[EAI-MBN South Korean Diplomacy 2021: Prospects and Strategies] Biden's Challenge, South Korea's Choice

YouTube Link: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=TmDxXaAN8nI

The East Asia Institute (EAI) has planned the "EAI-MBN South Korean Diplomacy 2021: Prospects and Strategies" expert interview series to provide policy recommendations for South Korea's foreign and security policy ahead of the 20th presidential election. This series presents seven major challenges facing the South Korean government amidst the launch of a new U.S. administration and the COVID-19 pandemic, along with the diplomatic strategies and visions for the new year as seen by experts in each field.

As the first installment of the "EAI-MBN South Korean Diplomacy 2021: Prospects and Strategies" expert interview series, we are publishing "Biden's Challenge, South Korea's Choice" by Dr. Chae Sung-jin, Director of EAI's Center for National Security Studies (Professor, Department of Political Science and International Relations, Seoul National University). For more detailed expert commentary, please check the link below.

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EAI aims to provide timely and in-depth analysis of current issues through Q&A sessions with experts in relevant fields. The views expressed in this interview are those of the individual expert and do not necessarily reflect the position of the East Asia Institute. Please cite the source when quoting this interview.

• Managed and Edited by: Baek Jin-kyung, Director of EAI Research Center

Inquiries: 02 2277 1683 (ext. 209) | j.baek@eai.or.kr

Video Transcript

Uh, uh, uh, uh, uh. Hello everyone. I am Jeong Gwang-jae, head of the MBN Political Desk's Foreign Affairs and Security Team. On January 20th, with the inauguration of U.S. President Biden, the Northeast Asian diplomatic landscape is being reshaped. A new East Asian order, completely different from the Trump administration, is anticipated. Today, we will discuss related issues with Dr. Chae Sung-jin, Director of EAI's Center for National Security Studies. Hello. Yes, nice to meet you. With the launch of the Biden era, people are interested in how the U.S. will return to its past diplomatic trajectory, especially after the Trump administration's unique approach. How do you anticipate this?

Indeed, the Trump administration's foreign policy differed significantly from traditional U.S. foreign policy. Domestically, it placed considerable emphasis on domestic politics, driven by populism or the far-right. Consequently, internationally, it exhibited isolationism and a considerable weakening of U.S. leadership. The Biden administration, in overcoming the legacy of the Trump administration, is pursuing policies to restore global leadership. Simultaneously, domestically, the U.S. economy and politics have significantly deteriorated due to the COVID-19 pandemic, and the administration faces the critical historical mission of revitalizing national strength. It is embarking on its term under these challenging circumstances.

This is a kind of regime change, a complete regime change. Therefore, there is considerable interest in how much of the previous administration's foreign policy will be maintained or if it will completely shift to new policies. Yes. President Trump became the candidate with the most votes in U.S. political history, yet he lost. Indeed, voter turnout in the U.S. election was exceptionally high, demonstrating that a significant number of Americans support the Trump administration and its policies.

This is often referred to as "Trumpism." Domestically, due to various reasons such as the decline of the middle class and wealth inequality, there was significant discontent among many Americans. For a long time, U.S. administrations focused on global order while neglecting the needs of the American middle class. This led to considerable dissatisfaction. While the Biden administration is expected to pursue a highly proactive foreign policy, if this imposes a burden on the American middle class or economy, nostalgia for "Trumpism" could resurface. Therefore, the Biden administration is starting its term under circumstances where it has very little room for failure.

That is a fair assessment. Given that Biden served as Vice President for eight years under President Obama, some might expect a return to the foreign policy principles of the Obama era. What are your thoughts on this? Yes, that is partly true, but there are also significant differences. Looking at the appointments, most of the foreign policy and national security team members served in the Obama administration, and many experts have returned to government. This suggests a considerable degree of continuity in both foreign policy and domestic politics.

Yes, but the Obama administration, despite the 2008 economic crisis, still had strong U.S. leadership and Trump was not yet in office. However, the current Biden administration faces a significant decline in national power. The economic initiative has been impacted by COVID-19, and the Biden administration is confronted with formidable domestic political challenges. Most importantly, the rise of China is a critical variable. President Obama, in 2013, pursued a

