North Korea's Stagnant Next Five Years: What is South Korea's Strategy?

YouTube Link: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=nGlcRD6nHiM

The East Asia Institute (EAI) has planned the expert interview series "EAI-MBN South Korean Diplomacy 2021: Prospects and Strategies" to provide policy recommendations for South Korea's foreign and security policy ahead of the 20th presidential election. This series presents seven major challenges facing the South Korean government amidst the new U.S. administration and the COVID-19 pandemic, along with the diplomatic strategies and visions for the new year as seen by experts in each field.

This is the fourth installment of the "EAI-MBN South Korean Diplomacy 2021: Prospects and Strategies" expert interview series, featuring EAI Chairman Ha Young-sun (Professor Emeritus, Seoul National University) with his commentary, "North Korea's Stagnant Next Five Years: What is South Korea's Strategy?" For more detailed expert commentary, please check the link below.

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EAI aims to provide timely and in-depth analysis of current issues through Q&A sessions with experts in relevant fields. The views expressed in this interview are those of the individual expert and do not necessarily reflect the position of the East Asia Institute. Please cite the source when quoting this interview.

• Managed and Edited by: Baek Jin-kyung, Director of EAI Research Center

Inquiries: 02 2277 1683 (ext. 209) | j.baek@eai.or.kr

Video Transcript

Uh, uh, uh, uh, uh. Hello everyone. I am [Name], who works in foreign affairs and security at MBN. Today, we will discuss North Korea-U.S. relations in the Biden era. Chairman Ha Young-sun of the East Asia Institute will provide an overall perspective on North Korea-U.S. relations in the new era. From his perspective, there are quite a few possibilities. I believe there are many potential avenues. Yes, the Biden administration has taken office, and the appointments for foreign affairs and security have been completed. Their first task is policy review, but is there really a need to wait for that? I think we can already predict to some extent what the policy review will entail. Hmm, yes. In this era of unpredictability, moving towards an era of predictability, whether it's North Korea-U.S. relations or inter-Korean relations, can we expect them to flow in a certain direction? How do you see President Biden and the newly appointed NSC members? Generally,

they share a basic philosophy, so I believe North Korea policy will move in a certain direction. Yes, broadly speaking, there are about three or four points we can anticipate here. First, on a formal level, there are one or two agreements being reached. The era of unilateral, top-down approaches, like summit diplomacy alone, is not desirable. Therefore, it will likely take the form of combining policy recommendations from those who have long dealt with North Korea issues at the working level with summit diplomacy. Second, it should not be done alone but in close consultation with relevant countries.

For example, there is South Korea, and Japan is definitely included. China is also considered. A six-party talk might be conceivable. So, these two aspects are predictable in terms of form. In terms of content, the question is how much difference there will be. Perhaps we can think of one or two points in terms of content. First, regarding the ultimate goal of North Korean denuclearization, will the new administration set it as the sole objective? I don't think so. The foreign and security direction that the current key figures hold is quite flexible and realistic. They will likely aim for a freeze on nuclear weapons initially, but ultimately, they will seek actions that demonstrate North Korea's commitment to denuclearization.

This will likely be an important goal. Therefore, when negotiations between the U.S. and North Korea begin, the core of the discussion will be moving from a nuclear freeze to denuclearization. If the nuclear freeze is not completed, cooperation on all their weapons and capabilities will be necessary. North Korea's calculations have not changed much, so they will likely come to the table with the cards of sanctions relief and regime security. Finally, one thing we must be cautious about is that the new administration's important guiding principle is that sanctions and military deterrence, which have been pursued, must be used effectively to reach the ultimate goal.

Yes, and this is likely an area where our government will need careful adjustment. Yes, but the Biden administration has just launched, and the current administration's term will end in about a year. In that respect, how will we coordinate the problems or processes? That will be of interest. Personally, I believe issues like inter-Korean relations go beyond partisan interests. Therefore, it would be prudent to be cautious about trying to achieve significant results within the remaining year and four months. The basic direction for the next five years, the basic direction for the U.S.'s next four years, will be revealed. Within that context, what should we do for the remaining year? It must be pursued with consistency so that ultimately, we can achieve some expected compromise. We will spend the remaining year and four months consolidating what we have done so far.

Yes, in such cases, unlike our expectations or hopes, both the U.S. and North Korea may find it difficult to coordinate with our desired direction. Yes, in fact, about 30 years have passed since the Geneva Agreed Framework in 1994, but if they are running in parallel, do you think the gap between these parallels has narrowed or widened? In terms of North Korea developing nuclear weapons, it has widened. However, the fundamental nature of the issue remains similar, and we are still debating. Why? The development of nuclear weapons itself. North Korea's development of nuclear weapons, even in this difficult situation, dates back to the mid-1960s. For nearly half a century, they have viewed the world from the perspective of transitioning from a revolutionary line to a survival strategy, leading to the development of nuclear weapons. Considering that,

it is not easy to say that it has narrowed. In the process of North Korean denuclearization negotiations, President Moon Jae-in made considerable mediation efforts. There must have been achievements and limitations. How do you assess this? First, the issue is how realistically it was assessed. The starting point for all problems is likely an accurate assessment of North Korea's denuclearization. We started with the premise that North Korea's complete denuclearization is possible. It felt like we were driving the car halfway, but it stopped and is not moving now. The reason, as we interpret it, is that the denuclearization explained to North Korea and the U.S. was not what North Korea thought denuclearization was, nor what the U.S. thought it was. In this regard, how North Korea-U.S. relations are established, and how ROK-U.S. relations are established, will likely affect North Korean denuclearization.

