[EAI-MBN Korean Diplomacy 2021 Outlook and Strategy] The Biden Administration's Rocky Road in Middle East Policy and South Korea's Response

YouTube Link: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=cHPJc-roqGw

The East Asia Institute (EAI) has planned an expert interview series, "EAI-MBN Korean Diplomacy 2021 Outlook and Strategy," to propose foreign and security policy recommendations for South Korea ahead of the 20th presidential election. This series presents seven major challenges facing the South Korean government amidst the variables of the new U.S. administration and COVID-19, and offers visions and outlooks for the new year from the perspectives of experts in each field.

As the seventh installment in the "EAI-MBN Korean Diplomacy 2021 Outlook and Strategy" expert interview series, we present "The Biden Administration's Rocky Road in Middle East Policy and South Korea's Response" by Kim Kang-seok, a full-time researcher at the Dankook University Institute for GCC Studies. Please find more detailed expert commentary at the link below.

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EAI aims to provide timely and in-depth analysis of current issues through Q&A sessions with experts in relevant fields. The views expressed in this interview are those of the individual expert and do not necessarily reflect the position of the East Asia Institute. Please cite the source when quoting this interview video.

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Video Transcript

Hello everyone. I am Jeong Kwang-seok, head of the Diplomacy and Security team at Naembi. Today, in collaboration with the East Asia Institute (EAI), we will discuss the Middle East policy of the Biden era. Our guest for today's discussion is Dr. Kim Kang-seok from the Dankook University Institute for GCC Studies. Welcome. We specifically chose "Middle East Policy in the Biden Era" as our topic because we believe the changes in Middle East policy will significantly impact the global order. What is the overall blueprint for the Biden administration's Middle East policy?

Generally, the Biden administration is expected to differ significantly from the Trump administration. While the Trump administration, based on its "America First" principle, reduced military involvement in the Middle East, pursued a policy of maximum pressure on Iran, and adopted a rather detached stance on the Israeli-Palestinian issue, the Biden administration is generally expected to strengthen cooperation with U.S. allies in Europe and elsewhere, presenting a considerably different approach from Trump's. This is the general assessment.

One of the most critical issues is the Iran nuclear deal, isn't it? The previous approach under the Obama administration was to resolve the nuclear issue, but the Trump administration sought a different path. That's correct. The Trump administration's approach was called "maximum pressure." They withdrew from the JCPOA, the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action agreed upon in 2015 under Obama, and imposed significant unilateral sanctions on Iran. Notably, in January of last year, the U.S. assassinated Qasem Soleimani, the commander of the Quds Force of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, at Baghdad Airport.

Yes, that action itself can be evaluated as a facet of U.S. policy demonstrating the conflict between the U.S. and Iran. Ultimately, haven't both Trump's and Obama's approaches to the Iran nuclear issue failed? Generally, yes. Although Obama reached an agreement in 2015, it ultimately failed to control Iran's nuclear capabilities. Trump, by unilaterally overturning it, adopted a policy 180 degrees opposite to Obama's, resulting in Iran still failing to find common ground on the nuclear issue. Therefore, it is thought that Biden is likely contemplating a new approach based on a reflective consideration of both Obama's and Trump's policies.

Dr. Kim, you mentioned that if Obama's negotiations had been pursued as a policy, perhaps things might have improved. Do you believe that? It's a hypothetical historical evaluation. Generally, there are many criticisms of overturning Obama's policies, even within the U.S. The approach to Iran's nuclear program has become considerably more hawkish, which could suggest such a possibility. However, Obama's administration itself has been criticized for not achieving a complete agreement with Iran. For example, issues such as missile development and internal human rights issues in Iran were not part of the comprehensive negotiations, so it's debatable whether a complete agreement was reached on the Iran issue. It's likely that there were limitations.

So, Dr. Kim, you were Vice President during the Obama administration's nuclear negotiations with Iran. Is there a high probability that the Biden administration will return to the framework of those negotiations? It is currently anticipated that they will return. However, it is widely assessed that the framework they are planning may differ from the 2015 agreement. If we consider the limitations of the 2015 agreement, one of the points raised by U.S. allies such as Israel and Saudi Arabia is the issue of Iran's missile program and its regional influence in places like Iraq and Syria. Iran's significant political influence in these areas causes considerable anxiety among allies. Therefore, while presenting negotiations within a new framework, it is likely that they will address not only Iran's nuclear capabilities but also its missile program and regional activities.

The issue of human rights is also being discussed. While the specific framework remains to be seen, it is possible that they will pursue comprehensive negotiations by bundling additional issues with Iran's nuclear program. Another crucial aspect of Middle East policy, besides Iran, is the policy based on the alliance between the U.S. and Israel. The Trump administration's recognition of Jerusalem as the capital of Israel and the relocation of the U.S. embassy there disrupted the balance in the Middle East. How will the Biden administration approach this?