Yes, one could say there is a degree of that. During the Trump era, Trump's approach was somewhat impulsive and aggressive. However, Biden's personality and the overall policy direction of his administration seem different. How do you foresee U.S.-China relations in the Biden era? The Trump administration, unlike the Obama administration, clearly defined China as a strategic competitor. It strongly believed that U.S. leadership could not be maintained without curbing China's growth to some extent. In trade disputes, the U.S. had a significant trade deficit with China, and while a phase one trade agreement was reached on January 15th of last year to address this, it did not resolve the fundamental issues. For example, although the U.S. trade deficit with China was partially reduced, the overall trade deficit remained severe, indicating that pressuring China alone would not solve the U.S.'s economic problems. However, given China's continued challenges in other areas, the Biden administration, like the Trump administration, clearly perceives China as a strategic competitor. Therefore, if there is one area where the Biden and Trump administrations will show continuity, it will be in their China policy. While Trump's approach was often indiscriminate, Biden may adopt a more sophisticated approach, leveraging China's weaknesses, such as human rights issues or the situation in Urumqi, Tibet, to exert pressure.

Yes, that is correct. China, in turn, is pursuing its own order and a "China model," seeking international consensus through its COVID-19 response model and economic solutions. Nevertheless, many of China's policies undermine existing norms or raise human rights concerns. Upon its inauguration, the Biden administration is forming a "global democratic alliance" to challenge China's weaknesses and problematic policies. In the East Asian context, it is strengthening existing alliances to counter China's growing military power, particularly its naval expansion. This is a significant effort. President Trump, when you consider the U.S.'s national strength as 100, what is China's national strength at present? Economically, based on PPP (Purchasing Power Parity), China has already surpassed the U.S.

Economically, based on PPP (Purchasing Power Parity), China has already surpassed the U.S. Projections indicate that by 2050, China will undoubtedly be the leading economy. However, it is difficult to assess national strength solely by economic size. In terms of defense spending, China spends one-third of the U.S. amount, meaning the U.S. still holds a significant lead. Particularly in technological innovation and weaponry, the U.S. has an overwhelming advantage. Therefore, in terms of overall comprehensive strength, the U.S. still leads. By what margin does China trail? It's about 50% behind, or perhaps more than 50%. Around 60% to 70% of the U.S.'s strength. No nation has ever come this close to U.S. hegemony since the Soviet Union, Japan, or Germany.

In terms of overall national strength, the Soviet Union was a considerably weaker nation compared to the U.S. Japan's economy caught up, and in terms of per capita GDP, Japan surpassed the U.S. However, in terms of overall size, Japan lagged far behind. Thus, China is the first competitor in a long time to approach the U.S. in overall size. Do Americans perceive this and harbor concerns about China? Not necessarily. Relations with China were also close. During the Obama administration, there was a "new model great power relationship" with China, and many areas for cooperation existed.

North Korea's nuclear program was one such area. There were many areas of cooperation between the U.S. and China, such as in the Arctic or cyberspace. However, the Trump administration's policies and, particularly, the COVID-19 pandemic, originating in China, have significantly worsened U.S. public perception. The initial response by China was incomprehensible to many Americans, and their approach to human rights issues also differed. Consequently, in the past year, U.S. public opinion towards China has sharply deteriorated. This is perhaps because as China becomes more active on the world stage, it reveals its lack of political and cultural appeal to assume global leadership. During the Trump administration, there were conflicts related to technology, such as Huawei and other IT sectors. What will be the key issues in the Biden era? In terms of technology, 5G is crucial. With the advent of the Fourth Industrial Revolution, most economies and militaries will become unmanned or automated. The core foundational technology for this is semiconductors and the equipment utilizing them, such as 5G. If the U.S. does not secure a dominant position in this area, and if China gains a significant advantage, it will fall far behind in future competition. Therefore, technology is a critical economic issue.

In terms of military conflict in Asia, there are four flashpoints: the East China Sea, the South China Sea, cross-strait relations with Taiwan, and the Korean Peninsula. Among these, China holds a military advantage in cross-strait relations due to proximity and familiarity with Taiwan. Consequently, China is gradually pursuing a strategy to push the U.S. out of Asia, moving towards the Pacific. The starting point for this is Taiwan. If an accidental military conflict erupts between the U.S. and China in Taiwan, it would be geographically very close to South Korea. Given the implications for the U.S. Forces Korea, this is an area that requires our careful attention. Furthermore, due to the technological and economic competition between the U.S. and China, some argue that our companies are benefiting more from this situation. In the context of global supply chains, the search for alternatives to China is leading to opportunities for our manufacturing sector. Does this U.S.-China technological competition benefit Korean companies?

