[East Asia Institute-Dialogue Culture Academy-East Asia Peace Conference Joint Academic Symposium] The Future of American Hegemony and East Asian Peace

YouTube Link: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=i1xeuRVtUWM

The East Asia Institute (President Son Yeol) jointly held the <East Asia Institute-Dialogue Culture Academy-East Asia Peace Conference Joint Academic Symposium: The Future of American Hegemony and East Asian Peace> at Somerset Palace Seoul on December 16th (Wed) with the Dialogue Culture Academy and the East Asia Peace Conference. This symposium, held to diagnose the future of American hegemony and discuss the challenges to East Asian peace in light of the emergence of the Biden administration, proceeded in two sessions: 'The Future of American Hegemony' and 'East Asian Peace: Challenges and Tasks.' Participants in each session engaged in in-depth discussions on the future of the United States, China, Japan, ASEAN, which are key actors in Korean Peninsula and East Asian peace, and the future of the regional order.

This joint academic symposium was conducted in a hybrid format, combining in-person attendance by experts with real-time online participation from the audience.

Program

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Video Script

We will now begin the East Asia Institute's Academy of Dialogue and Culture's East Asia Peace Way Joint Academic Forum on the Future of American Hegemony and East Asian Peace. Before we proceed with the forum, we will hear opening remarks from Chairman Lee Sam-yeol of the Academy of Dialogue and Culture. Please give him a big round of applause. Hello. We are currently in a meeting room on the second floor of the Ambassador Hotel. The speakers and panelists are seated here, and the technical staff facilitating the session are in a separate room. However, I believe that members of the Academy of Dialogue and Culture and the East Asia Peace and Cooperation Forum, as well as members of the East Asia Institute for Peace Studies, who are following this discussion nationwide via video conference, are watching this broadcast from their respective offices.

The entire world is paying close attention to the policies of the Biden administration, which will take office on January 20th next year. While there is interest in whether the U.S. can restore its reputation, tarnished by its failure to combat and respond to COVID-19, or how it will overcome the current economic crisis, the reality is that we cannot help but calculate our gains and losses by observing how the economic and military hegemonic competition between the U.S. and China unfolds on the world stage in this bipolar era and what consequences it will bring.

Especially for South Korea, which is geographically close to China, has the largest economic relationship with it, and maintains a top-priority diplomatic and military alliance with the U.S., it is impossible not to pay the utmost attention to the U.S.'s China and North Korea policies. Currently, there is much debate about who will be appointed as the next U.S. Secretary of the Treasury or Secretary of Defense, and whether they are considered hawks or doves. For the Korean Peninsula, which has not yet overcome its confrontational and divided system amidst the end of the Cold War and globalization, we cannot help but worry about how we will endure and survive in the turbulent East Asian region where signals of a new Cold War are being sounded. We must cautiously seek a cool-headed analysis and wise strategies to turn this crisis into an opportunity.

Similar seminars and workshops on related topics are being held frequently these days. I believe this is because we all keenly feel the need for a correct analysis and wise policies regarding this situation. Although we cannot possibly discuss all policy alternatives in a few hours of dialogue, perhaps we can gain some help in newly discovering our own position and accurately grasping the current situation by conducting a more objective and rational analysis of the present reality.

We believe that the convening of this forum today by the Academy of Dialogue and Culture and the East Asia Peace and Cooperation Forum, in collaboration with the East Asia Institute, which has a long tradition and extensive research achievements, holds significant meaning in terms of linking civil society with research institutes. I would like to express my deep gratitude to the distinguished speakers and panelists who will be presenting and discussing today. I also extend my warm greetings and sincere thanks to the members of the East Asia Peace and Cooperation Forum, the Academy of Dialogue and Culture, and the East Asia Institute who are participating via video conference from their homes and offices due to social distancing.

I sincerely hope that this forum will provide us all with renewed resolve and courage to endure and overcome these difficult times. Thank you. Thank you. Next, we will hear welcoming remarks from Director Son Yeol of the East Asia Institute. Please give him a big round of applause. Hello. I am Son Yeol, introduced just now as the Director of the East Asia Institute. I would like to express my sincere gratitude to the honorable former Prime Minister Lee Hong-koo, Chairman Lee Sam-yeol of the Academy of Dialogue and Culture, Chairman Ha Young-sun of the East Asia Institute, Director Kim Joon-hyung of the Korea Institute for National Defense Strategy, and all the distinguished panelists who have joined us today despite the difficult circumstances.

I also extend a warm welcome to all the viewers watching online. As Chairman Lee mentioned briefly, there are indeed numerous seminars currently being held on the implications of the Biden administration's inauguration for U.S.-ROK relations and policy. I am aware that similar events are taking place elsewhere today. The East Asia Institute has also held several seminars in November on topics such as a post-election analysis, ROK-U.S. alliance issues in the post-election era, and South Korea's direction amidst U.S.-China economic conflict. Nevertheless, there is a reason why we must hold this forum today. That reason is that although the Biden administration is about to take office, from our perspective, we need to go beyond immediate alliance issues and joint North Korea policy coordination to diagnose the future of American hegemony and contemplate the future of East Asia from a broader, long-term perspective.

We believe that such contemplation and discussion are necessary. The East Asia Institute is currently undertaking projects on the future prospects of U.S.-China competition and the construction of a new civilization in the future. In about ten years, the GDPs of the U.S. and China will become comparable. And about twenty years after that, their military expenditures will also become comparable. Looking ahead to these next ten and twenty years, we are contemplating how the U.S.'s global order will change amidst these shifts in its material foundations, GDP, and military power. Will American hegemony continue to be sustained? What will be the nature of counter-hegemonic or anti-hegemonic movements? We have been continuously contemplating these issues.

Amidst this, the Academy of Dialogue and Culture and the East Asia Peace and Cooperation Forum proposed that we examine these issues from a longer-term perspective, and the East Asia Institute gladly accepted this proposal and organized this project. In fact, the issues we are discussing today go beyond the scope of what can be discussed in the numerous webinars currently flooding the internet, where U.S. and South Korean experts on Korean Peninsula affairs meet. Therefore, we have gathered here today some of the most distinguished individuals in this field in South Korea.

Therefore, I hope that this forum, lasting approximately two hours, will provide a valuable and beneficial opportunity for our viewers regarding the future of American hegemony, the future of East Asia, and the future of East Asian peace. I will now conclude my welcoming remarks. Thank you. Thank you for your insightful words. Next, we will hear congratulatory remarks from former Prime Minister Lee Yong-gu, Chairman of the East Asia Peace and Cooperation Forum. Please give him a big round of applause. I am pleased to be able to attend this event today, which brings together many people to discuss issues of national concern.

Formally, I am speaking as a representative of the East Asia Peace and Cooperation Forum, one of the organizing bodies. The reason I am here is because of the other organizing bodies. The first is the Academy of Dialogue and Culture. As you know, after the passing of Reverend Moon Ik-hwan and Pastor Kang Whan-mo, the Academy of Dialogue and Culture was established with the belief that dialogue must continue. It has been a place for many people, especially those interested in social culture and peace, to engage in dialogue. Just a few days ago, the Women's Peace Conference was also held here.

The 1960s, and so at that time, the development was difficult, but democracy was also very difficult. Because it was written with such a narrative, there were many difficult problems. Representatives of various organizations gathered and had discussions. In that period, a certain pastor was greatly influenced. After that pastor passed away recently, he established the Peace Forum. He emphasized that peace is most important, both between North and South Korea and in Asia. He also said that international order is important in every era. He created the Peace Forum, and before he passed away, he called me and said, 'This Peace Forum has become like this, so...'

He entrusted this to me. I have inherited it now, but it's too much for me alone. It's a huge problem with many opinions. So, how can we make this a reality? Because there were many difficulties, I asked for help from many elders and colleagues and established the Peace Forum. And we decided to continue the dialogue on many issues with Tae-hwa and G. Regarding religion, as you all know, Pastor Kang and Elder Kim Son-chung have been working together, so everyone is helping.

Centered around the members of Jeongdong Church, it would be good to have a good time, but even after that, because I am in charge of Tae-hwa, I am currently in a position where I cannot easily refuse if our chairman, Lee Seong-yeol, says he will do something. Also, the East Asia Institute is here. Recently, Professor Seong-gyeol gave a lecture with a similar title. It's a very good thing, but looking at the preparation alone, it's not often that experts carefully prepare and propose a topic for Tae-hwa.

It's truly good, and what's more related is that when the East Asia Institute was founded, I was the chairman. So, although I don't do anything myself, I served as the first chairman for 10 years. Then, Professor Woo Sung-gyeol, who has been working hard, became the director. Professor Jeong also went to the institute, and Professor Son Yeol-ro, who just appeared, developed it into an excellent research institute where scholars can conduct academic reviews by inviting relevant people in a way that suits the situation. I served as chairman, and my last words were that we must finish the East Asia Peace Conference, which is not a legal entity, within the year.

Specifically, it was to commemorate the 100th anniversary of the March 1st Movement and reconsider East Asian peace. Because if you look at the March 1st Independence Declaration, the most emphasized point is peace. Our independence is important, but it's because Korean independence is only possible with East Asian peace, and without Korean independence, there is no East Asian peace. This is the logic that Reverend An Jung-geun wrote in a precious book shortly before his death in Yeosu Prison. We have inherited much of that, but I was worried that we didn't know it well at the time. Politics, society, and many people...

So, we decided to do something, and for the 50th anniversary, we held the East Asia Peace Conference. Then, former Prime Minister [Name] came and gave a speech. Chinese Chairman [Name] also attended. It wasn't a formal conference, but we gathered and discussed it. Since it was a peace conference, there was no chairman. However, they asked me to sit in the center as a representative. So, the former Speaker of the National Assembly and others were there. They gave me the title of moderator.

Or, since I was sitting in the center, I was the moderator. The East Asia Peace Conference also had a constructive meeting last summer with Japanese elders and experts, who felt that things couldn't go on like this. We have received very good news recently. If things go well, we might be able to constructively promote efforts to improve current relations between the two countries by involving elders from both sides and those directly related to the issue. We are also making such efforts. However, the most urgent thing is that for all of this to go well, we need to have a certain level of understanding with the newly inaugurated US government and proceed with joint research. How will we do this? Everyone has the same thought, but it's difficult to express it precisely. The reality in Korea is that this position is considered very precious because it requires national consensus and understanding to establish such plans and strategies.

I hope that today's valuable discussion can serve as a great support and a starting point for national and public efforts. Thank you. Thank you for your kind words. Now, we will begin the first session, 'The Future of American Hegemony.' This session will be moderated by Director Son Yeo-won of the East Asia Institute. Before we begin the session, please note the following: When speaking, please briefly remove your mask. Thank you.





Hello, I am Son Yeo-won, moderating the first session.

The first session will proceed for approximately 1 hour and 20 minutes to 1 hour and 40 minutes. The overall theme of our session is 'The Future of American Hegemony.' You might wonder why we are discussing China's hegemony. In fact, recently, there has been much discussion in academic and policy circles about whether we are entering an era of US-China hegemonic competition. In other words, if the current US-China relationship is described as a strategic competition, at what point will it evolve into a hegemonic competition? Then, what will be the nature of that hegemonic competition, what will be its essence, and when will that time come? Many studies are being conducted on these topics.

In that context, regarding the future of American hegemony, if the US hegemonic order has been maintained until now, will this order continue to be maintained? Specifically, looking from the present moment to the next 10 years, up to 2030, what will be the future of America's hegemonic status? And if the US has hegemony, what kind of hegemony is it? Today, many will be discussed, such as liberal hegemony or illiberal hegemony, or will the US abandon hegemony? Within that framework, what can the US achieve in the next 10 years, in terms of its material foundations and its structure of legitimacy? We will have a session to examine the US from these perspectives.

We have five speakers today who will present and discuss. Two of them are connecting online via Zoom. Let me first introduce those who are connecting via Zoom. Professor Lee Hye-jung of Chung-Ang University will present. If she is not visible on screen, I will just introduce her. Another presenter is Director Kim Jun-hyung of the Korea Institute for National Defense Strategies, who is seated to my right. As a discussant, Professor Seo Jeong-gwon of Kyung Hee University is connecting online.

To my far left, Professor Jeon Jae-seong of Seoul National University, who will be a discussant today, and Director of the Center for National Security at the East Asia Institute. Lastly, to my right, as a discussant, Professor Cha Tae-seong of the Department of Political Science and International Relations at Sungkyunkwan University. We have two presenters for this session. Since this is a discussion, it is not a typical academic conference where papers are presented and then designated discussants provide feedback. Instead, the two presenters will provide introductory remarks for discussion for about 13 to 14 minutes, and then the remaining time will be allocated to the three discussants. Please consider this as a roundtable discussion rather than a formal academic discussion, with each discussant taking about 10 minutes. This will take approximately 1 hour and 15 minutes for the presentations and discussions.

We will have about 35 to 40 minutes remaining, during which we will engage in a second round of discussion on the themes raised in the first presentation and discussion, as well as any new topics that arise. First, let's invite Professor Lee Hye-jung of Chung-Ang University, who seems to be preparing via Zoom. Can you hear me clearly, Professor? Yes, I can hear you clearly. Thank you. Please proceed with your presentation.

Thank you. I am Lee Hye-jung from Chung-Ang University, who was just introduced. Thank you for inviting me to this meaningful event. As Mr. Lee Sam-yeol mentioned earlier, the context and purpose of today's meeting were briefly explained. In my case, I briefly worked with the policy team of the Peace Forum, which Pastor Kang Won-yong established before his passing, so I have mixed feelings. As time is limited, I will focus on three main points, as I was given 12 minutes by the organizers. If I exceed 12 minutes, I will essentially stop speaking.

The first point is to briefly address the questions posed to me, which is the first point. The second point is my thoughts on the future of American hegemony. To conclude, I believe the current crisis is an unprecedented, multi-layered crisis in the history of American hegemony. I will share my thoughts on this. The third point, among the five questions, is the challenge and opportunity for Korea. My simple answer is that the framework of Korean foreign policy and security, especially the ROK-US alliance, needs a comprehensive restructuring.

If time permits for the first and second points, I will not go into detail for the third point, as I expect there will be a third round. First, regarding the issue of the future of American hegemony, I agree with the premise of viewing it from a long-term perspective. However, I would like to make two points. First, has the fate of Korean foreign policy been intertwined with American hegemony? It is undeniable that America has been one of the most important variables in Korean foreign policy since its inception. However, American hegemony and Korean foreign policy have not always gone hand in hand. Therefore, the fundamental question is, what should be the basis of Korean foreign and security policy? In the presentation I submitted to the organizers, I quoted the last sentence of a recent article by Professor Seo Jung-gwon in 'Creation and Criticism.'

Since the organizers are not reading the entire presentation, I will read it briefly. The important thing is what we always want and how we will achieve it. Our national interest should be our top priority. America should be, and will be, one of many independent variables. Therefore, the future of American hegemony is not unimportant, but the future of American hegemony is not the entirety of Korea's problems.

There are times when Korea faces difficulties even when American hegemony is strong. This is a matter of interpretation. When we experienced the tragedies of the Korean War and the division of the peninsula, scholars studying American hegemony in the US often cited a memo by Secretary of State Dean Acheson, titled 'The Korean War: A Moment of Creation.' This was the moment of American hegemony creation, and it coincided with the Korean War. So, depending on the interpretation, our tragedy could have been a decisive moment for the construction of American hegemony. Therefore, we need to view it from that perspective. The second point is that predicting the future of hegemony is very difficult. Moreover, it depends on the definition and criteria of hegemony, and most importantly, how we view America. This is perhaps the fated task of international political scientists. In the presentation I submitted, I quoted the international political scientist John Mearsheimer, who also served as president of the International Studies Association. In 2012, Mearsheimer wrote an article in 'Foreign Affairs' reviewing a debate on the future of American hegemony.

It is quite difficult to predict the future. Another point is what hegemony is. It depends on the definition and criteria of hegemony. Most importantly, how to view the United States. The world is difficult in all these aspects. And perhaps this is akin to the destined fate of international relations scholars. In the paper I recommended, the international relations scholar, a famous person who was also the president of the International Studies Association, Hayo, in 2012, based on the debate on American hegemony, wrote a short review for the magazine 'The American Interest'.

At that time, Mearsheimer's work focused on whether American hegemony was declining or not. There are variables, and at that time, Mearsheimer believed there were known variables and unknown variables. However, there were so many unknown variables that he concluded it was better not to speculate on the future of hegemony, as it could not be accurately predicted. This serves as both a point of contention and, ultimately, my most important argument today: the current crisis in the United States is an unprecedented crisis in history. One piece of evidence for this is that what Mearsheimer did not know at the time.

Therefore, the core of what Mearsheimer did not know then was the future of competition between great powers, particularly the unknown factor of China. This was in 2012, but Mearsheimer, a brilliant international political scientist, argued in 2011 that the future of hegemony could not be predicted because China might collapse internally. Therefore, I, along with others, have revisited what I wrote about American hegemony in 2010 and 2011.

Honestly, looking back at 2010, I wonder if it was a collective failure that none of us, including myself, could have predicted the current situation in 2020. And although we talk about US-China hegemonic competition now, Mearsheimer, considered a brilliant international political scientist, stated in 2012 that he could not rashly discuss the future of American hegemony because China's system might collapse. This could be a scholar's fate. However, in line with today's discussion, Mearsheimer showed remarkable foresight in that he stated that it is uncertain whether domestic political support for American hegemony will continue.

Therefore, he advised against rashly discussing the future of American hegemony. Looking back 10 years later, domestic political support for American hegemony appears to have significantly eroded. Another important issue is whether what Mearsheimer took for granted in 2012 is still valid today. This is something I have discussed with the organizers and participants. Among the many things he assumed, a crucial point related to today's discussion is that international politics cannot be properly organized without a leading nation exercising leadership.

This leads to the 'tragedy of the commons' problem. Leadership must come from a capable and democratic nation, and only the US has such capability. Nations that are not democratic are inherently unstable. In today's world, it is questionable whether the US has the domestic political and economic support to exercise leadership. Furthermore, is democracy itself a stable system? This is a question that has arisen globally, especially in developed Western countries. Regarding the East Asian Peace Theory, which Professor Lee Hong-gu briefly mentioned earlier, since the late 19th century, Western imperialism has disrupted the China-centric order in this region. The question is whether the market economy, as established by the West's civilization standards, is functioning properly, and whether democracy is functioning properly, especially in contrast to China's rapid resolution of these issues. This is a stark contrast.

