[EAI-MBN Korean Diplomacy 2021: Prospects and Strategies] The Indo-Pacific Strategy to be Continued by Biden and South Korea's Policy Direction

YouTube Link: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=PYrYc86ujU0

The East Asia Institute (EAI) has planned the expert interview series "EAI-MBN Korean Diplomacy 2021: Prospects and Strategies" to propose foreign and security policy recommendations for South Korea ahead of the 20th presidential election. This series presents seven major tasks facing the South Korean government amidst the launch of a new U.S. administration and the COVID-19 pandemic, and offers visions and prospects for South Korea's foreign strategy and the new year as seen by experts in each field.

As the sixth installment in the "EAI-MBN Korean Diplomacy 2021: Prospects and Strategies" expert interview series, we are publishing Professor Park Jae-jeok's "The Indo-Pacific Strategy to be Continued by Biden and South Korea's Policy Direction" from Hankuk University of Foreign Studies. For more detailed expert commentary, please check the link below.

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EAI aims to provide timely and in-depth analysis of current issues through Q&A sessions with experts in relevant fields. The content of this interview represents the personal opinions of the interviewee and does not reflect the position of the East Asia Institute. Please cite the source when quoting this interview video.

• Managed and Edited by: Baek Jin-kyung, Director of EAI Research Center

Inquiries: 02 2277 1683 (ext. 209) | j.baek@eai.or.kr

Video Transcript

Hello everyone. I am Jeong Gwang-deuk. Today, we will discuss the Indo-Pacific policy of the Biden administration in the post-Trump era with the East Asia Institute (EAI). Joining me today is Professor Park Jae-jeok from Hankuk University of Foreign Studies. Professor, the concept of an Indo-Pacific strategy doesn't seem to be that old. When did discussions about an Indo-Pacific strategy begin? Yes, the term Indo-Pacific strategy was formally initiated during the Trump administration.

While its origins can be traced back to the Obama administration's "Pivot to Asia" strategy, the Indo-Pacific strategy as a policy framework truly began with President Trump. Previously, we generally referred to the region as the Asia-Pacific, or "APEC." The term "Indo-Pacific" suggests that the U.S. highly values India's strategic importance. Is that a correct interpretation? Yes, that can be seen as correct. While India was indeed a regional country in APEC, and a member of the East Asia Summit, designating the Pacific and Indian Oceans together as the Indo-Pacific signifies that India has emerged to the forefront of the U.S.'s Asian alliance network. Is the reason India has become such a strategically important partner for the U.S. due to the U.S.'s intention to strategically leverage India to counter China's rise? Yes, that's correct. I recall a statement by a U.S. policymaker during the Obama administration, who said something to the effect of: "The U.S. does not need to respond to China's rise. What the U.S. needs to do is allow India to grow." It can be seen as a symbolic statement, reflecting the U.S.'s intention to counter China through India. If the Trump administration adopted and emphasized the strategic concept of the Indo-Pacific strategy, how will it be transmitted in the Biden era? Will the Biden administration adopt the Indo-Pacific strategy as its own new strategy, or will it inherit and develop it? This is a point of interest.

This question is currently debated in academia as well. I believe it will be the latter – inherited and developed. In that sense, the Trump administration likely has both assets and tasks inherited from the previous administration. The assets would be the strengthened alliances and emphasis on the region during the Trump administration. On the other hand, a task would be that the emphasis on security aspects led to a lack of geopolitical depth, and perhaps a somewhat superficial approach to diplomacy by President Trump. These could be considered tasks inherited by the Biden administration.

India and China have historically had a very poor relationship. There has been actual warfare in border areas, and recently, there have been localized clashes resulting in casualties. The borders are not clearly defined, leading to disputes. As you mentioned, there was a clash last year, and a significant clash in 2017 as well. Due to last year's border clash, anti-China sentiment in India is quite strong.

From the U.S. perspective, for India's strategic value to continue growing, stable economic growth and political stability in India would be necessary. What is the overall U.S. policy towards India? It is to solidify India's position as a key regional power. While promoting U.S.-India relations is necessary, the U.S. also plays a role in supporting India's active economic and cultural exchanges with regional countries from behind the scenes. I believe the U.S. is playing such a role.

There were concerns that South Korea might be somewhat sidelined in the Indo-Pacific strategy. Fundamentally, the Indo-Pacific policy was initially presented as a security policy under the Trump administration. However, our government, under the Moon Jae-in administration, pursued a "New Southern Policy" and regional policies. As you know, the New Southern Policy was primarily focused on economic aspects. Therefore, there may have been aspects where the security-focused Indo-Pacific policy and the economy-focused New Southern Policy did not align well.

Recently, as the U.S. has requested our participation in the Indo-Pacific strategy, we have also been strengthening the security aspects of our New Southern Policy, and efforts are underway to find common ground between the New Southern Policy and the U.S. Indo-Pacific strategy. One of the reasons why our policy might have appeared somewhat hesitant from the U.S. perspective is likely because we could not ignore our relationship with China. That dilemma is likely to persist. Yes, it is likely to continue. The current administration fundamentally considers the North Korean issue as our most important problem, and believes that engagement with China is essential for resolving the North Korean issue. Therefore, we cannot help but consider China's security interests. Since the U.S. Indo-Pacific strategy is generally perceived as a strategy to counter China, there have been limitations to our active participation.

