy of creating defectors from the military is still valid even in the current crisis situation where the coup must be deemed a failure.

This concludes my presentation. Thank you. Next, Dr. Lee Jae-hyun will present on ASEAN's response. Thank you. I will remove my mask to speak, as my voice is not good and will be even harder to hear with a mask. My presentation will focus on what ASEAN is doing and how it is responding to the Myanmar coup. Before I begin, I must state that although ASEAN was established in 1967 and boasts over 50 years of history, it is not the EU. Many people, seeing it as a regional cooperation body with a long history, might expect it to be somewhat similar to the EU. However, the gap between the EU and ASEAN is considerable, and I ask you to keep this in mind as you listen. I will divide my talk into three parts: first, how individual countries and ASEAN as a whole are reacting to the Myanmar coup and striving to influence the situation; second, an assessment of these responses; and third, future scenarios.

First, it must be said that, once again, ASEAN has hidden behind the 'ASEAN Way,' which emphasizes non-interference in internal affairs and respect for sovereignty. When it is difficult to comment on another country's issues or when they lack the capacity to do so, they conveniently retreat behind this principle, stating it is an internal matter. Immediately after the incident in Myanmar, countries like Malaysia and Singapore reacted first. Both countries merely urged an end to the situation and a return to normalcy through peaceful means. The subsequent ASEAN Chair's statement was similar, with the addition of a reference to democracy from the ASEAN Charter. Countries like Cambodia, the Philippines, Vietnam, and Thailand, in their initial reactions, typically stated that this is an internal Myanmar issue, and they would not interfere or comment. As time passed, countries like Brunei, Indonesia, Thailand, and the Philippines issued second and third statements, beginning to mention the issue of victims. For example, they mentioned the release of detained individuals, including Aung San Suu Kyi, and expressed concern over casualties from violence. However, no ASEAN country has pointed out that the military coup in Myanmar is problematic.

Amidst this, the Indonesian Foreign Minister made efforts to gather consensus among ASEAN countries by traveling to and holding virtual meetings with her counterparts. However, these efforts were not very successful. Following these efforts, an emergency meeting of ASEAN Foreign Ministers was held virtually on March 1st and 2nd. The Chair's statement issued after this meeting is interesting. Although the Foreign Ministers must have met to discuss the Myanmar situation, the statement, which I have here, dated March 2nd, begins by evaluating Brunei's chairmanship, then discusses the formation of the ASEAN Community, followed by ASEAN's response to COVID-19, and then, oddly, discusses the South China Sea and the Korean Peninsula. Finally, in one paragraph, it mentions Myanmar, not with a strong statement, but merely expressing hope for a peaceful resolution and concern for civilian casualties. Therefore, it can be assessed that ASEAN as a whole, and individual Southeast Asian countries, have said and done very little regarding the Myanmar coup and the resulting casualties. In fact, compared to Korea's stance, including the statement issued on February 3rd or 4th, the Presidential Office's remarks, and the subsequent independent sanctions imposed on Myanmar, the actions and opinions from Southeast Asia and ASEAN regarding Myanmar are woefully insufficient. Historically, ASEAN's hesitant or inactive stance on Myanmar issues is not new; it has a history.

When Myanmar joined ASEAN in 1997, there was significant international criticism. How could ASEAN admit a military dictatorship like Myanmar? The European Union refused to attend the ASEAN Summit, and Canada suspended its development cooperation programs with ASEAN countries over this issue. These programs were only resumed in 2004. Despite such criticism, ASEAN argued that it was better to bring countries like Myanmar, which were committing human rights abuses, into the fold to encourage change, and eventually included them as member states. The second issue arose in 2006 when Myanmar was scheduled to assume the ASEAN chairmanship alphabetically. For a year or two prior, there was criticism from various sources. How could a country like Myanmar become the chair? The United States, for example, pressured by this, threatened not to attend the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) Foreign Ministers' Meeting.

Ultimately, due to this international criticism, ASEAN resolved the issue by having Myanmar skip its turn as chair through discussions with the Myanmar military. In other words, the problem was resolved behind the scenes. Looking at past examples, ASEAN has never played an active role in addressing Myanmar's human rights abuses or democratization issues. Therefore, as I mentioned at the beginning, in the current situation as well, individual countries and ASEAN are hiding behind the principle of non-interference in internal affairs to justify their inactive stance. Finally, assessing the current actions of ASEAN countries, I must reiterate the clear limitations of the 'ASEAN Way.' It is unable to address issues of democracy within the region or human rights abuses occurring in other countries. Another limitation is that ASEAN, unlike the EU or other regional organizations, functions less as an enforcement or regulatory body and more as a forum for dialogue among regional countries. Perhaps ASEAN could use this as an excuse, but on the other hand, ASEAN prefers a regional approach to internal matters, rather than external powers or international organizations intervening. They aim to resolve the situation quietly from within.

Regarding the outlook, I will conclude in about one or two minutes. The most realistic scenario currently seems to be as follows. Since Myanmar joined ASEAN in 1997, ASEAN has had experience sitting at the table and cooperating with the military regime until 2011. As international attention to Myanmar wanes, ASEAN countries are likely to resume dialogue and cooperation with Myanmar as if nothing had happened. Although the high number of civilian casualties might put more pressure on the military, the same was true during the Saffron Revolution in 2007. Despite international pressure, once the dust settled, they returned to normal. A more positive outlook would be if the international community's pressure becomes so intense that the military feels compelled to change, and ASEAN could act as a mediator between the military and the international community, advocating for human rights in Myanmar. However, in terms of probability, the former scenario is far more likely than this positive one. This concludes my presentation.

Thank you. Next, Professor Kim Heon-jun will speak about the responses of Korea and the broader international community. Thank you. I have considered the direction and possibilities, as well as the limitations, of supporting Myanmar's democracy from the perspective of Korea-Myanmar relations, and I intend to provide an overall assessment of Korea's response. Of course, to understand this, we must first examine the broader context of current international politics and how these dynamics unfold. In the current international political landscape, there are broadly unfavorable and favorable environments for the Myanmar situation. Unfavorable environments include the recent rise of authoritarianism and populism, the Trump administration in the US, and the rise of China. The US-China conflict also means that human rights and democracy are being used strategically, and China is devaluing these concepts and their importance. Of course, this does not mean there are no favorable environments.

Favorable environments include the emergence of the Biden administration and its emphasis on value diplomacy, prioritizing human rights and democracy in its new strategies. While the actual implementation remains to be seen, the global proliferation of international human rights norms such as human rights, accountability, and the responsibility to protect over the past decade or two, along with the development of international criminal law, represent a favorable environment with various available means and the potential for their actual application. I will not elaborate on the Myanmar situation itself. Regarding the diplomacy of major powers, particularly the US and China: The US condemned the coup immediately, citing human rights and democracy violations. They imposed individual sanctions, blocked account withdrawals, and reviewed US-provided ODA. These are not new measures but a return to previously existing measures, indicating a swift response from the US. In contrast, China's attitude is highly controversial, especially given its significant interests related to the Belt and Road Initiative. Furthermore, Xi Jinping visited Myanmar in January 2020, strengthening ties. The official stance recently articulated by Foreign Minister Wang Yi on April 3rd clearly outlines three points of support and three points of opposition. That position will likely be maintained. The three points of support are: resolving the issue through dialogue, emphasizing ASEAN's principle of non-interference, and seeking resolution through ASEAN meetings. The three points of opposition are: rejecting violent incidents, rejecting inappropriate interference by the UN Security Council – they explicitly stated 'inappropriate interference,' clearly indicating they will block any action through the UN Security Council – and third, rejecting interference by external forces, which refers to the United States.

