Rebuilding Korea-Japan Relations: Where is the Breakthrough?

YouTube Link: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=E0cypFJE4Lg

The East Asia Institute (EAI) has planned the expert interview series "EAI-MBN Korea Diplomacy 2021 Outlook and Strategy" to propose foreign and security policy recommendations for Korea ahead of the 20th presidential election. This series presents seven major tasks facing the Korean government amidst the variables of the launch of a new US administration and COVID-19, along with the diplomatic strategies and visions for the new year as seen by experts in each field.

This is the third installment of the "EAI-MBN Korea Diplomacy 2021 Outlook and Strategy" expert interview series, featuring EAI President Yeol Sohn (Professor, Yonsei University Graduate School of International Studies) on "Rebuilding Korea-Japan Relations: Where is the Breakthrough?" Please check the link below for more detailed expert commentary.

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EAI aims to provide timely and in-depth analysis of current issues through Q&A sessions with experts in relevant fields. The views expressed in this interview are those of the individual expert and do not represent the position of the East Asia Institute. Please cite the source when quoting this interview video.

• Managed and Edited by: Jinkyung Baek, EAI Director of Research

Inquiries: 02 2277 1683 (ext. 209) | j.baek@eai.or.kr

Video Transcript

Hello everyone, I am Jeong Gwan, head of MBN's Political, Diplomatic, and Security team. Today, we will be discussing Japan, a country that is both close and distant, with Yeol Sohn, President of the East Asia Institute (EAI). Hello. Yes, hello. There is perhaps no better expression to describe the relationship between Korea and Japan than "close yet distant." Over the past four years of President Moon Jae-in's administration, the Korea-Japan relationship has felt more like a distant country than a close one. I agree. In fact, the relationship during the previous Park Geun-hye administration, also four years, was quite a rollercoaster, wasn't it?

Moving beyond the comfort women issue, if one were to evaluate the foreign policy of the Park Geun-hye administration, the Korea-Japan relationship would likely receive the lowest score. Now, four years into the current administration, if we were to evaluate it, it still seems like a distant country, and if we consider specific aspects, the Korea-Japan relationship would likely receive the lowest score again. I believe that's the case. The reason why the Korea-Japan relationship has become so distant is likely due to the two major pending issues: the comfort women issue and the forced labor issue. The current government has found it very difficult to resolve these two issues properly.

Specifically, regarding the comfort women issue, after President Moon took office, he declared that the agreement reached between Korea and Japan during the Park Geun-hye administration had significant procedural and substantive flaws, making it difficult to resolve the comfort women issue through this agreement. Subsequently, the Reconciliation and Healing Foundation, established as a result of the comfort women agreement, was dissolved. Furthermore, on January 8th, a court ruling ordered the Japanese government to pay compensation for the comfort women issue. Therefore, rather than making no progress, the comfort women issue seems to have regressed. The other pending issue is forced labor. As you know, most of the rulings on forced labor occurred two years and three months ago, and little has changed. The public does not feel that any headway has been made through government-level consultations. Thus, a significant stalemate continues, leading to considerable frustration. Frankly, in the Korea-Japan relationship, there haven't been many clearly memorable events. There were issues like the GSOMIA issue or Japan's export restrictions. With major pending issues like the comfort women and forced labor issues, it seems difficult to find any breakthrough for dialogue. That's correct. Historically, the historical issues were primarily discussed as historical issues. While these historical issues did cause tensions in Korea-Japan relations, they were somewhat compartmentalized. However, in this instance, Japan responded to the forced labor court ruling with export restrictions, which was unprecedented.

I don't remember that many things, which is normal. What's wrong? Issues like forced labor, or the regulatory issues from Japan's export restrictions. Even though there are such grave current issues as the comfort women issue and the forced labor issue, it seems like it wasn't even easy to have a dialogue or discussion. That's right. Historically, the historical issues have mainly been discussed as historical issues. Of course, due to historical issues, bilateral relations have been strained, but it has been somewhat contained. However, in this case, Japan's retaliatory measures, such as export restrictions, in response to the forced labor ruling are unprecedented.

Korea, in response, escalated the situation by not only retaliating against the export restrictions but also by bringing up the GSOMIA issue, an issue of national security, into the fray. Therefore, the situation is indeed at its worst, as mentioned earlier. If there was a certain boundary in past Korea-Japan relations, the fact that the relationship has deteriorated beyond that boundary is a matter of considerable concern. Consequently, given the current state of affairs, it will be very difficult for the current administration to reverse the situation within its remaining term. In the early 2000s, due to the "Korean Wave," Japanese perceptions of Korea were often quite positive. However, recently, perceptions have fallen to their worst levels.

