[EAI Online Seminar] After Trump Series 3. Korea and the US: Alliance Future and Vision

YouTube Link: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=m0Q9yxddW54

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The East Asia Institute (EAI) held an online seminar titled “Korea and the US: Alliance Future and Vision” as the third session of its [After Trump] series. Amidst changes in the international landscape, the US presidential election, and intensifying US-China competition, the Korea-US alliance faces a new phase. This seminar discussed the security policies of the new US administration and their impact on Korea, North Korea strategy, and the mid- to long-term prospects of the Korea-US alliance.

• Date & Time: Tuesday, November 24, 2020, 23:00-00:30 (KST)
• Speakers: Lee Sang-hyun (Senior Research Fellow, Sejong Institute), Chun Jae-sung (Director, EAI Center for National Security Studies; Professor, Seoul National University), Scott Snyder (Senior Fellow and Director, Program on U.S.-Korea Policy, Council on Foreign Relations), Patrick Cronin (Asia-Pacific Security Chair, Hudson Institute)
• Discussants: Kim Hyun-wook (Professor, Korea National Diplomatic Academy), Woo Jeong-yeop (Director, Center for American Studies, Sejong Institute), Jean Lee (Director, Center for Korean History and Public Policy, Woodrow Wilson Center), Frank Aum (Senior Fellow, U.S. Institute of Peace)

I. Summary

Korea-US alliance's divergent views must be addressed

• Patrick M. Cronin (Asia-Pacific Security Chair, Hudson Institute): Through Korea-US dialogue, bilateral solidarity can be enhanced, and based on this, differences in positions on contentious issues such as defense cost-sharing can be reconciled. Both countries must narrow their differences and respond with a consistent stance on the peace of the Korean Peninsula and approaches to North Korea.
• Scott A. Snyder (Senior Fellow and Director, Program on U.S.-Korea Policy, Council on Foreign Relations): Now is a crucial time for South Korea and the United States to create an environment for mutual understanding and establish channels for dialogue, rather than seeking tangible achievements. For instance, the discourse surrounding US-China competition and South Korea's related concerns, which are actively discussed in Korea, should be expanded and continued with the United States. It is important to broaden the scope of dialogue to share concerns in areas such as technology, economy, norms, and regional security, and to develop joint solutions.
• Kim Hyun-wook (Professor, Korea National Diplomatic Academy): To establish a shared understanding of security threats and strategic breakthroughs between Korea and the US, the 2+2 dialogue, which was sustained from 2010 to 2016, should be reactivated. Based on these joint efforts, a collective response system should be established to counter China's economic sanctions.
• Woo Jeong-yeop (Research Fellow, Sejong Institute): The ROK and the US need to reaffirm the scope of the alliance as envisioned by each country through dialogue. In Korea, there are some views that limit the scope of the ROK-US alliance to the Korean Peninsula and are concerned about its expansion to China policy, while in the US, there are movements to utilize the ROK-US alliance mechanism to respond to conflicts with China. In this situation, differences may arise in evaluating the importance and benefits of the alliance.

US policy toward North Korea must

• Patrick M. Cronin (Asia-Pacific Security Chair, Hudson Institute): The incoming Biden administration must establish a direction through thorough discussion on whether to adhere to the denuclearization path as US policy toward North Korea, or to approach the coexistence path with a nuclear-armed North Korea, which South Korea is implicitly pursuing. Meanwhile, efforts should be made to shift allies toward pursuing a more productive and sustainable diplomatic roadmap, including negotiations with North Korea, moving away from the sense of tension regarding North Korea.
• Scott A. Snyder (Senior Fellow, Council on Foreign Relations): The Biden administration should continue to signal that the door for dialogue with North Korea remains open and explore ways to establish and maintain a direct communication channel with Chairman Kim Jong Un. The private communication method, such as the 'love letters' exchanged between President Trump and Chairman Kim Jong Un, could serve as an example.
• Lee Sang-hyun (Senior Research Fellow, Sejong Institute): North Korea is unlikely to easily resume dialogue with the United States after the collapse of the North Korea-US summits. Despite difficult domestic and international circumstances, the Biden administration should inherit the key elements of the 2018 Singapore Declaration and the 2019 Hanoi North Korea-US Summit. Although these summits did not yield substantial results, they at least opened channels for dialogue and brought North Korea back to the negotiation table, thus the need to continue this momentum.
• Frank Aum (Senior Fellow, U.S. Institute of Peace): South Korea and the United States must repeatedly convey their willingness to 'engage' with North Korea. Reaffirming the agreements made in the 2018 US-North Korea Singapore Declaration can be the starting point for such a conciliatory measure. While it may be burdensome for the Biden administration to continue President Trump's North Korea diplomacy, it must be acknowledged that the Singapore Declaration is currently the only principle that North Korea has not rejected. Maintaining nuclear deterrence and security, and embracing risks that can be tolerated for peace, should be pursued.

An alliance encompassing not only security cooperation on the Korean

• Scott A. Snyder (Senior Fellow, Council on Foreign Relations): There is a need to establish a long-term vision for the Korea-US alliance. To date, the Korea-US alliance has tended to be bound by various past issues stemming from the Korean War. From now on, long-term goals for a sustained Korea-US alliance must be set from a broader perspective. The focus of the alliance needs to move beyond the existing security-centric view to create various areas of cooperation, including technology and COVID-19.
• Patrick M. Cronin (Asia-Pacific Security Chair, Hudson Institute): I agree that the Korea-US alliance should extend beyond the North Korean issue into various fields. South Korea and the United States each have challenges and opportunities, and cooperation can create greater synergy. The scope of cooperation can be expanded beyond the current focus on issues in the East Sea or West Sea to include areas such as COVID-19, climate change, liberalism, free trade, infrastructure development, and communication.
• Jean H. Lee (Director, Center for Korean History and Public Policy, Woodrow Wilson Center): Through the Korea-US alliance, South Korea and the United States should make various efforts to contribute not only to peace and security issues on the Korean Peninsula but also to the expansion of the liberal world order. This shared sense of purpose between the two countries will not only strengthen regional liberalism but also expand their influence beyond the Korean Peninsula by leveraging the benefits of the alliance. In this process, maximizing South Korea's growth potential in areas such as health, environment, and technology will be a new vision for the Korea-US alliance.
• Frank Aum (Senior Fellow): It is important to recognize that cooperation between Korea and the US is bidirectional, not unilateral, and to reconcile each other's interests. Thus far, the alliance has appeared to place a considerable burden on South Korea regarding issues such as regional security or policy toward China. In the future, the Biden administration must devise ways to support South Korea as an ally. One method is to adopt a more flexible approach to US policy toward North Korea or the transfer of wartime operational control.

Can the US provide sufficient compensation to allies standing at

• Professor Kim Hyun-wook: With the majority of countries worldwide exhibiting high economic dependence on China, there are concerns about whether the United States has the capacity to provide commensurate incentives to its allies and lead alliances. As existing U.S. allies stand at a crossroads between 'China's money' and 'American values,' the U.S. will inevitably incur significant costs to maintain hegemony amidst the sharp U.S.-China confrontation.
• Research Fellow Woo Jeong-yeop: Many countries, including South Korea, are concerned that maintaining alliances with the U.S. will worsen their relations with China. If the Biden administration wishes to sustain alliances, it must continuously devise strategies to counter China and reassure these allied nations.
• Professor Jeon Jae-sung, Seoul National University: The current political and economic situation can be described as an era of hegemonic impossibility, where it is difficult for any single nation to achieve hegemony. As seen in the COVID-19 pandemic, individual countries lack the capacity to provide sufficient public goods required by the international community. At present, the ability to mobilize one's allies, both globally and regionally, is more crucial. In this regard, the United States, representing universal norms, holds an advantageous position. The U.S., which appears likely to continue its engagement policy in its relationship with China, seems capable of strengthening ties with its allies based on norms.