This is the situation. Regarding Korea's various diplomatic measures, since the Director of Division is here, I will not go into specific details. However, there are some measures taken in March that I have noted in my written materials. For instance, the Vice Minister directly met with exchange students, held discussions, formed an emergency response headquarters, and developed measures for overseas citizens. My overall assessment of these actions is that Korea's diplomatic efforts concerning Myanmar have been quite swift, particularly the measures taken on March 12th, which are considered effective. The diplomatic tone has been strong, including presidential tweets and various vice-ministerial meetings. We have also strongly condemned the indiscriminate casualties resulting from the coup. The statements issued show a clear escalation in tone, from February 2nd, February 11th, to February 28th. Therefore, it is certain that we are delivering a clear, firm, and unambiguous message.

In the remaining time, I would like to discuss what else Korea's diplomacy can do and what its limitations are. Regarding possibilities, I have broadly divided them into bilateral diplomacy, multilateral diplomacy, and civil society diplomacy. In terms of bilateral diplomacy, Korea, which has traditionally emphasized vulnerable groups and democracy promotion, should voice concerns, particularly regarding women and children, who constitute a high proportion of victims. Measures taken on March 15th, such as voluntary departure and the suspension of forced repatriation, have been implemented. Currently, approximately 30,000 Myanmar nationals reside in Korea, and practical policies in this regard would send a strong message. In the area of development cooperation, many are discussing the problems caused by the suspension of programs due to the Myanmar situation, including the US. Therefore, we should focus on strengthening monitoring and guiding efforts towards civil society. Bilateral diplomacy should also involve strongly pressuring on issues such as the rights of children and youth, women's rights, freedom of the press, and attacks on medical personnel, which are widely agreed upon internationally and are also explicitly mentioned in the ASEAN Human Rights Declaration adopted in 2012.

Multilateral diplomacy involves utilizing various multilateral forums. Although these issues may not be on our agenda, they will undoubtedly be discussed, so it is crucial to clearly explain our position and actions. Recently, what is considered the most realistic approach is supporting and pressuring ASEAN's response. Furthermore, regarding digital authoritarianism, information control, and future control through these means, creating a more multilateral framework for these issues might be something we can do. Diplomacy through civil society involves corporations and civil society organizations, which the state cannot compel. However, as the voice of civil society grows and pressure intensifies, it can shape foreign policy directions. Therefore, we should move towards a direction that maximizes the reflection of public opinion and voluntary participation of citizens in foreign policy and receives their support.

Of course, there are three main concerns and limitations. These are issues that many analysts, who have been closely observing the ongoing situation and Myanmar's internal politics, consider to have a bleak outlook. First, if the situation prolongs, the military, accustomed to sanctions and unlikely to relinquish power, will continue to resist. In such a prolonged situation, the effectiveness of diplomacy and sustained pressure may diminish, and public interest may wane. This is one concern. Second, as reported in The Economist today, the term 'failed state' is emerging. With the outbreak of civil war or refugee outflows, especially if young people resort to armed resistance, the situation could devolve into a two-sided conflict. This could create significant difficulties in formulating foreign policy. Furthermore, if civil war breaks out, it could lead to complex problems similar to the Syrian situation. Lastly, a difficult issue is that of punishment. International norms regarding punishment have expanded, and the issue of punishment is widely discussed, with many demands for it. However, many also worry that punishment may prolong the conflict. Given that human rights violations have already occurred, the emergence of punishment as an issue could lead the military to consolidate power for longer and exert greater pressure. Therefore, how to address this issue is a concern for our foreign policy, and these three points should be considered. This concludes my presentation.

Thank you. Next, Professor Kim Heon-jun will speak about the responses of Korea and the broader international community. Thank you. I have considered the direction and possibilities, as well as the limitations, of supporting Myanmar's democracy from the perspective of Korea-Myanmar relations, and I intend to provide an overall assessment of Korea's response. Of course, to understand this, we must first examine the broader context of current international politics and how these dynamics unfold. In the current international political landscape, there are broadly unfavorable and favorable environments for the Myanmar situation. Unfavorable environments include the recent rise of authoritarianism and populism, the Trump administration in the US, and the rise of China. The US-China conflict also means that human rights and democracy are being used strategically, and China is devaluing these concepts and their importance. Of course, this does not mean there are no favorable environments.

Favorable environments include the emergence of the Biden administration and its emphasis on value diplomacy, prioritizing human rights and democracy in its new strategies. While the actual implementation remains to be seen, the global proliferation of international human rights norms such as human rights, accountability, and the responsibility to protect over the past decade or two, along with the development of international criminal law, represent a favorable environment with various available means and the potential for their actual application. I will not elaborate on the Myanmar situation itself. Regarding the diplomacy of major powers, particularly the US and China: The US condemned the coup immediately, citing human rights and democracy violations. They imposed individual sanctions, blocked account withdrawals, and reviewed US-provided ODA. These are not new measures but a return to previously existing measures, indicating a swift response from the US. In contrast, China's attitude is highly controversial, especially given its significant interests related to the Belt and Road Initiative. Furthermore, Xi Jinping visited Myanmar in January 2020, strengthening ties. The official stance recently articulated by Foreign Minister Wang Yi on April 3rd clearly outlines three points of support and three points of opposition. That position will likely be maintained. The three points of support are: resolving the issue through dialogue, emphasizing ASEAN's principle of non-interference, and seeking resolution through ASEAN meetings. The three points of opposition are: rejecting violent incidents, rejecting inappropriate interference by the UN Security Council – they explicitly stated 'inappropriate interference,' clearly indicating they will block any action through the UN Security Council – and third, rejecting interference by external forces, which refers to the United States.

This is the situation. Regarding Korea's various diplomatic measures, since the Director of Division is here, I will not go into specific details. However, there are some measures taken in March that I have noted in my written materials. For instance, the Vice Minister directly met with exchange students, held discussions, formed an emergency response headquarters, and developed measures for overseas citizens. My overall assessment of these actions is that Korea's diplomatic efforts concerning Myanmar have been quite swift, particularly the measures taken on March 12th, which are considered effective. The diplomatic tone has been strong, including presidential tweets and various vice-ministerial meetings. We have also strongly condemned the indiscriminate casualties resulting from the coup. The statements issued show a clear escalation in tone, from February 2nd, February 11th, to February 28th. Therefore, it is certain that we are delivering a clear, firm, and unambiguous message.

In the remaining time, I would like to discuss what else Korea's diplomacy can do and what its limitations are. Regarding possibilities, I have broadly divided them into bilateral diplomacy, multilateral diplomacy, and civil society diplomacy. In terms of bilateral diplomacy, Korea, which has traditionally emphasized vulnerable groups and democracy promotion, should voice concerns, particularly regarding women and children, who constitute a high proportion of victims. Measures taken on March 15th, such as voluntary departure and the suspension of forced repatriation, have been implemented. Currently, approximately 30,000 Myanmar nationals reside in Korea, and practical policies in this regard would send a strong message. In the area of development cooperation, many are discussing the problems caused by the suspension of programs due to the Myanmar situation, including the US. Therefore, we should focus on strengthening monitoring and guiding efforts towards civil society. Bilateral diplomacy should also involve strongly pressuring on issues such as the rights of children and youth, women's rights, freedom of the press, and attacks on medical personnel, which are widely agreed upon internationally and are also explicitly mentioned in the ASEAN Human Rights Declaration adopted in 2012.

Multilateral diplomacy involves utilizing various multilateral forums. Although these issues may not be on our agenda, they will undoubtedly be discussed, so it is crucial to clearly explain our position and actions. Recently, what is considered the most realistic approach is supporting and pressuring ASEAN's response. Furthermore, regarding digital authoritarianism, information control, and future control through these means, creating a more multilateral framework for these issues might be something we can do. Diplomacy through civil society involves corporations and civil society organizations, which the state cannot compel. However, as the voice of civil society grows and pressure intensifies, it can shape foreign policy directions. Therefore, we should move towards a direction that maximizes the reflection of public opinion and voluntary participation of citizens in foreign policy and receives their support.