I believe I've seen reports to that effect. Is that accurate? Yes, that's correct. Coincidentally, we at the East Asia Institute, along with Canon MP, conduct a joint public opinion survey between Korea and Japan for the eighth consecutive year. In this survey, when we began in 2012, Japanese favorability towards Korea exceeded 40%. By last year, it had dropped to 20%, a halving of the favorability. There was a slight rebound this year.

In Korea's case, it started at 12% at the beginning of the Park Geun-hye administration, the worst situation, and steadily rose to 32%, a threefold increase. However, over the past year, with issues like export restrictions and retaliatory measures, and the GSOMIA issue, things became very difficult, and favorability has plummeted again. Yes, but the key point is that while perceptions in Japan towards Korea, as you mentioned, were driven by cultural aspects like the Korean Wave, leading to a very good relationship, the political leaders of both countries have created significant friction and conflict over historical issues. This has spread to the general public, particularly in Japan, where perceptions of Korea have worsened considerably. We can observe this. Generally, public sentiment was quite good, but as the atmosphere deteriorated from the top down, public sentiment at the grassroots level also declined.

That's correct. The public opinion survey I mentioned earlier shows a very distressing figure: the favorability of the leader of the opposing country among the citizens of each country. The favorability of Prime Minister Abe among South Korean citizens is 1.5%. This is a shocking figure. The favorability of President Moon Jae-in among Japanese citizens is less than 1.5%. While the public sentiment towards each other has soured, overall favorability remains between 20% and 30%.

However, a favorability of 1.5% towards the leader suggests, with all due respect, that the problems ultimately lie with the leaders of both countries. President Moon also wishes to resolve the difficult Korea-Japan relations during his term, but as you mentioned, it's difficult. Can a turning point be created within the remaining 1 year and 4 months? There are two factors we need to consider. First, the most significant factor influencing international relations and Korea's foreign policy this year will undoubtedly be the Biden administration.

Therefore, we need to consider whether the Biden administration will help break the current stalemate in Korea-Japan relations or what impact it will have. Second, as mentioned earlier, Korea-Japan relations have been strained for a very long time, spanning the Park Geun-hye administration and the Moon Jae-in administration, a total of nearly 16 years. Consequently, the public is indeed weary.

Therefore, to what extent can efforts be made to improve relations while taking advantage of this sentiment? We can consider both external and internal pressures. The primary goal of the Biden administration's foreign policy is to restore America's global leadership. In other words, it aims to counter China's challenge. This challenge from China means that many of the problems we face internationally are due to China's challenge. Therefore, to restore international peace, America must counter China's challenge. How can this challenge be countered? By strengthening alliances and promoting democratic values through international solidarity. Through this dual solidarity, military deterrence against China can be achieved, and collective pressure can be applied to China's market and its various economic issues.

Furthermore, by pursuing a strategy of advancing democracy and human rights, Korea and Japan are in a very important position. Therefore, it is inconceivable that these two important allies would be bickering over historical issues. From America's perspective, while it may be an important issue for you, from the perspective of America's global strategy, it should be set aside. Cooperation is requested. This would be the Biden administration's vision. The US has strongly conveyed this message to both countries regarding GSOMIA. Although we cannot confirm specific details, even during the previous administration, GSOMIA was not merely an issue of information exchange between Korea and Japan. The US considered GSOMIA a crucial component of its Indo-Pacific strategy for maintaining regional order, and interfering with it was problematic.

What I am saying now is that the Biden administration's approach is more intense than that. It goes beyond mere military information exchange between Korea and Japan; it requires comprehensive cooperation in military, economic, human rights, and democratic norms. This is a much broader scope than the pressure exerted on Korea-Japan relations during the Trump administration. Furthermore, with the change of administration in Japan from the Abe administration to the Suga administration, there might have been expectations of creating more opportunities for dialogue.

That's correct. Particularly from the Korean side, there were expectations for Prime Minister Suga, given the low favorability rating of 1.5% for the former prime minister. However, is that the case for Japan? Not entirely. The approval rating and favorability towards President Moon Jae-in remain high in Japan, and as we can see from the prolonged stalemate in Korea-Japan relations, there has been no movement in consultations regarding the Supreme Court ruling on forced labor for the past two years and three months. This is because neither Korea nor Japan is fundamentally willing to concede first from their current stances, which is why there has been no progress. While various efforts are being made by our government, the reason Japan remains unmoved, as discussed, is due to these structural issues.