I believe there was a decisive problem. Moving on to the second point of my argument, the question is how much Trump's influence has waned and how much Biden can recover. My view on Trump is that he is a result of the structural problems inherent in American society, and he has amplified those structural problems. Economically, the problem stems from the accumulation of structural issues with neoliberalism since the 2008 financial crisis. This has led to economic polarization and the collapse of the middle class. The biggest external policy problem arising from this is the principle of 'harmony of interests,' which I analyze as follows: For American hegemony and leadership to be sustained, there must be a harmony of interests between two aspects: the US's hegemonic policies abroad and the concrete interests of the American middle class. However, Trump's significant impact was to shatter this by arguing that protecting allies like South Korea and Japan, or engaging in free trade, is not in the interest of the white working class in the American middle class. This is a situation where the principle of harmony of interests has been broken domestically. As a result, globalism is in conflict with 'America First,' breaking a taboo that has not been touched since the post-WWII era. Therefore, a new foundation must be built. A new domestic legitimacy mechanism must be created to explain why America should engage in global cooperation and be a global leader. And since Trump has broken this once, those who are pessimistic about the future believe there is no guarantee that another Trump will not emerge.

Therefore, Trump is currently contesting the election results, and the majority of forecasts suggest that Trump will exert a certain level of influence at least until 2024. In this case, the contracts between the US and the international community, and between the US and its allies, must be renegotiated. Regarding Biden, what I am focusing on, although I have not fully developed this thought, is that The New York Times, which can be considered representative of the mainstream liberal media in the US, did not endorse Biden during the Democratic primaries.

The New York Times, in a highly unusual move, endorsed Elizabeth Warren and Amy Klobuchar. In their editorial explaining why they supported these two candidates over Biden, they stated that the problem America is facing is that the existing order is collapsing, and therefore, a moderate candidate within the existing order is not enough. They argued that a candidate with reformist ideas capable of changing the existing order is needed, and that Biden lacks such ideas. This was the reason The New York Times did not endorse Biden.

Now, Biden is the president, and in his acceptance speech at the convention and his victory speech, Biden directly addressed four immediate crises: overcoming COVID-19, the economic crisis, racial issues, and climate change. These four crises represent a once-in-a-century pandemic since the 1918 Spanish Flu, an economic crisis not seen in decades since the Great Depression, a racial crisis not seen since the 1960s Civil Rights Movement, and climate change, which humanity is facing for the first time. Political division is a crisis not seen since the American Civil War.

The magnitude of these crises is immense. Biden must embody both reform and moderation. However, since the 1960s, there have been repeated discussions about the decline of American hegemony, but it has always been overcome. The decisive factor in overcoming it in the 1970s was reform, such as reflecting on the Vietnam War and strengthening the rule of law after Watergate. Currently, considering the domestic and international situation facing the Biden administration, it seems lacking in the capacity for such reform. Paradoxically, compared to the 1970s, if someone like Jimmy Carter had not emerged, would Biden have emerged?

Historically, Carter proposed the withdrawal of US troops from Korea and human rights diplomacy, which was a scathing critique of the existing US hegemonic order. However, Biden speaks of rebuilding leadership, but is there a similarly scathing critique? After the Iraq War and the 9/11 terrorist attacks, America's excessive military intervention, the decline of the middle class – does the leadership itself have the will or program for reform? My argument is that there is none. Historically, the crisis facing the US today is unprecedented. If reform was the decisive factor in reversing the decline of American hegemony since the 1960s, then the conditions for reform, and the leadership collective capable of driving that reform, are not visible. Furthermore, the possibility of domestic consensus on reform seems very slim.

I will conclude here. Thank you. Thank you. Next, we will proceed to the second presentation. The presenter is Director Kim Jun-hyung. Given the time constraints, I will not go through all the points in the provided materials. Please proceed with your presentation within approximately 10 to 15 minutes, perhaps addressing some of the questions raised by Professor Lee Hye-jung. Thank you for inviting me. Although the materials are extensive, I have prepared a presentation without slides. Please download the presentation materials from the data book.

Yes, I will conclude here. Thank you. Yes, thank you. We will now proceed to the second presentation. The presenter is Director Kim Shin-young. It seems like it would take too much time to go through the provided materials point by point. So, yes, you can partially address the questions raised by the previous speaker. Please give a presentation of about 10 to 15 minutes. Yes, thank you for inviting me. Although I prepared a short presentation here, I thought the provided materials were quite extensive, so I tried to create something that would fit together. Nevertheless, I created a PPT presentation. So, I recommend downloading the handout and referring to it.

There are 30 to 31 slides. I will focus on the main points. Fundamentally, from 1991 to 2019, the world order proceeded within a single context, a trend, or a paradigm. The collapse of the Cold War in 1991, and until 2001, was the era of 'unipolarity,' as the neoconservatives advocated. It was a system of absolute US dominance, and the most prominent term during that era was 'globalization.' The world experienced its golden age. During this period, the US doubled its wealth, which is entirely different from developing countries doubling their wealth. However, from then on, American hegemony and globalization began to falter. This was marked by the 9/11 attacks in 2001, which, while not dismantling America's absolute hegemony, instilled a sense of threat in the policy decisions and perceptions of leaders. It became a crucial turning point that prevented the creation of an order following the peaceful end of the Cold War.

The 2008 financial crisis directly exposed the Achilles' heel of liberal neoliberalism. Although it was overcome, the accumulation of these events led to two movements in 2016: Brexit and Trumpism. These represent the opposite of globalization, leading to a focus on self-reliance, fragmentation, and the far-right. In Europe and the US, these forces made decisions that fundamentally rejected or reversed the liberal international order. The 2019 COVID-19 pandemic paradoxically acted as a catalyst, urging humanity to make a decision about which direction to take. This is what I believe today's topic addresses. Ultimately, the liberal international order is based on three pillars: democracy, capitalism, and Pax Americana, the stable international order maintained by American hegemony. These three pillars are what constitute the liberal international order, or in better terms, integration and cooperation.

Since all three pillars are shaking, the system is facing a collapse. Globalization is disappearing, and the term 'geopolitics' is emerging. Democracy, as we know, is not functioning, and it is being said that functioning authoritarianism is better than non-functioning democracy, with China as a prime example. Adam Schmidt argues that there are no institutional safeguards to prevent democratically elected leaders from subverting democracy.

As Professor Lee mentioned earlier, democracy is not stable and is actually regressing, as evidenced by the rise of strongmen. The inequality highlighted by Thomas Piketty is the biggest contradiction and an intractable dilemma of neoliberalism. The third pillar is Pax Americana, which is now the issue of US-China hegemonic competition. These problems have persisted for decades, and Trump and Biden have acted as catalysts. Instead of restoring or rebuilding the liberal international order or devising alternative forms, the US, which initially benefited from it, has taken the lead in fragmentation and nationalism, and anti-globalization movements. This, I believe, is the problem with Trumpism.

I see three possible paths: If we move towards economic recovery, globalization will be restored. If we move towards complete fragmentation, it will be a domestic value chain, meaning each country will focus on its own interests. The third option, RVC (Regional Value Chains), involves regional cooperation or the formation of clusters. Whether these clusters will exclude China or whether regionalism will emerge, or a third path will be taken, remains unclear.

International organizations and cooperation are naturally facing crises. This is a period of 'post-truth,' as Oxford Dictionary declared 'post-truth' as its word of the year in 2016, coinciding with Brexit and Trump's election. It signifies an era where opinions and emotions prevail over facts and evidence, and where demagoguery thrives, influencing foreign policy decisions based on domestic political ideology. This plays a significant role today. Therefore, I believe that the next decade will be characterized by a state of 'rule by the mob,' and this situation could persist for decades depending on the circumstances.

Furthermore, the so-called 'neo-geopolitics' is emerging. The term 'geopolitics,' which was not heard before, is now being heard. This refers to traditional geopolitics combined with cyber technology and cyber hegemony. This will be discussed further later. US-China strategic and economic competition is already happening, along with currency and trade system conflicts, democracy versus authoritarianism, and technological warfare. Currently, the US is attacking China, while China is in a defensive posture.

Physically, in East Asia, there are four focal points where the US-China hegemonic confrontation or competition is taking shape: the Korean Peninsula, the East China Sea, China-Taiwan Strait, and the South China Sea. China is trying to break out of this encirclement, while the US is trying to contain it. This could lead to a situation where both countries engage in provocations or challenges against each other without direct conflict, possibly through blame games or strategic maneuvering. Among these, the Korean Peninsula is arguably the most important and dangerous flashpoint.

Therefore, I believe that the situation, as mentioned earlier, where democracy and wealth inequality, and national security, are not resolved or stabilized on one side, but rather coexist, will occur. Globalization and self-reliance will coexist. And instead of the U.S. and China decisively defeating each other and settling the situation, or dividing spheres of influence like the past U.S.-Soviet Union and stabilizing, the push and pull will continue. This coexistence will lead to confusion and make the world unstable. As mentioned earlier, an unstable world order will affect individual lives, not to mention domestic politics. In such a situation, people will become susceptible to demagoguery, and division, crisis awareness, and instability will define the next decade. I believe this is how it will be.

In addition, there is the so-called 'new geopolitics.' The term geopolitics, which was not heard much before, is now being heard. This is essentially the past geopolitics combined with so-called cyber hegemony, hegemony in cyberspace. I will elaborate on this point later. Strategic economic competition between the U.S. and China is actually happening, and currency and trade systems, democracy and human rights, and technological wars will occur. For now, it appears to be the U.S. attacking China, and China is in a defensive posture.

Physically, in East Asia, this is leading to a real confrontation or demarcation line between U.S. and Chinese hegemony, with four points of contention. These are the Korean Peninsula, the East China Sea, China-Taiwan, the Taiwan Strait, and the South China Sea. China is trying to break out of what is described as a '1st island chain,' and the U.S. is trying to contain it. This also has the potential to become a point of contention where, as mentioned earlier, in the process of a blame game or push and pull, the two countries avoid direct conflict while engaging in provocations or challenges to each other. Among these, the Korean Peninsula is arguably the most important and dangerous.

Regarding the Thucydides Trap and the possibility of conflict, I can only say one thing: Originally, scholars like Graham Allison and others argued, particularly regarding the Thucydides Trap, that in recent times, four out of 16 power transitions have been overcome, mostly in recent history. These scholars, being neoliberals, presented this as evidence that it could be overcome. However, it is increasingly being used to justify the inevitability of conflict. I believe that the Thucydides Trap and the concept of 'kleptocracy' are much more applicable. This is because in the past, a power that lost its hegemonic influence sought hegemonic leadership, while the US, despite having hegemonic influence, relinquished leadership due to isolationism, leading to a vacuum. This vacuum eventually led to war. Currently, China, despite lacking the capacity, is upholding the liberal international order, at least outwardly.

The US, with its inherent tendency towards exceptionalism, will lead to its own decline. There are counterarguments to this, however. The person raising the most objections is George Friedman. He argues that the US has the internal capacity for reform and will overcome this crisis, eventually surpassing China, just as it overcame Japan and the Soviet Union, leading to a new era of American global dominance. I will skip the government's reform plans.

Ultimately, the issue of technological hegemony between the US and China is the most significant in the coming century. Historically, all challengers, including Great Britain, the Soviet Union, and Japan, operated on platforms created by the US and sought to surpass them within those platforms. While China also operates within this framework for now, what if China creates its own platform? As Professor Lee mentioned, I fully agree that the US faces internal problems, leadership challenges, and a crisis of hegemony.

However, the challenge posed by China, which is unprecedented, is also significant. The term 'Sprint to the South' is being discussed. Currently, China operates on the global platform created by the US (WWW). However, if the US continues to isolate China and exclude it from global value chains, China will inevitably create its own internet ecosystem, and as mentioned in the context of neo-geopolitics, this could lead to a division in cyberspace. This is what I am trying to convey.

As you can see, the reason why the issue of currency is becoming a major problem now is that the internet, which is cyber space, actually has about 380 undersea cables laid physically. About 90 of these are being laid by China, especially in developing countries, to build infrastructure. The issue of dividing these ultimately becomes a fight over undersea cables, which are the basis of the internet. If this progresses further, and if quantum computing, as it is called, becomes a reality, and if communication systems between the US and China become completely different, the world will indeed be divided in half. Of course, all of this is still a possibility, but I believe there are new challenges in that regard.

I largely agree with the points raised by Professor Yeom and Professor Lee. To put it simply, there are three catchphrases he mentioned: 'Back to Normal,' 'One Case, One Hundred,' and 'Make America Great Again.' The problem is, can we break Trump's 'Make America Great Again'? I want to pose a question mark here. Trump was about winning battles, but could he lose the war? Can he truly be a 'reflection point,' as he himself called it, a turning point? I don't think it will be easy in the current US society. Especially concerning China, which is outside the platform, we must also consider whether pushing China too hard might actually provide a stimulus or motivation for them to build a new platform.

Finally, it is about the issue of currency. I still do not believe it is a new Cold War, and I consciously avoid using the frame of a new Cold War. However, the potential is still there, and if it escalates, I believe many countries, including Korea, will drift further apart. There is a saying I like: 'The logic of war is power, and power is essentially limitless; the logic of peace is proportionality, and proportionality implies moderation. Success in war is victory; success in peace is stability. The condition for victory is commitment; the condition for stability is restraint. Peace is not the product of coercion and submission, but of mutual understanding.' Ultimately, in this era of uncertainty, the way to maintain peace is through the collective leadership of the second-tier and third-tier countries to create a buffer, or to prevent the US and China from reaching an extreme division. The role of the second-tier and third-tier countries becomes very important. I will conclude here.

Thank you very much, Director Moon. Both of you have presented, and you have raised many issues. Among the various issues, the first point we need to continue to discuss is the future of hegemony. Regarding the fact that the 'social contract' that supports hegemony within the US has been broken, many people agree. But is there no way to rebuild it? Professor Yeom stated that it is not possible during Biden's four years and gave reasons for it. What is even more interesting is that you mentioned that both Biden's diagnosis and prescription are currently incorrect. Professor Seo will discuss this further, and I would like to ask you to speak more concretely about US domestic politics. Second, the second issue, which I believe really needs to be discussed a lot,

This goes beyond the crisis of American hegemony to a crisis of America itself. This diagnosis, which is unprecedented in history, is likely to be a highly controversial issue. And finally, Director Kim Joon-young mentioned that the current system, which is difficult to even call 'normal,' the international system or international order, is heading towards chaos and decline. You predicted that this will be the case for the next 10 years. I believe further discussion is needed on this point.

With that said, Professor Seo Jung-kwang, who is connected online, please join us. Yes, can you hear me? Yes, I can hear you. Please proceed. You have 10 minutes. I will keep my remarks brief, as Professor Seo mentioned earlier. First, I would like to thank Kyung Hee University for giving me this good opportunity to speak. As I listen to the discussions, it seems that while the topic is American hegemony, everyone else here, except for me, is a specialist in China, and I am the only one studying American politics. However, this is a phenomenon that occurs everywhere, not just in the US or Korea. So, on one hand, it's a bit less burdensome because I'm a minority, but I also feel that scholars of American politics should perhaps speak up more.

Earlier, Professor Link, Professor Bahk, and others spoke about the concept of hegemony and its domestic implications. In fact, over the past four years, we have engaged in discussions on international issues at the public level, including the pursuit of hegemony. Therefore, for Americans who have experienced such conflicts, what exactly is hegemony? This is something we should reflect on. What I thought was that during the Cold War, hegemony for Americans was somewhat akin to an 'us vs. them' mentality, but after the Cold War ended, it became a rather ambiguous concept. While we are very familiar with the term 'hegemony' and its direct translation, it's unlikely that foreigners use it in their daily lives.

So, what is this? Is it 'USA uses 2' or something else? The concept of hegemony itself, and the American understanding of American hegemony, could be in a very different context than what we imagine. I'd like to start by raising this issue. President Trump has reduced foreign policy issues to personal, electoral, and public opinion matters. In this situation, the foreign policy establishment in Washington, the think tanks, and so on, although often mentioned in books, have become relatively marginalized. Will these people re-emerge in the Biden era, or will the experiences of the past few years lead to criticism of their roles and positions? We can consider these questions. Secondly, predicting the future of U.S. foreign policy and hegemony in the Biden era is something I'd like to discuss.

Although I am speaking now, when we consider the context of U.S. foreign policy, can we analyze it within a four-year presidential term, or is the actual time available to them simply 2021? This is not to say that Biden is old or that the single-term presidency is a given. After all, the U.S. President, like the U.S. policy establishment, has a certain 'expectation gap.' People think the world will change when the president changes, but even when the president changes, nothing really changes. This is similar to the situation with the South Korean presidency. Therefore, rather than assuming that the Biden era will naturally bring about change, we will see the presidential election campaign heating up in 2023 as candidates emerge from both parties. This will become the main focus of the election.

Another question is whether the U.S. actually possesses a foreign policy 'DNA.' The more I study U.S. foreign policy, the less I find it to be a country with a foreign policy DNA. The U.S. has taken many actions that make it difficult to see it as such. In fact, the first stage of the U.S.'s rise to global leadership was the Cold War. After World War II, the U.S.'s worldview and its understanding of the international order were largely shaped by the ideological competition between the two superpowers, their alliances, and their ideologies. Therefore, the U.S.'s foreign policy and international relations are quite narrow. A country without this foreign policy DNA, and with the disappearance of China's threat, can it truly pursue coexistence and cooperation, which are very dynamic in international relations, under Biden? I am very skeptical about this.

I have listened carefully to Director Lee's presentation. I would like to add a couple of points and then ask some questions. Regarding the possibility of U.S. multilateralism and international cooperation, Director Lee explained it in detail. Where can we find the domestic support for the multilateralism and international cooperation that the U.S. can drive? What I found interesting was that immediately after Biden's election, the U.S. rejoined the WHO. From my perspective, this was possible because the suburban voters' support was clear in Biden's election. Therefore, he was able to make foreign policy decisions regarding the international order, or at least the re-establishment of the international order, such as rejoining the WHO. However, these same suburban voters supported Trump in 2016. In 2018, they voted for the Democratic Party because of the Affordable Care Act. In 2020, they voted for Biden because of COVID-19.