Of course, there are three main concerns and limitations. These are issues that many analysts, who have been closely observing the ongoing situation and Myanmar's internal politics, consider to have a bleak outlook. First, if the situation prolongs, the military, accustomed to sanctions and unlikely to relinquish power, will continue to resist. In such a prolonged situation, the effectiveness of diplomacy and sustained pressure may diminish, and public interest may wane. This is one concern. Second, as reported in The Economist today, the term 'failed state' is emerging. With the outbreak of civil war or refugee outflows, especially if young people resort to armed resistance, the situation could devolve into a two-sided conflict. This could create significant difficulties in formulating foreign policy. Furthermore, if civil war breaks out, it could lead to complex problems similar to the Syrian situation. Lastly, a difficult issue is that of punishment. International norms regarding punishment have expanded, and the issue of punishment is widely discussed, with many demands for it. However, many also worry that punishment may prolong the conflict. Given that human rights violations have already occurred, the emergence of punishment as an issue could lead the military to consolidate power for longer and exert greater pressure. Therefore, how to address this issue is a concern for our foreign policy, and these three points should be considered. This concludes my presentation.

Thank you. Next, Professor Kim Heon-jun will speak about the responses of Korea and the broader international community. Thank you. I have considered the direction and possibilities, as well as the limitations, of supporting Myanmar's democracy from the perspective of Korea-Myanmar relations, and I intend to provide an overall assessment of Korea's response. Of course, to understand this, we must first examine the broader context of current international politics and how these dynamics unfold. In the current international political landscape, there are broadly unfavorable and favorable environments for the Myanmar situation. Unfavorable environments include the recent rise of authoritarianism and populism, the Trump administration in the US, and the rise of China. The US-China conflict also means that human rights and democracy are being used strategically, and China is devaluing these concepts and their importance. Of course, this does not mean there are no favorable environments.

Favorable environments include the emergence of the Biden administration and its emphasis on value diplomacy, prioritizing human rights and democracy in its new strategies. While the actual implementation remains to be seen, the global proliferation of international human rights norms such as human rights, accountability, and the responsibility to protect over the past decade or two, along with the development of international criminal law, represent a favorable environment with various available means and the potential for their actual application. I will not elaborate on the Myanmar situation itself. Regarding the diplomacy of major powers, particularly the US and China: The US condemned the coup immediately, citing human rights and democracy violations. They imposed individual sanctions, blocked account withdrawals, and reviewed US-provided ODA. These are not new measures but a return to previously existing measures, indicating a swift response from the US. In contrast, China's attitude is highly controversial, especially given its significant interests related to the Belt and Road Initiative. Furthermore, Xi Jinping visited Myanmar in January 2020, strengthening ties. The official stance recently articulated by Foreign Minister Wang Yi on April 3rd clearly outlines three points of support and three points of opposition. That position will likely be maintained. The three points of support are: resolving the issue through dialogue, emphasizing ASEAN's principle of non-interference, and seeking resolution through ASEAN meetings. The three points of opposition are: rejecting violent incidents, rejecting inappropriate interference by the UN Security Council – they explicitly stated 'inappropriate interference,' clearly indicating they will block any action through the UN Security Council – and third, rejecting interference by external forces, which refers to the United States.

This is the situation. Regarding Korea's various diplomatic measures, since the Director of Division is here, I will not go into specific details. However, there are some measures taken in March that I have noted in my written materials. For instance, the Vice Minister directly met with exchange students, held discussions, formed an emergency response headquarters, and developed measures for overseas citizens. My overall assessment of these actions is that Korea's diplomatic efforts concerning Myanmar have been quite swift, particularly the measures taken on March 12th, which are considered effective. The diplomatic tone has been strong, including presidential tweets and various vice-ministerial meetings. We have also strongly condemned the indiscriminate casualties resulting from the coup. The statements issued show a clear escalation in tone, from February 2nd, February 11th, to February 28th. Therefore, it is certain that we are delivering a clear, firm, and unambiguous message.

In the remaining time, I would like to discuss what else Korea's diplomacy can do and what its limitations are. Regarding possibilities, I have broadly divided them into bilateral diplomacy, multilateral diplomacy, and civil society diplomacy. In terms of bilateral diplomacy, Korea, which has traditionally emphasized vulnerable groups and democracy promotion, should voice concerns, particularly regarding women and children, who constitute a high proportion of victims. Measures taken on March 15th, such as voluntary departure and the suspension of forced repatriation, have been implemented. Currently, approximately 30,000 Myanmar nationals reside in Korea, and practical policies in this regard would send a strong message. In the area of development cooperation, many are discussing the problems caused by the suspension of programs due to the Myanmar situation, including the US. Therefore, we should focus on strengthening monitoring and guiding efforts towards civil society. Bilateral diplomacy should also involve strongly pressuring on issues such as the rights of children and youth, women's rights, freedom of the press, and attacks on medical personnel, which are widely agreed upon internationally and are also explicitly mentioned in the ASEAN Human Rights Declaration adopted in 2012.

Multilateral diplomacy involves utilizing various multilateral forums. Although these issues may not be on our agenda, they will undoubtedly be discussed, so it is crucial to clearly explain our position and actions. Recently, what is considered the most realistic approach is supporting and pressuring ASEAN's response. Furthermore, regarding digital authoritarianism, information control, and future control through these means, creating a more multilateral framework for these issues might be something we can do. Diplomacy through civil society involves corporations and civil society organizations, which the state cannot compel. However, as the voice of civil society grows and pressure intensifies, it can shape foreign policy directions. Therefore, we should move towards a direction that maximizes the reflection of public opinion and voluntary participation of citizens in foreign policy and receives their support. Of course, there are three main concerns and limitations. These are issues that many analysts, who have been closely observing the ongoing situation and Myanmar's internal politics, consider to have a bleak outlook. First, if the situation prolongs, the military, accustomed to sanctions and unlikely to relinquish power, will continue to resist. In such a prolonged situation, the effectiveness of diplomacy and sustained pressure may diminish, and public interest may wane. This is one concern. Second, as reported in The Economist today, the term 'failed state' is emerging. With the outbreak of civil war or refugee outflows, especially if young people resort to armed resistance, the situation could devolve into a two-sided conflict. This could create significant difficulties in formulating foreign policy. Furthermore, if civil war breaks out, it could lead to complex problems similar to the Syrian situation. Lastly, a difficult issue is that of punishment. International norms regarding punishment have expanded, and the issue of punishment is widely discussed, with many demands for it. However, many also worry that punishment may prolong the conflict. Given that human rights violations have already occurred, the emergence of punishment as an issue could lead the military to consolidate power for longer and exert greater pressure. Therefore, how to address this issue is a concern for our foreign policy, and these three points should be considered. This concludes my presentation.

Yes. Thank you. Next, I would like to ask Ms. Lee Hyun-yoon to present on the response of South Korean civil society. Hello. My name is Lee Hyun-yoon, and I work at the Democratic Labor Movement Foundation. I am not in a position to provide academic analysis or practical forecasts, as there are many experts here. I would like to share my thoughts on the attitudes of Myanmar's civil society that I have encountered and the implications of this situation from their perspective. Next page, please. My first connection with Myanmar began in 2010 in Mae Sot, on the border of northwestern Thailand, when Myanmar had not yet fully opened up.