The Korea-Japan relationship is a crucial partnership for us within the broader global order, where values of liberal democracy clash with Chinese-style socialist or authoritarian values. Therefore, what policies should be pursued to restore Korea-Japan relations, and what aspects should be approached with caution? Please elaborate. There is only 1 year and 4 months left. Therefore, we must distinguish between what can and cannot be done, and what should and should not be done.

We must acknowledge the current reality of the relationship between the two countries and address the issue of asset liquidation stemming from the forced labor ruling. Instead of trying to resolve the entire issue at once, we should maximize the deferral of asset liquidation to minimize the repercussions. During this process, we should pursue a certain level of cooperation at a low level, ensuring that Japanese companies do not suffer actual damage, thereby preventing a recurrence of the retaliatory cycle seen last year. Notably, this year is an election year for Korea, and Japan also has important elections.

With elections in both countries, there is a significant incentive to politically exploit nationalistic sentiments. Therefore, it is crucial to manage these desires effectively and to manage the historical issues at the current level, thereby playing a bridging role for the next administration to resolve these issues. Second, there is the pressure from the Biden administration. As we have discussed, the Biden administration desires cooperation between Korea and Japan not on historical issues, but on security and economic matters. From Korea's perspective, the Moon Jae-in administration's foreign policy towards Japan has been based on a "two-track diplomacy."

This means addressing historical issues separately from cooperation on security and economic matters. However, if we ask whether our government has truly practiced this two-track diplomacy, the answer is questionable. While acknowledging the difficulty of historical issues, has there been a genuine willingness to actively cooperate with Japan on economic and security matters? When discussing the current administration's foreign policy, it is often referred to as "North Korea-first diplomacy." If the perspective is that Japan's role in resolving North Korean issues and improving inter-Korean relations is that of a spoiler, then there is little room for cooperation with Japan.

However, the Biden administration is seeking cooperation, not in that context. There are various areas of cooperation emerging regarding North Korea, but from Korea's perspective, there are many areas where cooperation between Korea and Japan is necessary beyond the North Korean issue. If we broaden our perspective, one such area is the US-China competition. This is a challenge faced by both countries. Will Korea and Japan align with the US's security policy to counter China's challenge and rise? This is a very difficult question. While both countries advocate for diplomacy based on democratic values, they have never truly practiced such diplomacy together. Therefore, if Korea and Japan attempt to divide Asia or the region through strategic competition with the US, their interests will strategically converge. Thus, the need for basic cooperation between Korea and Japan to create a regional order where the world is not divided but can compete, coexist, and co-prosper is being discussed by many, but policy consultations have not yet begun. However, I believe this is a very important issue. Second, from an economic perspective, the current discussion revolves around lifting export restrictions and other demands. However, beyond lifting export restrictions and the issue of the " பட்டியலில்" (list), the more significant issue is the adherence to rule-based order in the region and the international community. If this order is not maintained, both Korea and Japan, as middle powers, will face significant economic challenges.

The US is shaking the foundations of the existing order, and China is asserting its own agenda. In this context, if Korea and Japan actively cooperate to establish a rule-based economic order, issues like export restrictions will naturally be resolved. Finally, there is the issue of COVID-19. COVID-19 is a purely epidemiological and global phenomenon that cannot be resolved without international cooperation. Japan, in particular, is in a position where international cooperation to combat COVID-19 is more urgent than any other country, especially with the upcoming Olympics.

Therefore, in the short term, Korea and Japan need to actively cooperate on COVID-19 prevention measures for the Tokyo Olympics. In a broader sense, how can we overcome the COVID-19 virus globally and transition to a new era? In this regard, the potential for cooperation between Korea and Japan is significant. Therefore, I hope that dialogue on various issues beyond North Korea, including cooperation in these areas, will be considered. This is my personal outlook. I believe that's all I have to say. Yes. Thank you. Yes. Yes.

Therefore, in the short term, Korea needs to actively participate in cooperation for Tokyo Olympics' COVID-19 prevention measures. Broadly speaking, there is a need for cooperation with Japan on how we can overcome the COVID-19 virus and move into a new era globally. From this perspective, cooperation with Japan is quite significant. Therefore, I personally hope that there will be more discussions on various issues beyond North Korea through this bilateral cooperation. I believe this is what I would like to convey. Thank you. Yes. Yes. Yes.