To the ROK-US alliance a fresh shock that brought Trump's four years, and the ROK-US two countries faced uncertainty transition period

• Senior Researcher Frank Aum: The Trump administration's policy toward the ROK-US alliance was somewhat strategically lacking, and some may even call it destructive. However, it can be positively assessed for providing a moderate shock that prompted a reconsideration of the key agenda items necessary for the alliance's continuity. An alliance between two countries is like a marriage; once it reaches a certain stage of stability, interactions can become repetitive and cyclical. To maintain an alliance, it is crucial to continuously coordinate and re-examine mutual interests, thereby injecting new vitality.
• Senior Researcher Lee Sang-hyun: Compared to the Trump administration, the Biden administration is expected to see a relative easing of conflicts arising from various agenda items in the ROK-US alliance. On the other hand, new challenges are anticipated with the emphasis on a 'value alliance.' It may be necessary to more directly address issues of human rights and liberalism, which have been sensitive points in South Korea's policies toward China and North Korea. As South Korea is also approaching a presidential election, both countries are facing an uncertain transition period and must swiftly readjust their policies. ■

II. Speaker and Moderator Biographies

■ Kim Hyun-wook_Director-General and Professor, Americas Policy Planning Division, Korea National Diplomatic Academy (KNDA). Ph.D. in Political Science from Brown University. Former Standing Member of the National Unification Advisory Council, Policy Advisor to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Policy Advisor to the Presidential Committee on National Security, and Advisor to the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Areas of expertise include the ROK-US alliance, North Korea-US relations, and East Asian security. Recent publications include "Prospects for the Biden Administration's Policies toward China and the Korean Peninsula" (2020).

■ 진 리(Jean H. Lee)_Director, Center for Korean History and Public Policy, Wilson Center. Master of Journalism from Columbia University, Global Fellow at the Woodrow Wilson Center. Former Pyongyang Bureau Chief for the Associated Press (AP) and Head of AP's Korean Peninsula Bureau. Recipient of the AP Media Editors' Award for the US and Canada in 2012 and the Online Journalism Award in 2013, and a Pulitzer Prize finalist for feature writing in 2013. Contributes to The New York Times and appears as an expert on the Korean Peninsula on CNN, BBC, and NPR.

■ 스콧 스나이더(Scott A. Snyder)_ Director of Korea Policy, Council on Foreign Relations. Master of East Asian Studies from Harvard University, Thomas G. Watson Fellow at Yonsei University. Established the Korea Policy Center while managing the International Relations Program at The Asia Foundation, and served as the Country Representative for Korea at The Asia Foundation. Primary research areas include East Asian security, North Korea policy, and ROK-US relations. Major publications include South Korea at the Crossroads: Autonomy and Alliance in an Era of Rival Powers (2018), The Japan-South Korea Identity Clash: East Asian Security and the United States (2015, co-authored).

■ 프랭크 엄(Frank Aum)_ Senior Fellow, U.S. Institute of Peace. Master in Public Policy (MPP) from Harvard University, Juris Doctor (JD) from the University of California, Berkeley School of Law. Former Special Assistant to the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Asian and Pacific Security Affairs and Senior Advisor on North Korea in the Office of the Secretary of Defense, U.S. Department of Defense.

■ Woo Jung-yeop_ Director, Center for American Studies, and Research Fellow, Security Strategy Research Division, Sejong Institute. Ph.D. in Political Science from the University of Wisconsin-Madison. Former Postdoctoral Fellow at the Korean Studies Institute, University of Southern California, and Research Fellow and Director of the Washington Office at the Asan Institute for Policy Studies. Currently serves as the Editor-in-Chief of "National Strategy." Primary research areas include international security, US foreign policy, ROK-US relations, and Korean Peninsula security. Major publications include Foreign Intervention in Civil Wars (Cambridge Scholars Publishing, 2017), and numerous articles such as "Changing Security Environment in Northeast Asia and South Korea’s Security Dilemma" (2019), "North Korea's Incomplete Denuclearization and the ROK-US Alliance" (2019), and "Is Prediction Possible for North Korea-US Relations?" (2018).

■ Lee Sang-hyun_ Senior Researcher, Security Strategy Research Division, Sejong Institute. Ph.D. in Political Science from the University of Illinois Urbana-Champaign. Former Director-General for Policy Planning at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade, and Research Fellow at the Institute of Foreign Affairs and National Security and the Korea Institute for Defense Analyses. Primary research areas include international security, ROK-US relations, war and conflict theory, regional conflicts, and military security. Major publications include "The ROK-US Alliance and China's Hegemonic Competition" (2020, co-authored, forthcoming), "The Trump Administration's Nuclear Policy: Implications for the International Nuclear Non-Proliferation Regime and the North Korean Nuclear Issue" (2019), and "Understanding Contemporary ROK-US Relations" (2019, co-authored).

■ Jeon Jae-sung_ Director, EAI Center for National Security Studies, and Professor at Seoul National University. Ph.D. in Political Science from Northwestern University. Served as a policy advisor to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of Unification. Primary research areas include international political theory, history of international relations, the ROK-US alliance, and Korean Peninsula studies. Major books and edited volumes include "Sovereignty and International Politics: The Imperial Character of the Modern Sovereign State System," "East Asian International Politics: International Politics of Imperfect Sovereign States," "Is Politics Moral?: Reinhold Niebuhr's Transcendent International Political Thought," "Is Politics Moral?", and "East Asian International Politics: From History to Theory."

■ 패트릭 크로닌(Patrick M. Cronin)_ Asia-Pacific Security Chair, Hudson Institute. Ph.D. from the University of Oxford. Former Director of Studies at the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), Executive Director of the Military Conflict Database, and Senior Vice President and Director of Studies at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS). Primary research areas include US Indo-Pacific strategy, US-China competition, Korean Peninsula security issues, alliances, and cooperation. Major publications include "All the Japanese Prime Minister's Course Corrections" (2020).

■ Managed and Edited by: Lim Hyun-jin, EAI Research Fellow

문의: 02-2277-1683 (ext. 203) hjyim@eai.or.kr

Video Script

good evening and good morning everybody i'm chad song chung from east east institute a chair of national security research center thank you for joining us today's conversation i'm going to moderate today's session we are having many webinars these days but today's discussion is a little bit different because today's discussion is based on the eai project a vision for the future rkus alliance which will be published next month on eai website four writers from the united states and south korea have conducted the project for almost a

year the purpose of the project is to evaluate the current status of the rk-us alliance and to predict the future security environments for the next decade and we are going to have a new biden administration which is likely to be highly different from the trump administration at least in dealing with the alliance network security policy in east asia authors have also discussed critical issues of how to deal with the rising influence of china in regional security matter and how to cope with unpredictable security threat from north

korea new frontier issues as witnessed in the matter of covet 19 are also central issues that the rk u.s alliance is going to handle and we have tried to suggest a way to countries will continue to cooperate not just for common security threats but also for the regional and global security order i'm delighted to introduce these authors besides me first scott snyder from council on foreign affairs he's a senior fellow for korean studies and director of the program in u.s korea policy dr patrick cronin the asia pacific