So, what is the scope for analyzing foreign policy or international relations centered on suburban voters? This is something we can consider. No one interprets the results of this election as a call for the restoration of U.S. international leadership. In fact, issues like the war in Iraq or the situation in Afghanistan in September and October were never election issues. In this situation, how much room does Biden have to move forward? I am somewhat skeptical. Also, regarding the 'hegemony crisis trifecta' that you mentioned, you summarized it so well that I thought I should definitely mention it when teaching students later. My thought is, is this excessive militarism and excessive American exceptionalism a characteristic of the U.S. hegemony crisis, or has it always been a characteristic of U.S. hegemony? I think we need to distinguish between these. Since the Cold War era, the U.S. has...

What we consider characteristics of U.S. hegemony, and whether these are part of the crisis, might lead to a broad interpretation of U.S. hegemony, but it could be difficult to logically define how it faces a crisis. Furthermore, the domestic evaluation of the hegemony crisis – many people talk about this, but they don't discuss it: the hegemony crisis, or the decline of the U.S.?

What is the domestic evaluation of these issues? For example, some say we should give up hegemony, while others advocate for maintaining it. As you mentioned, most surveys show strong support for 'shared leadership.' So, the problem starts here. If we talk about shared leadership, for example, Obama's 'leading from behind' was heavily criticized by the media and conservative media.

There is a clear gap between the consensus of the elite and the content that leadership can pursue. This might be a characteristic of U.S. hegemony. Regarding Professor Lee's presentation, I would like to add one more point. You spoke a lot about American democracy, and the U.S. is a country of elections. With federal elections every two years, who decides the direction of U.S. foreign policy or hegemony? Is it decided by public opinion? Or, as we have often discussed, is it decided by the relationship between the executive and legislative branches? Or, as we have always known, is it decided by a small group of elites? The relative weight of these various variables has changed since the end of the Cold War, the failure of the Iraq War, and the global financial crisis. I feel that the relative importance or the way these factors are weighed has changed.

Since time is limited, I will conclude by saying that the argument for restoring alliances advocated by Biden is clearly not an argument to return to the Cold War era. We need to recognize this clearly. The failure of the Iraq War, the global financial crisis, and the Trump administration have made it highly unlikely that the U.S. will return to the liberal international order we knew. In my opinion, it is possible to reach a consensus on a new order after the Cold War and the post-Cold War era.

I believe it is impossible. Therefore, I think it is realistically irresponsible and strategically dangerous to not critically evaluate the U.S. hegemony, which is currently in decline, and to perceive our alliances as unchanging. This is similar to the automotive industry that Professor Lee mentioned. I would like to add one more point: the issue of the 'Freedom Speaker Act.' For example, although it may seem like a minor issue now, the recent passage of the bill to ban the distribution of leaflets to North Korea has caused a huge uproar in Washington among those who were unaware of the situation. Later, I will elaborate on this, but what I want to convey is this: while we have some concerns about freedom of expression and the press, the general public opinion is that banning leaflets to North Korea is excessive and counterproductive. However, in the U.S., this issue is viewed...

They view this issue from a very different perspective. That is, the Korean perspective and the U.S. perspective, Korea's interests and U.S. interests are different. Starting from this difference, can we persuade the conservative hardliners in the U.S. by going to Washington? Absolutely not. However, what I want to argue is that we need to speak clearly, actively, and confidently about what we are doing regarding North Korea and our foreign policy, what we want, and why we are doing it.

I would like to conclude my remarks here. Thank you. It is perfectly fine to go over two minutes. Thank you for your presentation. Next, Professor Jeon Ju-seong will provide commentary. When you provide your commentary, please address one point: the U.S. foreign policy and hegemony policy have been significantly reduced to military politics. This is one perspective, a 'hard power' image. However, from another perspective, a 'soft power' image, what happens? Especially after the U.S. presidential election, the Biden administration faces many domestic issues that must pass through Congress, making it very difficult in the fragmented U.S. political landscape. However, foreign policy is an area that can be pursued without going through Congress or domestic political processes, so there is room for maneuver. Therefore, please add your comments regarding the balance between domestic and international affairs in foreign policy.

Yes, that's right. I have listened carefully to both presentations. Both presentations were very insightful and raised fundamental issues, so I learned a lot and had a good listening experience. Professor Lee is also here. The topic is hegemony, which presents a very difficult challenge. As Professor Lee mentioned in her presentation, the first topic I would like to discuss is whether the term 'hegemony' or the role of hegemony continues to exist in the same way as in the 20th century.

The concept of hegemony, originating in international relations theory, can be traced back to scholars like Gilpin, but it has been defined as a great power that possesses overwhelming power to control the actions of other states and to establish norms and rules. The post-Cold War era, spanning the last thirty years, has been considered a typical period of hegemony. As a result, U.S. hegemony has become extremely fragile. Many conclude that U.S. hegemony has weakened due to the flawed policies pursued during the post-Cold War period, including the policies of the Trump administration.

So, the expectation is that the Biden administration will make a different choice and revive hegemony. I think that's also a possibility. But I want to think a bit more fundamentally. As Professor Kim Ji-won mentioned earlier, when hegemony exists, international politics is relatively stable. We've often said this. But when hegemony disappears, the possibility of war increases, which is true. However, to what extent is peace and stability guaranteed when hegemony exists? While hegemony acts as a final arbiter or ultimate deterrent, in this rapidly changing era, can hegemony, even if it exists, guarantee a certain level of peace and stability? I think that's a different question.

The past 30 years of international politics seem to have been a period of transition to global politics. In that sense, globalization began, and many forces beyond national borders have been at play. The Asian financial crisis, the 2008 financial crisis, and the COVID-19 pandemic were all issues within a globalized world. All countries, including the United States, and US international politics, viewed the past 30 years from the perspective of hegemony. So, why has it become like this, when the past 30 years should have been very stable?

Perhaps the current bewilderment stems from viewing the world only through the lens of international relations and not global politics. Therefore, while hegemony plays a role and is possible in international politics, its role is severely limited in the era of global politics, and perhaps hegemony itself is impossible. It is too much for one country to produce global public goods. Therefore, perhaps a deeper trap exists within the forces. In that sense, even with the Biden administration in power, it's not a problem that can be solved by pursuing past policies.

We often analyze US grand strategy across various spectra. Professor Lee Jung-hoon clearly outlined the spectrum of China strategies and world strategies within the US. I would like to ask if we are living in an era where problems can be solved within that framework. Second, regarding the critique of neoliberal globalization, which you have both elaborated on, neoliberal globalization has become a crucial economic foundation for US hegemony.

From the Washington Consensus in 1990, globalization has seen various versions. Just as we talk about varieties of democracy or capitalism in English, we also talk about varieties of globalization. The globalization we pursued was neoliberal globalization. Within this, there is not only economic globalization but also population movement due to technological advancements, and the homogenization of the world, among other aspects of globalization. However, it feels like we are reaching the limits of the contradictions within neoliberal globalization. This was revealed through the financial crisis, and although we thought it could be resolved, it couldn't be. As mentioned earlier by Lee On-nyul and the New York Times, we are facing structural limitations that prevent reviving globalization within neoliberal globalization. Therefore, we are inevitably moving towards a different version of globalization, and the COVID-19 pandemic is, in any case, a crisis that necessitates a different kind of globalization. In that sense, demands for a different kind of globalization are emerging.

We are entering an era that demands a different kind of globalization. However, the US response has been inadequate. For example, neoconservatives sought to revitalize neoliberalism through geopolitical expansion, and there was a collusion between economic interests and political ones in the liberal internationalist camp. However, this was too structural a problem to be attributed to a single nation. In fact, reforms to neoliberalism began in the late 1970s. Thus, looking at indices like the Human Development Index released by the UN, paradoxically, North America shows the greatest decline in the human development index. This is because the income gap is widening, and the Anglo-Saxon capitalism, as we call it, has many structural factors. As Professor Sohn Yeo-sung, our moderator, knows much more about this, in this regard, another problem facing hegemony today is a crisis in accumulation within the entire historical bloc, as discussed in the hegemony discourse of the so-called Gramscian school. This also needs to be overcome.

In this context, when we talk about a crisis of hegemony, I believe there is a more fundamental problem. Relatedly, you mentioned the issue of democracy versus authoritarianism, which is quite debatable. For example, in the case of South Korea, despite some issues with epidemic control, I believe it has been relatively successful. While the success of South Korea is attributed to the Confucian model or its citizens' culture, in reality, democratic virtues as public citizens have taken root in South Korea. Broadly speaking, is it a problem with the democratic model, leadership, individuals, or various cultural factors? Due to the confrontation between the US and China, we tend to simplify it, but I don't think that's the case.

Furthermore, we need to consider the various reasons why the Arab Spring failed in the Middle East, the problems arising from democracy in small states, and the issues of populism emerging from anti-globalization sentiments. It is difficult to easily conclude that a world order centered on authoritarianism is more practical or effective simply because democracy exists in the West. Lastly, with about a minute left, when considering the significance of the Biden administration, it is important to position it within the context of the US's previously failed responses. Many American commentators are now saying that a single election is insufficient to resolve the problems the US has faced so far.

However, there is also debate about whether the foundations of hegemony have completely collapsed. Public opinion polls show the importance of leadership. Consequently, future international politics will require very different forms of leadership. If this is a means to revive US hegemony through autonomy or alliances, the success rate is low. Rather, it is about the US supporting coalitions that can fulfill a hegemonic role, albeit with significantly limited power, which could be termed 'meta-steering' in English. The Biden administration may lay the groundwork for such a direction. I believe this is the perspective from which we can view it. Thank you.

Thank you. Then, our final discussant, Professor Lee Jung-hoon, please proceed. Thank you. I am Lee Jung-hoon from Sungkyunkwan University. Both previous speakers have provided very broad and comprehensive perspectives on the past, present, and future of US hegemony. I don't have any particular points of disagreement or alternative opinions. However, I would like to highlight or delve deeper into two points for the sake of discussion.

One is about US domestic politics, and the other is about evaluating the Trump administration to understand America's future. Both of these points were heavily emphasized in both presentations. It was suggested that to understand the future of US hegemony, it is crucial to understand the ongoing developments within the US. I believe we need to focus particularly on the realignment of US politics, that is, how American political parties are being reorganized. This is ultimately connected to how the United States conceives of its own identity and national role. I believe this will be a crucial factor in the future of US hegemony. The discussion about party realignment implies the need to examine the transformation of the Republican Party. While it is often said that the Republican Party has now become completely 'Trumpified' or has transformed into a Trumpist party, this transformation was observable even before Trump. Particularly after the 2008 financial crisis, as you may recall, the Tea Party movement emerged, which manifested as a radicalization or populist transformation of the Republican Party. As an important theoretical or ideological resource for this populism, nationalism, or more precisely, racism, has become prominent. The Republican Party, as we knew it, as a traditional conservative party, or as a party of neoconservatism or neoliberal economics, has transformed into a party with far-right populist and, to some extent, racist implications.

I would like to draw attention to this transformation. Especially, the Trump era has further deepened the changes in the Republican Party. While the US domestic political landscape continues to operate within the two-party system, the fundamental question is what the Democratic and Republican parties are competing over. It is about the nature of the United States itself: What kind of country is America? What role should America play in world history? There has been a profound shift in these questions. Therefore, instead of focusing solely on an individual like Trump or his leadership, we should view Trump as a symptom and pay attention to the changes in the Republican Party that he represented, and further, to the shifts in the fault lines of American politics as a whole. How will the Republican Party move after Trump's departure? How will the forces supporting the Republican Party engage in American politics? We need to pay attention to these aspects. This is not only a change in US domestic politics but also has the potential to alter America's conception of its international role in world politics. Therefore, it is a crucial focus. Scholars like Ibby Polzing have, for example, used the expression 'the end of the liberal international order.'

Scholars like Walter Russell Mead have described the US as a 'log-superpower.' Ultimately, the rise of illiberal forces within American politics, influencing US foreign policy through the Republican Party, has led to the abandonment of the existing liberal hegemonic doctrine and liberal internationalism, and the emergence of illiberal or realist foreign policies. We have already witnessed such changes during the Trump era. The changes in US domestic politics and the Republican Party have influenced US grand strategy. Therefore, I would like to discuss this point further. In particular, regarding what Director Kim Jun-young mentioned about the 'Thucydides Trap,' one of the important traps we now recognize in evaluating US foreign policy during the interwar period is that it was not just about evaluating America's objective capabilities or comprehensive national power, but rather how America used its power was a crucial factor. As you know, the US already possessed the economic power of the third-largest economy during the interwar period. However, as you know, due to a lack of willingness to manage global hegemony or provide public goods, a tragedy occurred. Even now, while many efforts are made to compare US and Chinese national power, perhaps more important is whether the US, regardless of its power, will use that power in the same liberal hegemonic or liberal internationalist manner as before. This needs to be evaluated from within US domestic politics.

In that sense, the changes in US domestic politics and the Republican Party ultimately affect US grand strategy. Therefore, I would like to discuss this point further. In particular, regarding what Director Kim Jun-young mentioned about the 'Thucydides Trap,' one of the important traps we now recognize in evaluating US foreign policy during the interwar period is that it was not just about evaluating America's objective capabilities or comprehensive national power, but rather how America used its power was a crucial factor. As you know, the US already possessed the economic power of the third-largest economy during the interwar period. However, as you know, due to a lack of willingness to manage global hegemony or provide public goods, a tragedy occurred. Even now, while many efforts are made to compare US and Chinese national power, perhaps more important is whether the US, regardless of its power, will use that power in the same liberal hegemonic or liberal internationalist manner as before. This needs to be evaluated from within US domestic politics.

In that sense, the changes in US domestic politics and the Republican Party ultimately affect US grand strategy. Therefore, I would like to discuss this point further. In particular, regarding what Director Kim Jun-young mentioned about the 'Thucydides Trap,' one of the important traps we now recognize in evaluating US foreign policy during the interwar period is that it was not just about evaluating America's objective capabilities or comprehensive national power, but rather how America used its power was a crucial factor. As you know, the US already possessed the economic power of the third-largest economy during the interwar period. However, as you know, due to a lack of willingness to manage global hegemony or provide public goods, a tragedy occurred. Even now, while many efforts are made to compare US and Chinese national power, perhaps more important is whether the US, regardless of its power, will use that power in the same liberal hegemonic or liberal internationalist manner as before. This needs to be evaluated from within US domestic politics.

In that sense, the changes in US domestic politics and the Republican Party ultimately affect US grand strategy. Therefore, I would like to discuss this point further. In particular, regarding what Director Kim Jun-young mentioned about the 'Thucydides Trap,' one of the important traps we now recognize in evaluating US foreign policy during the interwar period is that it was not just about evaluating America's objective capabilities or comprehensive national power, but rather how America used its power was a crucial factor. As you know, the US already possessed the economic power of the third-largest economy during the interwar period. However, as you know, due to a lack of willingness to manage global hegemony or provide public goods, a tragedy occurred. Even now, while many efforts are made to compare US and Chinese national power, perhaps more important is whether the US, regardless of its power, will use that power in the same liberal hegemonic or liberal internationalist manner as before. This needs to be evaluated from within US domestic politics.

The second point is the evaluation of Trump. We are already in the post-Trump era, and we are discussing how US hegemony will be managed and how US grand strategy will change in the Biden era. However, to evaluate the future, we must first ask how we should interpret the four years of the Trump administration. I believe there exists a kind of 'rational core,' or 'rational kernel,' of a Trump doctrine. While many commentators and scholars argue that the Trump era lacked a doctrine and was characterized by inconsistency and chaos, I believe, more proactively, that a Trump doctrine existed and poses questions for us. Specifically, within the context of the history of US grand strategy over the past 30 years, the questions raised by Trump, or the new social forces he represented – what can be called the 'Jex' or populist forces – are significant. For example, is the liberal hegemonic strategy sustainable? Can grand social engineering, like the Iraq War, be realized? Or is American exceptionalism, as Director Kim Jun-young mentioned earlier, a desirable premise for US foreign policy? Trump consistently questioned the consensus among the established elites, the 'establishment,' and the bipartisan agreement between the Democratic and Republican parties. However, whether he effectively realized this or translated it into consistent programs is another matter entirely, and he certainly does not receive high marks in that regard. Nevertheless, I believe Trump has consistently disseminated a message regarding foreign policy doctrines and pursued policies accordingly from the 2000s until he left office in 2020.

For instance, I consider the non-initiation of new wars during his term to be his most significant legacy. As Walter Russell Mead, editor-in-chief of The American Interest, recently stated, Trump is the first president since Jimmy Carter not to initiate a new war during his term. I believe this is a very significant point. During his four years as president, he did not initiate any new wars. While he had to continue existing wars inherited from previous administrations, such as those in Syria, Iraq, and Afghanistan, the fact that he did not start any new ones breaks with the framework of US foreign policy of the past 30 years, or even 40 years going back to Jimmy Carter. How should we evaluate this? Scholars like Randall Schweller argue, if we interpret this actively, that he was an individual who experimented with realism as an alternative foreign policy strategy to grand hegemonic strategies or liberal internationalism. He is evaluated in this way.

For example, this can be compared to Richard Nixon in the 1970s. At that time, the US faced a crisis of hegemony, similar to the Vietnam War then and the Iraq War now. There was the oil crisis then, and the financial crisis now. In terms of imperial overreach and economic downturn, realist foreign policy ideas existed in both the Nixon and Trump eras within the broader context of US grand strategy. Although Trump operated this realist doctrine in a very inconsistent and chaotic manner, ultimately failing, the questions he raised are worthy of our evaluation. Perhaps I will elaborate further on this during the next round, but for instance, the unconventional nature of Trump's North Korea strategy can also be evaluated from this realist perspective.

For example, when Trump spoke about North Korea or the Kim Jong-un regime, one point that was very interesting to me was that, to my knowledge, he never mentioned the NPT. He approached North Korea not as an external entity defined by the norms of the liberal world order or as a rogue state or axis of evil, but from a realist perspective of deal-making. He saw them as rational actors, just as he saw himself as a rational actor. He directly explored the possibility of mutual dialogue from a pragmatic standpoint, asking, 'What deal can we make?' In this sense, he might be the only president in the post-Cold War era to have directly explored this possibility. While Clinton also attempted this and failed, Trump's approach was unique. In this regard, if we consider US foreign policy more broadly, his attempt to redefine the relationship between the US and third-world countries, or so-called rogue states or axis of evil, although ultimately unsuccessful due to various chaotic and practical issues, raises questions worth reconsidering.