However, it is difficult to imagine that the negotiation process so far will create a turning point. Perhaps in the Trump administration, such a turning point could have been created, but in the Biden administration, it might not be easy to create such a turning point. There is that aspect. But what's interesting is that Kurt Campbell has become the Indo-Pacific Coordinator at the NSC. Formally, Biden is at the top, and below him is Campbell, who will coordinate. For working-level matters, there are Secretary of State Blinken, Deputy Secretary of State Sherman, or Under Secretary of State. Campbell's style is somewhat bold. He might take the position that summit diplomacy is necessary when needed. However, it's not the kind of summit diplomacy Trump pursued. But as you mentioned, looking at it that way, will a breakthrough be easily achieved? In my opinion, we should not focus solely on the remaining year and four months, but consider North Korea's five years and

the U.S.'s four years. Our current government and the next president must seek continuity. Although it is difficult, there will be unexpected variables. From North Korea's perspective, the 8th Party Congress indicated that three major tasks are awaiting them. The border is still closed. In fact, five tasks were planned, but at the next 9th Party Congress, they will inevitably have to report that they could not achieve the planned results.

Second, there is the COVID-19 variable. Although it is formally over, the so-called North Korean quarantine crisis is a very complex issue. They have to close borders and manage the economy externally, but they also have to manage it internally. They cannot easily lift sanctions. There are still triple difficulties, and they must show something. If they maintain nuclear weapons, lifting sanctions will not be easy. No matter how much we try, objectively, it is becoming increasingly difficult for North Korean policy decision-makers. Dramatic change will likely come from North Korea, realizing that in such difficult circumstances, a survival strategy suitable for the 21st century is needed. That is, a strategy based on denuclearization while maintaining the regime.

Unless such a strategic decision is made, we will likely face very difficult circumstances. As you mentioned, North Korea's economy has not been good since the 1990s, but nuclear development is a separate concept. Therefore, it is questionable whether the current economic hardship can create favorable conditions for North Korean denuclearization negotiations. It is not a decisive variable. There has been a long debate about this. From the beginning of development, people like me said they would never give up economic development for it. In the early stages, we often heard such talk.

Perhaps it was a negotiation tactic. But negotiation is about human lives. If a person is on the verge of death from cancer, and you offer them 10 billion won to die a day earlier, no one would accept it. Therefore, subjectively, they consider it the survival of the regime, which is why they do not give it up. They have continued with this approach, but it has not been resolved so far. A generation has passed since the 1990s. The party itself will continue with these two lines for the next five years: the economy will proceed as the economy, and strengthening military power will be set as a goal. As time goes on, will these become conflicting models? The thought is growing, and can someone create the conditions for a change in that thinking? This is likely a very important part, and how it is possible is something we need to consider in the long term.

Inter-Korean relations are inherently difficult to resolve unilaterally without considering ROK-U.S. relations. Therefore, cooperation on how to effectively handle North Korean issues in ROK-U.S. relations is necessary. What kind of efforts are needed for that? To return to what we discussed initially, North Korea cannot go in the direction it desires for the next five years, but it has set its desired direction. The U.S. has also presented its own plan.

For the next four years, or perhaps eight years, we can set our own policy direction. First, since the U.S. will not engage in unilateral diplomacy, we cannot either. Therefore, if the U.S. is preparing for close consultation, I believe a basic agreement on the reality is necessary. Going back to the point about denuclearization, our judgment, North Korea's judgment, and the U.S.'s judgment – the objective reality of where North Korea is heading – is not objective.

If the truth is that the judgments of the two sides differ, then some consultation or agreement will be necessary. Otherwise, we cannot draw up a roadmap for North Korea's nuclear issue or inter-Korean relations. Chairman Kim Jong-un is fully prepared to proceed with a survival strategy different from his grandfather's and father's. We may think it's simple, but the U.S. thinks it's more complex. Therefore, to prevent difficulties from arising, sanctions and deterrence must be eased very carefully, and negotiations for a new survival and prosperity strategy should begin as a very basic step.

And finally, since the final decision has not been made, we must observe internally whether the leadership will make such a decision. Therefore, there needs to be a more accurate understanding between the U.S. and South Korea regarding the reality. Based on that, the second step is to prepare a roadmap. For example, our government initially prepared the "Peace Process for Denuclearization," but if we unilaterally present it to the U.S., they will not accept it. The U.S. will prepare its own denuclearization process. As mentioned earlier, if a third summit is held, the U.S. will likely propose a freeze on nuclear weapons as a step towards complete denuclearization, and use North Korea's offered cards as a means to achieve practical results, while cautiously using deterrence and sanctions, and limited engagement to see if there are changes. This is likely how it will be presented.

They are likely already planning this. Therefore, within that plan, we need to consider which aspects should be emphasized or regulated. This is a crucial part of preparing the roadmap. Finally, the ratio of the U.S.'s strategy and our government's strategy in utilizing these tools will likely be significantly different. Thank you for your valuable insights today. Yes. Uh, uh, uh.