security chair at hudson institute and also uh dr cyan lee a senior research fellow at the seijong institute so i will invite these colleagues first and ask them to talk about their views in the alliance but not confined to the project itself the first patrick scott and sanyon and also we have four distinguished uh discussions from both countries two from the united states and two from south korea first gene lee who is a pulitzer nominated veteran foreign correspondent and expert on north korea she led the associated press news

agencies coverage the korean peninsula as bureau chief from 2008-2013 she became the first american reporter granted extensive access to underground in north korea in 2012 opened ap's pyongyang bureau next mr frank um who is a senior expert north korea at the us institute of peace he oversees the institute's work on north korea and focuses on ways to strengthen diplomacy to reduce tensions and enhance peace and stability in the current peninsula from 2010 to 2017 he worked at the department of defense

including a special counsel to army general counsel special assistant to the secret assistant secretary of defense for asian and pacific security affairs and senior adviser north korea in the office of the secretary of defense from korean side we have dr hyonu kim professor at the department of american studies korea national diplomat academy and institute of foreign affairs and national security his research covers us our care alliance usdprk relations east asian security and last but not least we have dr

chongyo research fellow at the cejung institute he previously worked in the same capacity at the assan institute for policy so today after two rounds of discussions between our colleagues and the discussions we'll try to answer a question from the audience so if you have questions please feel free to deliver to the questions to ai okay let me invite patrick thank you very much and a great delight to be here today and also to be part of this uh study my remarks are more general than the study report

and i'm going to pick up on the biden administration that's coming to power as they right now with the transition team try to think through what is the challenge facing u.s korean relations writ large not just the alliance in terms of a military uh institution and i think they would probably say the first thing is to focus on getting america's house in order getting our own house in order um we're resilient creative country um but we are also capable of succumbing to hubris um of self-delusion and a lack of strategic

empathy and i think we've seen all of these frailties on display with a jacksonian populist as president uh who thought he could persuade kim to do what he wanted he could shake down our allies for profit he could cancel exercises or withdraw our troops without warning that he could conduct international diplomacy by tweets you know the expert said he couldn't and they were not wrong um but having said that uh even without trump on the scene as president um the inevitable drift in the raison debt

of the alliance uh its basic rationale um even if our militaries are indeed acutely focused and working together the reality is that the changes in the world and in our countries over these past few years and decades require a reassessment of the alliance require new investment a recalibration at least i think with closer dialogue with more connectivity between south korea and the united states with more teamwork between our governments are our ends our objectives can be aligned more closely uh without

aggravating long-standing trends over disputes over the means of who's sharing the most burdens so the disagreements over goals and ends of course we need to remain steadfast on focusing on peace on the peninsula and managing north korea but the obama administration is going to have to make a choice do they stay completely steadfast behind north korean denuclearization as the main goal or do they move closer to the implicit south korean position of accommodation and coexistence with an indefinitely nuclear north korea and

i don't think they've made that determination i don't think they have to make it right away this is a process that they'll be putting together a deliberative uh careful uh set of diplomacy but on the other hand um it's not all about north korea because the world has so many challenges and it can't be reduced just to a u.s china rivalry but the reality is that the china relationship looms large for both of us as a long-term complex challenge and it's it's a larger challenge than the kim family regime poses

to the united states certainly to the region and i think to south korea you don't have to sign up for secretary of state mike pompeo's portrayal of the chinese communist party as a marxist londoners monster to take xi jinping at his word about his plans for the great rejuvenation of china by the middle of this century over the next 15 to 30 years china wants to strive to have technological primacy that will give them economic and potentially military primacy and that changes the calculations for our security over

the next one to three decades the china strategy is something many koreans prefer to discuss sato voce quietly and this is less the case with other u.s allies australia japan the united kingdom for instance you don't see the rok u.s alliance as active in calling out the hong kong national security law or crackdown on democracy and nor is the rok u.s alliance moving in sync to prevent china's national champions like huawei from controlling fifth generation telecoms so in the absence of shared threat

assessment or a mission that is truly vital to both of our countries as important as north korea is disagreement over means are so easily inflamed and that's what we've seen uh you know accusations of a free rider problem over collective goods uh the old abandonment entrapment problem of alliances but these means can be managed provided we agree on strategy that matters and uh that their our interests are and values are being considered uh for both of our governments and societies and i think that's what the buy administration

challenge will be now the response in just a minute will be twofold one to have a new philosophy or mindset i think the buy administration brings renewed trust in institutions of a liberal world order mobilizing allies and partners at the same time we're embracing multilateral institutions and trying to strengthen them and conducting policy by expert empirical deliberative processes not by tweets and then i think they in my administration can enlarge the aperture of the alliance uh cooperation on the pandemic and covet

cooperation long term on climate change cooperation on the canons of a liberal world order the standards of democracy having a d10 sum of the democracies the canons of north korea meaning that north korea's nuclear fissile material and irbms icbms while we're negotiating toward a peace accord controls on critical infrastructure like 5g and undersea cables critical technology uh intellectual property and exports and scientific exchanges the command and control of the alliance but also how we adapt to

the regional international order where information and communications are a threat and an opportunity in short with greater self-reflection and correction on part of the united states greater understanding of south korea greater dialogue with south korea a renewed strategy where we actually have strategic empathy and understand north korea understand other challenges we can then take concerted actions across a broad array of issues and i think be a much more effective positive vision for the decade ahead thank you thank you

very much uh that recovers many issues related to the alliance actually the writers uh discussed about north korean issues but not just north korean issues we have to deal with the rising influence of china which is a big issue so as patrick said the common threat assessment and the strategic consensus is very important even though we differ in means and measures and he also gave us very good ideas about new frontier issues from technology climate change and new health problem and also d10 forum so how to connect

the bilateral alliance with the more global kind of dialogue so we have a very comprehensive preview of alliance we have to work on that we can have a better corporate cooperative alliance in the future thank you and next uh scott you please yeah well thank you jay sung it's real pleasure to join you and the other panelists uh for uh this uh discussion uh and of course um the election of uh president as of of um joe biden as president uh marks a shift back to a conventional approach uh in american foreign policy but what

does that mean for the alliance and what does the alliance really need at this time i just want to highlight two main needs that i see before talking about where i think the moon administration and the vite administration are going to have some challenges and the two i think issues that the alliance really needs are one we need to build a forward-looking uh for and they and strong base for our alliance cooperation so much of our rationale uh for um since the korean war has been focused on the challenges of the past uh and um

uh the fact that we stood shoulder shoulder in war but we're 70 years on now and we really need to be able to build a forward-looking rationale for our alliance cooperation that will help to keep us together and then the second theme patrick has already touched on that i think is critical is that the alliance is at a stage where we need to broaden the aperture of the alliance uh and i think that this applies both in the regional context and in a functional context and so what does a transition to a conventional approach

by biden mean for cooperation between the moon administration and the mine administration well i think that actually the removal of president trump actually reveals some as a lightning rod for the alliance actually reveals a number of critical gaps that are going to be magnified in the course of this transition uh and so you know those are going to be i think the main challenges uh that uh are initially going to be faced as both sides try to build a coordination between the two sites and one really

interesting thing about this transition is that i think that it is going to lessen the focus on the traditional alliance management issues between our two capitals on issues like burden sharing uh even though that there are there are other issues like uh exercises um and operational control transition they're going to have to be managed i think that the major focus of attention is going to shift to the regional context and so what we're really talking about there is uh how can the us and south korea