It has both positive and negative aspects. For instance, the U.S. has enacted legislation to prevent semiconductor companies, including Korean ones that utilize U.S. technology, from exporting their products to China. This is part of the "clean tech network." In this regard, the Chinese market is very important for Korea, and the inability to freely access the Chinese market presents a disadvantage. On the other hand, the U.S. fully supports companies with advanced semiconductor technology, such as those in Korea and Taiwan, which could lead to increased market share, presenting an advantage. However, in the long term, if a decoupling occurs between the U.S. and China, establishing the economic relationship between Korea and China will be a very difficult issue. Regarding this, how will the U.S. cooperate with the South Korean government on Korean Peninsula policy and denuclearization? The environment is likely to be completely different from the Trump era. What are your thoughts on this? As you know, the Trump administration's officials were not deeply involved in the North Korean nuclear issue or well-acquainted with North Korea. President Trump, as mentioned in his book "The Art of the Deal," was confident that one-on-one deals could resolve complex issues, and this yielded some results. For example, the Singapore summit on June 12, 2018, was a bilateral agreement through a summit that previous presidents could not have imagined, and it could serve as a good starting point. However, there were significant difficulties in implementing follow-up measures.

There were significant difficulties in implementing follow-up measures. Therefore, the question is whether we can restart from that point. President Biden has also stated that the success of the follow-up measures after the Singapore agreement is crucial. Obama administration officials are largely highly specialized experts who are very familiar with the North Korean nuclear issue and North Korea. Some hold a hardline stance, arguing that sanctions are necessary to bring North Korea to the negotiating table. Their approaches and perceptions of North Korea differ. Therefore, establishing a partnership between the South Korean government and the Biden administration regarding the North Korean nuclear issue will be challenging, unlike in the Trump era.

In that sense, perhaps it would have been easier for the current South Korean government to align its North Korea policy with the Trump administration's approach. Yes, there is certainly that aspect. One of the reasons the North Korean nuclear issue remains unresolved is North Korea's perception of the U.S.'s hostile policy towards it, its belief that the U.S. desires its collapse, and that the U.S. does not want to establish political relations and coexist. However, since the U.S. President met with Chairman Kim Jong-un and promised to establish new relations, it represented a groundbreaking breakthrough. This is a policy change due to the change in U.S. administration; the continuity of policy is broken. We need to wait and see. Some argue that the Singapore agreement, or the Panmunjom Declaration, involves establishing new political relations between North Korea and the U.S. There is an opinion that if the Biden administration formally inherits this, it could lead to a certain level of mutual trust between North Korea and the U.S. However, for North Korea to abandon its nuclear weapons, thorough verification and complete declaration of its nuclear arsenal are necessary, which North Korea has consistently refused. Therefore, we need to see if North Korea intends to rebuild North Korea-U.S. relations through denuclearization with such a level of trust. Furthermore, at the 8th Party Congress, North Korea spoke of "strength against strength," demanding that the U.S. first show goodwill and withdraw its hostile policy towards North Korea's regime before engaging in cooperation. Therefore, it remains to be seen whether the U.S. will approach this with such goodwill.

Regarding the ROK-U.S. alliance, Biden has stated that he values alliances. However, the defense cost-sharing negotiations, which have been ongoing since 2019, have yet to be concluded. How will the ROK-U.S. alliance, including defense cost-sharing, change in the Biden era? I believe it will change considerably. Beyond defense costs, if we consider the broader issue of sharing security burdens and expanding the mission and function of the ROK-U.S. alliance, defense costs are only a part of it. President Trump, from his perspective, did not see South Korea's contribution to U.S. security or East Asian security as significant; rather, the monetary amount was important. Therefore, the Biden administration, which evaluates the utility of alliances from a different perspective, not necessarily out of altruism, is likely to seek a rational resolution on defense costs, possibly within a range of around 13% increase from the previous year, as proposed by the South Korean government. However, a more critical issue is that the Biden administration views its Asian allies as crucial for containing China and maintaining the status quo in Asia. To achieve this, it will likely demand significant contributions from the U.S. Forces Korea and South Korea. The question of how South Korea views the ROK-U.S. alliance for the broader Asian order, beyond the North Korean issue, is a significant challenge for us.

It was too difficult to achieve, so the question is whether we can restart from there. The President also mentioned yesterday whether follow-up measures after the Singapore agreement could be successful, which is a key point. Most of the Obama administration's officials are highly specialized experts who know the North Korean nuclear issue and North Korea very well. Some also hold the hardline view that sanctions must be imposed on North Korea for it to come to the negotiating table. Therefore, their approaches differ, and their perceptions of North Korea also differ. This means there are difficulties in establishing a partnership between our government and the Biden administration regarding the North Korean nuclear issue, which will be very different from the Trump era.