The Biden administration is generally expected to adopt a more pro-Palestinian approach compared to Trump. Trump moved the embassy to Jerusalem and recognized Israeli sovereignty over the Golan Heights, territories occupied by Syria. He also significantly cut funding for UNRWA, the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East, and closed the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) office in Washington. These policies were seen as excessively pro-Israel and detrimental to the Palestinians. Traditionally, Democratic administrations have been more open to addressing Palestinian issues than Republican administrations. However, one thing to consider is that the U.S.-Israel alliance has been strategically formed over a long period. Therefore, while there may be a more pro-Palestinian approach compared to Trump's policies, it is unlikely that the fundamental U.S.-Israel alliance will be undermined.

Despite these expectations, it is unlikely that the Biden administration will be able to easily alter the fundamental U.S.-Israel alliance. For instance, it is widely believed that Biden will not be able to reverse the previous decision on the status of Jerusalem. The U.S. has historically been more interested in maintaining the status quo in the Middle East, particularly in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, even if it meant preserving the current unstable situation. Trump, however, pursued policies excessively favorable to Israel, which tended to undermine that balance.

That's correct. The Trump administration proposed a "deal of the century" and presented a very generous offer regarding the Palestinian issue. The core of this proposal involved the issue of Israeli settlements in the West Bank, where numerous settlements have been built. This has been a very difficult and sensitive issue for previous administrations. Trump, in fact, recognized these areas as Israeli territory. He also recognized Israeli sovereignty over the Jordan Valley, a fertile territory bordering Palestine and Jordan, in a manner different from previous U.S. administrations. While he also offered economic aid to the Palestinians as a counter-benefit, it is assessed that these measures were largely unsuccessful.

Under the Biden administration, it is possible that policies will emerge to restore the balance between Israel and Palestine to its previous state. Regarding the Palestinians, their trust has been significantly damaged. They boycotted the Trump administration's "deal of the century." While Biden is likely to take some steps to restore this damaged trust, the extent to which these steps can lead to substantial problem-solving, considering the relationship with Israel, is subject to various assessments.

However, one thing to consider is the Abraham Accords, brokered by Trump in September 2020. This involved Bahrain and the United Arab Emirates normalizing relations with Israel. While Biden has criticized many of Trump's policies, he has expressed a positive view of the Abraham Accords. Therefore, it is possible that the trend of normalization between Arab countries and Israel, following the Abraham Accords, will continue under the Biden administration.

However, one thing we can consider here is the Abraham Accords. In September of last year, 2020, Trump actually brokered a peace agreement between Israel and the Arab nations of Bahrain and the United Arab Emirates. Although Biden has negated many of Trump's policies, he has given a positive assessment of this issue. Therefore, it is possible that the normalization trend between Arab countries and Israel, which followed the Abraham Accords, will continue under the Biden administration.

Another area of concern in the Middle East is the so-called Islamic State (IS). While IS was once a formidable force, its influence seems to have weakened recently. What is the outlook for IS, and what factors have contributed to its decline? The Biden administration was inaugurated on January 20th, and on January 22nd, two suicide bombings occurred in Baghdad, Iraq.

There had been no such terrorist attacks in Baghdad for the past year and a half. Many analysts interpret these attacks as a strategic message from IS and other extremist groups timed to coincide with the Biden administration's inauguration. This suggests that IS, which was considered by some to have ended its existence after the assassination of its leader, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, in October 2019, still possesses attack capabilities. The fact that IS carried out these attacks around the time of the Biden administration's inauguration indicates its continued potential for resurgence. This sends a strong message about the Biden administration's approach to IS, which may differ from Trump's. Therefore, the potential for IS's resurgence is a matter that needs to be considered.

The reason we are interested in the Iran nuclear negotiations is that they could influence the North Korean denuclearization talks. Are there any lessons we can learn from the North Korean denuclearization process? Fundamentally, there are differences between the North Korean and Iranian denuclearization talks. Both North Korea and Iran, in principle, demand preemptive measures from the U.S. They argue that they can only take corresponding actions if the U.S. first lifts its unilateral sanctions. Therefore, the Biden administration's policy approach to Iran's denuclearization could serve as a model for what the U.S. can offer North Korea. We need to closely monitor how Iran's corresponding actions are managed and identify areas where we can find common ground with the U.S.