coordinate policies towards neighbors to include north korea but also china and japan and so the first gap that i see between what the biden campaign has said and what the moon administration has been focusing on is kind of a gap between a peace-based approach to north korea and a deterrence-based approach to north korea and i think that it's going to be important for moon and biden to try to incorporate those two in a logical way in order to use deterrence as a basis upon which to try to achieve

peace but that's going to be a real challenge uh and i think that the other factor that is looming that uh everybody is kind of already factored in uh is the possibility that north korea might initiate some kind of provocation um as the early test for both the biden administration and the alliance and i see two camps developing there one is a camp that is really focused on prevention uh of provocation and taking early steps in in order to try to keep north korea from shaking things up but of course it's really under north

korea's control the path that they take and another group that is focusing on how do we capitalize on the provocation in order to achieve our objectives vis-a-vis north korea and that really involves anticipating that the provocation will create an environment in which it's possible to exert greater pressure on north korea in order to get back to the negotiating table but those are issues that are i think going to be front and center on north korea uh a second major issue that i see in the regional context is related to

coordination of policy toward china we know in south korea that there has been a lot of discussion about the implications of rising sino-us competition it's important for that dialogue to be broadened so that americans and south koreans can understand where our shared objectives lie where our differing concerns may lie with regards to china and how we can charge a course for shared action in china-related policy issues and we all know that those china-related policy issues extend from technology to economics to values

to regional security so we need to have a dialogue but not in an environment where we're immediately looking for deliverables but one in which it is possible for us to understand each other and then i think the third contextual issue really is related that the bite administration is likely to emphasize is related to the restoration of trilateral coordination among the u.s japan and south korea i think that we already see awareness in japan and south korea that the biden administration is likely to

return to trilateral coordination i think it's important to note that this was one of the things that anthony blinken the secretary of state designate worked on at the end of the obama administration and in fact trilateral coordination was incorporated as one of the principles underlying the rebalance as uh he was able to establish a regular trilateral dialogue among foreign ministries and then the last thing i would say with regards to broadening the aperture of the alliance is that there is real

promise i think on what has been categorized as the frontier issues uh and this is really related to space endemic uh the possibility of trying to build our technological technological cooperation i think that south korea stands out as a promising partner in terms of application and design functions related to new technologies uh and uh this is an area that we really need to i think uh build on uh as part of a broader uh partnership with south korea thank you very much this is a very good preview of our report he covers

many issues from north korea to frontier issues and especially i think uh trump administration uh as he talks about many alliance manage issues in a very unhealthy way it has an effect of postponing the most impending dialogue between south korea and the united states especially dealing with the regional issues such as china and trilateral cooperation scott focused on those issues and with some updates what's happening in the united states these days thank you very much and then uh sanyon please

well uh thank you um i uh uh mostly agree with the two uh previous uh uh presenter's view about korea u.s alliance and uh i would i would like to address two sets of particular challenges that from south korea's perspective one is the issues related with the alliance management the other set of challenges of course coordinating policy in the region particularly towards china well i would say the current status of the korea-us alliance is generally good and stable but at the same time let's admit

there are some different different priorities and perspectives on specific issues for example current budgeting government in korea the highest priority is placed on improving inter-korean relations and progress in building a peace regime on the peninsula but by contrast washington placed more priority in dealing with china for example so uh in in first sets of challenges in alliance management issues in the uh after the latest uh korea u.s security consultative meeting which was held in october this year

well major south uh south korea's major media addressed three points one is the in the joint statement um the the phrase that uh uh current level of us fk maintained that was dropped out of the statement and some people believe that this may be the signal from the trump administration that united states may be pushing south korea to increase both sharing with the a possible withdrawal of the usfk uh second issue was the defense bonus sharing uh there's obviously some different perspective on this issue

i thought this was a wartime outcome control well other than that there are very little more sensitive issues like a when to resume suspended south korea usa during the military exercise features stopped for negotiating in nuclearization bargaining with north korea and also how to secure a live fire training and ranging needed by the u.s forces in korea and i think that that will be a a little bit a practical issue and policy issue and sooner or later both government can handle issues in appropriate way

and second channel set up challenge coordinating uh policy toward china i think this will be more complicated and tricky and difficult part for uh for the alliance in coming years so uh the two presentation already indicated that uh in the coming years perhaps u.s china strategic competition will be intensified and if that's that scenario uh south korea uh will be increasingly in the position to make some decision on a particular issue that touches both u.s and china relations but we already we all know well what happened when

south korea decided to agree on deploying third and missile system in south korea we all remember how china responded in that decision china and south korea had to suffer from china's retaliation and also i think that kind of situation can happen in the future more frequently like an economic transmitter and u.s is also asking uh i suspect to join for the plus and also uh u.s uh uh demand south korea to make some decisions on uh sanctioning uh uh china china's uh telecom company huawei like that

so uh this will be the kind of assessment challenge that both government mundane government and wider nation also have to frankly discuss the future direction and uh two previous presenters talked about uh what will be the new uh challenges uh in uh biden administration uh launched in washington dc well uh i would say uh for the initial uh reaction from south korean audience for the victory of the biden is quite positive in our latest contribution to young news agency biden mentioned that korean u.s alliance is a broad forged

alliance and also he expressed his question that he would not export south korea by threatening to withdraw u.s troops from south korea i think that's quite kind of an encouraging signal from by the administration and also uh i would say his remarks point out that the susquehanna relationship is a strategic path machine that goes beyond simply a military alliance and uh because of that given that under the bible by the administration uh the possibility of a conflict that you depending on language issues will decrease

compared to the trump era but new set of challenges will also emerge which is that the need for south korea to keep pace with the biden administration's value oriented agenda setting and expect to increase for example as part of the allied response to china he is expecting is he is expected to value alliance value alliance with allies and partners and call for security cooperation among south korea the u.s and japan and also uh probably biden will have a different priority in handling and north korea not only

denuclearization but also uh touches the human right issues so uh even if and also um even if the by the mission take office uh negotiation on uh uh defensive body sharing and joined the defensive party between south korea and the united states and coordination on north korea policy china and china policy uh expected to continue uh to be important agenda between two countries so uh uh it is a time of a time of a big transition in u.s politics and sooner or later south korea will also get in the president's election cycle so i think

this is the kind of a tradition with a huge uncertainty in both washington and so on and uh because i would say reading a more uh uh enhanced enhance the strategic communication between two characters so let me stop you thank you very much sanyon introduced some south koreans view about the future rks alliance so we have alliance management issues but also we have regional security issues as sanyan remarked we have the issue of chinese retaliation which we might want to talk more later and also he talked about

value issues so the change of u.s administration gives us a question uh what kind of value south korea think in terms of our future of regional order so what kind of value south koreans really think and how we can talk those values with by the administration so that's more fundamental question actually that the future administration will pose to south korean government uh okay then uh we'll go to our discussions first jane lee gee first hi thank you so much for giving me the opportunity to read your paper

and to join this discussion i would first like to applaud all of you for taking on the challenge of assessing and mapping out a vision for the future of the rok us alliance during what has been such a tumultuous period so i can only imagine how many twists and turns you've had to take in the writing of this paper during this particular time with the added challenge of the covet pandemic which i think brings a layer of complication as well perhaps as some new opportunities and i would like to hear more about that but also because

the uncertainty over who would be in the white house in 2021 i think has had such an impact on uh thinking about the future alliance so much of the last four years has been a strain on the alliance to a certain degree and so you've certainly had to shift gears and thinking about the future of the alliance with this nail biter of an election uh over the past few months you know i do think my personal feeling is that the alliance has been strained there have been moments where it has been tested over the past several