I first entered mainland Myanmar in 2013 and conducted many interviews with various people until my last visit in 2019. What I commonly felt during that process was that even when discussing politics, Myanmar had a unique sense of freedom ingrained in its national character, and that patience and dialogue were highly valued. As a rather impatient Korean who was deeply interested in politics, I was quite surprised. I met with Karen refugees living in Thailand, migrant workers, the 8888 Political Prisoners Support Association in Myanmar, leaders of seven major ethnic groups, civil society organization workers, and ordinary citizens. Their general attitudes towards politics were quite similar.

Based on my previous interactions with Myanmar citizens, when the coup first broke out, I naively expected that civil society would engage in peaceful civil disobedience, the military would respond with limited violence, and the military government and the NLD would enter a phase of prolonged dialogue. However, my expectations were completely overturned after the first victim appeared on February 9, 2009, and the civil society protests erupted on February 10. The peaceful protests, which initially involved banging pots and pans and offering flowers, could no longer be sustained. Next page. The response from the South Korean government and the international community to the Myanmar crisis also appears to have been relatively prompt. The Myanmar coup occurred on February 1, the first civilian casualty was on February 9, and our President officially expressed his support for Myanmar's democracy on March 6.

Next page. There are reasons for the relatively prompt response from the international community and our government. Firstly, the Myanmar military has long been recognized internationally as an enemy of the state. When the military agreed to transfer power to civilians, the international community offered support and expectations. This coup is tantamount to declaring the revival of military dictatorship, leaving little room for disagreement when the international community condemned it. Secondly, it was a case of clear and egregious human rights violations. There were a significant number of civilian casualties, which also left no room for counterarguments from the international community, and this served as a driving force for our government to take a stance. This situation differs significantly from our reaction to casualties during the Hong Kong pro-democracy protests or China's military provocations against Taiwan.

Next page. Civil society, being freer from such influences than governments, is actively responding to the democratization of Myanmar. South Korean civil society feels a stronger emotional solidarity with the Myanmar issue and expresses it more than any other Asian country. This response seems to align with our recent experience of the Candlelight Revolution. The victory of the Candlelight Revolution in civil society development is a great asset and driving force for our civil society. This is not only a great strength for us but also has a significant impact on Thailand and other Asian countries. The explosive demand for democratization from citizens worldwide, broadcast live, and the subsequent change of government have become a great inspiration and phenomenon in Myanmar, following the examples of Hong Kong and Thailand. South Korean citizens are also sending their support based on this emotional agreement and belief in the possibility of victory.

It appears to be receiving support based on that. Another important link is Gwangju. The massacre of civilians by the Myanmar military junta reminded Koreans of the Gwangju of 80 years ago. With the trial of Mr. Jeondo-han still ongoing and the 5.18 incident frequently appearing in the news, public interest continues to be sustained. In this context, the clear picture of the Black Sector has become a catalyst for fostering a strong sense of solidarity and connection between Koreans and Myanmar people. In Gwangju, in particular, the Myanmar Gwangju Solidarity group has been formed to bring together organizations and gatherings voicing opposition to the Myanmar coup.

Next page. Observing the flow of these events, I have summarized the aspects of civil society's response in Myanmar into four main points. The first is irreversibility. It has been just over 10 years since the door to democracy opened in Myanmar. During this time, the flood of capitalism and culture has advanced Myanmar society to a point of no return. The gap between rich and poor, caused by capitalism, has already begun. I once visited a rooftop bar in downtown Yangon, and it was no different from the upscale hotels in downtown Seoul, and the prices were very expensive.

It takes only a few days for Korean cultural content, with Myanmar subtitles, to spread throughout Myanmar. After the coup, events happening across Myanmar are transmitted to Myanmar people worldwide via mobile phones and immediately reach the civil societies of the respective countries. In this situation, any attempt to turn back the clock of history is futile. The people of Myanmar are already global citizens, and their demand for democracy, while it can be suppressed and silenced, cannot be eradicated. The second point is pervasiveness.

The protest patterns of the Myanmar people are already following global trends and heading towards the world. We are well aware that they are sending appeals in real-time and in the languages of various countries. The third point is convergence. The protest culture, resembling peace protests and festivals, has already spread. What was interesting was the protest that utilized the traditional 'Tamain' skirt. Homes hung Tamains to block soldiers' entry, and this evolved into a campaign on March 8th, International Women's Day, symbolizing that women's power is citizens' power.

This can be seen as a case where the desire for democracy has utilized discrimination against women, thereby overcoming misogyny and serving as a mechanism to elevate civic consciousness. Next page. Lastly, there is interactivity. We are all aware of people sharing news on social media. I have seen posts from friends on social media asking to boycott our companies, Korean companies economically linked to the Myanmar military junta. Within days, these issues become headlines in the media, giving the impression that Myanmar is actually leading the issue-fighting within Korea. The weapon of the citizens, at the center of all these phenomena, is the mobile phone, which is information.

However, as you know, the situation is not good. The internet and social media have been blocked since February, and crackdowns are being carried out through identification, making the situation very difficult. Despite this, what can civil society do? Given the current situation, international emergency aid is also blocked due to COVID-19, and citizens are going out into the streets every day, risking their lives. Direct assistance from civil society seems difficult to have an immediate internal impact, but despite these difficulties, we are witnessing the progress of democracy in Myanmar. If the situation calms down, it is expected that support for Myanmar, which surged like a trend in the international community in the early 2000s, will once again pour in. At that time, civil society, especially Korean civil society, will have a great deal to do due to the strong sense of solidarity that has been formed. A significant role

can be played. I believe it is time for our civil society and government to start contemplating that role. Thank you. Thank you. The four presenters have given excellent presentations, and now we have two discussants left. Mr. Hwainso of the EAI, as a Myanmar national, will be able to offer valuable insights into how this issue is viewed from the ground. Please proceed. Yes. I would like to express my gratitude to the four professors who presented on the struggle for democracy. First, I listened carefully to Professor Park Geun-ho's presentation on the structural problems of Myanmar's democratic transition. He provided an overview of the history of how these events unfolded. Based on this, regarding the current resistance movement by the citizens, we have the Committee Representing Pyidaungsu Hluttaw (CRPH). The CRPH is currently composed of 17 members from the National Unity Government (NUG). Therefore, my first question is, what conditions must the CRPH meet to gain recognition from the international community and be considered a democratic state in accordance with international norms? As everyone knows, since 1962, after the fall of U Nu, Myanmar's federal democracy has not progressed smoothly. There have been difficulties and ethnic conflicts over the years. How will the CRPH encompass these and move forward together? That is my first question. I will ask two questions in total.

Second, the CRPH is currently being supported by our citizens. If a new government is formed by the CRPH, there is a belief that a federal army must exist. Therefore, among the younger generation, the prevailing sentiment is that joining the armed struggle is the best course of action. From the citizens' perspective, they feel they can no longer afford to lose. Therefore, I would like to ask about the possibility of the CRPH joining forces with armed ethnic organizations to lead a federal army. These are my two questions.

Thank you. Next, Ms. Bae Hyun-jin from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, please. Yes. I am Bae Hyun-jin, head of the Southeast Asia Division II at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. My division is responsible for bilateral relations with five mainland Southeast Asian countries, including Myanmar, and for cooperation with Myanmar. I took office in February last year. Since taking office, I have made significant efforts to strengthen bilateral relations with Myanmar. The New Southern Policy places great importance on diversifying our diplomacy, and a balanced approach is crucial within the framework of the New Southern Policy. Under the broad goal of the New Southern Policy, a people-centered, peaceful, and prosperous community, I have made various efforts to develop relations between Korea and Myanmar. However, on February 1st, a sudden crisis occurred in Myanmar, which I personally find very regrettable and heartbreaking.