You also explained the New Southern Policy pursued by our government. The current administration strongly drove the New Southern Policy as a new growth engine. To what extent do you think it has achieved success? The New Southern Policy has three main goals: first, prosperity; second, people; and third, peace. I believe it has achieved a certain level of success in terms of prosperity and people. We have seen growth in trade and people-to-people exchanges with ASEAN countries. However, in terms of peace, as mentioned earlier, the New Southern Policy was fundamentally launched with an emphasis on economic aspects. While we have attempted various initiatives in the security domain, there haven't been any achievements that have been widely recognized. In that regard, as we continue to pursue the New Southern Policy with renewed focus from 2021, we are also incorporating security aspects.

Regarding security issues, there is the Quad, through which the U.S. is trying to enhance its strategic value in the Asia-Pacific. There are differing opinions domestically and perhaps even in the U.S. on whether South Korea should participate in it. The U.S. would likely want our participation. There is talk of "Quad Plus," for example. However, the Quad has various aspects. The aspect that receives significant media attention is the military dimension, involving four countries engaging in joint military exercises. Japan has been a regular participant since 2015, and India joined later. It seems they want our participation, which is quite favorable from our perspective.

Because it is recognized as a response strategy, our participation has had certain limitations. Regarding the New Southern Policy and Indo-Pacific Policy pursued by our government, the current administration strongly pushed the New Southern Policy as a new growth engine. To what extent do you think it has achieved success? The New Southern Policy has three main goals: first, prosperity; second, people; and third, peace. We believe that we have achieved a certain degree of success in the first two goals, prosperity and people, by expanding trade and exchanges with ASEAN countries.

However, in terms of peace, as mentioned, the New Southern Policy was fundamentally launched with an emphasis on economy. Therefore, although we attempted various things in terms of security, there were no achievements that could be clearly recognized. In this regard, we can see that security aspects are being added as the New Southern Policy is being pursued as a priority again starting from 2021. Regarding security issues, there is the Quad, through which the United States is trying to increase its strategic value in the Asia-Pacific.

There are differing opinions domestically and perhaps in the US on whether South Korea should join it. The US would certainly want us to participate. There is the Quad Plus, which has recently garnered much attention. However, the Quad has various aspects. The aspect that receives much media attention is the military aspect. For example, the US and India have regular military exercises, and Japan has been participating regularly since 2015. Of course, Australia has also participated. While they seem to want our participation, from our perspective, it seems quite favorable.

Nevertheless, the Quad is not solely about military aspects. The Quad countries also coordinate with regional partners or share capabilities, such as maritime domain awareness. In that sense, there is room for us to participate in "Quad Plus," or even without calling it "Quad Plus," there is space for engagement. Earlier, we discussed the New Southern Policy, which focused on how South Korea could enhance its economic standing in Southeast Asia. Conversely, some Southeast Asian countries have close relations with North Korea, and perhaps these relationships could be leveraged to approach the North Korean issue more effectively.

As you mentioned, among the Southeast Asian countries we have dealt with, there are countries that have diplomatic relations with North Korea. We may have thought that we could receive help in resolving the North Korean issue through them. On the other hand, Southeast Asian countries may have thought that they could receive help from us regarding issues such as the South China Sea territorial disputes. Fundamentally, the North Korean issue is not a major issue for Southeast Asian countries, and the South China Sea issue is not an immediate concern for us.

Therefore, security issues have had lower common engagement compared to economic issues. That is correct. Regarding the security issues that each party prioritizes most, there is not much room for the other partner to help. Therefore, as you mentioned, the New Southern Policy was a policy focused on the economy, and although there were aspects of deteriorating relations due to China's economic retaliation against Korea following the THAAD deployment, there was also the aspect that the areas where we could practically strengthen relations were limited to the economic sphere.

Southeast Asian countries might be looking for U.S. military support regarding territorial issues like the South China Sea. While not all Southeast Asian countries expect U.S. security assistance, countries with territorial disputes or potential disputes with China, such as Vietnam, the Philippines, Malaysia, and Indonesia, particularly value U.S. security engagement. However, countries like Cambodia and Laos are representative pro-China nations. There are media reports suggesting that China is building a military base in Cambodia, although China denies it. The U.S. is treating this as a fait accompli and is imposing sanctions on companies involved. What aspects should we pay attention to and monitor as we pursue our New Southern Policy? Firstly, in economic terms, we need to pay close attention to infrastructure investment. China is pursuing a massive undertaking with its Belt and Road Initiative, and the U.S. and Quad countries are working to create a counter-narrative. For us, this represents a significant economic interest, as it is a large market. We could potentially cooperate with Quad countries to form joint funds or undertake joint projects. As technologically advanced nations like Japan, the U.S., Australia, and India, we can participate in initiatives related to technology or security. However, we must be cautious. While we are laying the groundwork to participate in China's Belt and Road Initiative, if we also participate in China's Belt and Road Initiative alongside the U.S. and other Quad countries, we might avoid the perception of aligning with China, especially given the current strained relations. What if, within the international order, while participating in both is ideal, there are issues that do not proceed as smoothly as we desire?