years but it is a strong and abiding alliance that has its root at its base very common uh objectives and so i have faith i personally have faith in the alliance but i do think that what is so promising in the presentations we've heard today is the shaping of a different type of goal for the alliance going forward and also the acknowledgement of south korea and its rise and its potential as a different type of partner in this alliance so i'm very interested in hearing a bit more about that i have had discussions with all of

you all of you writers over the past year about the rise in u.s china's strategic competition and what concerns the south koreans have in terms of how to manage the strategic competition but also what opportunities it presents i am curious i did have a couple questions for our speakers i wanted to ask our american speakers because we had just heard the news yesterday uh that the biden administration had announced and selected its nominations for our foreign policy and national security team what steps and signals

in the early weeks of the bite administration do you expect or suggest that they will have to project or convey to north korea to prevent or prevent a provocation or create space for engagement and i would say a second question i have is what challenges do we face i know you you are addressing the pandemic and its impact both on the global world order and nationals and international security today but we face the challenge of an increasingly isolated north korea with no indication that they are planning to come out of that isolation

what challenges do we face if north korea continues to stay in that phase of isolation and what how do you think the alliance can work to get past that isolation i'll post those questions and i look forward to your responses thank you very much eugene addressed very very important questions both short-term and long-term uh perspective first what will by administration do in terms of the north korean policy in the early months how can we cope with those challenges and also the u.s channel rivalry actually we had

a lot of discussions because south korea is in a very difficult position to just agree with united states in you know having very hard-line or security-related measures so far so that will be a very good question and also how can we evaluate the current status of the alliance but we have a feeling that is not that all good there are some problems as scott said in approaching north korean problems we have peace-based versus detroit-based approach there is some disagreements as well so we have to manage that

those questions i think it will be very important and we have to deal with that next uh frank gohan please uh thank you so much for the opportunity to participate in this dialogue and comment on the presentations um so i thought they were very comprehensive in their discussions of strategic alliance issues so i don't try to address all the interesting insights that were raised and since i agreed with most of the points discussed let me just make uh three specific observations about alliance coordination

my first point is that the trump administration's approach to the u.s south korea alliance uh while certainly not very strategic and in many cases very damaging to the alliance did provide the kind of shock that may occasionally be necessary to help highlight uh important questions uh within the alliance i think the alliance is sort of like a marriage where sometimes you get to a comfortable level and act out of habit when you should instead be constantly nurturing reassessing and revitalizing it

and one example is u.s troop levels so the two countries should continuously be thinking about our combined defense posture in terms of capabilities and how they can respond to the changing security and threat environment and yet we become very lazy about accepting certain metrics like the number 20 500 as the best measure of capability deterrence and reassurance i've worked on the language of several joint communiques that have come out of the security consultative meetings and i feel like we get

too caught up in certain words like 28 500 or abiding by the northern limit line instead of thinking creatively uh about ways to improve uh the alliance uh even when it comes to the sma the special measures agreement uh the problem was not in reevaluating south korean contributions to host nation support but rather in the manner in which the issue was raised and discussed the second point i wanted to make is that alliance coordination is a two-way street and both seoul and washington will have the burden of

meeting and managing the other side's expectations it seems like a lot of the focus is on south korea needing to do more to fall in line with washington's approach to china uh regional security and other global issues uh and this is true but i think the other side is that the byte administration also needs to think about how it can better support its south korean ally one way is to be more flexible on north korea policy in line with the moon administration's thinking another area uh where the fight

administration can be accommodating is opcon transition this is one of president moon's signature initiatives and the south korean government has continued to increase its defense budget over the last several years to ensure that it enhances its defense capabilities particularly related to meeting the first two conditions of opcon transition when i worked at dod i draft the conditions based opcon transition plan and i always understood that the decision to move forward with opcon transition would ultimately be

a political decision and this is because the third condition that has to be satisfied for opcon transition is arbitrary the third condition states that the two allies have to determine that the security environment is conducive to op-on transition but depending on how you define this a conducive security environment could be in two years or it could be when north korea denuclearizes which maybe never right so ultimately i think the u.s recognizes that obcon transition is an issue where it will need to

uh be more considerate of seoul's preferences and this gets me to my third point which is that uh managing alliance coordination and each country's national interest doesn't have to be threatening or mutually exclusive in fact in many cases alliance coordination is all about resolving and managing interests that aren't well aligned one example is the united nations command so despite all the concerns about the unc being an obstacle to inter-korean cooperation i think ultimately the unc played a helpful role

in the inter-korean comprehensive military agreement there are many other examples where our country's interests had to be accommodated by the other including the revised missile guidelines obcon transition the fad deployment uh south korea's contributions to the afghanistan efforts and south korea's participation in regional efforts so going forward i think it would be helpful for the bite administration to quickly agree to stronger consultation mechanisms like seoul's recent proposal for a state

department ministry of foreign affairs consultative mechanism which would be helpful in managing these types of coordination issues thank you very much this is a very good advice to both administrations how to deal with the short-term impending issues upcoming transfer us issues which is actually a very hot issue in south korea how to deal with these issues with the upcoming biden administration and that's a very good advice from his own very practical experience i guess thank you very much and then i will go to shannon please

you're muted do you hear me yep okay thank you uh i think this was very uh timely writing now because i was during the four years of trump government i was uh very much astray about what the alliance is about right now i mean we transformed the alliance in 2008 to a comprehensive strategic alliance i think uh comprehensible strategic alliance is still valid but still in many issues we were pretty much astray and we needed a lot of talk at this moment so this kind of vision about the alliance is very important at this point

so i think i just want to talk about four big challenges about the alliance right now first challenge i think is uh is the u.s ready uh to manage alliances globally uh compared to the colder period in which u.s gdp was 42 percent now it's only 25 the global public uh you know goods provided by the united states ally was very important to manage the alliance system at the time after the undercoat were there was no enemy no threat as obama came in the china rice and china threat became very serious so i think

now it's time for the united states to manage alliance systems and the allies help is very important for the united states to maintain money in the world but that is very costly um maybe that's why u.s wants to help from allies but i don't know whether allies will be really willingly and easily ready to cooperate with the united states i think that is the biggest challenge for the united states to get along with allies this is pretty much linked to the second challenge i think uh i think uh you you mentioned in your

writing about shared values as an important uh tool uh to manage the global alliances but his values enough during the colder period democracy and human rights values of the united states was very important uh in maintaining alliance systems globally including u.s uh south korea alliance and u.s japan alliances but more important thing i think at the time was the military aid and economic aid to japan and korea and throughout that aid and throughout the aid the alliance system was managed and you know throughout the alliance

system democracy and human rights was delivered to those countries and now this things are much more serious now every many countries in the world has strong economic dependence to china they cannot give up their economic dependence on china so maybe during the colder period the division and choice of allies partners was whether we choose free democracy based upon the united states were choose soviet-based you know social assistance that was very clear choice but now i'm not sure if it's very clear

we have to choose u.s values or do we have to choose chinese money that's not a matter of choice so i think this is a very serious problem maybe maybe biden has a very big homework i mean gathering allies would not be very easy as we think i mean building building back better you know that is a very important uh homework for the united states i mean what kind of measures do we need in addition to values to gather and strengthen the alliance systems our third challenge i think is uh i mean as we we have seen during the trump government