For example, this can be compared to Richard Nixon in the 1970s. At that time, the US faced a crisis of hegemony, similar to the Vietnam War then and the Iraq War now. There was the oil crisis then, and the financial crisis now. In terms of imperial overreach and economic downturn, realist foreign policy ideas existed in both the Nixon and Trump eras within the broader context of US grand strategy. Although Trump operated this realist doctrine in a very inconsistent and chaotic manner, ultimately failing, the questions he raised are worthy of our evaluation. Perhaps I will elaborate further on this during the next round, but for instance, the unconventional nature of Trump's North Korea strategy can also be evaluated from this realist perspective.

For instance, when Trump spoke about North Korea or the Kim Jong-un regime, one point that was very interesting to me was that, to my knowledge, he never mentioned the NPT. He approached North Korea not as an external entity defined by the norms of the liberal world order or as a rogue state or axis of evil, but from a realist perspective of deal-making. He saw them as rational actors, just as he saw himself as a rational actor. He directly explored the possibility of mutual dialogue from a pragmatic standpoint, asking, 'What deal can we make?' In this sense, he might be the only president in the post-Cold War era to have directly explored this possibility. While Clinton also attempted this and failed, Trump's approach was unique. In this regard, if we consider US foreign policy more broadly, his attempt to redefine the relationship between the US and third-world countries, or so-called rogue states or axis of evil, although ultimately unsuccessful due to various chaotic and practical issues, raises questions worth reconsidering.

In summary, the questions posed by Trump can also be posed to Biden. Biden talks about returning to the normal liberal internationalist paradigm of 'Build Back Better.' However, as Professor Lee Jung-hoon pointed out, the question is whether there is any reflection or self-criticism. This is a question consistently posed by Trump, the populists who supported him, and recently by realist and liberal scholars at institutions like the Quincy Institute. They ask: What do you, the establishment, need to reflect on? What reflections do you have on supporting the Iraq War, or on the financial crisis caused by neoliberal globalization? Are you offering a new vision? Can you overcome this predicament in the 'return to normalcy' manner? Through the evaluation of the Trump era, we can pose these questions. Thank you.

In summary, the questions posed by Trump can also be posed to Biden. Biden talks about returning to the normal liberal internationalist paradigm of 'Build Back Better.' However, as Professor Lee Jung-hoon pointed out, the question is whether there is any reflection or self-criticism. This is a question consistently posed by Trump, the populists who supported him, and recently by realist and liberal scholars at institutions like the Quincy Institute. They ask: What do you, the establishment, need to reflect on? What reflections do you have on supporting the Iraq War, or on the financial crisis caused by neoliberal globalization? Are you offering a new vision? Can you overcome this predicament in the 'return to normalcy' manner? Through the evaluation of the Trump era, we can pose these questions. Thank you.

My discussion ends here. Thank you. Yes, thank you. It always flows this way. We initially planned for a second round of discussion, but time constraints prevent us from reaching that stage, and we end up with each speaker having about 10 minutes. To proceed to the second round before this time limit, we will give the two presenters a chance to speak for about 5 minutes each, focusing on important points or sharing any remaining thoughts. Director Kim will speak first for 5 minutes, followed by Professor Lee Jung-hoon for 5 minutes. We will then have about 10 minutes left for questions from the floor. Thank you. Yes, thank you. I have also learned a great deal, and I regret that time is limited.

I will make one point at a time. Regarding what Professor Seo Jung-hoon pointed out about the lack of a US hegemonic sense or diplomatic DNA, I completely agree. Having lived in the US for decades, I find that there is very little foreign news consumption. Furthermore, the three major crises ultimately lead to the collapse of hegemony, or rather, a logic of decline. However, my point is that what was once a characteristic strength of the US, which it utilized well, has now become a weakness. Thus, a certain degree of instrumental logic is inevitably linked. This is because the pursuit of profit or the 'American exceptionalism' that the US possessed were drivers of its narrative, but when this narrative is not sustained and undergoes transformation, a sense of crisis emerges. This dissonance is what led to the crisis.

I will make one point at a time. Regarding what Professor Seo Jung-hoon pointed out about the lack of a US hegemonic sense or diplomatic DNA, I completely agree. Having lived in the US for decades, I find that there is very little foreign news consumption. Furthermore, the three major crises ultimately lead to the collapse of hegemony, or rather, a logic of decline. However, my point is that what was once a characteristic strength of the US, which it utilized well, has now become a weakness. Thus, a certain degree of instrumental logic is inevitably linked. This is because the pursuit of profit or the 'American exceptionalism' that the US possessed were drivers of its narrative, but when this narrative is not sustained and undergoes transformation, a sense of crisis emerges. This dissonance is what led to the crisis.

Another point is that international politics is inextricably linked to domestic politics. Trump was the best at utilizing this. One of the greatest strategic errors of Trump and Bolton was completely ruining the atmosphere for frank discussions in foreign policy. If such a situation arises where revelations are made to discredit opponents, I believe this will be very important. I raise the issue of how Americans perceive, or rather, how to overcome the politicization of foreign policy that has already occurred or is deeply entrenched.

Regarding Professor Jeon Jae-seong's point about democracy and authoritarianism, perhaps you misunderstood, or I misunderstood, but my argument was not that democracy fails or does not function. Rather, I was speaking about the extent to which such challenges have weakened America's soft power and its influence as a democracy. I agree with you. However, I consider the Korean model to be very regionally specific. In many ways, the state was expelled by one of the great harms of neoliberalism. This state possessed the important asset of publicness. When the market fails or encounters problems, Western countries have lost the capacity to restore publicness. China, on the other hand, has excessive publicness, and its citizens are subordinate to the state, a model we disliked in the past, which is now demonstrating strength in certain aspects. Between these two, we possess both state power and civic consciousness. When the state, with its publicness, attempts to dominate citizens, the actual citizens rise up and correct the state, creating a dynamic balance. The question is whether this can be replicated. Setting aside nationalistic pride, can other countries replicate this? This dynamic balance is desirable, but as mentioned earlier, it is not easy. In that sense, Professor Jeon Jae-seong, you ultimately referred to a transition from unipolarity to multipolarity. Therefore, I believe that in the context of US assistance, these smaller nations, by mediating between the US and China, can play a role. This is the only alternative, and as mentioned earlier, perhaps regional clusters, rather than just regions, can function with 'mini-multipolarity.' This is where the alternative lies.

In many ways, the state was expelled by one of the great harms of neoliberalism. This state possessed the important asset of publicness. When the market fails or encounters problems, Western countries have lost the capacity to restore publicness. China, on the other hand, has excessive publicness, and its citizens are subordinate to the state, a model we disliked in the past, which is now demonstrating strength in certain aspects. Between these two, we possess both state power and civic consciousness. When the state, with its publicness, attempts to dominate citizens, the actual citizens rise up and correct the state, creating a dynamic balance. The question is whether this can be replicated. Setting aside nationalistic pride, can other countries replicate this? This dynamic balance is desirable, but as mentioned earlier, it is not easy. In that sense, Professor Jeon Jae-seong, you ultimately referred to a transition from unipolarity to multipolarity. Therefore, I believe that in the context of US assistance, these smaller nations, by mediating between the US and China, can play a role. This is the only alternative, and as mentioned earlier, perhaps regional clusters, rather than just regions, can function with 'mini-multipolarity.' This is where the alternative lies.

In many ways, the state was expelled by one of the great harms of neoliberalism. This state possessed the important asset of publicness. When the market fails or encounters problems, Western countries have lost the capacity to restore publicness. China, on the other hand, has excessive publicness, and its citizens are subordinate to the state, a model we disliked in the past, which is now demonstrating strength in certain aspects. Between these two, we possess both state power and civic consciousness. When the state, with its publicness, attempts to dominate citizens, the actual citizens rise up and correct the state, creating a dynamic balance. The question is whether this can be replicated. Setting aside nationalistic pride, can other countries replicate this? This dynamic balance is desirable, but as mentioned earlier, it is not easy. In that sense, Professor Jeon Jae-seong, you ultimately referred to a transition from unipolarity to multipolarity. Therefore, I believe that in the context of US assistance, these smaller nations, by mediating between the US and China, can play a role. This is the only alternative, and as mentioned earlier, perhaps regional clusters, rather than just regions, can function with 'mini-multipolarity.' This is where the alternative lies.

I wholeheartedly agree that US will is important. And I believe that the remaining liberal forces within the US are still functioning. Therefore, I find the term 'global zero-sum game' very dangerous. It was stated that it would be resolved within 100 days, but if this leads to a recurrence of Carter's mistakes or Bush's policies, becoming like the liberal peace theory, then both extremes could be disastrous. I hope we do not go in that direction.

One last point: before heading towards a new Cold War, in the past, we offered concessions to build our own bloc, providing aid, incentives, and promises for the future. Now, it's 'by punishment.' That is, if you deviate, you will be punished. Look at Australia being beaten down, or even Greece saying the US didn't help us. In this regard, our stance towards blocs and confrontation should also change from the past. In that sense, I agree with Professor Seo and Professor Lee Jung-hoon that we must move centered around the 'winter,' meaning stability. That's all. Thank you.

Yes, thank you. Professor Jeon, please proceed. Yes, I would like to make two or three points. First, regarding the future of US hegemony, which Professor Sohn and Professor Lee have discussed, the most optimistic outlook or expectation, as mentioned by Professor Jeon Jae-seong during the discussion, is a new situation of 'global politics' rather than international politics. In this context, the US, rather than aiming to dominate and lead everything as in the past, would reduce its role and exercise restraint, restoring a degree of autonomy. This would be a limited revival or restoration of US hegemony within a restructured political order. Another possibility is the emergence of a predatory, illiberal hegemony, as discussed by Professor Seo Jung-hoon, characterized by 'rent-seeking' or a 'gangster state' approach, as described by scholars like Cox or Koselleck. A third possibility, as Director Kim Jun-young and Professor Lee Jung-hoon suggested in their discussion, is that the US, following Fukuyama's analysis, will struggle to create effective programs, and thus, neither the US nor China will be able to provide unified leadership, leading to a more fragmented world. These three scenarios seem to have emerged. From my perspective, the most hopeful scenario is within the structural context of optimistic political restructuring, where the US exercises restraint. However, whether this is realized through G20 or other mechanisms is uncertain. Ultimately, I believe we are somewhere between the worst-case scenario of a 'rogue superpower' or a US-led 'delinquent state' and this more optimistic scenario. Let me briefly explain why.

The concept of hegemony itself is very complex. If hegemony simply means overwhelming power, then there is no need for this discussion. In that case, structurally, the US has never lost its military superiority, and it still holds it. Another argument for the perpetuity of US hegemony is the role of the dollar as the reserve currency. The dollar's strength as the reserve currency has not changed since 1945 and is unlikely to be replaced by the yuan in the foreseeable future. Therefore, in policy discussions looking at the next decade, or what South Korean diplomacy should do, if we use such criteria—whether the US is number one in terms of comprehensive national power, or whether anyone can replace its military strength or the dollar's role as the reserve currency—the threshold is too high, and it becomes difficult to identify policy-driven changes. If we consider hegemony in this way, even if Britain was the hegemonic power in the 19th century, its current power is significantly weaker than what the US possesses. However, the US has abundant resources, a large population, high productivity, and many other advantages. Therefore, if we think of hegemony in this manner, there is no change. Ultimately, what is meaningful hegemony? It is about whether the US has achieved its hegemonic goals, such as democratizing Iraq or the Middle East. When we talk about general leadership, say 50-50, the most important issue of that era. If the most important issue today is addressing climate change, can the US lead collective action to address climate change? We should evaluate it by such standards. However, in the sense of leading collective action to solve common problems, not through overwhelming physical power, the most important requirement is for the US to adjust its mission, its hegemonic goals. The goal of democratizing the entire world or spreading neoliberal economic development, or if, for example, Professor Jeon Jae-seong were to argue for it, the condition for the revival of US hegemony as a soft leadership suited to global politics is not just capability, but most importantly, lowering the mission itself. The US must lower its objectives. Furthermore, the most fundamental problem of current hegemony is not military. China has never aimed to surpass the US in nuclear capabilities, and it has consistently followed the US in certain areas. However, China does not yet have such ambition.

The concept of hegemony itself is very complex. If hegemony simply means overwhelming power, then there is no need for this discussion. In that case, structurally, the US has never lost its military superiority, and it still holds it. Another argument for the perpetuity of US hegemony is the role of the dollar as the reserve currency. The dollar's strength as the reserve currency has not changed since 1945 and is unlikely to be replaced by the yuan in the foreseeable future. Therefore, in policy discussions looking at the next decade, or what South Korean diplomacy should do, if we use such criteria—whether the US is number one in terms of comprehensive national power, or whether anyone can replace its military strength or the dollar's role as the reserve currency—the threshold is too high, and it becomes difficult to identify policy-driven changes. If we consider hegemony in this way, even if Britain was the hegemonic power in the 19th century, its current power is significantly weaker than what the US possesses. However, the US has abundant resources, a large population, high productivity, and many other advantages. Therefore, if we think of hegemony in this manner, there is no change. Ultimately, what is meaningful hegemony? It is about whether the US has achieved its hegemonic goals, such as democratizing Iraq or the Middle East. When we talk about general leadership, say 50-50, the most important issue of that era. If the most important issue today is addressing climate change, can the US lead collective action to address climate change? We should evaluate it by such standards. However, in the sense of leading collective action to solve common problems, not through overwhelming physical power, the most important requirement is for the US to adjust its mission, its hegemonic goals. The goal of democratizing the entire world or spreading neoliberal economic development, or if, for example, Professor Jeon Jae-seong were to argue for it, the condition for the revival of US hegemony as a soft leadership suited to global politics is not just capability, but most importantly, lowering the mission itself. The US must lower its objectives. Furthermore, the most fundamental problem of current hegemony is not military. China has never aimed to surpass the US in nuclear capabilities, and it has consistently followed the US in certain areas. However, China does not yet have such ambition.

The concept of hegemony itself is very complex. If hegemony simply means overwhelming power, then there is no need for this discussion. In that case, structurally, the US has never lost its military superiority, and it still holds it. Another argument for the perpetuity of US hegemony is the role of the dollar as the reserve currency. The dollar's strength as the reserve currency has not changed since 1945 and is unlikely to be replaced by the yuan in the foreseeable future. Therefore, in policy discussions looking at the next decade, or what South Korean diplomacy should do, if we use such criteria—whether the US is number one in terms of comprehensive national power, or whether anyone can replace its military strength or the dollar's role as the reserve currency—the threshold is too high, and it becomes difficult to identify policy-driven changes. If we consider hegemony in this way, even if Britain was the hegemonic power in the 19th century, its current power is significantly weaker than what the US possesses. However, the US has abundant resources, a large population, high productivity, and many other advantages. Therefore, if we think of hegemony in this manner, there is no change. Ultimately, what is meaningful hegemony? It is about whether the US has achieved its hegemonic goals, such as democratizing Iraq or the Middle East. When we talk about general leadership, say 50-50, the most important issue of that era. If the most important issue today is addressing climate change, can the US lead collective action to address climate change? We should evaluate it by such standards. However, in the sense of leading collective action to solve common problems, not through overwhelming physical power, the most important requirement is for the US to adjust its mission, its hegemonic goals. The goal of democratizing the entire world or spreading neoliberal economic development, or if, for example, Professor Jeon Jae-seong were to argue for it, the condition for the revival of US hegemony as a soft leadership suited to global politics is not just capability, but most importantly, lowering the mission itself. The US must lower its objectives. Furthermore, the most fundamental problem of current hegemony is not military. China has never aimed to surpass the US in nuclear capabilities, and it has consistently followed the US in certain areas. However, China does not yet have such ambition.

The concept of hegemony itself is very complex. If hegemony simply means overwhelming power, then there is no need for this discussion. In that case, structurally, the US has never lost its military superiority, and it still holds it. Another argument for the perpetuity of US hegemony is the role of the dollar as the reserve currency. The dollar's strength as the reserve currency has not changed since 1945 and is unlikely to be replaced by the yuan in the foreseeable future. Therefore, in policy discussions looking at the next decade, or what South Korean diplomacy should do, if we use such criteria—whether the US is number one in terms of comprehensive national power, or whether anyone can replace its military strength or the dollar's role as the reserve currency—the threshold is too high, and it becomes difficult to identify policy-driven changes. If we consider hegemony in this way, even if Britain was the hegemonic power in the 19th century, its current power is significantly weaker than what the US possesses. However, the US has abundant resources, a large population, high productivity, and many other advantages. Therefore, if we think of hegemony in this manner, there is no change. Ultimately, what is meaningful hegemony? It is about whether the US has achieved its hegemonic goals, such as democratizing Iraq or the Middle East. When we talk about general leadership, say 50-50, the most important issue of that era. If the most important issue today is addressing climate change, can the US lead collective action to address climate change? We should evaluate it by such standards. However, in the sense of leading collective action to solve common problems, not through overwhelming physical power, the most important requirement is for the US to adjust its mission, its hegemonic goals. The goal of democratizing the entire world or spreading neoliberal economic development, or if, for example, Professor Jeon Jae-seong were to argue for it, the condition for the revival of US hegemony as a soft leadership suited to global politics is not just capability, but most importantly, lowering the mission itself. The US must lower its objectives. Furthermore, the most fundamental problem of current hegemony is not military. China has never aimed to surpass the US in nuclear capabilities, and it has consistently followed the US in certain areas. However, China does not yet have such ambition.