Briefly returning to the period before the declaration of a state of emergency in Myanmar, around the time of last year's general election, we arranged a video conference between the National Election Commission of Korea and the Myanmar Election Commission to share experiences of conducting elections under COVID-19. On the day of the general election, our embassy led the dispatch of election observers. We received reports and saw photos of Myanmar citizens lining up to vote on election day.

If we briefly go back to before Myanmar declared a state of national emergency, around the time of last year's general election, we arranged a video conference between the Myanmar Election Commission and our National Election Commission to share our experience of holding elections under COVID-19. On election day, our embassy also organized the dispatch of election observers. We were informed that we would receive photos of Myanmar citizens lining up for the election on election day.

In addition, signature projects between the two countries, such as the Korea-Myanmar Friendship Bridge and the Economic Cooperation Industrial Complex, were proceeding smoothly. Furthermore, at the end of last year, despite COVID-19, high-level visits from Myanmar, including the Chairman of the Special Committee on the New Southern Policy and the Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs, were successfully realized. Although the military repeatedly raised doubts about the fairness of the election before and after the general election last year, I personally did not expect the military to take such action until the declaration of a state of emergency in Myanmar.

Therefore, I was quite surprised. Just before the declaration of a state of emergency on February 1st, we sensed the tense atmosphere on the ground and issued a statement in the name of the Embassy of the Republic of Korea in Myanmar on January 29th. On the morning of February 1st, Advisor Suu Kyi was detained, and we heard the news that the military had declared a state of emergency. Since then, our government has been taking measures, and the Southeast Asia Division II has been handling the practical aspects. Regarding government measures, as explained earlier, they can be broadly categorized into three areas: official statements, practical response measures, and protection of overseas nationals. Firstly, regarding the government's official position, after the declaration of a state of emergency, we have expressed a firm stance based on values and principles through four statements by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs spokesperson, presidential and prime ministerial SNS messages, and joint statements with like-minded countries. We strongly urged the military to immediately cease the use of force, release detained individuals including State Counsellor Suu Kyi, and restore democracy.

In addition, the First Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs met with the Ambassador of Myanmar to Korea to convey the government's position. As mentioned by the professor earlier, he also met with representatives of Myanmar students studying in Korea to hear directly about their difficulties. We believed that these measures, along with the public statements, would send a significant message in themselves. Secondly, the response measures announced by our government on March 12th. The core contents can be summarized into three points: suspension of new cooperation in defense and security sectors, prohibition of military goods exports, strengthening of strategic goods export controls, and a review of development aid to Myanmar. As a follow-up measure, a review of development aid to Myanmar is currently underway. As of 2019, approximately 90 million USD was provided annually to Myanmar, and the number of projects is quite large. These individual projects are currently being meticulously reviewed by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

While the specific review results are yet to be determined, we have announced our policy to continue projects related to the livelihoods of the Myanmar people and humanitarian assistance. Furthermore, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, in consultation with the Ministry of Justice, has taken measures to extend the period of stay for Myanmar nationals residing in Korea until the situation in Myanmar stabilizes. To my knowledge, this is the first time our government has taken such a measure to extend the period of stay on humanitarian grounds due to the deteriorating situation in Myanmar. Thirdly, measures for the protection of overseas nationals. Before the declaration of a state of emergency in Myanmar, approximately 3,500 Korean nationals were staying in Myanmar. As the situation in Myanmar worsened, the government recently upgraded the travel advisory for Myanmar to a recommendation to evacuate. Accordingly, we advised Korean nationals in Myanmar, unless for urgent business, to evacuate. If our citizens need to return home, they require flights. However, with the ongoing COVID-19 pandemic since last year, the Myanmar government has significantly restricted flights between Korea and Myanmar. Therefore, we have taken measures to increase the number of flights, from the initially scheduled one flight per week, by adding temporary flights, to facilitate the return of our citizens. Currently, a crisis management headquarters related to the Myanmar situation, headed by the Minister of Foreign Affairs, has been established. We will continue to make every effort to protect our citizens and businesses while closely monitoring the situation in Myanmar.

It is difficult to predict how the situation in Myanmar will unfold in the future. We are internally developing various scenarios and diligently contemplating corresponding response strategies. We will continue to cooperate closely with the international community and actively explore ways in which our government can contribute meaningfully. In my opinion, the most important thing is, of course, the lives, safety, and welfare of the Myanmar people. Therefore, our government will continue to work diligently to ensure that the issue is resolved promptly in a direction that respects the will of the Myanmar people and their aspirations for democracy. We will also continue to carefully consider the various opinions raised at this seminar when formulating our future policy towards Myanmar. Thank you. Thank you. We have concluded the four presentations and two discussions. Many questions have been posted on the monitor. I will now group the questions and direct them to the panelists who can best answer them.

First, a question for Professor Park Geun-ho. In your presentation, you mentioned that for the current situation to change, there must be defections from the military. So, is it possible for such divisions to occur within the military, and is there a possibility of a change in the military's attitude, such as the expulsion of the Commander-in-Chief? This is my first question. Related to this, would the international community's recognition of the Committee Representing Pyidaungsu Hluttaw (CRPH) help increase the number of defectors from the military? This is the second question. Thirdly, many are concerned about the position of the ethnic armed groups. Some of these armed groups are receiving overtures from both the military and the pro-democracy forces. There are said to be about 11 ethnic armed groups, and their positions seem to differ. Therefore, I would like to ask for your outlook on which side these armed groups will align with.

Yes. First, I will answer the question posed by Mr. Wen. In neighboring countries like Thailand, and also in Myanmar, the most pressing national issue is National Reconciliation. In the current crisis, the Aung San Suu Kyi government did indeed disappoint the international community, particularly regarding the Rohingya issue, and although the '21st Century Panglong Agreement' was created, it did not function properly. As we know, General Aung San established the concept of a federal union before independence. This time, if the CRPH and the National Unity Government (NUG) that the CRPH is trying to establish can actively embrace ethnic minorities and create a genuine federal democracy and constitution, it will be a precious opportunity to upgrade Myanmar's democracy through this crisis. That is my belief. In particular, as reported and observed, the Rohingya are participating in the Civil Disobedience Movement (CDM), and ordinary

citizens have come to empathize with the suffering of the Rohingya. Therefore, I believe that this empathy-driven democracy will become a significant force. I believe that these forces can create new hope and possibilities in what may seem like a bleak situation now. I believe this will be an opportunity for Myanmar to move towards a higher level of democracy through national reconciliation, which is a prerequisite for a genuine nation-state, after 48 years of independence. The international community should therefore join forces to achieve this.

Currently, even the rebels are receiving attention from both the military and the democratic forces. There are said to be 11 ethnic minority rebel groups, and their positions seem to differ. Therefore, I would appreciate it if you could provide an outlook on which of these rebel groups will form alliances. Yes. First, I will respond to the question raised by Ms. Wen. Both Thailand, which is adjacent to Myanmar, and Myanmar itself face the most urgent national issue: national reconciliation.

Specifically, regarding the ethnic minority issue, I understand that there are ten ethnic armed organizations that have signed the Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement (NCA). These NCA- signatory armed groups have officially expressed their opposition to the coup this time. However, some ethnic groups that have not joined the NCA, particularly the Wa people, who have significant ties with China, have not taken a clear stance. Therefore, I believe it is somewhat dangerous for the media to emphasize significant differences of opinion among ethnic armed groups. For now, the crucial factor will be how much the CRPH and the NUG it is trying to establish will accommodate the share and political voice of ethnic minorities. Whether this will be implemented as a genuine power-sharing, not just a mere declaration as in the past, will be a key factor. I believe so.