uh talk with kim jong-un uh a lot of uh u.s south korea alliance has been weakened extended in terms of uh u.s south korea alliance has been weakened as a bargaining chip uh for the north korean denuclearization so i think if maybe i think that that would not be happening during dividing government but if there's any chance that uh biden government negotiation with north korea happens i think uh you know that's something that we have to aware of i mean is the top some kind of arms control or mutual disarmament

or is uh the chip or the incentive the u.s can give to north korea vis-a-vis their denuclearization is only something economic incentive or sexual relief incentive i think that's some kind of serious thing we have to think about our fourth challenge i think is of course u.s china issues i think quad class issue is very serious uh i had a meeting with uh you know chinese uh military attache here in korea two days ago and he was very adamant that if south korea joins the quad class there will be another chinese sanctions

on south korea because it's a military and security issues aiming at and targeting it and the pressure in china so i think these are four challenges and three three additional things are what i want to say about um what we need to do i think you first thing is that i mean you didn't i think it would be good if you mentioned about the climate change issues in your writing because uh south korean government now announced a new deal policy which is pretty much you know you know focusing on the reducing carbons

and you know you know climate issue related industries are very important in south korea according to that plan so i think uh climate change issue might be very important linkage between us and south korea about their economic issues and development issues a second one issue is that you may should be here that we need a senior level hall of government dialogue one thing i can think about is that two plus committee we had a two-plus meeting from 2010 to 2016 but we did not have it uh 2018 and this year we didn't have two

plus meeting so that kind of meeting is something we need because we have we have a lot of things to talk strategically and also we need a lot of talk about what is our common thread perceptions and common visions of alliance and last one i think you mentioned it here in the writing that uh both countries need collective response system to cope with chinese retaliation yes this is something we need to talk seriously we need some measures to uh to cope with chinese economic sanctions on south korea

we need some kind of measures of u.s assurance to be given to south korea when china sanctions software thank you thank you very much he addresses many questions and with some south korean views our report is really bipartisan view uh this will not represent any uh to government's view but china works more directly for south korean government so i think he has really answers in his mind even though he asked us very difficult questions thank you very much and then please thank you very much and thank you for

having me for this uh valuable meeting between two allies i i hope that my daughter is not waking up and asking me why are you talking to your computer in the middle of the night but uh let me ask you the first rough questions with regard to your paper and the presentation today so my question to your paper is what is the scope of the alliance that you are thinking of when you are suggesting and proposing uh all those like recommendations uh to forge the alliance it is because that as patrick mentioned that i i'm not sure

whether the current currently two governments are sharing their threat the same threat perception i think that defines the scope of the alliance whether we want to go beyond the korean peninsula or whether we want to keep the alliance just on the korean peninsula i think that will determine that what kind of like burden sharing or outcomes or other pending issues uh to be uh the scope of all those issues so uh dr e sanchez mentioned that south korea and the united states has like different priorities which is that south korea

focuses on north korean issue whereas u.s want to discuss the china issues i think that's directly related to the scope of the alliance uh we don't want like some south koreans do not want the alliance to be the mechanism to deal with the china issues they want to keep the alliance only for the defense of the south korea in the case of north korean aggression so if there is no aggression from the north korea the benefit or value of alliance from the u.s interview if we take the china factory into the account

and if the alliance is the mechanism to deal with the china issue in the region then the the value of alliance is go up if two allies will agree but if to allies will not agree on that scope of the alliance there is going to be a problem between two alliance so i think that the the first part of your paper is like uh arguing based on the premise that alliance should go beyond the the korean peninsula that is why like scott mentioned like frontier issues and like patrick mentioned that i shared that perception

but in reality i think there is still a strong possibility possibility that two countries will not agree on the scope of the alliance so uh at this first round that i want authors to address uh how we are going to solve this problem thank you thank you very much that was also a very important question uh when we first think of the scope of the alliance uh well south korean authors i think with sanyan that north korea problem is a problem on the korean peninsula but it needs international cooperation uh

from the united states and china so it is a korean financial related problem but also it's an international problem so if we cannot deal with a chinese position uh with cooperation with the united states then it will be also very hard to solve uh the issue of breast declaration if we focus on north korean nuclear issues only from the perspective of north korea united states relations or integrating relations then there is less possibility to solve the problem but still uh the scope is important and

also as frank uh talks you know the usfk is not just about numbers uh of the troops it's also about the function of usfk with the changing security environments for example u.s is pursuing so-called multi-domain operation from 2018 and the reports manual reports say that the role of usfk should be transformed to some degree to deal with the chinese military threat so even though we think that usfk is just for deter or defense north korea's military threat but we have to think in broader terms anyway

because usa is changing the military strategy in the u.s china rivalry so uh there is a scope issue uh so and also there is skepticism i know that uh to object to this kind of transformation so this is also a very important sure so let me turn to our presenters our writers first there are many uh questions probably from south korean side to the new uh by the administration's policy for north korea and china and alliance so uh patrick or scott you want to start first scott so much was raised these are very good

uh comments uh and um i don't necessarily want to answer all of them but i maybe i'll just respond a little bit to jane and then also our korean colleagues with regards to um how do we anticipate north korea's uh response to the biden administration you know what's the best approach and then also issues related to the vision for the alliance so my feeling is that what the bite administration should be trying to do is to um continue to send the signal that the door is open for dialogue and seek private ways to sustain crisis

communication with kim jong-un previously that has come in the trump administration in the form of love letters i think that uh by administration should attempt to sustain a private communication channel uh with north korea to the extent possible but you know the real challenge that gene is pointing to is what if north korea doesn't come out of its shell and how can we make north korea come out of its shell are we going to use pressure are we going to use confidence building measures is it going to be a combination

and then what would north korea you know what would make north korea come out of his shell i personally think that it is going to be some kind of evidence of acceptance of north korea as a nuclear state but i actually think that that is something that the biden administration is not yet going to be prepared to do and i don't know exactly what that is going to look like in terms of consultations between vitamin and then my second point in response to the korean commentators very interesting that both of them

essentially raised the issue of um whether or not the joint vision for the alliance and shared threat perception coheres and this is really interesting because i believe that the biden administration people are going to come in holding to the vision for the worlds that was left off in the obama administration including the idea that there is an agreed upon joint vision for the alliance but that joint vision for the alliance was built with conservative administrations in south korea and the moon administration has not

yet uh explicitly publicly signed on to that joint vision but i think that the trump discontinuity actually also can in some ways is helpful for the us in transitioning to a new form of alliance relationship in the sense that um it really i think that in the new world that the byte administration is going to face partnership is going to be critical and the question is really going to be both can the us accept greater representation in alliance dialogue and can south korea provide greater representation

in that kind of alliance dialogue uh and so that's what i think is really going to be interesting the world that uh obama left is different from the one that biden inherits and that actually means that uh how uh the bidet administration is able to adjust to the new challenges uh posed by this new world is going to be a critical factor as we look at those issues thank you uh patrick to have here yeah let me just pick up on a few of those points um on north korea certainly during the transition uh and right in the early months of

obama administration there needs to be continued deterrence measures to keep provocations hopefully at bay but if they do occur try to contain their damage to make sure they're limited in scope not overreact and finally as scott had suggested initially in his comments today um that we together in the alliance try to pivot from that perceived tension if not crisis toward the diplomatic roadmap that we'd like to pursue including getting north korea back to the table on terms that could be productive

and sustainable um i think one thing that will limit president biden will be obviously the polarization that will continue in u.s politics including the senate even if it turns out that the democrats are in charge of the senate if they win two at-large seats that are up for an election in january it will be by the narrowest of margins where the vice president would uh have to be the swing vote and there's all likelihood they won't actually gain control which means that the buy administration not only get