The concept of hegemony itself is very complex. If hegemony simply means overwhelming power, then there is no need for this discussion. In that case, structurally, the US has never lost its military superiority, and it still holds it. Another argument for the perpetuity of US hegemony is the role of the dollar as the reserve currency. The dollar's strength as the reserve currency has not changed since 1945 and is unlikely to be replaced by the yuan in the foreseeable future. Therefore, in policy discussions looking at the next decade, or what South Korean diplomacy should do, if we use such criteria—whether the US is number one in terms of comprehensive national power, or whether anyone can replace its military strength or the dollar's role as the reserve currency—the threshold is too high, and it becomes difficult to identify policy-driven changes. If we consider hegemony in this way, even if Britain was the hegemonic power in the 19th century, its current power is significantly weaker than what the US possesses. However, the US has abundant resources, a large population, high productivity, and many other advantages. Therefore, if we think of hegemony in this manner, there is no change. Ultimately, what is meaningful hegemony? It is about whether the US has achieved its hegemonic goals, such as democratizing Iraq or the Middle East. When we talk about general leadership, say 50-50, the most important issue of that era. If the most important issue today is addressing climate change, can the US lead collective action to address climate change? We should evaluate it by such standards. However, in the sense of leading collective action to solve common problems, not through overwhelming physical power, the most important requirement is for the US to adjust its mission, its hegemonic goals. The goal of democratizing the entire world or spreading neoliberal economic development, or if, for example, Professor Jeon Jae-seong were to argue for it, the condition for the revival of US hegemony as a soft leadership suited to global politics is not just capability, but most importantly, lowering the mission itself. The US must lower its objectives. Furthermore, the most fundamental problem of current hegemony is not military. China has never aimed to surpass the US in nuclear capabilities, and it has consistently followed the US in certain areas. However, China does not yet have such ambition.

I don't know what the next 20 or 30 years will bring, but the core issue today is the problem of neoliberal globalization, and by extension, the problem of capitalism. If we view the problem of capitalism not as a structural issue but as an issue of agency, then American capitalists must create a new hegemonic project. For example, in the 1930s, for about 50 years, American manufacturing giants like Ford, in alliance with finance capital, reached a certain compromise with major labor unions, creating a welfare state model, a New Deal-like model. This model produced the Fordist economic theory. Today, the most successful sector is Big Tech. So, regarding antitrust issues concerning companies like Apple...

...aren't there issues? So, how will capitalism operate with these companies, Wall Street, and the successful sectors in manufacturing, R&D, and Hollywood, reaching a compromise? To create such a capitalist system, there must be a ruling bloc or a hegemonic bloc capable of formulating foreign policy. Does such a hegemonic bloc currently exist? In my opinion, no. The US-China tech war is framed as a tech hegemony battle, but if the US is to re-establish hegemony in this way, it needs to secure tech hegemony. For example, in the 1950s and 60s, there was a social consensus and a global consensus that 'what is good for Ford is good for America, and if America is good, the world will be good.' Is there such a consensus now? In the US, there is no ruling bloc, foreign policy and security elites operate separately from economic elites, and foreign policy elites seem to be pursuing their own agendas without introspection. The domestic political situation is fragmented. In such circumstances, isn't it very difficult?

And finally, this is not something Professor Lee is currently discussing, but I recall experiencing something similar in Germany. It's confusing. Finally, finally, ah, this, this, ah, finally, what is it? Professor Seo Jeong-woo asked a very good question earlier. Excessive militarism, casino capitalism, and American exceptionalism – are these attributes of American hegemony or symptoms of the American hegemony crisis? I think it's a very important distinction, and I believe we can differentiate them. Consider the Cold War. When we look at the extreme militarism, the US, which loves ideology so much and criticizes foreign capitalism, what did it do with Nexon? When it was on the verge of currency collapse, it imposed price controls for over a year and prohibited stock market speculation.

When cornered, the US compromised its principles. The US compromised its principles. Even though Dulles engaged in ideological warfare with the Eastern Bloc, when faced with a lack of real power, they compromised. When cornered, they compromised or reformed voluntarily. But it seems there is no such introspection now. Thank you. Time is almost up. We are not particularly running over, but if you have any questions or comments, please feel free to ask.

If there are no further questions, we have about ten questions submitted online. The issue of the Quad and its anti-China alliance will be discussed in the next session, so we will move on to that. One of the current questions is about Jake Sullivan's emphasis on foreign policy for overcoming domestic polarization or for the middle class. Is it possible that such foreign policy might differ from the traditional US foreign policy vision of the Biden administration? This question has been consistently raised, so I need to provide an answer. Director Kim, what are your thoughts?

We will also move on to the next session. Since our time is up, I don't think I need to summarize anything in particular. The previous speaker has already provided a summary. However, regarding the Biden administration's foreign policy and its East Asia or Asia-Pacific policy, there have been mixed reactions of both anticipation and concern in many meetings. It seems there was no anticipation in today's session. It was almost entirely expressed as concern and apprehension. Professor Kim mentioned earlier that the debate over the decline of US hegemony reflects the current atmosphere. We are witnessing the crisis of American democracy, manifested in the refusal to accept election results, domestic divisions, racial discrimination, and the worst economic situation in the US, with its response to COVID-19 being the worst among developed countries. Perhaps today's outlook on the US reflects this atmosphere to some extent.

I will also move on to the next session. Since our time is up, I don't think I need to summarize anything in particular. The previous speaker has already provided a summary. However, regarding the Biden administration's foreign policy and its East Asia or Asia-Pacific policy, there have been mixed reactions of both anticipation and concern in many meetings. It seems there was no anticipation in today's session. It was almost entirely expressed as concern and apprehension. Professor Kim mentioned earlier that the debate over the decline of US hegemony reflects the current atmosphere. We are witnessing the crisis of American democracy, manifested in the refusal to accept election results, domestic divisions, racial discrimination, and the worst economic situation in the US, with its response to COVID-19 being the worst among developed countries. Perhaps today's outlook on the US reflects this atmosphere to some extent. In this context, when the discussion moves to the specific setting of East Asia, how will the points discussed today connect to the future of US foreign policy or US power? I believe we can only make a comprehensive assessment of America's future after observing that. With that cautious thought, I will conclude our session here.

It has been 1 hour and 40 minutes. I would like to thank the two presenters and three discussants for their passionate presentations and discussions. This concludes the first session. This marks the end of the first session of the East Asia Institute's joint academic conference. We will have a 20-minute break, and the second session will begin at 4:20 PM. The topic of the second session is 'Challenges and Tasks for Peace in East Asia.' This session will be moderated by President Ha Young-sun of the East Asia Institute.

Following the first session, we will now begin the second session, titled 'Challenges and Tasks for Peace in East Asia.' The first session, 'The Future of US Hegemony,' involved various discussions that provided much food for thought and learning. A significant point is that Professor Sung, who moderated the first session, mentioned that he would move on to the second session. However, there are one or two points that should have been addressed in the first session instead. The reason is that although the first session concluded successfully, I personally felt there were one or two minor shortcomings.

The first is the question of the future of US hegemony. Perhaps by framing the issue this way, especially for the scholars, the focus on hegemony itself led to some partial difficulties in revealing the overall picture of the greatest problems we are facing in this era and space. As many of you know, An Jung-geun's unfinished 'Theory of Eastern Peace' was published in 1910. There was a period of about 15 years after the Sino-Japanese War when the 'Theory of Eastern Peace' was discussed. However, I believe that during that very precious time, the intellectuals of that era, both conservative and progressive, did not fully grasp the unfolding of history.

Perhaps because we did not prevent the tragedy of 1910, we are now facing the reality of the 2020s. Instead of academic interest in the genre of US hegemony, we must consider it as a matter of our own life and death, or the life and death of the Asia-Pacific region. We have entered an era where all members within it must act individually. How can we survive together if we do not strive for collective survival? The preface to 'Eastern Peace' by An Jung-geun, although written in Korean, had a certain appeal to Japanese intellectuals that was quite difficult to ignore.

That is the first regrettable aspect. The second is a small part of it: the question of whether the US can maintain its current position. As has been intermittently pointed out, this requires a more comprehensive view of the US's remaining potential and limitations within the international system, China's potential and limitations, the limitations of domestic political and economic linkages of both sides, and finally, the potential and limitations of leadership. If these were examined in a more integrated manner, and if they were further elaborated upon by those observing this discussion or participating in the debate, it would not merely be an academic discussion, but perhaps a small cornerstone for the future of not only our nation but also the Asia-Pacific region and the world order in the 21st century.

Therefore, I am unsure how much of this significant burden we can digest in such a short time. However, in today's second session, we have presentations from three well-known experts, both domestically and internationally, and three discussants. We will strive to proceed with the discussion by expanding upon the issues that were developed in the first session. Since we have one more presenter in the first session than in the second, I will arbitrarily proceed. Despite the fact that you have put in great effort to prepare, I will ask Professor Park Myung-lim to present first for about 10 minutes in this first round. Second, Professor Park Jae-jeong from Korea University. Third, Professor Jeong Eun-yeong from Seoul National University.

Therefore, I am unsure how much we can digest this large burden in a shorter amount of time. However, in today's second session, we have a panel discussion with three distinguished experts who are well-known domestically and internationally. I will strive to expand on the issues that will unfold from a preliminary perspective and move the discussion forward. Since we have one more presenter than panelists, I will arbitrarily take the liberty to have Professor Park Myung-lim present first for about 10 minutes, followed by Professor Park Ja-jung from Korea University, and then Professor Jeong Min-a from Seoul National University.

Following that, we will have Professor Park Kyung-jung from the National Defense University, Professor Lee Dong-yul from Dongduk Women's University, and Professor Lee Ji-yeon from the University of North Korean Studies as discussants. I think it would be best to proceed directly to the discussion without presentations. However, since some viewers may not have seen this in advance, please consider your presentations to be about 10 minutes long, and then engage in a lively discussion where the three discussants will elaborate for about 5 to 7 minutes each. I will set the stage for this self-introduction.

Professor Park Myung-lim will start. He needs to set a good example so that the subsequent participants can follow suit. Professor Park Myung-lim is capable of writing a great deal and has been with us for a long time, so he is very adaptable. I will ask him to present concisely for 10 minutes. Professor Park, please begin. Thank you for inviting me to this event. I am grateful to the Korea Institute for National Unification for this opportunity. I will proceed directly to my remarks due to time constraints.

From a traditional perspective on peace, especially from the viewpoint of East Asian peace, I believe that the US-China power dynamic, Japan's peace constitution, and denuclearization are the three major pillars of peace in East Asia. Regarding US-China relations, I tend not to accept the term 'great power competition.' Unlike in the past, both the US and China are employing soft power. Since the normalization of US-China relations, for the first time, there has been a long period of peace in the Asia-Pacific region without a major war. I believe the two pillars of this peace are China and the US, so a direct US-China conflict is unlikely in the near future.

We think in terms of competitive overlapping relationships or supranational competitive relationships. In Japan, I wonder if it will be difficult to function or be dynamic with integrated apartment plans and decadent subjects. I will try to mention this at the end. However, the entire issue is whether we can see international peace or world peace as human peace, and peace limited to human order caused by human factors. Recently, even looking at data on human damage, factors other than humans, such as fine dust, climate change, infectious diseases, and food and air pollution, cause significantly more damage to humans than traditional factors. In other words, if we express it in a modern way, we should think about planetary peace and ecological peace, or Earth peace. International peace and world peace might be very small factors.

This has been repeatedly discussed by Kant and many others. Recently, scholar William Cronon stated that it would be difficult to realize humanistic goals without thinking globally. Therefore, the issue of planetary order and planetary politics, as well as international order and international politics, seems to be gaining importance. Within this overall framework, I would like to share my thoughts on the issue of peace in East Asia. Firstly, regarding China's short-term epidemic prevention and economic success within the framework of planetary peace and planetary order, I believe this will be advantageous for China in the short term but will lead to a reduction in China's influence in the long term. This is because I see the Huawei issue and the COVID-19 issue as fundamentally the same: in terms of transparency, government trust, and open communication, China has incurred decisive losses in international trust in exchange for securing its national interests, making it extremely difficult to recover.

I believe China's pursuit of core interests will not be sustained. I was very surprised. I have repeatedly studied the Huawei issue and the COVID-19 issue for seven years, and experts on both sides had the same view. This is a matter of information openness and transparency, and it will be difficult for China to recover trust in this regard. Secondly, from a macroscopic perspective, China is now raising issues like the "China Threat Theory" and the "Clash of Civilizations." From the perspective of human history, I believe this, like the "Yellow Peril" of the past, where technologies like gunpowder and printing were exported to China and returned within 100 years as cannons and firearms, is something that Karl Jaspers analyzed in detail.

Why did China export gunpowder? I believe that China's recent resurgence of nationalism will ultimately lead to Sinocentrism, and in the long run, it will be self-defeating for China. Thirdly, even setting aside Huawei and COVID-19, does China, at its developing country stage, have the capacity to lead and set international standards in the future? While it has benefited from international society's support and opportunities for entry, when full-scale competition in civilization and economy or standards begins, can China navigate it? I believe it will not be easy. China faces significant barriers. For example, even if it's not Trump, consider Hong Kong. The return of Hong Kong, the establishment of the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank, and the listing of Chinese companies were all issues. Even the UK, which had been supportive, is now using the term "significant conflict" in relation to Hong Kong for the first time in 150 years.

This suggests that in the context of international standards, market economy, democracy, and the legal system, can China solve the problems of domestic capital accumulation and surplus value? It seems difficult to do so with a one-party dictatorship. Furthermore, China's excessive nationalism, advocating for a new era and a "New Tang Dynasty," is something I consider impossible to achieve. This is because, firstly, it reverts to the unique Eastern system before the encounter with the West and Asia; secondly, it was a concept and practice before the advent of international law and order; and thirdly, it was a system that functioned before countries like Japan, Korea, Vietnam, India, and the Philippines experienced democracy, market economy, and international civilization and human rights. Now, East Asia, which has embraced these universal values after the war, will find it difficult to achieve this.

Then, in China's grand strategy, represented by the "New Type of Great Power Relations" and the "Belt and Road Initiative," how much space will there be in East Asia? This also, including the recent Hong Kong issue, has been widely discussed by experts, but it has become apparent that China has not adequately addressed the various issues of "One Country, Two Systems." Due to this nationalism and great power chauvinism, will this issue be resolved regardless of whether it was Trump or not? Considering the China-India conflict, China-Australia conflict, China-UK conflict, and the Hong Kong issue, how should we view it? From this perspective, looking at Hong Kong as a precedent, the future of East Asia... I have been advocating for this for a long time. Since I only have one minute left, I will conclude my remarks.

I believe that peace in East Asia in the post-COVID-19 era, unlike the past where China compromised and adapted to the existing international order led by Fujita Osamu, is now attempting to create something new. This is a China-centric approach. Conversely, Xi Jinping's era may represent a departure from China's past expansionary phase into a contractionary phase. Lu Xun and Mao Zedong, who repeatedly refuted it, warned that there was only one path to China's ruin: invite Confucianism. They argued that inviting Confucianism would surely lead to ruin. Lu Xun and Mao Zedong, who opened the ideological horizons of modern and contemporary China, conversely stated that the only way for China to perish is to invite Confucius.

From this perspective, I believe this could be an opportunity for China to gradually enter a contractionary phase. Therefore, I believe that peace in East Asia ultimately depends on how we overcome the "East Asian paradox," which is linked to how we connect economic development with the sustainability of authority in the past, and how we connect economic development, regional trade, cooperation, arms races, mutual cooperation, and the strengthening of nationalism in East Asia today.

I will finish here by mentioning the Korean case one last time. Regarding the "Moon Jae-in generation" and the "May 8.6 generation," I wonder if it is possible to find precedents in past nationalistic and ethnocentric ideologies. The most perplexing issue was the top-down approach to resolution, which is unheard of in international relations. However, the mediator's role, which is anachronistic for the times, is a classic tenet of diplomacy.

Can the recognition of top-down mediation, ethnocentrism, and functionalism, which have long been prevalent, be learned and accepted in this era of global interconnectedness and democracy? This is a very difficult question. I believe that the worldview of the 8.6 generation will determine the future direction and potential for change in East Asian peace. I will conclude my presentation. Thank you. The final part will be dedicated to a special session for discussion. If we combine the presentations of Professor Shinsegae and Professor Park Myung-lim, a very interesting outcome emerges.

The future of the United States is also very bleak. Professor Park Myung-lim's current research focuses on the bleak future of China in the mid-21st century. Conversely, if Korea remains passive, will Korea's future arrive? This is a very interesting point. Therefore, although Professor Park Jae-jung was scheduled to speak first, we will now call upon Professor Cho Young-nam, who has been observing China day and night for the past ten years, to hear his position on Professor Park Myung-lim's pessimistic analysis.

Please do not go too far in an academic direction. I would appreciate it if you could share your thoughts on the issues raised by Professor Park or Professor Shin, looking ahead 10 to 30 years into China's future. Good afternoon. I am Ha Young-sun. I have been invited to this event, but I personally have little experience and do not like attending external meetings. I don't know how many years it's been since I started attending meetings, so I am quite nervous. I have listened carefully to your remarks.

When I was asked by Director Sohn, I, as someone who studies Chinese domestic politics, thought I should provide a foundation for others to discuss by presenting specific details. What I have prepared is related to what Director Bang mentioned, but fundamentally, I wanted to discuss whether China is truly equipped with the conditions to succeed in future competitions, whether it be in 10 or 20 years, from an internal perspective. I have discussed these topics multiple times in my workplace.

Although I did not participate in the fighting, we have had many discussions. What I found regrettable was that while people talked about China being like this or like that, I wondered if we had reached a consensus on what "China" actually meant and what China is doing now. Therefore, I prepared this, thinking it might help to some extent. In that regard, there were three major issues this year. The first issue is the problem of the national governance system and governance capacity. The US-China competition is also a factor, but the fundamental question is whether China has the capacity for it.

The question is whether China has the capacity. The COVID-19 pandemic provided an important opportunity to reflect on this. When looking at it this way, China and the international community have fundamentally different perspectives. China initially emphasized its success in controlling the epidemic, claiming it had never failed. On the other hand, the international community primarily focused on the initial response. Therefore, there is a disconnect, but I believe we need to consider both aspects.

Looking at it that way, the failure in the initial response can be largely attributed to two factors: first, the failure of the governance system, which led to a delay of about 20 days in understanding the situation; and second, even after understanding the situation, a further delay of about 20 days in responding accurately. This is about 40 days. The problem of media freedom and civil society activities also clearly demonstrates the systemic flaws. I will not dwell on this further, as it has been discussed extensively.

However, we should also pay attention to the subsequent period. The success over the next 40 days, in terms of controlling the virus through lockdowns, including Wuhan, allowed China to achieve control within 40 days. This is something that many people have discussed, but I believe it warrants serious consideration. Firstly, looking back at the past 40 years of reform and opening up, we see a paradox of crisis: China has never been stagnant, and interestingly, it has achieved a leap forward every decade.