Regarding the issue of defectors, I believe it is ideal, as in the Philippines in 1986 with the People Power Revolution, when Defense Minister Enrile and General Ramos turned their backs, leading to the victory of the People Power movement. It may be difficult for such a phenomenon to occur in the Myanmar military, given its strong monolithic nature. However, if the international community intensifies sanctions and raises its voice against the hardline military faction in Myanmar, and especially if China, which has maintained relations with both Aung San Suu Kyi and the current regime, can be persuaded by the international community and ASEAN regarding the scenario of mutual destruction if the conflict escalates into civil war, which would mean losing everything, then a change in China's attitude may be possible. I will take a bit longer, but I will conclude. Although you are from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, I believe our government is pursuing a unique value-oriented diplomacy in Asia through independent sanctions. However, a boycott movement is actually occurring within Myanmar. Through hacking, the names of 200 to 300 military-affiliated companies have been revealed, and POSCO is among them. Therefore, civil society organizations and international human rights organizations have continuously pointed out that POSCO International and POSCO Steel are providing funds to the military. I believe there should be clear guidelines on this matter. Thank you.

I believe that the most important thing is the lives, safety, and welfare of the Myanmar people. Therefore, our government will continue to work diligently to ensure that the issue is resolved promptly in a direction that respects the will of the Myanmar people and their aspirations for democracy. We will also continue to carefully consider the various opinions raised at this seminar when formulating our future policy towards Myanmar. Thank you. Thank you. We have concluded the four presentations and two discussions. Many questions have been posted on the monitor. I will now group the questions and direct them to the panelists who can best answer them. First, a question for Professor Park Geun-ho. In your presentation, you mentioned that for the current situation to change, there must be defections from the military. So, is it possible for such divisions to occur within the military, and is there a possibility of a change in the military's attitude, such as the expulsion of the Commander-in-Chief? This is my first question. Related to this, would the international community's recognition of the Committee Representing Pyidaungsu Hluttaw (CRPH) help increase the number of defectors from the military? This is the second question. Thirdly, many are concerned about the position of the ethnic armed groups. Some of these armed groups are receiving overtures from both the military and the pro-democracy forces. There are said to be about 11 ethnic armed groups, and their positions seem to differ. Therefore, I would like to ask for your outlook on which side these armed groups will align with.

Regarding the issue of defectors, I believe it is ideal, as in the Philippines in 1986 with the People Power Revolution, when Defense Minister Enrile and General Ramos turned their backs, leading to the victory of the People Power movement. It may be difficult for such a phenomenon to occur in the Myanmar military, given its strong monolithic nature. However, if the international community intensifies sanctions and raises its voice against the hardline military faction in Myanmar, and especially if China, which has maintained relations with both Aung San Suu Kyi and the current regime, can be persuaded by the international community and ASEAN regarding the scenario of mutual destruction if the conflict escalates into civil war, which would mean losing everything, then a change in China's attitude may be possible. I will take a bit longer, but I will conclude. Although you are from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, I believe our government is pursuing a unique value-oriented diplomacy in Asia through independent sanctions. However, a boycott movement is actually occurring within Myanmar. Through hacking, the names of 200 to 300 military-affiliated companies have been revealed, and POSCO is among them. Therefore, civil society organizations and international human rights organizations have continuously pointed out that POSCO International and POSCO Steel are providing funds to the military. I believe there should be clear guidelines on this matter. Thank you.

Indeed. Regarding the question directed at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, I also asked the head of the division the same question just now. POSCO International is heavily involved in Myanmar's gas industry. My research on trade data shows that Korea is not a major trading partner with Myanmar, ranking sixth and ninth in exports and imports respectively. While it is within the top 12, China accounts for one-third of both exports and imports, making it the primary partner. Therefore, I inquired if there might be leverage in areas like gas or mining, given the limited trade leverage. Could you please elaborate on your explanation again, Mr. Bae? Yes. We are fully aware of the points raised by Professor Park. After the declaration of a state of emergency in Myanmar, following the issues raised by some Korean companies operating in Myanmar, we at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs have been actively communicating with those companies. From what we understand, many companies were already aware of these issues prior to the declaration of the state of emergency on February 1st and have been developing their own response strategies. We have been informed that they have been aware of these issues for a long time and are developing their own response strategies. Since February 1st, these issues have been raised more actively, and we are communicating well with them. Separately, we believe it is necessary to respond clearly to issues that are factually incorrect. We believe it is necessary to provide the necessary explanations. We are maintaining close communication with the companies with this mindset. Yes.

Yes. To add, POSCO privatized in 2000 and is no longer a public enterprise. Also, the contracting parties are primarily public enterprises in Myanmar, not the military junta, which presents contractual challenges, as I understand. Next, I would like to ask Professor Kim Hwan-jun. Several questions have been raised. Specifically, if the democratization movement fails, what will be the impact on Southeast Asia and, by extension, the regional international politics of Asia? You have already explained China's stance, but even before the recent coup in Myanmar, there was anti-China sentiment, and Myanmar citizens are deeply disappointed with China's position following this coup, further increasing anti-China sentiment. However, the military and China have close ties through initiatives like the Belt and Road Initiative, and the Aung San Suu Kyi government also had a close relationship with China. Therefore, how do you view the Myanmar situation within the context of Sino-US relations and the broader international political landscape? Yes. Yes. The resolution of the Myanmar situation, or rather, how to position the Myanmar situation within the context of Sino-US relations, is posing a significant challenge for the Biden administration. It is widely reported that the Biden administration also found it difficult to foresee this coup. The Myanmar crisis erupted shortly after the administration took office. If this situation fails, what impact will it have on the international political landscape? I believe that many have spoken about this, including a former Singaporean Deputy Foreign Minister, who has publicly expressed such views. The most realistic approach currently is to persuade the military as much as possible and then hold general elections. While it is clear that these general elections will not be fair, the most realistic approach to prevent bloodshed and move forward is to follow ASEAN's lead and China's suggestions. In particular, the United States, immediately after the Myanmar crisis erupted, saw many experts discussing the US's long-standing efforts to promote democracy in Myanmar. Since there are no significant vested interests involved, it is difficult to frame this within a US-China rivalry. Those who voice more realistic opinions are saying this, and that is the reality. What I am concerned about, as I mentioned earlier, is that if the situation prolongs, or if it leads to an outflow of refugees or a civil war situation, then these arguments will gain more traction. My current outlook is that this is the case. However, what gives me hope is that international public opinion, the various human rights mechanisms that have been developed, the international accountability systems, and the growing voices of civil society in the US and the EU, if these factors come into play, then perhaps the US and the EU can take stronger action. That is the current outlook.

We are well aware of the points raised by Professor Park. Following Myanmar's declaration of a state of national emergency and subsequent inquiries from some of our companies operating in Myanmar, we have been actively communicating with the relevant companies from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. From our discussions, we understand that many companies were already aware of these issues before the declaration of the state of emergency on February 1st, and have been developing their own response strategies.

Furthermore, as these issues have been raised more actively since February 1st, we are maintaining open communication. Separately, we believe it is necessary to clearly refute any allegations that are not factually accurate. We intend to provide necessary explanations accordingly and are maintaining close communication with the companies.

Yes. To add a point, POSCO was privatized in 2000 and is no longer a public enterprise but a private company. We have also heard that there are issues with the contractual procedures, as the parties to many contracts are public enterprises in Myanmar, not the military government. Next, I would like to ask Professor Kim Hwan-joon. There are several questions, particularly regarding the impact on Southeast Asia and broader Asia if the democratization movement fails. You have already explained China's stance. It was mentioned earlier that there was anti-China sentiment in Myanmar even before the recent coup, and that Myanmar's citizens are deeply disappointed with China's position following the coup, leading to increased anti-China sentiment.