senior officials confirmed but that's why people like tony blinken will get confirmed but some officials might not get confirmed the by administration is going to have to sell whatever they do if they want money or law to some republicans they're going to need bipartisan support so there's always going to be that limitation to try to get the united states government to move to acceptance of a north korean as a nuclear weapon state is not going to happen in the next four years de facto well we all exist with this in fact so

there's a there's a gap between the reality and the perception but politically you could not confront uh the politics of america and get something sold there so we're going to be careful how far we can go on north korea policy um on the alliance policy my argument here is that we do need to broaden uh this relationship uh beyond the north korea issue we have challenges and we have opportunities and together we can do so much more together in a knowledge society alliance that we have i've suggested we can go from you know

the east and west sea focus to the seven seas the seven seas of cove climate the cannons of liberal order the cannons of north korea controls of the institutions like trade and infrastructure um to command to communication so we have a much broader agenda that we should be pursuing finally on china a very important issue on the economic dependency and reliance that we all economies have with china i would submit that the buy administration gets this that's why joe nye has talked about we have to manage this as a cooperative

rivalry between us and china that's why richard danzig has said this is a relationship the u.s china relationship is too big to fail that's why jake sullivan the incoming national security adviser has written with kurt campbell that we have to have competition with china without catastrophe so it's a founded competition the buy administration fully gets that that's the good news but south korea has to understand that it is not just your gains from trade with china it is about the rules that china imposes

it is about the economic penalties that china imposes unilaterally as they're doing on australia and as they did on australia at the very time that china was signing up to the regional uh trade agreement the regional comprehensive and economic uh partnership um and also it's about over reliance on china as we see with medical gear or as we see with 5g communications all of those are areas that don't say we shouldn't be trading with china but together we should be thinking about the rules and the responses and our over

dependency on it and work strategically and i think there there's a lot of scope for cooperation thank you thank you very much uh uh yes uh let me respond to a chinese execution first what is the scope of the alliance um well uh you you critically mentioned most korean people may prefer the alliance focus solely on queen peninsula issue but in the past administration or administration of south korea we already have had some a good idea about the alliance scope for example during the union administration the so-called 21st

century strategic alliance concept but this uh concept suggests that a good uh strategic alliance may a focus on not only korean political issues but also regional and global issues i think already a korean u.s alliance has has grown beyond the korean peninsula scope so uh in my percentage i mentioned that as korea u.s alliance even though it started as the military alliance that was solely focused on the korean peninsula and you know we had that korea u.s bilateral relationship includes uh uh has grown up to a very

comprehensive level it is not just a military partners but it also includes social cultural economic collaboration so in that sense uh i would say that if we treat korea u.s alliance solely for the uh korean peninsula for the purpose korean peninsula level i think it just unnecessarily devalue the alliance and the potential of this alliance so i'm not sure how uh biden administration and south korean government will uh discuss the scope issue in of the alliance but i i have always argued that korea u.s

alliance should focus on not only a financial level but also regional and global issue i think that's the good way forward and uh uh regarding uh by the administration's north korean policy uh my understanding is that uh before the hanoi up to the hanoi summit north korea also had some positive expectations about the outcome but since the collapse of the harmony summit and north korea completely uh disappointed and he kim jong-un decided that he will not easily come to the dialogue with the united states so one of my

recommendations for the biden of the ministry instead why don't biden pick up the point where hanoi summit and some of the mutual understanding that both government will continue the legacy of the singapore and hanoi dialogue of course there's not much things to uh in actually in there just stay true summit but nevertheless the spirit uh by the administration should pick up the spirit of that dialogue and try to induce north korea uh into uh further uh negotiation so let me study thank you uh probably

you have to include that in the report your last point uh okay uh why don't i turn to our discussions for the second round it could it can be short but uh you might have some comments or helpful uh input to our report or your own thoughts about the future of the alliance anything so let me start with the gene please so i'm not sure how much more we want to build on i feel like we've given so many comments but i just wanted to focus a bit more on the very intriguing statement in the paper that the uh

rok u.s alliance should aspire not just to deliver peace and security on the korean peninsula but also to help usher in tomorrow's liberal world order i think this uh this objective gives the alliance an expanded purpose which we've referenced one that not only restores order but also broadens the alliance's utility past and beyond the korean peninsula yeah i think this takes into account south korea's leadership potential beyond northeast asia and on the global stage and i want to i do like this acknowledgement

that capitalizing on south korea's growth and potential has to be part of a future vision of the alliance and i like that there were certain areas for potential cooperation i think there were three that were mentioned that i that i picked up on health the environment and technology i would certainly like uh to see those points developed because i think that we have to acknowledge that the us has so much to learn from how south korea as a fellow democracy has managed to flatten the curb when it comes to the pandemic and i also see

south korea as having the potential to play a role and serve as an inspiration for other developing countries not just in southeast asia which is that region that the administration has focused on with its new southern policy but in other areas as well and that that by harnessing the example that south korea can present uh the united states and the south koreans that the alliance could be mutually beneficial in different ways that we would not have anticipated in 1953. so i think this uh in the geopolitical sense the potential

for south creative play uh that middle power role uh is something that i would like to see developed further in the paper but i think overall i as i said earlier i think that it's very clear with the paper the challenge was that there's been so much uh tumultuous activity over the past year making it very hard to chart uh the future vision but i think as you as things settle in over the next couple months i hope that you'll be able to clarify and really present some of those potential opportunities

particularly when it comes to health some of these issues that go beyond security including health technology where south korea has also been at the forefront and has so much potential and geopolitics in serving as a a role model to other countries looking to navigate us china's strategic competition thank you very much i think gene actually captured the main points of the report and there are some something that south korean writers try to emphasize there's underlying themes such as the liberal international order i personally

think that that order that term is very important and significant for south korea even though there are many debates about the real meaning of liberal international order but i think south korea has developed under that framework the u.s led liberal international order and now it's the time that south korea as a middle power tried to be a proponent of that order uh with the united states or with other countries as well as a leading south korea can have a leading role in some areas i think our democracy has some

potential as a foreign policy asset as uh witnessed in the copy 19 situation so there are something that we want to emphasize uh in the report thank you very much uh frank um please so i want to go back to the issue that gene and scott uh discussed about how we respond to north korea early on um i think there's a couple constraining factors one is the the workers party congress uh in january next year that you know may harden north korea's hardline views as well as the divided administration's own need to conduct a

north korean policy review that may extend well into the summer uh and prevent early action um i like how scott uh characterized the two camps on on a north korea provocative action one being a prevention camp and the other being uh focused on capitalizing on the provocation to enhance our objectives um i see myself more in the prevention camp i don't understand a mentality that looks at a north korean provocation as a fair completely looking at it passively and then cynically tries to capitalize on it to

enhance our objectives i feel like um you know we should be moving aggressively to uh indicate to north korea our willingness to engage uh there's ways to signal unilateral conciliatory measures like um and this is something that raised which is uh reaffirming the principles of the singapore statement um it's hard it's hard it's hard to see the dubai administration why in the stomach uh maintaining any remnants of a trump policy but we have to remember the singapore statement is uh these principles are something that

north korea has not rejected yet north korea has rejected previous agreements agreed framer the sixth party statement all that they still uh at least at the moment hold to the singapore statement um it's you know something that maybe we can uh credit to the republican administration as an achievement um so i feel like you know there's a way to maintain deterrence maintain our security and still use that as a base to take risks not for aggression but risks for peace and that's something that i feel like