This is an interesting phenomenon. Personally, I thought that the COVID-19 outbreak would also lead to another leap forward. This cannot simply be attributed to the governance system or the one-party system. The United States currently has 16 million confirmed cases and 300,000 deaths, but this is not because it is a democracy. Similarly, China's success in controlling the virus is not solely due to it being a one-party state.

Many countries have not yet reached this stage. Therefore, from this perspective, many people overlook the fact that China has, over the past 40 years, built up a governance system and capacity through its focus on political development and pragmatic leadership. This is how China's future economic development should be evaluated. Focusing too much on the one-party system or the Xi Jinping era risks overlooking this crucial aspect. This is my first point.

Secondly, another issue related to China's political system is the so-called "gerontocracy dilemma." How does China's political elite maintain stability? I believe that for all socialist countries, including the former Soviet Union and Eastern European socialist countries, the most dangerous moment is when the political elite is divided. However, can China's political elite maintain unity? If not, there is no need to discuss future competition. Regarding this, all socialist countries have proven something, as argued by scholars:

The collective leadership system in China, as well as the gerontocracy, is maintained through the equitable distribution of power among the ruling elite. However, this raises issues of decision-making inefficiency and political expediency. Consequently, power tends to be concentrated in one person, leading to a one-person system, as seen in the systems of Khrushchev and Mao Zedong. However, under Xi Jinping, there have been various developments that differ from the past. While you seem to evaluate his predecessors, Deng Xiaoping and Hu Jintao, positively and view him as a cautious leader, this issue is central.

Specifically, we have seen ominous signs under the Xi Jinping regime. When a one-person system emerged in China, significant problems arose. This was the Cultural Revolution, driven by radical and leftist elements. The Chinese government does not officially acknowledge it, but the Cultural Revolution resulted in the abnormal deaths of approximately 30 to 40 million people due to starvation and disease. This also led to severe political turmoil. Therefore, the question arises whether such problems will emerge under Xi Jinping's concentrated power.

There are many ominous signs. He holds about 13 official and unofficial posts, earning the moniker "Chairman of Everything." Furthermore, by aggressively promoting reforms and pushing for the "people's war," he has sent a strong message that he is determined to achieve his goals. Moreover, he removed the term limits for the head of state, and in October, a document was released. In conclusion, there is nothing new in these developments.

It is not a matter of concentrating power in a one-person system. I was actually surprised. Strengthening power and institutionalizing it would typically imply a revival of the cult of personality, but that is not the case. Moreover, he is continuing the institutional reforms he has been pursuing for the past three years, and even publicized them. This means that even some Chinese researchers are unaware of such provisions.

Publicizing these provisions means that he is limiting the General Secretary's authority himself. For reference, when we talk about a one-person system in China, Mao Zedong and Deng Xiaoping were officially recognized as the ultimate decision-makers. Mao Zedong held this position in 1935, and Deng Xiaoping in 1987. Therefore, whenever a significant issue arose, the final decision-making power was always held by a collective body, not just an individual.

However, this is not happening in this case. In that sense, concentrating power excessively can lead to political instability and potential political turmoil. Therefore, I believe this is something to watch out for. I do not agree with the term "one-person system" for this era. Perhaps in two years, at the 20th Party Congress in 2022, Xi Jinping will secure the positions of President and Chairman of the Central Military Commission, and he may also be re-elected as General Secretary.

However, I do not view these developments as a formalization of a one-person system. In other words, I see it as a "concentrated collective leadership system." Why do I use this term? Because the situation is very different from Mao Zedong's era, which truly exhibited a one-person system. This is the second aspect. Finally, although there is only about 1 minute and 30 seconds left, China announced its development strategy for the period up to 2035 last November. This is something we should pay close attention to when considering the future of China.

Simultaneously, an interesting phenomenon is that in the past, five-year plans rarely mentioned national security. They were purely national economic and social development plans. However, this time, national security and foreign policy have been added. Overall, without going into detailed content, the core keyword is innovation. While many people in China are discussing this in relation to domestic issues, the most important aspect is that China will continue to innovate in its rise, particularly economically.

Furthermore, regarding foreign policy, many people believe that significant changes have occurred since the Xi Jinping administration took office, but I disagree. While Xi Jinping's foreign policy has changed, many of the approaches have not. In this regard, it shows what has not changed and what has been improved. The 14th Five-Year Plan has been released, and China's policy objectives for 2035, announced by the State Council, show that there is not much difference from the past. Particularly, what stands out in contrast to the COVID-19 regulations is the emphasis on "high-quality development." However, this has also been emphasized since the Xi Jinping administration, not just since 2007.

However, Xi Jinping is attempting to bolster this with power, thereby strengthening it. Overall, considering the political system, the stability of the political elite, and the development prospects, the Xi Jinping administration is not as aggressive as some claim, and at the same time, it possesses the governance capacity to implement its policies. This is my assessment. We can further elaborate on this through discussion.

I will conclude my presentation with these six points. Thank you. Yes, as expected, there were interesting responses. I believe the discussion will continue. Thirdly, following the presentations of the two previous speakers, what kind of alternatives can we propose? Given that both the US and China face challenges, what alternatives are possible? In connection with this, Professor Park Jun-seok will present the final topic, "Challenges and Tasks for Multilateral Security Cooperation," offering a broader perspective on the future. He will have about 10 minutes.

Thank you, Professor Lee Hyun-ah. I am grateful for the invitation to present at this important meeting. I will structure my presentation into three parts. First, I will discuss the failure of top-down attempts to establish effective multilateral security cooperation in the region and the emergence of bottom-up approaches as an alternative. Second, I will address the current trend of the United States seeking to establish multilateral security cooperation through the expansion of the Quad and China's reaction to this.

Finally, thirdly, I will discuss what stance smaller countries and South Korea should take in this situation. First, let me begin with the first point. There are various multilateral security cooperation mechanisms in the region, such as the ARF, ADMM, and ADMM-Plus exercises. However, the general consensus is that these mechanisms have remained largely symbolic and have failed to foster substantial cooperation. I have noted several reasons for this, but I will not elaborate due to time constraints.

In this context, various attempts are underway to promote multi-layered security cooperation in the region and, through the linkage of this multi-layered cooperation, to establish ultimately effective multilateral security cooperation. This can be considered a bottom-up approach. The key issue here is that the United States is leading the effort to link these multi-layered multilateral security cooperation initiatives.

Since multi-layered security cooperation ultimately involves the expansion of alliances and bilateral security cooperation, it is relatively easy for the United States, which forms the security network in East Asia, to lead these efforts. From this perspective, noteworthy US-led multi-layered security cooperation initiatives include the trilateral strategic dialogues among the US, Japan, and Australia; the trilateral strategic dialogues among the US, Japan, and India; and the quadrilateral security cooperation among the US, Japan, Australia, and India, which we know as the Quad.

In September of this year, US Secretary of State Blinken stated his intention to create an "Asian NATO" through the expansion of the Quad. This signifies that the promotion of multilateral security cooperation through the layered linkage of US-led multi-layered security cooperation is becoming visible and concrete at the policy level. Regarding the expansion of the Quad, there are discussions about various areas beyond the initial four members. The media often points to specific countries, with the UK and France being particularly noteworthy. Although the UK withdrew from Singapore in the 1970s, it still maintains the Five Power Defence Arrangements with Australia, New Zealand, Malaysia, and Singapore.

As the concept of the Indo-Pacific region expands, France claims to be an Indo-Pacific nation. France has five military bases in the Indo-Pacific region, and a significant portion of its territory is in the Indian Ocean. Thus, both the UK and France are participating in freedom of navigation operations in the southern seas, sending naval vessels. Furthermore, in 2018, French President Macron proposed a trilateral strategic dialogue among Australia, India, and France to foster stability in the entire Indian Ocean region. In fact, the first vice-ministerial level strategic dialogue between these three countries was held in September of this year.

A Quad foreign ministerial meeting was held in Japan in October. In the press briefing following the meeting, Japan stated that it welcomes efforts by some European countries to promote a free and open Indo-Pacific. It is clear that the Quad countries are keeping in mind European countries, particularly the UK and France, as potential expansion partners. Some regional countries are advocating for an "Indo-Pacific Charter," modeled after the Atlantic Charter signed by the US and the UK in 1941, which later served as the foundation for the UN.

This charter would proclaim universal principles such as freedom of navigation and the rule of law in the Indo-Pacific and call for regional countries to sign it. Currently, China and ASEAN countries are negotiating a Code of Conduct (COC) in the South China Sea, with a target of 2022. If this negotiation does not proceed as planned, there is a high possibility that discussions on the Indo-Pacific Charter will gain momentum. If the Indo-Pacific Charter is discussed and signed, it is highly likely to serve as a cornerstone for establishing a multilateral security cooperation mechanism within the region.

However, as Stephen Biegun mentioned, it is unlikely that the Quad will become an "Asian NATO" or that an "Indo-Pacific Charter" will be signed in the short term. Instead, the US is likely to pursue various "Quad Plus" initiatives annually. These Quad Plus initiatives are expected to take various forms and cover diverse areas, not just a single issue. For example, the recent virtual meeting between the US, India, South Korea, Vietnam, and New Zealand for cybersecurity cooperation is referred to as a Quad Plus initiative. The US is likely to pursue various Quad Plus initiatives under the pretext of regional economic development, addressing development gaps, and responding to non-traditional security issues. As long as these initiatives are pursued with such justifications, the participating countries will likely feel less burdened. To alleviate the burden, these initiatives will likely focus on issues with strong justifications.

Given these issues, it will be difficult for China to severely criticize the US approach. China's perspective on this US approach is quite interesting. While some state-affiliated media and scholars in China have criticized the US Indo-Pacific strategy, the government has largely refrained from responding. However, interestingly, since Stephen Biegun and some US policymakers mentioned the possibility of an "Asian NATO" through the Quad, the government has actively criticized the Quad. For instance, during his recent tour of ASEAN countries, Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi strongly criticized the Quad at every stop, calling it a "security group that divides." China fundamentally views the US's multi-layered security cooperation initiatives as an attempt to contain China. Expanding the regional concept to the Indo-Pacific is intended to check China, including India. Creating an "Asian NATO" through the Quad is perceived as an effort by the US to tighten its grip on China by linking its Indo-Pacific security network with Europe.

Therefore, China is naturally strengthening its security cooperation with Russia, and in 2018, President Xi Jinping even referred to Russia as a "natural ally." China is also responding to the US through various multi-layered cooperation frameworks, such as BRICS, SCO, and CICA, in which China is a participant or leader. Thirdly, in the remaining 1-2 minutes, I will discuss what regional countries should do as alternative approaches.

Therefore, China is naturally strengthening its security cooperation with Russia, and in 2018, President Xi Jinping even referred to Russia as a "natural ally." China is also responding to the US through various multi-layered cooperation frameworks, such as BRICS, SCO, and CICA, in which China is a participant or leader. Thirdly, in the remaining 1-2 minutes, I will discuss what regional countries should do as alternative approaches.

There is a difference in perception between the US and China regarding the multi-stakeholder security cooperation strategy, which is linked to the 'Kim Jukyo' (Bishop Kim) through the 'Soda Ja' (multi-stakeholder) cooperation. In this context, the issue becomes how regional countries should respond. What is noteworthy recently is that regional countries are also promoting multi-stakeholder cooperation among themselves. Representative examples include the cooperation between Japan, Australia, and India, which began in 2015, and the cooperation between Indonesia, Australia, and India, which began in 2007. South Korea is also showing significant interest recently, isn't it? I am very interested in the multi-stakeholder security cooperation among Korea, Indonesia, and Australia.

What is noteworthy is that while the US-led Indo-Pacific network strengthens through the cooperation of countries like Japan, Australia, India, Vietnam, Indonesia, and South Korea, which are part of this network, as a byproduct, multi-stakeholder cooperation led by regional countries among themselves is also being promoted. This seems to be a very noteworthy point. So, what should we do to promote multi-stakeholder cooperation among regional countries, free from geopolitical competition with the US or China?

There are three points. First, we need to link such multi-stakeholder cooperation with the multi-stakeholder cooperation that is spontaneously progressing within the region. For example, ASEAN countries are engaging in multi-stakeholder cooperation for health cooperation or maritime security and information sharing. We need to connect these with the US-led network and the multi-stakeholder cooperation among countries within the network. Second, if necessary, we need to have a balanced approach to promote multi-stakeholder cooperation led by China, which regional countries can join. Third, core node countries in the US-led Indo-Pacific network, such as Japan and Australia, need to proactively pursue multi-stakeholder security cooperation, thereby gaining autonomy from the US.

In this situation, South Korea needs to promote multi-stakeholder security cooperation by linking with countries like Australia and the US. We are currently promoting cooperation with ASEAN and India within the framework of the 'New Southern Policy.' On the other hand, cooperation with countries like Japan and Australia is relatively stagnant. Since Japan and Australia are emerging as central nodes in the US-led Indo-Pacific network, we need to enhance security cooperation with these countries. Japan and Australia recently signed the 'Ship Pro Local Access Agreement' in October, and they are actively engaged in these efforts. We need to promote cooperation with these countries.

In the US-led Indo-Pacific network, Japan and Australia are emerging as central nodes. Therefore, if we do not enhance cooperation with countries like Japan and Australia, there could be a problem in the hierarchy where the US is the central axis, Japan, Australia, and ASEAN are intermediate hub countries, and South Korea is a subordinate country within the framework. Furthermore, if we are not actively engaged in multi-stakeholder security cooperation with countries like the US, Japan, Australia, and ASEAN, we risk falling behind in establishing multilateral security cooperation through regional multi-stakeholder security cooperation.

For now, I will conclude my presentation here for the sake of progress. Thank you. I will make just a couple of remarks before we move on to the discussion. Recently, while browsing the internet at home, two phrases have particularly caught my eye. One is related to the transition committee website, which I inevitably visit daily. The first page, as you can see here, is not about the future of American hegemony, but rather about 'Restoring American Leadership.' Therefore, while we view the situation from the perspective of hegemony, they see America's issues as a matter of restoring leadership.

I am somewhat cautious in my remarks, given that Professor Jo Sung-hoon from China, Professor Lee Sung-yoon, and others are present. Since the 19th Party Congress in 2017, China has frequently used the term '창신' (Chuangxin, innovation) to describe the 'new era' looking towards 2035. What does this 'new era' signify for China? And where do we fit in? My personal thought is that perhaps we are gradually being included in the second concentric circle of the American-drawn diagram. As Professor Park briefly outlined, China dislikes the term 'alliance' and prefers 'partner.' However, we are not even the primary partner in their conception.

So, can we independently lead the US-China dynamic and move in our desired direction? In 21st-century global politics, it is a very challenging process where comprehensive power is built by combining hard and soft power. You mentioned earlier that national interest is paramount. However, to maximize national interest, don't we paradoxically need the perspective to discern the interests of others and act accordingly? This feeling was particularly strong as I listened to the points raised by the distinguished professors.

Now, let us move on to the discussion. First, Professor Park Young-jun from the National Defense University. We kindly request that your discussion remarks be kept within 5 minutes, ideally no more than 6-7 minutes. Professor Park is the first discussant. While there are esteemed scholars here from the East Asia Institute, the Academy of East Asian Studies, and the East Asia Peace Forum, who have focused on East Asian peace as a crucial theme, I am participating as a discussant. Personally, I have always considered the three points continuously mentioned by Professor Bang Min-young in her keynote address as the core issues in achieving peace in East Asia.

These are the denuclearization of North Korea, the peace and security of surrounding countries including the Korean Peninsula, and the establishment of a new order of cooperation, which I have termed a 'cooperative system for a new horizon of order' from a global perspective. These three are considered crucial. My discussion will focus on whether South Korea is effectively responding to these three dimensions of peace, and how it can do so better.

First, the Moon Jae-in administration has pursued an ambitious goal of establishing a peace regime on the Korean Peninsula, addressing North Korea's denuclearization. I believe we need to examine whether this is an appropriate goal and if its pursuit is proceeding effectively, especially since we are discussing peace. While there appear to have been some achievements, the efforts to establish a peace regime on the Korean Peninsula seem to have encountered significant obstacles in two aspects.

The first is whether, despite aiming for North Korea's denuclearization and offering incentives such as inter-Korean economic cooperation and normalization of North Korea-US relations, we are seeing appropriate progress at this point, two to three years into the process. Is North Korea demonstrating sincerity and tangible results? This is a question that warrants serious consideration. Second, a peace regime on the Korean Peninsula, in essence, involves achieving peaceful coexistence among surrounding countries in East Asia. However, is the concept of a peace regime on the Korean Peninsula too narrowly focused? For instance, a new Cold War or strategic economic competition is currently unfolding between the US and China. Has the Moon Jae-in administration, compared to previous administrations, considered what role South Korea should play in fostering a cooperative order not only between North and South Korea but also between the US, China, and Japan in East Asia?

In relation to this, one cannot help but feel that the very concept of establishing a peace regime on the Korean Peninsula lacks the necessary critical perspective. In fact, even when considering the underlying concerns that inspired Ahn Jung-geun to write 'The Philosophy of East Asian Peace,' it seems that despite our increased global influence, our discourse on peace has become somewhat constrained. I worry that the government is presenting a rather limited perspective.

Second, even if there are issues with the discussion on a peace regime for the Korean Peninsula, I believe we should consider utilizing Japan to our advantage. This is especially true given my specialization in Japanese studies. For example, as Professor Bang Min-young continuously presented, while a peace regime for the Korean Peninsula may lead to North Korea's denuclearization and the normalization of North Korea-US relations, the normalization of North Korea-Japan relations is also a crucial component. If North Korea-Japan relations are normalized, wouldn't that also resolve the limitations of the so-called San Francisco Peace Treaty system?

Perhaps, in the process of establishing a peace regime on the Korean Peninsula, our government could have facilitated Japan's constructive role by preventing the deterioration of South Korea-Japan relations and maintaining a cooperative stance with Japan, thereby achieving strategic national goals such as North Korea's denuclearization and the establishment of a peace regime on the Korean Peninsula. However, this perspective seems to have been somewhat lacking. Furthermore, due to various historical issues, the deterioration of South Korea-Japan relations has prevented us from effectively leveraging Japan's potential contributions to peace on the Korean Peninsula.