Yes. Thank you. Next, Dr. Lee Jae-hyun. The position is to resolve the issue centered around China and ASEAN. However, as you mentioned, the ASEAN Charter includes principles like 'Good Governance' and 'Democracy,' but they seem ineffective, merely resulting in statements. Therefore, if ASEAN fails to respond effectively to this crisis, will the so-called 'ASEAN Centrality' be significantly undermined? This is the first question. There is also a question regarding relations with Thailand. Thailand is Myanmar's second-largest export market, and when refugees began to emerge from Kachin State, crossing into Thailand, there was concern about whether the Thai government would accept them or halt their entry. This is a matter of great interest. Please comment on this. Yes. Thank you. There are several questions regarding ASEAN that have been posted, so I will address the one you just asked first. The ASEAN Charter is being violated. It includes democracy and the rule of law. However, if you look closely, before mentioning democracy and the rule of law in the ASEAN Charter, it discusses individual state sovereignty and non-interference. Only then does it mention the rule of law and democracy. Therefore, from ASEAN's perspective, it is not a violation of the ASEAN Charter to emphasize non-interference in internal affairs. Yes, that is the situation. Will ASEAN Centrality be weakened? If that were the case, ASEAN Centrality would have been weakened during the 1997 Asian financial crisis, in 2006, and subsequently, whenever there were issues concerning democracy or human rights within ASEAN member states. You also mentioned 'Talk Shop,' which is a term that has been heard for a long time.

The issue of ASEAN Centrality is not so much about ASEAN's inability to resolve internal issues among its member states, but rather about how ASEAN can gain recognition for its important role from major powers and external forces in its relations with them. Therefore, it is not primarily an issue of ASEAN's internal capacity, but rather its external relations are more important. Of course, if its internal capacity is insufficient, questions about ASEAN Centrality will increase, but I do not see ASEAN Centrality as being significantly at risk. Regarding relations with Thailand, they share a border, and even before this, there were armed groups in Thailand, as mentioned earlier, such as in the Mae Sot region. Therefore, this is not new. However, we need to consider the nature of the current Thai ruling regime. It came to power through a military coup in 2014, just like Myanmar. The only difference, and they also amended the constitution, is that in 2019, the Thai military held elections, albeit under their own constitution, and came to power. The Myanmar military, on the other hand, has only staged a coup so far. Therefore, the Thai government cannot strongly condemn the Myanmar military's coup. Yes. It might sound strange, but they share a similar predicament. Yes. Thank you. Ms. Lee Hwa-in, you have two questions. One is, as a Korean citizen, how can I support Myanmar's democratization along with global citizens? The other question is about the Myanmar citizens who are now saying that they have no choice but to resort to armed struggle. What are the advantages and disadvantages of transitioning to armed struggle versus continuing non-violent resistance?

Yes. Thank you. I was not able to present today due to the circumstances, but a leader of a civil society organization in Myanmar sent me a short video message. In her message, she stated that Myanmar citizens are well aware that Korean civil society is supporting Myanmar more diligently than any other civil society, and that it is a great source of strength. She also conveyed that the Myanmar military junta is keenly aware of the international civil society's response and is very fearful of it. However, her concern is that at each stage of Myanmar's democratization, China and Russia have provided strong backing behind the military junta whenever demands for democratization arose. Therefore, the junta has repeatedly failed due to China and Russia, and the military undoubtedly relies heavily on China and Russia even now. The citizens' resistance will continue, but as the conflict drags on and the sacrifices increase, they are facing a difficult situation. She urged that Korea should not cease its support so that they can continue to fight without getting tired. She also mentioned the situation regarding a potential civil war. While it may not seem like a civil war is imminent, there are growing concerns that in the states inhabited by ethnic minorities other than the Bamar majority, outside the urban areas, armed groups that were previously confronting the Bamar might join forces with the citizens demanding democracy, leading to a civil war situation. I cannot predict whether armed struggle will ensue. However, it is very clear from the current situation that the citizens will never give up and will continue to demand democracy. With support from the international community, they will be able to continue fighting without getting tired. We believe so, and the citizens of Myanmar also believe so, and they have a conviction in their hearts that they will ultimately win. And currently,

Yes. Thank you. Next time, I will ask Dr. Lee Jae-hyun. Ah, currently, there is a stance that issues should be resolved centering on China and ASEAN, but as Dr. Park mentioned, the ASEAN Charter's provisions on good governance and democracy have little effect; it's merely issuing statements. So, if ASEAN fails to respond properly to this situation, will the so-called ASEAN centrality be significantly undermined? This is the first question, and there is a specific question regarding Thailand. Thailand is Myanmar's second-largest export market, and when refugees from Kachin State emerged, there was a situation where they crossed over to Thailand. Therefore, whether the Thai government will accept them or halt their entry is a matter of considerable interest. Please elaborate on this point.

Direct assistance is difficult, but perhaps civil society or, well, the government may or may not, but funds for the future may be established through civil society, or perhaps support may be secretly channeled through the Thai border. There are many networks and solidarity groups formed by civil society, such as the Myanmar Democratic Network or the Gwangju Myanmar Solidarity, to help Myanmar. If you wish to support them as a citizen, you can express your support through these channels or provide financial assistance. Thank you. Thank you. This is a personal question for Head of Division Bae from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

Actually, I am one of those who thinks highly of our government's diligent efforts in practicing diplomacy based on democracy by taking concrete response measures for such specific situations. My question is, is it possible to multilateralize this? For example, can this agenda be raised at the ARF? Or, since we are talking about multilateralism, could we play a coordinating role in supporting Myanmar's democracy with countries like Indonesia, Malaysia, or Japan, which are like-minded democracies? It would be much more impactful if similar democratic countries worked together rather than doing it alone. Another point is, let's not just look at Asia. There is a reason why voices are being raised about the Myanmar situation. The EU as a whole, not just individual countries. Korea is a member of 'Drive for Democracy,' a multilateral initiative led by Sweden. Could we, in solidarity with European countries through such platforms, extend our efforts beyond the continent for greater impact? Have you considered such measures? Regarding specific discussions on the Myanmar issue, whether it be with a few countries, regional cooperation bodies, or the establishment of new platforms, we have not conducted concrete reviews. However, discussions with major countries, including recent calls by the Minister and others, consistently include the Myanmar issue. Therefore, within the broader framework of regional affairs and in the process of consulting with ASEAN countries, the Myanmar issue is being treated as an important agenda item within the New Southern Policy. I would like to state that it is being treated as such. As Professor Lee Sook-jong mentioned, we will consider such measures as feasible options for review. Yes. Thank you. Finally, I would like to give the floor to Mr. Hwainso Lee. Yes. This is my last question, and I would like to ask it to everyone here. I have been actively participating in anti-coup activities in Myanmar since February 1st while residing in Korea. Initially, in lectures and discussions, I spoke with a hopeful voice, saying, 'We will win.' This continued until about two weeks ago. But now, as the professors know, there have been over 700 casualties. And although the CRPH exists, how can we, as a coalition, unite with Generation Z? There is also the dilemma of whether the punishment for the military that we have sought will be carried out if we compromise. Why? Because there have been over 700 casualties in Myanmar, and recently, the Rohingya incident occurred. If we compromise, we cannot achieve justice. Given the military's past actions, if there are precedents in Korea where past perpetrators were not punished, then as Myanmar citizens, especially the younger generation representing us, can we endure this? We are carrying this sense of obligation. Yesterday, one out of every three Generation Z individuals was arrested or detained. This is also a part of the dilemma. Therefore, the path forward is unclear. It's like walking in darkness. So, while I initially spoke with hope, nowadays, I feel like the path is very unclear. Compromising brings these concerns, leading to a sense of despair. And if we join the coalition, we don't know how to proceed. This is the current situation. Therefore, I would like to ask everyone here for their thoughts on this dilemma. Lastly, as time is running out, please look at this. Of the 740 casualties, 40% are between 20 and 39 years old, including Generation Z. This 40% is an enormous number of casualties. Therefore, for us to move towards a democratic nation in the future, I believe we must nurture the younger generation's political forces. And we must nurture the younger generation's civil society forces to move forward. To achieve this, in a situation where political leadership is lacking and civic awareness is insufficient, how should we organize ourselves and become a force? Because we cannot trust the current vested interests. I will ask two questions in total. Yes. Yes. I deeply sympathize with your feelings, and I cannot give a direct answer. However, we will stand up and show the three-finger salute to express our solidarity with the Myanmar citizens engaged in the disobedience movement. Panelists, please also stand up and strike a pose. You are welcome to decline if you are uncomfortable.