In terms of policy priorities, does the U.S. prioritize Iran's denuclearization over North Korea's? Given the U.S.'s long-standing interest in the Middle East, dating back to the Obama administration and continuing through the Trump and Biden administrations, it is highly likely that the U.S. will prioritize Iran's denuclearization over North Korea's. Therefore, there is a need for us to focus on Iran's nuclear issue. By analyzing the process of Iran's denuclearization negotiations and identifying areas where we fell short, we may be able to draw lessons for North Korea's denuclearization talks. This is also connected to other issues. For example, in 1994, there was the U.S.-North Korea Geneva Agreed Framework. During that time, while the U.S. was engaged in the North Korean nuclear issue, President Clinton was also heavily involved in the Oslo Accords between Israel and Palestine from 1993 to 1999. If the U.S. becomes more involved in Middle East issues due to energy or other policy priorities, it could lead to a relative neglect of the North Korean nuclear issue. Therefore, it is important to monitor these interconnected issues and closely observe the U.S.'s strategic priorities.

North Korea is considered a nuclear-weapon state, but is Iran also considered to possess nuclear weapons? Not yet. Iran is not yet considered to have nuclear weapons. While the JCPOA stipulated an uranium enrichment level of 3.6%, Iran increased it to 20% on January 4, 2021. However, it is still not at the stage where it can produce nuclear weapons. This is a key difference from North Korea, which is assessed to possess dozens of nuclear warheads. Therefore, the process of dismantling existing nuclear weapons, which is necessary for North Korea, is not yet applicable to Iran. This could make the process with Iran relatively easier.

Iran does not currently possess nuclear weapons, so we can view it that way. However, given that its neighbors, such as Israel, are perceived to possess nuclear weapons, there is a security dilemma. Furthermore, due to the sanctions and military pressure imposed by the U.S. on Iran thus far, the future of Iran's nuclear program remains uncertain. This is a point that needs consideration.

What advice do you have for the South Korean government regarding its Middle East policy? Fundamentally, the Middle East has not been a high priority for South Korean foreign policy. Traditionally, due to our geopolitical location on the Korean Peninsula, issues related to the four major powers and the Korean Peninsula have been paramount. However, if the U.S. prioritizes the Middle East, it could influence U.S. policy towards the Korean Peninsula. Therefore, South Korea must pay close attention to U.S. Middle East policy.

Traditionally, South Korea has often been drawn into Middle East affairs. For example, the U.S. requested troop deployment to Iraq in 2003, and last year, requested South Korea's participation in a naval operation in the Strait of Hormuz. At that time, the South Korean government, while considering the ROK-U.S. alliance, also took into account its relations with Iran and adopted a passive response, such as expanding the operational area of the Dongmyeong Unit. However, as South Korea is now a major global player, it needs to develop diplomatic capabilities to actively discuss Middle East issues with the U.S. within the framework of the ROK-U.S. alliance.

There are reports that the Korean Wave has created a very positive image of South Korea in the Middle East. Is this true from your perspective? Generally, the image of South Korea in the Middle East is very positive. Korean language and culture programs are being offered at some universities, and there is significant interest in Korean culture, language, and the Korean Cultural Center. South Korea possesses a very strong positive image as a vehicle for soft power among Arab populations in the Middle East.

Regarding our relations with Iran, there is a recent dispute over $8 billion in frozen funds related to Korean ships and oil. This issue is linked to U.S. sanctions on Iran, and it is a concern that it may not be easily resolved. Iran is indeed facing severe economic difficulties due to the U.S.'s "maximum pressure" policy. Therefore, they harbor significant resentment towards the freezing of funds connected to South Korea. Despite the visit of the South Korean Vice Foreign Minister, a resolution has not yet been reached. I believe that South Korean diplomacy in the Middle East needs a more specialized approach, such as appointing a special envoy for Middle East affairs or developing personnel with expertise in the region. This would allow for the cultivation of networks and diplomatic solutions through long-term engagement. China, for instance, has had a special envoy for Middle East affairs for a considerable time and has been very active. It is understood that when Vice Foreign Minister Choi Jong-moon visited Qatar, he requested Qatar's mediation in this matter.

In the Middle East, issues are often closely linked with neighboring countries. Qatar, for example, has a good relationship with Iran and can play a mediating role. South Korea needs to enhance its diplomatic negotiation capabilities by engaging in various diplomatic contacts with neighboring countries to resolve these issues more effectively. The early release of the funds, or similar measures, may be difficult to achieve as long as the $8 billion issue remains unresolved. The current sentiment in Iran is one of strong resentment, and they are unwilling to release funds even for humanitarian issues like COVID-19. Therefore, it appears that South Korea will face difficulties in securing Iran's cooperation unless it offers some form of financial incentive or a clear roadmap.

However, with the inauguration of the Biden administration in the U.S., negotiations between the U.S. and Iran are expected to proceed. By closely tracking the outcomes of these negotiations, we may find opportunities to resolve this issue. Thank you for the insightful discussion. Thank you.

Thank you. I've learned a lot. Thank you.