It is undeniable that Japan and North Korea agreed to normalize relations and provide economic assistance from Japan in exchange for North Korea's actions during the summit in 2002. Therefore, from the perspective of establishing a peace regime on the Korean Peninsula, the normalization of North Korea-Japan relations should be considered as important as the normalization of North Korea-US relations. For this to happen, relations must be managed well. However, it seems that such considerations are lacking in our government's policy towards Japan and its approach to the Korean Peninsula peace regime.

Third, I believe South Korea should play a role in fostering more stable and cooperative relations between the US and China. While Professor Park Jae-jeong's presentation offered several valuable ideas, our government has made efforts to build such relations in East Asia. In previous administrations, for example, we participated in initiatives like the Trilateral Cooperation Secretariat between South Korea, China, and Japan, and multilateral security dialogues. However, recently, even trilateral summits and cooperation projects among South Korea, China, and Japan have not been functioning well. As Professor Park Jae-jeong pointed out, countries like Japan and Australia, while aligned with the US, also maintain a strategic perspective and engage with China. This is something we should emulate.

Therefore, I believe that by adopting a perspective of playing a constructive role in building a desirable order in East Asia, South Korea can explore avenues for strategic autonomy, similar to countries like Japan, Singapore, India, the Philippines, or even Germany in Europe, which navigate between the US and China. I would like to offer my opinion on this matter.

What is actually done, then Professor Lee Dong-yeol will be Michael Dang. Yes, it's Two Singers. Yes, thank you. The answer to the question of 5 is that the discussion will be very lively compared to any other time. What role should I play? I was actually a bit taken aback. Yes, I will talk about three main issues. First, regarding China's rise, which was discussed throughout the morning in the context of the decline of US hegemony, the question is whether China can become a leader in new technologies and seize global leadership. Second, returning to domestic issues, is the stability of China's Xi Jinping regime? And third, as Professor Park Jin-hyuk mentioned, is there an alternative order? I will divide my talk into three parts. First, I think the dual nature of China's rise was confirmed through the presentations by Professor Park and Professor Cho Young-nam at this meeting. This seems to be a reality in Korea as well. So I also...

I think the discussion can be very relative. While listening to the discussions, I thought, 'I need to change my perspective on China.' But as I listened to the professors, I wondered, 'What should I do?' I am bewildered. Firstly, I am somewhat negative about whether China is building an alternative order. There are difficulties in showing such aspects since Xi Jinping took office. Discourse is a prime example. But while talking about the Chinese dream and the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation, Chinese scholars are discussing the new world order and new security. This is ultimately a challenge to the hegemony of the US and the existing order. But Trump's 'greatest nation' rhetoric is not much different from Xi Jinping's 'great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation.'

In other words, it is Chinese isolationism. Especially, I would like to use the expression 'political isolationism.' For China, over the past 40 years, the most important task has been to maintain the stability of its unique system, the one-party communist system. Deng Xiaoping believed that the most important means to achieve this was economic globalization and participation in the world economy, which would ultimately strengthen the political system of the Communist Party.

However, under the Xi Jinping government, it seems to be recognized that participation in economic globalization, which was an important means to strengthen political isolationism, is itself being challenged. Currently, while publicly stating that they will participate in economic globalization and opening up, the reality is that the process has been distorted over the past decade, as evidenced by the dual circulation strategy. In fact, China's move towards political and economic isolationism could be a significant challenge for Korea. Korea's meaning to China's economy is also significant. There is a question about this.

In essence, discourses such as 'community of shared future for mankind,' 'new international relations,' and 'great power diplomacy' are China's way of saying that its rise will not be a threat to the international community. However, the international community, including the US, interprets this as a challenge to the US and an effort to change the existing order. This is understandable because China's discourse on its rise is actively expressed through the expansion of its power.

The expansion of power, and through economic liberalization, economic cooperation, and economic power, it has been realized. The US, on the other hand, seems to be interpreting China's pursuit as an expansion of its own fears. Another controversial and key issue is the 'three-way convergence.' It is a very comprehensive and universal concept, as Professor Cho Young-nam mentioned: sovereignty, security, and development. However, the US's current focus is on issues of sovereignty and security. On the one hand, is China a country that is so vulnerable in terms of sovereignty and security? How many countries in the international community would threaten China's sovereignty and security?

This is indeed the case. Although the Trump administration is currently strongly asserting China's sovereign rights, as you know, China's response has been surprisingly weak. This does not necessarily reflect the vulnerability of the Chinese system. The Hong Kong issue is a prime example. In fact, the Hong Kong policy is a policy that reflects China's characteristics. For 200 years, they waited for Hong Kong's return, and they said they would wait another 50 years after its return. This is the dual nature of Hong Kong policy. However, it seems that they have become very impatient in recent years, which shows their haste. I believe this is a manifestation of Xi Jinping's desire for global expansion, and paradoxically, it is a manifestation of their greatest vulnerability. When the US began to intervene in the Hong Kong issue, it inadvertently covered up some of China's vulnerabilities. Paradoxically, the global norms and human rights issues inherent in the Hong Kong issue have become a tool for US pressure on China, and as the Hong Kong issue becomes more prominent, Chinese citizens are becoming more unified, which paradoxically reveals the stability of the Communist Party's regime and its vulnerabilities. Therefore, the most important issue for China internally is development. The most important factor that ensured the stability of the one-party Communist system for the past 40 years has been economic growth. This crucial factor of economic growth is now significantly weakened. Therefore, they are facing the challenge of how to secure the legitimacy of the one-party Communist system. Thus, the issue of the domestic system is the most important.

The most important issue is the domestic system. Regarding the stability of the one-party Communist system, as Professor Cho mentioned, I think Xi Jinping's regime is paradoxically showing that it is conforming to the times, compared to Mao in the 1970s, 40 or 50 years ago. This means that while the Xi Jinping regime may not be as monolithic as it appears from the outside, the fact that it is interpreted as being as retrogressive as Mao suggests that there might be internal problems within the Xi Jinping regime. I personally believe that the stability of the Chinese regime ultimately depends on the 'grand strategy' mentioned by Professor Park Jin-hyuk. I do not believe that the Chinese regime will be shaken by external pressure or resistance from below. Rather, the consensus and unity of the elite class are crucial. Whether the Xi Jinping regime was created through elite consensus or through individual power is a very important point. This may be confirmed at the 20th National Congress of the Communist Party of China. The leadership elite, through historical experience, undoubtedly harbors a sense of insecurity and crisis regarding instability, so elites will do their utmost to avoid conflict or to not expose conflicts. This is a crucial basis of power that allows the increasingly weakened Communist regime to be maintained.

This is the basis of power that allows the increasingly weakened Communist regime to be maintained. Time is running out, but I will continue. The fire seems to be catching on. Third, Dr. Lee Jae-heon, from the Institute for East Asian Policy. Thank you for inviting me to this good discussion, and I apologize for not being able to participate in person. The reason I am participating in this discussion is probably because much of the discussion revolves around East Asia, focusing on US-China relations and East Asian studies. However, a missing element is Southeast Asia. Perhaps I was recommended to provide a perspective from Southeast Asia. Therefore, I will focus on that aspect. I have submitted a written presentation beforehand, but regardless of that, I would like to share my thoughts and feelings as I listened to the presentations.

Or is it intended to be individualistic, which is a very important point, and this may be confirmed to some extent in the 27th chapter of the operational plan. The leadership's desire to avoid conflict is clearly shaped by historical experiences of anxiety and crisis, leading elites to make continuous efforts to avoid or not expose conflicts. This is currently the important driving force behind the maintenance of the communized system, whose legitimacy is weakening.

This is my thinking. It takes time for things to unfold this way. The fire seems to be starting to ignite. Third, Dr. Lee Jae-heon, please take the floor. Yes, I am Lee Jae-heon from the Institute for Policy Studies. Thank you for the invitation to this excellent forum, and I apologize for not being able to participate directly in the field. The reason I was invited to this discussion is likely because while much of the discussion has focused on the US, China, and East Asia, a missing piece is Southeast Asia. Therefore, I believe I was recommended to provide a perspective from Southeast Asia. I will focus my remarks on that region, and I have submitted a pre-forum presentation on the topic. Regardless, as I listened to the various presentations, I would like to share my thoughts and impressions.

First, Professor Park Myung-rim asked a question during his presentation: 'Can China, as a regional power, gain the hearts and support of its neighbors?' I have long pondered the question of whether it can gain the hearts and support of its neighbors, and whether it can gain such support in Southeast Asia. My personal answer is that, for very realistic reasons, not because of universal values or norms, it will be difficult for China to gain such support and affection in Southeast Asia. I have been thinking about this for a long time.

When we consider the order led by the US and the order discussed by China, and the US and China as entities, which is right? Leaving aside right and wrong, I would like to offer this thought: for countries in the region, which is more familiar? What we don't know is terrifying, and what we know is terrifying. Rather than forging a new path with the unfamiliar, it is more comfortable to stick with what is familiar. This 'familiarity' does not refer to historical events from hundreds of years ago, but to the recent memories of current political leaders and policymakers since the beginning of the Cold War. Generally, Southeast Asian countries were not enthusiastic about the US either. They are great powers and act in their own interests. However, they are more wary of China than the US. Southeast Asian countries believe that not siding with the US does not necessarily mean siding with China, and vice versa. We tend to think of the US-China spectrum as being divided in half, with the US on one side and China on the other. However, from the perspective of Southeast Asian countries, the US order and the China order are at the two extremes, and there is a considerable space between them where Southeast Asian countries and other countries can move autonomously. This is my general thinking.

This is my general thinking. I would like to add one more point. There is much discussion about what China is leading, or what ASEAN is leading. Many people are concerned about whether China's enormous economy will influence the overall regional economic order and whether it will draw things towards China. I don't know about Northeast Asia, but in Southeast Asia, there have been many opportunities for economic cooperation with China and cooperation with the US, which are greater than RCEP.

In my opinion, even though initiatives like China-ASEAN FTA, China's Belt and Road Initiative, and AIIB have been implemented, Southeast Asian countries have maintained a considerable degree of autonomy in their economic interactions with China. While there is economic dependence, it is not a state of subjugation to China. Therefore, RCEP is not a mechanism through which China can exert significant influence in the region. My allotted time is almost up, so I will conclude with a few final remarks.

In fact, Dr. Park Jae-seok should have said more, but he spoke about alternative order and Southeast Asian countries at the end. I have had the same thoughts for a long time. However, I think it is important to consider what we are pursuing through alternative order. I agree with Dr. Park Jae-seok's thoughts. Small and medium-sized countries do not cooperate to challenge or defeat great powers like the US or China. If small and medium-sized countries only watch the US and China, the new order, regional order, and global order created by them will inevitably serve the interests of the great powers. We cannot let this continue. We must create an organization that secures and expands the interests of small and medium-sized countries and gains leverage over great powers. We must create our own strength. That is why cooperation among small and medium-sized countries is important. While there may be some nuances regarding Japan and Australia in Korea, Southeast Asia's policy towards Korea, although it exists, is still focused on economic and socio-cultural cooperation, with strategic cooperation and security cooperation being pushed back in priority.

This is due to a perception issue within Korea. While we attach strategic importance to Southeast Asia, which is a much larger entity than us, Korea, being smaller, tends to strategically neglect Southeast Asia. Unless this perception issue is resolved, it will be difficult to advance strategic cooperation with Southeast Asian countries. I think this is the case.

I will conclude here. Thank you. Yes, we don't have much time left, but we will move on to the second round. I believe the greatest virtue of society is to instigate fights and mediate them. I believe we have succeeded to some extent in instigating fights. As for the three presenters, I believe they have things they want to say, even if I don't point them out. Among them, Professor Park Myung-rim, who is likely to have the most pent-up frustration, probably has a lot to say. Please take about 5 minutes. First, I do not subscribe to the discourse of 'great power competition.' Therefore, I will look for answers in the 'great power competition' and the 'anti-hegemonic aspirations' mentioned by Professor Cho Young-nam and Professor Lee Dong-yeol. I believe the answer lies in the 'Great East Asia Economic Union.'

GMEO: Greater East Asia Economic Union. This implies multilateralism and joint ventures. Ahn Jung-geun's plan fundamentally includes all four elements: the East Asian Peace Union, which is based on military, finance, currency, education, and language, as well as mutual cooperation among the three countries. It is multilateral and is a joint venture. What is even more surprising is the duality of identity. If you look closely at the East Asian Peace Union plan, it proposes that each person contribute their share, like paying taxes. This is about national identity, citizen identity, and East Asian citizen identity. Simultaneously, it extends to Southeast Asia and India, as mentioned by Professor Lee Dong-yeol. I began to seriously consider this plan after hearing Professor Hahn Sung-joo's remarks regarding the establishment of a joint venture with Thailand and Myanmar. This clearly involves multilateral cooperation in areas such as international politics, diplomacy, health, food, and the WHO.

This clearly involves multilateral cooperation in areas such as international politics, diplomacy, health, food, and the WHO. Regarding Professor Cho Young-nam's remarks, I would like to discuss one point: although the times are changing, will the current era, unlike the eras of Mao, Deng Xiaoping, Jiang Zemin, and Hu Jintao, be able to resolve crucial succession issues? Regarding the stability of the Xi Jinping regime, which Professor Cho described as a 'neo-Maoist regime,' if these issues are not clearly addressed, could it lead to chaos similar to the Gang of Four? As Professor Moon Yong-shik mentioned, the most important issue for China is succession. Is this not a difficult problem for East Asian peace? Even if what you say is consistent, the issue of the regime is also important. Regarding the expansion of power, I believe that monarchy leads to expansion, while peace leads to peace. This is what is meant by 'democratic peace,' or rather, 'republican peace.' Many critics of democracy advocate for republican peace. Kant and Metternich spoke of republican peace, not democratic peace. They connected peace within a republic to the peace of multiple republics. Can China peacefully resolve the issues of succession and the one-party system, as well as internal inequality? And will this lead to peace throughout East Asia? This question remains important. I believe that the expansion of power is inherent in monarchy.

Monarchy leads to expansion, while peace leads to peace. This is what is meant by 'democratic peace,' or rather, 'republican peace.' Many critics of democracy advocate for republican peace. Kant and Metternich spoke of republican peace, not democratic peace. They connected peace within a republic to the peace of multiple republics. Can China peacefully resolve the issues of succession and the one-party system, as well as internal inequality? And will this lead to peace throughout East Asia? This question remains important. Finally, regarding Korea, your critique is quite sharp. Professor Park Yong-jung, when you talk about the 8.6 generation, their nationalism and ideology are very negative towards universal values, human rights, and peaceful coexistence. In particular, this statist nationalism is a failure of democratic nationalism, as it mobilizes everyone. I believe the 8.6 generation's statist nationalism is the most negative, except for North Korea, towards Japan, the US, and China, in terms of pursuing peaceful coexistence. From the period of Roh Tae-woo to Kim Young-sam and Kim Dae-jung, and even extending to Roh Moo-hyun, it was a time when they tried to combine the internal and external aspects. However, the 8.6 generation is the most negative. This statist nationalism, a product of the failure of democratic nationalism, is even more negative.

This is why, looking at the current situation, the 8.6 generation seems to be moving forward innovatively by inheriting the ideas of the Roh Tae-woo, Kim Young-sam, and Kim Dae-jung governments, such as the US-China balance and the North-South Commonwealth. Dr. Cho Young-nam, please proceed. Yes, thank you. I will briefly comment on the issues raised. First, regarding whether China can lead the world order after the US, I believe China has neither the intention nor the capability. Regarding the intention, looking at the current actions of the Chinese government, it does not seem to aim for hegemony by replacing the US in terms of economy, military power, or ideology. Rather, its intention is to create the international environmental conditions for its future growth and secure the legitimate space for its activities. Therefore, looking at China's actions towards countries like Australia and Canada, it does not seem to seek support, agreement, or affection from developed countries. Instead, China's basic strategy is to break through the containment and encirclement by developed countries, including the US, by strengthening economic, social, and diplomatic cooperation with developing countries, including those in Southeast Asia.

In this regard, I believe that discussing China as the next hegemon after the US is fundamentally flawed. It lacks both the intention and the capability. This is my perspective. However, does this mean that a predetermined war is inevitable? I do not see it that way. It is not a predetermined war. China is most concerned about two things: first, the problem of national division through democratic political reform, as seen in the Soviet experience; and second, unnecessary arms races, which lead to conflict and waste national strength. China is concerned about these two things. In this sense, it is not as relentlessly aggressive as it appears. It pursues a pragmatic diplomacy that shows strength when necessary and compromises when necessary. In this regard, I do not believe it intends to challenge the US with its strength, which is inferior to that of the US. Therefore, I would like to emphasize one point: when considering China's policy on Taiwan and Hong Kong, it must be approached with exceptional care. This is because for the Chinese people, Chinese intellectuals, and the Chinese leadership, these represent the beginning of a century of humiliation. The Opium War in 1840 marked the loss of territory and dignity to foreign powers. Therefore, the return of Hong Kong in 2021, coinciding with the centenary of the founding of the Communist Party of China, is an issue that the Communist Party of China cannot accept. Similarly, when looking at the Taiwan issue, we see it as a matter of national self-determination, but for Chinese leaders and intellectuals, it is also a historical humiliation, as they were defeated by Japan in war and lost territory. Therefore, when we try to understand China's domestic and international relations through this lens, we may misinterpret it. Furthermore, the issue of domestic regime stability, which has been repeatedly discussed, is an unavoidable challenge for any ruling party, especially in one-party states. In this sense, when asked if China's political regime is stable, I cannot say it is stable. This applies to the Mao era, the Deng Xiaoping era, the Jiang Zemin and Hu Jintao eras, and the Xi Jinping era. Whoever emerges after Xi Jinping will likely face instability within the political regime due to the inherent dilemma of authoritarianism. The crucial question is whether this instability can be managed. In this regard, rather than emphasizing explosion, it is closer to management. Stability is not the right word. Especially regarding the transfer of power from the fourth to the fifth generation, and then to the sixth generation, although this remains to be seen in 2020, even if a fifth-generation leader becomes the General Secretary of the Communist Party, if the positions of President and Chairman of the Central Military Commission are still held by Xi Jinping, I believe he will still have influence. However, even if power is not transferred smoothly, does this mean that the political instability affects the national governance capacity? I do not think so.