the bite administration should consider yep thank you very much that's a very good advice please do you have anything to ask um i don't know if you can add this one up but i think uh uh yes you in the writing the authors mentioned the us competition as a strategic competition i think biden's guidance concept of the u.s china strategic competition would be different from trump uh ideological or systemic company and based upon that i think biden will try to look at china not as a threat but more as a competitor

i think that if that's the case i think uh south korean u.s can talk about china issues um from south korean uh government south korean perspective china is not threat but china is definitely a concern for south korea at the same time time we are good partners but i think china is a big concern to south korea maybe in the future it would be a potentially become a threat but i think abiding governments us and south korea i think can definitely talk about china issues uh you know i agree with patrick that

definitely south korea is worrying about our uh you know dependence economic dependence on china that's why we i think that now the south korean public opinion is very much anti-china government view on china is definitely different from public view on china so i think uh definitely we have to be aware of you know you know making china a completely a threat from south korean perspective that's not easy we want to uh be wary of china's rights because we do nothing about china we don't know no measures based upon u.s

south south korea alliances and china rises definitely the chinese influence of south korea and the korean principle will be bigger and bigger so long term it is definitely a concern for south korea so i think definitely we have to talk about china issues between us and south korea but at the same time uh you know short-term policy of south korea vis-a-vis china is that uh you know ganging up on any specific security of military related uh alliances or uh you know quad class or multilateral you know networks uh

you know that is a you know related to the military aspect of vijaya china that's something i don't think south korea do anything about um and i think uh it would be better this is just to my thinking uh you know you have written here in your writing about the you know possible collecting response measures fiji china i think this is something we have to develop more and more thank you uh my question uh is like uh if you decides to lead the allies again then the question is how the united states is going to lead

so once all the countries agree on the cause of the alliance of like like-minded countries to deal with china then the question is how usa is going to lead the liars the question is uh the thing is that the level of involvement of various allies and partners with the united states uh we will be different for example like south korea is not like japan or australia in terms of joining the united states in its policy toward china so if u.s is going to rely on like caution or like sanction uh to put all the allies and partners to

be on board with the united states there's going to be some like reservations from the allies and partners and china is probably going to use all the tools that they can use to drive a wedge between the allies and the united states like economic coercion that doctor is mentioned in the third incident uh a couple years ago so i think what kind of tools that the u.s can use under biden administration to make the allies and partners affairs safe in following the u.s lead without china so one of the like kind of

like fear or concern that many countries including south korea has is that what if we are following the u.s lead and cutting the relations with china and reducing the level of involvement with china but if u.s turns its course towards china then u.s can rebuild its relations with china but what about the other countries like south korea so i think uh it is very important for biden administration to reassure that what kind of tools that they can use in leading the allies and partners in terms of dealing with

china so i i think whether there's that kind of discussions in washington thank you thank you very much uh we're almost uh up in terms of time uh let me raise a couple of points myself uh i think the question about u.s capability as a global leader is very important one because we are entering into the period of i think the period of hegemonic impossibility because no one country even though it's very strong cannot provide sufficient collective goods to the international needs as we witnessed in the profit 19 crisis

so the game is whether any strong country can effectively mobilize its allies or partners to lead the global original order and i think u.s is in much much uh favorable position because uh u.s represents the universal norms so far but the question is what's the ultimate goal of u.s china policy so i personally for a past couple of days read tony blinken's uh remarks and he said that he wants to engage with china but from a position of strength so i guess he still has the idea of engaging with china meaning that

structurally changing chinese thinking and behavior and try to include china in the liberal global order so as long as we have a hope of including china in that order i think u.s can lead and mobilize the allies even though allies and partners are very much dependent upon china in terms of economy uh or for china for south korea in terms of having a peace regime on the korean peninsula so we will watch we don't have any details so far about the u.s china policy but we'll see the second point in the report as well we try to have a

more detailed program to deal with chinese any influence especially the coercive means so we try to write down some the need to collectively respond to chinese course of economic means because we already experienced that kind of retaliation as hanging said but we have many uh things to do first we have to define what is the retaliation is it a regular economic uh transaction or is a is it is a secret secretized very much politicized economic transaction so we need to have a common definition of economic

retaliation then how can we collectively cope with that one so yesterday probably uh the secretary pompeo talked about collective response to chinese economic retaliation uh which is relevant to chinese reaction to australian uh these days you know uh reactions so we have to develop the idea in a very normative way so that china should conform to that idea so we have to be very detailed program so far we talked about very abstract or strategic issue how can have a consensus in a broad sense in dealing with china

okay we have only five or more minutes i picked up three questions and specifically two questions are directed to scott uh well first question is you mentioned about the revival of trilateral arrangements so what is your expectation about south korea's role in pursuing this trilateral arrangement second one also to scott these days in south korea we talk about perry process uh a little bit so will there be any chance that by the administration will revive or in a change of form the pay process in the future

now another question i think to patrick is that it's not a difficult one but we'll buy the administration tip club mechanism of regional security cooperation then how should a software respond to that kind of idea so there is some argument in south korea that collective security system is very much optimal for south koreans options so if you have any comments please can we start with scott yes um so i think the expectation i don't think that trilateralism needs to be controversial because i think there's

been an institutional preference within south korea to participate and so the expectation is really that south korea participate in trilateral coordination activities with regard to the peri process you know that was over 20 years ago now uh and the main bumper sticker from the perry process was that we need to accept north korea as it is apply that to today it means accepting north korea as an entrenched nuclear dictatorship and i'm not sure that that is going to be the baseline for a biden policy um just one

final comment i mean what the korea what i hear from our korean discussion colleagues uh is uh really the big question of how does the biden administration intend to build alliances back better and i think that is a critical question and i think that it's going to be it's going to involve a set of expectations for alliance um partners as partners but i think that it is also going to have to involve listening and it's going to have to be i'll also involve a more equivalent distribution uh of responsibility uh along with

contribution and we'll have to see how it goes uh it is a big challenge it is different from what existed in the past and i think the future of american leadership globally will depend on how alliances respond to that call thank you very much as the biden administration seeks to build back better the rust belt of the united states which was most centrally the target of that slogan during the campaign um the buy administration is going to be interested in building back the global order the liberal world order

and that includes strengthening the alliance as scott just suggested that's why the quadrilateral security dialogue with india australia japan and the united states as important as that is it won't be jettison but it's no longer essentially important to the foreign policy of the united states from 2021 on because they'll be looking to build back other institutions starting with alliances starting with new new uh institutions perhaps like this democratic 10 idea of 10 democracies helping to strengthen

those institutions or helping to write the data age digital age trade rules for the world trade organization so those are the kinds of institutions and by the way with china and just going back to one of the other questions about how to abide in competition with china will differ it's largely because it's embracing multilateral institutions uh it's seeking to revitalize the strategic dialogue with china which atrophy uh it's also seeking areas of cooperation so think of john kerry and climate change

reaching out on china those all will differentiate and differentiate by the way is the word by the way that eli ratner who's on the transition team at the defense department right now likes to use about biden administration china policy that is it's going to pick and choose its battles it's going to narrow down the problem set and then figure out the best way forward with strong allies that's the tony blinken from a position of strength building back the institutions that are inclusive and that we'd like to see the rules

enforced on all so thank you thank you very much i think we have to close the session this was a very timely and very helpful session i think uh we have a better idea about the future of the alliance and the next u.s administration also i look forward to having our reports published next month soon so please expect that thank you very much uh have a good day have a good night thank you thank you thank you bye-bye