In that regard, perhaps it would have been easier for the current government to proceed in line with former President Trump's North Korea policy, given the current government's stance on North Korea policy. Yes, there are certainly such aspects. One of the reasons why the North Korean nuclear issue remains unresolved is the perception that the U.S. pursues a policy of hostility towards North Korea, desires North Korea's collapse, and does not want to establish political relations with North Korea. Since the U.S. President met with Chairman Kim Jong-un and promised to establish new relations, it can be seen as a breakthrough.

Given the change in administration, policy continuity should be broken. We need to wait and see. Some argue that the Singapore agreement, or the Hanoi summit, involves establishing new political relations between North Korea and the U.S. If the Biden administration nominally inherits this, it might be possible to start with a certain level of mutual trust between North Korea and the U.S. However, for North Korea to actually abandon its nuclear weapons, thorough verification of the extent of its nuclear arsenal and complete declaration are necessary, which North Korea has consistently refused. Therefore, it remains to be seen whether North Korea intends to rebuild North Korea-U.S. relations through denuclearization with such a level of trust. The 8th Party Congress also stated that if the U.S. does not show goodwill first, and if it does not show its intention to withdraw its hostile policy towards North Korea and coexist with the North Korean regime, then North Korea will not engage. Therefore, from the U.S. perspective,

we need to wait and see whether it will start with such goodwill. Regarding the ROK-U.S. alliance, Biden has stated that allies respect each other's values. However, the defense cost-sharing negotiations, which began in 2019, have not yet been concluded. How will the ROK-U.S. alliance, including defense cost-sharing negotiations, change in the Biden era? It is expected to change significantly. If we consider the broader issue of sharing overall security burdens, not just defense costs, and look at the overall mission or function of the ROK-U.S. alliance, defense costs are only a part of it. From President Trump's perspective, South Korea's contributions to U.S. security or East Asian security were not clearly visible, and the amount of money was important.

This is a significant challenge that the current administration must address. What advice can you offer the current administration regarding its policy towards the U.S.? First, the initial engagement with the Biden administration will be crucial. The Biden administration is entering its first year, and President Biden himself has spoken about taking a measured approach. Whether it's Vice President Harris or a new president re-elected through the Democratic primaries, the Democratic Party is planning for eight years. Therefore, even if that does not happen, the U.S. will likely adjust its pace with a long-term perspective. Our government, however, faces an election this year and needs to achieve tangible foreign policy results. The North Korean issue is likely the most visible and achievable. Therefore, we are likely to focus on linking the ROK-U.S. alliance with the North Korean nuclear issue and discussing it centered on the Korean Peninsula. Former President Trump's memoirs and other accounts suggest that the current South Korean government is solely focused on the North Korean issue, neglecting broader U.S. concerns in Asia and China, despite being an ally. This is not entirely accurate.

Therefore, it is necessary to dispel that perception and lay the groundwork for new cooperation with the Biden administration on a long-term East Asian strategy, not just the North Korean issue. This requires preparation. I believe it is important for the current administration to develop a long-term U.S. strategy, not just focused on the next year. Considering your remarks, the U.S. is likely taking a long-term view, while the current administration has only about a year and a half left. This difference in temporal perspective could lead to some difficulties. Yes, there could be difficulties, particularly concerning the pace and schedule.

However, if our government prepares well, the U.S. also intends to resolve the North Korean nuclear issue over eight years, recognizing it as a medium- to long-term problem. Therefore, even with differing timelines, if we can develop short-term plans for achievable problem-solving, it does not necessarily mean conflict. What is more important, however, is the U.S.-China relationship and China strategy. The previous approach of "hedging," simultaneously considering both the U.S. and China as partners, is gradually becoming less feasible. That seems to be the case. Yes. It seems to be the case. Uh, uh, uh, uh.

The previous approach of "hedging," simultaneously considering both the U.S. and China as partners, is gradually becoming less feasible. That seems to be the case. Yes. It seems to be the case. Uh, uh, uh, uh.

However, if our government prepares well, the U.S. also intends to resolve the North Korean nuclear issue over eight years, recognizing it as a medium- to long-term problem. Therefore, even with differing timelines, if we can develop short-term plans for achievable problem-solving, it does not necessarily mean conflict. What is more important, however, is the U.S.-China relationship and China strategy. The previous approach of "hedging," simultaneously considering both the U.S. and China as partners, is gradually becoming less feasible. That seems to be the case. Yes. It seems to be the case. Uh, uh, uh, uh.

The previous approach of "hedging," simultaneously considering both the U.S. and China as partners, is gradually becoming less feasible. That seems to be the case. Yes. It seems to be the case. Uh, uh, uh, uh.