Finally, regarding Korea, although it is a very good critique, what Park Yong-jeung said made me criticize it more from the perspective of the 8.18 generation. The nationalist goal or framework of the 8.18 generation is very negative towards universalism, human rights, and peaceful coexistence. In particular, state-led nationalism is a failure of democratic nationalism. It mobilizes everyone to push it forward. However, I wonder if the state-led nationalism of the 8.18 generation is oriented towards engaging with Japan, the US, and China, excluding North Korea. When considering the periods from Roh Tae-woo to Kim Young-sam and Kim Dae-jung, and perhaps extending to Roh Moo-hyun, these were times when there was an attempt to combine internal and external factors. In contrast, the 8.18 generation is perhaps the most negative. In the context of the Korean Peninsula, Northeast Asia, and world peace, this nationalism, which is negative towards universalism and nationalism, is a product of the failure of state-led nationalism and is even more negative.

Looking at this from the perspective of policy, it is quite progressive to see the unification policy of the 8.18 generation, whether it is the US-China alliance, the China-leaning policy of the Roh Tae-woo era, the Kim Dae-jung administration's North-South Commonwealth, or the Kim Dae-jung administration's policies. Please proceed to the next slide. Yes, thank you. I will briefly address the issues raised in relation to my presentation.

The very first question is whether China can lead the world order after the United States. I believe China has neither the intention nor the capability to do so. The lack of intention is evident in the current actions of the Chinese government; they do not appear to aim to replace the US as a hegemonic power in terms of economy, military, or ideology. Their current intention, as I see it, is to form international conditions conducive to their continued growth and to secure a space for legitimacy for their activities. This intention is strong.

Therefore, judging from China's actions towards Australia and Canada, it does not seem to seek support, agreement, or affection from foreign countries, especially developed nations. Instead, China's basic strategy appears to be to break through the containment and pressure from developed countries, including the US, by strengthening economic cooperation and, if necessary, diplomatic engagement with developing countries, including those in Southeast Asia. This seems to be their strategy.

In this regard, I believe that discussing China as the next global power after the US is fundamentally flawed and inaccurate, as it lacks the capability. Moreover, I do not believe this will necessarily lead to a predetermined war. China's greatest concerns are twofold: first, the problem of national division through democratization, as seen in the Soviet Union's experience; and second, the wasteful competition and conflict arising from unnecessary military buildup. These are what China seeks to avoid.

In this sense, contrary to appearances, China does not blindly push forward with force. It pursues a pragmatic diplomatic strategy, demonstrating strength when necessary, and compromising when appropriate. Therefore, I do not believe they intend to engage in a military conflict with the US, given their current capabilities. If I may add one more point, regarding the Taiwan issue, China's policy towards Taiwan is exceptional and must be treated as such.

This is because, for the Chinese people, Chinese intellectuals, and the Chinese leadership, it represents the beginning of China's 100 years of humiliation – the loss of Hong Kong in the Opium War of 1840. Therefore, the return of Hong Kong at the time of the Chinese Communist Party's centenary in 2021 is an issue that the Chinese Communist Party cannot accept. Similarly, when viewing the Taiwan issue, while we see it as a separate country, for Chinese leaders and intellectuals, it is also a source of humiliation.

In this sense, when observing China's elite politics, it is more appropriate to consider the management of inherent instability within socialist systems. This is my opinion. Thank you. Professor Park Jae-jeong, please proceed. Thank you. Professor Park Myung-rim asked about China-Russia relations. Of course, I believe China-Russia cooperation is necessary. So far, discussions on China's foreign policy have focused on areas like humanitarian cooperation and non-traditional security issues. However, I believe we need to expand China-Russia cooperation to include traditional security and the combination of traditional and non-traditional security. Regarding this, Professor Park Myung-rim mentioned trilateral cooperation among China, Japan, and Korea. This is a good example of multilateral cooperation that functions well without US interference. What I would like to emphasize is that these autonomous regional cooperation initiatives need to be expanded and linked. As I mentioned earlier regarding the expansion of China-Russia cooperation to include traditional and non-traditional security, Southeast Asian countries are conducting joint training and exercises to prevent accidental collisions in maritime and air transport, through a mechanism called an

This was the case under Hu Jintao, and it is the same under Xi Jinping. Regardless of who emerges after Xi Jinping, the Chinese political system will likely remain unstable due to the inherent dilemmas of succession. Ultimately, the question is whether these issues can be managed. I believe it is more accurate to focus on manageability rather than emphasizing the potential for upheaval. This is not to say that the system is inherently stable. Especially regarding the transition of power from the fifth to the sixth generation, while this will become clearer by 2020, even if a sixth-generation leader were to become General Secretary of the Communist Party, as long as the current leader holds the positions of State President and Chairman of the Central Military Commission, I believe Xi Jinping's influence will remain. However, even if power transitions are not smooth, will this political instability affect the nation's governance capacity? I do not believe so.

Therefore, when examining Chinese elite politics, considering the inherent instability of the socialist system and focusing on the management of these factors is, in my opinion, the correct approach. Thank you. Professor Park Jae-jeong, please. Thank you. Regarding Professor Park Yong-jeung's question about China-Korea relations, I naturally believe they are necessary. Thus far, discussions on China-Korea diplomacy have been limited to areas such as humanitarian aid and non-traditional security.

In the future, we should expand China-Korea cooperation to encompass both traditional and non-traditional security. Regarding this, Professor Park mentioned trilateral cooperation among China, Japan, and South Korea, which seems to function well without the US's involvement. What I would like to emphasize is the need to link these regional self-sustaining cooperation mechanisms.

This linkage and expansion are crucial. As I mentioned regarding the need to combine traditional and non-traditional security in China-Korea cooperation, for example, Southeast Asian countries are conducting joint training exercises to prevent accidental collisions in maritime and aerial domains. While Japan and China have bilateral agreements on such matters, there is no trilateral agreement in Northeast Asia. The focus of China-Korea cooperation has so far been on functional areas. By moving beyond this to encompass traditional and non-traditional security, and by linking this with Southeast Asian countries, we can develop a large-scale multilateral cooperation mechanism in East Asia. This could serve as a model.

From this perspective, I believe we must approach China-Korea cooperation. Among the points made by Dr. Lee, what best captures my presentation is likely the TPP. After the US withdrew from the TPP under the Trump administration, Japan took the lead in forming the CPTPP. Similarly, as bilateral FTAs develop, a regional mega-FTA can emerge through the linkage of regional cooperation mechanisms. The CPTPP and CPTPP 11 are prime examples of this. When the US retreats from regional engagement, it is crucial for countries of significant size in the region to take the lead in establishing security cooperation frameworks. This is what I emphasized in my presentation, and I believe it would be best if this were primarily economic and trade-related. I fully agree with everything Dr. Lee has said. We are not pursuing these initiatives to engage in a US-China confrontation, but rather to gain leverage with great powers or, like the TPP, to establish alternative regional security frameworks and cooperation systems in preparation for potential US withdrawal. This is why I believe these efforts are necessary.

I would like to give the discussants a brief opportunity to speak. Dr. Lee, please begin in reverse order. Thank you. I do not have much more to add. As this is my final opportunity to speak, I would like to extend my previous remarks on how to achieve regional peace and secure the interests of middle powers through cooperation among them. More specifically, I am considering the role of South Korea, and what it should do. I strongly believe that we must return to the period of the Kim Dae-jung administration. When the current administration's "New Southern Policy" was announced, I hoped that South Korea would move beyond bilateral cooperation with ASEAN and India, and emulate the Kim Dae-jung administration's efforts in leading expanded East Asian regional cooperation, such as ASEAN Plus Three and the East Asia Summit. Unfortunately, it seems we have not yet progressed significantly in that direction. Therefore, I hope that we can revive the memory of South Korea's leadership in East Asian multilateral cooperation during the Kim Dae-jung administration and utilize existing platforms for multilateral cooperation among middle powers to contribute to regional peace. We could even propose new platforms, but it would be best to take a leading role in such multilateral cooperation. These are my thoughts. I will conclude my remarks here. Thank you, Professor. I do not believe that Chinese leaders perceive the world order through a Sino-centric framework. The problem is that they excessively mobilize nationalism to cover up the vulnerabilities of China's political system. Recent claims regarding the Korean War or BTS are examples of this. Ultimately, this risks hindering the innovation and revitalization of the Chinese system. This is not unique to China; both the US and South Korea are excessively mobilizing nationalism due to domestic political needs, which is causing harm to each other and to neighboring countries. As mentioned earlier, this international politics of hatred and emotion appears very dangerous.

I believe that multilateral security cooperation is an opportunity for South Korea. Even if it does not reach the level of a full alliance, both the US and China are currently preoccupied with domestic issues, significantly weakening their global leadership. Moreover, due to the pandemic, there is a strong atmosphere of self-reliance throughout the international community. Therefore, South Korea, rather than being pressured to choose between the US and China, should seek alternatives. However, this is not solely a South Korean issue. There are geopolitical constraints, the problem of division, the North Korean nuclear issue, and domestic political polarization. How can we overcome these challenges and shift our focus from great power diplomacy to diversified and expanded diplomatic engagement? Creating national consensus for this will be a difficult task. This is my conclusion.

I would like to add a point regarding Professor Park Kyung-joong and Park Min-seo. Regarding the mention of state-led nationalism of the 8.18 generation, I hope we can find a more appropriate term for the 386 generation, as I do not believe state-led nationalism is entirely accurate. I would like to emphasize that not all members of the 386 generation fit this description. When Professor Cho Young-nam explained that China lacks the intention and capability for hegemony...

I believe that Chinese leaders do not envision a world order based on Sino-centricity. The problem is that they excessively mobilize nationalism to cover up the vulnerabilities of China's political system. Recent claims regarding the Korean War or BTS are examples of this. Ultimately, this risks hindering the innovation and revitalization of the Chinese system. This is not unique to China; both the US and South Korea are excessively mobilizing nationalism due to domestic political needs, which is causing harm to each other and to neighboring countries. As mentioned earlier, this international politics of hatred and emotion appears very dangerous.

I believe that multilateral security cooperation is an opportunity for South Korea. Even if it does not reach the level of a full alliance, both the US and China are currently preoccupied with domestic issues, significantly weakening their global leadership. Moreover, due to the pandemic, there is a strong atmosphere of self-reliance throughout the international community. Therefore, South Korea, rather than being pressured to choose between the US and China, should seek alternatives. However, this is not solely a South Korean issue. There are geopolitical constraints, the problem of division, the North Korean nuclear issue, and domestic political polarization. How can we overcome these challenges and shift our focus from great power diplomacy to diversified and expanded diplomatic engagement? Creating national consensus for this will be a difficult task. This is my conclusion.

I would like to say a few words regarding Park Kyung-joong and Park Min-seo. Regarding the state-led nationalism of the 8.18 generation, I hope you can find a more appropriate term for the 386 generation. I don't think state-led nationalism is entirely accurate. I would like to emphasize that not all members of the 386 generation fit that description. When Professor Cho Young-nam explained that China lacks the intention and capability for hegemony...

However, the pursuit of securing its proper space, as explained, is something that, from a third-party perspective, I believe is quite dangerous. Germany's pursuit of its 'proper status' in World War I, in competition with Britain and France and in its colonial expansion, was a slogan used by the German Empire. Japan, too, in its pursuit of the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere, sought its 'proper status' under the guise of establishing a new order in East Asia.

Therefore, if the Pacific becomes a space contested by the U.S. and China, as Professor Cho suggests, could this not send a threatening signal to the U.S. and neighboring countries? I would like to pose this question. We have proceeded very quickly, but as we still have some time left, I would like to offer the floor to the panelists who raised their hands. We have a 30-second slot. The first to raise their hand was Professor Cho.

Yes, as an expert on China, I would like to offer a few points related to today's discussion. First, to what extent does the Chinese government or the CCP formulate a vision for a 'new world order' or 'new order'? I believe the answer is 'not much.' For instance, there was a book by Alistair Cooke titled 'The Ten Thousand Year War,' which argued that the Chinese system is superior. Years ago, I had the opportunity to attend a meeting in China and asked some Chinese professors what they thought of Alistair Cooke's ideas. Their response was, 'Well, it's good for us.' What they meant was that such notions of a 'new world order' are a significant project for scholars and the government, but I do not believe this reflects the Chinese government's actual stance.

I believe it is quite simplistic to view it this way. In reality, they possess their own unique framework, a blend of realism, pragmatism, and nationalism. Therefore, while it is acceptable for some scholars or segments of the Chinese government to discuss these ideas, I do not believe it represents a comprehensive strategy. Furthermore, I do not believe China is isolated. While looking solely at the Pew Research Center data might suggest China is isolated, a broader examination of developing countries reveals otherwise.

China is not isolated, and it has reasons to be confident. For example, the Belt and Road Initiative alone involves direct investments of up to $2 trillion. Considering this, along with the financial and technological support provided through various channels, it suggests a different narrative than a purely isolationist one. While domestic views in Korea might be negative towards China, this is not necessarily the case in other developing countries. In this context, while the U.S. is pushing for a confrontation, China is reframing it as a North-South divide, a conflict between developed and developing nations. This is a new dynamic that warrants attention. Thank you.

Yes, what you have just said is a very important issue, and I agree with much of it. China still seems to be operating within the framework of Mao Zedong's thought, emphasizing non-alignment and the Bandung spirit of Afro-Asian solidarity, aiming to break away from the bipolar world order dominated by the U.S. and the Soviet Union. Your point about securing space in the ideological realm is crucial. The framing of the issue as a North-South or East-West divide is indeed significant. What I would like to focus on is how we in Korea should respond. The collapse of the Soviet Union and the socialist bloc led to the rise of China.

In the global landscape, the North-South issue and the collapse of socialist states have led to the emergence of strategic states. We have completed the establishment of a strategic state system, moving from internal conflicts and succession struggles, as seen in the Kim Young-sam, Kim Dae-jung, and Roh Moo-hyun administrations, which attempted peaceful unification. Based on this, we moved from establishing diplomatic relations with China and improving relations with Japan, to the Basic Agreement on Inter-Korean Relations and the June 15 Joint Declaration. However, we are now facing internal conflicts, escalating to a level of inter-Korean conflict. In this situation, with China's firm rise, the completion of the strategic state system, and the internal division reaching the level of civil war, while the peace of the Republic of Korea is increasingly threatened, our government is mobilizing nationalism and engaging in confrontational bloc politics. In this context, the illusion that peace in East Asia is possible, even without resolving the nuclear issue, simply by improving inter-Korean relations, needs to be addressed. How can we...

This is a significant challenge, and I believe it is a matter that requires deep reflection. While it is regrettable, I feel we must conclude our discussion. As I wrap up, I would like to make a couple of points. Frankly, this is a self-criticism for me, and I believe it is also a shared responsibility for the panelists, the organizing institutions, and all of us present. First, are we truly understanding the 'grand trends' of the world? I believe we need a more sober and introspective approach in the 21st century.

Regarding the U.S.-China relationship, I agree with Professor Cho and Professor Jo Yeong-ran's points. It is well-known that both the U.S. and China are actively researching and developing policy alternatives for the period around 2035. By 2035, the economic realities will be such that China's GDP will approach that of the U.S., or they will be on par. The timeline for this parity is estimated to be around 2030-2035, with GDPs reaching $30 trillion to $45 trillion.

What about 2050? By 2050, it is projected that China's GDP will reach $45 trillion, while the U.S. GDP will be around $30 trillion. If the U.S. and China maintain a balance, there is a risk of them becoming rivals. Therefore, I urge those who view the U.S. or China to consider a longer-term perspective. I agree with Professor Cho's point that someone needs to consider the relationship between the Chinese nation and humanity in the context of the 'great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation' and the 'community of shared future for mankind' in 30 years.

This is a significant task for this space, and I believe the U.S. faces a similar challenge. As a middle power, we have the advantage of being able to play a longer game than the U.S. or China. Even if they do not consider how they will lead the future, we must look much further ahead. This is my first point. Second, as Professor Park and Professor Park Young-joon pointed out, the question of what we should do has been raised multiple times. Personally, I was deeply moved by the two lines left behind by Ahn Jung-geun in his 'Theory of Eastern Peace,' which he could not complete before his death. He left them as a testament, perhaps out of a sense of shame that he could not finish his work. The two lines I am referring to are: 'Despite this, seeing that Japan has not changed its strategy, I truly want to kill it.' However, the last two lines are not about killing. He wrote, 'How can I convey the principles of benevolent governance to Japan?' When I mentioned this in an interview with a major Japanese media outlet, they did not publish the entire interview. Therefore, I believe this is a very important expression. Paradoxically, he uses a paradoxical expression of overcoming hatred with love. What should we do about this? If we have such a proud tradition, people like Minse during the 1930s, despite difficult circumstances, spoke of moving from the nation to the world and from the world to the nation. After 70-80 years, why are we still in a situation where we must say, as Professor Park mentioned, that we need to move beyond nationalism? This is a tragedy. Naturally, I believe we are people who can speak of the nation, the world, and even beyond the world, and doing so will lend us more persuasive power. However, this requires a foundation of strength in the 21st century. Professor Lee and Professor Park's discussion about Southeast Asia and other regions, while accurate, feels somewhat limited from the perspective of a middle power.

Perhaps from a broader perspective, it is understandable. Instead of using terms like 'network diplomacy,' perhaps we should consider other expressions. However, the final point I wish to make is that while engaging in network diplomacy, we must acknowledge to the U.S. and Japan that we are allies, but also make them understand that we cannot always be on the same side. Simultaneously, we must gain China's trust that we value our relationship with them as much as we do with our existing allies. By achieving this mutual trust, we can expand our network diplomacy. This, I believe, presents an opportunity to realize the 'international nationalism' that Ahn Jung-geun and scholars like Nam In-soo spoke of in the 21st century. With this, I would like to conclude today's presentations and discussions. In my subjective judgment, it was a very interesting and engaging discussion. The panelists also actively participated.

We had 30-second slots, and I would like to express my gratitude to the three organizing institutions. I will conclude here. This marks the end of the joint academic conference on East Asian Peace, co-hosted by the East Asia Institute and the Academy of East Asian Studies. Thank you. (Sound of applause)

I would like to conclude by expressing my gratitude to the three organizing institutions. I will conclude here. This marks the end of the joint academic conference on East Asian Peace, co-hosted by the East Asia Institute and the Academy of East Asian Studies. Thank you. (Sound of applause)

Thank you. This concludes the joint academic conference on East Asian Peace, co-hosted by the East Asia Institute and the Academy of East Asian Studies. Thank you. (Applause)