Yes, there were many in areas like the one you mentioned, so it's not entirely new. We need to look at the nature of the current ruling power in Thailand. In 2014, they came to power through a military coup, similar to Myanmar. The only difference, and they also amended the constitution, is that in 2019, the Thai military held elections, albeit under a constitution they drafted, and came to power through those elections. The Myanmar military, on the other hand, has only staged a coup so far. Therefore, the Thai government cannot strongly condemn the Myanmar military's coup.

Perhaps it's cliché to say, but they share a common plight. Yes, they have a relationship. Thank you. Ms. Hyun has two questions. One is, as a global citizen, how can Korean citizens best support the democratization of Myanmar? The other question is about the Myanmar citizens' shift towards armed struggle, given the current non-violent civil disobedience movement. What are the advantages and disadvantages of transitioning to violent resistance versus continuing non-violent struggle?

Yes. Due to current circumstances, I could not present it here today. However, a leader of a civic group in Myanmar, who is actively engaged in civil society movements, sent me a short video message. She conveyed that the people of Myanmar are well aware that Korean civil society is supporting Myanmar more diligently than any other civil society, and that this support is a great source of strength. She also mentioned that the Myanmar military is keenly aware of the international civil society's response and is quite fearful of it. However, there are concerns regarding each stage of Myanmar's democratization process.

The demand for democratization has consistently been backed by strong support from China and Russia, which has led to failures. The military junta heavily relies on China and Russia even now. The people's resistance will continue, but the momentum is waning, and the prolonged conflict is leading to increased casualties, placing them in a difficult situation. She requested that Korea continue its support so that they can persevere in their struggle without tiring. She also discussed the ongoing civil war situation.

While it is said that the situation does not immediately suggest civil war, concerns are growing that in the peripheral areas of ethnic minority states in Myanmar, beyond the Bamar majority, armed forces confronting the Bamar may unite with citizens demanding democracy and lead to a civil war situation, as might have occurred in the past. I cannot predict whether the violent struggle will continue or if it will remain non-violent. However, it is becoming very clear from the current situation that the citizens will never give up and will continue to demand democracy. With the support of civil society, they will be able to continue their struggle without tiring. We believe this, and the people of Myanmar believe it, and ultimately, the conviction that they will win seems to be in everyone's hearts. And currently,

Rather than providing direct assistance, there may be support, perhaps through civil society or government channels, though the government's actions are uncertain. Funds for the future might be established, or assistance could be secretly funneled in, perhaps through the Thai border. There are many civil society networks and alliances organized to help Myanmar, such as the Myanmar Democratic Network or the Gwangju Myanmar Solidarity. If you wish to help as a citizen, you can express your support or provide financial assistance through these channels. Thank you. Yes, thank you. This is a personal question for Director Bae from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

Actually, I am one of those who view our government's concrete response and diligent efforts in promoting democracy in this specific situation very positively. My only question is whether this can be multilateralized. For example, can this issue be raised at the ARF, or within the context of plurilateralism, could neighboring countries like Indonesia, Malaysia, or Japan play a coordinating role in supporting Myanmar's democracy? It would undoubtedly have more impact if done collectively rather than individually.

When similar democratic countries act together, it lends significant strength. Furthermore, it is not just about looking at Asia; there is a reason for raising our voice on the Myanmar situation. South Korea is a member of the "Drive for Democracy," a plurilateral initiative led by Sweden, not the entire EU. By collaborating with European countries through such platforms, we could have a much greater impact across continents. Have you considered such approaches? Regarding the Myanmar issue itself, while we have not specifically examined forming a consultative body of a few countries, engaging with regional cooperation bodies, or creating new platforms, it is a topic that is consistently discussed in our consultations with major countries, including recent calls by our Minister. In discussions about the regional situation and in our consultations with ASEAN countries, the Myanmar issue is always included, whether in the context of the New Southern Policy or otherwise. It is being treated as a significant agenda item. I would like to state that for now. Professor Lee Sook-jong, we will certainly consider those approaches as viable options for review.

Thank you. Then, I will give the final speaking turn to Ms. Huynn So from the Center for Foreign Affairs and National Security. Yes. My final question is directed to everyone here. I have been participating in activities against the coup that began on February 1st while staying in South Korea, doing what I can.

Initially, when we participated in lectures or similar events, we expressed a hopeful voice that we would win until two weeks ago. However, as professors are aware, the number of victims has now exceeded 700. Additionally, while there is currently a CBC, we must consider how the Z generation can unite as a coalition. There is also the dilemma of whether the punishments we have desired for past actions will be implemented.

This is because there are over 700 mothers who have become victims, and there have been recent incidents involving the elderly. If we compromise, we cannot accept it. Given the past actions that have occurred, there have been examples in Korea as well. When past actions went unpunished, we saw the consequences. As a representative of the young generation, I have come forward, and that is why we are now engaged in the civil disobedience movement in Myanmar.

Can we endure this? We feel a sense of obligation regarding this matter. For instance, just yesterday, one out of three Z generation individuals was arrested. This is part of the ongoing situation. It feels as if there is no clear path ahead, akin to walking in darkness. Initially, I spoke with a hopeful voice, but nowadays, it seems that the way forward is unclear. Compromising feels disheartening, and participating in the coalition leaves us uncertain about what to do. I would like to ask those who may have thoughts on this somewhat ambiguous situation. Lastly, although time is running out, I want to point out that among the 740 victims, 40% are aged between 20 and 39, including the Z generation. This represents a significant loss. To move towards a democratic nation, I believe we need to empower the political force of the young generation.

I believe we must nurture the young generation's civic organizations. Only by strengthening these groups can we advance. In this context, I am curious about how we can organize ourselves and build a coalition, especially since we cannot trust the current vested interests. Therefore, I will present two main points. Yes, I completely understand that sentiment. While I cannot provide a direct answer, we will stand together and show solidarity with the citizens of Myanmar who are engaged in the civil disobedience movement by raising three fingers. I would like all panelists to stand and pose for a moment; those who are uncomfortable may choose not to participate.

Okay. Yes, thank you. Let's take our seats. Yes. Today, we have had a very valuable session of presentations and discussions. All Koreans are deeply pained by the current events, and we all hope that this military oppression and violent crackdown will soon cease, and that a path back to democracy through peaceful means will be opened. In this difficult process, the fact that South Korea has demonstrated policy responses and solidarity movements for countries facing democratic challenges abroad has been a great learning opportunity for us. Therefore, I believe it will serve as valuable experience for Korea in its future international cooperation for value-based diplomacy and democratic collaboration. Thank you very much for attending, and we will continue to have meaningful dialogues. Thank you. This concludes the East Asia Institute's conference on the Future of Myanmar's Democracy After the Coup. Thank you.

Thank you. This concludes the East Asia Institute's conference on the Future of Myanmar's Democracy After the Coup. Thank you.