First, in terms of economy, we need to pay great attention to investment in India. China is pursuing a massive project with its Belt and Road Initiative, and the US and the Quad are making efforts to create a counter-strategy. For us, the economic benefits are also significant, aren't they? Since the Indian market is large, we can consider forming joint ventures or undertaking joint infrastructure projects with Quad countries. We are a technologically advanced country like Japan, the US, Australia, and India.

It is the government's diplomatic capability to make things happen as we desire. However, when comparing security and economic issues, we have more room to move in the direction we want in economic matters than in security. The Indo-Pacific strategy is fundamentally an economic issue. China and the U.S. both have justifications for investing in infrastructure, so it would be difficult to oppose it. However, security is a different matter. In the context of the South China Sea, it would be difficult for us to take sides in a military conflict. Therefore, while it may be challenging, there is ample room in the economic sphere. When pursuing our New Southern Policy, simply stating that we will gain significant benefits from ASEAN countries might be perceived negatively by those countries. We need to establish a win-win relationship. How do you see the establishment of such relationships where both sides can win? We should not simply aim to unilaterally gain economic benefits. As our New Southern Policy progresses, we are increasing trade with Vietnam. For example, the establishment of Samsung or Hyundai factories in Vietnam is a significant economic benefit for Vietnam. Furthermore, infrastructure investment, while providing us with economic benefits, also results in the construction of essential facilities for those countries. Therefore, I believe it is a win-win, mutually beneficial strategy in economic terms.

The Indo-Pacific strategy is bringing about changes in the U.S., and how we should respond to these changes is a crucial task. The Biden administration will likely continue the Indo-Pacific strategy, inheriting assets from the Trump administration, such as strengthened alliances. On the other hand, it will likely address and correct the shortcomings of the Trump administration. A prime example is engagement in multilateral diplomacy. President Trump attended the East Asia Summit only once during his term. Corrections will be made in this regard, and President Biden is expected to attend. Despite this, the Biden administration's emphasis on democracy and human rights might lead to friction. Additionally, the Biden administration is likely to strengthen economic engagement and partnerships with Southeast Asian countries. In this context, we should align with the U.S. to some extent, while avoiding unnecessarily provoking China on security matters, and coordinate our policies accordingly.

As you mentioned, among the Southeast Asian countries we have dealt with, there are indeed countries that maintain diplomatic relations with North Korea. There might have been an idea of seeking assistance in resolving the North Korean issue through these channels. On the other hand, Southeast Asian countries might have sought assistance from us regarding issues like territorial disputes in the South China Sea. Fundamentally, the North Korean issue is not a major concern for Southeast Asian countries, and the South China Sea issue is not an immediate problem for us, is it? Security issues generally have lower commonality compared to economic issues. Yes. The scope for mutual assistance in the security issues that each party prioritizes is not very large. Therefore, as you mentioned, the New Southern Policy, which was primarily based on economic foundations, also faced challenges. While the Chinese economic retaliation following the THAAD deployment had a negative impact, it also highlighted that the areas where we could genuinely strengthen relations were limited to the economic sphere.

We should not aim to unilaterally gain economic benefits. As our New Southern Policy progresses, we are increasing trade with Vietnam. For example, the establishment of Samsung or Hyundai factories in Vietnam is a significant economic benefit for Vietnam. Furthermore, infrastructure investment, while providing us with economic benefits, also results in the construction of essential facilities for those countries. Therefore, I believe it is a win-win, mutually beneficial strategy in economic terms.

The Indo-Pacific strategy is bringing about changes in the U.S., and how we should respond to these changes is a crucial task. The Biden administration will likely continue the Indo-Pacific strategy, inheriting assets from the Trump administration, such as strengthened alliances. On the other hand, it will likely address and correct the shortcomings of the Trump administration. A prime example is engagement in multilateral diplomacy. President Trump attended the East Asia Summit only once during his term. Corrections will be made in this regard, and President Biden is expected to attend. Despite this, the Biden administration's emphasis on democracy and human rights might lead to friction. Additionally, the Biden administration is likely to strengthen economic engagement and partnerships with Southeast Asian countries. In this context, we should align with the U.S. to some extent, while avoiding unnecessarily provoking China on security matters, and coordinate our policies accordingly.

The key will be how South Korea's foreign policy can effectively leverage these changes at the center of regional strategy. Yes. While the U.S. and China are considered G2, in reality, rather than a G2 like during the Cold War, they are in a situation where they must cooperate with regional countries to resolve global issues. Therefore, their political importance is significant. Thank you for your insights today. Thank you. It was a pleasure.

Yes. The key will be how South Korea's foreign policy can effectively leverage these changes at the center of regional strategy. Yes. While the U.S. and China are considered G2, in reality, rather than a G2 like during the Cold War, they are in a situation where they must cooperate with regional countries to resolve global issues. Therefore, their political importance is significant. Thank you for your insights today. Thank you. It was a pleasure.